Academic literature on the topic 'Aiding and abetting suicide'

This thesis is concerned with the ways in which international law regulates state and individual complicity. Complicity is a derivative form of responsibility that links an accomplice to wrongdoing by a principal actor. Whenever complicity is prohibited, certain questions arise about the scope and structure of the complicity rule. To answer these questions, this thesis proposes an analytical framework in which complicity rules may be assessed, and defends a normative claim as to their optimal structure. This framework and normative claim anchor the thesis’ analysis of complicity in international law. The thesis shows that international criminal law regulates individual complicity in a comprehensive way, using the doctrines of instigation and aiding and abetting to inculpate complicit participants in international crimes. These doctrines are marked by the breadth of the complicit conduct prohibited, a standard of knowledge in the fault required of the accomplice, and an underused nexus requirement between the accomplice’s acts and the principal’s wrong. In contrast, international law’s regulation of state complicity was historically marked by an absence of complicity rules. In respect of state complicity in the wrongdoing of another state, international law now imposes both specific and general complicity obligations, the latter prohibiting states from aiding or assisting another state in the commission of any internationally wrongful act. In respect of the ways that states participate in harms caused by non-state actors, the traditional normative structure of international law, which imposed obligations only on states, foreclosed the possibility of regulating the state’s participation as a form of complicity. As that traditional normative structure has evolved, so the possibility of holding states responsible for complicity in the wrongdoing of non-state actors has emerged. More and more, both the wrongs that international actors commit, and the wrongs they help or encourage others to commit, matter.

Fers de lance de la démocratisation de la parole en ligne, les réseaux sociaux ont incontestablement bouleversé notre paysage informationnel en offrant à chacun la faculté de s’exprimer et de nouer des contacts avec d’autres personnes. Porteuses d’espoirs, ces plateformes ont également contribué à l’apparition de nouvelles formes d’atteinte qui ne pouvaient laisser indifférent le droit pénal. « Raids numériques », discours de haine, délinquance sexuelle, tromperies ou atteintes à la personnalité, voilà autant d’agissements illicites qui trouvent à être amplifiés par le canal des réseaux sociaux et qui justifient, in fine, de recourir au droit pénal. La thèse explore alors les rapports entretenus entre cette branche punitive du droit et les réseaux sociaux, et plus exactement, mesure l’incidence de ces services en ligne sur les conditions et la mise en œuvre de la responsabilité pénale. Loin de bouleverser la responsabilité pénale de fond en comble, les réseaux sociaux incitent plutôt, en raison de leurs particularités, à un renouvellement de ce mécanisme répressif. D’une part, ce sont les contours des infractions qui doivent être rénovés afin d’épouser les dimensions interactive et intrusive des réseaux sociaux ; partant, de nombreuses infractions doivent être confrontées à ces supports communicationnels inédits, tels que les délits de presse, les infractions sexuelles, les atteintes au consentement, ou encore les atteintes à la vie privée ou à l’identité. D’autre part, le fonctionnement spécifique de ces services en ligne plaide pour un renouvellement des règles liées à la répression lato sensu. Du côté des utilisateurs de réseaux sociaux, leur régime répressif mérite d’être aménagé afin de tenir compte de l’objet interactif de ces supports, nécessitant dès lors de réajuster les normes d’imputation et de sanction des infractions. Du côté des gestionnaires de ces plateformes, la prise de conscience sur leur rôle actif dans la circulation des contenus sur leur espace invite au contraire à approfondir leur régime répressif, et ce pour les contraindre à anticiper la survenance de risques infractionnels<br>Spearheading the democratization of online speech, social networks have undoubtedly revolutionized our informational landscape by offering everyone the opportunity to express themselves and connect with others. Bearers of hope, these platforms have also contributed to the emergence of new forms of infringement that criminal law could not ignore. Digital raids, hate speech, sexual offences, deceit and offences to the personality, are some of the unlawful acts that are amplified by social networks, and that ultimately justify resorting to criminal law. The thesis delves into the relationship between this punitive branch of the law and social networks, and, more precisely, measures the impact of these online services on the conditions of criminal liability. Far from turning criminal liability upside down, the features of social networks spur a renewal of this repressive mechanism. On the one hand, the contours of the offences need to be renewed in order to embrace the interactive and intrusive dimensions of social networks. As a result, many offenses have to be confronted with these new communication media, such as press offences, sexual offenses, offenses against consent or offenses against privacy or identity. On the other hand, the specific functioning of these online services calls for a renewal of the rules relating to the repression lato sensu. Regarding social networks users, their repressive regime needs to be adapted to take the interactive nature of these media into account. Thus, the rules of attribution and punishment of the offenses have to be adjusted. Regarding platform managers, the growing awareness of their active role in the circulation of contents calls for a deepening of their repressive regime, in order to force them to anticipate the occurrence of offenses risks

Qu’elle soit extranationale, transnationale ou internationale par nature, l’infraction internationale est toujours construite de la même manière : elle naît de la réunion d’un élément matériel et d’un élément moral, incluant parfois un élément contextuel. Cette constance structurelle dominant la diversité définitionnelle milite en faveur d’une unification des formes de la participation associées à ces infractions internationales : la spécificité de la participation à l’infraction internationale résiderait donc dans la spécificité, non des formes de la première, mais de la définition de la seconde. D’ailleurs, il n’existe que deux grands systèmes de participation applicables à l’infraction internationale : celui des juridictions pénales nationales et celui des juridictions pénales internationales. De leur comparaison, pourrait naître un système unique de participation à l’infraction internationale, permettant de mieux appréhender la criminalité collective en attribuant aux participants intellectuels une place plus juste au sein de la participation. En effet, après quelques adaptations nécessaires, il pourrait être fait appel au critère mixte du contrôle sur l’infraction internationale, développé récemment par la Cour pénale internationale, pour distinguer les formes principales des formes secondaires de la participation à l’infraction internationale. Ainsi, seraient des participants principaux les agents qui, avec l’état d’esprit idoine, prennent le contrôle de l’infraction internationale (coauteurs et auteurs intellectuels), tandis que seraient des participants secondaires les agents qui ne prennent pas un tel contrôle (complices par aide ou assistance et subordonnants)<br>Can it be extranational, transnational or international by nature, the international crime is always the same : it needs the reunion of a material element and a moral element, sometimes including a contextual element. This structural constancy, which dominates the definitional diversity, inclines us to campaign for the unification of the participation forms associated to the whole international crimes. In other words, the specifity of the participation in the international crime would be less due to the specifity of the first one’s forms than to the specifity of the second one’s definition. Now, there are only two grand systems of participation in the international crime : the one applied by the national criminal jurisdictions and the one applied by the international criminal jurisdictions. From the comparison of these two systems, it is possible to imagine a unique system of participation in the international crime, permitting a better understanding of the collective criminality by attributing a righter role to the intellectual participants within the participation. More precisely, and after a few necessary adaptations, control over the international crime, which is a mixed criterion recently developed by the International Criminal Court, could be used to distinguish the main forms from the secondary forms of participation in the international crime. Thus, main participants might be those who, with the suitable state of mind, take control over the international crime (co-perpetrators and intellectual perpetrators) while secondary participants might be those who don’t take such a control (accomplices by aid and assistance and “subordinators”)

Qu’elle soit extranationale, transnationale ou internationale par nature, l’infraction internationale est toujours construite de la même manière : elle naît de la réunion d’un élément matériel et d’un élément moral, incluant parfois un élément contextuel. Cette constance structurelle dominant la diversité définitionnelle milite en faveur d’une unification des formes de la participation associées à ces infractions internationales : la spécificité de la participation à l’infraction internationale résiderait donc dans la spécificité, non des formes de la première, mais de la définition de la seconde. D’ailleurs, il n’existe que deux grands systèmes de participation applicables à l’infraction internationale : celui des juridictions pénales nationales et celui des juridictions pénales internationales. De leur comparaison, pourrait naître un système unique de participation à l’infraction internationale, permettant de mieux appréhender la criminalité collective en attribuant aux participants intellectuels une place plus juste au sein de la participation. En effet, après quelques adaptations nécessaires, il pourrait être fait appel au critère mixte du contrôle sur l’infraction internationale, développé récemment par la Cour pénale internationale, pour distinguer les formes principales des formes secondaires de la participation à l’infraction internationale. Ainsi, seraient des participants principaux les agents qui, avec l’état d’esprit idoine, prennent le contrôle de l’infraction internationale (coauteurs et auteurs intellectuels), tandis que seraient des participants secondaires les agents qui ne prennent pas un tel contrôle (complices par aide ou assistance et subordonnants)<br>Can it be extranational, transnational or international by nature, the international crime is always the same : it needs the reunion of a material element and a moral element, sometimes including a contextual element. This structural constancy, which dominates the definitional diversity, inclines us to campaign for the unification of the participation forms associated to the whole international crimes. In other words, the specifity of the participation in the international crime would be less due to the specifity of the first one’s forms than to the specifity of the second one’s definition. Now, there are only two grand systems of participation in the international crime : the one applied by the national criminal jurisdictions and the one applied by the international criminal jurisdictions. From the comparison of these two systems, it is possible to imagine a unique system of participation in the international crime, permitting a better understanding of the collective criminality by attributing a righter role to the intellectual participants within the participation. More precisely, and after a few necessary adaptations, control over the international crime, which is a mixed criterion recently developed by the International Criminal Court, could be used to distinguish the main forms from the secondary forms of participation in the international crime. Thus, main participants might be those who, with the suitable state of mind, take control over the international crime (co-perpetrators and intellectual perpetrators) while secondary participants might be those who don’t take such a control (accomplices by aid and assistance and “subordinators”)

Le coauteur est traditionnellement défini en droit pénal comme l’individu qui, agissant avec un autre, réunit sur sa tête l’ensemble des éléments constitutifs de l’infraction. Pourtant, il est permis de douter de la pertinence de cette affirmation tant la jurisprudence comme la doctrine en dévoient le sens.En réalité, loin d’être cantonnée à une simple juxtaposition d’actions, la coaction doit être appréhendée comme un mode à part entière de participation à l’infraction. En effet, elle apparaît comme un titre d’imputation à mi-chemin entre l’action et la complicité, auxquelles elle emprunte certains caractères. Autrement dit, elle se révèle être un mode de participation à sa propre infraction. Surtout, son particularisme est assuré par l’interdépendance unissant les coauteurs : parce que chacun s’associe à son alter ego, tous sont placés sur un pied d’égalité. Ces différents éléments, qui se retrouvent dans sa notion et dans son régime, permettent ainsi d’affirmer la spécificité de la coaction tout en renforçant la cohérence entre les différents modes de participation criminelle<br>In criminal law, the co-perpetrator is classically presented as an individual who, acting jointly with another, gathers all the constitutive elements of the offence. However, one may harbor doubts concerning the relevance of this assertion since both case law and legal scholars denature its meaning.Actually, far from being limited to a mere juxtaposition of perpetrations, co-perpetration must be understood as a full mode of participation in the offence. Indeed, it appears as a form of imputation halfway between perpetration and complicity, from which it borrows some characteristics. In other words, it proves to be a mode of participation in one’s own offence. Above all, its particularism is provided by the interdependence between the co-perpetrators : because each of them joins forces with his alter ego, all are placed on an equal footing. These elements, which are found both in it’s concept and in it’s regime, demonstrate thereby the specificity of co-perpetration while strengthening the coherence of the different modes of criminal participation

Le coauteur est traditionnellement défini en droit pénal comme l’individu qui, agissant avec un autre, réunit sur sa tête l’ensemble des éléments constitutifs de l’infraction. Pourtant, il est permis de douter de la pertinence de cette affirmation tant la jurisprudence comme la doctrine en dévoient le sens.En réalité, loin d’être cantonnée à une simple juxtaposition d’actions, la coaction doit être appréhendée comme un mode à part entière de participation à l’infraction. En effet, elle apparaît comme un titre d’imputation à mi-chemin entre l’action et la complicité, auxquelles elle emprunte certains caractères. Autrement dit, elle se révèle être un mode de participation à sa propre infraction. Surtout, son particularisme est assuré par l’interdépendance unissant les coauteurs : parce que chacun s’associe à son alter ego, tous sont placés sur un pied d’égalité. Ces différents éléments, qui se retrouvent dans sa notion et dans son régime, permettent ainsi d’affirmer la spécificité de la coaction tout en renforçant la cohérence entre les différents modes de participation criminelle<br>In criminal law, the co-perpetrator is classically presented as an individual who, acting jointly with another, gathers all the constitutive elements of the offence. However, one may harbor doubts concerning the relevance of this assertion since both case law and legal scholars denature its meaning.Actually, far from being limited to a mere juxtaposition of perpetrations, co-perpetration must be understood as a full mode of participation in the offence. Indeed, it appears as a form of imputation halfway between perpetration and complicity, from which it borrows some characteristics. In other words, it proves to be a mode of participation in one’s own offence. Above all, its particularism is provided by the interdependence between the co-perpetrators : because each of them joins forces with his alter ego, all are placed on an equal footing. These elements, which are found both in it’s concept and in it’s regime, demonstrate thereby the specificity of co-perpetration while strengthening the coherence of the different modes of criminal participation

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Law, 2015.<br>At present, international law has not succeeded in establishing a way through which multinational corporations (MNCs) can be regulated effectively and compelled to adhere to international human rights standards. This poses a problem for states that rely heavily on the investment of MNCs for economic development. African states in particular compete for investment by reducing their regulatory mechanisms in order to attract MNCs. This allows MNCs to engage in practices that violate human rights and contribute to the commission of international crimes. This thesis seeks to address this problem by exploring how MNCs can be held criminally liable in international law if they are involved in serious human rights abuses and international crimes. In the twentieth century, two seminal events in international criminal justice illustrate that there was evidence that the notion of holding multinational corporations criminally liable was possible. These include i) the jurisprudence of the Allied Tribunals at Nuremberg after World War II which contemplated the possibility of corporate criminal liability and ii) the negotiations during the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the 1990s which considered proposals for the extension of criminal liability to corporations. At the national level, many states provide for corporate criminal liability. This is often derived from the establishment of criminal liability of an official of the corporation. The United Kingdom and Australia, however, have successfully set out how a corporation may itself be found criminally liable without the need to derive its criminal liability from an official. These developments show that the idea of holding MNCs criminally liable, either through a derivative or non-derivative process, is possible and achievable. In particular, this thesis proposes that MNCs can be found criminally liable for aiding and abetting international crimes under Article 25(3)(c) of the Statute of the ICC. In proposing a way through which this can be achieved, this thesis does two things: i) it extracts principles of non-derivative criminal liability established in the United Kingdom and Australia and ii) it develops a theory of corporate criminal liability for aiding and abetting international crimes that incorporates these principles. This theory underpins the proposed new approach to the establishment of corporate criminal liability for aiding and abetting in the ICC.