Literatura académica sobre el tema "Factical life"

In his early Freiburg lectures on the phenomenology of religious life, published as his Phenomenology of Religious Life, Heidegger sought to interpret the Christian life in phenomenological terms, while also discussing the question of whether Christianity should be construed as historically defined. Heidegger thus connected the philosophical discussion of religion as a phenomenon with the character of the religious life taken in the context of factical life. According to Heidegger, every philosophical question originates from the latter, which determines such questions pre-theoretically, while the tradition of early Christianity can also only be understood historically in such terms. More specifically, he holds that the historical phenomenon of religious life as it relates to early Christianity, inasmuch as it undergirds our conception of the religious phenomenon per se, reveals the essential connection between factical life and religious life. In this way, the conception of religion that Heidegger establishes through his analyses of Paul’s Epistles takes on both theological and philosophical ramifications. Moreover, the historicity of factical life finds its fulfillment in our comprehension of the primordial form of Christianity as our very own historical a priori, determined by our own factical situation. Hence, historicity and factical life belong together within the situation that makes up the foundation of the religious life.

Salsa dancing, a partnered dance premised on the felt sense of connection, is well suited to an exploration of Henry’s radical phenomenology of immanence and Heidegger’s facticity of life. Birthed in social celebratory contexts, salsa carries a particular motile freedom. What matters most is not how the dance movements are created from an outer frame of reference, but the experience of interactive responsiveness that emerges from unanticipated acts of giving life to another. Connecting to one’s partner and exuding a presence filled with life is revealed in an indepth interview with two-time world champion salsa dancer, judge, choreographer and coach, Anya Katsevman. This interview attempts to invoke the kinetic, kinesthetic and affective registers of the lividness and livingness of salsa dancing. As a phenomenological inquiry into factical life, the inter-view is presented not so much as a matter of shared perspectives or viewpoints, but more in the way of an inter-feeling, a practice of life engagement. This affectively-oriented approach provides both promise and challenge to the field of phenomenology. It invites us to delve more deeply into feeling acts of seeing. It also helps us understand how, through attending more fully to acts of seeing, we can increase the intensity with which we feel the upsurge of life.

The main focus of this article is the methodological problem of the selfdetermination of the philosophy according to the phenomenological analysis carried out by Heidegger in one of the lectures of his early period (the so called Früh Freiburger Vorlesungen). The general frame of the current paper implies a hermeneutical thesis according to which the relevance of the well-known “factical life” is not solely thematic but mainly methodological. This function explains why these “phenomenological exercises” are some sort of genetical enquiries. In consequence, the specific aim of this article is, on the one hand, to show that the problem of the selfdetermination of the philosophy is the document of the more basic problem of the possibility of access to the intentional structures as such. On the other hand, this implies that the facticity as the primary horizon of comprehension constitutes in deed a redrawing of the intentional structure, in such a way that it is avoided the paradoxical consequences of the reflexive-intuitive model of access to one self and makes a relevant issue to the philosophy the problematic character of the intentionality itself.

Determining what philosophy is for the young Heidegger is a complex task. It is also an ambiguous task in that it is considered unresolved and intricate due to its subsidiary link to factical life. This paper will try to show that from the approach of worried concern and from a critique of the theoretical attitude and worldviews, Heidegger conceives that philosophizing is committing oneself to the possibility of carrying out a personal transformation lived as a commitment of a personal nature. From this situation, which will be critically scrutinized in the development of the present paper, I will determine philosophy to be the setting in motion of the self-enlightenment of the life of each existent.

AbstractMy aim in the present paper is to show the significance of Heidegger's phenomenology of religion as an important step on his way to his magnum opus. First, I wish to exhibit traits characteristic of Heidegger's path of thinking in terms of his confrontation with phenomenology, historicism, hermeneutics, and Lebensphilosophie. I will then argue, in a second step, that it was with an eye to, and drawing upon, his previous understanding of religion and religious life, as well as of the relation between faith and theology, that Heidegger was to conceive of philosophy and its relation to human existence in Being and Time. Both theology and philosophy offer a conceptual elaboration of something previously enacted or lived (a sort of having-been) and, in doing so, are at the same time meant to refer back to and reinforce what they grow out of—faith or factical life.

This article aims to demonstrate, by means of a comparison with Lacoste’s proposal, that we can find a particular phenomenology of liturgy in the early Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion, centered in the structure of “being-placed before God”. His examination of this structure manages to go deeper than Lacoste in order to account for the essence of human existence. With this purpose in mind, in the first section of the article I will the present the basic features of the liturgical experience, as it is introduced in Experience and the Absolute. In the second section, I will analyze the early Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion and its interpretation of Christian factical life experience. Finally, in the third section, I will bring the insights from both sections together to establish the particularities of Heidegger’s phenomenology of liturgy.

I examine a passage from Heidegger’s 1922 overview of a proposed book on Aristotle wherein he addresses the importance of Aristotle’s treatment of accidental (sumbebēkos) causes in the Physics II.4–6. My analysis shows that this passage plays a key role within the account of Aristotle’s ontology presented in the overview insofar as it allows Heidegger to open up a new way of reading Aristotle, one that both diagnoses and pushes through the inheritance of being understood as technē in order to retrieve originary insights about the movement of factical human life, world, and care. Rather than subordinate tuchē and automaton (chance) to the four “real” causes they would remain merely incidental to or derivative of, Heidegger asks that we recognize the priority of praxis, whose archē unfolds as care toward and within a world of accidents.

In this paper I shall present two elements of Husserl’s theory of the life-world, facticity and historicity, which are of exemplary importance for his late phenomenology as a whole. I compare these two notions to two axes upon which Husserl’s phenomenology of the life-world becomes inscribed. Reconsidering and reconstructing Husserl’s late thought under this viewpoint sheds new light on a notoriously enigmatic problem, i.e., the concept of the transcendental and its relation to the „mundane“ – to the world as constituted by transcendental consciousness. Drawing on unpublished manuscript material I claim, specifically, that the transcendental subject, in its „self-enworlding“ activity, as it were, „covers its tracks“ so as to obscure the transcendental origin of the worldly ego. This self-obscuring is itself an eidetic law of transcendental consciousness. The ambiguity in the transcendental/mundane ego is thrown into relief through Husserl’s analyses concerning the corporeal functioning of the lived-body. These considerations help further clarify Husserl’s claim that the transcendental and the factical are „moments of one structure“, while also incorporating the problem of historicity.

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The publication of Martin Heidegger´s Complete Works has been offering new elements for students to consider his intelectual trajectory. In the early 1920´s, he shares Husserl´s perception that philosophy is [CONFUSÃO MIXED UP] and can only be phenomenology. He disagrees that phenomenology must be limited to the description of the consciousness. It is the explicitation of factical life experience (faktische Lebenserfahrung). In his theological studies, Heidegger discovered the questionability of each one´s concrete life. Theoretical knowledge, which drives contemporary philosophy and, according to him, has its beginning in greek philosophy, is unable to describe it. Factical life experience is not objective, thus a new method is necessary to describe it. Phenomenology is such method. This study focuses on the lecture course called Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, taught in the 1920-21 winter semester. The lessons show contemporary philosophy´s inability to access the factical life experience of primal christianity found on Saint Paul´s Epistles. Phenomenology allows such proto-christian religious experience to show itself. It is a way of living one´s life in which one figts against the tendency to seek ilusionary security in daily experiences. For the christian, the end of time is already present since conversion. And conversion is always actualized. Heidegger discovers a temporality that is different and inaccessible to theory, which only know chronological time. It is factical life experience´s kairological time. Metaphysics is thus a way of seeking security. In this study, the lesson course is contextualized within Heidegger´s historical moment. Philosophy and life are implicated. Next, Heidegger´s way of demonstrating factical life experience´s originality and philosophy´s need of returning to such origin are shown. To do so, are presented 1) a brief description of factical life experience , 2) the formal indication as the phenomenological concept able to describe it, and 3) philosophy and the sciences as its possibilities. At last, Heidegger´s interpretation of Saint Paul´s Epistles is followed in order to understand the apostle´s factical life according to how it shows itself, instead of taking as point of departure previously conceived theories. In doing so, it is human life which unveals itself. That is the task of phenomenology
A publicação das Obras Completas de Martin Heidegger tem oferecido aos estudiosos novos elementos para que se considere sua trajetória intelectual. Esta começa na teologia e desemboca na filosofia. No começo da década de 1920, ele compartilha com Husserl que a filosofia, que se encontra enredada em confusão com as ciências objetivas, só pode ser fenomenologia. Diverge de seu mestre, entretanto, em que a fenomenologia não se limita à descrição da consciência. Ela é explicitação da experiência de vida fáctica (faktische Lebenserfahrung). Nos estudos de cunho teológico, Heidegger descobrira a questionabilidade da vida concreta de cada qual. O conhecimento teórico, que anima a filosofia de sua contemporaneidade e cuja origem ele encontra na filosofia grega, mostra-se incapaz de tematizá-la. A experiência de vida fáctica não é objetiva, de modo que necessita de um novo método para ser tematizada. A fenomenologia é esse método. No presente estudo, destaca-se o curso ministrado no semestre de inverno de 1920-21, intitulado Introdução à Fenomenologia da Religião , no qual Heidegger demonstra a incapacidade da filosofia contemporânea de acessar a experiência de vida fáctica do cristão primitivo contida nas Epístolas Paulinas. Com a fenomenologia, a experiência religiosa protocristã pode mostrar-se. Trata-se de um modo de viver pelo qual se luta contra a tendência a encontrar ilusório asseguramento nas experiências quotidianas. O cristão é aquele para quem o fim dos tempos já se faz presente desde a conversão; esta sendo sempre atualizada. Heidegger encontra nisso uma temporalidade diferente e inacessível à teoria, que só conhece o tempo cronológico. É a temporalidade kairológica, própria da experiência de vida fáctica. A metafísica revela-se, assim, um modo de buscar asseguramento. Neste estudo, contextualiza-se o curso no momento histórico de vida de Heidegger, pois filosofia e vida imbricam-se. Em seguida, apresenta-se o exercício que ele realiza para demonstrar a originalidade da experiência de vida fáctica e a necessidade de a filosofia ser capaz de retornar a essa sua origem. Para isso, mostra-se 1) uma breve descrição da experiência de vida fáctica , 2) a indicação formal como conceito fenomenológico capaz de tematizá-la e 3) a filosofia e as ciências como possibilidades dela. Por fim, realiza-se com Heidegger a interpretação das Epístolas Paulinas, a fim de compreender a vida fáctica do apóstolo tal como se apresenta a partir dele, e não de teorias previamente concebidas. Com isso, é a vida humana que se desvela. Essa é a tarefa da fenomenologia

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The conductive thread of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger s phenomenological investigations is the concept of intentionality; his analysis has for purpose to solve the fundamental methodological problem concerning the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience (Erlebnis). So that it becomes clear, it is necessary to consider him formally. In Husserl, the sphere of lived experience is the one of the pure ego or pure consciousness, and the intentionality is understood as intentionality of consciousness; in Heidegger, it is treated of what denominated factical life or existence of Dasein, in that the intentionality designates the type of comportment that the human existence maintains in relation to itself and to the world. This work seeks a critical confrontation among the two positions, pointing out the heideggerian concern with the inadequacies of the theoretical attitude and her form of conceiving the field of the formal, towards an investigation concerning the nature and the formation of the concepts and philosophical statements as formal indications.
O fio condutor das investigações fenomenológicas de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger é o conceito de intencionalidade; sua análise tem por finalidade resolver o problema metodológico fundamental acerca do modo de abrir cientificamente a esfera dos vividos (Erlebnis). Para que se torne claro, é necessário considerá-lo formalmente. Em Husserl, a esfera dos vividos é a do ego puro ou consciência pura, e a intencionalidade é compreendida como intencionalidade da consciência; em Heidegger, trata-se do que denominou vida ou existência fáctica do Dasein, em que a intencionalidade designa o tipo de comportamento que a existência humana mantém em relação a si e para com o mundo. Este trabalho visa um confronto crítico entre as duas posições, salientando a preocupação heideggeriana com as insuficiências da atitude teorética e sua forma de conceber o campo do formal, em direção a uma investigação acerca da natureza e da formação dos conceitos e enunciados filosóficos como indicações formais.

The concern of The Responsibility to Understand is to contribute to the rehabilitation of the philosophical study of ethical life through consideration of the sense of responsibility at issue in hermeneutical experience. After a consideration of the scope and limits of this project for the discipline of ethics, the “Introduction” situates inquiry into the responsibility to understand within current research in hermeneutics. Inquiry into the responsibility to understand takes shape as a post-Gadamerian approach within hermeneutics that eschews postmodern positions, such as that forwarded by Gianni Vattimo, and builds on more recent, realistic positions that focus on factical life, such as those developed by Günter Figal, Donatella di Cesare, and James Risser. In this, I argue that inquiry into the responsibility to understand calls for a reconsideration of Gadamer’s attempt to advance (and perhaps advance beyond) Heidegger’s ontological turn in hermeneutics and, with it, his emphasis on the hermeneutics of facticity.

The chapter goes into detail about the tempestuous envoyship of Joel Poinsett, the undiplomatic American diplomatic representative to Mexico. He and Alamán developed a very conflictual relationship that in part was responsible for Alamán’s departure from the ministry in 1825 although the two men overlapped only for about six months; Poinsett was eventually recalled by his government at the request of Mexico in 1829. The influence of the establishment of York Rite Freemasonry in Mexico, introduced by Poinsett and which formed the basis for factional divisions in national politics, is discussed in depth.

This chapter examines the relationship between pastor and congregation in the London parishes during the Interregnum. It addresses how godly ministers, called on by Parliament at the outbreak of the Civil War to reform parochial discipline and prevent the ‘promiscuous multitude’ from polluting the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper in England’s parish churches, negotiated issues of authority, changes to worship and liturgy, and the already contentious issues of patronage and finance. These factors forced ministers to look to the lay leaders of the parish, whether as elders or vestrymen, making them subject to factional struggles within the church life of the parish community. This chapter assesses the establishment and operation of Presbyterianism in London’s parishes during the 1640s and 1650s, as well as the practical difficulties, economic and administrative, that godly pastors experienced at the parochial level as a result of the dismantling of the Church of England.

This chapter recounts that although John Roy Lynch had been appointed a major and Paymaster of Volunteers, since the position was known to be a temporary one, he felt that it was not only his privilege but his duty to continue to take an active part in politics. Having secured a greater degree of official recognition for his friends than appeared to be possible during the early days of the McKinley administration, the outlook for the future was not only encouraging but more satisfactory than at any time since the beginning of the factional fight in the state of Mississippi. Having been denied a seat in the national convention of 1896, to which he knew he was justly entitled, Lynch began at an early date to lay his plans for the national convention of 1900. Lynch was determined to be elected a delegate to that convention from the state at large, which would probably be the last national convention he would aspire to be a member of. The first step in that direction was to bring about such an adjustment of factional differences in the party as would prevent a double or contesting delegation.

Chapter 2 examines China and Japan’s confrontation in the English-language press during the Jinan Incident in May 1928. Japan’s swift, consistent and intensive reporting about the event drowned out China’s voice in both the treaty-port and metropolitan papers. But what contributed to Japan’s victory of the propaganda battle was not only its sophisticated news network, but also the favorable context of international public opinion. Japanese-controlled media portrayed Chinese troops as looters, and established Japan as a defender of imperial interests in China. The Nationalist government’s propaganda efforts, in contrast, were hindered by factional struggles among the top leaders, and the anti-foreign tradition of the Nationalist Party.