To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Contract production.
Journal articles on the topic 'Contract production'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Contract production.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Taherifard, Ali, Fazel Moridi Farimani, and Zarir Negin-Taji. "The Efficiency of Upstream Petroleum Contracts: Risk Service Contract in Focus." International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 15, no. 4 (2025): 367–77. https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.18363.
Full textAbstract:
Upstream contracts in petroleum sector may alter the behaviour of the contractor. This alteration may deviate the production path from the optimal one; this adverse effect is called distortionary effect of contracts. In this paper the distortionary effect of a risk service contract is evaluated using the data from an oil field in Middle East. The field is operated under a risk service contract signed in 2000 to increase the production by around 80,000 bbl/day. The contractual production profile (proposed by the contractor and stipulated within the contract) is compared against the estimated optimal production path over the contract life-cycle (2000-2024) and with the actual production. The optimal production path is calculated in both finite and infinite case using stochastic dynamic programming method. Results reveal that under different scenarios of discount rate, depletion rate and gas injection, the contractual production falls below the optimal production path which results in a loss of cumulative production of 5- 34% over the contract lifecycle. It is also shown that actual production is also below the optimal path and the path suggested by the contractor within the contract. It is discussed how contract time limitation affects adversely on the cumulative production of the field. Inflexibilities in contractual elements such as cap on total recoverable costs, stringent work program and upper/lower limit of production profile are discussed to be the main sources of distortion.
2
Olesen, H. B. "Contract production of peas." Food Policy 28, no. 1 (2003): 29–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0306-9192(02)00069-6.
Full text
3
Xu, Jiayang, Jian Cao, Sanjay Kumar, and Sisi Wu. "Optimal government and manufacturer incentive contracts for green production with asymmetric information." PLOS ONE 18, no. 8 (2023): e0289639. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289639.
Full textAbstract:
Governments commonly utilize subsidy policy to incentivize manufacturers to produce green products, promoting sustainable development. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, some manufacturers may dishonestly misrepresent the green degree of their products to secure higher subsidies. This study examines different incentive contracts between the government and a green product manufacturer who keeps private information of a product’s green-degree in a principal-agent model. Lump-sum transfer and fixed- and flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contracts are proposed to investigate screening and improving green-degree issues. To further enhance the flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contract, we construct a non-linear coordinated contract based on the Nash bargaining solution. The revelation principle and Nash bargaining are performed for comparison and analysis of the contracts. We find that the lump-sum contract reveals true green-degree information but fails to impel manufacturers to improve product’s green-degree in developing countries where green product development is in initial stages. In contrast, both fixed- and flexible- proportion benefit-sharing contracts are effective in reveling and enhancing green-degree. The non-linear coordination contract optimizes resource allocation and achieves Pareto improvement. An applied case study for inkjet printer operations and numerical experiments corroborate our model findings.
4
Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan, Yashodha, and Judit Johny. "Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production." PLOS ONE 16, no. 8 (2021): e0255176. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255176.
Full textAbstract:
Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from realizing the full potential benefits from seed contracts. We carried out an economic experiment with real producers and organizers currently engaged in seed production to analyze their preference for group seed contracts, its sustainability and welfare implications in the seed value chain. The producers are offered two types of group contracts: B and C. Contract B involves a company-organizer-seed producer group (SPG) whereas contract C removes the organizer and directly engages with the SPG (company → SPG). In the experiment, producers are asked to choose between an existing contract and either of the proposed group contracts. The experiment consists of two treatments: (i) concealed and revealed price information between agents, and (ii) presence and absence of a local organizer while making the decision. We find that the preference for group contract B is higher than for group contract C, suggesting the need for producers bargaining which can be achieved through group contract in the existing contract, Bargaining is high (6.3 percentage points) when price information is concealed. SPGs survive for about four out of five rounds and more than half of the groups (53%) formed in the first round survived throughout the five rounds, indicating a very high group sustainability.
5
Martin, Laura L. "Production Contracts, Risk Shifting, and Relative Performance Payments in the Pork Industry." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 29, no. 2 (1997): 267–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s107407080000777x.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractActual performance records of production contract farmers are used to assess the extent to which contract production reduces the risk borne by pork producers. Comparisons of contracting relative to independent market production reveal that farmers who enter into production contracts based on absolute performance measures reduce risks associated with variable income. Weak evidence is found that relative performance contracts, similar to those used in the broiler chicken industry, further reduce income variability. The effectiveness of such relative performance contracts will rely on several factors; among these are increased contract production and a more uniform pork production and processing system.
6
Muhammad, Ayad Jawad. "A critical reading of oil and gas investment in the form of a production sharing contract A study in Iraqi law." Journal of Legal and Political Studies 13, Special Issue 2025 (2025): 356–69. https://doi.org/10.17656/jlps.10297.
Full textAbstract:
The production sharing contract is one of the most important contracts in the field of oil and gas investment. It is a relatively new contract when compared to other oil and gas investment contracts. It is based on the principle of oil companies sharing with the state the production produced by oil fields that these investing companies sought to produce either by discovering new fields or developing existing fields. The Kurdistan Region's oil and gas investment law stipulated its adoption, while it was mentioned in the draft federal Iraqi oil and gas law . In general, the production sharing contract has a number of positive aspects, but it is not devoid of a number of negatives, although these negatives are not sufficient to eliminate this type of contract, especially if specific controls are established for resorting to it in the event of its adoption by legislation related to investment in the oil and gas sector. Keywords:- Investment, Production participation contract, Service contract, Oil licensing contracts, Concession contract, Purchase contract for the sold item
7
Van Brunt, Jennifer. "Contract Production: Buying Technical Expertise." Nature Biotechnology 4, no. 8 (1986): 701–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nbt0886-701.
Full text
8
Esser, John P. "Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms of Contract." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 03 (1996): 593–629. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1996.tb00091.x.
Full textAbstract:
A replication of Macaulay's 1963 study of Wisconsin manufacturers shows that manufacturers are using a new type of contract to govern changed transactions and to establish new form of industrial organization. This article seeks to specify these changes and to demonstrate their theoretical significance by constructing an empirically and theoretically informed analytical framework. This framework establishes relations of meaning between discrete contracts, job shop production, and classical contract law; between openterm contracts, mass production, and neoclassical contract law; and between long-term agreements, flexible production, and a “shadow” relational contract law. It demonstrates that long-term agreements constitute a new device for governing exchange, that they are part of a broader change from mass production to flexible production, and that their distinctive features are not recognized by neoclassical contract law.
9
Key, Nigel, and William D. McBride. "Do Production Contracts Raise Farm Productivity? An Instrumental Variables Approach." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 37, no. 2 (2008): 176–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500002987.
Full textAbstract:
Estimating how the use of production contracts affects farm productivity is difficult when unobservable factors are correlated with both the decision to contract and productivity. To account for potential selection bias, this study uses the local availability of production contracts as an instrument for whether a farm uses a contract in order to estimate the impact of contract use on total factor productivity. Results indicate that use of a production contract is associated with a large increase in productivity for feeder-to-finish hog farms in the United States. The instrumental variable method makes it credible to assert that the observed association is a causal relationship rather than simply a correlation.
10
Prajapati, Niraj Kumar, Monika Kumari, Byomakesh Swain, Meena Dinesh Ku, and Sanjay Kumar. "Contract Farming of Vegetable Production: Economic Benefits and Challenges." International Journal of Research Studies on Environment, Earth, and Allied Sciences 1, no. 1 (2024): 5–12. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14398867.
Full textAbstract:
<em>Contract farming in vegetable production has emerged as a significant agricultural business model, with the global contract farming market reaching USD 98.5 billion in 2023. This study analyzes the economic benefits and challenges faced by stakeholders in vegetable contract farming systems. Research across developing countries shows that contract farmers experience 25-40% higher income compared to independent farmers, primarily due to guaranteed market access and price stability. Data from India indicates that contract farming in vegetables has reduced market uncertainty by 60% and post-harvest losses by 30%. However, significant challenges persist. Analysis of 500 contract farming cases reveals that 35% of small-scale farmers face issues with delayed payments, while 28% report difficulties meeting strict quality standards. Power imbalances in contract negotiations remain prevalent, with studies showing that 40% of farmers accept unfavorable terms due to limited bargaining power. Recent surveys indicate that 45% of contracting firms struggle with side-selling issues, where farmers breach contracts during price spikes in the open market. Despite these challenges, successful models demonstrate that contract farming can increase productivity by 20-30% through improved access to technology and inputs. The study concludes that while contract farming offers significant potential for economic growth in vegetable production, its success depends on balanced contract design, transparent pricing mechanisms, and strong institutional support.</em>
11
Choi, Jae-Yoen, and Jeong-Wook Byun. "Effects of Components Procurement Contracts for Mass-production of Weapon System - Focused on Separation contract and Collective contract -." Journal of the Korean Association of Defense Industry Studies 27, no. 2 (2020): 57–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.52798/kadis.2020.27.2.5.
Full text
12
Shkurkin, Sergey I., and Vasiliy Yu Zhdanov. "Organizational models of contract farm production." Economy of agricultural and processing enterprises, no. 12 (2023): 52–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.31442/0235-2494-2023-0-12-52-56.
Full textAbstract:
One of the disadvantages of traditional approaches to stimulating entrepreneurial activity in agriculture is the unresolved issue related to the sale of products, which limits the sustainable development of small businesses in this area. The strategy of contract production can become an effective tool for solving the issue of product sales. . It allows businesses to focus on their core competencies, manufacturing and improving the quality of their products. The article discusses three main models of contract farming depending on the supplier of resources. These models are universal for different markets and regions. Alternative models of contract farming are also presented, such as: centralized, a model with a main field, a multilateral model, an informal model, and an intermediary model. The organizational mechanism of interaction in each of them is determined. Based on the results of the analysis of foreign and Russian contract companies, the peculiarities in their business models are highlighted. The specific features of the contract agreement between farmers and the customer company are indicated. A list of advantages and disadvantages of contractual relations has been compiled for both the farmer and the customer.
13
Key, Nigel. "Production Contracts and Farm Business Growth and Survival." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 45, no. 2 (2013): 277–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800004740.
Full textAbstract:
Using farm-level panel data from the U.S. Census of Agriculture, this research examines whether hog producers with production contracts increased output more, or were more likely to survive in business over 5 years, compared with independent producers. Additionally, this research examines whether independent producers who adopted a production contract grew more than similar independent operations who did not contract. The local availability of contracts serves as an instrumental variable to address the potential endogeneity of the contracting decision. Results indicate that the use and adoption of production contracts affect farm size growth and survival differently depending on the initial size of an operation.
14
MULLIN, RICK. "KemFine Buys Avecia Contract Production Arm." Chemical & Engineering News 83, no. 39 (2005): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/cen-v083n039.p011a.
Full text
15
Ma, Wanglin, and Awudu Abdulai. "Linking apple farmers to markets." China Agricultural Economic Review 8, no. 1 (2016): 2–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/caer-04-2015-0035.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of marketing contract choices including written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, as well as to examine the impact of marketing contracts on net returns from apple production in China. Design/methodology/approach – A two-stage selection correction approach (Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (BFG)) for the multinomial logit model is employed to estimate the impact of marketing contracts on net returns from apple production. On the basis of the BFG estimation, the authors also use an endogenous switching regression model and a propensity score matching technique to estimate the causal effects of marketing contract choices on net returns from apple production. Findings – The results reveal significant selectivity correction terms in the choices of both written contracts and no contracts and insignificant selectivity correction terms in the choice of oral contract, indicating that accounting for selection bias is a prerequisite for unbiased and consistent estimation. The findings also indicate written contracts increase apple farmers’ net returns, while oral contracts exert the opposite effect. Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of marketing contract choices on net returns from apple production, accounting for selectivity effects.
16
Ariyon, Muhammad, Sukendi Sukendi, Ridwan Manda Putra, Husnul Kausarian, and Bella Santika. "Comparison of oil and gas fiscal policies in Southeast Asian Countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam." BIO Web of Conferences 70 (2023): 06007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/bioconf/20237006007.
Full textAbstract:
This study's objective was to examine the comparison of petroleum management policies in accordance with the concession contract system and production sharing contract system in several countries in the Southeast Asia region. In contrast to existing research, this comparison focuses more on the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, which are developing countries producing petroleum in the Southeast Asia region. Moreover, this comparative research will be used to identify the kind of oil and gas contract that will yield the highest profits for Indonesia. Since Indonesia is a developing nation that is an archipelago, it depends heavily on its oil and gas resources for foreign exchange, necessitating the creation of suitable oil and gas management laws. Comparison of oil and gas policies undertaken through interviews with oil and gas law experts and a literature review of the history of the petroleum management policies in each country. The study's findings indicate that production sharing contracts are more profitable to implement in developing maritime countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam compared to the concession system. This is due to the implementation of a production sharing contract system in the state has a strong position towards contractors. Apart from that, the provisions in the Production Sharing Contract also require the use of domestic labor and goods. This will definitely increase the multiplier effect and technology transfer so that Indonesia is expected to be able to compete with other countries.
17
Khatchadourian, Minas. "Legal Safeguards in Egypt's Petroleum Concession Agreements." Arab Law Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2008): 387–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157302508x374410.
Full textAbstract:
This article deals with the concession contracts for the exploration and the production of oil and gas in Egypt. Such tripartite contracts are concluded between the Government of Egypt (GOE) as the host country, a National Oil Company (NOC) as the concession holder and an international oil company (IOC) as the foreign contractor who receives a part of the oil or gas production on a production sharing agreement (PSA). From an Egyptian legal perspective, this contract is qualified as a State contract which is supposed to give the Government some exorbitant powers towards its counterparts. However, in order to attract foreign investors into this kind of agreement and encourage international oil companies to explore natural resources, several legal safeguards are incorporated in the concession agreement. Examples of this include placing the contract in the framework of a legislative act, granting the contract a supremacy on any contrary legislation, stabilization clause, adaptation of the contract through renegotiation, arbitration clause, etc.
18
Tatlidil, F. Fusun, and Duygu Akturk . "Comparative Analysis of Contract and Non-contract Farming Model in Tomato Production." Journal of Agronomy 3, no. 4 (2004): 305–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.3923/ja.2004.305.310.
Full text
19
Wadhan, Wadhan. "MORAL HAZARD DAN AGENCY COST (Pencederaan Kontrak Bisnis dalam Perspektif Ekonomi Syarî’ah)." AL-IHKAM: Jurnal Hukum & Pranata Sosial 3, no. 2 (2019): 239–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.19105/al-lhkam.v3i2.2606.
Full textAbstract:
A contract for business organization or production process may generally involve Principal- agent problems due to information asymetry. Islâmic business contracts has manifold avenues and modalities to be implemented as according to the suitability of time, place and environment.The essential benefits of the Islâmic business contracts is to ensure the benefit of the both partners in the contract. Since the contract for business organization or production process embodies some sort of problems like principal- agent problem due to information asymetry and moral hazard, this also be easily minimised in an Islâmic contract. Therefore, it may be said that if in an Islâmic economy, Islâmic firm implements the business contract as designed and approved by the shariah, then principal- agent problem will be minimised and society will be more benefited from the welfare motive of the producer and other market agents.
20
Tao, Ze-Jin, and Pyung-Hoi Koo. "A Coordinated Supply Contract for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Considering Learning Effects." Applied Sciences 14, no. 4 (2024): 1513. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app14041513.
Full textAbstract:
In a supply chain composed of multiple members, supply chain coordination plays a crucial role in achieving overall optimization and efficiency. Various supply contract forms have been studied in the existing literature to facilitate supply chain coordination. However, most existing literature has established coordination models assuming constant production costs. In reality, per-unit production costs often decrease as production quantity increases, which is called the learning effect. This paper underscores the significance of considering this learning effect in decision-making processes for coordinated supply contracts. We propose a supply contract scheme for channel coordination that incorporates the learning effect within a supply chain comprising a single manufacturer and a single retailer. In this framework, the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader, initiating the process by designing and presenting the contract. The supply contract scheme is designed to ensure that the retailer’s order quantity aligns with the global solution. We also demonstrate how the contract parameters are determined when the relative bargaining powers of the supply chain members are given exogenously in the market. Our findings reveal that contracts with a learning curve can generate additional profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer compared to the existing coordinated contracts with static production costs. This study provides valuable insights into the impact of the learning effect on supply chain efficiency and offers practical implications for supply chain practitioners.
21
SHor, Inna Mikhailovna, and Dildarakhon Abdisamadovna SHelestova. "PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY USING AN OFFSET CONTRACT AND A SPECIAL INVESTMENT CONTRACT." AIC: economics, management, no. 3 (March 1, 2025): 74–81. https://doi.org/10.33305/253-74.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of the study is to substantiate the feasibility of using an offset contract and a special investment contract (hereinafter referred to as SPIC) in the domestic production of agricultural machinery and to develop recommendations aimed at the practical implementation of this process in modern conditions. The methodological basis of the research was analysis, synthesis, logical methods and expert assessment. The main results of the study: based on the study of the 2017-2024 fleet of the main types of agricultural machinery, its domestic production and shipment, the justification of the legal possibility and economic feasibility of using an offset contract and a SPIC in relation to the production of agricultural machinery, supported by the disclosure of the essential characteristics and advantages of these forms of public-private partnership (hereinafter – PPP); presentation of recommendations on minimizing/eliminating risks and overcoming obstacles in the creation and development of Russian agricultural machinery production based on an offset contract and a SPIC. The theoretical significance of the research lies in the development of the scientific foundations of the use of offset contract and SPIC in agriculture, and the practical significance lies in the use of the results obtained in the development and implementation of investment projects for the production of agricultural machinery.
22
Becher, Shmuel. "A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law." University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, no. 42.4 (2009): 747. http://dx.doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.42.4.fair.
Full textAbstract:
Consumer contracts diverge from the traditional paradigm of contract law in various conspicuous ways. They are pre-drafted by one party; they cannot be altered or negotiated; they are executed between unfamiliar contracting parties unequal in their market power and sophistication; they are offered frequently by agents who act on behalf of the seller; and promisees (i.e., consumers) do not read or understand them. Consumer contracts are thus useful in modern markets of mass production, but they cast doubt on some fundamental notions of contract law. To reframe the long-lasting debate over consumer contracts, this Article develops a superior legal regime whereby sellers can obtain certification of a form contract by an independent third-party. Such approval may be viewed as a quality certification, akin to a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval," for standard form contracts. The many impediments to the design of such a project notwithstanding, its overall advantages are promising. The tension between the duty to read contracts and the common practice of signing consumer contracts without reading them will be better reconciled. The adverse consequences of asymmetric information possessed by typical sellers and consumers will be obviated. This regime will also minimize sellers' ability to manipulate consumers' bounded rationality, increase social welfare by reducing transaction costs, diminish socially undesirable litigation over standardized contracts, make a notable step towards minimizing the alleged anomaly that punitive damage awards create in consumer contract cases, and promote market participants' autonomy by advancing trust between the contracting parties.
23
Deshpande, Shreesh, and Vijay Jog. "Non-public contracts, cash flows and firm value: the case of Lockheed." Review of Accounting and Finance 13, no. 3 (2014): 274–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-03-2013-0035.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose – This study aims to examine a large, non-disclosed production contract awarded to Lockheed Corp. in the context of a trade-off between a contractually required non-disclosure clause and the need (as a publicly traded firm) to disclose material information to its shareholders. This production contract generated significant cash flows to the firm as evidenced by growth in its earnings. However, the existence of the production contract and its contribution to Lockheed’s earnings, was not disclosed by the firm to shareholders and potential investors while the production contract was being executed. Design/methodology/approach – The authors examine the market reaction to several key contract events which were not disclosed at the time they occurred, in compliance with the contractually required non-disclosure clause. Findings – A statistically significant stock price reaction around the time of the award of this non-public contract, indicative of trading by some capital market participants using non-public information was documented. Originality/value – Because similar large non-public contracts funded by the government are common in the industrial economy, we conclude by discussing implications for organizational structure, firm’s cost of capital, equity-based compensation and market efficiency.
24
Huang, Fuyou, and Zhe Gao. "Optimal production decision and supply chain coordination under different capital conditions." Advances in Economics and Management Research 10, no. 1 (2024): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.56028/aemr.10.1.7.2024.
Full textAbstract:
This paper investigates a two-level supply chain composed of a retailer and a manufacturer with budget-constrained. The manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is explored under different own capital conditions, and the gap between in the decentralized system with wholesale price contract and in the centralized system is discussed. Then, an option contract is used to investigate the supply chain coordination issue. The results show that, when the manufacturer has enough capital, both the production quantity and the expected profit in the decentralized system with wholesale price contract are less than that in the centralized system, and the gap between in the decentralized system and in the centralized system is increasing on the own capital. The option contract can coordinate the supply chain with budget-constrained, and in the presence of supply chain coordination, both the manufacturer and the retailer can become better off by setting reasonable option contracts. Several numerical examples are provided to demonstrate these finds.
25
Zeemering, Eric S. "Why Terminate? Exploring the End of Interlocal Contracts for Police Service in California Cities." American Review of Public Administration 48, no. 6 (2017): 596–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0275074017701224.
Full textAbstract:
With the recent growth in interlocal contracts for municipal service delivery, insufficient attention has been given to city governments that choose to terminate interlocal contracts. The termination of interlocal contracts deserves scrutiny because theory points to multiple possible explanations for service change. This research examines the termination of interlocal contracts for police service delivery by California cities between 2001 and 2010. Public documents from the nine cities that terminated interlocal contracts are analyzed to assess rationale for termination. The stated reasons for termination include problems related to community responsiveness, the contract relationship, local control, service cost, service levels, and staffing. Grounded theory is advanced through analysis of the nine cities. The research refines our understanding of how cities weigh the costs and benefits of in-house production versus production through interlocal contract. While contract failure is evident in some cities, termination may also be explained as a process of vertical integration and service expansion. The research refines theories about local government service delivery and informs the practice of interlocal contract management.
26
Tatar, Olga. "CONTRACT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT." LEGEA ŞI VIAŢA=LAW AND LIFE=ЗАКОН И ЖИЗНЬ . 9-10 (October 11, 2022): 88–103. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7184957.
Full textAbstract:
The Contract for the International Sale of Goods is the most important of all foreign trade contracts. This agreement is closely related to various types of work contracts - transactions aimed at the performance of work and the provision of services related to the supply of machinery and equipment. Execution of this type of contract involves the conclusion of a contract of carriage and insurance, and often also a license agreement, which is concluded in order to ensure the production of goods provided for by the contract for the international sale of goods.
27
Radeva, Irina, and Ivan Popchev. "Blockchain-Enabled Supply-Chain in Crop Production Framework." Cybernetics and Information Technologies 22, no. 1 (2022): 151–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/cait-2022-0010.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to propose an approach to blockchain-enabled supply-chain model for a smart crop production framework. The defined tasks are: (1) analysis of blockchain ecosystem as a network of stakeholders and as an infrastructure of technical and logical elements; (2) definition of a supply-chain model; (3) design of blockchain reference infrastructure; (4) description of blockchain information channels with smart contracts basic functionalities. The results presented include: а supply-chain model facilitating seeds certification process, monitoring and supervision of the grain process, provenance and as optional interactions with regulatory bodies, logistics and financial services; the three level blockchain reference infrastructure and a blockchain-enabled supply-chain supporting five information channels with nine participants and smart contracts. An account management user application tool, the general descriptions of smart contract basic functionalities and a selected parts of one smart contract code are provided as examples.
28
Tursyn, А. О. "Kazakhstan's public procurement landscape: an in-depth review over two years." Central Asian Economic Review, no. 6 (February 25, 2025): 68–82. https://doi.org/10.52821/2789-4401-2024-6-68-82.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose of the study is to analyze the public procurement market in Kazakhstan, identifying key trends, factors influencing contract failure, and regional variations in procurement practices.Methodology: We examined nearly 3.9 million procurement contracts, employing descriptive statistics to overview market characteristics and using Generalized Linear Model regression analysis to identify factors affecting contract failure. The study focused on variables such as local production share, contract sum, procurement method, and regional differences.Originality/Value: This research contributes to the limited literature on public procurement in emerging economies, offering a comprehensive analysis of Kazakhstan's procurement landscape. It provides valuable insights for policymakers and practitioners, highlighting areas for potential improvement in the country's procurement system.Results: The study identified several key findings: (1) a high proportion of contracts marked as "changed," likely due to software structure rather than actual modifications; (2) a 4% contract failure rate, with failure more common in larger contracts; (3) requests for proposals emerging as the dominant procurement method (52% of contracts), reflecting a shift towards competitive bidding; (4) minimal growth in single-source procurement, consistent with government transparency efforts; (5) a negative correlation between local production share and contract failure, supporting the hypothesis that domestic suppliers contribute to contract stability; (6) unexpectedly lower failure rates in single-source contracts, suggesting supplier familiarity and pre-negotiation reduce risks; and (7) significant regional disparities in contract failures, indicating local administrative and market influences. These findings suggest the need for further research on competitive bidding, and investigation into factors contributing to the success of single-source contracts.
29
Abdulai, Yahaya, Abdul-Manan Khalid, and Mas-ud Mustapha. "Analysis of Factors Influencing Output and Cost of Soybean Production: A Comparison between Contract and Non-contract Farmers in the Northern Region of Ghana." Journal of Economics, Management and Trade 30, no. 6 (2024): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.9734/jemt/2024/v30i61210.
Full textAbstract:
Contract farming has emerged as a crucial remedy for bolstering the prospects of small-scale soybean farmers in Ghana. Both governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations, including the Savanna Farmers Marketing Company (SFMC), the Northern Development Authority (NDA), and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), are actively engaging farmers in contracts to grow soybeans. This initiative is especially prominent in the Northern Region of Ghana. This study investigates the factors influencing the output and cost of soybean production, drawing a comparison between contract and non-contract farmers. The research employs stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and translog functional forms to analyze data collected from 374 soybean growers. The findings reveal that farm size, labour, and agrochemical usage significantly impact soybean output for both contract and non-contract farmers. However, contract farmers exhibit increasing returns to scale, while non-contract farmers experience decreasing returns. Regarding production costs, the study identifies farm size, seed cost, agrochemical cost, and output as significant determinants for the pooled sample. Contract farmers' production costs are primarily influenced by farm size, seed cost, and agrochemicals, whereas non-contract farmers' costs are driven by farm size, seed cost, agrochemicals, and output. The analysis highlights the complementary and substitute relationships among input variables, providing valuable insights for policymakers and stakeholders in the soybean industry. The findings underscore the need for targeted interventions to enhance productivity and cost efficiency for both contract and non-contract soybean farmers.
30
Kurniawan, Faizal. "BENTUK PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM TERHADAP KEKAYAAN MINYAK DAN GAS BUMI SEBAGAI ASET NEGARA MELALUI INSTRUMEN KONTRAK." Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan 2, no. 3 (2018): 471. http://dx.doi.org/10.25216/jhp.2.3.2013.471-492.
Full textAbstract:
State has the power to manage natural resources for the sake of social justice, the general welfare and are used as much as possible the greatest benefit for the greatest welfare of people. Contract law is the main instrument used to protect the state assets including oil and gas. Production Sharing Contract as a legal safeguard for oil and gas, is a fundamental pillar in the effort and utilization management activities of oil and gas. In the contracts involving the Government, called government contract, there is a unique characteristic which is not entirely subject to private law. In principle, the state should not be harmed, called as state immunity. This principle also applies universally in the interest of protecting the state assets. Keywords: Production Sharing Contract, Government Contract, State Immunity, Protection of State Assets Clause.
31
Ryan, Nicholas. "Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence From the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India." Econometrica 88, no. 2 (2020): 383–424. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta17041.
Full textAbstract:
Weak contract enforcement may reduce the efficiency of production in developing countries. I study how contract enforcement affects efficiency in procurement auctions for the largest power projects in India. I gather data on bidding and ex post contract renegotiation and find that the renegotiation of contracts in response to cost shocks is widespread, despite that bidders are allowed to index their bids to future costs like the price of coal. To study heterogeneity in bidding strategies, I construct a new measure of firm connectedness, based on whether a firm has been awarded coal concessions by the Government. Connected firms choose to index less of the value of their bids to coal prices and, through this strategy, expose themselves to cost shocks to induce renegotiation. I use a structural model of bidding in a scoring auction to characterize equilibrium bidding when bidders are heterogeneous both in cost and in the payments they expect after renegotiation. The model estimates show that bidders offer power below cost due to the expected value of later renegotiation. The model is used to simulate bidding and efficiency with strict contract enforcement. Contract enforcement is found to be pro‐competitive. With no renegotiation, equilibrium bids would rise to cover cost, but markups relative to total contract value fall sharply. Production costs decline, due to projects being allocated to lower‐cost bidders over those who expect larger payments in renegotiation.
32
Hipp, Janie S., and Harriet F. Francis. "The Legal Environment Facing Economic Agents in Production." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 37, no. 2 (2005): 327–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800006817.
Full textAbstract:
Agriculture has seen a steady movement toward the increased use of contracts. Agricultural contracts now guide the interrelationships of parties throughout the modern production system, extending well beyond the livestock sector. With this predominance come new issues that require us to reexamine contract theory and the roles of the parties. This review examines legislation, regulations, and recent court rulings in seemingly unrelated areas that have specific relationships to the development of contracts in production agriculture: environmental law and labor law.
33
Febrianti, Rima, and Ugung Dwi Ario Wibowo. "Pengaruh Efikasi Diri dan Kontrak Psikologis terhadap Keterikatan Kerja pada Karyawan bagian Produksi." PSIMPHONI 3, no. 1 (2022): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.30595/psimphoni.v1i2.8048.
Full textAbstract:
This study aims to determine the effect of self-efficacy and psychological contracts on job attachment in the employees of the production department. Multiple linear regression analysis technique is used to analyze the data. The subjects of this study were all employees of the production department with 55 people. Data collection is done by try out using the scale of job attachment, self-efficacy scale, and psychological contract scale. The job attachment scale has a reliability of 0.914, a self-efficacy scale has a reliability of 0.952 and a psychological contract scale has a reliability of 0.932. Based on the analysis of the data obtained, the value of Fcount = 66.210 with probability sig (p) = 0,000 (sig value (p) 0.05). Thus the hypothesis is accepted since there is an effect of self-efficacy and psychological contract simultaneously on job attachment to employees of the production department. Self-efficacy and psychological contracts make an effective contribution of 71.8% to job attachment (Rsquare = 0.718).
34
Rachmasari Putri, Adinda Tissa, and Mohammad Rondhi. "CONTRACT FARMING AND THE EFFECT ON PRICE RISK IN BROILER FARMING." E3S Web of Conferences 142 (2020): 05002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202014205002.
Full textAbstract:
Contract farming is one of the ways in a production relationship that is carried out by at least two parties who work together for a certain unit of time arranged in a written or oral agreement. Contracts in agriculture are carried out to reduce the risks faced by both parties. There are several agriculture commodities developed under the contract farming system, one of which is broiler. Broiler are important for fulfilling animal protein. High consumption in Indonesia at 2012-2016, not supported by production and the price of broiler has large fluctuations. Large fluctuations in Jember at 2012-2016 illustrate the magnitude of the risk in broiler farming both the risk of production and price. The amount of risk borne by farmerss causes easy contract farming to be applied in broiler chicken farming. This study purpose to see: (1) The pattern of contract farmIng carried out on broiler farming; and (2) The effect of contract farming on the price risks faced by farmerss. Method of determining the research area is purposive method. The research method is carried out by descriptive and analytical. The method of data collection is by interview, observation and secondary data with the use of recapitulation of the results of farmers maintenance. Determination of respondents was conducted randomly at farmerss in Jember Regency. The results of the study show: 1) The pattern of contract farming carried out on broiler farming is a contract farming with the type of production contract; and (2) The effect of contract farming causes the risk faced by farmerss to be reduced by 39% than independently farmerss.
35
Inanda, Destu Syah, Pandu Laksono, Any Suryantini, and Arini Wahyu Utami. "Stakeholders and Farmers’ Preferences Towards Contract Attributes: Evidence from Hybrid Maize Production in Indonesia." Caraka Tani: Journal of Sustainable Agriculture 40, no. 1 (2025): 139. https://doi.org/10.20961/carakatani.v40i1.88996.
Full textAbstract:
The availability of quality seeds is critical to supporting the sustainability of agriculture, which is further reinforced by the success of contract farming between seed companies and partner farmers. To foster a mutually beneficial partnership, it is essential to align the needs of farmers with the facilities and services provided by the company through well-defined contract terms and conditions. This study aims to explore the contract attribute preferences and their importance levels among farmers, growth leaders, and companies using a quantitative approach. A discrete choice experiment utilizing the conditional logit model was employed to investigate the preferences of 170 farmers, while a descriptive analysis was used to outline the preferences of other stakeholders. The findings indicate that farmers prefer written agreements over informal ones, favor shorter contract durations, and demand higher prices. Additionally, farmers showed a marked preference for receiving inputs, incentives, and credits. The preference patterns of stakeholders align with those of farmers regarding agreement form, inputs, price, incentives, and credit, although stakeholders tend to favor contracts with longer durations. Based on the rank-based quotient method, both growth leaders and farmers identified price, input subsidies, incentives, credits, agreement form, and duration as the most important attributes in maize seed partnership contracts, in descending order of importance. Contrarily, the company prioritizes input subsidies over other attributes, including price, duration, credit, incentive, and agreement form. These insights can inform the design of more suitable and effective contracts, thereby fostering sustainable partnership relationships in the future.
36
Teegerstrom, Trent, Gerard D’Souza, Phillip Osborne, and Kezelee Jones. "To Contract or Not to Contract? A Decision Theory and Portfolio Analysis of Cattle Contract Grazing." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 26, no. 2 (1997): 205–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500002677.
Full textAbstract:
Contract grazing is compared with retained ownership of cattle using two frameworks—decision theory and portfolio analysis. The study area is West Virginia. Contracting is optimal under a wide range of price and weather scenarios and decision criteria. It also dominates other alternatives based on labor efficiency measures. The optimal portfolio consists of contract grazing and pasture rental, with the results insensitive to small changes in contract grazing returns. The decision theory and portfolio analyses are complementary; together, the two sets of results provide a comprehensive view of the optimal production alternative. Because different agents employ different decision criteria, this approach can increase the utility of results to decision makers and contribute to better decisions.
37
Reddy, Chidananda, G. T. Gopala, M. Harisha, B. H. Rudresh, B. G. Veeranna Gowda, and S. H. Shreyansh. "Assessment of Extension Advisory Services in Contract and Non-Contract Broiler Farming." Journal of Experimental Agriculture International 45, no. 9 (2023): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.9734/jeai/2023/v45i92169.
Full textAbstract:
Poultry is one of the most important and fastest growing sectors of agriculture today in India. Poultry in India has emerged as the most dynamic and diversified subsector. Estimates from all India poultry breeders association indicates that poultry will contribute for USD 17.31 billion of the total India’s gross value and satisfies the hungers of 50 million people through direct or indirect employment. Within the poultry sector, broiler and layer segment constitutes about 65.3 and 34.7 percent with the monthly turnover of 400 million chicks and 8400 million eggs respectively [1]. As per the 19th Livestock census, Karnataka ranks 5th place in both egg and meat production in India and it has about 534.42 lakh poultry (512.54 lakh in rural area and 2.19 lakh in urban areas) and 96.60 lakh fowl in backyard poultry comprising of 17.84 lakh cocks, 43.99 lakh hens and 34.77 lakh chicken below five months. The share of backyard fowl population in total fowl population was 11%. The State stands 7th in egg production and 10th in chicken meat production in the country. The present study was conducted to assess the extent of extension advisory services in contract and non-contract broiler farming. The study was conducted in 3 districts of Karnataka and the data was collected from 60 contract and 60 non-contract broiler farmers through pretested interview schedule. The study revealed that Cent percent of the Contract Broiler Farmers (CBF) depends on Integrator for the extension advisory services, non-contract broiler farmers depend upon private poultry consultant for extension advisory services. The returns are assured and almost fixed in contract broiler farming, whereas in Non-Contract Broiler Farming (NCBF) they vary widely depending upon the market price, Establishment of regulatory bodies and expansion and strengthening of the EAS is essential for further improvement.
38
Lu, Zhi Jian, Yuan Xin Sun, and Ru Liang Yang. "Optimization of Energy Performance Contract Production Decision-Making." Advanced Materials Research 869-870 (December 2013): 366–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.869-870.366.
Full textAbstract:
EPC have an important role in promoting energy conservation and emission reduction in China. With the rapid development of the energy services industry, ESCOs faced with the problem how to make investment decisions about pricing and performance levels. This paper reference one monopoly pricing and performance level joint decision model into a single market, put forward the EPC price and performance level joint optimal decision model, and then solves it to obtain the optimal price and the best performance level. Lastly we take a numerical example to analyze Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) how to choose the performance level to obtain maximal profit. Result show that price sensitivity and performance level sensitivity of demand have an impact on the performance level choosing ; the highest rate of return on investment and maximum profit could be obtain at a lower performance level.
39
Liao, Chia-Hung, Hui-En Lin, and Shyan-Ming Yuan. "Blockchain-Enabled Integrated Market Platform for Contract Production." IEEE Access 8 (2020): 211007–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3039620.
Full text
40
Bidzakin, John Kanburi, Simon C. Fialor, Dadson Awunyo-Vitor, and Iddrisu Yahaya. "Contract farming and rice production efficiency in Ghana." Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging Economies 10, no. 3 (2020): 269–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jadee-11-2018-0160.
Full textAbstract:
PurposeEven though many studies identify positive effects of contract farming (CF) on the livelihood of farmers, the use of CF as a tool to increase farm performance is unsettled debate. Information on CF is relatively not available in staple food chains. Theoretical considerations have shown that there are challenges in employing CF in staple food chains such as rice. With the increasing trend of rice CF in Ghana, it is very critical to establish its performance in rice production in Ghana. It is therefore imperative to analyse the impact of CF on the performance of smallholder rice farmers.Design/methodology/approachA survey was conducted where 350 rice farmers selected through a stratified sampling technique using structured questionnaires were interviewed. Descriptive and inferential statistics including stochastic frontier analyses and endogenous treatment effect regression were used to analyse the data.FindingsThe results from the endogenous treatment effect regression model show that CF improves rice farmers' technical, allocative and economic efficiencies by 21, 23 and 26%, respectively. Farm size and CF were identified as common factors influencing technical, allocative and economic efficiency measures of the farmers positively. It further identified age of farmer, educational level and household labour as factors influencing farmers' participation in CF positively.Research limitations/implicationsIt is recommended that CF is a good tool to enhance rice production efficiency, and hence, farmers should be encouraged to participate in CF as strategy to enhance the local rice production in Ghana.Social implicationsThe outcome of this study has the potential to influence rice production in the country. The country is a net importer of rice and just about 35% self-sufficient in rice production.Originality/valueThis study is the first to assess performance of CF in rice crop production in Ghana and also one of the few to use efficiency as a performance measure.
41
Imbruce, Valerie. "The production relations of contract farming in Honduras." GeoJournal 73, no. 1 (2008): 67–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10708-008-9179-z.
Full text
42
Dong, Fengxia, David A. Hennessy, and Helen H. Jensen. "Contract and Exit Decisions in Finisher Hog Production." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 92, no. 3 (2010): 667–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aap041.
Full text
43
Yuliastri, Deda Annasia, Anna Fariyanti, and Netti Tinaprilla. "Pengaruh Kemitraan Terhadap Efisiensi dan Risiko Usahatani Bawang Merah di Provinsi Jawa Tengah." Jurnal Agribisnis Indonesia 10, no. 1 (2022): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.29244/jai.2022.10.1.53-62.
Full textAbstract:
Productivity of shallot in central Java as an area production center has a declining trend from 2013-to 2018. One way to increase productivity is through technical efficiency. However, to increase productivity, the probability of production risk will also be higher. Contract farming is one way to increase productivity and overcome production risks in shallot farming. The objectives of this study were to analyze the effect of contract farming on technical efficiency and perception of risks production between contract and non-contract farmers. Secondary data was used in this study. The research sample consisted of 1.508 (10 contract farmers and 1.498 non-contract farmers) shallot farmers in Central Java. The data were analyzed using the stochastic frontier method to see technical efficiency, and the Likert scale to see farmers' perceptions of production risk. The analysis shows that contract farming affected decreasing efficiency. Meanwhile, there is no difference between both farmers in perceptions of the risk of pest and disease attacks. Meanwhile, contract farmers’ perception of the risk of climate change was greater in decreasing production than non-contract farmers. Management efforts by both contract and non-contract farmers to overcome pests and plant diseases are no different. They both prefer chemical methods to overcome pest and disease plant attacks.
44
CODJO, Ogoudélé Simon, Rose FIAMOHE, Sylvain KPENAVOUN, Denis ACCLASSATO, and Gauthier BIAOU. "Estimation of Optimal Portfolios of Governance Structures for Improving Benin’ Rice Producers’ Income." Annales de l’Université de Parakou - Série Sciences Naturelles et Agronomie 9, no. 2 (2019): 49–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.56109/aup-sna.v9i2.54.
Full textAbstract:
Prices volatility is one of the critical problems that highly affects smallholder producer’s income; therefore, it might contribute to deeper poverty. This study applies portfolio analysis to identify the optimal portfolio of governance structures (GSs) selection for paddy marketing. Data were collected in Benin in 2015 from 300 rice producers randomly selected. The results indicate that the optimal portfolio of two GSs consists of selling 17% and 83% of the production through spot market and formal contract, respectively. The best portfolio of three GSs consists of selling 13%, 57%, and 30% of the production through spot market, formal contract, and farmer association. Finally, a portfolio that consists of selling 10%, 25%, 43%, and 22% of the production through spot market, informal contract, formal contract, and farmers association, respectively, is the best one in the case of four GSs. Formal contract is included in all the best portfolios identified and always presents the highest percentage. Therefore, these formal contracts can be used to enhance rice producers’ revenues and reduce price fluctuation risk. The portfolios developed in this research can be used to advise paddy producers for a better marketing decision.
45
Danastri, Tania Indah, Alireza Manouchehr, and Shamaamah Hajeera. "Economic Work Evaluation Of New Zone Behind Pipe Based On Psc Cost Recovery And Gross Split Contract In YL Field." Journal of Geoscience, Engineering, Environment, and Technology 9, no. 2 (2024): 163–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.25299/jgeet.2024.9.2.15480.
Full textAbstract:
Oil production in the YL field has decreased, to increase production work was carried out New Zone Behind Pipe (NZBP). For production results to benefit contractors and the government, this project was carried out by grab into account operating and investment costs following the standard cooperation contract system that applies in Indonesia. This study aimed to calculate the economic indicators of NPV, IRR, and POT based on the PSC system cost Recovery and system gross Split. Then determine which contract was feasible more or better by comparing the final results of the economic indicators of PSC contracts and economic indicators of contracts Gross Split. This study produced a comparison based on the system growth Split more wells were considered feasible, namely 6 of the 12 wells studied, with oil production above 2.65 MSTB to 9.71 MSTB, respectively the NPV, IRR, and POT values were 11.90 to 52, 5, 11% to 40%, 0 to 4.22 months. While the PSC system only 5 wells were considered feasible out of 12 wells, with oil production of 1.82 MSTB to 9.71, respectively the NPV, IRR, and POT values were 13.2 to 189.80, 11% to 156%, and 0 to 6.47 months. The system Gross Split was the best cooperation contract system to be applied to the YL field.
46
Nosoohi, Iman, and Ali S. Nookabadi. "Designing a supply contract to coordinate supplier’s production, considering customer oriented production." Computers & Industrial Engineering 74 (August 2014): 26–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2014.04.012.
Full text
47
Schuhmann, Ralph. "Quo Vadis Contract Management?" European Review of Contract Law 16, no. 4 (2020): 489–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2020-0027.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe progressive automation of management and production processes is increasingly affecting the way contracts are handled. Although for contract automation more concepts are currently being discussed than actually applied, the outlines of what will be possible in the future have become apparent. They raise the questions of what challenges contract handling will have to cope with in the future and whether the concept of contract lifecycle management (CLM) provides a suitable framework for this task. To give answers to these questions, the present article analyses the impact of the pull-effects of new forms of business and the push-effects of technology on the function, content, representation and usage of contracts. The results indicate that these developments entail major changes in the way contracts are handled and that the CLM concept will only be able to address them with considerable adjustments.
48
Chen, Xue, Bo Li, and Simin An. "Option contract design for supply chains under asymmetric cost information." Kybernetes 48, no. 5 (2019): 835–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-12-2017-0495.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of an option contract within a one-period two-echelon supply chain in the presence of asymmetric cost information. Design/methodology/approach Based on the principal-agent model, the retailer, acting as a Stackelberg leader, offers a menu of option contracts to mitigate the risk of uncertain demand and reveal asymmetric production cost information. The optimal contract in asymmetric and symmetric information scenarios is derived. Finally, the impact of production costs on the optimal contracts and the actors’ profits is explored by numerical experiments. Findings By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, the authors show that asymmetric cost information has a large impact on the optimal option contract and profits. In addition, information rent is affected by the type differential. The results prove that the level of information asymmetry plays a vital role in option contracts and profits. Originality/value Different from the existing literature on private demand information, this paper considers a supply chain with asymmetric cost information in the context of option contracts. Interestingly, not only the production cost but also the probability of a low production cost can affect the option strike price. In addition, from the perspective of the manufacturer, a high cost does not always bring a high information rent. These findings can provide some guidance to decision-makers.
49
Adismar, Ryan, and Dewi Nusraningrum. "Construction Process Business Model Strategy to Fulfil the Working Contract at PT Uniteda Arkato." European Journal of Business and Management Research 7, no. 4 (2022): 231–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2022.7.4.1559.
Full textAbstract:
This study aims to (1) analyze the appropriate business model at PT. Uniteda Arkato, (2) To analyze how to increase the production of stockpiling dams to achieve the target of the work contract, (3) To analyze to determine rational production capability standards. The population in this study is the contract PT. Uniteda Arkato, totaling four contracts. Analytical method used in this research is the Canvas Business Model, Critical Path Method (CPM), and Line Balancing. The results of the study found that with the appropriate canvas business model, companies can compete with companies that have been developing for a long time, Critical Path Method (CPM) can determine critical path that exists during construction process and line balancing analysis makes the production process more efficient. From low production, there is a tendency for delays in the time agreed in the contract. As a result of this delay, the company suffers from possible loss of penalty penalties in addition to the production level that is not achieved will lead to an increase in costs, especially overhead costs.
50
Han, Jiaojie, Amnon Rapoport, and Patrick S. W. Fong. "Incentive structures in multi-partner project teams." Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 27, no. 1 (2019): 49–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ecam-09-2018-0410.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of incentive contracts in multi-partner project teams (MPPTs) on the agents’ effort expenditure and project performance, analyze how the agents allocate their efforts between production and cooperation and offer suggestions for project managers on how to design incentive contracts. Design/methodology/approach The paper proposes a model of MPPT in which agents are inequity-averse and their effort expenditures are exogenously bounded. An extensive numerical example is presented in online Appendix 2 to illustrate the theoretical results. Findings The paper suggests that if the potential benefit of the agents’ cooperation in MPPT is high or if both agents exhibit inequity aversion and the efforts’ marginal costs are low, then group-based incentive contracts outperform individual-based incentive contracts. It also shows that the impact of the incentive contract on the agents’ effort expenditure and project team performance is correlated with several critical project attributes. Originality/value Fulfilling a need to study the design of incentive structures in MPPTs, the paper complements the existing literature in three ways. First, in contrast to single-partner project teams, it considers projects with multiple partners where cooperation between them enhances the project outcome. Second, rather than focusing on individual production problems, it considers multi-task projects with constrained efforts that must be allocated between production and cooperation. Third, it analyzes the effects of changes in the project attributes, incentive intensities and information transparency on the effectiveness of the contract.