Academic literature on the topic 'Franco-Russian Alliance. France-Foreign economic relations Russia'

The subject of this research consists in determination of legal component of creation and functionality of the technological strategic alliances, taking into account Russian experience and the experience of other countries. The article reveals that the agreement-based strategic alliances are assigned the key position, as such structures ensure sustainable and effective development of technological sector of the economy of each country. Based on the analysis of international and Russian experience, systematic review and author’s conclusions are presented the peculiarities of creation of such structures. The author analyzes the possible forms of establishment of strategic alliance with participation of the Russian companies. The creation of such treaty-based unions may become an instrument for stemming the operational risks for particular participants, since the reduction in transaction costs and influence of synergism of the business approximate an organization to achieving strategic goals. It is underlined that there is currently a number of objective obstacles in establishment of the long-term partnership relations between the Russian and foreign subjects and creation of transnational associations.

The current state of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China is described by many international relations experts as the best in history. After taking the president office by Donald Trump, the bilateral relations between America and abovementioned powers are cooling down. Current foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation focuses on holding a common position in the international political arena, which is in fact an attempt to counterweight political influence of the US administration and their allies. The dimension of the strategic partnership between China and Russia is also determining the mutual economic dependence, which is now crucial for both powers to build a strong position on the international forum. In addition, Russia is one of the crucial partners for the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – by many recognized as the Chinese attempt to break the American economic domination. The collisional course of the American foreign policy towards Russia and China forces the latter to look for Central and Eastern European allies as well as to gain influence in the region of Central Asia which is leading to a constant increase in tensions between China and Russia.

In the international framework India is finding a larger position for itself. This hope is focused on the belief that India is a prosperous democracy with substantial human and material resources; it is an increasingly strong economic power; it has a proven record as a responsible and law-abiding regime, and as a member of the non-aligned party it has consistently shared the interests of the developing nations. Indian foreign policy makers argue that India wants to re-invent itself at this point of 'take-off' as a great force. India needs new alliance for the proposed new position, including the dominant superpower, the United States of America (US). The US has said it would turn India into a great force. This essay attempts to examine the old pattern of relations with Russia that India had enjoyed. There's an Indo-US triangular alliance taking its place. How is this current type of strategic partnership distinct from that of the Indo Soviet/ Russian alliance? However, both countries' natural desire to strive towards multi polarity in world politics has helped restore the relationship, particularly over the past decade. Remarkably, ties with the US no longer stand in the way of stronger relations between India and Russia. The turbulent security climate marked by what is frequently assumed to be the state-sponsored insurgency invulnerable Asian areas, the war in Afghanistan, and the political turmoil in both Afghanistan and Central Asian countries has paved the way for a strategic alliance between India and Russia.

This article is devoted to the description and analysis of the Russian foreign policy as it has evolved from a more pro-Western line after 1991-1992 to a more balanced and nationalistic version by the mid-1990s. In addition, as a part of this article certain projections are made for the future of Russian relations with the West. The author argues that in many ways the foreign policy of the new Russia during the early 1990s was continuation of the Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking.’ Gorbachev had hoped to put the Soviet Union on the path of partnership with the Western alliance through clearing away the military and political baggage of Stalinism-Brezhnevism. This strategy enjoyed full support of the pro-western democratic movement headed by Yeltsin. The Russian democrats saw Western nations as their chief ideological and political allies, and a possible source of economic aid and a model for Russia’s economic development. However, over time, a number of internal and external factors started to influence the original Yeltsin’s strategy. Internally, the failure of ‘shock therapy’ led to the weakening of democrats and strengthening of the communists and nationalists. Furthermore, Yeltsin’s foreign policy became the target of intense criticism. Moreover, as a result of the internal and external influences and specifically the national debates, Russia’s foreign policy was gradually modified. Russia again puts an emphasis on security, and on the strength of its armed forces, and forging strategic partnerships in various parts of the world. In addition, nationalism would be expressed through the protection of the Russian diaspora, the glorification of Russia’s imperial past, and the scaling down the policy of repentance for the misdeeds of the Communist regime. Russia’s great power ambitions could be observed through Russia’s attempt to play pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, and a desire to show the Russian flag across the world. Moreover, ideology does not influence Kremlin’s relations with other states anymore, instead economic interests encourage Moscow to restore cooperation with many Third World nations. It can be expected that Russia will continue to compete for predominance with the West in the post-soviet republics and in the field of security and at the same time Russia will promote its partnership with China and other non-Western actors. However, despite these shifts, a multidirectional strategy will likely be preserved.

The article is devoted to the Russian-Greek ecclesiastical and political relations before and during the Eastern Crisis of the 1820s. After the start of the Greek uprising in 1821, Russia took an ambivalent position: as a patron of all orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, it sought to support the Greeks, but Russia also had to recognize the Greek revolution as an illegitimate rebellion. As a member of the Holy Alliance of European Powers Russia had no other choice but to adhere to the principles of legitimism. Russia had both political and economic interests in the region. After the Greek uprising, main powers in the Western Europe had no doubt that Russia would support the rebels. Nevertheless, Russia regarded the Greek rebellion as another European revolution. After a successful war of independence, Russia established its diplomatic mission in the Greek capital. The first ambassador was P.I. Rickman, who arrived with aim to provide political relations with this new Balkan state. If political support of the rebellion could find no understanding in the conservative European circles, the aid of the Orthodox Balkan Church was implied by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 1774. Special attention in this support, provided by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Greek monasteries, was paid to the Athos monasteries. This support was designed by a special document. It was adopted in 1735 under the Empress Anna Ivanovna and was subject to execution in subsequent years. The Archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has kept lists of all Orthodox monasteries on the territory of the Ottoman Empire that enjoyed material support from the Russian church; a significant part of this list are the Orthodox churches of Greece.

RETRACTEDIn this article the writer analyses the development peculiarities of the Tajik-Russian geopolitical relations during the establishment of Tajikistan foreign policy up to the commencement of multi-vector «open doors» policy in 2003-2004. Since the establishment of peace and stability in Tajikistan beginning from the year of 2000 the socio-economic development issues have been set as prior actions. To boost the economy, attraction of foreign investments, creation of new jobs and improvement of life standard of population were the issues to address. Political leaders of Tajikistan had no right to waste time making no headway. The country inevitably faced the issue of diversification of interstate and foreign economic relations, including outside the CIS. The article highlights that the foreign «open door» policy declared at the turn of2002-2003 implied mandatory modernization of the Tajik-Russian cooperation through strengthening its economic and human dimensions, adjusting the strategic partnership and alliance between the two states to the new global political realities. As to the geopolitical and military-political priorities, which Tajikistan had firmly adhered throughout the entire 1990th since its Independence, they actually remained unchanged even after 2002. The author points out the long-term Russian presence in the form of a large scale military base and military infrastructure on the territory of Tajikistan. The Republic is one of the most consistent, active and disciplined members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. During the first decade of the XXI century the political leaders of Tajikistan had been receiving offers from foreign non CIS countries with regard to deployment of military facilities on a fee basis on the territory of Tajikistan which were not even considered by the Government. Thus, the multi-vector foreign policy of «open doors» has been reflected in diversification of the international relations of Tajikistan, in demonopolization of trade and economic priorities, in attraction of foreign investments and military-technical assistance from the third countries (other than CIS and CSTO countries) but completely preserving the geopolitical and military-political priorities established until 2002.

The essence of integration transformations taking place recently in Eurasia where the leading role belongs to Russia as a regional power. A peculiar result was the creation of the post-Soviet reintegration Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in January 2015 This alliance is another integration project in Russia, designed to finally consolidate its influence in Eurasia, and in the long run turn into a powerful center of political and economic influence multipolar world. Create EEU were in during acceleration transformation of the world order growth in the context contradictions between the major geopolitical players. The final shift towards Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic structures has caused a crisis in its relations with Russia, which led to the annexation of the Crimea and escalated into armed confrontation with Russia supported puppet republics of the DPR and the LPR. Support local armed conflict and the deployment of a hybrid war was the reaction of the foreign Kyiv choices that ultimately negated Ukraine’s participation in the Eurasian integration structures. Aggravation Ukrainian crisis caused cautious traditional participants Eurasian integration – Belarus and Kazakhstan, which are increasingly trying to pursue an independent geopolitical game in its relations with the EU and China, which does not enhance EEU. The cooling of relations with Russia its allies traditional, multiplied by the loss of the prospects of Ukraine to EEU significantly weakens the new Eurasian organization and makes its future uncertain.

With Australia and Russia increasingly seeing their future in the Asia-Pacific, neither can reach its full economic potential except under the guidance of Beijing’s control of ports on its “Maritime Silk Road.” Cold War clichés of the “Yankee lapdog” and the big bad “Russian bear” continue to dominate how Canberra and Moscow view each other. Yet when it comes to the future of Australia-Russia-China relations, one must look beyond Moscow, Beijing, and Canberra, but rather at Vladivostok and Darwin, symbols of an as-yet unrealized goal to shift emphasis onto each country’s sparsely-populated regions bordering the Asia-Pacific. With the dawning of the “Asian Century,” how does the United States change the geopolitical dynamics of the region, and how do China, Russia, and Australia react to “America’s Pacific Century”? Rather than a capitulation to America’s aggressive posture in the Asia-Pacific, China and Russia have consolidated the integration of their economies and militaries to counter such penetration. This emerging rivalry creates a challenge for Australia to balance its military alliance with the United States and its economic reliance on China. The necessity of finetuning this balance should be Canberra’s primary foreign policy issue.

Relations between Russia and Turkey have gone through five centuries at different stages, sometimes in difficult wars and conflicts, sometimes in harmony and good relations. However, conditions changed in the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was weakened and disintegrated. Russia played an important role in cutting down parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as in reducing the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, which was considered a great nation for centuries. At the end of the First World War, after the victory of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Russian troops withdrew from the war fronts. The Bolshevik government exposed the secret clauses of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, with the Quadruple Alliance, led by Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire, like its German ally, took advantage of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the war fronts. In contrast to the agreement, attacks were launched on the Caucasus regions controlled by Russian Russia. However, following the emergence of the Turkish National Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal and the signing of the Sevre Treaty and there were changes in the war fronts, as in the political arena. Russia, which became Soviet Russia at that time, found a new friend and ally, which had common interests with Soviet Russia, against the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. Both countries have benefited from this friendship and alliance. But at a time when the Kurds, especially in the Ottoman Kurdistan, had a chance to move towards achieving their goals and national rights, and at least making some progress in accordance with the provisions of the Sovereign Convention on the Rights of the Kurds. As the first country to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Turkey with the help of the Kemalist Movement in various ways, Russia, as well as economic, industrial and mining assistance, became a great supporter of Turkey in international and diplomatic forums. All this, along with many other factors, helped the Republic of Turkey stand on its own feet. When the revolutions and movements against the injustice and tyranny of the Turks occurred in Northern Kurdistan in the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet Russia sided with all possible means, military and political, as well as the Turkish Republic. Which brutally suppressed these uprisings and every move of a Kurdish nationalist nature.

In the first decade of the 21st century, Moscow and Beijing made two strategic decisions to expand and deepen bilateral economic relations. The first one was to endorse diversified energy partnership. The second was centered on cross-border area and has been offered in the program of regional cooperation between Russian and Chinese border regions. However, basic methodological illogicality between estimations and expectations in Russia–China economic relations has smashed the good intentions of both sides. Recommendations for the governments to develop economic relations were theoretically correct, but mostly generalized and abstract in nature. Subsequently, these relations had not found a stable ground and were undermined by numerous internal and outside factors, positive and negative. A narrow range of trade articles made Russian–Chinese exchange dependent on the demand and prices for these goods, and small mutual investments slightly influenced an economic exchange between two countries. In spite of a number of decisions related to cross-border and inter-regional relations accepted at the top level, these relations are still the weakest link in bilateral ties. Mutual investments and modern forms of economic cooperation did not flourish along the border also. Moreover, economic troubles in Russia of 2014–2016 have hampered the cross-border relations seriously, while Heilongjiang Province being the intermediary between many Chinese territories and Russia has become the biggest loser on the Chinese side. In spite of all problems in economic cooperation between Russia and China, today, China is the no. 1 trade partner of Russia and Russia is the no. 1 supplier of oil to China. Their energy alliance has strengthened both countries’ statuses in their economic interaction: the position of raw material supplier for Russia and the exporter of manufactured goods to Russia for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Western sanctions amplified the Chinese high-tech goods export to Russia; China’s share in Pacific Russia’s foreign trade increased from 29.2% in 2014 to 33.4% in 2017 and the peoples’ mood in this region moved in favor of China. However, by the end of second decade of the 21st century, Russia’s and China’s favorable “economic complementarities” and geographic proximity happened to remain a virtual product of academic’s intellectual exercises and have not transformed into the genuine economic cooperation. This is because, on the one hand, the philosophy, political and cultural infrastructures of Russia–China economic relations did not change much since 1990s, and, on the other hand, of some domestic and international factors that prevented this transformation.