Academic literature on the topic 'Grand Council Treaty no. 9'

October and November 1960 were two of the coldest months of the Cold War. Continuing tensions over Berlin and the nuclear balance were exacerbated by crises in Laos, Congo, and—for the first time—France's rebellious départements in Algeria. During Nikita Khrushchev's table-pounding visit to the United Nations, he embraced Belkacem Krim, the foreign minister of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA). After mugging for the cameras at the Soviet estate in Glen Cove, New York, Khrushchev confirmed that this constituted de facto recognition of the provisional government and pledged all possible aid. Meanwhile, in Beijing, President Ferhat Abbas delivered the GPRA's first formal request for Chinese “volunteers.” U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked his National Security Council “whether such intervention would not mean war.” The council agreed that if communist regulars infiltrated Algeria, the United States would be bound by the North Atlantic Treaty to come to the aid of French President Charles de Gaulle and his beleaguered government. After six years of insurgency, Algeria appeared to be on the brink of becoming a Cold War battleground.1

The Conclusions Reached at the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht, on 9 — 10 December 1991, on economic and monetary union and also on political union, form an impressive and complex whole, in which undertakings of major importance coexist with other more timid ones. A detailed analysis would overstep the limits of an article. Moreover, there are still some problems to be cleared up before the final drafts are agreed, even if the principal political decisions have already been taken. The remarks which I would like to submit here will therefore deal more with general questions, and I will limit myself to the more significant provisions of the Maastricht agreements.

On 1 January 1995 Austria became a member of the European Union. Austria’s accession to the EU constituted the most important transfer of jurisdiction in the history of the Federal Constitution. On this occasion the Austrian legislature passed an amendment to the Federal Constitution which provides for the participation of Austrian organs in the decision-making process of the European Union. The legal basis of Austria’s membership in the EU is the treaty on accession to the European Union and the special constitutional bill authorizing the competent authorities to ratify the treaty on accession. First of all, provisions on the election of Austrian members to the European Parliament were introduced by the amendment into the Constitution. Secondly, the amendment contains a procedure for participation of the Austrian lands and local governments in the decisions of the European Union. Thirdly, the legislative bodies on the central government level (National Council and Federal Council) are also accorded the right to participate in decision-making of the EU. Finally, a special provision confirming Austria’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union was introduced.

Gregory IX is rarely associated with the affairs of the Holy Land. In fact, he is most widely known for initiating the conflict between imperial and papal authority which was to occupy European society for most of the thirteenth century. After all, the conflict with Emperor Frederick II had been among the defining features of Gregory’s pontificate. In September 1227, barely six months into office, he excommunicated Frederick, and in 1241 he died after a failed attempt to try Frederick before a general council. Consequently, the period of concord between 1230, when peace was made with Frederick in the Treaty of San Germano, and March 1239, when the Emperor was excommunicated for a second time, has been described as an interlude, a breathing space, allowing both Frederick and Gregory to muster the means and arguments for their final show-down.

Objective:To describe with prospective methodology the therapeutic response to clonazepam or paroxetine in a 3-year treatment of panic disorder (PD).Methods:A total of 120 PD outpatients (DSM-IV) were openly treated with clonazepam or paroxetine for 8 weeks. Those who responded entered a 3-year follow-up. Demographic and clinical features were compared in the two groups.Results:Efficacy was evaluated by Intent to treat, last value carried forward. The Hamilton Scale for Anxiety (HAMA) did not differ between the groups at baseline and during the first two months. In the acute treatment phase and at the end of the long-term follow-up both groups had a significant and similar response - 86.8% of the clonazepam group and 73.0% of the paroxetine group had a complete remission of panic attacks. The mean dose for clonazepam was 1.9 ± 0.2 mg/day and for paroxetine 33.8 ± 9.8 mg/day. There was no difference in the scale scores, and the reduction in panic attacks from baseline to end-point did not differ significantly between the groups. The most common adverse events during treatment were tremor/shaking, nausea/vomiting, sexual dysfunction and appetite/weight change in the paroxetine group and drowsiness, sexual dysfunction and memory/concentration complains in the clonazepam group.Conclusion:PD patients using clonazepam or paroxetine had an equivalent response during acute and long term treatment. The patients using clonazepam had significantly less side effects than the paroxetine group.Acknowledgements: Brazilian Council for scientific and technological development (CNPq).Grant: 554411/2005-9.

AbstractIn the new post-Cold War security era, there is a perception that the nature of cross-border security threats has changed. The need to respond to these new threats has led to a proliferation of multilateral international and regional treaties in this area, as well as unilateral demands made by the United States post-9/11. We have, then, seen a process of globalisation of criminal law, a field traditionally linked to State sovereignty. This chapter examines, first, EU action with regard to UN multilateral conventions and the impact of those conventions on internal EU law, as well as the impact of EU action within the framework of the regional treaties of the Council of Europe; secondly, the interrelationship between Union law and the global production of norms in criminal matters by the UN Security Council and by the Financial Action Task Force; thirdly, bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US, in particular in connection with the transfer of Passenger Name Records data; fourthly, the question of compliance by the EU in this area, in both the internal and the external context; and, fifthly, the Court of Justice’s approach to the protection of fundamental rights when global criminal law is engaged. The EU has managed to take centre stage in international developments in the field of global criminal law through a clear commitment to multilateral negotiations as well as a clear political will to implement at the Union level norms agreed internationally without a high degree of transparency. The Court of Justice has also been reluctant to overturn Union security decisions in the name of fundamental rights. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty will eliminate some complexity in this area, but not all, and it still remains to be seen whether in the process of globalisation of criminal law the European values proclaimed in Article 2 of the new EU Treaty will be promoted or compromised.

Abstract In the new post-Cold War security era, there is a perception that the nature of cross-border security threats has changed. The need to respond to these new threats has led to a proliferation of multilateral international and regional treaties in this area, as well as unilateral demands made by the United States post-9/11. We have, then, seen a process of globalisation of criminal law, a field traditionally linked to State sovereignty. This chapter examines, first, EU action with regard to UN multilateral conventions and the impact of those conventions on internal EU law, as well as the impact of EU action within the framework of the regional treaties of the Council of Europe; secondly, the interrelationship between Union law and the global production of norms in criminal matters by the UN Security Council and by the Financial Action Task Force; thirdly, bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US, in particular in connection with the transfer of Passenger Name Records data; fourthly, the question of compliance by the EU in this area, in both the internal and the external context; and, fifthly, the Court of Justice’s approach to the protection of fundamental rights when global criminal law is engaged. The EU has managed to take centre stage in international developments in the field of global criminal law through a clear commitment to multilateral negotiations as well as a clear political will to implement at the Union level norms agreed internationally without a high degree of transparency. The Court of Justice has also been reluctant to overturn Union security decisions in the name of fundamental rights. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty will eliminate some complexity in this area, but not all, and it still remains to be seen whether in the process of globalisation of criminal law the European values proclaimed in Article 2 of the new EU Treaty will be promoted or compromised.

On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.

On September 11, 2019, twelve states parties invoked the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), because they considered the crisis in Venezuela to have a destabilizing impact on the peace and security of the hemisphere. Venezuela was one of the twelve, voting in favor; this was because, on April 9, 2019, the Organization of American States (OAS) formally recognized Juan Guaido's representative, Gustavo Tarre, in lieu of Nicolas Maduro's Ambassador. At the OAS General Assembly in June, Tarre's appointment was approved in a much contested and heated session. The OAS has thirty-five member states and approximately one-third of its membership supported the invocation of the TIAR. The TIAR is the OAS's mutual defense pact; it was last invoked following the events of September 11, 2001. Article 5 of the NATO Charter, calling for collective action in the case of an armed attack on one member, is derived from Article 3 of the TIAR. Following invocation of the TIAR, the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the OAS equivalent to the UN Security Council, but without veto power) held its 30th meeting in New York City during the UN General Assembly. The result of that meeting was the adoption of the Resolution under consideration here.

This article reveals the existence of a hitherto unknown Black Chamber in the Dutch Republic and the identity of its principal codebreaker, Abel Tasien d'Alonne (1646–1723), acting also as private secretary to Grand Pensionary Heinsius. On the basis of an analysis of a number of previously unidentified worksheets, three cases are put together that merited d'Alonne's attention, one related to a French diplomat at the court of the Bavarian Elector during the years 1707–9, one related to an undercover agent of the Bavarian Elector in the Dutch Republic during the years 1711–12 and one related to a French emissary to the state council in Brussels during the period 1714–15. The emergence of a Black Chamber in The Hague is remarkable because the Dutch could always call upon the Black Chamber of Hanover for the solution of any intercepted, coded documents. This indicates that the development of inter-allied relations during the war played a more important role in the rise of the Dutch Black Chamber than one would expect.

The thesis examines the international law pertaining to the use of force by states, in general, and to the use of force in self-defence, in particular. The main question addressed is whether the use of force, which was purported to be in self-defence, by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was lawful. The thesis focuses not only on this specific use of force, but also on the changing nature of conflict, the definition of terrorism and on the historical evolution of limitations on the use of force, from antiquity until 2006. In the six chapters which trace the epochs of international law, the progression of five inter-related concepts is followed: limitations on the resort to force generally, the use of force in self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, the use of forcible measures short of war, and the use of force in response to non-state actors. This historical analysis includes a particular emphasis on understanding the meaning of the 'inherent right of self-defence', which was preserved by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter. This analysis is then applied to the use of force against Afghanistan which occurred in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US and the UK notified the United Nations Security Council of their resort to force in self-defence under Article 51. Each element of Article 51 is analysed and the thesis concludes that there are significant doubts as to the lawfulness of that decision to employ force. In addition to the self-defence justification, other possible grounds for intervention are also examined, such as humanitarian intervention, Security Council authorisation and intervention by invitation. This thesis challenges the common assumption that the use of force against Afghanistan was an example of states exercising their inherent right to self-defence. It argues that if this particular use of force is not challenged, it will lead to an expansion of the right of self-defence which will hinder rather than enhance international peace and security. Finally, this thesis draws on recent examples to illustrate the point that the use of force against Afghanistan could become a dangerous precedent for the use of force in self-defence.

This chapter traces the development of EU law-based fundamental rights, from early Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law up to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It considers the EU's relationship with the Council of Europe, focusing on how the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) attempt to avoid conflicting interpretations of overlapping rights, and whether the EU can in fact sign up to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is important to remember that the ECtHR and the ECHR are not part of EU law. The ECHR is an international human rights treaty administered by the Council of Europe. It is applied and interpreted by the ECtHR, and is transcribed into UK law in the form of the Human Rights Act 1998. The EU, meanwhile, has the Charter of Fundamental Rights as its human rights ‘treaty’. The chapter then looks at the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR, and examines post-Brexit fundamental rights.

This chapter provides an overview of the treaty-making procedures in the European Union. It explains the historical evolution of primary law in the field and gives examples for each step under Article 218 TFEU (negotiation, signature, provisional application, and conclusion). Excerpts of European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law illustrate how these provisions are interpreted and applied in practice. The chapter also discusses the principles covering suspension and termination of EU agreements, and the ever more important system that allows the EU to contribute to the adoption of international secondary law under Article 218, paragraph 9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A final section describes EU practice for adopting non-legally binding instruments and reproduces the new guidance of December 2017 issued by the Council and the Commission in this respect after the ECJ’s judgment in the case relating to the EU–Swiss Memorandum of Understanding.

This chapter examines two important developments in the history of the European Union (EU): the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. In June 1989, the European Council agreed to European Commission President Jacques Delors’s three-stage plan for monetary union by 1999, despite British opposition. In 1991, intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) were held on both monetary union and political union. The proposals of these IGCs were incorporated into the Treaty on European Union (TEU), agreed at Maastricht in December 1991. The TEU marked a major step on the road to European integration. It committed most of the member states to adopting a single currency and introduced the concept of European citizenship, among others. This chapter considers the events leading up to the signing of the TEU, from the Maastricht negotiations to the issue of enlargement, the 1996 IGC, and the Treaty of Amsterdam.

This chapter examines two important developments in the history of the European Union: the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. In June 1989, the European Council agreed to European Commission president Jacques Delors’s three-stage plan for monetary union by 1999, despite British opposition. In 1991, intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) were held on both monetary union and political union. The proposals of these IGCs were incorporated into the Treaty on European Union (TEU), agreed at Maastricht in December 1991. The TEU marked a major step on the road to European integration. It committed most of the member states to adopting a single currency and introduced the concept of European citizenship, among others. The chapter considers the events leading up to the signing of the TEU, from the Maastricht negotiations to the issue of enlargement, the 1996 IGC, and the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Corruption, generally speaking, can be defined as “abuse of power for private gain” that can be classified as grand, petty, and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. Therefore, it is a phenomenon that compromises rule of law, weakens public institutions and democracy, impacting negatively on productivity and economy. Indeed, because of all these implications, it can be analyzed stressing social, economic, politic, or legal perspectives. These features have allowed experts from different fields to investigate the phenomenon, which does not exclusively concern conduct punishable by criminal law, but also conduct that can be considered just an “expression of maladministration” in both the public and private sectors. This chapter seeks to address the legal aspect of corruption. In particular, it overviews the main anti-corruption measures international community has adopted in recent years. By showing the evolution and steps that led to the actual treaty situation, the Authors offer a hint on the goals achieved and those to be achieved.

This chapter describes the relationship between the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA; the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) and the Hague Principles. OHADA is an African supranational organization which was created on October 17, 1993. As per the Preamble and Article 1 of the OHADA Treaty, OHADA aims at creating simple, modern, and harmonized business law rules in Africa. To achieve this goal, OHADA has five institutions: (i) the Conference of Heads of State and Government; (ii) the Council of Ministers; (iii) the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration; (iv) the Regional Training Centre for Legal Officers; and (v) the Permanent Secretariat. Uniform Acts are the main instrument of OHADA. To understand the rules governing choice of law in commercial international contracts under OHADA law, it is important to examine the relation between the acts of OHADA (Uniform Acts and regulations) and the domestic law of the Member States. Meanwhile, there is no uniform codification of private international law under OHADA law. The chapter then explains that the Working Group on the Preliminary Draft Uniform Act on the Law of Obligations in the OHADA Region in 2015 did not use the Hague Principles, and why this omission should be reversed.