Academic literature on the topic 'Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)'
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Journal articles on the topic "Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)"
1
Craig, Edward. "David Hume." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004041.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
2
Callergård, Robert. "A Treatise of Human Nature - a critical edition - By David Hume." Theoria 74, no. 4 (November 4, 2008): 367–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00030.x.
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Matson, Erik W., and Colin Doran. "The Elevated Imagination: Contemplation and Action in David Hume and Adam Smith." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15, no. 1 (March 2017): 27–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2017.0150.
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In this paper we seek to draw attention to some striking and heretofore unnoticed textual connections between Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments and David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. We find significant textual parallels between the parable of the poor man's son of TMS 4.1 (TMS 4.1.8-4.1.10) and the famous conclusion to Book 1 of Hume's Treatise. These passages are often regarded as especially intense and moving parts of their respective works. We explore the nature and substance of these connections and comment on their larger significance. The nature of the connections suggests that Smith consciously engaged Hume in his work through philosophical conversation. We suggest that these related passages show both Hume and Smith exploring and developing a particular dialectic between contemplation and action in human life. Both move to invert the classical relationship between contemplation and action through what we call the elevated imagination.
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Pereira Campelo, Wendel de Holanda. "Razão, Sentimento e Oscilação Cética no Tratado de David Hume." Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 27, no. 54 (2019): 153–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica2019275425.
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This article offers a reading of David Hume’s skeptical “dangerous dilemma”, comparing it with the thought of authors of the seventeenth century as Descartes, Pascal and Huet with regard to the wavering between our natural sentiment and skeptical doubt. Based on this, we propose a different reading of the relationship between sentiment and reason in the Treatise of Human Nature, often taken only negatively and stressed by the interpreters of Hume’s skepticism.
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Suyudi, M., and Wahyu Hanafi Putra. "Kritik Nalar Kausalitas dan Pengetahuan David Hume." Al-Adabiya: Jurnal Kebudayaan dan Keagamaan 15, no. 02 (November 21, 2020): 201–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.37680/adabiya.v15i02.569.
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This research aims at explaining David Hume’s logical critique of causality and knowledge. As library research, the method used is descriptive-qualitative. Data and data sources were obtained from his important works Why Cause is Always A Need and A Treatise of Human Nature and several secondary literatures on causality. The data was carried out through documentation, started by the researcher documenting Hume's thoughts, especially criticism of the law of causality (cause-effect) and knowledge of both of Hume's primary works. The study results explained that Hume criticized the performance of the law of causality, which explained that the existence of a second essence and after it was an impact or certainty of the first essence. The second essential is the consequence and legitimacy of the first one. According to Hume, it cannot serve empirically as the law of causality occurs because the sequential process is stagnant. Hume's skepticism and doubts over dogmatic and metaphysical matters then affect that all knowledge can only be explored with the five senses and is empirical. All irrational and non-empirical characteristics cannot be attributed to a belief and truth. In conclusion, real truths in knowledge are those that can be investigated empirically.
Keywords: Causality, Hume, Knowledge, The five senses.
Penelitian ini bertujuan menjelaskan kritik nalar kausalitas dan pengetahuan David Hume. Sebagai penelitian pustaka, metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif-kualitatif. Data dan sumber data didapat dari karya-karya Why Cause is Always Necessary dan A Treatise of Human Nature serta literatur-literatur sekunder yang berkaitan dengan tema kausalitas. Teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan dokumentasi, yaitu peneliti mendokumentasikan pemikiran-pemikiran Hume terutama kritik atas hukum kausalitas (sebab-akibat) dan pengetahuan dari kedua karya primer Hume tersebut. Hasil penelitian menjelaskan bahwa Hume melakukan kritik atas kinerja hukum kausalitas yang menjelaskan bahwa adanya esensi kedua dan setelahnya merupakan dampak atau keniscayaan atas esensi pertama. Esensi kedua merupakan akibat dan legitimasi dari esensi pertama. Hal demikian yang menurut Hume tidak dapat dijelaskan secara empiris. Menurutnya, hukum kausalitas itu terjadi karena proses keterurutan secara stagnan. Sikap skeptis dan ragu-ragu Hume atas perihal yang sifatnya dogmatis dan metafisik membawa dampak bahwa segala pengetahuan hanya bisa digali dengan panca inderawi dan bersifat empiris. Semua perihal yang sifatnya irasional dan tidak empiris tidak dapat dinisbatkan pada suatu keyakinan dan kebenaran. Pada akhirnya, kebenaran sejati dalam pengetahuan adalah yang dapat diselidiki secara empiris.
Kata kunci: Hume, Kausalitas, Pengetahuan, Panca Indera
6
Marušić, Jennifer Smalligan. "Does Hume Hold a Dispositional Account of Belief?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 2 (June 2010): 155–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2010.0001.
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Philosophical theories about the nature of belief can be roughly classified into two groups: those that treat beliefs as occurrent mental states or episodes and those that treat beliefs as dispositions. David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature seems to contain a classic example of an occurrence theory of belief. Hume defines ‘belief’ as ‘a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression’ (Treatise 1.3.7.5 96). This definition suggests that believing is an occurrent mental state, such as judging, or thinking about something in a particular manner. However, at the same time, a number of Hume's readers claim to find elements in his writings that are suggestive of a dispositional account of belief. Moreover, these elements are sometimes taken as signs of the inadequacy of Hume's account of belief and his dissatisfaction with it. If Hume is not, in fact, wholeheartedly committed to a thoroughgoing occurrence theory of belief, one wonders just who is.
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Schwerin, Alan. "Hume and The Self: A Critical Response." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5, no. 1 (March 2007): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2007.5.1.15.
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In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness.
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Demeter, Tamás. "A Chemistry of Human Nature: Chemical Imagery in Hume’s Treatise." Early Science and Medicine 22, no. 2-3 (June 7, 2017): 208–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15733823-02223p05.
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David Hume’s ‘science of man’ is frequently interpreted as an enterprise inspired in crucial respects by Newton’s Principia. However, a closer look at Hume’s central concepts and methodological commitment suggests that his Treatise of Human Nature is much more congruent with the research traditions that arose in the wake of Newton’s Opticks. In this paper I argue that the label Hume frequently attached to his project, ‘anatomy of the mind,’ is a metaphor that, considered in itself, seems to be expressing a commitment to the study of human nature in analogy with organic living nature. In this vein, Hume’s anatomy relies on conceptual and methodological resources derived from a chemical and physiological perspective on the natural cognitive and affective functioning of human beings. Since the idea of natural functioning provides various options for deriving normative considerations, Hume’s account can be seen as a middle-range theory that connects the discourses of organic nature and normative morality.
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Gelfert, Axel. "Hume on Testimony Revisited." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 13, no. 1 (April 5, 2010): 60–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01301004.
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Among contemporary epistemologists of testimony, David Hume is standardly regarded as a ‘global reductionist’, where global reductionism requires the hearer to have sufficient first-hand knowledge of the facts in order to individually ascertain the reliability of the testimony in question. In the present paper, I argue that, by construing Hume’s reductionism in too individualistic a fashion, the received view of Hume on testimony is inaccurate at best, and misleading at worst. Overall, Hume is much more willing to regard testimonial acceptance as a natural (default) response to testimony than has traditionally been thought. In particular, Hume believes that indirect evidence of human nature and of the social world around us, can take the place of first-hand evidence of the track record of individual speakers or specific classes of testimony. In developing this interpretation of Hume’s views on testimony, the present paper draws on discussions found in the Treatise, the Enquiry, and in Hume’s writings on historical knowledge. In der zeitgenössischen Debatte um den erkenntnistheoretischen Status zeugnisbasiertenWissens wird gern auf David Hume als den Urheber eines „globalen Reduktionismus“ verwiesen, demzufolge der Zeugnisempfänger über ausreichend empirische Belege für die Verlässlichkeit des betreffenden Zeugnisses verfügen muss. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass die in der Literatur vorherrschende Meinung ein übertrieben „individualistisches“ Bild von Humes Reduktionismus zeichnet; dadurch wird Humes Position in der gegenwärtigen Debatte ungenau und bisweilen irreführend wiedergegeben. Bei genauerer Betrachtung erweist sich Hume als ausgesprochen aufgeschlossen gegenüber dem Akzeptieren fremden Zeugnisses und sieht darin eine Art Grundmuster im testimonialen Umgang mit anderen. Insbesondere konzediert Hume, dass indirekt erworbenes Wissen um die menschliche Natur und die soziale Welt an die Stelle direkter Belege für die Verlässlichkeit einzelner Zeugen (oder bestimmter Klassen von Berichten) treten kann. Die im vorliegenden Aufsatz entwickelte Neuinterpretation stützt sich auf den Treatise, den Enquiry und auf Humes Schriften zum Problem der historischen Erkenntnis.
10
Gill, Michael B. "SHAFTESBURY ON SELFISHNESS AND PARTISANSHIP." Social Philosophy and Policy 37, no. 1 (2020): 55–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052520000047.
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AbstractIn the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume credits “my Lord Shaftesbury” as one of the “philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.” I describe aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that justify the credit Hume gives him. I focus on Shaftesbury’s refutation of psychological egoism, his examination of partiality, and his views on how to promote impartial virtue. I also discuss Shaftesbury’s political commitments, and raise questions about recent interpretations that have taken his Characteristicks to be a polemic, partisan text.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)"
1
Larruscahim, Márcio. "Os elementos da filosofia de Hume." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/13821.
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O presente trabalho procura mostrar que para Hume poder fazer as distinções que ele pretende fazer no início do Tratado da Natureza Humana, entre impressões e idéias e entre idéias da imaginação e idéias da memória, Hume precisa ter recurso a elementos que não são dados empiricamente, como a crença em um mundo externo, atitudes em relação a percepções (crença) e propensões da mente. No entanto, argumentamos que estes não são nem pressupostos irrefletidos de Hume, nem medidas de contenção usadas quando problemas começam a aparecer, mas que constituem elementos imprescindíveis de sua filosofia, amplamente trabalhados por ele, e sem os quais a compreensão de sua filosofia ficaria severamente prejudicada.The present work tries to show that, for Hume to be able to make the distinctions he intends to make at the beginning of A Treatise of Human Nature, between impressions and ideas, and between ideas of imagination and ideas of memory, Hume needs to make use of elements which are not given empirically, such as belief in an external world, attitudes towards perceptions (belief), and propensities of the mind. However, we argue that they are neither unexamined presuppositions made by Hume, nor accessory measures used to solve problems as they begin to show up in his philosophy; rather, they are necessary elements of his philosophy, thoroughly worked by him, and without which the understanding of Hume’s philosophy would become very limited.
2
Silva, Jean Pedro Malavolta e. "Simpatia e sentimentos morais em David Hume." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/156341.
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O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação.The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.
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Klaudat, André Nilo. "Os limites da razão : uma investigação sobre a filosofia teórica de Hume no Treatise." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/165539.
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Soares, Franco Nero Antunes. "Uma investigação sobre a inevitabilidade da crença em objetos externos segundo David Hume." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/16907.
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Esta dissertação pretende mostrar que a tese de Hume de que nós estamos inevitavelmente determinados a crer na existência de objetos externos tem a circunscrição de seu significado condicionada à identificação e à resolução de uma inconsistência presente na teoria humeana da crença inevitável em objetos externos. Essa inconsistência se expressa pela incompatibilidade entre a tese de que (P1) nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos e a tese de que (P2) não podemos conceber objetos externos. Essas teses são incompatíveis se se considera que, para Hume, (P4) não podemos crer em algo que não podemos conceber. Esse problema só emerge se se supõe um uso unívoco da expressão "objeto externo" por parte de Hume em (P1) e (P2), e se se supõe que (P4) é o caso para Hume, o que se mostra ser um ponto de partida razoável. Os resultados indicam que as duas interpretações gerais do significado da tese de que nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos, o naturalismo cético e o realismo cético, chegam a conclusões insatisfatórias porque ignoram esse problema. Por fim, conclui que não há, de fato, uma inconsistência na teoria humeana da crença em objetos externos porque não é o caso que não possamos ter uma concepção de objetos externos para Hume. Essa concepção se origina de um sentimento ou instinto original da mente.This paper aims to show that Hume's claim that we are unavoidably determined to believe in the existence of external objects has the delimitation of our meaning conditioned to the identification and resolution of an inconsistency present in Hume's theory of the unavoidable belief in external objects. This inconsistency expresses itself by the incompatibility between the claim that (P1) we unavoidably believe in external objects and the claim that (P2) we can't conceive external objects. These claims are incompatible if we recognize that Hume claims as well that (P4) we can't believe in something that we can't conceive. This problem arises only if we suppose that Hume univocally uses the expression "external object" in (P1) and (P2), and if we suppose that (P4) is the case, a reasonable starting point. The results indicate that both general views of the meaning of the claim that we unavoidably believe in external objects, the skeptical naturalism and the skeptical realism, arrives at unsatisfactory outcomes because they ignore that problem. Finally, concludes that there's not, actually, an inconsistency in Hume's theory of belief in external objects because it's not the case that we can't conceive external objects. This conception of external existences arises out of a sentiment or natural instinct of the mind.
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Santos, Rafael Bittencourt. "O ceticismo de Hume no Tratado da natureza humana : uma abordagem a partir da discussão sobre a distinção entre qualidades primárias e secundárias." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/134200.
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A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa.This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.
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Morrow, Sarah Emily. "Absent Characters as Proximate Cause in Twentieth Century American Drama." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/english_theses/58.
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This thesis explores the status of a specific subset of absent characters within twentieth century American drama. By borrowing the term “proximate cause” from tort law and illuminating its intricacies through David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, this thesis re-appropriates proximate cause for literary studies. Rather than focus on characters whose existence remains the subject of critical debate, this set of absent characters presumably exists but never appear onstage. Despite their non-appearance onstage, however, these absent characters nonetheless have a profound effect upon the action that occurs during their respective plays. Highlighting the various ways in which these characters serve as the proximate cause for the onstage action of a given play will expand the realm of drama and literary studies in myriad ways.
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Collier, Mark David. "Newton of the mind : an examination of Hume's science of human nature /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p9935469.
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Perinetti, Dario. "Hume, history and the science of human nature." Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38509.
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This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc.Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."
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Arslanoglu, Celik Sengul. "The Role Of Human Nature In Hume'." Phd thesis, METU, 2008. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12609476/index.pdf.
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This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume's philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo
s &ldquo
science of man&rdquo
attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo
s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo
being-human&rdquo
, the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo
s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.
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Ribeiro, Andreh Sabino. "PaixÃes propulsoras e razÃo diretiva na ciÃncia moral de David Hume." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2010. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=19920.
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FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgicoEste trabalho pretende apresentar a filosofia moral de David Hume a partir da associaÃÃo entre razÃo e sentimento, a formarem um composto inseparÃvel na aÃÃo e na distinÃÃo morais. Para tanto, considero sua teoria no domÃnio mental e no social. O filÃsofo acreditava que a artificialidade das instituiÃÃes nÃo implicava a negaÃÃo da natureza, mas sua extensÃo. Assim, virtudes e vÃcios sÃo reconhecidos pelos seres humanos enquanto aÃÃes que, respectivamente, lhes agradam e desagradam. Isto porque compartilhamos uma mesma natureza que nos capacita discernirmos a utilidade das condutas para nossa sobrevivÃncia de acordo com as circunstÃncias de tempo e espaÃo. Recusa-se, entÃo, um objetivismo metafÃsico e uma autoridade religiosa como fundamento da moralidade. Hume entendia seu projeto como um complemento da RevoluÃÃo CientÃfica do sÃculo XVII, ao estender o uso do mÃtodo experimental no campo da moralidade.
This work is intended to show that David Hume‟s moral philosophy associated reason to feeling, both in mental and social domains, like an inseparable compound in moral action and distinction. He believed that the artificiality of institutions did not implicate the negation of nature, but its extension. Thus, virtues and vices are recognized by humans as actions which respectively please and unplease them. This is because we share a nature in common that enables us to discern the utility of behavior for our survival according to the circumstances of time and space. Then, it means a refusal of the methaphysical objectivism and the religious authority as the foundation of morality. Hume understood his project as a complement to the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, extending the use of experimental method in the field of morality.
Books on the topic "Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)"
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P, Wright John. Hume's "Treatise of human nature": An introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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Hume's skepticism in the Treatise of human nature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.
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The mind of David Hume: A companion to book I of A treatise of human nature. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995.
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Sympathy and ethics: A study of the relationship between sympathy and morality with special reference to Hume's Treatise. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
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Fate, Norton David, and Norton Mary J, eds. A treatise of human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
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Selby-Bigge, L.A. Sir, 1860-1951. and Nidditch P. H, eds. A treatise of human nature. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
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1942-, Wright John P., Stecker Robert 1947-, and Fuller Gary 1942-, eds. A treatise of human nature. London: Everyman, 2003.
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Order and artifice in Hume's political philosophy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1985.
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Deleuze, Gilles. Empiricism and subjectivity: An essay on Hume's theory of human nature. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)"
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Klemme, Heiner F. "Hume, David: A Treatise of Human Nature." In Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 1–3. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_9644-1.
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Wiley, James. "The Systematic Theory of Theory of the Treatise of Human Nature." In Theory and Practice in the Philosophy of David Hume, 62–80. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137026422_3.
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Streminger, Gerhard. "6. KAPITEL: A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE." In David Hume, 134–74. C.H.Beck, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/9783406614033-134.
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Mossner, Ernest Campbell. "A Treatise of Human Nature." In The Life of David Hume, 117–33. Oxford University Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243365.003.0010.
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Stewart, M. A. "Hume, David (1711–1776), Scottish Philosopher and Historian." In Hume's Philosophy in Historical Perspective, 11–18. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199547319.003.0002.
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Abstract A brief but comprehensive account of the life and works of Hume. Summarizes Hume’s achievements in his historical, moral, political, and literary writings, but argues for the centrality of the sceptical philosophy elaborated A Treatise of Human Nature.
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Steiner, Mark. "Hume and Maimonides on Imaginability and Possibility." In Jewish Philosophy in an Analytic Age, 119–34. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811374.003.0007.
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Much of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature is based on the following axiom: Possibility is identical to imaginability. From this axiom, he derives his notorious view that there are no necessary connections between events, as well as his anti-Euclidean propositions that there are minimal distances and times. Maimonides explicitly denounced this axiom as being the central doctrine of the Kalamist theologians of Islam. He proceeds to show the “absurdities” that flow from it, and works out an entire philosophy which he attributes to the Kalam—including the Humean doctrines mentioned above. Since scholars deny the historicity of Maimonides’ “Kalam,” and say that Maimonides was only caricaturing the Kalam in order to discredit it, one arrives at the startling conclusion that Maimonides, hundreds of years before the birth of David Hume, discovered Hume’s philosophy.
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Sagar, Paul. "Introduction." In The Opinion of Mankind. Princeton University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691178882.003.0001.
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This book examines how David Hume and Adam Smith forged a new way of thinking about the modern state. It considers what Hume referred to as the opinion of mankind, a political theory found in the second and third books of A Treatise of Human Nature. Smith read and absorbed Hume's arguments, adapting them to his own purposes in the construction of a political theory that would move beyond the Treatise. Both Hume and Smith rejected Thomas Hobbes's vision of human nature and his arguments about our capacity to form stable societies over time. The book discusses Hume's theory of sociability, the role of history and the family in debates over human sociability and the foundations of politics, and Smith's theory of regime forms. This introduction provides an overview of the theory of the state and the history of political thought.
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Zitin, Abigail. "Introduction." In Practical Form, 1–27. Yale University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300244564.003.0001.
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When David Hume writes, in Book 2 of his Treatise of Human Nature, that “beauty is nothing but a form, which produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of parts, which conveys pain,” it may seem as though form is already fixed in place as a concept around which aesthetic theory revolves....
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Fosl, Peter S. "Hume and the Legacy of Academic Scepticism." In Hume's Scepticism, 39–76. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474451123.003.0003.
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Chapter Two of Hume’s Scepticism charts the development of Academic scepticism from Cicero and Augustine, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and into early modernity. The exposition is organized around sceptical ideas that anticipated or may have influenced David Hume, who describes himself an ‘academical’ sceptic. The chapter also sets out Cicero’s influence upon Hume, scepticism at the college in La Flèche where Hume wrote much of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Hume’s self-conception of Academic scepticism. Accounts of sceptical ideas in Marin Mersenne, Simon Foucher, John Locke, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle set the stage for Hume’s own Academicism. The chapter closes with a five-point General Framework defining Academic Scepticism.
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Mossner, Ernest Campbell. "The Dignity of Human Nature." In The Life of David Hume, 604–8. Oxford University Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243365.003.0040.
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