Tesis sobre el tema "Aboriginal Australians. Legal status, laws, etc"

In Mabo v. State of Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, the majority of the High Court held that ???native title??? had survived the acquisition of sovereignty over the Australian continent and is ???recognised??? by the common law. However, all the judgments failed to articulate clearly either the nature of native title as a legal form, and the relationship of that legal form to the common law, or what is meant by ???recognition???. Twelve years later the High Court has still not provided a satisfactory understanding of any of these matters. The central problem investigated by this thesis is the nature of that relationship and of the legal interest of native title. It is contended that this relationship can be understood and ordered as a matter of jurisdiction. This thesis seeks to recuperate a substantive concept of jurisdiction, and specifically of a particular jurisdiction, that of the common law, and to demonstrate how the interest of native title results from the jurisdictional relationship between common law and indigenous law. Part I is a genealogy of native title, drawn out through a history of ideas about common law jurisdiction. It is an account of the legal practice of jurisdiction, through a conceptual elaboration of a particular jurisdiction: the common law. This part traces the history of the common law from its origins in a pluralistic, fragmented, jurisdictional landscape, to its current position as the ???law of the land???. It considers the traditional mechanisms and techniques through which the common law has ordered its relationships with other jurisdictions, and how it has appropriated matters traditionally within the purview of other jurisdictions, accommodating them within the common law as ???custom???. The thesis demonstrates that the same gestures and practices can be seen in modern native title decisions, and contends that the ordering which underpins both native title, and the Australian legal system, is jurisdictional. Part II examines the practice of jurisdiction through an examination of three technologies of jurisdiction, all of which contributed to the construction of the legal entity of native title as an act of jurisdiction: mapping, accommodation and categorisation.

The thesis is an exploration of how indigenous knowledge has emerged as a subject within Australian intellectual property law. It uses the context of copyright law to illustrate this development. The work presents an analysis of the political, social and cultural intersections that influence legal possibilities and effect practical expectations of the law in this area. The dilemma of protecting indigenous knowledge resonates with tensions that characterise intellectual property as a whole. The metaphysical dimensions of intellectual property have always been insecure but these difficulties come to the fore with the identification of boundaries and markers that establish property in indigenous subject matter. While intellectual property law is always managing difference, the politics of law are more transparent when managing indigenous concerns. Rather than assume the naturalness of the category of indigenous knowledge within law, this work interrogates the politics of its construction precisely as a ???special??? category. Employing a multidisciplinary methodology, engaging theories of governmental rationality that draws upon the scholarship of Michel Foucault to appreciate strategies of managing and directing knowledge, the thesis considers how the politics of law is infused by cultural, political, bureaucratic and individual factors. Key elements in Australia that have pushed the law to consider expressions of indigenous knowledge in intellectual property can be located in changing political environments, governmental intervention through strategic reports, cultural sensitivity articulated in case law and innovative instances of individual agency. The intersection of these elements reveals a dynamic that exerts influence in the shape the law takes.

"August 2006"<br>Thesis (PhD) -- Macquarie University, Division of Law, 2007.<br>Bibliography: p. 343-364.<br>Abstract -- Candidate's certification -- Acknowledgements -- Acronyms -- Chapter one -- Chapter two: Linking public participation to environmental decision making and natural resources management -- Chapter three: The right to public participation -- Chapter four: Implementing the right to public participation in environmental decision making : the participation of indigenous peoples in the conservation and management of protected areas -- Chapter five: The legal and policy regime for the participation of indigenous peoples in the conservation and management of protected areas in Australia -- Chapter six: The legal and policy regime for the participation of indigenous peoples in the conservation and management of protected areas in Uganda -- Chapter seven: Implementing public participation in environmental decision making in Australia and Uganda : a comparative analysis -- Chapter eight: The right to public participation in enviromental decision making and natural resources management : summary and conclusions -- Bibliography.<br>In recognition of the importance of public participation as a basis for good governance and democracy, Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary General to the United Nations, has noted that: "Good governance demands the consent and participation of the governed and the full participation and lasting involvement of all citizens in the future of their nation. The will of the people must be the basis of governmental authority. That is the foundation of democracy. That is the foundation of good governance Good governance will give every citizen, young or old, man or woman, a real and lasting stake in the future of his or her society". The above quotation encapsulates the essence of what this thesis has set out to do; to examine the concept of public participation and its application in environmental governance within the context of the participation of indigenous peoples in the conservation and management of protected areas in Australia and Uganda. The concept of public participation is of such intrinsic importance that it has emerged as one of the fundamental principles underpinning environmental governance and therefore forms the basis for this study. -- Environmental governance, as a concept that captures the ideal of public participation, is basically about decisions and the manner in which they are made. It is about who has 'a seat at the table' during deliberations and how the interests of affected communities and ecosystems are represented. It is also about how decision makers are held responsible for the integrity of the process and for the results of their decisions. It relates to business people, property owners, farmers and consumers. Environmental governance is also about the management of actions relating to the environment and sustainable development. It includes individual choices and actions like participating in public hearings or joining local watchdog groups or, as consumers, choosing to purchase environmentally friendly products. -- The basic principles behind good governance and good environmental decision making have been accepted for more than a decade. The 178 nations that attended the Rio Summit in 1992 all endorsed these nvironmental governance principles when they signed the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) - a charter of 27 principles meant to guide the world community towards sustainable development. The international community re-emphasised the importance of these principles at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. -- The right to public participation in nvironmental decision making and natural resources management is one of the 27 principles endorsed by the nations of the world and is embodied in the provisions of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.<br>Environmental decisions occur in many contexts. They range from personal choices like whether to walk or drive to work, how much firewood to burn, or whether to have another child. They encompass the business decisions that communities or corporations make about where to locate their facilities, how much to emphasise eco-friendly product design and how much land to preserve. They include national laws enacted to conserve the environment, to regulate pollution, manage public land or regulate trade. They take into account international commitments made to regulate trade in endangered species or limit acid rain or C02 emissions. -- Environmental decisions also involve a wide range of actors: individuals; local, state and national governments; community and tribal authorities such as indigenous peoples; civic organisations; interested groups; labour unions; national and transactional corporations; scientists; and international bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Trade Organisation. -- Each of the actors have different interests, different levels of authority and different information, making their actions complex and frequently putting their decisions at odds with each other and with ecological processes that sustain the natural systems we depend on. -- Accordingly, this thesis aims to examine participation in environmental decision making in a way that demonstrates these complexities and interdependencies. It will explore the theoretical and conceptual basis for public participation and how it is incorporated into international and domestic environmental and natural resources law and policy. -- It will examine public participation in the context of the legal and policy framework for the conservation and management of protected areas and will use case studies involving the participation of indigeneous peoples in Australia and Uganda to provide the basis for a comparative analysis. -- The thesis will also faces on a comparative analysis of the effectiveness and meaningfulness of the process for public participation in environmental decision making in Australia and Uganda. There is extensive literature on the purposes to which participation may be put; the stages in the project cycle at which it should be employed; the level and power with regard to the decision making process which should be afforded to the participants; the methods which may be appropriate under the different circumstances, as well as detailed descriptions of methods; approaches and forms or typologies of public participation; and the benefits and problems of such participation.<br>However, there is not much significant literature that examines and analyses the meaningfulness and effectiveness of the contextual processes of such participation. This is despite the widespread belief in the importance and value of public participation, particularly by local and indigenous communities, even in the face of disillusionment caused by deceit, manipulation and tokenism. Accordingly, the thesis will use case studies to demonstrate the meaningfulness and effectiveness or otherwise of public participation in environmental decision making in protected area management. -- Increasingly, the terminology of sustainable development is more appropriate to describe contemporary policy objectives in this area, with an emphasis on promoting local livelihood and poverty alleviation within the constraints of ecosystem management. However, the domestic legal frameworks, and institutional development, in Australia and Uganda tend to reflect earlier concepts of environmental and natural resources management (referred to as environmental management in this thesis). There are some significant differences between a North (developed) nation and a South (developing) nation, in terms of the emphasis on economic objectives, political stability, resources and legal and administrative capacity. The thesis intends to explore these differences for the comparative analysis and to draw on them to highlight the complexities and interdependencies of public participation by indigenous peoples in environmental decision making, natural resources and protected area management.<br>Mode of access: World Wide Web.<br>377 p

This paper discusses the legal principles which are relevant in determining the appropriate level of compensation for infringements to aboriginal and treaty rights. This issue has been left open by the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal case of Delgamuukw. The nature of aboriginal and treaty rights as well as the fiduciary relationship and duties of the Crown are briefly described. The basic constitutional context in which these rights evolve is also discussed, including the federal common law of aboriginal rights and the constitutional position of these rights in Canada. Having set the general context, the paper then reviews the legal principles governing the infringement of aboriginal and treaty rights, including the requirement for just compensation. Reviews of the legal principles applicable to compensation in cases of expropriation and of the experience in the United States in regards to compensation in cases of the taking of aboriginal lands are also carried out. Six basic legal principles relevant for determining appropriate compensation in cases of infringement to aboriginal and treaty rights are then suggested, justified and explained. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

This dissertation attempts to show that Aboriginal peoples' ways of thinking have not been recognized by early colonial European political thinkers. I begin with an examination of Kymlicka's political theory of minority rights and show that, although Kymlicka is a strong advocate of the right of Aboriginal self-government in Canada, he fails to consider Aboriginal ways of thinking within his own political system. From an Aboriginal perspective this is not surprising. However, I claim that Kymlicka opens the conceptual space for the inclusion of Aboriginal voices. The notion of "incorporation" means that Aboriginal peoples became included in the Canadian state and in this process their Aboriginal sovereignty was extinguished. Aboriginal peoples question the legitimacy of such a claim. A consequence of the Canadian government unilaterally asserting its sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples is that Aboriginal ways of thinking are not recognized as valuable within the legal and political discourse of sovereignty. In chapters two through five, respectively, I examine the Valladolid debate of 1550 between the Spanish monk Bartolome de Las Casas and Juan Sepulveda, The Great Law of Peace of the Iroquois Confederacy, Thomas Hobbes's distinction between the state of nature and a civil society, and Alexis de Tocqueville's account of democracy in America. Each of the examples, except for The Great Law of Peace, generate a philosophical dialogue that includes judgments about Aboriginal peoples. However, none of these European thinkers considers the possibility that Aboriginal voices could play a valuable role in shaping their political thought. To show the value of an Aboriginal exemplar of political thinking I consider the Iroquois Great Law of Peace. The Iroquois view of political sovereignty respects the diversity of voices found within a political relationship. This was put into practice and enforced in early colonial northeast America until the power dynamic shifted betwe

The aim of this thesis is to reveal the need for a principled framework that would establish an effective implementation of the aboriginal peoples' right to self-government in Canada. In recent decades, many agreements instituting the right to self-government of First Nations have been concluded between the federal and provincial governments and aboriginal peoples. It then becomes important to evaluate the attempts of the two existing orders of government and the courts of Canada as regards the right to self-government and assess the potential usefulness of the two's efforts at defining and implementing the right. Firstly, the importance and legitimacy of the right to self-government is recognized through its beginnings in the human right norm of self-determination in international law to the establishment of the right in Canadian domestic law. Secondly, an evaluation of the principal attempts, on behalf of the governments and the courts, to give meaning and scope to the aboriginal right to self-government, which culminate in the conclusion of modern agreements, reveals their many inefficiencies and the need for a workable and concrete alternative. Lastly, the main lacunae of the negotiation process, the main process by which the right is concluded and implemented, and the use of the courts to determine the scope and protection of the right to self-government, are revealed. An analysis of European initiatives to entrench the right to self-government, mainly the European Charter of Self-Government and its established set of principles that guide the creation of self-government agreements, are also used in order to propose a viable option for the establishment of a principled framework for the aboriginal right to self-government in Canada.

Is it possible to redefine Aboriginal title? This study intends to answer this question through the construction of an integral doctrine of aboriginal title based on a detailed analysis of its criticisms. The author uses international law to show a possible way to redefine this part of Canadian law. After a careful review of the most important aspects of aboriginal land in international law, the author chooses the law of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights as its framework. Using the decisions of this Court he produces an internationalized redefinition of Aboriginal title.

In August 2000, Justice O�Loughlin of the Federal Court of Australia handed down the decision in Cubillo v Commonwealth in which Lorna Cubillo and Peter Gunner took action against the Commonwealth Government, arguing that it was vicariously liable for their removal from their families and communities as children and subsequent detentions in the Northern Territory during the 1940s and 1950s. The case is the landmark decision in relation to legal action taken by members of the Stolen Generations. Using the decision in Cubillo as a key site of contestation, my thesis provides a critique of legal positivism as the dominant jurisprudential discourse operating within the Anglo-Australian legal system. I argue that the function of legal positivism as the principal paradigm and source of authority for the decision serves to ensure that the debate concerning reconciliation in Australia operates rhetorically to maintain whiteness at the centre of political and discursive power. Specifically concerned with the performative function of legal discourse, the thesis is an interrogation of the interface of law and language, of rhetoric, and the semiotics of legal discourse. The dominant theory of evidence law is a rationalist and empiricist epistemology in which oral testimony and documentary evidence are regarded as mediating the relationship between proof and truth. I argue that by attributing primacy to principles of rationality, objectivity and narrative coherence, and by privileging that which is visually represented, the decision serves an ideological purpose which diminishes the significance of race in the construction of knowledge. Legal positivism identifies the knowing subject and the object of knowledge as discrete entities. However, I argue that in Cubillo, Justice O�Loughlin inscribes himself into the text of the judgment and in doing so, reveals the way in which textual and corporeal specificities undermine the pretence of objective judgment and therefore the source of judicial authority.

Bibliography: p. 367-378. "This thesis is about the origins and original intentions of law; that which I call raw law. Law emanates from Kaldowinyeri, that is the beginning of time itself. Law first took form in song. In this thesis I argue that the law is naked like the land and its peoples, and is distinguished from that known law by the colonists, which is a layered system of rules and regulations, an imposing one which buries the essence and nature of law."

Bibliography: p. 367-378.<br>x, 378 p. ; 30 cm.<br>"This thesis is about the origins and original intentions of law; that which I call raw law. Law emanates from Kaldowinyeri, that is the beginning of time itself. Law first took form in song. In this thesis I argue that the law is naked like the land and its peoples, and is distinguished from that known law by the colonists, which is a layered system of rules and regulations, an imposing one which buries the essence and nature of law."<br>Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Law, 2000

This thesis argues that native title rights are fundamental to Indigenous citizenship in Australia. It does this by developing a normative conception of citizenship in connection with a model of constitutionalism. Here, citizenship is more than a legal status. It refers to the norms of individual rights coupled with democratic responsibility that are attached to the person in a liberal-democracy. Constitutionalism provides the framework for understanding the manner in which Australian society realizes these norms. This thesis focuses on a society attempting to grapple with issues of postcolonialism. A fundamental question faced in these societies is the legitimacy of group rights based in pre-colonization norms. This thesis argues that these rights can be legitimized when constitutionalism is understood as originating in the deliberations connecting civil society with the state; which deliberations reconcile individual rights with group rights in such a way as to resolve the issue of their competing claims to legitimacy. Civil society is the social space in which politico-legal norms collide with action. The argument constructed here is that native title is built on norms that have the potential (it is a counterfactual argument) to contribute to a postcolonial civil society. This is one in which colonizer and colonized coordinate their action in a mutual search for acceptable solutions to the question 'how do we live together?'. The optimistic analysis is tempered by a consideration of the development of native title law. The jurisprudence of the High Court after the Wik's Case has undermined the potential of native title to play a transformative role. It has undermined Indigenous Australians' place in civil society, and their status as equal individuals and responsible citizens. In seeking to explain this, the thesis turns from jurisprudence to political sociology, and argues that an alternative model of constitutionalism and civil society has supplanted the postcolonial; viz., the neoliberal.

This thesis focuses on both the State and Commonwealth Governments' involvement in Aboriginal affairs in Queensland from 1965 to 1975. It also examines the way in which the world anti-racism and decolonisation process was heavily influential not only upon the Australian Government's policy but also upon Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people's responses and methods of protest as well. Because Australia is a settler colony with an Aboriginal population estimated as only 1% between 1965 and 1975, this thesis observes how the United Nations remained particularly watchful over Australia. This occurred at a time when Australia was attempting to convince the international community that it was condemning racism and treating Aboriginal minority populations properly within a post-colonial climate of expectation. However, whatever label either Commonwealth or State Governments placed on newly formed Aboriginal policies, this thesis argues that they were merely more acceptable up-to-date methods of colonisation aimed predominantly at averting criticism. Given the overwhelming outcome of the 1967 referendum, the Commonwealth had to address Aboriginal affairs in Australian States, especially Queensland. Initially the Commonwealth provided much needed funding to the Queensland Government to provide health, education and housing on reserves. In the late 1960s, the Commonwealth had started to provide funding to the State Government for housing outside of reserves for Aboriginal families. By the early 1970s, the Commonwealth was funding Aboriginal community-based organisations direct (despite Queensland Government's objections), set up a national elected representative Aboriginal organisation, committed to remove discriminatory legislation from Australian statutes and introduced legislation to outlaw discrimination, attempted to address economic development and committed to the provision of Aboriginal land rights. Using mostly primary resources including speech notes, annual reports and cabinet submissions and other related papers and files from AIATSIS, National Australian and Queensland State archives, the State and Commonwealth Governments' tactics are examined. The examination of activism and resistance provides not only an overview of the workings of organisations in relation to challenging both the State and Commonwealth Governments, but more importantly, the use of the enhanced Australian public opinion together with the UN and international community as effective leverage at a time when the Australian Government was attempting to convince the world that it was committed to protecting the rights of Australia's Aboriginal peoples. The influx of vast numbers of Aboriginal people into Queensland towns and cities facilitated the politicisation of many and led to the emergence of more radical organisations like the Black Community Centre, Act Confrontation Committee, Black Panther Party, Aboriginal Legal Service and Black Community Housing Serves to name a few. Most of these organisations played a role notifying the world about the Queensland Government's tactics and embarrassed the Commonwealth. Aboriginal organisations used Australia's need to avert UN criticism as effective leverage in Queensland particularly between 1965 and 1975.

This thesis looks at the reality of the situation of the Tasmanian Aborigines using the theme of the 19th Century genocide of the Tasmanian Aborigines and the Sacred wound in the context of the law and spirituality. The methodology of the lived experience of the author is drawn upon for a legal and spiritual analysis of cases lived by the author, which provide a backdrop to the handing back of certain Aboriginal lands in Tasmania as well as reflecting on the intersection of Aboriginal lore and the legal system. The meaning of these cases goes beyond a rational legal analysis as the idea that genocide is still continuing is a difficult one for Australians to understand due to compartmentalisation between spirituality and the law in the context of modern Australia. The High Court case of Mabo poses a dilemma for Aborigines as it contains an opportunity to move beyond terra nullius thinking, but at the same time it limits claims in a way that continues dispossession and may in certain circumstances disallow aspects of Aboriginal self determination. Within this apparent standoff lies the possibility for a development of the law that can embrace or incorporate the Aboriginal spiritual attachment to the land, ancestors and artefacts. There is no word in the English language that can describe the multifaceted, inside and outside, perspectives required to carry out the required discussion that could bring the law more into tune with the people, the land and the original inhabitants. The spiritual direction of Australia, however, could be affected by the turning away from a material, logical rational perspective to the embracing of connection as a value in itself: to spiritual values and a personal sense of calling. The Sacred wound is the meditation around which the discussion of all these themes of lived experience, the law and spirituality moves and ultimately rests.<br>Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

With the decision in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] in 1992, the courts cemented their role in the self-determination strategies of Indigenous peoples in Australia. More than merely recognising a form of title to traditional lands, the tenor of the judgements in Mabo's case respected Indigenous peoples and offered the protection of the common law. However, the expectations of many Indigenous people for change have not since been met. This thesis examines the usefulness of the courts and the common law in particular for the self-determination claims of Indigenous peoples. I examine the theoretical and institutional limitations on the courts that have resulted in a doctrinal history which has generally excluded Indigenous peoples. I also analyse the potential for the common law to accommodate self-determination claims. I argue that the courts require familiar concepts upon which to base their decisions. I identify the notion of equality of peoples as a proper foundation for the courts to structure the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state. Equality of peoples has roots in the fundamental principles of the common law and maintains the integrity of Indigenous peoples’ claims.

When the Metis were included in section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, Metis leaders were euphoric. With the constitutional recognition of the Metis as on of the three Aboriginal peoples of Canada and the protection of Metis Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it was thought that the battle for recognition was over. Surely the next step would be the federal government's recognition of its jurisdiction for the Metis and the recognition by the courts and the Crown that Metis have Aboriginal rights that can be exercised along with those of the Indians and the Inuit. But Metis expectations were short lived. More than twenty years later, Canada refuses to recognize it has legislative jurisdiction for the Metis, arguing that Metis are a provincial legislative responsibility. And both the federal and provincial governments have failed to conduct themselves in keeping with the principle of the "honour of the Crown" because they consistently deny that Metis have Aboriginal rights. Whenever Metis harvesters attempt to exercise their rights, the Crown is there as a game warden, prosecutor or jailor, but never as a fiduciary to maintain the Crown's honour. The Crown often argues that without a clear understanding of Metis definition and identity, Metis Aboriginal rights would be too difficult to administer. More importantly, the Crown has argued that if Aboriginal rights are linked with pre-contact customs practices and traditions, the Metis could not possibly meet the Aboriginal rights test that has been established by the courts. But then came the decision in R. v. Powley making it clear that the Metis are a distinct people, separate from the Indians and the Inuit, with Aboriginal rights flowing from the customs, practices and traditions of Metis communities that emerged subsequent to the period of first contact, and prior to the exercise of "effective control" by the Crown. The Supreme Court of Canada found in favor of Powley by using a "purposive" approach in the analysis of Metis Aboriginal rights and by not mechanically applying the section 35 justification analysis. The purpose of this thesis is to develop a core set of principles that can be used as a framework for a purposive analysis of Metis Aboriginal rights. The principles support the propositions that: Metis fall within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the federal government; that Metis have Aboriginal rights that are recognized and affirmed by section 35; and, that Metis Aboriginal rights are immunized from the application of provincial wildlife regulations because of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.<br>Law, Peter A. Allard School of<br>Graduate

The author critiques various strands of liberal moral and political theory as they relate to Aboriginal rights. In particular, he rejects the formulation of liberal theory by philosopher Will Kymlicka, as failing to respond to the unique realities and perspectives of First Nations. He then draws on the insights of philosophers Charles Taylor and James Tully to argue for a new approach to Aboriginal rights, premised on principles of dialogue, recognition and the willingness to engage in an "intercultural journey" in which a middle ground of law, informed by Canadian and indigenous norms, is created. In chapters two through four, the author employs Wittgenstein's "perspicuous contrast" in order to reveal the dialogical basis of Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en legal and political structures, as well as to reveal the dominant role that "monologues" play in the Canadian law of Aboriginal rights. He identifies three monologues: discovery, sovereignty and the "authentic Indian," by which Canadian law marginalizes and subjugates First Nations and their legal systems. Such monologues depend for their coherence and success upon Aboriginal silence. In chapter five, the author argues that notwithstanding the persistence of monologues, Canadian law can be open to dialogue and to the broadening of understanding that is required for the construction of an intercultural legal middle ground. He issues a strong call for the legal system to turn to Aboriginal law as a major source for the middle ground, and argues that doing so will help preserve the ability of First Nations to participate in the intercultural dialogue in their own voices and ways of knowing, which is essential to the successful deployment of the approach argued for in chapter one. The author concludes that the middle ground will best be achieved through treaties, backed by an intercultural legal duty on all parties to negotiate in good faith. He also argues that a rethinking of sovereignty is necessary, in order to preserve the ability of First Nations to participate in intercultural dialogue secure in their autonomy and self-determination. To that end, he argues that courts can provide a useful "backdrop" to the intercultural middle ground, by continuously identifying intercultural legal norms which respect bedrock principles of each community's legal system in order to preserve the autonomy and self-determination of each.

This thesis focuses on Aboriginal women as survivors of intimate violence, and as participants in debates about justice and rights in the academic, political and legal spheres. While several federal and provincial reports have documented the adverse impact of the dominant criminal justice system on Aboriginal peoples, most of the reports fail to consider the impact of the dominant system, and of reform initiatives on Aboriginal women, who engage with such systems primarily as survivors of violence. Although feminist legal scholars and activists have focused on survivors of violence in critiquing the dominant justice system, such discourses have also tended to ignore the needs and concerns of Aboriginal women in recommending reforms to the dominant system, as well as in theorizing the causes and sites of intimate violence. Using feminist methods, I explore how the writings of Aboriginal women have begun to fill these gaps. In focusing on gender and racial oppression, Aboriginal women have complicated theories on and reforms around intimate violence, and have demanded that they be included in the shaping of public institutions in both the Canadian legal system, and in the context of Aboriginal self-government. While Aboriginal women largely support the creation of Aboriginal justice systems, some have expressed concerns about the willingness of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal leaders to include women in the process of creating, implementing and operating such systems. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as Aboriginal rights under the Constitution Act, 1982 have been advocated as means of achieving Aboriginal women's participation in this context. This gives rise to a number of fundamental questions which I examine in my thesis. What is the historical basis for the participation of Aboriginal women in the political process, and for survivors of violence in both the dominant and Aboriginal justice systems? What is the significance of the absence of Aboriginal women from dominant discourses on justice and intimate violence? Might a broader level of participation for survivors of violence, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, ameliorate the problematic aspects of the dominant justice system? Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provide a vehicle for survivors of violence who seek a greater level of protection and participation in the dominant justice system? Can the Charter, or Aboriginal rights under the Canadian constitution, assist Aboriginal women in establishing a right of participation in the processes leading to the creation of Aboriginal justice systems, and their participation in such systems once they have been created? What are the limitations of rights discourse in this context? My analysis suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada's conservative approach to rights, as well as more fundamental limitations in rights discourse, make constitutional litigation within the dominant system a sometimes necessary, but not ideal strategy for Aboriginal women in defining their involvement in the political and justice arenas. On the other hand, there is potential for rights discourse to bear more fruit once Aboriginal decision making fora are in place, in keeping with holistic approaches to interpretation, and the traditional roles of Aboriginal women and survivors of violence in justice and in the community.

This thesis questions why young female and aboriginal plaintiffs consistently receive lower damage awards for loss of future earning capacity than young white male plaintiffs. I argue that due to the social construction of law, and specifically tort law, the dividing line between public and private law should be challenged. The effect of tort is partially "public" in nature due to the broad impact tort has on valuing the potential of individual plaintiffs. When damages for female and aboriginal plaintiffs are assessed on a reduced scale due to gender and race, a message is sent that the potential of these plaintiffs, and the potential of the groups to which they belong, is somehow less. Due to the "public" impacts of damages quantification, principles of equality derived from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be considered in the quantification process. I argue further, that the current practice of damages quantification has been the result of the court's over-reliance on "formalist" notions of tort law which has insulated the area from the social context of law. In addition, I suggest that the acceptance by courts of economic evidence, which is often reflective of discriminatory norms in the labour market and our society generally, has had the effect of de-valuing certain members of Canadian society; in particular women and aboriginal plaintiffs. I demonstrate this analysis through an examination of cases dealing with young, catastrophically injured, female and aboriginal plaintiffs. Finally, I suggest that, though an imperfect solution, currently the only equitable method of quantifying damages for loss of future earning capacity is to adopt white male earning tables for all young plaintiffs with no demonstrated earning history.

The last decade has seen the development of an unprecedented profile for aboriginal concerns over the inadequacies of the criminal justice system. This thesis examines the major commissions of inquiry that were established to address criminal justice reforms for aboriginal Canadians. Through a comparison of these inquiries, it is my intention to provide a greater understanding as to why some commissions have had a more positive role to play in initiating policy change, while others have been less than satisfactory in promoting the needs of aboriginal persons. Analysis reveals that commissions of inquiry are most often established to address more general concerns about the impact of the criminal justice system on aboriginal peoples, rather than to investigate specific cases in which there was a miscarriage of justice. My findings also reveal that the current criminal justice system can and should be improved, without in any way detracting from the movement toward the larger social, political and economic goal of self- determination. Due to the fact that autonomous solutions remain prevalent in the academic literature, future inquiries will be required to acknowledge this perspective. An appreciation of the variety of concerns held by aboriginal individuals can only be made possible through extensive consultation with aboriginal communities and utilizing creative and innovative means of gathering research. By providing an open process, commissions will be able to encompass views that may not be prevalent in academic circles, but accepted at a grass roots level. On the much larger question of the policy impact of commissions of inquiry, they have been useful institutions for opening up the policy debate in regards to criminal justice reforms for aboriginal Canadians. Frequently these inquiries have been faulted because their specific recommendations are not accepted. However, inquiries are valuable because they provide one of the few occasions for defining public issues, including debate about reformist and radical conceptions of the issues. Consequently it is more useful to assess commissions of inquiry for their role in the development of policy debate.

Aboriginal rights, and aboriginal fishing rights in particular, are topics which elicit a variety of responses ranging from the positive to hostile. In British Columbia, fish is big business and it is the fourth largest industry in the province. The stakes are high and the positions of the various user groups and stakeholders are clearly demarcated. The fight over fish has pitted aboriginal groups against other aboriginal groups as well as against the federal government and its department of fisheries and oceans - however, the fight becomes vicious, underhanded, and mean spirited when the aboriginal groups are matched against the commercial industry. In an attempt to even the odds the aboriginal peoples have turned to the courts for recognition and protection of what they view as inherent rights - that is a right to fish arising out of the very nature of being an aboriginal person. Up until the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Sparrow aboriginal rights had been virtually ignored by both the courts and the state. However Sparrow changed all that and significantly altered the fight over fish. And that fight has become a virtual no-holds barred battle. The Sparrow decision remains to this day one of the most important Supreme Court decisions pertaining to aboriginal rights. This thesis is a case study of Sparrow - it will examine the decision from a perspective of whether subordinate or disadvantaged groups are able to use the law to advance their causes of social progress and equality. The thesis examines the status and nature of aboriginal fishing rights before and after the Sparrow decision. The thesis will examine whether the principles of the decision have been upheld or followed by the courts and the government of Canada. Data will consist of interviews with representatives of the key players in the fishing industry, namely, the Musqueam Indian Band, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and the commercial industry. In brief, the findings of my research do not bode well for the aboriginal peoples - the principles of the Sparrow decision have not been followed by the government of Canada and aboriginal fishing rights remain subject to arbitrary control. The thesis will examine why and how this happened.

This thesis is concerned with two central questions. The first is theoretical and asks, "Can a direct appeal be made to the foundational principles of liberalism to support collective rights?" The second question is practical and asks: "Would such a defense serve the interests of contemporary Canadian Aboriginal claims to special constitutionally recognized collective rights known as the Aboriginal Right?" I utilize Will Kymlicka's defense of minority rights as the theoretical framework in assessing this first question and in assessing the latter, I refer to various reported Aboriginal conceptions of the so-called Aboriginal Right which have been formalized by Aboriginal people themselves through constitutional addresses, Royal Commission hearings, discussion papers and legal claims. Part I of the thesis involves an enquiry into the nature of the revisions that Kymlicka proposes to make to liberal theory, and asks whether, in making such changes, he is able to retain identification with the so-called "modern" liberals, with whom Kymlicka identifies himself, and consistently defend the kind of group minority rights of the sort actually being claimed in Canadian society today. I conclude that Kymlicka argument fails in two respects: it fails to do the work required of it by modern liberals and it ultimately fails to do the work required by the standards of Kymlicka own theory. In Part II, I argue that even if it were theoretically possible to protect the good of culture in the way that Kymlicka hopes, such a defense of collective rights fails in the most important respect: that is, it cannot do the work required of it by the Aboriginal people for whom it was designed.

The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate “only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.” The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”: The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the healing of wounds and the restoration of social harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony were the goals - not punishment. The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional, and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary Aboriginal society. Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice component and concomitant Charter values. This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its reconciliation-mediation strength. This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty.

In British Columbia, fifty-one First Nations have filed Statements of Intent signifying their interest in negotiating a treaty with Canada and the Province of British Columbia since the establishment of the British Columbia Treaty Commission in 1993. Twenty-seven of these First Nations participants claim ocean spaces within their traditional territories. Academic research and writing over the last decade has focussed on Aboriginal title to land, with little, if any reference, to ocean spaces. The concept of Aboriginal title was recently recognized by the courts in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. My research will explore what information and legal principles could be utilized to recognize Aboriginal title to ocean spaces within the Canadian legal context, and therefore provide some bases for First Nations in substantiating their claims. My analysis will begin with a review of international law principles surrounding title to and jurisdiction over ocean spaces. Following which, I will delineate the sources available for recognizing such a theory, starting with a review of the concepts of Aboriginal title as determined in Delgamuukw and their applicability to ocean spaces. Delgamuukw has affirmed Aboriginal perspectives are an integral part of the investigation of Aboriginal title, and voices of members of two particular First Nations being the Haida Nation and the Tsawwassen First Nation, with whom I visited, will be included. Rounding out the sources will be a review of comparative legal concepts drawn from the United States and Australian experiences, and the principles espoused within international human rights materials. Having established the avenues for recognition of this concept, I then turn to discussion of its reconciliation within the Canadian legal context by reviewing theories of co-management and examining a number of settlement instruments that have yielded some degree of reconciliation between the federal government and the particular First Nation or Province involved. Comments from First Nations in respect of the obstacles that hold back reconciliation will be noted. In conclusion, my research will deduce Aboriginal title to ocean spaces is a viable legal concept in Canada, and First Nations have the resources necessary to substantiate their claims. Comments about the possibilities that may result at the treaty table or in the courts upon recognition of this concept will also be discussed. This analysis is timely and important as many First Nations are nearing the stage of the treaty process where discussions will be directed towards what territories these First Nations groups will retain and what ownership, jurisdiction and rights they will enjoy as to ocean spaces and resources. Such issues directly relate to the continued way of life, culture, and sustainable economic growth and stability of First Nation communities into the twenty-first century.

While Canada is often called a pluralist state, there are no sustained studies by political scientists in which aboriginal self-government is discussed specifically in terms of the analytical tradition of pluralist thought. Aboriginal self-government is usually discussed as an issue of cultural preservation or national self-determination. Aboriginal identity is framed in terms of cultural and national traits that are unique to an aboriginal community and selfgovernment is taken to represent the aboriginal communal desire to protect and preserve those traits. Is such an understanding of what motivates aboriginal self-government accurate, or does it yield an incomplete understanding of the complex phenomenon that aboriginal selfgovernment in Canada represents? The political tradition of pluralism allows for analysis of aboriginal self-government that addresses questions left unattended by the cultural and nationalist frameworks. Pluralism is often viewed as a public arrangement in which distinct groups are given room to live side by side, characterized by mutual recognition and affirmation. At the same time, there are different faces of pluralist theory and each addresses questions about the recognition and affirmation of aboriginal self-government in different ways. Those three contemporary faces can be distinguished by the labels communitarian, individualist, and relational. The major hypothesis advanced is that aboriginal self-government is better understood if an "identification" perspective on aboriginal identity is adopted as opposed to a "cultural" or "national" one and if that perspective is linked to a relational theory of pluralism as opposed to a communitarian or individualist one. The identification approach examines aboriginal identity not in terms of cultural and political traits, but in terms of identification with, and political commitment to, an aboriginal community. Relational pluralism in turn, examines the challenge of aboriginal self-government in terms of power differences within aboriginal communities and between aboriginal and Canadian governments. Applying these approaches to aboriginal politics in Canada confirms their suitability. Contrary to what previous scholarship has assumed, aboriginal self-government should not be seen primarily as a tool to preserve cultural and national differences as goods in and of themselves. The politics of aboriginal self-government should be seen as involving demands to equalize current imbalances in power so that aboriginal communities and the individuals within them can construct aboriginal identities according to their own design.