Academic literature on the topic 'Islamiska influenser'
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Journal articles on the topic "Islamiska influenser"
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Ilmi, Robby Hidayatul, and Ahmad Fauzi. "Pergeseran Paradigma Tafsir Islamis di Indonesia (Studi Kasus Mohammad Natsir dan Felix Y Siauw)." Mashdar: Jurnal Studi Al-Qur'an dan Hadis 4, no. 2 (December 31, 2022): 175–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.15548/mashdar.v4i2.4525.
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Islamists have always been defined by two categories, politically they want to unite religion and state and religiously they are literalists. This article will re-examine these two theses by assuming that not all islamists are literalists. Using descriptive-analytical method, this article will compare the interpretation of two prominent islamists leaders, Mohammad Natsir (early Islamist) and Felix Y Siauw (contemporary Islamist). Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics will be used as an analytical method whereas Abdul Mustaqim's epistemological classification of tafsiir will be used to map those islamist thoughts among other scholars. This article found, firstly, that not all islamists understand the Qur'an literally. Islamists are the same as literalists was produced by research that take sample on post-Soeharto Islamists. Second, there is a shift in the paradigm of islamists interpretation. The early phase of Islamists tended to be more contextual and influenced by early islamic reform. As for contemporary Islamists, they tend to be textual and militant. This research has shown that it is necessary to study these islamists, especially their understanding of Qur’anic text.
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IBRAHIM, Gusti Haikal, and Myrna LAKSMAN-HUNTLEY. "Marine Le Pen anti-islamism propaganda." FRANCISOLA 8, no. 2 (December 20, 2023): 72–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.17509/francisola.v8i2.67836.
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RÉSUMÉ. L'islamisme est une doctrine politique qui poursuit l'application exclusive des valeurs islamiques dans la politique et la société. En tant que question de sécurité de l'État, l'islamisme est également devenu une préoccupation politique pour le gouvernement français, y compris Marine Le Pen, pour le combattre sous forme de propagande. Cette recherche vise à montrer que Marine Le Pen utilise la structure des phrases dans l'une de ses interviews dans l'émission politique en direct Le Grand Jury pour propager publiquement l'anti-islamisme afin qu'il puisse influencer l'opinion publique française. Cette recherche qualitative utilise la théorie syntaxique de Le Querler (1994), la théorie de la propagande politique de Malraux (1928) et les composantes du sens de Leech (1981). Les résultats de la recherche ont révélé que la structure de phrase dominante utilisée par Marine Le Pen est constituée de phrases complexes, de sorte que la présentation de ses idées de propagande devient plus holistique, claire et pleine d'emphase, ne laissant aucune place au public pour réfléchir à nouveau aux raisons pour lesquelles la France devrait commencer à se battre l'idéologie de l'islamisme. Les éléments de peur, de diabolisation et de harcèlement contenus dans les peines sont des outils de propagande politique utilisés pour convaincre. Ainsi, à travers l’explication de la structure de la phrase et l’utilisation d’outils de propagande politique, il est prouvé que ce discours a été utilisé pour propager le mouvement islamiste et a réussi à accroître son éligibilité face aux élections de 2022.Mots-clés : Islamisme, Marine Le Pen, Propagande, Structure des phrases ABSTRACT. Islamism is a political movement or doctrine that pursues the exclusive application of Islamic values in politics and society. As a state security issue, Islamism has also become a political concern for the French government, including Marine Le Pen, to fight against in the form of propaganda. This research aims to show Marine Le Pen’s use of sentence structure in one of her interviews in the live political broadcast Le Grand Jury to publicly propagate anti-Islamism so that it might influence the French public. This qualitative research uses syntactic theory by Le Querler (1994), Malraux's political propaganda theory (1928), and Leech's (1981) components of meaning. The research results found that the dominant sentence structure used by Marine Le Pen involves phrase complexes so that the delivery of her propaganda ideas becomes more holistic, clear, and full of emphasis, leaving no room for the public to question why France should start fighting the ideology of Islamism. The elements of fear, demonization and harassment in sentences are the political propaganda tools used to persuade. Thus, through the explanation of the sentence structure and the use of political propaganda tools, it is proven that this speech was used to propagate the Islamist movement and succeeded in increasing its electability in the 2022 elections.Keywords: Islamism, Marine Le Pen, Propaganda, Sentence structure
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Baugut, Philip, and Katharina Neumann. "Online news media and propaganda influence on radicalized individuals: Findings from interviews with Islamist prisoners and former Islamists." New Media & Society 22, no. 8 (October 10, 2019): 1437–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444819879423.
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This study is the first to explore the twin influences of online propaganda and news media on Islamists. We conducted 44 in-depth interviews with cognitively and behaviorally radicalized Islamist prisoners in Austria as well as former Islamists in Germany and Austria. We found that online propaganda and news media had interdependent influences on Islamists’ rejections of non-Muslims and Western politics, as well as on their willingness to use violence and commit suicide. Cognitively radicalized individuals were influenced by propaganda that blamed non-Muslims for opposing Islam; this was reinforced by online mainstream news reports of right-wing populism and extremism that propagandists selectively distributed via social media. Among behaviorally radicalized individuals, exposure to propaganda and news reports depicting Muslim war victims contributed to the radicalized individuals’ willingness to use violence. Moreover, propaganda and media reports that extensively personalized perpetrators of violence strengthened radicalized individuals’ motivations to imitate the use of violence.
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Bohdan, Siarhei. ""They Were Going Together with the Ikhwan": The Influence of Muslim Brotherhood Thinkers on Shi'i Islamists during the Cold War." Middle East Journal 74, no. 2 (August 1, 2020): 243–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/74.2.14.
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By analyzing the interest displayed by the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in writings by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, this article shows how the Shi'i Islamist movement in Iran and Afghanistan was both transnational and influenced by Sunni Islamists in the Arab world. Using mostly Iranian and Afghan sources, this article discusses these influences through the notion of Islamic revolutionary ecumenism. While much attention has been given to Khomeini's call to "export" Iran's Islamic Revolution, this article shows some of the ways his own followers "imported" their ideology.
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Barnett, Carolyn. "The Socialization of Female Islamists: Paternal and Educational Influence." Hawwa 7, no. 1 (2009): 57–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920809x449544.
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AbstractMany women have played an important role in Islamic renewal as advocates and activists within Islamist movements and parties. Women's participation is of particular interest, given the reputation of these groups as insufficiently supportive of women's rights. The specific influences and experiences that lead women to approach their own empowerment through Islam and to reform Islamist movements from within have been neglected. This article investigates some of the important influences on two prominent female Islamists: Heba Raouf Ezzat, Professor of Political Science at Cairo University, and Nadia Yassine, founder and head of the women's branch of the Moroccan movement Justice and Spirituality (JSA). First and foremost, it overviews the circumstances in which prominent women in Egypt and Morocco have asserted themselves in the past century, highlighting the consistent importance of paternal influence and the expansion of access to education, as well as the evolving role of religion and religious discourse in arguments for women's rights. This article discusses the role of paternal influence and schooling as agents of political socialization, pointing out that scholars have underestimated the important role that fathers play in strongly patriarchal societies and the ability of schools in former colonies to produce anti colonial and nationalist political sentiments. It then turns to Ezzat and Yassine themselves, presenting in detail the influence their fathers and foreign schools had on their political socialization. Both fathers held progressive views on women's education, but they differed in their specific political views, such as their attitude towards Islamism, and the extent to which they sought to transfer their political views to their daughters. This article ends by discussing the role of foreign education in Ezzat's and Yassine's socialization and identity construction, emphasizing the importance of encounters with racist and condescending attitudes as a contributing factor to women's search for Islamic alternatives.
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Palamar, Antonіі. "The Influence of Religion on the Political Situation in Egypt in 2011–2013: "Political Islam" and "Islamic Fundamentalism"." Grani 24, no. 1 (January 31, 2021): 58–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/172106.
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The influence of religion on politics is inherent not only to the Islamic world, however, none of political theorist should ignore the role of Islam in Muslims’ public life, its impact on the policies of Muslim nations and the global geopolitical situation. Due to its historical uniqueness Modern Islam is not only a religion but also a way of life for the vast majority of Muslims and the basis of their civilizational and even national self-identification. Therefore, the role of religion in the Muslim world is different to that of countries, mostly populated by Christians, as Christianity is legally separated from the system of public administration in European countries. Islam, on the other hand, regulates not only the sociocultural sphere of society, including human relations, but also significantly affects the socio-political life of many Muslim countries, where Islamist movements have now become the major part this sphere.In Egypt, where authoritarian secular regime of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown during the revolution, Islamists took the lead in the protest movement, won the first democratic elections and used the opportunity to lead the country after nearly 60 years of underground activity. This paper examines the influence of the religious factor on the change of Egypt’s political regime in 2011-2013 by conceptualizing the terms of “political Islam” and “Islamic fundamentalism.” The author concludes that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party should not be defined as “fundamentalists” because: 1. they don’t try to return to a “righteous caliphate,” Sharia, and a literal perception of the sacred texts; 2. the Brothers could not be viewed as the most conservative force among Islamists, while Salafists are properly rightly considered to be; 3. the association is considered as a part of moderate Islamism, an ideology that does not mandate any the use of armed methods of struggle. At the same time, the author argues that owing to the fact that Egyptian “Muslim Brotherhood” adhered to moderate Islamism as an ideological party basis, it became a decisive reason that provided them a venue at the top tier of the government in 2011-2013.
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Maula, Bani Syarif. "The State Legal Policies on Sharia Application in Changing Pattern of Indonesia’s Islamic Movements." Al Hurriyah : Jurnal Hukum Islam 7, no. 1 (July 12, 2022): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.30983/alhurriyah.v7i1.5455.
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<p><span>Legal politics are inextricably linked to power politics. Political dynamics in Indonesia are always colored by the dynamics of Islamic politics, as most Indonesians' political aspirations are influenced by Islamic views. This paper examines the evolution of Islamic law in the modern Indonesian democratic system, particularly after the reform era. Indonesia's democratisation gave rise to freedom of expression and opinion. Even today, Islamic conservatism is growing in Indonesia, but this does not mean that radical Islamist groups are gaining strength. Many political organisations, including Islamic parties and other Islamic movements, have liberated themselves and broadened their organisational philosophies in order to address broader issues and concerns. While maintaining their Islamic identity, some Islamic groups are turning towards the secularization of their goals and objectives as a means of adapting to the changing political environment. Political analysts refer to this development as post-Islamism. The current direction of Islamic politics is more accommodating aspects of democracy but still highlights its Islamic sides. This makes the government more accommodative to laws and regulations based on Islamic teachings.</span></p><p><span><em><span>Politik hukum tidak lepas dari aspek-aspek politik kekuasaan. Di Indonesia, dinamika politik juga tidak lepas dari politik Islam, karena aspirasi politik sebagian besar masyarakat Indonesia dipengaruhi oleh pandangan Islam. Makalah ini membahas tentang perkembangan hukum Islam dalam sistem demokrasi Indonesia kontemporer, terutama setelah masa reformasi. Demokratisasi Indonesia memunculkan kebebasan berpendapat dan berekspresi. Bahkan saat ini konservatisme Islam di Indonesia semakin meningkat, namun hal itu bukan berarti menguatnya kelompok Islamis radikal. Banyak organisasi politik termasuk partai Islam dan gerakan-gerakan Islam lainnya melakukan pembebasan diri dan melakukan keterbukaan filosofi organisasi mereka untuk mengakomodasi berbagai masalah dan keprihatinan yang lebih luas. Sambil mempertahankan identitas keislamannya, beberapa kelompok Islam beralih ke arah sekularisasi tujuan dan sasaran mereka sebagai sarana untuk beradaptasi dengan lingkungan politik yang berubah. Analis politik menyebut perkembangan ini sebagai post-Islamisme. Arah politik Islam saat ini lebih mengakomodasi aspek-aspek demokrasi namun tetap menonjolkan sisi keislamannya. Hal ini membuat pemerintah lebih bersikap akomodatif terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlandaskan ajaran Islam.</span></em></span></p>
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Dobaev, I. "Islamic Terror Organizations in Northern Caucasus: Influence of Exogenous Factor." World Economy and International Relations, no. 10 (2012): 13–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2012-10-13-20.
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Modern terrorism does not lock itself in the framework of a particular region. The activities of certain terror groups is extremely decentralized, there is a regular communication via the Internet. This particularly applies to radical Islamist groups. Terrorists flow from one country to another, the youth is travelling for study in spiritual centers of Islamic education in Arab countries. The article is devoted to the analysis of the Caucasus Emirate which turned to become an important network structure of radical Islamists.
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Haryanto, Agus, Saras Ikhtia Maulida, and Arief Bakhtiar Darmawan. "The Influence of AKP Party on Turkey’s State Identity during Erdogan Administration." Jurnal Global & Strategis 13, no. 2 (November 25, 2019): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jgs.13.2.2019.93-107.
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ABSTRAK Penelitian ini menjelaskan pengaruh partai Adelete Ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) terhadap identitas negara (state identity) Turki pada tahun 2002-2018. Penelitian ini fokus kepada perubahan yang dilakukan AKP terhadap identitas negara Turki pada tahun 2002-2018. 2002 yang merupakan awal pemerintahan Turki dibawah AKP, serta dibatasi pada tahun 2018 yang merupakan batas penulis dalam meneliti dikarenakan keterbatasan waktu, mengingat AKP dan Erdogan masih memerintah sampai saat ini. Penelitian ini menggunakan konsep state identity oleh Maxym Alexandrov yang merekonseptualisasikan state identity agar lebih komprehensif. Penulis juga menggunakan teori peran (role theory) untuk melihat peran kelompok AKP dalam kebijakan luar negeri Turki. Jenis penelitian ini ialah penelitian kualitatif. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian, AKP berhasil membentuk state identity baru yang mendasarkan pada nilai-nilai sejarah, budaya dan sosialisasi masyarakat Turki. Namun, conservative democratic ini tidak sesuai dengan apa yang diharapkan sebelumnya. AKP menggunakan strategi politik populisme, yang mana ia memiliki ruang untuk ideologi lain dalam ideologi conservative democratic, yaitu Islamisme. Hal ini terlihat dari berbagai kebijakan dalam dan luar negerinya, rezim Erdogan menjadi pemerintahan yang otoriter ke dalam, namun Islamis ke luar. Turki mencoba untuk menjadi pemimpin regional dan mengambil peran dalam komunitas negara-negara Islam. Erdogan dianggap memanfaatkan demokrasi sebagai batu loncatan untuk membentuk negara Islam. Kata kunci: Adelete Ve Kalkinma Partisi, identitas negara, Erdogan, teori peran, Turki This study explains the influence of Adelete Ve Kalkinma Partition (AKP) party on Turkish state identity in 2002-2018. This research focuses on the changes made by the AKP to Turkish state identity in 2002-2018. 2002 which was the beginning of the Turkish government under the AKP, and was limited to 2017 which was the author's boundary in research due to time constraints, considering that the AKP and Erdogan still governed until now. This research uses the concept of the state identity approach by Maxym Alexandrov who reconceptualizes the state identity to be more comprehensive. The authors also use role theory to see the role of the AKP group in Turkish foreign policy. This type of research is qualitative research. Based on the results of the research, the AKP succeeded in forming a new state identity based on the historical, cultural and socialization values of Turkish society. However, conservative democratic is not in accordance with what was previously expected. The AKP uses a political strategy of populism, where it has room for other ideologies in conservative democratic ideology, there is Islamism in it. This can be seen from various internal and foreign policies, Erdogan's regime became an authoritarian government inward, but Islamists came out. Turkey tries to become a regional leader and take a role in the community of Islamic countries. Erdogan is considered to use democracy as a springboard to form an Islamic state. Keywords: Adelete Ve Kalkinma Partisi, Erdogan, role theory, state identity, Turkey
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Dolgov, Boris V. "The Islamist Challenge in the Greater Mediterranean." Vestnik RUDN. International Relations 21, no. 4 (December 27, 2021): 655–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2021-21-4-655-670.
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The article examines and analyzes the spread of Islamism or Political Islam movements in the Greater Mediterranean and their increasing influence on the socio-political situation in 2011-2021. The historical factors, which contributed to the emergence of the hearths of Islamic culture in the countries which entered the Arab Caliphate in the Greater Mediterranean parallel with the Antique centers of European civilization, are retrospectively exposed. The Islamist ideologues called the Ottoman Imperia the heir of the Arab Caliphate. The main doctrinal conceptions of Political Islam and its more influential movement Muslim Brotherhood (forbidden in Russia) are discovered. The factor of the Arab Spring, which considerably influenced the strengthening of the Islamist movements, as well as its continuation of the protests in the Arab countries in 2018-2021, is examined. The main attention is allotted to analyzing the actions of the Islamic movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts too. The influence of external actors, the most active of which was Turkey, is revealed. The author also analyzes the situation in the Arab-Muslim communities in the European Mediterranean on the example of France, where social-economic problems, aggravated by COVID-19, have contributed to the activation of radical Islamist elements. It is concluded that confronting the Islamist challenge is a complex and controversial task. Its solution depends on both forceful opposition to radical groups and an appropriate foreign policy. An important negative factor is the aggravation of socio-economic problems and crisis phenomena in the institutions of Western democracy, in response to which the ideologues of Islamism preach an alternative world order in the form of an Islamic state. At the moment the Western society and the countries which repeat its liberal model do not give a distinct response to this challenge.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Islamiska influenser"
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Pinheiro, Nuno Santos. "O islamismo e o arco ultrapassado na Península Ibérica-sua influência na arquitectura alentejana." Phd thesis, Instituições portuguesas -- UTL-Universidade Técnica de Lisboa -- -Faculdade de Arquitectura, 1990. http://dited.bn.pt:80/29768.
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Dimaksyan, Margarita. "Influences on Islamists : an analysis of radicalisation and terrorism in an Australian context." Thesis, Federation University Australia, 2021. http://researchonline.federation.edu.au/vital/access/HandleResolver/1959.17/175575.
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Terrorism has long existed throughout history. However the Islamist terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (known as 9/11) in the United States represented a fundamental turning point and a significant change in the terrorism landscape. Since 9/11, terrorism discourse has dominated not only the media, but also a sense of security and safety globally. Over a decade after 9/11, there was another significant shift with the declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 by terrorist organisation, Daesh. The atrocities committed by and in the name of this terrorist group sparked global outrage and horror and have had long lasting impacts around the world. Despite the fact that the conflict originated in the Middle East, the impact was felt domestically with a number of terrorist attacks perpetrated and planned in Australia in the name of an extremist neojihadist ideology. To understand Islamist terrorism in an Australian context, this thesis explores the factors which have influenced the radicalisation of domestic Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts. This is achieved having regard to the characteristics of 194 Islamist terrorists from Australia who engaged in a multitude of terrorist acts between 2001 and 2018 (either domestically or overseas), their motives and the role of social and familial networks on their radicalisation and involvement in terrorism. In responding to the central research question – In an Australian context, what has influenced the radicalisation of Islamist terrorists who have engaged in terrorist acts? – this thesis:Doctor of Philosophy
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Ennahi, Youssef. "De l’usage de l’influence et de la manipulation comme stratégies de communication politique chez les islamistes marocains : cas de M. Abdelilah Benkirane, Chef du gouvernement marocain (2011-2017)." Thesis, Sorbonne université, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SORUL103.
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A l’instar d’autres pays, le Printemps arabe s’est soldé au Maroc par l’accession des islamistes au pouvoir ; une victoire surprenante que d’aucuns mettent sur le compte de la capacité du PJD (parti islamiste) à surfer sur la vague des revendications populaires en prenant, à son propre compte, les doléances phares des manifestants, et ce, notamment par le biais de stratégies d’influence et de manipulation politiques. Mais l’arrivée du PJD à la tête de l’exécutif marocain aura surtout permis de révéler M. Benkirane, en tant que personnalité politique hors du commun ayant su imposer une communication politique fondamentalement différente de celles de ses prédécesseurs, mais également fondée sur un usage intensif de procédés d’influence et de manipulation. Car ce qui caractérise l’entrée de ce leader islamiste sur la scène politique marocaine par la plus haute des fonctions, c’est le fait qu’il s’est progressivement départi de sa communication d’opposant islamiste pour adopter une communication dotée de nouvelles orientations. Les principaux traits de cette nouvelle ligne politique sont le changement de position par rapport aux assises doctrinales majeures du PJD ainsi qu’une rétraction par rapport aux engagements brandis lors du Printemps arabe et de la campagne électorale des législatives de 2011. Ce changement d’orientation en matière de communication politique est, pensons-nous, l’œuvre manifeste de stratégies d’influence et de manipulation politiques que M. Benkirane orchestre subtilement. La présente thèse s’assigne pour objectif de mettre en exergue ces stratégies telles qu’elles sont à l’œuvre dans la communication politique de M. BenkiraneComparable to other countries in the region, the Arab Spring resulted in Morocco with the rise of Islamists to power ; a surprising victory that some justify as the ability of the PJD (Islamist party) to ride the wave of popular demands by taking, on its own, the main complaints of protesters using strategies of political influence and manipulation. The arrival of PJD as head of the Moroccan executive revealed Mr. Benkirane, as an outstanding political figure who knew how to impose a political communication fundamentally different from those of his predecessors founded on strong use of influence and manipulation methods. Indeed, what characterizes the entry of this Islamist leader on the Moroccan political scene is the fact that he progressively diverted his communication from an Islamist opponent to adopt a communication with new orientations. The main features of this new political line are the change of position to the major doctrinal foundations of the PJD as well as a withdrawal from the commitments made during the Arab Spring and the electoral campaign of 2011 elections. The orientation of Mr. Benkirane political communication is, I believe, the manifest subtle orchestration of strategies of influence and political manipulation. This dissertation aims to highlight these strategies as they are manifested in the political communication of Mr. Benkirane
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Saidin, Mohd Irwan Syazli Bin. "Between revolution and political stability : the perceptions and influences of the Arab Uprisings among the Islamist movements in Malaysia." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/34687.
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This thesis examines the attitude of Malaysia’s Islamist movements – (1) The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS); (2) The National Trust Party (AMANAH); (3) The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) and (4) the Malaysian Muslim Solidarity Front (ISMA) towards the 2011 Arab Uprisings events or popularly known as the ‘Arab Spring’ in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, it explores the knowledge and perceptions of selected Islamist movement activists, politicians and members in Malaysia towards the Arab Uprisings as well as considering how the events impact their activism, political approach and attitudes towards the issues of regime change, civil disobedience, political revolution, democracy, Islamism and political stability. This thesis also identifies a number lessons learnt by the Malaysian Islamists from the development of post-Arab Uprisings in the MENA region. The tendency of Malaysian Islamists to be influenced by the development in the Middle East and global political Islam are not seen as something new as evidently shown in the case of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. This popular event was known for its indirect impact on the political activism and approaches of PAS and ABIM in Malaysia back in the 1980-1990s, as well as inspiring many Malaysian Islamists to uphold the struggle of establishing an Islamic state in the country. Following the recent uprisings in several Arab states, which also witnesses the rise of Arab Islamist parties in securing a ruling power, these events have also been widely followed by the Malaysians in general and the Islamists in particular with great interest. Furthermore, the major involvement of Malaysian Islamists in a series of mass protests, popularly known in Malaysia as the “Bersih movement” (circa 2011-2016), against the ruling government, were perceived by numerous local and foreign journalists as an attempt to create a “Malaysian Spring” which inspired by the ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon for the sake of toppling the current regime. However, there have been strong opinions voiced by the Malaysian authorities and various local scholars suggesting that there was no basis for presuming an Arab Uprisings impact in the context of the Malaysian experience. This raises the question of the relationship between the Arab Uprisings and Malaysian Islamists. Nevertheless, no matter how relevant the questions raised between Malaysia’s Islamist movements and the ‘Arab Spring’, the central concern that needs to be highlighted is the extent to which Malaysian Islamists grasp the fundamental issues of the 2011 Arab Uprisings before jumping to any conclusion about the polemics of the “Malaysian Spring”. In so doing, both quantitative and qualitative methods were applied through a questionnaire based-survey which was conducted in Malaysia involving 530 respondents, primarily among the registered and active representative of Malaysian Islamist between the ages of 18 and 45, as well as 15 in-depth interviews with selected Malaysian Islamist activists and leaders ranging from those in opposition political parties (PAS and AMANAH) to those in non-government Islamist organisations (ABIM and ISMA). The survey of Malaysian Islamists’ attitudes towards the Arab Uprisings development covered a variety of dimensions, namely understanding the general issues about the Arab Uprisings’ phenomenon, factors that lead to the Uprisings, the role of Islamist movements, the influences of the Uprisings on Malaysia’s Islamist movements activism and finally lessons learnt from the Arab Uprisings. The data is statistically analysed with the assistance of the SPSS computer package, and by using a number of statistical procedures, such as frequencies and cross-tabulations. The outcome of this research shows that the majority of respondents have an outstanding knowledge on the Arab Uprisings which was mostly obtained via new social media such as Facebook and Twitter, along with mixed perceptions toward the events. Furthermore, they also reached an understanding that the uncertainties in the Arab world would eventually lead to another wave of uprisings in the long term. Speaking of the global impact of the Arab Uprisings events, some elements of political repression, coupled with corruption and power abuses (which some claimed to be practised by the Malaysian regime), led to a number of Malaysian Islamists believing that they were inspired by the acts of mass street protests during the Arab Uprisings. This inspiration came when they witnessed the ousting of several long-serving autocratic Arab rulers in their respective states by the Arab protesters. However, the fear of insecurity and political instability which is currently evident in the post-Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Syria and the Yemen led to many respondents favouring political stability rather than regime change. Most of the respondents were quite sceptical about the polemics of the “Malaysian Spring” as most of them neither disagreed nor agreed that the series of political rallies by the Bersih movement were an indirect effort to topple the ruling government which was ‘accused’ by several pro-government media, politicians and authorities in Malaysia. Overall, this empirical research found that the majority of Malaysian Islamists from PAS, ABIM, ISMA and AMANAH are supportive of a free and democratic elections as a relevant medium for political change, rather than overthrowing the current regime via civil disobedience, street demonstration, or ‘revolution’.
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Arènes, Claire. "Le programme PREVENT et les musulmans en Grande-Bretagne, enjeux et contradictions de la "prévention du terrorisme"." Thesis, Paris 3, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA030119.
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Les attentats du 7 juillet 2005, commis par quatre musulmans britanniques, placent la « radicalisation endogène », processus menant des Britanniques à apporter leur soutien au terrorisme, au centre des préoccupations du gouvernement. Cette recherche s’intéresse au paradoxe que constitue le programme de prévention de l’extrémisme violent (Prevent) formulé après ces attentats : supposé remédier au « manque d’intégration » des communautés musulmanes britanniques dans l’ethos national, il encourage de fait le financement d’initiatives portées par ou pour les musulmans. D’autre part, il prétend œuvrer à la construction de relations de confiance entre musulmans et institutions britanniques, mais place ces relations sous le prisme du contre-terrorisme. Le programme Prevent se place donc sous le signe d’une double ambivalence : renforcement d’une identité exclusive musulmane au lieu de faire primer une identité civique britannique, et « sécuritarisation » des rapports entre musulmans et institutions plutôt que construction d’une relation de confiance. Ce travail postule que ce décalage s’explique par la résurgence d’un cadre différentialiste propre à la Grande-Bretagne, où la société est vue comme composée de groupes ethno-culturels distincts. Ce cadre de pensée, qui a constitué la base des politiques de gestion de la diversité, a été réinvesti par les politiques de contre-terrorisme après 2005 pour « gagner les cœurs et les esprits » des populations dont se réclament les terroristes, et remobilisé par les acteurs de la mise en œuvre de Prevent à l’échelon local. Ce sont les apories de Prevent que sonde ce travail de thèse, en inscrivant cette stratégie dans la filiation des politiques de sécurité et de gestion de la diversité britanniques, et en la confrontant à sa mise en œuvre sur le terrainIn the wake of the July 7, 2005 London bombings, perpetrated by four British Muslims, the British government devised a policy, Prevent, aimed at preventing “home-grown radicalisation”, that is to say the process by which young Britons come to support and possibly engage in acts of terrorism. This work focusses on two contradictions embedded in Prevent. First, this policy is meant to facilitate the cultural integration of Muslims into the national community, but works in practice as a new mono-ethnic funding stream for which only associations headed by or working with Muslims can apply. Second, it aims at enhancing institutional engagement with Muslims but narrows down such engagement to counter-terrorism purposes. Therefore, Prevent reinforces exclusive forms of identification to a Muslim communal identity instead of favouring inclusion in a wider civic community, and it securitises institutional relations with Muslims rather than fostering trust. It is argued here that such contradictions arise from the legacy of previous approaches of ethnic diversity management in Britain, which are based on the assumption that society is made of distinct groups (communities) defined by their ethnicity. This culturalist pattern, which has been key in the building of anti-discrimination legislation and measures to support cultural diversity, has been reinvested lately by counter-terrorism policies aimed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the populations whose support is sought by the terrorists. It has then been reinforced by the practice of fieldworkers involved in the implementation of Prevent at the local level. This work discusses the implications of the paradoxical nature of the Prevent strategy, tracing it back to the legacy of previous policies and contrasting it with its implementation on the ground
Books on the topic "Islamiska influenser"
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Ådahl, Karin. Orientalismen i svensk konst: Islamiska föremål, förebilder och influenser i konst och konsthantverk. [Höganäs]: Wiken, 1990.
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Simposio internazionale sull'arte veneziana e l'arte islamica (1st 1986 Venice, Italy). Arte veneziana e arte islamica: Atti del Primo simposio internazionale sull'arte veneziana e l'arte islamica. Venezia: L'Altra Riva, 1989.
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Indonesia) Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (Jakarta. Anti-Ahok to anti-Jokowi: Islamist influence on Indonesia's 2019 election campaign. Jakarta, Indonesia]: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2019.
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Nolte, Ernst. L' eredità del nazionalsocialismo: Immigrazione di massa, guerre balcaniche, islamismo. 2nd ed. Roma: Di Renzo, 2003.
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Castelnuovo, Antonella. Minoranze religiose e cultura europea: Ebraismo, protestantesimo, islamismo nelle forme simboliche dell'Occidente. Milano, Italy: FrancoAngeli, 1999.
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Bellafiore, Giuseppe. Architettura in Sicilia nelle età islamica e normanna (827-1194). Palermo: A. Lombardi, 1990.
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Ambrosetti, Nadia. L'eredità arabo-islamica nelle scienze e nelle arti del calcolo dell'Europa medievale. Milano: LED, 2008.
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Doniselli, Isabella. Arte islamica in Italia: Influenza, ispirazione, imitazione : atti della Giornata di studi, Milano 11 giugno 2018. Milano: ICOO, Istituto di cultura per l'Oriente e l'Occidente, 2018.
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Agostino, Cilardo, ed. Atti del convegno sul tema : presenza araba e islamica in Campania (Napoli-Caserta, 22-25 novembre 1989). Napoli: Instituto Universitario Orientale, Dipartimento di Studi e Ricerche su Africa e Paesi Arabi, Dipartimento di Studi Asiatici, 1992.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Islamiska influenser"
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Tausch, Arno. "Introduction: What This Study Is Not and What It Aspires to Be." In Political Islam and Religiously Motivated Political Extremism, 1–5. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24854-2_1.
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AbstractThis study, financed by the Austrian “Dokumentationsstelle Politischer Islam”, attempts an analysis of what can be said about the phenomenon of “political Islam” in the Arab world and what can be said about religiously motivated political extremism (hereafter abbreviated RMPE) in an international comparison from the perspective of international, empirically oriented social sciences. We use open, internationally accessible data from the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey to analyse these two phenomena. In this chapter, we describe the general outline of our study. We emphasise that we follow the example of Cammett et al. (2020), in attempting to present our own empirical data from recognised social science surveys on political Islam. In doing so, the focus is on a tradition influenced by the mathematical logic and analytical philosophy of the Vienna Circle through Rudolf Carnap (1988), of relying on the extension of a contested concept. In our case—of “political Islam”—the research of the Arab Barometer as well as Francois Burgat, but also Jocelyne Cesari, John Esposito, Gilles Kepel and Oliver Roy have in any case very clearly outlined which important value patterns the adherents of political Islam represent (five items from the Arab Barometer) and which political movements and governments of countries can be assigned to the extension of the phenomenon, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sudan and Jordan, Jamaat-i-Islami in South Asia, the Refah Party in Turkey, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, al Nahda in Tunisia, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories and Gamaa Islamiyya and Jihad in Egypt. It is certainly also legitimate, in the light of the above literature, to describe the current AKP government in Turkey and the Islamist regime in Iran as “political Islam in power”. Our measurement of “political Islam” thus adopts this perspective without “ifs” and “buts” and 1:1. After all, according to the “Arab Barometer” team, “political Islam” occurs whenever the following opinions are held in the region: It is better for religious leaders to hold public office Religious leaders should influence government decisions Religious leaders are less corrupt than civilian ones Religious leaders should influence elections Religious practice is not a private matter.
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Muharam, Moch Mubarok, Mi’rojul Huda, and Agus Trilaksana. "Discourse and Action of Darul Ulum Jombang Islamic Boarding School to Prevent the Influence of Islamism (Intolerant) Thoughts and Movements." In Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, 1781–88. Paris: Atlantis Press SARL, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/978-2-38476-152-4_179.
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Tausch, Arno. "The Empirical Results of Our Empirical Study." In Political Islam and Religiously Motivated Political Extremism, 45–75. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24854-2_5.
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AbstractThe study clearly shows that identification with Turkey and Iran, with a political Islam that also influences elections and results in a theocracy, promotes religious and gender discrimination and advocates an Islamist interpretation of Islam, are very much the most important, interrelated syndromes of political Islam, which together explain more than 50% of the total variance of the 24 model variables used. If the states of Europe want to win the fight against jihadism, they must work closely with the moderate Arab states, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab Gulf states, and be aware that, on a population-weighted basis, 41% of all Arabs now view the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the strongest and most coherent force in political Islam today, negatively or very negatively. According to the data brought to light here, only 7% of people in the Arab world now have a high level of trust in their country's Islamist movement, while 14% have some trust, 19% have little trust, but 60% have no trust. Our overall index—Overcoming political Islam shows that Morocco and Tunisia are the top performers, while Iraq and Sudan bring up the rear. Following an important study by Falco and Rotondi (2016), we also explore the question of whether political Islam is more prevalent or less prevalent among the more than 20% of the Arab population who plan to emigrate in the coming years than among the population as a whole. Far from feeding alarmist horror scenarios, our evaluation shows firstly that Falco and Rotondi (2016) are correct in their thesis that among potential migrants to the West, political Islam is certainly less pronounced than among the Arab population as a whole. On a population-weighted basis, only 13.11% of potential migrants to the West openly state that they trust the country-specific Islamist movement. In the second part of our empirical evaluations, we explore religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) by international comparison on the basis of the following items of the World Values Survey, which are sparse but nevertheless available on this topic: The proportion of the global population who favour religious authorities in interpreting the law while accepting political violence is alarmingly high in various parts of the world and is raising fears of numerous conflicts in the coming years in an increasingly unstable world system. It amounts to more than half of the adult population in Tajikistan (the international record holder), and Malaysia and some non-Muslim-majority countries. In many countries, including NATO and EU member states, it is an alarming 25–50%, and we mention here the Muslim-majority countries Iraq, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Indonesia. It is 15–25% even in core countries of the Western security architecture, but also in the Muslim-majority countries: Pakistan, Iran and Tunisia. Only in the best-ranked countries, among them the Muslim-majority countries Albania, Egypt, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Jordan, the potentially fatal combination of mixing religion and law and accepting political violence has a relatively small following of less than 15%. In the sense of the theses of the late Harvard economist Alberto Alesina (1957–2020), social trust is an essential general production factor of any social order, and the institutions of national security of the democratic West would do well to make good use of this capital of trust that also exists among Muslims living in the West.
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"Islamist modernists." In Iran’s Influence. Zed Books Ltd, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350220843.ch-003.
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Karagiannis, Emmanuel. "Hizbullah and the Environment." In Why Islamists Go Green, 100–124. Edinburgh University Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781399506229.003.0005.
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Chapter 4 investigates the environmentalism of the Lebanese Shi’i group Hizbullah. It begins with its general perspective on the environment, which has been greatly influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini’s political theology. The chapter then considers water management, an issue of growing importance for Lebanon. It also describes the group’s understanding of trees, pollution and energy. Finally, the chapter scrutinizes the influence of religion on Hizbullah’s environmental policy.
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Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. "The Contested Terrain of Sufism." In Islam in Pakistan, 195–225. Princeton University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691149226.003.0007.
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This chapter considers other expressions of contestation in the religious sphere taking place on the once expansive terrain of Sufism. Long a core part of Muslim identity, Sufi practices, doctrines, and institutions have continued into modern times to exercise considerable influence not only on common people but also on the religious and political leaders of the community. Though many among the `ulama, including the reformists in their ranks, have often had a relatively seamless relationship with Sufism, the Islamists, too, and even the modernists have been receptive to the appeal of Sufism. Yet, the conditions of modernity, the claims of the modern state, and modernist and Islamist efforts to radically reshape Islam in a particular image, with some recent help from militant Islamist groups, have hit institutional Sufism hard. Sufism has some other vulnerabilities which have also contributed to a certain shrinking of the space it has traditionally occupied in this part of the world.
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Wilkinson, Benedict. "Saudi Arabia: Terror and Legitimacy." In Scripts of Terror, 59–82. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197521892.003.0003.
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This chapter examines the Saudi violent Islamist movement and the strategic scripts it resorted in the early 2000s. It explores how its’ strategists envisaged these scripts reaching their desired outcomes and how their strategies unfolded in practice. It begins by focusing on the way in which the attitudes of both bin Laden and Saudi Arabia’s non-violent Islamist movement towards the regime changed throughout the 1990s and how these changes significantly influenced his strategic vision for the Peninsula. It then examines the emergence of two contrasting strategic visions in the networks of Yusuf al-Uyayri and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and examines how these two visions were derived from scripts whose assumptions were flawed. The third section focuses on the ‘campaign of violence’ used by AQAP between 2003 and 2005 under the leadership of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and explores the structure and flaws in his three-stage script. The chapter concludes by examining the flaws and assumptions in these scripts Islamists and examines how these assumptions were translated into failed strategy, producing the ‘strategic gap’.
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Murray-Miller, Gavin. "Pan-Islamism and Ottoman Imperialism." In Empire Unbound, 70–97. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192863119.003.0004.
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Controlling and instrumentalizing migratory flows was one means of exercising imperium that proved beneficial to European powers. This did not imply, however, that the Ottoman Empire was completely held hostage to external influences. Like its European counterparts, the Ottoman government found means of turning migration and trans-imperial networks to its advantage. Appeals to Pan-Islamic solidarity were part of an informal policy designed to influence Muslims outside the empire and use religious loyalties as a tool to exert diplomatic pressures on European governments. It also abetted processes of Ottoman empire-building at home and abroad as the Porte employed religious networks in Africa and the Near East to advance its power. Ottoman Pan-Islamism did not emerge ex nihilo, as this chapter indicates. It evolved out of existing movements taking shape across Muslim societies. As European imperialism threatened to obliterate dar al-Islam and swallow up independent Muslim states, activists from North Africa to India responded with calls for a united Islamic front, insisting unity would empower Muslims and provide the motor for Islamic renewal. The Ottoman government exploited these sentiments as it attempted to use trans-imperial networks and Muslim loyalties to meet pressing security concerns and expand its global influence. It channeled popular feelings for Muslim unity into an Ottoman-centric policy and used anti-imperial movements to pursue its own imperialist goals.
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Collins, Kathleen. "The Islamic Revival Party Challenges Communism." In Politicizing Islam in Central Asia, 137—C5N213. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197685068.003.0006.
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Abstract Chapter 5 traces the emergence and development of the first wave of Islamism in Tajikistan, beginning with the formation of Nahzat-i Islami during the 1970s, an underground group motivated by the severe religious repression in the Tajik republic, which extended from the Stalin-era Red Terror through the Khrushchev-era closure of shrines. The spread of ideas about cleansing Soviet influences, Islamic political justice, the anti-Soviet mujahidin’s victory in Afghanistan, and the Iranian Revolution’s success further spurred the Nahzat to religious entrepreneurship. Ongoing religious repression but growing associational space during perestroika led the Nahzat to form an Islamic party to contest power through open mobilization as the USSR crumbled. The IRPT was joined by a broad coalition of Islamic leaders, together with nationalists and democratic parties. The Tajik regime’s crackdown on peaceful protests escalated into violence, and the Islamists became the leading opposition faction in the five-year civil war.
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"FOREWORD." In Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia, V—VI. ISEAS Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/9789814695923-001.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Islamiska influenser"
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Dubovetskaia, Ekaterina Leonidovna. "Dynamics of public opinion towards Islamists in the Arab Republic of Egypt at the beginning of the 21st century." In All-Russian Scientific Conference. Publishing house Sreda, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.31483/r-105446.
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The article describes the process of restructuring the Egyptian political field in the context of confrontation between representatives of the military elite and religious political movements in Egypt on the eve and after the events of the Arab Spring. The data of sociological surveys conducted by the Arab Barometer Center on the attitude of citizens towards Islamist parties and religious leaders in the MENA are analyzed. As a result of a comparative analysis of data for 2012–2014 with data obtained in 2018–2019, conclusions were drawn about a decrease in the level of trust of the population of the region in Islamists and a decrease in the level of religiosity in general. As a result of the historical analysis, the reasons that influenced this process are named, including the unsuccessful reforms of the Islamists and the rise of the extremist movement.
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Maigre, Marie-Elisabeth. "THE INFLUENCE OF THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT IN THE EMERGENCE OF A TURKISH CULTURAL THIRD WAY." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/mxux7290.
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This paper aims to understand the role of Fethullah Gülen’s movement in the emergence of the new Islamic culture in Turkey. Among the Islamic dynamics that emerged in the 80s, the movement based on Gülen’s ideas is unique not in that it spread through an intellectual, healthcare and media network – this is true of other Sufi communities – but in its develop- ment of an effective educational programme now comprising more than 300 schools around the world. In the 1990s, this movement favoured a ‘Turkish Islam’ encompassing the principles of de- mocracy and moderation, and so rejected the radical ideals of Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah party. After the 1997 ‘soft coup’ removed the Erbakan government, pro-Islamic businesspeo- ple became more disinclined to support a party that could threaten their business interests. A reformist branch led by Istanbul mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, began to adopt the principles of democracy and religious freedom as part of a new political argument, and eventually won the general elections of November 2002. It seems that three actors – the Islamist reformists, the businessmen, and Gülen’s followers – converged around the common concepts of Turkish Islam, Conservative Democracy, and Business to re-elaborate the cultural content of the Islamic movement with a more Western- democratic and capitalist orientation. The phrase ‘Islam de marché’, coined by Patrick Haenni, refers to the culture, born of globalisation, in which business success is efficiently used to translate thinking or religious beliefs into something practical and derive some cul- tural influence from association with the state. Fethullah Gülen, whose movement is a paradigm of these new approaches, could be consid- ered a far-sighted visionary since he anticipated the need for Turkish people, whether secular or Islamist, to adapt to the present times, and the strong potential of globalisation to diffuse his vision of Islam.
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Iliev, Andrej, Aleksandar Grizev, and Aleksandar Petrovski. "IDEOLOGY OF MODERN WAHHABISM." In SECURITY HORIZONS. Faculty of Security- Skopje, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.20544/icp.3.7.22.p16.
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Wahhabism represents an ideological and religious movement. It is the dominant islamic movement in Saudi Arabia. The founder of this ideology is Muhammad Ibn Abd AlWahhab (1703-1792). In the introductory part of this paper, the authors give an explanation of the historical paths of Wahhabism as a general Islamic doctrine. The main focus of the paper is on the basis of the ideology of wahhabism. This ideology starts with the Muslim brotherhood of Hassan el-Banna in 1928, through the Islamic ideological movements of Abul ala Maududi and Sayid Qutb and ends with the extremist Deobandi faith in South Asia. All of these Islamist movements established a strong presence in the Muslim world during the second half of the 20th century. In the sesond part of the paper, the authors give a review on wahhabism ideology, as in its basis, wahhabism is not an officially recognized and approved Islamic religious direction. Having in mind that the main role of wahhabism is unification of Saudi Arabia, this religious direction has always been a broader subject of public attacks and criticism. However, the interest in wahhabism increased at the beginning of the 21st century, especially with the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11.09.2001. One of the first Islamic movements based on wahhabism was founded in Saudi Arabia, known as “Ikhwan”. This Islamic movement was represented by Bedouin tribes that were formed by Ibn Saud. Finally, having in mind the full spectrum of ideological and doctrinal steps of wahhabism in general, we must mention the influence of wahhabism towards the other Islamic movements, and also gave a clear vision of its widespread vision in global frames. The ideology of wahhabism, according to the world views on radical Islam movements, represents a prototype ideology of some extreme and terrorist groups. The aim of this paper is to analyze the historical development and social role of the modern ideology of wahhabism towards other Islamic movements. All of the above mentioned will be analyzed through the comprehensive social changes that have taken place in the world over the last century. 190 Keywords: ideology, modern wahhabism, islamic movements, influence, terrorist groups
Reports on the topic "Islamiska influenser"
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Bachtiar, Hasnan. Indonesian Islamist populism and Anies Baswedan. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), October 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0025.
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Anies Baswedan emerges as a pivotal figure in Indonesian Islamist populism, notably for his role in defeating Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) in the 2016 Jakarta gubernatorial election and his involvement in the criminalization of Ahok’s blasphemy case. His influence has fueled the rise of Islamist populism in the post-reform democratization era. Anies’s recent announcement as the National Democratic Party’s (Nasdem) presidential candidate for the 2024 election positions him against Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto. This article scrutinizes Anies’s prospects in the 2024 presidential election, exploring whether he continues to employ identity politics and Islamist ideologies to attack political opponents and what his overall stance is regarding Islamist populism. It raises pertinent questions about the impact of these developments on Indonesian democracy, pondering whether the looming challenges will culminate in storms or pave the way for clearer skies in the nation’s democratic landscape.
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Bourekba, Moussa. Climate Change and Violent Extremism in North Africa. The Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.55317/casc014.
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As climate change intensifies in many parts of the world, more and more policymakers are concerned with its effects on human security and violence. From Lake Chad to the Philippines, including Afghanistan and Syria, some violent extremist (VE) groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State exploit crises and conflicts resulting from environmental stress to recruit more followers, expand their influence and even gain territorial control. In such cases, climate change may be described as a “risk multiplier” that exacerbates a number of conflict drivers. Against this backdrop, this case study looks at the relationship between climate change and violent extremism in North Africa, and more specifically the Maghreb countries Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which are all affected by climate change and violent extremism. There are three justifications for this thematic and geographical focus. Firstly, these countries are affected by climate change in multiple ways: water scarcity, temperature variations and desertification are only a few examples of the numerous cross- border impacts of climate change in this region. Secondly, these three countries have been and remain affected by the activity of violent extremist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State organisation (IS) and their respective affiliated groups. Algeria endured a civil war from 1991 to 2002 in which Islamist groups opposed the government, while Morocco and Tunisia have been the targets of multiple terrorist attacks by jihadist individuals and organisations. Thirdly, the connection between climate change and violent extremism has received much less attention in the literature than other climate-related security risks. Although empirical research has not evidenced a direct relationship between climate change and violent extremism, there is a need to examine the ways they may feed each other or least intersect in the context of North African countries. Hence, this study concentrates on the ways violent extremism can reinforce vulnerability to the effects of climate change and on the potential effects of climate change on vulnerability to violent extremism. While most of the existing research on the interplay between climate change and violent extremism concentrates on terrorist organisations (Asaka, 2021; Nett and Rüttinger, 2016; Renard, 2008), this case study focuses on the conditions, drivers and patterns that can lead individuals to join such groups in North Africa. In other words, it looks at the way climate change can exacerbate a series of factors that are believed to lead to violent radicalisation – “a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence” (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010: 38). This approach is needed not only to anticipate how climate change could possibly affect violent extremism in the medium and long run but also to determine whether and how the policy responses to both phenomena should intersect in the near future. Does climate change affect the patterns of violent extremism in North Africa? If so, how do these phenomena interact in this region? To answer these questions, the case study paper first gives an overview of the threat posed by violent extremism in the countries of study and examines the drivers and factors that are believed to lead to violent extremism in North Africa. Secondly, it discusses how these drivers could be affected by the effects of climate change on resources, livelihoods, mobility and other factors. Finally, an attempt is made to understand the possible interactions between climate change and violent extremism in the future and the implications for policymaking.