Literatura académica sobre el tema "Act (Philosophy) Prudence"

Abstract Humeans about normative reasons claim that there is a reason for you to perform a given action if and only if this would promote the satisfaction of one of your desires. Their view has traditionally been thought to have the revisionary implication that an agent can sometimes lack any reason to do what morality or prudence requires. Recently, however, Mark Schroeder has denied this. If he is right, then the Humean theory accords better with common sense than it has been thought to. I argue that Schroeder is mistaken, even if welfare (and thus prudence) is understood in terms of the satisfaction of one's desires: any Humean must concede that one can sometimes lack any reason to act morally or prudently. I also identify a novel variant on Humeanism that could perhaps avoid its revisionary implications about prudence (but not morality) if desire satisfactionism is the correct theory of welfare.

The ethics of heritable genome editing (HGE), or germline engineering, are currently being debated vigorously among scientists and bioethicists, and the Catholic Church has declared the procedure to be morally illicit. While these judgments are based mostly on the justice and consequences of the act, a fruitful approach is to consider HGE from the perspective of the virtuous Christian. This article examines participation in HGE according to the virtues of charity, justice, hope, faith, fortitude, temperance, and prudence. HGE does not appear to be consonant with the virtuous life of a Christian person. Summary: The article evaluates heritable genome editing (HGE or genetic engineering of embryos) according to the Christian virtues of charity, justice, hope, faith, fortitude, temperance, and prudence. HGE does not seem to be consonant with the virtuous life of a Christian person.

The paper describes in detail the accounting principle of prudence in non-profit organizations and financial institutions. It defines its application in such organizations and based on comparison it evaluates the practical use of the prudence principle and its reflection in the accounting books. The main focus is on differences in applying the prudence principle that result from differences in the purpose activities and methods of asset management in these organizations. The practical application of the prudence principle in accounting consists mainly in the creation and use of provisions and impairments. These methods are defined by the Implementing Regulation to the Accounting Act No. 563/1991. The paper also provides tables where the creation and use of impairments and provisions in the above-mentioned organizations is compared with how business companies proceed in creating impairments and provisions. The key legislation standardizing accounting in the Czech Republic is the Accounting Act No. 563/1991, as amended, which stipulates the general accounting principles, the so-called accounting philosophy. The accounting is built around the general accounting principles, which are perceived as the pillars of accounting. Even though they are not stipulated in any particular law, they are legally enforceable and their ignorance can be sanctioned. The general accounting principles represent a set of rules to be observed in keeping the accounting books, preparing the accounting reports and submitting the accounting reports to users. The keystone accounting principle is the principle of true and fair refl ection of facts the essential goal of which is to report in the fi nancial statement actual assets and the fi nancial position of the accounting unit with an essential focus on reporting events that occurred during the accounting period with respect to their content.

In recent months, there has been a lot of debate surrounding the use of those COVID-19 vaccines that have been either tested or manufactured with cell lines that were isolated from the remains of an aborted fetal child. Most faithful and orthodox Catholic moral theologians, among whom I count myself, have concluded that their use is not intrinsically evil. Therefore, like every other decision that falls into the category of actions that are not intrinsically evil, the decision to be vaccinated with these morally controversial vaccines has to be governed by the virtue of prudence. It is a decision that calls for a wisdom that properly sees this action within the constellation of actions that propels the human agent to the heights of holiness. This is why prayer is so essential for authentic moral judgment. With prayer, we ask the Holy Spirit who is the all-prudent one to guide our actions so that we can choose and act well not only for our only well-being but for the well-being of all. Acts that are not themselves intrinsically evil are deemed virtuous or not within the narrative of the individual person’s life.

We extend “4E” cognition to moral psychology. Since acting on affordances typically requires expertise, moral expertise, or virtue, is needed to act on moral affordances and to shape moral agency. Ethical rules and codes, often selected through a process of constraint satisfaction, are also involved in the detection and selection of moral affordances. We argue that individuals who act prudently possess moral expertise that allows them to remain in the “metastable zone” between mind and world, giving them an optimal grip on moral affordances and permitting wise judgement and action. We show how this can be explained via a noncognitivist, affordance-based account of the virtue phronesis (prudence). Our overall approach creates space for reciprocally causal accounts and prospection in explanations of human moral activity.

Morality requires us to act for the good of others. This is not the only moral requirement there is, and it is, of course, controversial where the good of others lies. But whatever their good is, there can be no serious doubt that acting so as to bring it about is one crucial obligation morality places on us. Yet the nature of this obligation is unclear, because there are difficult questions about its aim and about the motivational sources required for realizing it. Who are the others for whose good we are obligated to act? Are they only people in our immediate context, or members of our society, or all human beings? And, as a matter of moral psychology, what leads us to honor this obligation? Is it a sense of justice, decency, prudence, benevolence, or some combination of these and perhaps other virtues? The answers we give will shape our understanding of the nature of the obligation. For the character traits which we think should move us will influence the choice of people we aim to benefit and the inclusiveness we attribute to the obligation will affect the motives we wish to cultivate in ourselves and others.

In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern. When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation by duty has been sharply distinguished from motivation by self-interest. Accordingly, from Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick to Rawls, Nagel, and Gauthier, concern for our own interests, whether long-term or short-term, has typically been regarded as intrinsically nonmoral. So, for example, although Thomas Nagel regards both prudence and altruism as structural features of practical reason, he identifies only the latter as a moral capacity, prudence being merely rational, long-term egoism. Similarly, John Ravvls and David Gauthier contrast self-interest and other nontuistic interests—interests that are independent of others' interests—with moral interest. We are morally permitted, no doubt, to act out of self-interest within certain constraints, but such acts can have no intrinsic moral worth. Pursuit of our own interests out of duty (if there is such a duty) does have intrinsic moral worth, but such pursuit, by hypothesis, cannot be motivated by self-interest. Self-interested pursuit of our own interests as such, no matter how realistic, farsighted, temperate, honest, or courageous, cannot be intrinsically moral. And this remains the case even if self-interest motivates us to perform other-regarding acts: only those other-regarding acts that are (appropriately) motivated by others' interests count as moral, because only such acts are altruistic.

The critics of the ICC in the Bush administration and its supporters within the human rights community have one thing in common: they assume that the ICC can evolve into a powerful institution independent of states, either to constrain American power or to act on a duty to prosecute to end impunity for perpetrators. Both overestimate the ability of the court to pursue a legalism divorced from power realities. The former attribute to the court powers it is unlikely to exercise, particularly if the United States remains outside the treaty. This is due, in part, to the safeguards within the Rome Statute, but more importantly, to the court's dependence on sovereign cooperation, which will lead it to place a high premium on cultivating the good will of the most powerful states. The latter overestimate the degree to which courts by themselves can deter atrocities. The ICC's effectiveness in any particular case will therefore be dependent on the political consensus of those actors capable of wielding power in that area. They also underestimate the need to compromise justice – at least, prosecutorial justice – in cases in which bargaining and compromise are the central means of facilitating transitions from armed conflict or dictatorship, and in cases in which the strength of the perpetrators and the limits of one's power would make legal proceedings either futile or counterproductive to other interests and values. Hence, decisions to prosecute must first be subjected to a test of political prudence, and then take place according to due process and the rule of law.

ABSTRACTThe ontological foundations of bioethics are traced from the "Nicomachean Ethics" (EN) Aristotle. To do this, we analyze the "Biological Treaties", the "Treaties Psychological" and "Metaphysics" Aristotle latter being considered the seminal work of Western ontological thought. The "Midpoint" the "Prudence", "Justice", the Amistad, the "Act", the "Power", the "substance" and "Alma", respectively, are basic categories, from which raised the respective discussions and interpretations. Various secondary sources provided the corresponding interpretative approaches theoretically required to support this research. The Spanish translation of the EN, by Marías, J. (1970), was the immediate source taken as a basis for interpretive contributions corresponding, which was analyzed by Books reason of logical and systematic sequence of this work. . Bioethics is assumed that since it implies deliberation prerequisite for formulating conclusions should be viewed as a tool for decision making. These decisions take transcendent nature they involve inherent addressing "Being" as "Being and" Being "in Society problems. Bioethics is ethics while applied to the field of life and health of man stands as a discipline whose identity logos after seat logical and epistemological found precisely in philosophy. The contemporary ethical proposals analyzed in this study do not provide length and breadth from Aristotle EN as basic references for redefinition. Research conducted suggests the adoption of a new logo to redefine "Bioethics" based on ethics, psychology and Aristotelian Biology. For purposes of defining the present manuscript. The most significant findings related to the analysis of the Nicomachean Ethics (EN) Disclosed.RESUMENSe rastrean los fundamentos ontológicos de la Bioética desde la “Ética a Nicómaco” (EN) de Aristóteles. Para ello se analizan los “Tratados Biológicos”, los “Tratados Psicológicos” y la “Metafísica” aristotélica por ser considerada esta última la obra fundamental del pensamiento ontológico occidental. El “Punto Medio”, la “Prudencia”, la “Justicia”, la Amistad, el “Acto”, la “Potencia”, la “Sustancia” y el “Alma”, respectivamente, constituyen categorías básicas, a partir de las cuales se plantean las respectivas discusiones e interpretaciones. Diversas fuentes secundarias aportaron las correspondientes aproxima-ciones interpretativas requeridas para fundamentar teóricamente esta Investigación. La traducción al español de la EN, realiza-da por Marías, J. (1970), constituyó la fuente inmediata tomada como base para los correspondientes aportes interpretativos, la cual fue analizada por Libros en razón de la secuencia lógica y sistemática de esta obra. Se asume que la Bioética en tanto que implica deliberación, paso previo para la formulación de conclusiones, debe ser vista como una herramienta para la toma de decisiones. Estas decisiones adquieren carácter trascendente porque implican el abordaje de problemas inherentes al “Ser” en cuanto “Ser y al “Ser” en Sociedad. La Bioética en tanto que es ética aplicada al campo de la vida y la salud del hombre se erige como un logos tras disciplinario cuya identidad y asiento epistemológico se encuentran precisamente en la filosofía. Las propuestas éticas contemporáneas analizadas en este estudio no aportan extensión y amplitud desde la EN de Aristóteles como referentes básicos para su redefinición. La Investigación realizada sugiere la adopción de un nuevo logos para redefinir la “Bioética” con fundamento en la Ética, la Psicología y la Biología aristotélica. Para fines de delimitar el presente manuscrito. Se exponen los hallazgos más significativos relacionados con la el análisis de la Ética a Nicómaco (EN).

Although he is not ordinarily interpreted as a philosopher, Thucydides enters into conversation with the canonical political philosophers by engaging with the question of the good life lived within a well-ordered society. Displaying the conceptions of the good society presented by leading Athenians and Spartans, Thucydides emphasizes their illusory, self-destructive qualities. If those political leaders are at least qualified utopians, then Thucydides is an anti-utopian who views human history as a world of war. Thucydides’ History highlights the suffering caused by the tendency of human beings, and especially political leaders, to aggrandize themselves. In the absence of durable customs, laws, and political institutions, we can hope, at most, for a decent life supported by resilience and guided by political prudence. More ambitious political aspirations will inevitably cause greater harm than benefit.

This work presents a new analysis and evaluation, based upon an original game-theoretic analysis of convention, of the thesis that justice consists of systems of distinguished conventions. This thesis has ancient roots but has never been central in philosophy because convention itself has historically been so poorly understood. Given a sufficiently precise and general analysis of convention, the view that justice at bottom consists of conventions provides cogent answers to two perennial questions: (1) What is justice? (2) Why be just? Conventions are analyzed as correlated equilibria of games where the agents involved have available alternative equilibria. This analysis is sufficiently general to summarize social interactions where the interests of the agents diverge, so that a satisfactory resolution incorporates principles of justice. Agents are in circumstances of justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve when all contribute to a cooperative surplus and (ii) each contributor risks being let down if this agent contributes and the others fail to contribute. Necessary and sufficient conditions are proposed for a satisfactory analysis of justice as mutual advantage that characterize justice as a special set of Baseline-Consistent conventions of agents in circumstances of justice. The origins of norms of fairness as the product of salience and inductive learning are explored. The state social contract is analyzed as a self-enforcing governing convention. The Reconciliation Project of demonstrating the compatibility of justice and rational prudence is reevaluated in light of the analysis of convention developed here.

Does someone deserve to be praised or punished? Can one individual merit owning more resources than another? Can blame be rightly attached to unintended actions? These are examples of moral questions that arise in everyday life. The Moral Sentiments is an ‘analysis of the principles’ that govern or underlie judgments of human conduct and character. ‘Living virtuously’ considers Adam Smith’s views on justice, benevolence, prudence, and other virtues. It is a central plank in Smith’s overall philosophy that individuals in a commercial society are able to act justly, prudently, and benevolently. There is no divergence between the ‘moral’ and ‘economic’ aspects of his thought.

In what follows I examine the following question: does it make a difference in moral psychology whether one adopts Aristotle's ordinary or Kant's revisionist definition of virtue as habit? Points of commensurability and critical comparison are provided by Kant's attempt to refute Aristotle's definition of virtue as a mean and by the moral problems of ignorance (I don't know what I ought to do) and weakness (I don't do what I know I ought to do). These two problems are essential topics for moral psychology. I show two things. First, Kant's definition is revisionist because he excludes from moral habit-formation what Aristotle includes, that is, (i) practice in prudential calculation of a mean, and (ii) habit-formation by repetition. This follows from Kant's insistence that an act is virtuous only if the moral agent is willing freely and universally. Secondly, Aristotle's virtues modify behavior directly, whereas Kant's virtues modify behavior indirectly by creating moral feeling which, in turn, represses the temptations of the natural inclination. I suggest, thirdly, that as one approximates Kant's ideal of perfect virtue, entailed by the broad duties of beneficence and self-perfection, the difference in kind invented by Kant between virtue and prudence, as a morally neutral rational skill, erodes and becomes a difference in degree. I conclude that Aristotle's ordinary definition of virtue is better able to modify human behavior and solve these two moral problems.

Virtue ethics is a way of viewing the moral life in terms of the necessary dispositions which shape human action towards the good, and towards human flourishing. Thinking of the moral life in terms of virtue was the dominant approach to moral philosophy in ancient and medieval thought. Although largely absent as a major strand of thought in moral philosophy after the Enlightenment, it has key features which challenge the dominant approaches in moral philosophy. The second half of the twentieth century saw a revival in virtue ethics, inspired by philosophers such as Anscombe and MacIntyre. The Hippocratic tradition provides a virtue framework for medicine, and the revival of virtue ethics has led to further work to explore the importance of virtue in medical practice. In the morally and technically complex world of medical practice, the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are necessary for the doctor to act according to the best interests of the patient, which are in line with the proper ends of medicine. The law has a role in prohibiting acts which are not in accordance with the ends of medicine, which cannot be virtuous. It also has a role in helping to arrive at prudential decisions in cases where there are disputes between patients or their families and medical teams about a best course of action. Finally, medical law should have a role in cultivating virtue within medicine for the benefit of patients and doctors.

The philosophy of free-market conservatism has swept the political field virtually everywhere, and virtually everywhere conservatives have been, in varying degrees, hostile to the cause of conservation. This is a problem of great consequence for the long-term human prospect because of the sheer political power of conservative governments. Conservatism and conservation share more than a common linguistic heritage. Consistently applied they are, in fact, natural allies. To make such a case, however, it is necessary first to say what conservatism is. Conservative philosopher Russell Kirk (1982, xv–xvii) proposes six “first principles” of conservatism. Accordingly, true conservatives:… • believe in a transcendent moral order • prefer social continuity (i.e., the “devil they know to the devil they don’t know”) • believe in “the wisdom of our ancestors” • are guided by prudence • “feel affection for the proliferating intricacy of long-established social institutions” • believe that “human nature suffers irremediably from certain faults.”… For Kirk the essence of conservatism is the “love of order” (1982, xxxvi). Eighteenth-century British philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke, the founding father of modern conservatism and as much admired as he is unread, defined the goal of order more specifically as one which harmonized the distant past with the distant future. To this end Burke thought in terms of a contract, but not one about “things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.” Burke’s societal contract was not, in other words, about tax breaks for those who don’t need them, but about a partnership promoting science, art, virtue, and perfection, none of which could be achieved by a single generation without veneration for the past and a healthy regard for those to follow. Burke’s contract, therefore, was between “those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born . . . linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world” ([1790] 1986, 194–195). The role of government, those “possessing any portion of power,” in Burke’s words, “ought to be strongly and awefully impressed with an idea that they act in trust” (ibid., 190).