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Rahemtulla, Shadaab. "Muslims in America". American Journal of Islam and Society 27, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2010): 103–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v27i3.1310.
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Muslims in America: A Short History is an accessible, succinct, andinformative historical survey of Muslim American communities. This popularbook has two key objectives: to increase non-Muslim Americans’understanding of Muslims in the United States and to foreground to Muslim Americans themselves their own religious, ethnic, and culturaldiversity (p. xi).The story of Muslim America begins in the eighteenth century. Chapter1, “Across the Black Atlantic: The First Muslims in North America,”sketches the lives of several West African Muslims, many of them highly literateand schooled in the Islamic sciences, who were enslaved and shippedto the United States, such as Ayuba Suleiman Diallo (Job Ben Solomon),Abd al-Rahman Ibrahima, and Omar ibn Sayyid. The second chapter, “TheFirst American Converts to Islam,” moves into the late-nineteenth and earlytwentiethcenturies. Here Curtis provides an array of highly diverse Muslimmissionary activities, from the rather unsuccessful proselytization work ofWhite American convert Alexander Russell Webb, to the steady spread ofmystical Islamic teachings spearheaded by such preachers as Indian Sufimaster Inayat Khan, to the Nation of Islam’s ascendance as a mass-basedBlack liberation movement ...
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Bagasra, Anisah y Mitchell Mackinem. "Assessing Aspects of Acculturation in a Muslim American Sample: Development and Testing of the Acculturation Scale for Muslim Americans". Religions 10, n.º 1 (2 de enero de 2019): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10010026.
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Acculturation of Muslims into the American culture continues to be a topic of deep interest. The purpose of this study was to examine acculturation in a sample of both American-born and Immigrant Muslim Americans. Two hundred and fifty five Muslim Americans completed a scale designed to assess two aspects of acculturation within the population: adherence to Islamic identity and conformity to American social norms. The survey was distributed in both a paper-based and online anonymous format consisting of demographic questions and the acculturation scale designed for this study. Results revealed that both immigrants and U.S. born Muslim Americans demonstrate a strong adherence to their Islamic identity and low levels of conformity to American social norms. American-born Muslims scored significantly lower on conformity to American social norms than immigrant Muslims. Study findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that Muslim Americans are less likely to sacrifice religious values to assimilate. Specific item results provide insight into what aspects of American culture Muslims are more willing to adopt, and which they are likely to shun. These findings demonstrate the challenges Muslim Americans face integrating in an increasingly hostile host culture.
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Bullock, Katherine. "American Muslims". American Journal of Islam and Society 20, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2003): 132–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v20i2.1866.
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With a picture of a minaret superimposed on the Statue of Liberty, thisbook's cover is a striking introduction to what is inside. Like the Statue ofLiberty that has acted as a beacon of freedom for wave after wave ofrefugees and immigrants, Khan argues that Muslims in America are beaconsfor the Muslim world, calling the ummah to an Islam of moderation, tolerance,and excellence; helping to bring the ummah out of its current malaiseby engaging in itjthad; and, the same time, bringing Islam to an ailing UnitedStates. And as the minaret and the Statue of Liberty also can represent polesof tension for Muslims (the love/hate relationship and the spilt personalitysyndrome that Muslims have toward the United States), Khan's book investigatesthe Muslim experience of living in the United States. He criticizes theUnited States for failing to live up to its promises of liberty for its Muslimcitizens and inhabitants, as well as for Muslims around the globe.American Muslims has eight chapters, each presenting a different angleof the relationship between being Muslim and being American. Khan setsthe scene by discussing "Islam in America" ( chapter l ), moves to "AmericanMuslims and American Politics" (chapter 2), "American Foreign Policy"(chapter 3), and "American Muslims and American Society" (chapter 4). Hethen introduces the notion of an American Muslim perspective (chapter 5)and has a chapter on the compatibility between Islam and democracy ( chai:rter 6). The 9/11 attack and its impact upon Muslims is discussed next (chai:rter 7), and the book ends with his perspective as an American Muslim onpolitics in the Muslim world (chapter 8).Khan presents forceful and consistent arguments that are both thoughtprovokingand often refreshing in their honesty. He is not afraid to say out ...
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Mohamed, Besheer. "Muslim Americans: Debating the Notions of American and Un-American (by Nahid Kabir)". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 36, n.º 2 (15 de abril de 2019): 85–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v36i2.585.
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Muslim Americans: Debating the Notions of American and Un-American is an ambitious attempt to explore how American Muslims, especially immigrants and their children, see the US and are seen by it. It uses the voices of Muslim Americans to explore what peoples and cultures can be considered American, and which are not. The author offers it as “a counter-narrative to the reactionary thinking of academics ... and some media and politicians who have place Islam/Muslims as the Other.”
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Chen, Yufeng y Saroja Dorairajoo. "American Muslims’ Da’wah Work and Islamic Conversion". Religions 11, n.º 8 (24 de julio de 2020): 383. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel11080383.
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Prior to the “9/11 attacks”, negative images of Islam in America were prevalent, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks made the situation for, and image of, Islam more sinister than before. Notwithstanding the extreme Islamophobia, one notes that, ironically in America, more people have been embracing Islam since, at least, the beginning of the twentieth century. Conversion to Islam in America seems to be a deviation from the adverse American public opinions towards Islam. An important question that, therefore, arises is: “Why are Americans converting to Islam despite negative public perception of the religion?” Perhaps Americans have been coerced into conversion by Muslim preachers through the latter’s meticulous and hard-hitting missionary work. In this qualitative study, the authors aim to explore how the missionary work, i.e., “Da’wah”, by some American Muslim missionaries influenced the conversion to Islam of those who were in contact with them. The authors argue that, unlike other Abrahamic proselytizing faiths such as Christianity or the Bahai faith, American Muslim proselytizing was not solely based on direct teaching of the tenets of the religion but also one that demonstrated faith by deeds or actions, which then made Islam attractive and influenced conversion of non-Muslims. These findings come from in-depth fieldwork that included interviews with forty-nine Muslim converts across the United States between June 2014 and May 2015.
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Abdullaev, M. H. "Muslim Community of the Present-Day USA: Looking for SelfIdentity in the Multicultural Society". Islam in the modern world 16, n.º 2 (25 de julio de 2020): 181–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.22311/2074-1529-2020-16-2-181-202.
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This article is devoted to the current socio- political processes experienced by the Muslim community in the United States of America. The author studies the process of harmonious integration by Muslim Americans into American society, the search for possible correlations between the religious and secular parts of society, and the requirements of Islam in the face of demo cratic values. The author pays special attention to the issues of self-determination for Islam adherents, including their political search, and attempts to gain a powerful voice in the most important political events. The article analyzes such aspects of American Muslims life as, interaction with representatives of other faiths, discrimination and Islamophobia, and the Islamic religious worldview of black Muslims. The author focuses on problematic discourse. Using methods of analysis, deduction, as well as methods of included observation, the author shows a modern picture of American Muslim life, and also makes important conclusions and predictions regarding their future in a rapidly changing multicultural American society.
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Pratama, Rifka. "MODERATE ISLAM AND ITS RELEVANCE IN THE POST 9/11 AMERICA AS IMPLIED IN IMAM FEISAL ABDUL RAUF’S MOVING". Rubikon : Journal of Transnational American Studies 3, n.º 2 (18 de julio de 2019): 60. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/rubikon.v3i2.34270.
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American Muslim is one of some existing religious minorities in America. Despite of minority, this religious group has been long, some believed it has been even since the Columbus exploration, living in the country. As time goes, the American Muslims are able to blend with American Society. These Muslim individuals are found in many fields of life of American, such as social, economic, education, and even politics in America. This condition is anyway worth appreciating as the struggle of American Muslims for their existence is not something simple and easy. Apart from the reality, the deadly attacks of 9/11, to some extent, has put American Muslims to be objects of suspicions. Soon after the tragedy, Muslims in many occasions are prejudiced as harsh, and of course, terrorists. These suspicions and prejudice have been, in fact, long found in the middle of American society pre-9/11 attacks. However, the tragedy aggravates the status quo of the American Muslims and it soon creates the worst point of so-called Islamophobia. In response to this phenomenon, many American Muslims start to deliver counters in various ways and media. Among the American Muslim figures, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, an American Muslim activist and leader, actively brushes off the bad images of Islam, especially regarding the 9/11 tragedy. Through his book entitled “Moving the Mountain: beyond Ground Zero to a New Vision of Islam in America”, Rauf explains his views on Islam. This book also implies counters to the so-called phenomena of Islamophobia. On the other hand, Moderate Islam contains the same spirits with Rauf’s Moving the Mountain. It offers the spirit of moderation in understanding and practicing Islam. Both the ideas in turn are able to counter Islamophobia in America, especially in post 9/11 America.Keyword: American Muslims, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, Moving the Mountain,Islamophobia, Moderate Islam
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Barreto, Matt A. y Dino N. Bozonelos. "Democrat, Republican, or None of the Above? The Role of Religiosity in Muslim American Party Identification". Politics and Religion 2, n.º 2 (14 de abril de 2009): 200–229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048309000200.
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AbstractThe role of religiosity as an important predictor of partisan identification has been well researched over the years, with most of our understanding of religion focused on Christianity. However, it is not clear that religiosity operates equally for the partisan identification of non-Christian religious groups. One of the most discussed religious minority groups in the United States today is Muslim-Americans. Numbering between 2.3 million and 7 million, Muslim-Americans have been the focus of considerable debate regarding religion and American political inclusion. We argue that religiosity does influence Muslim-American party identification, however not in the same manner as with other groups. While the two major political parties encourage religiosity among Protestants, Jews, and Catholics, they are either silent or opposed to religiosity among Muslims within their parties. Thus, religiosity among Muslim-Americans may not necessarily lead to partisan identification with either Republicans or Democrats. Rather, high levels of religiosity, coupled with perceptions of discrimination against Muslims, may lead many to oppose both major political parties and instead identify with “none of the above.” This is not to say that Muslim-Americans reject civic engagement or political participation in the United States, but rather the two political parties have not carved out a space to welcome Islam, as they have for Christianity and Judaism. We examine new data from the 2007 Muslim-American Public Opinion Survey to assess the predictors of partisan identification among Muslims in the United States.
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Karataş, İbrahim. "Turks and Other Muslims in the US: An Analysis of Perceptions". Journal of Al-Tamaddun 16, n.º 1 (29 de junio de 2021): 99–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/jat.vol16no1.7.
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Surveys show that, in the United States, Americans have a less favorable view of Muslims due to various reasons as opposed to American Muslims who conversely favor the American state and population. In line with this fact, this study tries to understand whether the Turkish community living in the US has different views about Americans than American Muslims do. This study makes a comparison because not all ethnic groups in the American Muslim community have the same views about Americans. While analyzing the Turkish community’s perceptions, this study also analyzes the views Americans and Muslim Americans have towards each other. The study compares previous surveys with the survey conducted among Turks living in the US and concludes that Muslims generally have the same perceptions regarding Americans. It also reveals that aside from the basic reasons which result in a negative view towards Muslims, being a small community and fragmented are two significant factors that damage the image of Muslims. In addition, it reveals that a lack of knowledge about each other increases negative perceptions.
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Fatima, Saba. "Muslim‐American Scripts". Hypatia 28, n.º 2 (2013): 341–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12020.
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This paper argues that one of the most valuable insights that Muslim‐Americans ought to bring into the political arena is our affective response to the government of the United States' internal and foreign policies regarding Muslims. I posit the concept of empathy as one such response that ought to inform our foreign policy in a manner inclusive of Muslim‐Americans. The scope of our epistemic privilege encompasses the affective response that crosses borders of the nation‐state in virtue of our propinquity to the narratives of Muslims globally. Such an affective response is crucial to our selves remaining multiplicitous and whole. Furthermore, I argue that we ought to access and assess those aspects of our identity that make us subject to suspicions of disloyalty, because it is precisely those aspects that can inform our social and political discourse in a more morally adequate and responsive way.
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Jan, Abid Ullah. "Moderate Islam". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.467.
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The Debate
Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.
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Jan, Abid Ullah. "Moderate Islam". American Journal of Islam and Society 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.467.
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The Debate
Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.
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Bin Abdullah, Omer. "Reflecting on Islam in America". American Journal of Islam and Society 19, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2002): 154–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v19i3.1936.
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"The strength of America is in its diversity, and this diversity includes theIslamic component, which is part of the American mainstream now." Soproclaimed ISNA secretary general Sayyid M. Syeed while inauguratingthe sixth annual ISNA Islam in America Conference, which is now part ofthe American academic calendar.Held in Chicago on July 5-7, four conferences were featured: Islam inAmerica, Islam among Latino Americans, Islam in American Prisons, andMuslim Refugee Resettlement in America. The mainstream American mediawas there in full to cover these events.l n his inaugural address, Syeed said that Muslims must continue toshape their public identity as they further integrate into mainstreamAmerican society. He added that while public perceptions about Muslimsand Islam have improved over the last 30 years, there is still work to bedone. He stated that ISNA will continue to serve Muslim Americans andpromote understanding among all Americans, and that INSA has receiveda federal faith-based initiative grant for a project.Mary Ann Peters, American ambassador to Bangladesh, remarked inher keynote address that America derives its strength from diversity andstressed that there is no acceptable level of intolerance in America. Sheinformed the audience that she had reached out to over 2,000 Bangladeshireligious leaders to promote womens' rights in their country, and that promoting democracy overseas serves American interests. She would like tosee better relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries, and mentionedthat the American government has accepted her suggestion of regularexchanges of religious scholars between the two countries.Shaikh Hamza Yusuf focused on the Prophet's conduct and remindedeveryone that he never repaid persecution, insults, or injury with anger orin kind. Addressing the mainstream media's treatment of Muslims, Yusufsaid that instead of simply criticizing the media, Muslims must form anorganization similar to the Anti-Defamation League that could correct andinform their detractors. Dr. David Schwartz, another keynote speaker whorecently retired as religious services administrator for the Federal Bureau ofPrisons, said that Islam is a positive element in inmates' lives. He vehementlyrejected the insinuation that American prisons are being used as ...
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BLAYDES, LISA y DREW A. LINZER. "Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World". American Political Science Review 106, n.º 2 (mayo de 2012): 225–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000135.
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The battle for public opinion in the Islamic world is an ongoing priority for U.S. diplomacy. The current debate over why many Muslims hold anti-American views revolves around whether they dislike fundamental aspects of American culture and government, or what Americans do in international affairs. We argue, instead, that Muslim anti-Americanism is predominantly a domestic, elite-led phenomenon that intensifies when there is greater competition between Islamist and secular-nationalist political factions within a country. Although more observant Muslims tend to be more anti-American, paradoxically the most anti-American countries are those in which Muslim populations are less religious overall, and thus more divided on the religious–secular issue dimension. We provide case study evidence consistent with this explanation, as well as a multilevel statistical analysis of public opinion data from nearly 13,000 Muslim respondents in 21 countries.
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Hotham, Matthew. "Affect, Animality, and Islamophobia". Bulletin for the Study of Religion 46, n.º 3-4 (21 de diciembre de 2017): 25–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/bsor.33901.
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American internet Islamophobia is fascinated with Muslim attitudes towards animals – especially pigs. Through an examination of internet memes found on right-wing and white supremacist websites and social media groups, this essay argues that affective relations to certain animals are part of what mark the Muslim as other and worthy of hate in American Islamophobic rhetoric. More importantly, this Islamophobic pig imagery, which often mischaracterizes or willfully misrepresents Muslim dietary restrictions, reveals that Islamophobic internet memes are not primarily aimed at Muslims nor are they first and foremost an expression of fear of Islam. Instead this Islamophobic rhetoric takes the form of an inside joke, affectively linking those who are “in” on the joke, uniting them in a jovial transgression of “politically correct" norms. This form of Islamophobia might be better termed “Islamophobophilia,” since it marks some Americans as insiders and others as outsiders. It is a method for non-Muslim Americans to signal to other other non-Muslim Americans that they are the right kind of American.
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Shuayb, Fiaz. "Bridging the Divide?" American Journal of Islam and Society 23, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2006): 144–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v23i1.1661.
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On January 9, 2006, in Washington, DC, the Saban Center for Middle EastPolicy at the Brookings Institution hosted the highest level meeting betweenthe Bush administration and the American Muslim community. Entitled “Bridging the Divide?” and organized by the Brookings Project on USPolicy toward the Islamic World, representatives of various Muslim organizationwere granted the opportunity to interface with C. David Welch, theAssistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. The conference,a follow-up to previous initiatives on “Bridging the Divide” theme, soughtto bring together key leaders and specialists “to explore the potential spacefor the American Muslim community to assist and advance US policytowards the Islamic world and capabilities within the community that mightbe better tapped.” In attendance were representatives from the Americangovernment, officials from a variety of American Muslim organizations,American Muslim foreign policy experts, others from the Washington thinktankand policy communities, and students.In the opening speech, Welch acknowledged several unique characteristicsabout the American Muslim community: its integration into Americancivic life; being Americans as well as Muslims; and, despite post-9/11 tensions,steering a moderate course while confronting extremist Islamist tendencies.As evidence, he cited the Fiqh Council of North America’s recentfatwa against Islamic terrorism that was endorsed by major Muslim organizations.He recognized that American Muslims can play an exceptional rolein explaining the American position, given their cultural, linguistic, and ethnicties with the Islamic world, and acknowledged the history of conflictbetween the United States and the Muslim world. In addition, he condemnedthe seeming “civilizational strife” between Islam and the West as a pointless“jihad/crusade.” He stated that he was more comfortable with the relationshipof the United States with the Muslim – especially Arab – world as beingdefined by a dialog stressing the commonalities of belief in God, virtue,family life, and socioeconomic justice ...
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Lizzio, Celene Ayat. "Finding Mecca in America". American Journal of Islam and Society 30, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2013): 103–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v30i2.1130.
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The notion that Islam is “Becoming an American Religion” may be unnervingto those who see America’s roots in its Christian, and more recentlyJudeo-Christian, heritage. Yet, given the rate of growth and development ofAmerican Muslim institutions and social networks, it may be more apt tospeak of Islam as part of an American multireligious heritage. In FindingMecca in America: How Islam is Becoming an American Religion, MuchitBilici explores the rapid increase of American Muslim educational, cultural,religious, and civic institutions, as well as how September 11, the so-calledwar on terror, and most recently media coverage of the Arab Spring have givenAmerican Muslims a unique visibility in the American public sphere.Bilici demonstrates how multifarious individuals and coalitions havebanded together to counter negative public sentiments toward Islam and Muslims,to advocate for legal protections against discrimination, and to help fashiona cultural and religious niche for the community’s faith, practices, andpresence. Even as public narratives about Muslims tend to emphasize “elementsof chaos, instability, and danger,” sympathetic representations of AmericanMuslims as “next-door neighbors” or “decent Americans struggling fortheir civil rights and in need of empathy, understanding and respect” are becomingmore prevalent in major media venues from National Public Radioto the New York Times (p. 3). In turn, Muslims are demonstrating their collectiveabilities to define authentically American identities through social andpolitical activism, forms of strategic public outreach, even ethnic comedy ...
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Chouhoud, Youssef, Karam Dana y Matt Barreto. "American Muslim Political Participation: Between Diversity and Cohesion". Politics and Religion 12, n.º 4 (15 de febrero de 2019): 736–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048318000858.
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AbstractAmerican Muslims’ increased societal salience has led to greater scrutiny of their political and social attitudes. Yet, systematic analyses of this population remain rare and tend to aggregate findings at a level that masks the community's diverse backgrounds and experiences. As a partial corrective, our paper provides a comprehensive demographic analysis of American Muslim political participation. Our conclusions, first, complement previous efforts to elaborate the influence of minority status on the core determinants of political participation. Second, they highlight the differential impact of these determinants within key American Muslim demographic subgroups, revealing the moderating effects of denomination, racial or ethnic background, and gender. As scholars and practitioners seek to better understand Muslims in America, our research suggests that there are myriad circumstances when this community's presumed cohesion gives way to meaningfully diverse perspectives and behaviors.
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Hussain, S. Mazhar. "International Conference on Muslim Minority /Majority Relations". American Journal of Islam and Society 7, n.º 1 (1 de marzo de 1990): 99–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v7i1.2673.
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The International Conference on Muslim Minority/Majority Relations held in New York, Rabi' al Awwal 23-25, 1410/0ctober 24 to 26, 1989 brought to the fore some of the little known but significantly major problems faced by the Muslim minority communities in many parts of the world. The magnitude of the problem can be seen from the fact that the Muslim minorities form one-third of the world Muslim population, over 300 million out of an estimated one billion Muslims. The three day conference was divided into different areas of concern. Over 50 papers were presented. Among the topics discussed were: North American Arab Muslims, an Intellectual and Attitudinal Profile of the Muslim Community in North America; Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations in America; Economic Development of Indian Muslims, Issues and Problems; The Turks in Bulgaria; South Africa: The Role of a Muslim Minority in a Situation of Change; The Islamic Minorities in Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique; Muslim/Christian Relations in Sudan; Muslim Women in an Alien Society: A Case Study in West Germany; Muslims in Britain: Some Recent Developments; Muslim Minorities and non-Muslim Party Politics in the Netherlands; Muslim Minorities in the Soviet Union, China, Australia, Sri Lanka, Tibet, Philippines, Thailand and other areas.
The first day of the conference was devoted to North America, Asia and Africa. In the session on North America, Dr. Ni'mat Barazangi highlighted the fact that the process of adjustment and integration of Muslims in America had its own challenges. On the one hand, the immigrant Muslims realize the need to maintain their religious and cultural identity, and, on the other, it is not easy, or even practical, to stay away from the mainstream of the majority culture and its impact ...
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Mohmand, Abdul-Qayum. "AMSS Regional Conference". American Journal of Islam and Society 20, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2003): 146–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v20i2.1871.
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On April 12, 2003, the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), incollaboration with the Muslim Students' Association (MSA) of theUniversity of Utah, held its first regional conference in Salt Lake City,Utah. The day-long conference, "The Place of.Islam in America," includedpanel discussions and workshops. The first panel dealt with "Images andPerceptions of Islam in America," and the second panel focused on "TheEmerging Muslim Community: Opportunities and Challenges." Toward theend of the program, both the panelists and the audience participated in threeworkshops: "Challenges of Raising a Muslim Child," "Examining the UtahMuslim Community," and "Muslim Youths Dealing with Temptations andPeer Pressure." Louay Safi (president, AMSS) and Sayyid M. Syeed (generalsecretary, ISNA) gave the two keynote addresses.At the beginning of the conference, Abdul-Qayum Mohmand, programcoordinator, welcomed the panelists and the guests and stated that: "Sincethe Muslim community is part of the social and political construct of thissociety and contributes to the build up of this society in many aspects, it isvital for them to find out where they are placed in this society."In his opening remarks, Safi talked about the importance of the Muslims'political and social positioning in the United Stated and pointed out that"American Muslims have a great opportunity to develop Islamic thought andinstitutions for modern-day society." He stressed that "faced with new socialchallenges stemming from modernist trends, American Muslims possess aUthe ingredients they need to develop solutions with far-reaching impact onimproving the quality of life both in the U.S. and throughout the Muslimworld." He expressed confidence that the conference deliberations are part ofthe Muslim American struggle to better the human condition.In the first panel, James Toronto (associate professor oflslamic studies,Brigham Young University, Utah) focused on the challenges and responsi bilitiesof the American Muslim community. Calling upon its members to ...
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Perkins, Alisa. "Muslims at the American Vigil". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 36, n.º 4 (7 de octubre de 2019): 26–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v36i4.547.
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The 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting at a gay dance club in Florida fomented a surge in Islamophobia, as pundits blamed the perpetrator’s Muslim identity for his hateful act. In the aftermath of the violence, vigils across the United States offered forums for Muslim American and other groups to publically express their shared grief and to address homophobia and Islamophobia together. The people affected most intensely by the tragedy were LGBTQ Muslims, who were simultaneously subjected to both intensified homophobia and Islamophobia in the wake of the shooting. This local ethnographic study of Orlando vigils in Michigan examines how the Orlando aftermath encouraged debate about the issue of LGBTQ Muslim visibility and conversation about the potential for Muslim civic leaders and mosque leaders to serve as their allies. During the Orlando vigils, LGBTQ Muslims, allies, and faith leaders drew on, negotiated, and/or resisted various repertoires of mourning and advocacy. Their responses to the Orlando moment provide valuable information about how connections among faith, sexuality, race, and protest are shaping the emergence of LGBTQ Muslim visibilities in the United States today.
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Perkins, Alisa. "Muslims at the American Vigil". American Journal of Islam and Society 36, n.º 4 (7 de octubre de 2019): 26–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v36i4.547.
Texto completoResumen
The 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting at a gay dance club in Florida fomented a surge in Islamophobia, as pundits blamed the perpetrator’s Muslim identity for his hateful act. In the aftermath of the violence, vigils across the United States offered forums for Muslim American and other groups to publically express their shared grief and to address homophobia and Islamophobia together. The people affected most intensely by the tragedy were LGBTQ Muslims, who were simultaneously subjected to both intensified homophobia and Islamophobia in the wake of the shooting. This local ethnographic study of Orlando vigils in Michigan examines how the Orlando aftermath encouraged debate about the issue of LGBTQ Muslim visibility and conversation about the potential for Muslim civic leaders and mosque leaders to serve as their allies. During the Orlando vigils, LGBTQ Muslims, allies, and faith leaders drew on, negotiated, and/or resisted various repertoires of mourning and advocacy. Their responses to the Orlando moment provide valuable information about how connections among faith, sexuality, race, and protest are shaping the emergence of LGBTQ Muslim visibilities in the United States today.
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Dana, Karam, Bryan Wilcox-Archuleta y Matt Barreto. "The Political Incorporation of Muslims in the United States: The Mobilizing Role of Religiosity in Islam". Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics 2, n.º 2 (14 de agosto de 2017): 170–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/rep.2017.4.
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AbstractDespite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, popular perceptions in the United States, especially among political elites, continue to believe that religious Muslims oppose American democratic traditions and values. While many studies find positive relationships between mosque attendance and civic participation among U.S. Muslims, an empirical and theoretical puzzle continues to exist. What is missing is research that examines the relationships between the multi-dimensional concept of religiosity and how this is associated with public opinion and attitudes towards the American political system among Muslim Americans. Using a unique national survey of Muslim Americans, we find a positive relationship between religious beliefs, behavior, and belonging and perceptions of compatibility with American democratic traditions. Quite simply, the most religious are the most likely to believe in political integration in the United States.
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Fuller, Graham E. "Freedom and Security". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 21–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.466.
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The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
GEF: Who is a moderate Muslim? That depends on whom you ask and what that person’s (or government’s) agenda is. Moderate is also a quite relative term, understood differently by different people. For our purposes here, let’s examine two basically different approaches to this question: an American view and a Middle Eastern view of what characterizes a moderate Muslim. Most non-Muslims would probably define a moderate Muslim as anyone who believes in democracy, tolerance, a non-violent approach to politics, and equitable treatment of women at the legal and social levels. Today, the American government functionally adds several more criteria: Amoderate Muslim is one who does not oppose the country’s strategic and geopolitical ambitions in the world, who accepts American interests and preferences within the world order, who believes that Islam has no role in politics, and who avoids any confrontation – even political – with Israel. There are deep internal contradictions and warring priorities within the American approach to the Muslim world. While democratization and “freedom” is the Bush administration’s self-proclaimed global ideological goal, the reality is that American demands for security and the war against terror take priority over the democratization agenda every time. Democratization becomes a punishment visited upon American enemies rather than a gift bestowed upon friends. Friendly tyrants take priority over those less cooperative moderate and democratic Muslims who do not acquiesce to the American agenda in the Muslim world. Within the United States itself, the immense domestic power of hardline pro-Likud lobbies and the Israel-firsters set the agenda on virtually all discourse concerning the Muslim world and Israel. This group has generally succeeded in excluding from the public dialogue most Muslim (or even non-Muslim) voices that are at all critical of Israel’s policies. This de facto litmus test raises dramatically the threshold for those who might represent an acceptable moderate Muslim interlocutor. The reality is that there is hardly a single prominent figure in the Muslim world who has not at some point voiced anger at Israeli policies against the Palestinians and who has not expressed ambivalence toward armed resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. Thus, few Muslim leaders enjoying public legitimacy in the Muslim world can meet this criterion these days in order to gain entry to the United States to participate in policy discussions. In short, moderate Muslimis subject to an unrealistic litmus test regarding views on Israel that functionally excludes the great majority of serious voices representative of genuine Muslim thinkers in the Middle East who are potential interlocutors. There is no reason to believe that this political framework will change in the United States anytime soon. In my view, a moderate Muslim is one who is open to the idea of evolutionary change through history in the understanding and practice of Islam, one who shuns literalism and selectivism in the understanding of sacred texts. Amoderate would reject the idea that any one group or individual has a monopoly on defining Islam and would seek to emphasize common ground with other faiths, rather than accentuate the differences. Amoderate would try to seek within Islam the roots of those political and social values that are broadly consonant with most of the general values of the rest of the contemporary world. A moderate Muslim would not reject the validity of other faiths. Against the realities of the contemporary Middle East, a moderate Muslim would broadly eschew violence as a means of settling political issues, but still might not condemn all aspects of political violence against state authorities who occupy Muslim lands by force – such as Russia in Chechnya, the Israeli state in the Palestine, or even American occupation forces in Iraq. Yet even here, in principle, a moderate must reject attacks against civilians, women, and children in any struggle for national liberation. Moderates would be open to cooperation with the West and the United States, but not at the expense of their own independence and sovereignty.
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Fuller, Graham E. "Freedom and Security". American Journal of Islam and Society 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 21–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.466.
Texto completoResumen
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
GEF: Who is a moderate Muslim? That depends on whom you ask and what that person’s (or government’s) agenda is. Moderate is also a quite relative term, understood differently by different people. For our purposes here, let’s examine two basically different approaches to this question: an American view and a Middle Eastern view of what characterizes a moderate Muslim. Most non-Muslims would probably define a moderate Muslim as anyone who believes in democracy, tolerance, a non-violent approach to politics, and equitable treatment of women at the legal and social levels. Today, the American government functionally adds several more criteria: Amoderate Muslim is one who does not oppose the country’s strategic and geopolitical ambitions in the world, who accepts American interests and preferences within the world order, who believes that Islam has no role in politics, and who avoids any confrontation – even political – with Israel. There are deep internal contradictions and warring priorities within the American approach to the Muslim world. While democratization and “freedom” is the Bush administration’s self-proclaimed global ideological goal, the reality is that American demands for security and the war against terror take priority over the democratization agenda every time. Democratization becomes a punishment visited upon American enemies rather than a gift bestowed upon friends. Friendly tyrants take priority over those less cooperative moderate and democratic Muslims who do not acquiesce to the American agenda in the Muslim world. Within the United States itself, the immense domestic power of hardline pro-Likud lobbies and the Israel-firsters set the agenda on virtually all discourse concerning the Muslim world and Israel. This group has generally succeeded in excluding from the public dialogue most Muslim (or even non-Muslim) voices that are at all critical of Israel’s policies. This de facto litmus test raises dramatically the threshold for those who might represent an acceptable moderate Muslim interlocutor. The reality is that there is hardly a single prominent figure in the Muslim world who has not at some point voiced anger at Israeli policies against the Palestinians and who has not expressed ambivalence toward armed resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. Thus, few Muslim leaders enjoying public legitimacy in the Muslim world can meet this criterion these days in order to gain entry to the United States to participate in policy discussions. In short, moderate Muslimis subject to an unrealistic litmus test regarding views on Israel that functionally excludes the great majority of serious voices representative of genuine Muslim thinkers in the Middle East who are potential interlocutors. There is no reason to believe that this political framework will change in the United States anytime soon. In my view, a moderate Muslim is one who is open to the idea of evolutionary change through history in the understanding and practice of Islam, one who shuns literalism and selectivism in the understanding of sacred texts. Amoderate would reject the idea that any one group or individual has a monopoly on defining Islam and would seek to emphasize common ground with other faiths, rather than accentuate the differences. Amoderate would try to seek within Islam the roots of those political and social values that are broadly consonant with most of the general values of the rest of the contemporary world. A moderate Muslim would not reject the validity of other faiths. Against the realities of the contemporary Middle East, a moderate Muslim would broadly eschew violence as a means of settling political issues, but still might not condemn all aspects of political violence against state authorities who occupy Muslim lands by force – such as Russia in Chechnya, the Israeli state in the Palestine, or even American occupation forces in Iraq. Yet even here, in principle, a moderate must reject attacks against civilians, women, and children in any struggle for national liberation. Moderates would be open to cooperation with the West and the United States, but not at the expense of their own independence and sovereignty.
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Hashem, Mazen. "Muslim Families in North America". American Journal of Islam and Society 10, n.º 3 (1 de octubre de 1993): 415–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v10i3.2498.
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The writers contributing their researaches to this book deal with anare8 that has not yet been adequately studied. Most of the litemhue onMuslims is historically or politically oriented and views immigrant Muslimsin North America as extensions of their homelands, in particular theMiddle East. This book discusses Muslim families as part of the pluralsticand ever-changjng social fabric of the United States and Canada. Thefamilies of African-American Muslims and Muslim converts are notstudied. We are going to present our critique chapter by chapter.Muslim Normative 'I).aditions and the North American Environment(Sharon Mclrvin Abu-Laban).The clear and workable typology of Muslim immigrant families presentedhere points out major social patterns and links to Islam. They aredivided into three cohorts based on "the dynamic interaction between socialconditions and group characteristics" @. 7): pioneer (nineteenth centuryto WWII); transitional (post-WWII to 1967); and differential (1968to ptesent). Different generations within each cohort are exarnined.African-American Muslims are excluded, as their case is unique.The fitst cohort lived in an era of total conformity to a socioculturalmilieu dominated by the English language and Christianity. This cohort'ssecond generation assumed a more conformist role due to its disadvantagedsocial status, distance from its original home and culture, and lackof financial resou~easn d ethnic institutions. Intermarriagew ith the widersociety was high. Ironically, all of this "generated the particular disdainof the newest Muslim immigrants," who arrived after 1976 @. 18).The transitional cohort consists mainly of foreign students from wellestablishedindigenous elite families who had been Europeanized beforetheir arrival. As a postcolonial generation, they saw nationalism, not religion,as a valuable means for development and social change. They intermarriedwith North Americans at a higher rate than their predecessors.The second generation of this cohort, along with the third generation ofthe pioneers, experienced the most discrimination and media stereotyping ...
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Hashemi, Manata. "Journey into America". American Journal of Islam and Society 28, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2011): 126–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v28i2.1257.
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Akbar Ahmed’s latest book, Journey into America: The Challenge of Islam,has become one of the first comprehensive ethnographic studies of theMuslim community in America. Ahmed and his team of young researchersoffer a keen anthropological analysis of American Muslims that spans overseventy-five cities, one hundred mosques, and two thousand interviews.A modern-day version of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America,Journey into America charts the various historical, social, and ideologicaltrajectories that have shaped both American and Muslim identities. Assuch, the work represents one of the first post-9/11 sociological commentariesthat attempt to define the nature of American Muslim identity and thepossibilities for its reevaluation. Over the course of nine chapters, Ahmedlays out for a general audience the groundwork for precisely such anendeavor ...
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Gotanda, Neil. "The Racialization of Islam in American Law". ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 637, n.º 1 (25 de julio de 2011): 184–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716211408525.
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After 9/11, the “Muslim terrorist” trope altered the American understanding of Islam. This article argues that the Muslim terrorist in our popular culture should not be seen as new but within an established tradition of racializing Asian Americans. The article employs three dimensions of racialization: raced body, racial category, and ascribed subordination. The raced body is the “brown” body of immigrants and descendants of immigrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southern Asia. “Muslim” as a racial category has acquired meaning beyond religion and now also describes a racial category: those whose ancestry traces to countries where Islam is significant. Linked to that category are the stereotypes of “terrorist,” “spy,” or “saboteur”—understandings within the tradition of characterizing Asian Americans as permanent, unassimilable foreigners. Inscribing the linked racial category and ascribed subordination of permanent foreignness upon the “brown” raced body is the racialization of Muslims into Muslim terrorists.
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Robinson, Rebecca S. "Sexuality, Difference, and American Hijabi Bloggers". HAWWA 13, n.º 3 (15 de octubre de 2015): 383–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15692086-12341289.
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This article uses qualitative content analysis to explore some themes associated with perspectives on sexuality and multicultural difference on American hijabi fashion blogs. These themes include tensions within the community, the American Muslim identity and Muslim women’s purposes for veiling and blogging about fashion. This paper frames the American hijabi fashion community as a counterculture movement that focuses on Islamically based objections to the commodification of women’s sexuality in the mainstream fashion and media industries. It also discusses disagreements within Muslim communities such as conceptualizations of awrah and hijab, the connections between veiling and empowerment, the tolerance of the American society and perspectives on the modern-traditional binary. The paper concludes with a discussion of how socioeconomic factors may allow “safe Muslims” such as hijabi fashion bloggers to assimilate into mainstream culture while excluding working class Muslims and how the hijab could create barriers to inclusion within Muslim communities.
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Khattab, Huda. "Islam Our Choice". American Journal of Islam and Society 21, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2004): 117–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i2.1800.
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This book is a delightful read. The somewhat unoriginal title (compilationsof conversion accounts under the title Islam Our Choice have been aroundfor several decades, including stories that date back to the mid-twentiethcentury) belies the original and unique stories told within. However, thesewords might be rather startling for many non-Muslims, and thus piquetheir curiosity enough to pick up the book and inquire further.Islam Our Choice, aimed primarily at non-Muslim Americans, tellsthe stories of fellow Americans who have chosen to follow a different pathbut who are still Americans. The authors express the hope that “each non-Muslim American reader will probably be able to relate to and identifywith the pre-Muslim background of at least one of the authors” (p. 2). Theinclusion of family photos and illustrations adds to the book’s visualappeal and shows the contributors as ordinary Americans who are at homewith their new identity as Muslims.Although the contributors cover a wide range of geographical locations,levels of education, and career paths, their ethnic and religious backgroundscover a narrower range. Most of the respondents were former Christians ofvarying denominations, and most are white; one African-American womanalso contributed her story. It is now well known that there are Jewish,Latinos/Latinas, and Native American converts, and, hopefully, their storieswill be told in the near future in order to present a fuller picture of how Islamis reaching all sections of American society.The book opens with a brief overview of Islamic faith and practice, Islamin America, and a comparison between the position of women in modernAmerica and in Islam. This sets the scene, as it were, for readers who may beunfamiliar with the Muslim world and with Muslim communities in the West.Written according to the introduction’s general outline, each chapterrelates the story of an American woman who has come to Islam. All contributorsoffer insight into their childhood worlds, whether they were cozyand relatively uneventful, or dogged by poverty and such family troublesas alcoholism. Debra L. Dirks introduces the Mennonite culture fromwhich her family comes, and Khadijah R. Beruni sheds light on the twoworlds of her childhood in an extended African-American family: living ...
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Gerteis, Joseph, Douglas Hartmann y Penny Edgell. "Racial, Religious, and Civic Dimensions of Anti-Muslim Sentiment in America". Social Problems 67, n.º 4 (17 de octubre de 2019): 719–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spz039.
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Abstract This paper examines anti-Muslim sentiment in America. Existing research has documented rising hostility to Muslims in Western countries, but has been much less clear about what drives such sentiments or exactly what sort of “other” Muslims are understood to be. Our interest is in the cultural construction of Muslims as a problematic or incompatible “other.” We explore the extent, content, and correlates of such views. Building from recent work in critical race theory and the study of cultural boundaries in national belonging, we argue that Muslims are distinct in being culturally excluded on religious, racial, and civic grounds at the same time. Using nationally representative survey data with specially designed measures on views of Muslims and other groups, we show that nearly half of Americans embrace some form of anti-Muslim sentiment, and that such views are systematically correlated with social location and with understandings of the nature of American belonging.
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Khan, Mohsin, Hamedi Adnan, Surinderpal Kaur, Rashid Khuhro, Rohail Asghar y Sahira Jabeen. "Muslims’ Representation in Donald Trump’s Anti-Muslim-Islam Statement: A Critical Discourse Analysis". Religions 10, n.º 2 (17 de febrero de 2019): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10020115.
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The Muslim community in America has been facing turmoil, particularly after the events of 9/11. Muslims are facing a number of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discriminatory practices, biases, and sentiments from many Americans. These religious prejudices are apparent at the public and political leadership levels, as well as other facets of the country. The current study has concentrated on Trump’s emerging ideology that positions him within anti-Islamic and anti- Muslim discourses since he announced his candidature for the presidency. The study aims to examine and pin point the self-other representations that are evident in the Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments in Trump’s statements during the American Presidential Elections of 2016. In order to examine Trump’s prejudicial discourse, the research engaged with Critical Discourse Studies as its framework, with a specific focus upon Van Dijk’s Ideological Square Model as well as NVIVO 12 Pro for linguistic inquiry. The results showed that the self-other binary is strongly evidenced in Trump’s statements and that he employed various discursive techniques to represent Islam and Muslims in a negative manner, while representing himself as very patriotic to the country. To legitimatize his arguments, he deployed several rhetoric strategies, including victimization, presupposition, authority, number game, evidentiality, polarization, and populism. Keeping the religious and economic context in view, the research reveals that Donald Trump has represented Islam and Muslims as a negative phenomenon and presented himself as an Islamophobe by negatively targeting Islamic components, like Shariah and Jihad. In his prejudicial representation of Islam, most of the Islamic beliefs are represented as anti-women and anti-American, threatening the security of America and its very way of life.
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Prickett, Pamela. "Complexity Beyond Intersections: Race, Class, and Neighborhood Disadvantage among African American Muslims". Social Inclusion 6, n.º 2 (22 de junio de 2018): 98–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/si.v6i2.1416.
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This study uses the case of African American Muslims to examine the intersection of religious inequality with other forms of disadvantage. It draws on more than six years of ethnographic and historical research in an African American Muslim community in a poor neighborhood in Los Angeles, comparing the experiences of community members with existing research on first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants. It addresses the three most prominent axes of difference between African American and immigrant Muslims—race/ethnicity, class, and neighborhood disadvantage—to explicate the ways in which religion may compound existing inequalities, or in some cases create new forms of difference. It also shows how identifying as native-born Americans allows African American Muslims to claim religion as a cultural advantage in certain situations. Religion is complex not only when different forms of inequality intersect but when these intersections create a different way of understanding what religion means for people of faith.
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Hussain, Amir. "Muslim Americans in the Military". American Journal of Islam and Society 35, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2018): 117–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v35i1.820.
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Edward E. Curtis IV is one of the most important scholars of Islam in theUnited States. This slim volume is a welcome addition to his work, andshould be required reading for all who are interested in the place of Muslimswithin the history of America. One also wishes that the book be readwidely by American Muslims. As the latter day prophet, Bob Marley, oncesang about other soldiers in the Americas, “If you know your history/ Then you would know where you’re coming from.” Curtis’ book helps us, asAmerican Muslims, to learn about our own history in our country.The book is not written for a specialized audience, and could easily beused by undergraduate or even senior high school students in a number ofcourses on Islam or religion in America. It is a very short volume, comingin at 82 pages of text with a single additional page of notes. The book is dividedinto five chapters of roughly equal length. The first chapter introducesthe contemporary issues of American Muslim soldiers in the United Statesarmed forces through the stories of Captain Humayun Khan and CorporalKareem Rashad Sultan Khan. Corporal Khan became widely known whena photo of his mother, Elsheba, cradling his gravestone was mentioned byGeneral Colin Powell in the 2008 election. Captain Khan’s introduction tothe American public was more recent, when his father, Khizr, spoke abouthis son’s sacrifice on the final night of the Democratic National Conventionin 2016 ...
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Bacchus, Nazreen S. "Resisting Islamophobia: Muslims Seeking American Integration Through Spiritual Growth, Community Organizing and Political Activism". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 36, n.º 4 (7 de octubre de 2019): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v36i4.548.
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Since 9/11, second-generation Muslims have experienced an increase in religious discrimination that has presented several challenges to their American integration. Scholars have noted that Muslims are often marginalized and “othered” because of their religious beliefs, attire choices and non-Western ethnic origins. In New York, Arabs, South Asians and Africans are the predominant ethnic groups practicing Islam. Although Muslim communities are ethnically and racially diverse, they are categorized in ways that have transformed their religious identity into a racialized group. This new form of racial amalgamation is not constructed on underlying skin color similarities but on their religious adherence to Islam. The War on Terror has complicated the image of Muslims by circulating Islamophobia, or the fear of Muslims and Islam, onto American society. Political rhetoric targeting Muslim communities has also incited new ways of misinterpreting Qur’anic text to further marginalize them. Second-generation Muslim Americans are responding to Islamophobia by reframing the negative depictions about their identities through community-based activism. This paper takes an intersectionality approach to understanding how Muslims across the New York metro area are managing their religious identities as they seek to develop a sense of belonging in American society. This ethnographic case study addresses how second-generation Muslims are resisting Islamophobia through community building, civic engagement, and college student associations. Countering Islamophobia has become part of the everyday life experience for Muslims in New York and is currently their main trajectory for integration into American society.
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Aziz, Diba Prajamitha. "AN IMAGE OF AMERICAN MUSLIMS THROUGH UPDIKE’S TERRORIST: A STUDY OF IDENTIFICATION AND REPRESENTATION". Rubikon : Journal of Transnational American Studies 2, n.º 2 (1 de septiembre de 2015): 14. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/rubikon.v2i2.34257.
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In the aftermath of September 9/11 tragedy, an image of Muslim dramatically becomes popular topic and object for the researchers. Although analyses for the most part tend to explain the image of Muslim in negative and stereotypical tendency, the wave of action that expresses positive image of Muslim has surfaced in American society. In that case, this thesis using a novel to see that social phenomena attempted to reveal that an image of American Muslims as represented by Ahmad Ashmawy Mulloy in Updike’s Terrorist contributed to endorse an image of Muslim neither as extremist nor as terrorist. To achieve its purpose, firstly this study employs theory of imaginary and symbolic identification from Jacques Lacan. This theory is used to explain the impact of fatherless background, the presence of surrogate father and the influence of another figure on Ahmad. Secondly focusing on an image of American Muslims, theory of representation from Hall is applied. His theory is as a bridge that Muslim can be constructed and represented in the novel. Furthermore, opinions about extremist and moderate Muslim are used to explain those images through characteristics such as thought, action and orientation. The result of the study reveals that the process of identification divides people whom Ahmad had interaction into category of Muslim and non-Muslim group. Muslim group teaches Islamic identity to Ahmad and non-Muslim group plays big role to influence Ahmad to integrate himself into American society. Due to those groups, an identity and image of Ahmad is always related to the other. Focusing on Ahmad’s representation as American Muslim, he shows that there are three images such as extremist, transitional and moderate. As a result, through depicting Ahmad as moderate Muslim, Muslim is not terrorist.Keywords: American Muslim, identification, representation, extremist Muslim, moderate Muslim
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Bacchus, Nazreen. "Resisting Islamophobia". American Journal of Islam and Society 36, n.º 4 (7 de octubre de 2019): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v36i4.548.
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Since 9/11, second-generation Muslims have experienced an increase in religious discrimination that has presented several challenges to their American integration. Scholars have noted that Muslims are often marginalized and “othered” because of their religious beliefs, attire choices and non-Western ethnic origins. In New York, Arabs, South Asians and Africans are the predominant ethnic groups practicing Islam. Although Muslim communities are ethnically and racially diverse, they are categorized in ways that have transformed their religious identity into a racialized group. This new form of racial amalgamation is not constructed on underlying skin color similarities but on their religious adherence to Islam. The War on Terror has complicated the image of Muslims by circulating Islamophobia, or the fear of Muslims and Islam, onto American society. Political rhetoric targeting Muslim communities has also incited new ways of misinterpreting Qur’anic text to further marginalize them. Second-generation Muslim Americans are responding to Islamophobia by reframing the negative depictions about their identities through community-based activism. This paper takes an intersectionality approach to understanding how Muslims across the New York metro area are managing their religious identities as they seek to develop a sense of belonging in American society. This ethnographic case study addresses how second-generation Muslims are resisting Islamophobia through community building, civic engagement, and college student associations. Countering Islamophobia has become part of the everyday life experience for Muslims in New York and is currently their main trajectory for integration into American society.
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Cury, Emily. "Contesting Islamophobia and Securing Collective Rights: Muslim American Advocacy in the 2016 Elections". Politics and Religion 12, n.º 4 (10 de septiembre de 2018): 710–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048318000469.
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AbstractThis paper examines how Muslim American advocacy organizations have responded to recent spikes in anti-Muslim discrimination, particularly in the context of the 2016 elections. It asks how Muslim American interest groups have helped frame and communicate the policy interests of U.S. Muslims and, consequently, the collective claims of the group on whose behalf they claim to speak. Relying on political ethnography as the main method of inquiry, I conduct in-depth participant observation, qualitative interviews with Muslim American leaders, and an analysis of primary documents and social media communication produced by Muslim American organizations. This data was collected between June 2016 and July 2017, and transcribed and coded using Nvivo. Through this analysis, I find that being targeted as “other” has driven Muslim advocacy organizations to rely on constituent empowerment strategies, mobilize in demand of Muslim American group rights, defend their constitutional rights, and claim their place as an American minority.
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Cury, Emily. "Muslim American Policy Advocacy and the Palestinian Israeli Conflict: Claims-making and the Pursuit of Group Rights". Politics and Religion 10, n.º 2 (27 de marzo de 2017): 417–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048317000062.
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AbstractSince the attacks of September 11, 2001, United States Muslims have been increasingly targeted as “others,” accused of holding dual-loyalties, and seen as potentially subversive. Nevertheless, Muslim American interest groups have not recoiled from foreign policy engagement. I argue that this is because mobilizing around symbolic foreign policy issues provides them with an opportunity to access the policy dialogue as a minority group making rights claims. To illustrate this argument, I conduct a discourse analysis of Muslim American policy engagement toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I rely on primary documents produced by the Council on American Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the two leading United States Muslims organizations, as well as interviews conducted with institutional elites. I find that, through their policy advocacy, these organizations are framing their demands around United States interests and minority group rights, while positioning themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Muslim American community.One of the most important issues to us is, of course, the Palestinian Israeli issue because this is central to what America is in the Middle East and the Muslim world.1—Salam Al-MarayatiAll I want from you, Mr. Policymaker is [for you] to listen to the other side of the story. I have a narrative that you didn't have a chance to hear, so let me give it to you and as-salamu alaykum [peace be upon you].2—Dr. Maher Hathout
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Kayaoglu, Turan. "Moving the Mountain". American Journal of Islam and Society 31, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2014): 127–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v31i1.1030.
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Few are as qualified as Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf to articulate a vision forAmerican Muslims. He has been involved with several major institutionbuildingprojects to address the concerns of American Muslims; his wife,Daisy Khan, has also participated in some of these projects. Since 1983, hehas served as imam of New York City’s al-Farah Mosque and thus is ratherfamiliar with the achievements, struggles, and diversity of the American-Muslim experience. His involvement with one of this community’s mostformative post-9/11 undertakings, the Cordoba House Project (also knownas Park 51 and the Ground Zero Mosque), attracted national and internationalattention.Several other American Muslims have written about the community. Forexample, James Yee’s For God and Country (2005), Sumbul Ali-Karamali’sThe Muslims Next Door (2008), and Asma Nomani’s Standing Alone in Mecca(2006) have experienced modest mainstream success. Mucahit Bilici’s FindingMecca in America (2012) is a notable, although a more academic, work.Imam Rauf’s book belongs to the first genre. Aimed at a general audience, itprovides a good understanding of such issues as jihad and gender relations inIslam, the Shari‘ah, and American-Muslim identity formation.Book Reviews 127The author’s key idea is that American Muslims are on their way to creatinga unique identity, one that is true to the spirit of Islam and also fits intoAmerican cultural norms. If fully realized, this identity would have threemajor potential benefits: making the United States more tolerant and just,healing the wounds between it and the broader Muslim world, and inspiringMuslims everywhere to reclaim Islam from the extremists. According toRauf, this identity can only be fully realized if Muslims have a good understandingof Islam, uphold American laws, and engage in the country’s ongoingmulti-faith projects ...
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Peterson, Kristin M. "Aesthetic Styles and the Occupation of Space in the “Places You’ll Pray” Photo Series". Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture 10, n.º 1 (6 de agosto de 2021): 115–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/21659214-bja10029.
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Abstract This paper analyzes a series of photographs that feature Muslim Americans praying in various public locations. In the “Places You’ll Pray” series, photographer Sana Ullah employs attractive settings along with framing, lighting, angle and colors to emphasize that the Islamic practice of prayer is not only an act that induces feelings of tranquility but also a beautiful practice that belongs within American public spaces. Through the policing of the sensory realm, the complex experiences of Muslims are generally over-simplified or made invisible in the media. This article explores how Muslim creators use aesthetics to shift the larger sensory realm of what is considered attractive, beautiful and valued in American society. As these photos circulate through social media and other digital spaces, Ullah and the photo subjects use the occupation of physical and digital spaces to assert that Muslim lives and Islamic values belong in the American landscape.
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Leonard, Karen. "American Muslim Politics". Ethnicities 3, n.º 2 (junio de 2003): 147–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468796803003002001.
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Bakalian, Anny y Mehdi Bozorgmehr. "Muslim American Mobilization". Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 14, n.º 1 (2005): 7–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/dsp.0.0004.
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Bakalian, Anny y Mehdi Bozorgmehr. "Muslim American Mobilization". Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 14, n.º 1 (marzo de 2005): 7–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/diaspora.14.1.7.
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During times of war or political crisis such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, minorities that share the same ethnic or religious background as the “enemy” of the state are subject to backlash. This backlash takes several forms. First, members of the majority population may engage in scapegoating of the targeted population (i.e., acts of intimidation, harassment, verbal abuse, and physical violence against persons and/or property). Extreme forms of such behavior (e.g., murder, arson) are categorized by law as “hate crimes.” Second, pre-existing, or newly created, negative stereotypes of the targeted group(s), propagated in the media, often fuel the actions of the hatemongers. Third, the state responds to perceived threats to the nation’s security and sovereignty by targeting members of the ethnic/religious group(s) for scrutiny and repression, allegedly because they constitute a fifth column, or have the potential to become a fifth column, within its borders. Government reprisals in American history have included internment, detention, deportation, mandatory identification cards, surveillance, and prosecution (Bozorgmehr and Bakalian, “Post-9/11”). While the state may not condone citizens’ vigilante actions, its own policies are likely to send a different message.
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Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.463.
Texto completoResumen
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.
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Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology". American Journal of Islam and Society 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.463.
Texto completoResumen
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.
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Abdelhadi, Eman. "Religiosity and Muslim Women’s Employment in the United States". Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 3 (1 de enero de 2017): 237802311772996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2378023117729969.
Texto completoResumen
Does Muslim women’s religiosity deter them from paid work outside the home? I extend this question to Muslims in the United States, where the Muslim community is both ethnically and socioeconomically diverse and where this question has not yet been answered. I pool data from the 2007 and 2011 Pew Research Center surveys of American Muslims, the only large, nationally representative samples of Muslims in the United States, and use logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between religiosity and Muslim women’s employment. I find that mosque attendance is positively associated with employment, whereas other measures of religiosity have no significant effect. Education, ethnicity, and childbearing, on the other hand, are strong, consistent predictors of Muslim women’s employment. These findings suggest that practicing Islam, in itself, does not deter American Muslim women’s engagement in paid work.
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.465.
Texto completoResumen
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims". American Journal of Islam and Society 22, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.465.
Texto completoResumen
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Hammer, Juliane. "The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism". American Journal of Islam and Society 24, n.º 4 (1 de octubre de 2007): 93–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v24i4.1512.
Texto completoResumen
Perceptions of the “other” are a powerful force in day-to-day human interaction,as well as in domestic and international politics. Since the publicationof Edward Said’s Orientalism almost three decades ago, many scholarshave appropriated and debated his thesis about the reality-changing powerof European (and American) discourses on Muslims and Arabs. In the bookunder review, Timothy Marr, professor of English in the American StudiesCurriculum department at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,simultaneously broadens and criticizes Said’s ideas.The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism (a somewhat misleadingtitle for a fascinating book) offers a rich analysis of how Americans appropriatedimages of Islam, Muslim societies, and the Middle East during theseventeenth to nineteenth centuries for various political, social, and cultural– but ultimately American – purposes related to domestic and internationalissues. The author argues that such perceptions, in light of their complex andmultiple uses in American history, are significant because they continue toshape contemporary American approaches to the Muslim world.Marr advances this thesis by looking at an impressive array of historicalsources and documents, as well as secondary literature on various aspects ofAmerican history and culture, in which he finds a multitude of references toIslam and Muslims (or Turks, Saracens etc., respectively). His analysis ofthese references offers a stunning kaleidoscope of American images of theMuslim “other,” but reveals far more about the inner dynamics of Americannation-building and cultural self-definition than about Islam or Muslims ...