Journal articles on the topic 'Moral and ethical aspects of Artificial insemination'

Technologies based on artificial intelligence (AI) have achieved significant results, including facial recognition, medical diagnostics, self-driving cars, insurance management and exchange assets, property, human resources, search and recruitment. Artificial intelligence promises huge benefits for economic growth, social development, and improving the well-being and people security. Of course, artificial intelligence and robotics are among the most discussed issues and technological trends around the world today. In the light of their widespread use and implementation in all spheres of human life, often the expected opportunities, achievements and scientific breakthroughs overshadow the reasonableness and expediency of using artificial intelligence technologies in a particular field from a legal and ethical point of view. Companies, in the pursuit of profit and leading positions in the market, are often irresponsible about the legal and ethical issues of interaction with artificial intelligence technologies. Nevertheless, the ethical aspects of the use of artificial intelligence technologies are gaining high importance these days. The emergence of high-tech systems and software that can function more and more independently of humans and can replace the performance of tasks by humans requires special attention. These systems raise a number of important and tough moral questions. The article discusses the main directions of the artificial intelligence technologies spread and the ethical consequences and moral issues that arise in this regard, both at the state and organizational levels. The main trends characteristic of the labor market that arise in the process of workplaces robotization and the intelligent robots introduction into the production process are studied. The authors convincingly prove the priority of ethics and human safety issues in the design and implementation of AI systems. During the discussion of the ethical problems of the artificial intelligence introduction in organizations, the emphasis is placed on the use of these technologies not from the point of view of automation and improving the efficiency of performing direct management functions, but from the point of view of the organization of personnel work. Based on this, the article concludes with recommendations for the development of ethical principles adapted to the design and use of AI systems.

The paper is dedicated to the emergence of progressive artificial intelligence technologies and its relations to the human nature and soul, as viewed by experts and in such specific community as the church. We seem now to be entering a new phase of the comprehension of the moral aspects of the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the life of different societies. The romantic period of high expectations and excessive anxiety is replaced by the growing understanding of the complexity of the man‒machine interaction, which implies the intersection moral, legal, political and utilitarian dimensions of both a person and an artifact. The problematic issues are now more obvious, clear and difficult, as the disciplinary boundaries are revealed and highlighted. Among the crucial issues one should mention deficiencies in definitions; weakness of research optics and the vision that would be friendly to other areas of study or practice. This also includes the issues of integral assessment of the existing dangers, difficulties in describing the mechanisms of fulfilling both ethical and technically viable requirements. As scientific knowledge accumulates, both the benefits of introducing AI technologies into everyday life and previously underestimated new threats become more obvious. These societal and humanitarian ones include, in particular, social turbulence, neuroticism, digital crimes and crimes associated freedom abuses and losses of identity. Over the past few years, state and non-governmental institutions have proposed different approaches to determining what is included in the moral core of the problem under consideration. The efforts of many, if not most, of them turn out to be compromised by suspicions in willful intents. In this context, the broad consensus with the key agent facilitators is required, and the role such actors play in providing social stability is indisputable. One of the key roles in offering society the broadest vision on the anthropocentric development and AI progress belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. The Vatican’s quest to unite philosophers, AI developers, and religious leaders to address the ethical challenges of designing and implementing robotics is becoming an important element of the Christian witness in a world that is consider ed irrevocably secularized by many.

The paper is dedicated to the emergence of progressive artificial intelligence technologies and its relations to the human nature and soul, as viewed by experts and in such specific community as the church. We seem now to be entering a new phase of the comprehension of the moral aspects of the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the life of different societies. The romantic period of high expectations and excessive anxiety is replaced by the growing understanding of the complexity of the man‒machine interaction, which implies the intersection moral, legal, political and utilitarian dimensions of both a person and an artifact. The problematic issues are now more obvious, clear and difficult, as the disciplinary boundaries are revealed and highlighted. Among the crucial issues one should mention deficiencies in definitions; weakness of research optics and the vision that would be friendly to other areas of study or practice. This also includes the issues of integral assessment of the existing dangers, difficulties in describing the mechanisms of fulfilling both ethical and technically viable requirements. As scientific knowledge accumulates, both the benefits of introducing AI technologies into everyday life and previously underestimated new threats become more obvious. These societal and humanitarian ones include, in particular, social turbulence, neuroticism, digital crimes and crimes associated freedom abuses and losses of identity. Over the past few years, state and non-governmental institutions have proposed different approaches to determining what is included in the moral core of the problem under consideration. The efforts of many, if not most, of them turn out to be compromised by suspicions in willful intents. In this context, the broad consensus with the key agent facilitators is required, and the role such actors play in providing social stability is indisputable. One of the key roles in offering society the broadest vision on the anthropocentric development and AI progress belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. The Vatican’s quest to unite philosophers, AI developers, and religious leaders to address the ethical challenges of designing and implementing robotics is becoming an important element of the Christian witness in a world that is consider ed irrevocably secularized by many.

Fertility treatments raise a range of social and ethical issues regarding self-identity for family, sexual intimacy, and the interests and welfare of potential children. Eggs and sperm are combined to produce fertilized eggs. These eggs are then implanted as embryos and grow into viable fetuses, which are carried by the original mother or a surrogate mother. This artificial form of conception can challenge religious values and family structures. In-vitro fertilization (IVF) can be considered either as a medical miracle or playing with divinity. What obligation do medical professionals have to infertile women and to what extent? The bioethical dilemma of IVF use encompasses different moral issues for all involved in the process. Ethical issues address respect for personal autonomy, access and care, and the duty of the health care provider to be compassionate to persons whose actions and moral values may be different from their own. Health care providers need to impart empathy, understanding and sensitivity towards this unique type of patient population. The conflict for those treating patients who are trying to conceive by IVF includes respect for personal autonomy, nonmaleficence, justice, utility and the ethics of care. As a registered nurse in a postpartum hospital unit, I have seen antepartum and postpartum women involved with this new technology. I have worked with mothers and their partners as they experience different levels of anxiety and hope for the future. There is an underlying psychosocial connection with patients who undergo IVF treatments. The purpose of this article is to explore the ethical use of IVF on older women. Is this type of biotechnolgy being applied for the right reasons and for the best patient population?

This article explores emerging ethical questions that result from knowledge development in a complex, technological age. Nursing practice is at a critical ideological and ethical precipice where decision-making is enhanced and burdened by new ways of knowing that include artificial intelligence, algorithms, Big Data, genetics and genomics, neuroscience, and technological innovation. On the positive side is the new understanding provided by large data sets; the quick and efficient reduction of data into useable pieces; the replacement of redundant human tasks by machines, error reduction, pattern recognition, and so forth. However, these innovations require skepticism and critique from a profession whose mission is to care for and protect patients. The promise of technology and the new biological sciences to radically and positively transform healthcare may seem compelling when couched in terms of safety, efficiency, and effectiveness but their role in the provision of ethical nursing care remains uncertain. Given the profound moral and clinical implications of how today’s knowledge is developed and utilized, it is time to reconsider the relationship between ethics and knowledge development in this new uncharted area.

There are a great variety of theoretical models of cognition whose main purpose is to explain the inner workings of the human brain. Researchers from areas such as neuroscience, psychology, and physiology have proposed these models. Nevertheless, most of these models are based on empirical studies and on experiments with humans, primates, and rodents. In fields such as cognitive informatics and artificial intelligence, these cognitive models may be translated into computational implementations and incorporated into the architectures of intelligent autonomous agents (AAs). Thus, the main assumption in this work is that knowledge in those fields can be used as a design approach contributing to the development of intelligent systems capable of displaying very believable and human-like behaviors. Decision-Making (DM) is one of the most investigated and computationally implemented functions. The literature reports several computational models that enable AAs to make decisions that help achieve their personal goals and needs. However, most models disregard crucial aspects of human decision-making such as other agents' needs, ethical values, and social norms. In this paper, the authors present a set of criteria and mechanisms proposed to develop a biologically inspired computational model of Moral Decision-Making (MDM). To achieve a process of moral decision-making believable, the authors propose a cognitive function to determine the importance of each criterion based on the mood and emotional state of AAs, the main objective the model is to enable AAs to make decisions based on ethical and moral judgment.

Abstract BACKGROUND Studying the human peri-implantation period remains hindered by the limited accessibility of the in vivo environment and scarcity of research material. As such, continuing efforts have been directed towards developing embryo-like structures (ELS) from pluripotent stem cells (PSCs) that recapitulate aspects of embryogenesis in vitro. While the creation of such models offers immense potential for studying fundamental processes in both pre- and early post-implantation development, it also proves ethically contentious due to wide-ranging views on the moral and legal reverence due to human embryos. Lack of clarity on how to qualify and regulate research with ELS thus presents a challenge in that it may either limit this new field of research without valid grounds or allow it to develop without policies that reflect justified ethical concerns. OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive overview of the existing scientific approaches to generate ELS from mouse and human PSCs, as well as discuss future strategies towards innovation in the context of human development. Concurrently, we aim to set the agenda for the ethical and policy issues surrounding research on human ELS. SEARCH METHODS The PubMed database was used to search peer-reviewed articles and reviews using the following terms: ‘stem cells’, ‘pluripotency’, ‘implantation’, ‘preimplantation’, ‘post-implantation’, ‘blastocyst’, ‘embryoid bodies’, ‘synthetic embryos’, ‘embryo models’, ‘self-assembly’, ‘human embryo-like structures’, ‘artificial embryos’ in combination with other keywords related to the subject area. The PubMed and Web of Science databases were also used to systematically search publications on the ethics of ELS and human embryo research by using the aforementioned keywords in combination with ‘ethics’, ‘law’, ‘regulation’ and equivalent terms. All relevant publications until December 2019 were critically evaluated and discussed. OUTCOMES In vitro systems provide a promising way forward for uncovering early human development. Current platforms utilize PSCs in both two- and three-dimensional settings to mimic various early developmental stages, including epiblast, trophoblast and amniotic cavity formation, in addition to axis development and gastrulation. Nevertheless, much hinges on the term ‘embryo-like’. Extension of traditional embryo frameworks to research with ELS reveals that (i) current embryo definitions require reconsideration, (ii) cellular convertibility challenges the attribution of moral standing on the basis of ‘active potentiality’ and (iii) meaningful application of embryo protective directives will require rethinking of the 14-day culture limit and moral weight attributed to (non-)viability. Many conceptual and normative (dis)similarities between ELS and embryos thus remain to be thoroughly elucidated. WIDER IMPLICATIONS Modelling embryogenesis holds vast potential for both human developmental biology and understanding various etiologies associated with infertility. To date, ELS have been shown to recapitulate several aspects of peri-implantation development, but critically, cannot develop into a fetus. Yet, concurrent to scientific innovation, considering the extent to which the use of ELS may raise moral concerns typical of human embryo research remains paramount. This will be crucial for harnessing the potential of ELS as a valuable research tool, whilst remaining within a robust moral and legal framework of professionally acceptable practices.

Developments in organ donation and transplantation continue to generate controversy, especially in the field of reproductive medicine. Techniques used in assisted reproductive technology (ART), such as artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation (IVF), gestational surrogate mothering and gender selection, continue to challenge conventional norms. The use of these techniques, as well as the transplantation of reproductive tissue such as ovaries and the testicles, for example, enables children to be conceived who may have no genetic or social relationship to one or more of their parents, biological or other. This generates religious, legal, moral and ethical dilemmas for many people, including Muslims, who tend to hold negative views about organ donation. Legal frameworks such as ijtihad (independent judgment) in conjunction with al-maqaasid al-shar’iyyah (the higher objectives of Divine decree) are assessed to review the available Sunni juristic rulings pertinent to the question, “what are the views of Muslim jurists about assisted reproductive technology and tissue transplantation given evolving implications for offspring and donors?” The review finds that a majority of Muslim jurists and juristic councils permit assisted reproductive technology and reproductive tissue transplantation with several conditions.

Purpose The developing academic field of machine ethics seeks to make artificial agents safer as they become more pervasive throughout society. In contrast to computer ethics, machine ethics is concerned with the behavior of machines toward human users and other machines. This study aims to use an action-based ethical theory founded on the combinational aspects of deontological and teleological theories of ethics in the construction of an artificial moral agent (AMA). Design/methodology/approach The decision results derived by the AMA are acquired via fuzzy logic interpretation of the relative values of the steady-state simulations of the corresponding rule-based fuzzy cognitive map (RBFCM). Findings Through the use of RBFCMs, the following paper illustrates the possibility of incorporating ethical components into machines, where latent semantic analysis (LSA) and RBFCMs can be used to model dynamic and complex situations, and to provide abilities in acquiring causal knowledge. Research limitations/implications This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics. Nonetheless, to ensure that a machine with an ethical component can function autonomously in the world, research in artificial intelligence will need to further investigate the representation and determination of ethical principles, the incorporation of these ethical principles into a system’s decision procedure, ethical decision-making with incomplete and uncertain knowledge, the explanation for decisions made using ethical principles and the evaluation of systems that act based upon ethical principles. Practical implications To date, the conducted research has contributed to a theoretical foundation for machine ethics through exploration of the rationale and the feasibility of adding an ethical dimension to machines. Further, the constructed AMA illustrates the possibility of utilizing an action-based ethical theory that provides guidance in ethical decision-making according to the precepts of its respective duties. The use of LSA illustrates their powerful capabilities in understanding text and their potential application as information retrieval systems in AMAs. The use of cognitive maps provides an approach and a decision procedure for resolving conflicts between different duties. Originality/value This paper suggests that cognitive maps could be used in AMAs as tools for meta-analysis, where comparisons regarding multiple ethical principles and duties can be examined and considered. With cognitive mapping, complex and abstract variables that cannot easily be measured but are important to decision-making can be modeled. This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics.

Conscientious objection refers to refusal by a health care provider (HCP) to provide certain treatments, including the standard of care, to a patient based upon the provider’s personal, ethical, or religious beliefs. Federal and state rules regarding conscientious objection have expanded the scope of legal protections that HCPs and institutions can invoke in support of refusal. Opponents of these rules argue that allowing refusal of care deprives patients of care that conforms to professionally established guidelines, contradicts long-standing principles related to informed consent, interferes with the ability of health care facilities to provide safe and efficient care, and leaves the patient without means of redress for injury. Proponents respond that such rules are necessary to preserve the moral integrity of providers, including institutions. Although refusal rules are most often associated with abortion, some HCPs have cited moral concerns regarding contraception, sterilization, prevention/treatment of sexually transmitted infections, transition-related care for transgender individuals, medication-assisted treatment of substance use disorders, the use of artificial reproductive technologies, and patient preferences for end-of-life care. Evidence suggests that the burden of conscientious refusal falls disproportionately on vulnerable populations, and legitimate concern exists that moral disagreement is merely pretext for discrimination. A careful balance must be struck between the defending the conscience rights of HCPs and the civil rights of patients.

The ecological aspect of catholic moral theology should not evoke astonishment, as it is not a strange hybrid created by means of artificial manipulations aiming at bestowing authority of Christian tradition on ecology. Popes' statements concerning natural environment conservation seem to testify against such claims and only show the importance and need of implementing responsible and moderate using the Earth's resources into Christian awareness. Practical ethical problems in the ecological aspect I started to present from the natural law, which determines divine moral order in the world, also in the ecological dimension. Then I undertook the problem of an ecological conscience, which is a kind of a "watchman" of our morality, also as far as human actions in the natural environment are concerned, and it tries to protect the human being from committing an ecological sin, which is one of the forms of disobedience to God. These ecological aspects of moral theology will remain just hot air if we do not spread them by means of ecological education. It is also very important to shape proper and fixed attitudes towards other people and nature that can be described in terms of love, prudence, and moderation as aretology (field of science concerning virtues) teach us. At the end of this paragraph, I put Ecological Decalogue, whose rules Christians should obey in everyday life.

A sophistic way towards moral maturity Morality is a component of culture, variable as much as the whole culture is. It cannot claim absolutization. Natural law is the only constant, ingrained in some way in the moral tissue of a person and revealing itself as its inborn moral sensitivity. Consequently, a morally mature person, with properly developed awareness of innate moral sensitivity, acting in him as a kind of moral instinct, is capable to judge what in this culture is and what is not in keeping with natural law, independently of different state institutions and all other organizations’ promulgations. The individual person is the real creator of culture and he also transmits in some way his characteristic sensitivity to this culture (under the condition that morally sensitive people prevail; as history and modern times teach us this is not always the rule). Therefore, culture and civilization, in a different manner, in accordance with manifold local determinants, makes its own way in its proper rhythm to the state in which absorption of natural law is achieved to its maximum, that is it leads to the state in which the established laws reconstruct natural law as accurately as possible, or at least its spirit. A person as an individual is the subject and creator of culture in all its aspects and that is why he cannot be treated like an object in the context of different cultural values (e.g. ethical, religious and political). If that is the case, culture is degenerated and artificial. Such are the consequences of a sophistic (and mainly Protagoras) science on humans in a specific environment of culture and civilization.

Developments in science and technology have, among other things, challenged the family. Human values, which change in step with this technological progress, have faced many legal, moral and ethical dilemmas which await answers from the science on bioethics. We are in such a situation when we discuss about many advances in contemporary and national family law, including new forms of family reproduction that differ from a natural process of child conceiving. The authors in this paper bring comparative aspects of biomedical and family legislation of the Republic of North Macedonia and Republic of Kosovo. Among other things, they emphasize that given the traditional and biological model of the family in our society, new reproductive forms are a very reserved topic in the family and biomedical field, but it awakens a curiosity of discussions on ethics, philosophy and legal regulation of reproduction of human beings in both countries. The numerous stereotypes that prevail in the society of both countries regarding the application of artificial reproduction technology methods are contrary to many legal and medical justifications for couples who do not have the opportunity to become parents in a biological (natural) way.
 Therefore, the purpose of the authors is to provide accurate and grounded information through this text about the legal framework and medical options available to all persons who wish to exercise their reproductive right to establish a family.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.因人類輔助生殖技術應用引發的生命倫理問題，已成為現代生命倫理學界研究的重點領域。隨著輔助生殖技術的進步與發展，所產生的生命倫理問題也愈來愈複雜，現代生命倫理學各學派對這些倫理問題的爭論也愈來愈激烈。本文以儒家家庭倫理觀對這些倫理問題進行解析，以期為解決這些倫理問題爭論提供一個新的視角。Assisted reproductive technology (ART) has provided both opportunities and crises for people to achieve pregnancy and reproduction by artificial or partially artificial means. As Chinese people have been shaped by Confucian family values, they are committed to pursuing the continuity, integrity, and prosperity of the family. Applying ART is not unethical in principle. However, different types of ART carry different ethical implications and should be defined clearly according to the Confucian moral perspective.Confucian ethics is committed to maintaining the continuity of the family. For infertile couples, both artificial insemination (AI) and in vitro fertilization (IVF) can be beneficial and justifiable, as long as the sperms and eggs involved are only from the husband and wife. However, according to the Confucian understanding of the integrity of the family, an AI or IVF by donor, rather than the husband, would destroy the blood-tie of the family, and is therefore ethically unjustifiable. In addition, Confucianism appreciates that a normal family must have both a husband and a wife, and that a child ought to be born in a normal family with both a father and a mother. Accordingly, it is ethically problematic for single men or women to use ART to conceive a child. Moreover, it is very difficult for Confucians to defend the practice of surrogate motherhood because the intrusion of another woman into a family would significantly threaten the peace and integrity of the family and be harmful to the development of the child.This paper does not intend to argue that all traditional Confucian ethical views are absolutely right and should never be changed. It does, however, argue that Confucian moral values and commitments should be taken seriously. These values and commitments are still vibrant in Chinese people’s lives, although they have not been promoted systematically in national politics. As they are embedded in the Chinese ways of life, Chinese bioethicists should carefully examine these views and provide relevant arguments for their preferred programs and solutions regarding the application of reproductive technologies.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 169 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

"Contemporary Health Care poses a lot of challenges, which sometimes are incompatible with the maintenance of the Christian faith. The report aims to analyze the discussions in the Russian Orthodox community to find the solution to the question: Does the participation of Orthodox infertile couples in Reproductive technologies (e.g. In Vitro Fertilization - IVF) coordinate with traditional Christian morality? Nowadays the Orthodox community is divided into conservatives, who are totally against being involved in IVF, and liberals, who suppose that some of the variants of IVF are admissible. The report provides an analysis of bioethical issues of Reproductive Technologies from the Orthodox point of view. The author posits that the dilemma discussed is false. It’s possible to avoid grievous ethical problems while using IVF. All of them are not equal. Some aspects are absolutely inappropriate. Others, falling short of the mark but not too far, still might be permitted due to the dispensation to a suffering person. The author discusses conservative and liberal arguments, which were articulated in the International Congress of Orthodox Doctors (2015) and at a panel discussion of Inter-Council Presence of Russian Orthodox Church (2017 – 2019). Cases of Orthodox infertile couples counseled by the author will show the need for some flexibility in resolving these issues. In the report the following cases of counseling will be discussed: A) Surrogacy in case of Snow Flakes Adoption); B) Ectogenesis – growing embryos and fetuses in artificial wombs; C) Cryopreservation of embryos; D) the use of IVF in secondary infertility. The work was done within the project of the Russian Science Foundation “Problems of bioethics in the historical context and socio-cultural dynamics of society” (№ 18-78-10018), carried out based on FSBEI HE PRMU MOH Russia. "

Modern processes of globalization taking place in the field of law are a great challenge to the idea of human nature, which is recognized in Ukraine as the highest social value, as well as to the concept and essence of law itself. In our opinion, this is a threat on a global scale and necessitates the search for an adequate response to the threat from the scientific and technical process in the field of biomedicine, both for the natural (physical) existence of man and the preservation of his moral identity. In fact, these foundations have become the prerequisites for the development of the science of bioethics. Bioethics studies controversial and ambiguous issues and proposes a humanitarian examination, which aims to assess the arguments in favor of the development of human creativity, health and prevention of premature death, and arguments in favor of preserving human identity in its spiritual and physical integrity. The purpose of the article is to study the essence of controversial bioethical problems, the reasons for their occurrence and prospects for solving these problems. human, manipulation of stem cells and others. Bioethical issues usually include the ethical issues of abortion; contraception and new reproductive technologies (artificial insemination, surrogacy); conducting experiments on humans and animals; obtaining informed consent and ensuring patients' rights; determination of death, suicide and euthanasia; problems in relation to dying patients (hospices); demographic policy and family planning; genetics (including problems of genome research, genetic engineering and gene therapy); transplantology; health equity; human cloning, manipulation of stem cells and others. These issues related to the progress of genetics, genomics, pharmacology, transplantation, biotechnology, cloning are becoming increasingly important as a direction of international law in the context of ensuring and protecting human rights. IN legal literature indicates the formation of "biolaw", "bioethical legislation", "bioethical human rights". Thus there is a combination of possibilities and purposes of medicine and law. In our article, we have explored only some of these issues, which are currently the most relevant, debatable, and therefore require detailed analysis. These include, in our view, the legal status of the embryo, therapeutic and reproductive cloning, abortion, the use of assisted reproductive technologies and organ transplantation. In order to adequately cover these issues, we compare the rules of law governing these debatable issues with the views of church representatives and scholars on these issues. We also proposed changes that need to be made to the legislation of Ukraine so that the rules of law governing these issues meet the moral and ethical principles. As a conclusion is marked, that as bioethics as science dealing with survival combines in itself biological knowledge and general human values, then it is possible to consider natural human rights, her honour and dignity morally-legal principles of bioethics, a self right and law must become on defence of that, in particular, with the aim of providing of natural (physical) existence of man, and maintenance of her moral identity. Keywords: human rights, moral, bioethics, abortion, reproductive technologies, cloning.

In the age of Big Data, companies and governments are increasingly using algorithms to inform hiring decisions, employee management, policing, credit scoring, insurance pricing, and many more aspects of our lives. Artificial intelligence (AI) systems can help us make evidence-driven, efficient decisions, but can also confront us with unjustified, discriminatory decisions wrongly assumed to be accurate because they are made automatically and quantitatively. It is becoming evident that these technological developments are consequential to people’s fundamental human rights. Despite increasing attention to these urgent challenges in recent years, technical solutions to these complex socio-ethical problems are often developed without empirical study of societal context and the critical input of societal stakeholders who are impacted by the technology. On the other hand, calls for more ethically and socially aware AI often fail to provide answers for how to proceed beyond stressing the importance of transparency, explainability, and fairness. Bridging these socio-technical gaps and the deep divide between abstract value language and design requirements is essential to facilitate nuanced, context-dependent design choices that will support moral and social values. In this paper, we bridge this divide through the framework of Design for Values, drawing on methodologies of Value Sensitive Design and Participatory Design to present a roadmap for proactively engaging societal stakeholders to translate fundamental human rights into context-dependent design requirements through a structured, inclusive, and transparent process.

The sphere of reproductive rights is still beyond the scope of a thorough legal analysis, and it is not given due attention in the legal literature. This may be due to the fact that the concept of reproductive rights is new to Ukrainian law and has not yet found its proper place in the general system of law. There is a lack of scientific development in the issue of protection of the rights of the child to birth, trafficking in human beings for the purpose of exploiting surrogate mothers or children born as a result of surrogate motherhood, etc. The purpose of the study is to analyze the legislative, doctrinal and moral aspects of reproductive rights and to identify effective legal measures to improve the legal regulation of surrogate motherhood in Ukraine and the proper legal protection of the child before and after birth. Experimenting with human gene material as a conception in vitro turns children into a commodity. There is an artificial situation in which wealthy men will hire women to provide contracting services to their offspring. It is difficult to disagree that in surrogate motherhood, as in any business, personal financial gain dominates. So, from this point of view, surrogacy is a kind of market and business. The conception of the child is not a right, but an opportunity that is not given to all, but surrogate motherhood turns the child into an "object of economic agreement and contract, a kind of ordering of goods." The child cannot be considered as an object of property. It is unacceptable to consider the practice of surrogacy as ethical. In addition, forced commercial surrogate motherhood falls within the definition of trafficking in human beings. The issue of reproductive technology must be addressed in such a way that the child born as a result of surrogate motherhood does not fall prey to further exploitation. The author concluded that in many countries with a licensing or altruistic regime, many aspects of the use of assisted reproductive technologies and surrogate motherhood remain unregulated. There is no clear understanding of all the principles and standards governing the use of assisted reproductive technologies and surrogacy agreements. In general, the legislation lacks sufficient standards and provisions to protect the rights of parties to surrogacy agreements. The most controversial issues are the rights of the surrogate mother, the expectant parents and the children born as a result of the surrogate motherhood. At the present stage, legal adaptation of society to the development of medicine in the field of reproductive technologies has not yet taken place in Ukraine. Cases such as the birth of several children by surrogate mothers, births of a child with developmental disabilities, birth of a dead child or miscarriage, the need for an artificial interruption of pregnancy according to the medical opinion of doctors, the termination of marriage by genetic parents, the death of one or both parents. Keywords: reproductive rights, surrogacy motherhood, legal regulation, legal protection, embryo, child rights, family, surrogacy agreement.

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AbstractThis research addressed the management awareness about the ethical and moral aspects of artificial intelligence (AI). It is a general trend to speak about AI, and many start-ups and established companies are communicating about the development and implementation of AI solutions. Therefore, it is important to consider different perspectives besides the technology and data as the key elements for AI systems. The way in which societies are interacting and organising themselves will change. Such transformations require diverse perspectives from the society and particularly from AI system developers for shaping the humanity of the future. This research aimed to overcome this barrier with the answers for the question: What kind of awareness does the management of AI companies have about the social impact of its AI product or service? The central research question was divided into five sub-questions that were answered by a fundamental literature review and an empirical research study. This covered the management understanding of the terms moral, ethics, and artificial intelligence; the internal company prioritization of moral and ethics; and the involved stakeholders in the AI product or service development. It analysed the known and used ethical AI guidelines and principles. In the end, the social responsibility of the management regarding AI systems was analysed and compared.

AbstractEthicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects on artificial entities and concern for the effects on human society. Beyond the conventional consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethicist ethical frameworks, some scholars encourage “information ethics” and “social-relational” approaches, though there are opportunities for more in-depth ethical research on the nuances of moral consideration of artificial entities. There is limited relevant empirical data collection, primarily in a few psychological studies on current moral and social attitudes of humans towards robots and other artificial entities. This suggests an important gap for psychological, sociological, economic, and organizational research on how artificial entities will be integrated into society and the factors that will determine how the interests of artificial entities are considered.

AbstractArtificial Intelligence (AI) continues to pervade several aspects of healthcare with pace and scale. The need for an ethical framework in AI to address this has long been recognized, but to date most efforts have delivered only high-level principles and value statements. Herein, we explain the need for an ethical framework in healthcare AI, the different moral theories that may serve as its basis, the rationale for why we believe this should be built around virtue ethics, and explore this in the context of five key ethical concerns for the introduction of AI in healthcare. Some existing work has suggested that AI may replace clinicians. We argue to the contrary, that the clinician will not be replaced, nor their role attenuated. Rather, they will be integral to the responsible design, deployment, and regulation of AI in healthcare, acting as the moral exemplar for the virtuous machine. We collate relevant points from the literature and formulate our own to present a coherent argument for the central role of clinicians in ethical AI and propose ideas to help advance efforts to employ ML-based solutions within healthcare. Finally, we highlight the responsibility of not only clinicians, but also data scientists, tech companies, ethicists, and regulators to act virtuously in realising the vision of ethical and accountable AI in healthcare.

Supportive Palliative Care and Hospice professionals frequently attend to Minimally Conscious State (MCS) patients near the end of life and in so doing, face decisions over maintenance or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Although both withholding and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) in such circumstances are considered by experts in ethics and law to be acceptable, not all families nor health care professionals agree. This paper will explore basic aspects of serious brain injuries, especially MCS, the psychological role of food in interpersonal relationships, and lessons from clinical ethics that can help in goals of care discussions about withdrawal of ANH.

AbstractIn the present article, I will advocate caution against developing artificial moral agents (AMAs) based on the notion that the utilization of preliminary forms of AMAs will potentially negatively feed back on the human social system and on human moral thought itself and its value—e.g., by reinforcing social inequalities, diminishing the breadth of employed ethical arguments and the value of character. While scientific investigations into AMAs pose no direct significant threat, I will argue against their premature utilization for practical and economical use. I will base my arguments on two thought experiments. The first thought experiment deals with the potential to generate a replica of an individual’s moral stances with the purpose to increase, what I term, ’moral efficiency’. Hence, as a first risk, an unregulated utilization of premature AMAs in a neoliberal capitalist system is likely to disadvantage those who cannot afford ’moral replicas’ and further reinforce social inequalities. The second thought experiment deals with the idea of a ’moral calculator’. As a second risk, I will argue that, even as a device equally accessible to all and aimed at augmenting human moral deliberation, ’moral calculators’ as preliminary forms of AMAs are likely to diminish the breadth and depth of concepts employed in moral arguments. Again, I base this claim on the idea that the current most dominant economic system rewards increases in productivity. However, increases in efficiency will mostly stem from relying on the outputs of ’moral calculators’ without further scrutiny. Premature AMAs will cover only a limited scope of moral argumentation and, hence, over-reliance on them will narrow human moral thought. In addition and as the third risk, I will argue that an increased disregard of the interior of a moral agent may ensue—a trend that can already be observed in the literature.

In recent years, there has been a surge of high-profile publications on applications of artificial intelligence (AI) systems for medical diagnosis and prognosis. While AI provides various opportunities for medical practice, there is an emerging consensus that the existing studies show considerable deficits and are unable to establish the clinical benefit of AI systems. Hence, the view that the clinical benefit of AI systems needs to be studied in clinical trials—particularly randomised controlled trials (RCTs)—is gaining ground. However, an issue that has been overlooked so far in the debate is that, compared with drug RCTs, AI RCTs require methodological adjustments, which entail ethical challenges. This paper sets out to develop a systematic account of the ethics of AI RCTs by focusing on the moral principles of clinical equipoise, informed consent and fairness. This way, the objective is to animate further debate on the (research) ethics of medical AI.

Research teams have used extra-uterine systems (Biobags) to support premature fetal lambs and to bring them to maturation in a way not previously possible. The researchers have called attention to possible implications of these systems for sustaining premature human fetuses in a similar way. Some commentators have pointed out that perfecting these systems for human fetuses might alter a standard expectation in abortion practices: that the termination of a pregnancy also (inevitably) entails the death of the fetus. With Biobags, it might be possible, some argue, that no woman has the right to expect that outcome if the technology is able to sustain fetal life after an abortion. In order to protect the expectation that the termination of a pregnancy always entails the death of the fetus, Elizabeth Romanis has argued that fetuses sustained in Biobags have a status different than otherwise ‘born’ children. In support of that view, she argues that these ‘gestatelings’ are incapable of independent life. This argument involves a misunderstanding of the gestational support involved, as well as a misapprehension of neonatology practice. Here, we argue that any human fetus sustained in a Biobag would be as ‘independent’ as any other premature infant, and just as ‘born’. Neonatologists would seem to have certain presumptive moral responsibilities toward any human fetus gestating in a Biobag. It remains a separate question whether the perfection and widespread application of Biobags for premature human beings would or should alter the expectation that ending a pregnancy also entails fetal death.

Purpose This paper aims to highlight the ethical implications of the adoption of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), for humanity. It proposes a virtues approach to resolving ethical dilemmas. Design/methodology/approach The research is based on a review of the relevant literature and empirical evidence for how AI is impacting individuals and society. It uses a taxonomy of human attributes against which potential harms are evaluated. Findings The technologies of the 4IR are being adopted at a fast pace, posing numerous ethical dilemmas. This study finds that the adoption of these technologies, driven by an Enlightenment view of progress, is diminishing key aspects of humanity – moral agency, human relationships, cognitive acuity, freedom and privacy and the dignity of work. The impact of AI algorithms is also shown, in particular, is shown to be distorting the view of reality and threatening democracy, in part due to the asymmetry of power between Big Tech and users. To enable humanity to be masters of technology, rather than controlled by it, a virtues-based approach should be used to resolve ethical dilemmas, rather than utilitarian ethics. Research limitations/implications Further investigation is required to provide more empirical evidence of the harms to humanity of some 4IR technologies cited, such as virtual and augmented reality, manipulative algorithms and toy robots on children and adults and the reality of re-skilling where jobs are lost through automation. Practical implications This paper provides a framework for evaluating the impact of some 4IR technologies of humanity and an approach to resolving ethical dilemmas. Social implications Most of the concerns surrounding 4IR technologies, and in particular AI, tend to focus on human rights issues. This paper shows that there are other significant harms to what it means to be a human being from 4IR technologies that will have a profound impact on society if not adequately addressed. Originality/value The author is not aware of any other work that uses taxonomy of AI applications and their different impacts on humanity. The proposal to use virtues as a means to resolve ethical dilemmas is also novel in regard to AI.

AbstractOn virtue ethical grounds, Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson recently recommended that near-future AIs should be developed as ‘Friendly AI’. AI in social interaction with humans should be programmed such that they mimic aspects of human friendship. While it is a reasonable goal to implement AI systems interacting with humans as Friendly AI, I identify four issues that need to be addressed concerning Friendly AI with Fröding’s and Peterson’s understanding of Friendly AI as a starting point. In a first step, I briefly recapitulate Fröding’s and Peterson’s arguments for Friendly AI. I then highlight some issues with Fröding’s and Peterson’s approach and line of reasoning and identify four problems related to the notion of Friendly AI, which all pertain to the role and need for humans’ moral development. These are that (1) one should consider the moral tendencies and preferences of the humans interacting with a friendly AI, (2) it needs to be considered whether the humans interacting with a Friendly AI are still developing their virtues and character traits, (3) the indirect effects of replacing humans with Friendly AI should be considered with respect to the possibilities for humans to develop their moral virtues and that (4) the question whether the AI is perceived as some form of Artificial General Intelligence cannot be neglected. In conclusion, I argue that all of these four problems are related to humans moral development and that this observation strongly emphasizes the role and need for humans moral development in correlation to the accelerating development of AI-systems.

La llamada era o siglo de la biotecnología, y con ella, una nueva realidad genética artificial, va abriéndose camino inexorablemente. La misma supone nuevas formas de dominio de la vida natural y humana sin precedentes. El hombre puede ya alterar nada menos que el curso de la evolución de las especies. Es fácil adivinar entonces por qué la genética traspasa su propio ámbito científico: se encuentra ineludiblemente cargada de dilemas éticos de toda índole, y unida al mundo filosófico y moral por su urgente necesidad de respuestas. La primera gran reflexión que la genética plantea a la ética es de tal calibre, que zozobra los cimientos de la propia tradición filosófica occidental y su concepción de la dignidad humana. Si el hallazgo del genoma humano lleva consigo una propensión de la visión de la realidad humana exclusivamente cientificista y biológica, procediendo a realizar una verdadera «sacralización de la ciencia» ¿Supone ello el derrumbe, la invalidación de la condición ética y libre del hombre? ¿Debemos renunciar a una visión del mismo como un ser digno y reducirlo a un animal más? ¿Debemos, en definitiva, dar carpetazo al humanismo, poniendo en tela de juicio la calidad moral del hombre? ¿Cerrar entonces los espacios de la ética o la filosofía, declarando que todos los aspectos que encierran la condición humana se consumen en una explicación científica? ¿Cómo afrontar otros posibles ataques a dimensiones de la dignidad humana como la libertad, la igualdad, la intimidad? ¿Precisan de disciplinas distintas, como la filosofía y el derecho, en busca de soluciones que exceden del campo científico y a los que éste no puede dar respuestas? Ante los nuevos poderes y responsabilidades que trae consigo el progreso científico, la explicación ética y la científica no deben sino reencontrarse. Apostar por el control ético del rumbo del proceso científico y tecnológico a través del paradigma de la dignidad humana se torna imprescindible. En definitiva, tratar de llevar a cabo el sueño del progreso universal, real, en el que la genética constituya un eslabón, un peldaño más en su consecución efectiva no puede darse sin intervención de la reflexión ética.This is definitely the age of biotechnology and with it comes a new artificial genetic reality. Biotechnology gives us never seen before control over plant, animal and human life. Mankind may now even be able to change the course of evolution in all living creatures, no less. That is why it is easy to understand that the science of genetics transcends its own domain; it is unavoidably confronted with ethical dilemmas of all kind and it is compelled to turn to philosophy and morality because of its need to find answers urgently. The first question raised by genetics is of such a magnitude that it overturns the basis of the Western philosophical tradition and its concept of human dignity. If the decoding of the human genome leads to an exclusively scientific and biological vision of human reality, to what you could call a «sacralisation of science», then what happens to free will, to man as an ethical being? Should we henceforth refuse to consider Man as a creature of Dignity and reduce him to just another animal? Should we, in short, abandon all humanistic idealism and question even the morality of human beings? Should we forget about ethics and philosophy and agree that all the aspects, implicit in the human condition, can find a scientific explanation? But how then should we deal with other attacks that may be made against such dimensions of human dignity as liberty, equality and privacy? Will there be no need for other disciplines, such as philosophy and law, to find solutions to problems which exceed the field of science and for which science has no answers to give?. In the face of all the new powers, potential and responsibilities brought about by scientific progress, ethics and science should not become adversaries. Ethical control over the course of scientific and technological progress based on the paradigm of human dignity is becoming essential. To summarise, it will be impossible to realise the dream of true progress, in which the science of genetics is but one step, without answering ethical questions.

I was born illegitimate. Born on an existential precipice. My unwed mother was 36 years old when she relinquished me. I was the fourth baby she was required to give away. After I emerged blood stained and blue tinged – abject, liminal – not only did the nurses refuse me my mother’s touch, I also lost the sound of her voice. Her smell. Her heart beat. Her taste. Her gaze. The silence was multi-sensory. When they told her I was dead, I also lost, within her memory and imagination, my life. I was adopted soon after but not told for over four decades. It was too shameful for even me to know. Imprinted at birth with a psychological ‘death’, I fell, as a Late Discovery Adoptee (LDA), into a socio-cultural and psychological abyss, frozen at birth at the bottom of a parturitive void from where, invisible within family, society, and self I was unable to form an undamaged sense of being.Throughout the 20th century (and for centuries before) this kind of ‘social abortion’ was the dominant script. An adoptee was regarded as a bastard, born of sin, the mother blamed, the father exonerated, and silence demanded (Lynch 28-74). My adoptive mother also sinned. She was infertile. But, in taking me on, she assumed the role of a womb worthy woman, good wife, and, in her case, reluctant mother (she secretly didn’t want children and was privately overwhelmed by the task). In this way, my mother, my adoptive mother, and myself are all the daughters of bereavement, all of us sacrificed on the altar of prejudice and fear that infertility, sex outside of marriage, and illegitimacy were unspeakable crimes for which a price must be paid and against which redemptive protection must be arranged. If, as Thomas Keneally (5) writes, “original sin is the mother fluid of history” then perhaps all three of us all lie in its abject waters. Grotevant, Dunbar, Kohler and Lash Esau (379) point out that adoption was used to ‘shield’ children from their illegitimacy, women from their ‘sexual indiscretions’, and adoptive parents from their infertility in the belief that “severing ties with birth family members would promote attachment between adopted children and parents”. For the adoptee in the closed record system, the socio/political/economic vortex that orchestrated their illegitimacy is born out of a deeply, self incriminating primal fear that reaches right back into the recesses of survival – the act of procreation is infested with easily transgressed life and death taboos within the ‘troop’ that require silence and the burial of many bodies (see Amanda Gardiner’s “Sex, Death and Desperation: Infanticide, Neonaticide, and Concealment of Birth in Colonial Western Australia” for a palpable, moving, and comprehensive exposition on the links between 'illegitimacy', the unmarried mother and child murder). As Nancy Verrier (24) states in Coming Home to Self, “what has to be understood is that separation trauma is an insidious experience, because, as a society, we fail to see this experience as a trauma”. Indeed, relinquishment/adoption for the baby and subsequent adult can be acutely and chronically painful. While I was never told the truth of my origins, of course, my body knew. It had been there. Sentient, aware, sane, sensually, organically articulate, it messaged me (and anyone who may have been interested) over the decades via the language of trauma, its lexicon and grammar cellular, hormonal, muscular (Howard & Crandall, 1-17; Pert, 72), the truth of my birth, of who I was an “unthought known” (Bollas 4). I have lived out my secret fatality in a miasmic nebula of what I know now to be the sequelae of adoption psychopathology: nausea, physical and psychological pain, agoraphobia, panic attacks, shame, internalised anger, depression, self-harm, genetic bewilderment, and generalised anxiety (Brodzinsky 25-47; Brodzinsky, Smith, & Brodzinsky 74; Kenny, Higgins, Soloff, & Sweid xiv; Levy-Shiff 97-98; Lifton 210-212; Verrier The Primal Wound 42-44; Wierzbicki 447-451) – including an all pervading sense of unreality experienced as dissociation (the experience of depersonalisation – where the self feels unreal – and derealisation – where the world feels unreal), disembodiment, and existential elision – all characteristics of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In these ways, my body intervened, acted out, groaned in answer to the social overlay, and from beyond “the dermal veil” tried to procure access, as Vicky Kirby (77) writes, to “the body’s opaque ocean depths” through its illnesses, its eloquent, and incessantly aching and silent verbosities deepened and made impossibly fraught because I was not told. The aim of this paper is to discuss one aspect of how my body tried to channel the trauma of my secret fatality and liminality: my pre-disclosure art work (the cellular memory of my trauma also expressed itself, pre-disclosure, through my writings – poetry, journal entries – and also through post-coital glossolalia, all discussed at length in my Honours research “Womb Tongues” and my Doctoral Dissertation “The Womb Artist – A Novel: Translating Pre-verbal Late Discovery Adoption Trauma into Narrative”). From the age of thirty onwards I spent twelve years in therapy where the cause of my childhood and adult psychopathology remained a mystery. During this time, my embodied grief and memories found their way into my art work, a series of 5’ x 3’ acrylic paintings, some of which I offer now for discussion (figures 1-4). These paintings map and express what my body knew but could not verbalise (without language to express my grief, my body found other ways to vent). They are symptom and sign of my pre-verbal adoption trauma, evidence that my body ‘knew’ and laboured ceaselessly and silently to find creative ways to express the incarcerated trauma. Post disclosure, I have used my paintings as artefacts to inform, underpin, and nourish the writing of a collection of poetry “Womb Tongues” and a literary novel/memoir “The Womb Artist” (TWA) in an ongoing autoethnographical, performative, and critical inquiry. My practice-led research as a now conscious and creative witness, fashions the recontextualisation of my ‘self’ into my ‘self’ and society, this time with cognisant and reparative knowledge and facilitates the translation of my body’s psychopathology and memory (explicit and implicit) into a healing testimony that explores the traumatised body as text and politicizes the issues surrounding LDAs (Riley 205). If I use these paintings as a memoirist, I use them second hand, after the fact, after they have served their initial purpose, as the tangible art works of a baby buried beneath a culture’s prejudice, shame, and judgement and the personal cries from the illegitimate body/self. I use them now to explore and explain my subclinical and subterranean life as a LDA.My pre-disclosure paintings (Figures 1-4) – filled with vaginal, fetal, uterine, and umbilical references – provide some kind of ‘evidence’ that my body knew what had happened to me as if, with the tenacity of a poltergeist, my ‘spectral self’ found ways to communicate. Not simply clues, but the body’s translation of the intra-psychic landscape, a pictorial and artistic séance into the world, as if my amygdala – as quasar and signal, homing device and history lesson (a measure, container, and memoir) – knew how to paint a snap shot or an x-ray of the psyche, of my cellular marrow memories (a term formulated from fellow LDA Sandy McCutcheon’s (76) memoir, The Magician’s Son when he says, “What I really wanted was the history of my marrow”). If, as Salveet Talwar suggests, “trauma is processed from the body up”, then for the LDA pre-discovery, non-verbal somatic signage is one’s ‘mother tongue’(25). Talwar writes, “non-verbal expressive therapies such as art, dance, music, poetry and drama all activate the sub-cortical regions of the brain and access pre-verbal memories” (26). In these paintings, eerily divinatory and pointed traumatic, memories are made visible and access, as Gussie Klorer (213) explains in regard to brain function and art therapy, the limbic (emotional) system and the prefrontal cortex in sensorimotor integration. In this way, as Marie Angel and Anna Gibbs (168) suggest, “the visual image may serve as a kind of transitional mode in thought”. Ruth Skilbeck in her paper First Things: Reflections on Single-lens Reflex Digital Photography with a Wide-angled Lens, also discusses (with reference to her photographic record and artistic expression of her mother’s death) what she calls the “dark matter” – what has been overlooked, “left out”, and/or is inexplicable (55) – and the idea of art work as the “transitional object” as “a means that some artists use, conceptually and yet also viscerally, in response to the extreme ‘separation anxiety’ of losing a loved one, to the void of the Unknown” (57). In my case, non-disclosure prevented my literacy and the evolution of the image into language, prevented me from fully understanding the coded messages left for me in my art work. However, each of my paintings is now, with the benefit of full disclosure, a powerful, penetrating, and comprehensible intra and extra sensory cry from the body in kinaesthetic translation (Lusebrink, 125; Klorer, 217). In Figure 1, ‘Embrace’, the reference to the umbilical is palpable, described in my novel “The Womb Artist” (184) this way; “two ropes tightly entwine as one, like a dark and dirty umbilical cord snaking its way across a nether world of smudged umbers”. There is an ‘abject’ void surrounding it. The cord sapped of its colour, its blood, nutrients – the baby starved of oxygen, breath; the LDA starved of words and conscious understanding. It has two parts entwined that may be seen in many ways (without wanting to reduce these to static binaries): mother/baby; conscious/unconscious; first person/third person; child/adult; semiotic/symbolic – numerous dualities could be spun from this embrace – but in terms of my novel and of the adoptive experience, it reeks of need, life and death, a text choking on the poetic while at the same time nourished by it; a text made ‘available’ to the reader while at the same narrowing, limiting, and obscuring the indefinable nature of pre-verbal trauma. Figure 1. Embrace. 1993. Acrylic on canvas.The painting ‘Womb Tongues’ (Figure 2) is perhaps the last (and, obviously, lasting) memory of the infinite inchoate universe within the womb, the umbilical this time wrapped around in a phallic/clitorial embrace as the baby-self emerges into the constrictions of a Foucauldian world, where the adoptive script smothers the ‘body’ encased beneath the ‘coils’ of Judeo-Christian prejudice and centuries old taboo. In this way, the reassigned adoptee is an acute example of power (authority) controlling and defining the self and what knowledge of the self may be allowed. The baby in this painting is now a suffocated clitoris, a bound subject, a phallic representation, a gagged ‘tongue’ in the shape of the personally absent (but socially imposing) omni-present and punitive patriarchy. Figure 2. Womb Tongues. 1997. Acrylic on canvas.‘Germination’ (Figure 3) depicts an umbilical again, but this time as emerging from a seething underworld and is present in TWA (174) this way, “a colony of night crawlers that writhe and slither on the canvas, moving as one, dozens of them as thin as a finger, as long as a dream”. The rhizomic nature of this painting (and Figure 4), becomes a heaving horde of psychosomatic and psychopathological influences and experiences, a multitude of closely packed, intense, and dendridic compulsions and symptoms, a mass of interconnected (and by nature of the silence and lie) subterranean knowledges that force the germination of a ‘ghost baby/child/adult’ indicated by the pale and ashen seedling that emerges above ground. The umbilical is ghosted, pale and devoid of life. It is in the air now, reaching up, as if in germination to a psychological photosynthesis. There is the knot and swarm within the unconscious; something has, in true alien fashion, been incubated and is now emerging. In some ways, these paintings are hardly cryptic.Figure 3. Germination.1993. Acrylic on canvas.In Figure 4 ‘The Birthing Tree’, the overt symbolism reaches ‘clairvoyant status’. This could be read as the family ‘tree’ with its four faces screaming out of the ‘branches’. Do these represent the four babies relinquished by our mother (the larger of these ‘beings’ as myself, giving birth to the illegitimate, silenced, and abject self)? Are we all depicted in anguish and as wraithlike, grotesquely simplified into pure affect? This illegitimate self is painted as gestating a ‘blue’ baby, near full-term in a meld of tree and ‘self’, a blue umbilical cord, again, devoid of blood, ghosted, lifeless and yet still living, once again suffocated by the representation of the umbilical in the ‘bowels’ of the self, the abject part of the body, where refuse is stored and eliminated: The duodenum of the damned. The Devil may be seen as Christopher Bollas’s “shadow of the object”, or the Jungian archetypal shadow, not simply a Judeo-Christian fear-based spectre and curmudgeon, but a site of unprocessed and, therefore, feared psychological material, material that must be brought to consciousness and integrated. Perhaps the Devil also is the antithesis to ‘God’ as mother. The hell of ‘not mother’, no mother, not the right mother, the reluctant adoptive mother – the Devil as icon for the rich underbelly of the psyche and apophatic to the adopted/artificial/socially scripted self.Figure 4. The Birthing Tree. 1995. Acrylic on canvas.These paintings ache with the trauma of my relinquishment and LDA experience. They ache with my body’s truth, where the cellular and psychological, flesh and blood and feeling, leak from my wounds in unspeakable confluence (the two genital lips as the site of relinquishment, my speaking lips that have been sealed through non-disclosure and shame, the psychological trauma as Verrier’s ‘primal wound’) just as I leaked from my mother (and society) at birth, as blood and muck, and ooze and pus and death (Grosz 195) only to be quickly and silently mopped up and cleansed through adoption and life-long secrecy. Where I, as translator, fluent in both silence and signs, disclose the baby’s trauma, asking for legitimacy. My experience as a LDA sets up an interesting experiment, one that allows an examination of the pre-verbal/pre-disclosure body as a fleshed and breathing Rosetta Stone, as an interface between the language of the body and of the verbalised, painted, and written text. As a constructed body, written upon and invented legally, socially, and psychologically, I am, in Hélène Cixous’s (“To Live the Orange” 83) words, “un-forgetting”, “un-silencing” and “unearthing” my ‘self’ – I am re-writing, re-inventing and, under public scrutiny, legitimising my ‘self’. I am a site of inquiry, discovery, extrapolation, and becoming (Metta 492; Poulus 475) and, as Grosz (vii) suggests, a body with “all the explanatory power” of the mind. I am, as I embroider myself and my LDA experience into literary and critical texts, authoring myself into existence, referencing with particular relevance Peter Carnochan’s (361) suggestion that “analysis...acts as midwife to the birth of being”. I am, as I swim forever amorphous, invisible, and unspoken in my mother’s womb, fashioning a shore, landscaping my mind against the constant wet, my chronic liminality (Rambo 629) providing social landfall for other LDAs and silenced minorities. As Catherine Lynch (3) writes regarding LDAs, “Through the creation of text and theory I can formulate an intimate space for a family of adoptive subjects I might never know via our participation in a new discourse in Australian academia.” I participate through my creative, self-reflexive, process fuelled (Durey 22), practice-led enquiry. I use the intimacy (and also universality and multiplicity) and illegitimacy of my body as an alterative text, as a site of academic and creative augmentation in the understanding of LDA issues. The relinquished and silenced baby and LDA adult needs a voice, a ‘body’, and a ‘tender’ place in the consciousness of society, as Helen Riley (“Confronting the Conspiracy of Silence” 11) suggests, “voice, validation, and vindication”. Judith Herman (3) argues that, “Survivors challenge us to reconnect fragments, to reconstruct history, to make meaning of their present symptoms in the light of past events”. I seek to use the example of my experience – as Judith Durey (31) suggests, in “support of evocative, creative modes of representation as valid forms of research in their own right” – to unfurl the whole, to give impetus and precedence for other researchers into adoption and advocate for future babies who may be bought, sold, arranged, and/or created by various means. The recent controversy over Gammy, the baby boy born with Down Syndrome in Thailand, highlights the urgent and moral need for legislation with regard to surrogacy (see Kajsa Ekis Ekman’s Being and Being Bought: Prostitution, Surrogacy and the Split Self for a comprehensive examination of surrogacy issues). Indeed, Catherine Lynch in her paper Doubting Adoption Legislation links the experiences of LDAs and the children of born of surrogacy, most effectively arguing that, “if the fate that closed record adoptees suffered was a misplaced solution to the question of what to do with children already conceived how can you justify the deliberate conception of a child with the intention even before its creation of cruelly removing that child from their mother?” (6). Cixous (xxii) confesses, “All I want is to illustrate, depict fragments, events of human life and death...each unique and yet at the same time exchangeable. Not the law, the exception”. I, too, am a fragment, an illustration (a painting), and, as every individual always is – paradoxically – a communal and, therefore, deeply recognisable and generally applicable minority and exception. In my illegitimacy, I am some kind of evidence. Evidence of cellular memory. Evidence of embodiment. Evidence that silenced illegitimacies will manifest in symptom and non-verbal narratives, that they will ooze out and await translation, verification, and witness. This paper is offered with reverence and with feminist intention, as a revenant mouthpiece for other LDAs, babies born of surrogacy, and donor assisted offspring (and, indeed, any) who are marginalised, silenced, and obscured. It is also intended to promote discussion in the psychological and psychoanalytic fields and, as Helen Riley (202-207) advocates regarding late discovery offspring, more research within the social sciences and the bio-medical field that may encourage legislators to better understand what the ‘best interests of the child’ are in terms of late discovery of origins and the complexity of adoption/conception practices available today. As I write now (and always) the umbilical from my paintings curve and writhe across my soul, twist and morph into the swollen and throbbing organ of tongues, my throat aching to utter, my hands ready to craft latent affect into language in translation of, and in obedience to, my body’s knowledges. It is the art of mute witness that reverses genesis, that keeps the umbilical fat and supple and full of blood, and allows my conscious conception and creation. Indeed, in the intersection of my theoretical, creative, psychological, and somatic praxis, the heat (read hot and messy, insightful and insistent signage) of my body’s knowledges perhaps intensifies – with a ripe bouquet – the inevitably ongoing odour/aroma of the reproductive world. ReferencesAngel, Maria, and Anna Gibbs. “On Moving and Being Moved: The Corporeality of Writing in Literary Fiction and New Media Art.” Literature and Sensation, eds. Anthony Uhlmann, Helen Groth, Paul Sheehan, and Stephan McLaren. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009: 162-172. Bollas, Christopher. The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known. New York: Columbia UP, 1987. Brodzinsky, David. “Adjustment to Adoption: A Psychosocial Perspective.” Clinical Psychology Review 7 (1987): 25-47. doi: 10.1016/0272-7358(87)90003-1.Brodzinsky, David, Daniel Smith, and Anne Brodzinsky. Children’s Adjustment to Adoption: Developmental and Clinical Issues. California: Sage Publications, 1998.Carnochan, Peter. “Containers without Lids”. Psychoanalytic Dialogues 16.3 (2006): 341-362.Cixous, Hélène. “To Live the Orange”. The Hélène Cixous Reader: With a Preface by Hélène Cixous and Foreword by Jacques Derrida, ed. Susan Sellers. Oxford, UK: Routledge, 1979/1994. 81-92. ---. “Preface.” The Hélène Cixous Reader: With a Preface by Hélène Cixous and Foreword by Jacques Derrida, ed. Susan Sellers. Oxford, UK: Routledge, 1994. xv-xxii.Coull, Kim. “Womb Tongues: A Collection of Poetry.” Honours Thesis. Perth, WA: Edith Cowan University, 2007. ---. “The Womb Artist – A Novel: Translating Late Discovery Adoptee Pre-Verbal Trauma into Narrative”. Dissertation. Perth, WA: Edith Cowan University, 2014. Durey, Judith. Translating Hiraeth, Performing Adoption: Art as Mediation and Form of Cultural Production. Dissertation. Perth, WA: Murdoch University, 2010. 22 Sep. 2011 .Ekis Ekman, Kajsa. 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Past Adoption Experiences: National Research Study on the Service Response to Past Adoption Practices. Research Report 21. Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2012.Kirby, Vicky. Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal. New York and London: Routledge, 1997. Klorer, P. Gussie. “Expressive Therapy with Severely Maltreated Children: Neuroscience Contributions.” Journal of the American Art Therapy Association 22.4 (2005): 213-220. doi:10.1080/07421656.2005.10129523.Levy-Shiff, Rachel. “Psychological Adjustment of Adoptees in Adulthood: Family Environment and Adoption-Related Correlates. 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Introduction Ever-enduring advancements in science and technology promise to offer solutions to problems or simply to make life a bit easier. However, not every advancement has only positive effects, but can also have undesired, negative ramifications. This article will take a closer look at Deus Ex: Human Revolution (DXHR), a dystopian video game which promises to put players in the position of deciding whether the science of human enhancement is a way to try to play God, or whether it enables us “to become the Gods we’ve always been striving to be” (Eidos Montreal, “Deus Ex: Human Revolution”). In this article I will argue that DXHR creates a space in which players can virtually witness future technologies for human performance enhancement without the need to alter their own bodies. DXHR is special particularly in two respects: first, the developers have achieved a high credibility and scientific realism of the enhancement technologies depicted in the game which can be described as being “diegetic prototypes” (Kirby, “The Future Is Now ” 43); second, the game directly invites players to reflect upon the impact and morality of human enhancement. It does so through a story in line with the cyberpunk genre, which envisions not only the potential benefits of an emergent technology, but has an even stronger focus on the negative contingencies. The game and its developers foresee a near-future society that is split into two fractions due to human enhancement technologies which come in the form of neuro-implants and mechanical prosthetics; and they foresee a near-future setting in which people are socially and economically forced to undergo enhancement surgery in order to keep up with the augmented competition. DXHR is set in the year 2027 and the player takes control of Adam Jensen, an ex-SWAT police officer who is now the chief of security of Sarif Industries, one of the world's leading biotechnology companies that produce enhancement technologies. Augmented terrorists attack Sarif Industries, abduct the head scientists, and nearly kill Jensen. Jensen merely survives because his boss puts him through enhancement surgery, which replaces many parts of his body with mechanical augmentations. In the course of the game it becomes clear that Jensen has been augmented beyond any life-saving necessity that grants him superhuman abilities and allows him to find and defeat the terrorists, but the augmentations also challenge his humanity. Is Jensen a human, a cyborg, or has he become more machine than man? DXHR grants players the illusion of immersion into a virtual world in which augmentations exist as a matter of fact and in which a certain level of control can be practiced. Players take up the role of a character distinctly more powerful and capable than the person in control, exceeding the limits of human abilities. The superior abilities are a result of scientific and technological advancements implying that every man or woman is able to attain the same abilities by simply acquiring augmentations. Thus, with the help of the playable character, Adam Jensen, the game lets players experience augmentations without any irreparable damages done to their bodies, but the experience will leave a lasting impression on players regarding the science of human enhancement. The experience with augmentations happens through and benefits from the effect of “virtual witnessing”: The technology of virtual witnessing involves the production in a reader’s mind of such an image of an experimental scene as obviates the necessity for either direct witness or replication. Through virtual witnessing the multiplication of witnesses could be, in principle, unlimited. (Shapin and Schaffer 60) In other words, simply by reading about and/or seeing scientific advancements, audiences can witness them without having to be present at the site of creation. The video game, hereby, is itself the medium of virtual witnessing whereby audiences can experience scientific advancements. Nevertheless, the video game is not just about reading or seeing potential future enhancement technologies, but permits players to virtually test-drive augmentations—to actually try out three-dimensionally rendered prototypes on a virtual body. In order to justify this thesis, a couple of things need to be clarified that explain in which ways the virtual witnessing of fictional enhancements in DXHR is a valid claim. Getting into the Game First I want to briefly describe how I investigated the stated issue. I have undertaken an auto-ethnography (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner) of DXHR, which concretely means that I have analytically played DXHR in an explorative fashion (Aarseth) trying to discover as many elements on human enhancement that the game has to offer. This method requires not only close observation of the virtual environment and documentation through field notes and screenshots, but also self-reflection of the actions that I chose to take and that were offered to me in the course of the game. An essential part of analytically playing a game is to be aware that the material requires “the activity of an actual player in order to be accessible for scrutiny” (Iversen), and that the player’s input fundamentally shapes the gaming experience (Juul 42). The meaning of the game is contingent upon the contribution of the player, especially in times in which digital games grant players more and more freedom in terms of narrative construction. In contrast to traditional narrative, the game poses an active challenge to the player which entails the need to become better in relation to the game’s mechanics and hence “studying games … implies interacting with the game rules and exploring the possibilities created by these rules, in addition to studying the graphical codes or the narration that unfolds” (Malliet). It is important to highlight that, although the visual representation of human enhancement technologies has an enormous potential impact on the player’s experience, it is not the only crucial element. Next to the representational shell, the core of the game, i.e. “how game rules and interactions with game objects and other players are structured” (Mäyrä 165), shapes the virtual witnessing of the augmentations in just an important way. Finally, the empirical material that was collected was analyzed and interpreted with the help of close-reading (Bizzocchi and Tanenbaum 395). In addition to the game itself, I have enriched my empirical material with interviews of developers of the game that are partly freely available on the Internet, and with the promotional material such as the trailers and a website (Eidos Montreal, “Sarif Industries”) that was released prior to the game. Sociotechnical Imaginaries In this case study of DXHR I have not only investigated how augmented bodies and enhancement technologies are represented in this specific video game, but also attempted to uncover which “sociotechnical imaginaries” (Jasanoff and Kim) underlie the game and support the virtual witnessing experience. Sociotechnical imaginaries are defined as “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects” (Jasanoff and Kim 120). The concept appeared to be suitable for this study as it covers and includes “promises, visions and expectations of future possibilities” (Jasanoff and Kim 122) of a technology as well as “implicit understandings of what is good or desirable in the social world writ large” (Jasanoff and Kim 122–23). The game draws upon several imaginaries of human enhancement. For example, the most basic imaginary in the game is that advanced engineered prosthetics and implants will be able to not only remedy dysfunctional parts of the human body, but will be able to upgrade these. Apart from this idea, the two prevailing sociotechnical imaginaries that forward the narrative can be subsumed as the transhumanist and the purist imaginary. The latter views human enhancement, with the help of science and technology, as unnatural and as a threat to humanity particularly through the power that it grants to individuals, while the former transports the opposing view. Transhumanism is: the intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities. (Chrislenko et al.) The transhumanist imaginary in the game views technological development of the body as another step in the human evolution, not as something abhorrent to nature, but a fundamental human quality. Similar ideas can be found in the writings of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Gehlen, who both view the human being’s need to improve as part of its culture. Gehlen described the human as a “Mängelwesen”—a ‘deficient’ creature—who is, in contrast to other species, not specialized to a specific environment, but has the ability to adapt to nearly every situation because of this deficiency (Menne, Trutwin, and Türk). Freud even denoted the human as a “Prothesengott”—a god of prostheses: By means of all his tools, man makes his own organs more perfect—both the motor and the sensory—or else removes the obstacles in the way of their activity. Machinery places gigantic power at his disposal which, like his muscles, he can employ in any direction; ships and aircraft have the effect that neither air nor water can prevent his traversing them. With spectacles he corrects the defects of the lens in his own eyes; with telescopes he looks at far distances; with the microscope he overcomes the limitations in visibility due to the structure of his retina. (Freud 15) Returning to DXHR, how do the sociotechnical imaginaries matter for the player? Primarily, the imaginaries cannot be avoided as they pervade nearly every element in the game, from the main story that hinges upon human enhancement over the many optional side missions, to contextual elements such as a conference on “the next steps in human evolution” (Eidos Montreal, “Deus Ex: Human Revolution”). Most importantly, it impacts the player’s view in a crucial way. Human enhancement technologies are presented as controversial, neither exclusively good nor bad, which require reflection and perhaps even legal regulation. In this way, DXHR can be seen as offering the player a restricted building set of sociotechnical imaginaries of human enhancement, whereby the protagonist, Adam Jensen, becomes the player’s vessel to construct one’s own individual imaginary. In the end the player is forced to choose one of four outcomes to complete the game, and this choice can be quite difficult to make. Anticipation of the Future It is not unusual for video games to feature futuristic technologies that do not exist in the real world, but what makes DXHR distinct from others is that the developers have included an extent of information that goes beyond any game playing necessity (see Figures 1 & 2). Moreover, the information is not fictional but the developers have taken strategic steps to make it credible. Mary DeMarle, the narrative designer, explained at the San Diego Comic-Con in 2011, that a timeline of augmentation was created during the production phase in which the present state of technology was extrapolated into the future. In small incremental steps the developers have anticipated which enhancement technologies might be potentially feasible by the year 2027. Their efforts were supported by the science consultant, Will Rosellini, who voluntarily approached the development team to help. Being a neuroscientist, he could not have been a more fitting candidate for the job as he is actively working and researching in the biotechnology sector. He has co-founded two companies, MicroTransponder Inc., which produces tiny implantable wireless devices to interface with the nervous system to remedy diseases (see Rosellini’s presentation at the 2011 Comic-Con) and Rosellini Scientific, which funds, researches and develops advanced technological healthcare solutions (Rosellini; Rosellini Scientific). Due to the timeline which has been embedded explicitly and implicitly, no augmentation appears as a disembodied technology without history in the game. For example, although the protagonist wears top-notch military arm prostheses that appear very human-like, this prosthesis is depicted as one of the latest iterations and many non-playable characters possess arm prostheses that appear a lot older, cruder and more industrial than those of Jensen. Furthermore, an extensive description employing scientific jargon for each of the augmentations can be read on the augmentation overview screen, which includes details about the material composition and bodily locations of the augmentations. Figure 1: More Info Section of the Cybernetic Arm Prosthesis as it appears in-game (all screenshots taken with permission from Deus Ex: Human Revolution (2011), courtesy of Eidos Montreal) More details are provided through eBooks, which are presented in the form of scientific articles or conference proceedings, for which the explorative gamer is also rewarded with valuable experience points upon finding which are used to activate and upgrade augmentations. The eBooks also reflect the timeline as each eBook is equipped with a year of publication between 2001 and 2022. Despite the fact that these articles have been supposedly written by a fictional character, the information is authentic and taken from actual scientific research papers, whereby some of these articles even include a proper scientific citation. Figure 2: Example of a Darrow eBook The fact that a scientist was involved in the production of the game allows classifying the augmentations as “diegetic prototypes” which are “cinematic depictions of future technologies … that demonstrate to large public audiences a technology’s need, benevolence and viability” (“The Future Is Now” 43). Diegetic prototypes are fictional, on-screen depictions of technologies that do not exist in that form in real life and have been created with the help of a science consultant. They have been placed in movies to allay anxieties and doubts and perhaps to even provoke a longing in audiences to see depicted technologies become reality (Kirby, “The Future Is Now” 43). Of course the aesthetic appearance of the prototypes has an impact on audiences’s desire, and particularly the artificial arms of Jensen that have been designed in an alluring fashion as can be seen in the following figure: Figure 3: Adam Jensen and arm prosthesis An important fact about diegetic prototypes—and about prototypes (see Suchman, Trigg, and Blomberg) in general—is that they are put to specific use and are embedded and presented in an identifiable social context. Technological objects in cinema are at once both completely artificial—all aspects of their depiction are controlled—and normalized as practical objects. Characters treat these technologies as a ‘natural’ part of their landscape and interact with these prototypes as if they are everyday parts of their world. … fictional characters are ‘socializing’ technological artifacts by creating meanings for the audience, ‘which is tantamount to making the artifacts socially relevant’. (Kirby, “Lab Coats” 196) The power of DXHR is that the diegetic prototypes—the augmentations—are not only based on real world scientific developments and contextualized in a virtual social space, but that the player has the opportunity to handle the augmentations. Virtual Testing Virtual witnessing of the not-yet-existent augmentations is supported by scientific descriptions, articles, and the appearance of the technologies in DXHR, but the moral and ethical engagement is established by the player’s ability to actively use the augmentations and by the provision of choice how to use them. As mentioned, most of the augmentations are inactive and must first be activated by accumulating and spending experience points on them. This requires the player to make reflections on the potential usage and how a particular augmentation will lead to the successful completion of a mission. This means that the player has to constantly decide how s/he wants to play the game. Do I want to be able to hack terminals and computers or do I rather prefer getting mission-critical information by confronting people in conversation? Do I want to search for routes where I can avoid enemy detection or do I rather prefer taking the direct route through the enemy lines with heavy guns in hands? This recurring reflection of which augmentation to choose and their continuous usage throughout the game causes the selected augmentations to become valuable and precious to the player because they transform from augmentations into frequently used tools that facilitate challenge and reduce difficulty of certain situations. In addition, the developers have ensured that no matter which approach is taken, it will always lead to success. This way the role-playing elements of the game are accentuated and each player will construct their own version of Jensen. However, it may be argued that DXHR goes beyond mere character building. There is a breadth of information and opinions on human enhancement offered, but also choices that are made invite players to reflect upon the topic of human enhancement. Among the most conspicuous instances in the game, that involve the player’s choice, are the conversations with other non-playable characters. These are events in the game which require the player to choose one out of three responses for Jensen, and hence, these determine to some extent Jensen’s attitude towards human enhancement. Thus, in the course of the game players might discover their own conviction and might compose their own imaginary of human enhancement. Conclusion This article has explored that DXHR enables players to experience augmentations without being modified themselves. The game is filled with various sociotechnical imaginaries of prosthetic and neurological human enhancement technologies. The relevance of these imaginaries is increased by a high degree of credibility as a science consultant has ensured that the fictional augmentations are founded upon real world scientific advancements. The main story, and much of the virtual world, hinge upon the existence and controversy of these sorts of technologies. Finally, the medium ‘videogame’ allows taking control of an individual, who is heavily augmented with diegetic prototypes of future enhancement technologies, and it also allows using and testing the increased abilities in various situations and challenges. All these elements combined enable players to virtually witness not-yet-existent, future augmentations safely in the present without the need to undertake any alterations of their own bodies. This, in addition to the fact that the technologies are depicted in an appealing fashion, may create a desire in players to see these augmentations become reality. 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