Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Stoic philosophy'

The aim of this thesis is to consider the relationship between philosophy and biography, and the bearing that this relationship has on debates concerning the nature and function of philosophy. There exists a certain tradition that conceives philosophy exclusively in terms of rational discourse and as such explicitly rejects the idea of any substantial relationship between philosophy and the way in which one lives. I shall argue that the claim that philosophy cannot have any impact upon biography is often based upon an implicit conception of philosophy as primarily rational discourse. In contrast to this I shall draw upon Socratic and Stoic philosophical resources in order to reconstruct an alternative conception of philosophy as an art concerned with one's way of life. Central to this conception will be the relationship between philosophical discourse or argument and philosophical training or exercise. I shall argue that the ancient claim that philosophy is primarily expressed in one's behaviour presupposes a conception of philosophy as an art that involves both rational discourse and training or exercise as two equally important components. I shall argue that by adopting this alternative conception of philosophy as a techne it will be possible to understand properly the relationship between philosophy and biography. In Part One I shall outline the ancient idea that philosophy is something expressed in one's life, the Socratic conception of philosophy as an art, the Stoic development of this conception into an art of living, and some ancient objections to this Stoic conception. In Part Two I shall examine the relationship between philosophical discourse and exercises in Stoic philosophy, focusing upon the neglected concept of philosophical askesis. Central to this will be the literary form of such exercises and so I shall focus upon two texts (by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius) concerned with philosophical exercises.

A presente dissertação consiste numa tradução anotada da peça Hercules furens, do filósofo e tragediógrafo romano Lúcio Aneu Sêneca (4? a.C. 65 AD), precedida de uma introdução na qual são apresentadas uma série de reflexões sobre a dramaturgia senequiana. Esse estudo introdutório divide-se em três partes principais: num primeiro momento, investiga-se brevemente a relação entre a História e a composição dramática de Sêneca, contextualizando a peça no período histórico em que foi composta; o segundo capítulo do estudo propõe-se a examinar as intersecções entre a Filosofia estoica, a mitologia e as composições poéticas de Sêneca; por fim, são analisados alguns procedimentos retórico-poéticos que fundamentam a tragediografia senequiana. Durante muito tempo, a peça em questão foi considerada mera adaptação romana do Héracles de Eurípides; por meio das reflexões concatenadas no estudo introdutório, esta dissertação tem por objetivo precípuo evidenciar o anacronismo de certos juízos de valor que com frequência foram projetados no texto de Sêneca, procurando-se, deste modo, resgatar uma visão menos parcial da peça e evidenciar ao leitor moderno as peculiaridades latinas encontrados no Hércules furioso, mostrando como a peça se insere na evolução do gênero trágico em Roma e como o texto dialoga amplamente com a tradição poética latina.<br>The present dissertation consists in an annotated translation of the play Hercules furens, written by the roman tragedian and philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4? BC AD 65), preceded by an introduction in wich a series of reflections on senecan tragedy are presented. This preliminary study is made up of three main parts: the first one is a brief investigation of how History and senecan work are related, giving us the historic context from when the play was written; the second chapter of the study is an analysis of the intersection between Stoic philosophy, mithology and Senecan poetry; at last, the third chapter is an analysis of some rhetorical-poetical procedures in wich the Senecan drama is based on. For a long time, Hercules furens has been considered a mere adaptation of Euripides Heracles; but through reflections linked together in the preliminary study, the main objective of this text is to point out the anachronism of certain judgements of value that were often projected into Senecas dramatic text, leading to a less biased vision of the play and showing to the modern reader the latin peculiarities found in Hercules furens and how the play plays a role in the evolution of the tragic genre in Rome and at last, how the latin poetry tradition is widely alluded to by the text.

Os Infortúnios trágicos da constante Florinda, de Gaspar Pires de Rebelo, foram publicados em 1625. Devido ao sucesso alcançado pelo texto, veio a público, em 1633, uma continuação intitulada Segunda parte da Constante Florinda, em que se trata dos infortúnios que teve Arnaldo buscando-a pelo mundo. A Constante Florinda (esse é o título pelo qual as duas partes da obra, em conjunto, ficaram conhecidas), muito lida nos séculos XVII e XVIII, foi praticamente esquecida nos séculos seguintes. Este nosso trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a referida obra, evidenciando os procedimentos retóricos e poéticos e os ensinamentos estóico-cristãos que constituem a narração e a doutrina da Constante Florinda. Tendo em vista tal propósito, o estudo, num primeiro momento, volta-se para os preceitos retóricos e poéticos que permitem pensar-se numa ars narrandi, ou seja, uma técnica de narrar que o narrador, como persona gnara, conhece e sabe empregar ao relatar os infortúnios trágicos de Florinda e Arnaldo. Se um dos ofícios dessa narração é ensinar algo para os leitores, já que estes devem ser movidos não apenas pelo deleite, mas também pelo proveito, nosso trabalho, num segundo momento, discute as lições das histórias narradas. Assim, o que buscamos demonstrar é que o proveito da narração dos infortúnios de Florinda e Arnaldo ecoa os ensinamentos da doutrina estóico-cristã dos séculos XVI e XVII, difundida por autores como Justo Lípsio e Francisco de Quevedo. Ressalta-se neste trabalho, por fim, o seu próprio artifício. Apenas no nosso estudo narração e doutrina podem ser separadas, pois no texto da Constante Florinda tudo se dá simultaneamente: a narração já é doutrina, e mostra aos leitores, com exempla estóicos, os caminhos (trágicos) do viver cristão.<br>Gaspar Pires de Rebelos Infortúnios trágicos da constante Florinda was published in 1625. Given its conspicuous success, a sequel, Segunda parte da Constante Florinda, em que se trata dos infortúnios que teve Arnaldo buscando-a pelo mundo, came out in 1633. Constante Florinda (this is the title both parts became known as), largely disseminated in the 17th and 18th centuries, was nonetheless virtually forgotten in the subsequent centuries. This dissertation intends to analyze the aforementioned work, so as to highlight not only rhetorical and poetic procedures, but also stoic-christian lessons which lie beneath both the narrative and the doctrine of Constante Florinda. Bearing this goal in mind, this study will first focus on rhetorical and poetic precepts which render it possible to think about the ars narrandi, that is to say, a narrative technique that the narrator (as persona gnara) deeply understands, thus being able to employ it when reporting the tragic misfortunes of Florinda and Arnaldo. If one of the purposes of this narration is to teach something to its readers, since the latter must be moved not only by delight, but also by profit, we also intend to adduce the lessons of the stories the narrator tells. Therefore, we mean to demonstrate that the profit from the narration of Florindas and Arnaldos misfortunes reflects 16th and 17th-century stoic-christian doctrine, profoundly advertised by authors such as Justus Lipsius and Francisco de Quevedo. Last but not least, our dissertation has it as an inherent intention to stress its artifice. Only in our study can narration and doctrine be set apart, since in Constante Florinda they emerge simultaneously: narration is also doctrine, and conveys the (tragic) paths, with stoic exempla, of christian life.

Investigar as relações filosóficas da lógica como instrumento segundo os antigos aristotélicos, até a época de Alexandre de Afrodísia, é o objeto principal de nosso trabalho. Ora, após avaliarmos criticamente algumas interpretações recentes, é ainda mais claro que uma lógica-instrumento não se encontra em Aristóteles. Como não pôde ter sido Aristóteles o primeiro a defender essa doutrina, nossa investigação se concentrou, então, num dos contextos mais significativos em que ela aparece, a saber, em uma polêmica com os estoicos; em contraste com os que defendiam que ela não era parte mas instrumento, estoicos argumentavam que a lógica é parte da filosofia, os quais argumentos nós analisamos aqui. É verdade, porém, que essas duas teses não são completamente contraditórias entre si, na medida em que, no período entre Aristóteles e Alexandre, há sinais de uma tese compatibilista, ou seja, de que a lógica seria considerada tanto parte quanto instrumento. Seja como for, nos debruçamos sobre as críticas dos aristotélicos contra uma lógica-parte, bem como sobre eventuais argumentos positivos dos peripatéticos, deixando claro o significado de uma determinada disciplina ser instrumento, órganon em grego. No aristotelismo antigo, disciplina-órganon implicava relações com o conceito de arquitetonicidade; segundo trechos de Aristóteles, objetos e, inclusive, técnicos de determinadas disciplinas podem ser utilizados como instrumentos por outras, mais arquitetônicas em relação às primeiras; daí peripatéticos posteriores denominarem as próprias disciplinas subordinadas de instrumentos; o conceito de disciplina instrumental, então, implica que ela contribui para a finalidade de sua superior. Com isso em mente, voltando-nos especificamente à lógica, Alexandre de Afrodísia considerava claramente que a lógica contribui para a contemplação, finalidade última do homem.<br>Our major aim here was to research the philosophical relations of logic as tool according to the ancient Aristotelians untill Alexander of Aphrodisias. After our critical assessments of recent interpretations, it is even clearer that Aristotle had not any idea of logic as tool. Since Aristotle could not have argued for such doctrine, our research focused on one of the most significative contexts in which it appears, namely, in a debate with the Stoics; contrary to the ones who said logic is no part, but an instrument of philosophy, the Stoics themselves sustained that logic is part of philosophy and we assessed their arguments for this. It is true that these two theses are not throughout contradictory between them, in so far as, in the period between Aristotle and Alexander, there are signals of a compatibilist thesis, i.e. that the logic had been regarded as part and tool. May as it be, the Aristotelians criticized the arguments for logic as part, which we analyzed, as well as some positive arguments of the Aristotelian school; accordingly, the meaning of some discipline as an instrument (in Greek organon) was clear. That means: a discipline-organon implied relations with the concept of architectonicity; for, according to texts of Aristotle, objects and even technicians of some disciplines could be used as tools by other more architectonic disciplines; that is why later Peripateticians named the subordinate disciplines themselves tools; the concept of instrumental discipline implies that it helps to the finality of its superior. That in mind, we could see the specific case of logic which, as at least Alexader of Aphrodisias clearly regarded, helps to the contemplation, the utmost finality of man.

First, this thesis outhnes part of the thought of some pre-Socratic thinkers, particularly Heraclitus. In doing this, I explore the historical provenance of certain ideas which came to be important in Stoicism. It then moves on to look at the Stoic view of 'physics', including some comparison with Epicurus and Aristotle, and with a focus on the concept of the continuum. The third chapter attempts to synthesise a common problem arising from a belief in the continuum, namely a problem of indeterminacy. In the fourth chapter, certain characterisations of Stoic epistemology are considered, along with an overview of recent interpretations of the Stoic theory of impressions. It concludes with the thought that at certain crucial points - such as whether impressions themselves are to be thought of as true and false - the Stoic position is underdetermined with respect to the evidence. Pursuing this thought into the fifth chapter, we see the evidence as being equivalently consistent with a 'two-tier’ theory of perception, where impressions themselves are understood as neither true nor false in any sense, but iu which 'the true' arises as a result of the transformative effect of reason. This theory is shown to connect with verbalisation through the 'rational impression'. This leads to the suggestion that the Stoics had a linguistic diagnosis for some problems in philosophy, arrived at by their reflections on ambiguity and etymology. In the final chapter, an account of intersubjectivity is explored, which preserves for the Stoics the claim that their truth has an objective character and is thus appropriate for a 'dogmatic' philosophy.

This thesis offers new philosophical and literary interpretations of Seneca's 'De ira'. It takes as its starting-point the observation that both the philosophical position on which the text relies and the way in which it is organised appear to be chaotic, and it investigates how far and why this is the case. It shows that a coherent philosophical position underlies the text but that the text presents it as incoherent, and that it does this for therapeutic purposes. Similarly, it shows that the text is organised in a far more orderly way than has been previously appreciated, and it explains how the (apparent) disruption of that organisational system serves the text's therapeutic function. In making these arguments, it presents new readings of the De ira that reveal the text's philosophical and literary qualities, arguing that it constitutes a more sophisticated response to Seneca's philosophical predecessors than previous accounts have claimed, and that the text, as it progresses, introduces new therapeutic strategies that provide 'safety nets' should its earlier principal strategies have failed. The thesis aims to be methodologically innovative in using Seneca's descriptions of emotional responses as well as more explicit theorising to reconstruct his philosophical position and in suggesting a new approach to interpreting the role of interlocutors and addressees in didactic and dialogic texts.

L’objectif du présent travail est de faire la lumière sur la conception de l’âme présente à l’intérieur de la pensée philosophique de Sénèque, en faisant émerger, d’un côté, son orthodoxie fondamentale à l’égard du stoïcisme, de l’autre, sa contribution originale. Dans ce but, notre thèse est divisée en trois parties. La première s’occupe de reconnaître les caractéristiques de l’âme humaine dans ses traits essentiels (nature, structure, fonction) en faisant émerger un premier “modèle” psychologique : l’âme stable et harmonieuse qui a rejoint la vertu. La seconde partie approfondit un second “modèle” psychologique : celui d’une âme instable, dysharmonique et passionnelle. Enfin, la troisième partie analyse la question de l’âme dans les œuvres qui ne sont pas stricto sensu philosophiques (les tragédies et les Naturales Quaestiones) dans la mesure où elles se révèlent avoir des affinités significatives avec le discours développé dans les deux premières parties, nous permettant ainsi de spécifier encore mieux notre thèse<br>The aim of this work is to unveil the conception of the soul within Seneca's philosophical thought by bringing out, on the one hand, his underlying orthodoxy towards Stoicism and, on the other, his original contribution. In this regard, the dissertation is divided into three parts. The first one reconstructs the characteristics of the human soul in its essential traits (nature, structure, functions) and develops a first psychological “model”: the stable and harmonious soul that has achieved virtue. The second part deepens a second psychological “model”: that of an unstable, disharmonious and passionate soul. Finally, the third part analyses the works not stricto sensu philosophical (tragedies and Natural Questions), as they reveal significant affinities with the discourse on the soul conducted in the first two parts, allowing us to specify our thesis even better

Notre thèse a comme point de départ la discussion critique d’un concept donné pour acquis par les spécialistes de la littérature et de la philosophie antiques. Il s’agit de la diatribe cynico-stoïcienne, ainsi nommée parce qu'elle ferait coexister des motifs cyniques et des thèmes stoïciens. Nous commençons par évaluer l'exactitude de la définition largement admise qui met la diatribe en relation avec toute une tradition d’argumentations relevant de la philosophie morale vulgarisatrice. Puis nous justifions notre choix d’accepter, en cherchant à les intégrer, certains acquits scientifiques récents, visant à défendre la diatribe comme un genre relevant de la méthode de direction spirituelle à l’intérieur des écoles philosophiques d’origine socratique, avec un accent particulier sur la situation d’énonciation maître-disciple. De ce genre littéraire controversé, d’origine grecque, nous analysons le passage à la latinité en examinant tout d’abord le problème terminologique, puis celui du cadrage philosophique. Parmi les procédés, définis comme diatribiques, nous nous intéressons à la seule caractéristique qui ne paraisse pas être mise en question et qui pour cette raison précisément pourrait servir de fondement à l’existence du genre même : le dialogisme et la présence d’un interlocuteur fictif. Nous concentrons ensuite notre attention sur l’œuvre de Sénèque, et notamment sur Les Lettres à Lucilius où la situation d’énonciation maître-disciple est intensément visible et dans laquelle la présence de l’interlocuteur fictif est structurellement liée au développement de cette relation. Nous passons ensuite à l’étude des formes diatribiques de la satire romaine afin d’aborder les cas de Lucilius, Horace et Perse. Un bref exposé est finalement consacré à l’analyse des relations entre la diatribe, la Seconde Sophistique et la prédication religieuse<br>The starting point of our thesis is the critical discussion of a concept taken for granted by literary and ancient philosophy scholars. This is the cynic-stoic diatribe, so named because cynical themes would coexist with Stoic ones. Our first step is assessing the accuracy of the widely accepted definition, which makes the connection between the diatribe and a tradition of topics relating to moral popular philosophy. Then we explain our choice to accept and to try to integrate recent scientific acknowledgments which accept the diatribe as a literary genre relating to the spiritual guidance method of the Socratic philosophical schools, with a particularly attentive focus on the relationship between master and disciple. Starting from this controversial genre of Greek origin, we analyze the transition to the Roman period, by first examining the terminological aspect and then the philosophical framing. Among the methods, defined as diatribic, we focus on the only feature which does not appear to be challenged and that for this exact reason could be the basis of the existence of the genre itself: dialogism and the presence of a fictitious interlocutor.We then focus our attention on Seneca's work, and particularly on Letters to Lucilius, where the attempt to create a master-disciple relationship is intensely visible, and in which the presence of a fictitious interlocutor is structurally related to the development of this relationship. Then we discuss the diatribic forms of Roman satire, to reach Lucilius', Horace's and Persius' cases. A brief presentation is finally devoted to the analysis of relations between the diatribe, the Second Sophistic and the religious preaching

Orientador: Paulo Sergio de Vasconcellos<br>Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T07:00:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bregalda_MairaMeyer_M.pdf: 809711 bytes, checksum: 8e790f16295e30872911fc1072e4da19 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006<br>Resumo: Os conceitos de sapientia e uirtus em Sêneca (4 a.C. ¿ 65 d.C.) permeiam grande parte de sua obra, sendo que, por vezes, encontram-se fortemente ligados: pode-nos parecer difícil pensar em uma pretensa relação de subordinação entre os conceitos de sabedoria e virtude em si mesmos; no entanto, o modo como ambos se conjugam na obra desse autor incita-nos a questionar se a meta final do homem é a virtude através da sabedoria, ou a sabedoria através da virtude. A filosofia estóica é bastante conhecida pelo fato de subjugar a lógica, e mesmo a física, à moral: como o próprio Sêneca apregoa, nada teria valor se não pudesse ser utilizado na vida prática. E, justamente no âmbito dessa, tais categorias são desenvolvidas nos escritos do estóico. Dessa forma, à primeira vista, tende-se a considerar que, para o filósofo, a sabedoria estaria subordinada à virtude. A pesquisa que realizamos dividiu-se em três etapas: a seleção e tradução de epístolas senequianas que expusessem sua concepção daqueles dois conceitos; a elaboração de notas explicativas; um estudo introdutório acerca da relação entre o ser sábio e a virtude, no contexto em que o filósofo se insere<br>Abstract: The concepts of sapientia and uirtus in Seneca (4 b.C. ¿ 65 a. C.) permeates a great part of his works, seeing that, sometimes, they are strongly linked: it seems to be difficult to think about an assumed relation of subordination between the subjects of wisdom and virtue in themselves; nevertheless, the form both get conjugated in this author¿s works incites us to question if the man¿s final goal is virtue through wisdom or wisdom through virtue. The stoic philosophy is well known by the fact of subjudging the logic and even physics to ethics: as Seneca himself proclaims, it would be useless if it could not be used in daily life. And, precisely on its ambit, these categories are developed on the author¿s writings. Therefore, at first sight, it tends to consider that, for the philosopher, wisdom would be subordinated to virtue. Our research was divided into three steps: selection and translation of Seneca¿s epistles that expose his conceivings about the two concepts; elaboration of explicative notes and an introductory study about the relation between being a wise man and the virtue, in a context where the philosopher inserts himself<br>Mestrado<br>Mestre em Linguística

The starting point of our thesis is the critical discussion of a concept taken for granted by literary and ancient philosophy scholars. This is the cynic-stoic diatribe, so named because cynical themes would coexist with Stoic ones. Our first step is assessing the accuracy of the widely accepted definition, which makes the connection between the diatribe and a tradition of topics relating to moral popular philosophy. Then we explain our choice to accept and to try to integrate recent scientific acknowledgments which accept the diatribe as a literary genre relating to the spiritual guidance method of the Socratic philosophical schools, with a particularly attentive focus on the relationship between master and disciple. Starting from this controversial genre of Greek origin, we analyze the transition to the Roman period, by first examining the terminological aspect and then the philosophical framing. Among the methods, defined as diatribic, we focus on the only feature which does not appear to be challenged and that for this exact reason could be the basis of the existence of the genre itself: dialogism and the presence of a fictitious interlocutor. We then focus our attention on Seneca's work, and particularly on Letters to Lucilius, where the attempt to create a master-disciple relationship is intensely visible, and in which the presence of a fictitious interlocutor is structurally related to the development of this relationship. Then we discuss the diatribic forms of Roman satire, to reach Lucilius', Horace's and Persius' cases. A brief presentation is finally devoted to the analysis of relations between the diatribe, the Second Sophistic and the religious preaching.

Orientador: Isabella Tardin Cardoso<br>Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T01:01:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DePietro_MatheusClemente_D.pdf: 3681860 bytes, checksum: 36814b62d25b775f7a20920f7440eee7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013<br>Resumo: O presente estudo dá continuidade à pesquisa anterior acerca da noção estóica de "harmonia" ou "acordo" na prosa do filósofo romano Lúcio Aneu Sêneca (4 a.C. -65 d.C.). Conforme verificado em estudo de Mestrado, areferida noção-, central à escola estóica -, encontra-se expressa por Sêneca de diversos modos, e, além disso, tem suas diversas particularidades apresentadas e desenvolvidas em diferentes "faces" pelo filósofo. No presente estágio da pesquisa, concentramos nossa investigação na obra De uita beata ("Sobre a vida feliz"), e procuramos analisar a presença e função que diferentes noções de "harmonia" e "acordo" têm no texto. Para isso, apresentamos uma tradução completa da obra, acompanhada de notas explicativas e de estudo acerca da tradição manuscrita do texto. No que concerne à noção em apreço, propomo-nos a conduzir investigação extensiva sobre noções de "harmonia" na escola estóica, bem como dos fundamentos teóricos que as suportam, e apresentamos os resultados em forma de uma sistematização geral desse conceito. Após tais considerações, realizamos análise detalhada de dois trechos do De uita beata,nos quais a presença de referências à "harmonia" estóica se mostra de modo mais evidente. A análise revelou que, ao menos nessas passagens, é observável um discurso densamente filosófico, aparente apenas após atenção a certos elementos estilísticos nela empregados, bem como ao reconhecimento de alusões e referências que Sêneca faz a particularidades da noção estóica de "harmonia". De modo geral, ao longo de toda a pesquisa-,seja durante a tradução, a investigação teórica, ou a análise de passagens da obra -, procuramos atentar ao vínculo entre filosofia e retórica verificável em Sêneca<br>Abstract: This thesis gives continuity to previous research on the Stoic notions of "harmony" and "agreement" in the prose works of the Roman philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BCE -65 CE). As observed in my studies at Masters' level, the idea in question is employed by Seneca in different manners and, in addition, it has its peculiarities presented and developed in several facies by the philosopher. In the current research I have focused my investigation on De uita beata ("On the happy life"), and I have conducted an analysis on the presence and function that different notions of "harmony "and "agreement" have in the text. To that purpose I present a complete translation of the work, accompanied by explanatory footnotes and by an inquiry of the manuscript tradition of the text. Regarding the idea under scrutiny, I have attempted careful examination of the notions of "agreement" in the Stoic school, as well as of the theoretical premises they relate to, and I have presented the results thereof in the form of a broad systematization of that concept, especially in its relation to Seneca's De uita beata. After such considerations I have performed a detailed analysis of two passages of De uita beata, in which the presence of references and allusions to some sort of Stoic "harmony" is more evident. The analysis has concluded that, at least in these excerpts, one may observe densely philosophical discourse, something manifest after close attention to certain stylistic elements found in it, as well as the identification of allusions and references that Seneca makes to particularities of that Stoic notion. In general -be it in the translation, in the theoretical investigation, or in the analysis of selected passages -,I have attempted, during the entirety of the research, to highlight and attend to the link between philosophy and rhetoric observable in Seneca<br>Doutorado<br>Linguistica<br>Doutor em Linguística

Orientador: Paulo Sérgio de Vasconcellos<br>Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T22:50:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bregalda_MairaMeyer_D.pdf: 1603873 bytes, checksum: 73b64fdd6282e9c3dffd18a7d6f49282 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011<br>Resumo: Este trabalho objetivou verificar que aspectos de conceitos encontrados durante a época republicana de Roma - como, por exemplo, a glória, a liberdade, a fama etc - se mostram na obra de Sêneca (4 a.C. - 65 d.C.). Constatou-se que a maneira segundo a qual o filósofo constrói essas noções difere da de Cícero (106 - 43 a.C.). Pode-se dizer, seguramente, que Sêneca "interioriza" conceitos que estavam, antes do Império, restritos a um contexto social e político. Para o Estoicismo, o importante é a vida moral dos seres humanos, e é nesse campo de ação que os escritos de Sêneca se desenvolvem. A investigação pretendeu demonstrar o modo como Sêneca trata os conceitos romanos, apresentando, de maneira original, as noções equivalentes gregas. Em sua obra, notadamente nas Epistulae morales ad Lucilium e em alguns Dialoghi - como o De breuitate uitae e o De tranquillitate animi - o filósofo emprega instrumentos linguísticos lexicais e morfossintáticos (esses últimos, de modo mais numeroso) referentes à interioridade. Em Sêneca, não somente os recursos linguísticos como também os imagéticos constituem parte do processo de interiorização. Nosso intuito, neste presente estudo, buscou expor tais recursos na medida em que surgiam juntamente com os conceitos por nós trabalhados<br>Abstract: This dissertation aimed at ascertaining which aspects found during the republican time period in Rome - for instance glory, freedom, fame, among others - are evident within Sêneca's work (4 BC - 65 AD). It was observed that the way this philosopher goes about building these notions is different from that of Cícero (106 - 43 a.C). One may firmly state that Sêneca "interiorizes" concepts that had been, prior to the Empire, restricted to social and political contexts. To Stoicism, the most important thing is the moral life of human beings, and it is within this field of action that Sêneca's writings are developed. This investigation intends to show the way Sêneca deals with these Roman concepts by showing, in an original way, the equivalent Greek notions. In his work, notably in Epistulae morales ad Lucilium and in some Dialoghi - such as De breuitate uitae and De tranquillitate animi - the philosopher makes use of linguistic instruments such as lexical and morphosyntactic ones (the latter being used more frequently) to refer to interiority. Within Sêneca's work, the process of interiorization involves not only linguistic but also imagery resources. Our goal, in the present study, sought to expose these resources as they emerged along with the concepts we work with<br>Doutorado<br>Linguistica<br>Doutor em Linguística

Over the course of four sections this PhD examines the ways in which the Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean philosophers portray bodily activity. In particular, it argues that their claims regarding bodies' natural tendency to preserve themselves, and seek out the goods capable of promoting their well-being, came to influence Hobbes's and Spinoza's later accounts of natural, animal and social behaviour. The first section presents the ancient accounts of natural and animal bodily tendencies and explores the specific ways in which the Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean views on animal desires came to complement and diverge from each other. After investigating the perceived links between natural philosophy, psychology and ethics, the section proceeds to consider how the ancients used this 'unified' view of nature to guide their accounts of the soul's primary appetites and desires. Also examined is the extent to which civil society is portrayed as a means of securing the individual against others, and how Aristotelian philia, Theophrastian oikeiotês and Stoic oikeiōsis came to stand in opposition to the fear-driven and compact-based accounts of social formation favoured by the Epicureans. The second section considers how the ancient accounts of impulsive behaviour and social formation were received and diffused via new editions of ancient texts, eclectic readings of Aristotle, and the attempts of Neostoic and Neoepicurean authors to update and systematise those philosophies from the late sixteenth century onwards. The particular treatments of Hellenistic thought by authors such as Justus Lipsius, Hugo Grotius and Pierre Gassendi are considered in detail and are placed within the context of the growing trend to use Stoic and Epicurean thought to replace the authority of Aristotle in the areas of science, psychology, and politics. The final two sections are devoted respectively to considering the ways in which Hobbes and Spinoza encountered the Hellenistic accounts of bodies and demonstrating how these earlier accounts came to feature in each of their own discussions of bodily tendencies. Engaging with a wide range of their texts, each section develops the many nuances and contours that emerged as both writers developed and fine-tuned their accounts of bodily actions. This reveals the many ways in which the ancient accounts of self-preservation helped to unify large aspects of Hobbes's and Spinoza's own philosophical corpus, while equally showing how a well-developed account of bodily tendencies might challenge the scholastic worldview and expand further the boundaries of the so-called 'New Science'.

The resource allocation and utilization discourse is dominated by debates about rights particularly individual property rights and ownership. This is due largely to the philosophic foundations provided by Hobbes and Locke and adopted by Bentham. In our community, though, resources come not merely with rights embedded but also obligations. The relevant laws and equitable principles which give shape to our shared rights and obligations with respect to resources take cognizance not merely of the title to the resource (the proprietary right) but the particular context in which the right is exercised. Moral philosophy regarding resource utilisation has from ancient times taken cognizance of obligations but with ascendance of modernity, the agenda of moral philosophy regarding resources, has been dominated, at least since John Locke, by a preoccupation with property rights; the ethical obligations associated with resource management have been largely ignored. The particular social context has also been ignored. Exploring this applied ethical terrain regarding resource utilisation, this thesis: (1) Revisits the justifications for modem property rights (and in that the exclusion of obligations); (2) Identifies major deficiencies in these justifications and reasons for this; (3) Traces the concept of stewardship as understood in classical Greek writing and in the New Testament, and considers its application in the Patristic period and by Medieval and reformist writers, before turning to investigate its influence on legal and equitable concepts through to the current day; 4) Discusses the nature of the stewardship obligation,maps it and offers a schematic for applying the Stewardship Paradigm to problems arising in daily life; and, (5) Discusses the way in which the Stewardship Paradigm may be applied by, and assists in resolving issues arising from within four dominant philosophic world views: (a) Rawls' social contract theory; (b) Utilitarianism as discussed by Peter Singer; (c) Christianity with particular focus on the theology of Douglas Hall; (d) Feminism particularly as expressed in the ethics of care of Carol Gilligan; and, offers some more general comments about stewardship in the context of an ethically plural community.

Cette nouvelle édition critique du De fuga saeculi d’Ambroise de Milan repose sur la collation de nouveaux témoins manuscrits et sur la révision de ceux utilisés par C. Schenkl, dont les valeurs respectives sont évaluées à l’aide d’un stemma absent de son édition de 1897. Le texte ainsi édité est assorti d’une traduction originale en langue française. Le De fuga saeculi, œuvre spirituelle et morale publiée par Ambroise avec trois autres textes au sujet proche, est replacé dans le contexte milanais de la fin du IVe siècle : mutations des modes de vie chrétiens, intérêt pour la vie monastique, concurrence avec les partisans du néoplatonisme et devoir pastoral de guider et former la communauté d’une capitale impériale. L’enquête sur les sources révèle que le De fuga saeculi est à la fois l’héritier des traditions philosophiques platoniciennes et stoïciennes relues au prisme de la pensée de Philon d’Alexandrie, et le promoteur d’une fuite du monde spécifiquement chrétienne inspirée d’épisodes et de préceptes de l’Ancien et du Nouveau Testament. Le commentaire éclaire les enchaînements d’une pensée kaléidoscopique, mettant en évidence les thèmes principaux, leurs reprises et leurs variations. Est ainsi soulignée l’originalité ambrosienne de la fuga saeculi sur un sujet d’actualité à la fin du IVe siècle et au début du Ve siècle : une fuite intra-mondaine qui est différente de celle encouragée par ses contemporains, Jérôme, Paulin de Nole et Augustin<br>This new critical edition of De fuga saeculi by Ambrose of Milan is based on the collation of new witness manuscripts and the revision of those used by C. Schenkl (their respective worth was examined thanks to a missing stemma in the 1897 edition). The edition is accompanied by an original French translation. A spiritual and moral work published by Ambrose along with three other texts on a similar topic, De fuga saeculi is placed in its Milanese context of the end of the 4th century : transformations in Christian ways of living, an interest in monastic life, competition with advocates of Neo-Platonism and a pastoral duty to guide and train the community of an imperial capital. An enquiry into the sources reveals that De fuga saeculi both inherits the Neo-Platonician and Stoic philosophical traditions – reinterpreted through the thought of Philo of Alexandria –, and advocates a specifically Christian escape out of the world, inspired by events and precepts from the Old and New Testaments. The commentary displays the sequences of a kaleidoscopic thought and highlights its majors themes, re-uses and variations. Inner-wordly escape is a topical issue of the late 4th and early 5th centuries, but Ambrose’s conception expressed in De fuga saeculy is original given that it differs from those of contemporary writers such as Jerome, Paulinus of Nola and Augustine

The primary aim of this project is to examine the nature of Socrates' influence on the Stoic Epictetus. While Plato's Socrates certainly influenced Epictetus, the Socrates portrayed in Xenophon's Memorabilia plays an even larger role in shaping the Socrates Epictetus seeks to imitate. This claim will be substantiated by drawing close parallels between passages in Epictetus' Discourses and Handbook and Xenophon's Memorabilia . The discussion here demonstrates that Epictetus' methodology is a reflection of Xenophon's approach, characterized by committed doctrines and proscriptive advice giving, rather than the searching dialectical approach ending with negative results found in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I begin by examining A.A. Long's claim that it is Plato's Socrates that Epictetus emulates, and providing a critical analysis of this argument. I then argue that the methodology of Epicetetus' Discourses , as well as the content and subject matter, are inspired by Xenophon's Socrates.

Rubens is known as a painter; he should also be defined as an art theorist. Following Robert Williams’ theory that Early Modern art became philosophical, I believe that style can connote art theoretical interests and philosophical models, and that in Rubens’s case, these included the classical Stoic. While it would be possible to trace Rubens’s commitment to Stoicism in his subject matter, I investigate it in his style, taking a Baxandalian approach to inferential criticism. I focus on Rubens’s formal choices, his varied brushwork, and his ability to create a vibrant picture plane. My study is divided into chapters on Ethics, Logic, and Physics. In Chapter One I treat Stoic moral philosophy as an influence in the design of Rubens’s paintings, consider similarities between classical and Early Modern interest in viewer/reader response, and argue that Baroque artists could use style to avoid dogma while targeting viewers’ personal transformation. In Chapter Two I focus on Rhetoric, a section of the Stoic philosophy of Logic. Stoic Logic privileged truth: that is, it centred on investigating existing reality. As such, Stoic rhetorical theory and the classical literature influenced by it promoted a style that is complex and nuanced. I relate this to the Early Modern interest in copia, arguing that this includes Rubens’s painterly style which, apropos copia, should be better termed the Abundant Style. In Chapter Three I explore similarities between Stoic Natural Philosophy and the Early Modern artistic interest in the unified visual field. The Stoics defined the natural world as eternally moving and mixing; with force fields, energy, and elements in constant relationships of cause/effect. The Stoic concept of natural sympathy was a notion of material/energetic interrelatedness in which the world was seen as a living body, and the divine inhered in matter. I consider ways that these classical Stoic concepts of transformation, realism, and vivified matter might be discerned in Rubens’s style.<br>Graduate<br>2020-12-14

This thesis investigates the social context of the Apostle Paul and the communities to which he preached with the aim of showing that early Pauline Christianity was shaped by a social milieu that included: first, a Greco-Roman and particularly Stoic philosophy, second, a universalizing Jewish movement and third, an overarching Roman political framework. Paul’s philosophy was built on a foundation of Judaism, interpreted with the tools of Stoic philosophy, and communicated to a largely Roman audience. Chapter One presents the figure of Paul as a Jew and Roman citizen with a Greek education, a product of three cultural worlds. Chapter Two argues that through allegory, Paul replaced Jewish nationalistic and ethnocentric aspects with symbolic ones, and communicated its ethical core with Stoic language and concepts to a primarily Roman audience. Chapter Three examines this audience and determines that they were largely Roman citizens who were both steeped in the prevalent philosophy of the time, Stoicism, as well as being associated with the Jewish community as sympathizers, God-fearers, or “Highest-God” worshippers, as a result of the popular Judaizing movement in the first century. Through the study of Paul, his letters, and his audience, this thesis argues that Pauline Christianity was, at its core, a Stoic interpretation of Judaism.<br>Graduate<br>0579<br>dcoad@uvic.ca

Chrystie Watson explored the application of the principles of Stoic philosophy in the workplace. She found professionals experienced greater acceptance of what was within their control, were better able to regulate their responses to changing circumstances and make clearer decisions while building an awareness of the contributions they make to the common good through their practice of Stoicism. These findings may inform the design of professional development initiatives and programs.

This thesis aims to illuminate Seneca’s criticisms of Neronian Rome through a novel exploration of the philosopher’s collection of moral letters – the so-called Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium. Noting the glaring absence of court politics in these letters the thesis identifies themes of dissimulation and veiled criticism, penned by Seneca in a concealed manner to ensure his safety during a time of dire political unrest. The first chapter establishes the cultural context of this collection by examining how they fit in with the practice of elite Roman letter writing. This line of inquiry stems from a longstanding question in the scholarship as to whether the Epistulae Morales are letters in the earnest sense, or merely a literary-philosophical exercise contrived by Seneca. The chapter concludes that the letters can be seen as genuine, exchanged with their addressee. They were, however, also written for the wider senatorial class who are clearly the subject of Seneca’s moral discussions. The second chapter examines the circumstances which preceded the writing of these letters in order to identify points of political tension under Nero’s reign. Drawing on the Neronian books of Tacitus’ Annals and earlier Senecan treatises, this chapter identifies themes of political ideology (clemency, libertas, tyranny, superbia) which shaped the ongoing altercations between senate and emperor during Nero’s rule. With the political tensions identified, the third chapter unearths the underhanded ways in which Seneca criticises Nero’s reign throughout the letters. Additionally, this chapter showcases a range of techniques employed by Seneca to disguise his criticisms in order to maintain deniability and avoid persecution. The fourth and final chapter examines Letters 14 and 18 in detail, illustrating the techniques discussed in the preceding chapter and bringing to light Seneca’s veiled criticisms of Nero’s regime. The pair of case studies demonstrates that Senecan criticisms are present throughout the collection, and are apparent in both letters with overt political themes (eg. Letter 14) and those which are, at first glance, seemingly mundane and commonplace (eg. Letter 18).<br>Thesis (MPhil) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2021

Le but de cette étude est de tirer profit de la contribution de Ludwig Wittgenstein à la question de la fonction éthico-thérapeutique du discours philosophique à la lumière du modèle de la vie philosophique de Pierre Hadot, dont le modèle stoïcien nous sert de cas de figure, et au sein duquel cette fonction occupe une place centrale. L’ensemble de l’étude est composé de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre vise à faire ressortir et analyser les cinq composantes fondamentales de la conception hellénistique et romaine de la vie philosophique tirée de l’interprétation de Hadot qui serviront par la suite de lignes directrices pour l’exploration de ces thèmes chez Wittgenstein : la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique, la conversion philosophique comme transformation individuelle, l’askesis comme méthode de conversion philosophique, l’idéal de sagesse comme visée éthique de la conversion philosophique et le modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinons comment Wittgenstein peut nous aider à penser la question de la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique. En premier lieu, il apparaît que le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique d’exprimer un certain vouloir. Plus précisément, les valeurs fondamentales, en relation avec un contre-vouloir (besoins, tendances, désirs, sentiments) à la base de préconceptions cristallisées dans des images captivantes, forment un caractère philosophique particulier et orientent implicitement les différentes conceptions que le philosophe, par l’usage de sa volonté, fait le choix d’exprimer par le biais du discours philosophique. En second lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique de générer de bonnes habitudes de vie, c’est-à-dire de produire un effet éthique sur les comportements que nous adoptons et les actions que nous posons de façon répétée. En effet, certains arrangements conceptuels, s’ils sont en accord avec l’éthique telle qu’elle est vécue dans les pratiques effectives de la forme de vie humaine, jettent un éclairage sur notre mode de vie éthique, en fonction de la conception du bonheur que nous valorisons, de façon à ce que nous puissions orienter nos actions habituelles en ce sens. Le troisième chapitre vise à mettre à profit la contribution de Wittgenstein à la question du discours philosophique comme outil de transformation individuelle conçue selon le modèle de la conversion philosophique. En premier lieu, il semble que le discours philosophique peut opérer une conversion de la volonté, synonyme d’une conversion à soi, et qui désigne l’arrachement à l’égard d’un certain vouloir inauthentique, indissociable d’un contre-vouloir au fondement de la pensée exprimée par le langage, pour revenir à un vouloir authentique qui coïncide avec le domaine qui est propre au sujet éthique que nous sommes. En second lieu, la fonction éthique du discours philosophique peut également s’exprimer à travers la visée éthique de la conversion qui peut être conçue comme un idéal asymptotique et philosophique de bonheur au sens de paix ou d’absence de trouble fondé sur une éthique de la finitude, de la liberté et de l’authenticité comportant une dimension transpersonnelle. Le quatrième chapitre aborde la conception wittgensteinienne de la méthode philosophique à partir de la question du discours philosophique comme askesis. En premier lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir ici une fonction éthique lorsqu’il est utilisé pour opérationnaliser une méthode de conversion consistant en un ensemble de techniques discursives pratiquées de façon répétée en vue d’adopter une attitude éthique. En second lieu, cette fonction peut être thérapeutique dans la mesure où la méthode de conversion peut être conçue à partir du modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique, c’est-à-dire à partir d’une conception implicite ou explicite de la maladie, de la thérapie et de la santé philosophiques telle qu’en témoigne la thérapeutique holistique du langage qu’il semble possible de tirer de la pensée du second Wittgenstein.<br>The purpose of this study is to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution to the issue of the ethical and therapeutic function of philosophical discourse in the light of the model of philosophical life of Pierre Hadot, exemplified by the Stoic model, and in which this function is central. The whole study consists of four chapters. The first chapter aims to highlight and analyze the five basic components of the Hellenistic and Roman conception of philosophical life drawn from the interpretation of Hadot which will then serve as guidelines for the exploration of these themes in Wittgenstein’s thought : the subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life, philosophical conversion as personal transformation, askesis as a method of philosophical conversion, the ideal of wisdom as ethical aim of philosophical conversion and the analogic model of philosophical therapy. In the second chapter, we examine how Wittgenstein can help elucidate the issue of subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life. First, it appears that philosophical discourse can have the ethical function to express a certain will. Specifically, core values, in connection with a counter-will (needs, tendencies, desires, feelings) underlying preconceptions crystallized in captivating images, form a particular philosophical character and implicitly determine the different conceptions that the philosopher, by the use of his will, makes the choice to express through philosophical discourse. Second, philosophical discourse can have an ethical function to generate good habits, that is to say, to produce an ethical impact on the behaviors that we adopt and the actions that we take repeatedly. Indeed, some conceptual arrangements, if they are in agreement with the effective practices of the human form of life, shed light on our ethical way of life, according to the conception of happiness that we value, so that we can orientate our habitual actions consequently. The third chapter aims to build on Wittgenstein's contribution to the question of philosophical discourse as a tool for personal transformation based on the model of philosophical conversion. First, it seems that philosophical discourse can give rise to a conversion of the will, synonymous with a conversion of the self to itself, which refer to the tearing away from a certain inauthentic will, inseparable from a counter-will at the foundation of thought expressed through language, to return to an authentic will that coincides with the domain that is specific to the ethical subject that we are. Second, the ethical function of philosophical discourse can also be expressed through the ethical aim of conversion that can be seen as an asymptotic and philosophical ideal of happiness as peace or absence of disturbance based on an ethics of finitude, freedom and authenticity with a transpersonal dimension. The fourth chapter discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method through the question of philosophical discourse as askesis. First, philosophical discourse here can have an ethical function when used to operationalize a conversion method consisting of a set of discursive techniques used repeatedly in order to adopt an ethical attitude. Second, this function can be therapeutic in that the conversion method can be elaborated through the analogic model of philosophical therapy, that is to say, as an implicit or explicit conception of disease, of therapy and philosophical health as evidenced by the holistic therapy of language it seems possible to draw from the second period of Wittgenstein’s thought.<br>Réalisé en cotutelle avec L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales de Paris