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1
Craig, Edward. "David Hume". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (marzo de 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004041.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
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Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (marzo de 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004069.
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David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
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Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (marzo de 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004065.
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David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
4
Waldmann, Felix. "David Hume in Chicago: A Twentieth-Century Hoax". Journal of British Studies 59, n.º 4 (octubre de 2020): 793–820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2020.127.
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AbstractThis article alleges that two letters attributed to the philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) were forged in the twentieth century. The letters were first published in 1972 and 1973 by Michael Morrisroe, an assistant professor of English in the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, after which they became monuments of conventional scholarship on Hume's life and writings. Both letters are cited without qualification by scholars of Hume's thought in dozens of publications, including Ernest Campbell Mossner's celebrated Life of David Hume (1980), and John Robertson's entry for Hume in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). This article reconstructs the history and transmission of Hume's extant letters and attempts to account for why the forgeries published by Morrisroe were accepted as genuine. It makes a systematic case against the authenticity of the letters, and focuses in particular on the question of whether Hume met the Jansenist homme de lettres Noël-Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) and had access to his library, in Reims, in 1734. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the exposé for modern editorial scholarship and intellectual history.
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Trincado Aznar, Estrella. "La innovación en la economía británica en el siglo XVIII: Hume, Smith, Bentham". Cuadernos de Estudios del Siglo XVIII, n.º 33 (6 de julio de 2023): 45–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17811/cesxviii.33.2023.45-75.
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La innovación fue el problema económico clave del Siglo XVIII, una época privilegiada donde empiezan a resonar unos discursos exaltados, enaltecedores de la necesidad de innovación constante, pero en la que muchos señalaban también los riesgos de esta innovación. En este artículo se presentan las visiones de la innovación que surgieron en el siglo dieciocho de la mano de tres autores prototípicos, David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790) y Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Sus tres teorías arrojan luz sobre las consecuencias de la innovación, al estar basadas en sus distintas definiciones del agente económico, del tipo de interés, del empresario y del desarrollo económico.
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Reis, Nilo Henrique Neves dos. "Maquiavel na Inglaterra: O leitor David Hume". Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 10, n.º 21 (24 de enero de 2020): 79. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/.v10i21.8953.
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Os escritos de Nicolau Maquiavel foram lidos por várias pessoas de modo não confessional desde a sua divulgação. Indícios apontam que os ingleses tiveram acesso as suas obras já no reinado de Henrique VIII, ainda que de forma restrita à elite inglesa, que tinha familiaridade com o idioma italiano. Decerto que as obras do florentino ofereceram uma sólida contribuição ao pensamento político inglês, o que, por sua vez, estimulou uma reflexão crítica ao fenômeno político, bem como aos valores vigentes, pois, como se sabe, suas ideias serviram de inspiração para muitos escritores. A bem da verdade, cotejando as produções inglesas, principalmente após a guerra civil, sente-se a influência de Maquiavel. David Hume, que viveu entre 1711 a 1776, dois séculos depois da circulação dos escritos na Inglaterra, quando o florentino já era um referencial ali, não tinha como desconhecer as contribuições dos escritos políticos de Maquiavel, já que uma série de autores faziam referência diretas a ele, muitos dos quais, comentados pelo escocês. Em uma época em que era pernicioso fazer menções louváveis ao pensamento do florentino, há vestígios de que Hume usou estratégias para colocar suas posições próximas, e dado aos indícios encontrados neste escrito, defende-se a posição de que a familiaridade do escocês com os textos de Maquiavel era grande, visto que ele conhecia bem o “corpus machiavellicus”.
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Schabas, Margaret y Carl Wennerlind. "Retrospectives: Hume on Money, Commerce, and the Science of Economics". Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, n.º 3 (1 de agosto de 2011): 217–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.217.
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David Hume (1711–1776) is arguably the most esteemed philosopher to have written in the English language. During his lifetime, however, Hume was as well if not better known for his contributions to political economy, particularly for the essays published as the Political Discourses (1752). Hume left his mark on the economic thought of the physiocrats, the classical economists, and the American Federalists. Adam Smith, who met Hume circa 1750, was his closest friend and interlocutor for some 25 years. Among modern economists, Hume's essays on money and trade have informed theorists of both Keynesian and Monetarist persuasions. In this essay, we begin by discussing Hume's monetary economics, and then spell out his theory of economic development, noting his qualified enthusiasm for the modern commercial system. We end with an assessment of his views on the scientific standing of economics, specifically his counterintuitive argument that economics could be epistemologically superior to physics.
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JOSEPH T. EKONG, REV FR y O.P. "Hume's Critique of Locke’s Variant Of "Social Contract Theory”: A Ratiocinative Assessment". International Journal of Scientific and Management Research 05, n.º 07 (2022): 98–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.37502/ijsmr.2022.5709.
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David Hume (1711-1776) has long been considered a severe denunciator of 'social contract theory', and this interpretation has implicitly premised a perspective that lays heavy weight on the importance of social contract in the history of political thought. This work presents Hume's critique of the Lockean version of the social contract, and identifies the issues responsible for such criticism. In Book 3 of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature (henceforth T), Hume displays his systematic criticism of social contract theory. Hume did not consider social contract theory as an important trend in the history of political thought. One of his points was that 'social contract theory' was quite new, strange and 'heterodoxical' in politics. This work offers an appraisal of Hume’s stance on the Lockean variant of “Social Contract Theory” and proposes a more judicious textual reading of his contributions in this regard.
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Botero Camacho, Manuel. "To dream or not to dream: incursión en la lógica de la canción de S. T. Coleridge". Razón Crítica, n.º 1 (29 de agosto de 2016): 122–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21789/25007807.1139.
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<p align="justify">A lo largo de este artículo se expone una serie de posibilidades que puede ofrecer la lectura del poema de Samuel Taylor Coleridge titulado “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798). Los argumentos aquí expuestos carecen de intención distinta de aquella que consiste en señalar elementos que acaso no sean accidentales dentro del texto. David Hume (1711-1776) será quien proporcione las relaciones que deban examinarse. En este escrito se ofrecen tres posibilidades interpretativas y, al menos, dos de ellas pueden verse como contaminadas por las teorías de Hume. Aunque la tercera no está directamente tratada en la filosofía que aquí se maneja, es fácil hacer la inferencia del origen de tal relación. El objetivo es presentar el poema de Coleridge como una objeción a la teoría de la causalidad enunciada por Hume.</p>
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Alvarenga Junnior Neto, Francisco y Larissa Cristina Gomes Teixeira. "A FORMAÇÃO DAS CRENÇAS NA TEORIA DO CONHECIMENTO HUMIANA". Sapere Aude 13, n.º 26 (30 de diciembre de 2022): 542–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5752/p.2177-6342.2022v13n26p542-554.
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Neste texto temos a intenção de apresentar e discutir a forma como o importante filósofo escocês, David Hume (1711-1776), em sua teoria do conhecimento e filosofia, compreende o processo de formação das crenças, a qual foi fundamental para o empirismo britânico e para a filosofia dos séculos posteriores. Para tanto, de início, iremos apresentar a distinção fundamental que o filósofo realiza entre impressões e ideias, segundo a qual impressões são mais fortes e vivazes que as ideias e, por isso, são compreendidas como a origem de todo o conhecimento. Feito isso, discutiremos a importância e o papel da causalidade para a composição e o surgimento da crença em sua teoria do conhecimento e como este efeito se relaciona com outros elementos da filosofia humenana para tal. Por fim, iremos apresentar a compreensão de Hume segundo a qual seria através do hábito, em relação com a causalidade, que elaboraríamos nossas crenças.
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King, Peter y Nathan Ballantyne. "Augustine on Testimony". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, n.º 2 (junio de 2009): 195–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0045.
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Philosophical work on testimony has flourished in recent years. Testimony roughly involves a source affirming or stating something in an attempt to transfer information to one or more persons. It is often said that the topic of testimony has been neglected throughout most of the history of philosophy, aside from contributions by David Hume (1711-1776) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796). True as this may be, Hume and Reid aren't the only ones who deserve a tip of the hat for recognizing the importance of testimony: Augustine of Hippo (354-430) affirms the place of testimony in human cognition, at least in his later writings.In what follows, we consider three questions raised by Augustine's thinking about testimony: the analytical question of what sources count as testimony (Section I); the epistemological question about the status of testimony-based belief (Section II); and the doxastic question about the circumstances in which it is appropriate to believe on the basis of testimony (Section III).
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Monteiro, Ricardo Rodrigues. "A SEMIÓTICA DE PEIRCE A PARTIR DE JOHN LOCKE E DAVID HUME: O ÍCONE, ÍNDICE E SÍMBOLO". Divers@! 11, n.º 1 (30 de junio de 2018): 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/diver.v11i1.52373.
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O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar alguns conceitos fundamentais da semiótica de Peirce (1839-1914), em especial a relação do signo com o objeto, demonstrando-a como uma evolução em relação ao pensamento de John Locke (1632-1704) e David Hume (1711-1776). Pretende-se assim fornecer subsídios aos interessados em conhecer ou aprofundar seus estudos sobre a semiótica de Peirce, de maneira introdutória, ou que estejam no início de um aprofundamento mais teórico-conceitual sobre o assunto. No início apresentamos conceitos essenciais que influenciaram Peirce, tais como a ideia de signo sonoro, em Locke, ou o conceito de associação de ideias por semelhança, contiguidade ou causa e efeito, em Hume. Tentaremos demonstrar que esse conceito, bem como a provocação feita por Hume aos filósofos, foram decisivos para o desenvolvimento da teoria geral dos signos de Peirce, em especial a relação entre signo e objeto (S-O), vindo a culminar na tricotomia clássica: ícone, índice e símbolo. Outrossim, vale destacar que o signo sonoro em Locke possivelmente influenciou a ideia de signo enquanto imagem acústica, em Saussure. Ainda, apresentaremos várias provas para atestar que a teoria de Peirce não é antropocêntrica e, por essa razão, pode muito bem ser utilizada, além da comunicação entre humanos, para os estudos de comunicação entre humanos e não humanos, e entre não humanos e não humanos
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Zamzami, Mukhammad, Ghorbanali Karimzadeh Gharamaleki, Abdullah Hosseinieskandian y Fikri Mahzumi. "THE DESIGN ARGUMENT FOR GOD’S EXISTENCE: Ayatullâh Ja’far Subḥânî’s Criticism of David Hume’s Thoughts". ULUL ALBAB Jurnal Studi Islam 24, n.º 1 (27 de junio de 2023): 89–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/ua.v24i1.20698.
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The design argument is one of the strongest arguments to prove God's existence. It has been analyzed by various thinkers throughout the history in defense of God’s existence. However, some empiricist philosophers who do not believe in God’s existence criticized and questioned this argument. David Hume (1711-1776) is one of those who made a tremendous effort to deny God’s existence. He also criticized the design argument. Hume’s critiques have always been challenged by philosophers and God-believing theologians. This article is made to criticize Hume’s critiques on the design argument from Ayatullâh Subḥânî’s perspective using descriptive-analytical method. Hume’s objection was due to misunderstanding of the argument’s purpose and function. It should be acknowledged that this argument can easily prove God’s essence along with other arguments such as ḥudûth, necessity, and possibility. The design argument pushes us to the supernatural limits. Also, this argument is supported by experimental sciences because every new discovery made in natural sciences provides us with a new sign to prove God.
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Silva, Carlos Campelo da. "A ortodoxia do “grande infiel”: ou sobre o uso do ceticismo Humeano por Kierkegaard e Hamann". Revista Ética e Filosofia Política 2, n.º 22 (4 de julio de 2020): 94–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.34019/2448-2137.2019.31111.
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Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a apropriação que Hamann e Kierkegaard fazem de alguns aspectos do ceticismo desenvolvido por Hume. Em 1744, David Hume (1711-1776), até então, autor do Tratado da Natureza Humana (1739) e dos Ensaios Morais e Políticos (1741) é rejeitado para o cargo de professor da cadeira de Ética da Universidade de Edimburgo, sob a alegação de que ele era um “notório infiel”. Desse modo, parece estranho pensar que Hamann que tão energicamente combateu a ilustração, sendo um defensor implacável de um cristianismo baseado somente na fé, tenha algo a ver com o ceticismo de Hume. Do mesmo modo, que não parece crível pensar que o autor de Escola do Cristianismo (1850), Obras do Amor (1847) e Discursos edificantes possa de alguma forma estar relacionado com este “notório infiel”. Entretanto, as afirmações de Hume de que: “[...] a religião cristã não só foi inicialmente acompanhada de milagres, como até hoje não é possível que uma pessoa razoável lhe dê crédito sem milagre [...]”, bem como a afirmativa de Hume, segundo a qual ser um cético filosófico é o primeiro e mais importante passo no sentido de se tornar um cristão verdadeiro, parecem ter provido as armas que Kierkegaard e Hamann tanto necessitavam para combater o racionalismo filosófico e teológico que se imiscuíam na religião e minavam a fé. Desse modo, essa comunicação pretende apontar as consequências do pensamento humeano para a concepção de um cristianismo cético desenvolvido por Hamann e Kierkegaard.
Palavras-chave: Hume. Ceticismo. Hamann. Kierkegaard. Cristianismo.
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Orsi, Cosma. "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCLUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORKHOUSE SYSTEM". Journal of the History of Economic Thought 39, n.º 4 (2 de octubre de 2017): 453–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837216000249.
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The aim of this article is to describe the rise and fall of the workhouse system in connection with the developments that took place in economic thought in the transition from mercantilism to the Classical tradition. By examining the economic debate about wages, efficiency, labor market, workers’ mobility, and unemployment, we discuss whether the social policy shift epitomized by institutional reforms like the Gilbert Act (1782), the Rose Act (1793), and the Speenhamland system (1795) was accompanied and eventually inspired by a change in the perception of major political economy issues. In doing so, we review the writings of Jacob Vanderlint (d. 1740), George Berkeley (1685–1753), Malachy Postlethwayt (1707?–1767), Josiah Tucker (1713–1799), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam Smith (1723-1790), among others. Although a direct influence by these writers cannot be proven, the originality of the present work rests on the effort to put into perspective the arguments elaborated by economic thinkers and the proposals made by social reformers so as to identify possible connections between economic theorizing and social legislation.
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Hume, David. "Moral, political, and literary essays: Of public credit". Economic Thought journal 66, n.º 6 (20 de diciembre de 2021): 91–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.56497/etj2166606.
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David Hume (1711-1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian and economist who, in just nine essays, part of his Political Discourses (first published in 1752 and then revised and undergoing numerous editions and revisions until his death), made an important critique of so-called mercantilist ideas on money, prices, international trade, taxation and employment. In the same year, 1752, which some consider to be the early dawn of economic science, Adam Smith was a student at Oxford and was reprimanded by his tutor for reading these newly published essays. This did not prevent this other Scotsman from becoming, in 1776, after the publication of The Wealth of Nations, a major enlightener in this field of human knowledge. What are some of Hume's major contributions according to modern views? First, his analysis of the mechanism of how prices are influenced by monetary money flows largely refutes the mercantilist thinking that the state should always strive for a positive trade balance. Second, Hume's positive attitude toward manufactures and crafts exposes the limited views of the Physiocrats. Third, in discussing taxation, he initiated economists' consideration of the problems of personal and corporate income that resulted from taxation and customs. Whereas Hume's multi-volume History of England, published between 1754 and 1761, enjoyed some success among readers in the 18th century and gained financial independence, his philosophical and economic ideas seem to be more popular in modern times.
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Timoshhuk, Aleksey. "How the Existent and the Deontic Meet". Ideas and Ideals 15, n.º 2-1 (28 de junio de 2023): 127–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.17212/2075-0862-2023-15.2.1-127-146.
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The English empiricist philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) formulated the logical problem of the interaction of essence and deontic: moral imperatives, norms, laws, values, goals, policies, etc. are not derived from facts. The existence quantor does not apply to statements with ‘should’, ‘must’. Similarly, artificial intelligence can operate with temporal, epistemic, and even aletic modalities, but cannot analyze deontic and axiological operators, etc. Hume’s guillotine forces a distinction between the normative and the descriptive and the deductive. Law is the most normative and precise human science, where the present and the ideal are correlated. The desire to define its essence gives rise to fundamental questions about its location. Is it worthwhile to equate norm and being? Is it possible to derive law from social rationing? Can we see it in the psychological need for order and stability, in the subjective experience of duty? How can we bring together the being and the proper in the contradictory category of ‘law’, which means both the objective and the present, and, on the other hand, the valuable and the concrete. The social avatar of the dilemma of the ontic and the deontic is the gap between normative and sociological jurisprudence. The methodological purity of normativism collides with a fluid social reality. Special-legal means and procedures can create a police regime, but they cannot create a system of social justice. Law from the point of view of the proper is the recognition of the dependence of the legal on the social, the political, the economic. Without the proper, however, law loses its instrumentalism. Therefore, the state is like a mangrove biome, uniting heterogeneous environments of the essential and the proper. This article develops models of legal metatheory, or such a descriptor of law, which would explain the forms of the union of the existent and the deontic.
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"David Hume". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (marzo de 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004045.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
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Koch, Carl Henrik. "Den mangfoldige Hume". Fund og Forskning i Det Kongelige Biblioteks Samlinger 51 (18 de diciembre de 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/fof.v51i0.41277.
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The Scot David Hume (1711–1776) and Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) in Holland were two of the greatest philosophers of the European Enlightenment. Whereas Spinoza’s Bible criticism was the inspiration behind the often clandestine tradition known as radical Enlightenment, Hume tried with all his might to wrest the science of mankind from the grip of theology and religion. Since the mid 19th century Hume’s philosophy has been interpreted as either scepticism, naturalism or first and foremost criticism of religion. In my article I describe these three very different interpretations and argue that, although Hume was in a certain sense a sceptic and strongly concerned to criticize the clergy and Christianity, yet both these traits of his thought are connected with his naturalistic and secularist philosophy. The title of the article is explained in its introduction, which describes his manifold interests.
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Takács, Dániel. "From Character to Nature". AnaChronisT 18, n.º 2 (31 de diciembre de 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.53720/vszm4824.
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This paper discusses the theory of passions of Alexander Pope (1688–1744) and David Hume (1711–1776). It focusses on two phrases: “ruling passion” by Pope and “predominant inclination” by Hume. This study attempts to demonstrate that Hume used his term with a similar meaning to that of Pope. The importance of the passions in the conduct of human life, according to these authors, involves a sceptical attitude towards the capabilities of reason. This paper attempts to show the manifestations of this attitude in Pope’s satires on human characters and in the characterisation of a false philosopher and philosophy by Hume.
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Akelyan, Davit G. "The Development and Manifestations of Fallibilism in the Epistemology of Descartes and Hume". Регион и мир / Region and the World, 25 de febrero de 2024, 87–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.58587/18292437-2024.1-87.
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The landscape of the modern Western philosophy, particularly within the domain of epistemological inquiry, has been profoundly influenced by the seminal contributions of the encyclopedic thinkers: the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) and the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776). Their perspectives have redefined numerous epistemological challenges inherent to both philosophy and science, laying the groundwork for the advancement of novel conceptual and methodological frameworks to address these challenges. Despite the marked differences between their epistemological frameworks, the philosophies of Descartes and Hume share several significant points of convergence that are particularly relevant to general fallibilism. For Descartes, the path to effective knowledge and the apprehension of truth is primarily forged through reason, emphasizing the understanding and application of its most fundamental principles and laws. Conversely, Hume posits that the foundation of epistemology rests upon experience and direct observation.
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ÖZÇELİK, Bilgehan y Gülüse AKSOY. ""Bir Çözüm Olarak" Skeptisizmin Hume'da Yeniden Kurulması". Felsefe Dünyası, 6 de agosto de 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1299019.
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İnsan, kendisinin de bir parçası olduğu dış dünya ile ilişki kurarken, doğasının ona çizdiği sınırlar içinde hareket etmeye yazgılıdır. Dış dünyayla ilişkilenme, bilgilenmenin en doğrudan hali ile sağlanan biçiminde, insan yaşamını kolaylaştırdığı sürece genel anlamda sorgulamaya kapalıdır. Ancak bilginin dinamik yapısı ile uyuşmayan söz konusu dogmatik kabul, değişimi zorlayan koşullar karşısında zamanla direncini yitirmeye başlar. Dogmaya karşı bir antitez olarak ortaya çıkan skepsis, ilerlemeyi işaret eden tüm tarihsel sıçramalarda başat unsur olarak işlev görür. Çünkü şüphenin olmadığı yerde değişmeden, gelişmeden, arayıştan bahsetmek zor hatta imkânsızdır. Ancak diğer yandan Pyrronculuk tarzında her türlü bilgiyi askıya alan, şüpheye teslim edilmiş bir düşünceden de sonuç çıkmayacağı açıktır. Hume, çözümde vazgeçilmez bir bileşen olarak ortaya koyduğu şüpheciliğini, felsefesinin genel karakteristiğine uygun olarak iki ucu dengeleyecek, akıl yürütmesini işler ve sürekli hale getirecek şekilde kurar. Onun doktrinini özgün kılan bir diğer özelliği de, skeptikliğini, dogmaların hâkim olduğu anlayışların ortaya çıkmasını daha en baştan yani henüz olgusal deneyim aşamasındayken önleyecek bir çözüm önerisi olarak sunmasıdır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, İskoç deneyimci David Hume (1711-1776)’un “denetim ve teftiş aracı” olarak nitelendirdiği şüpheyi, metafizik eleştirisi ile ilişkilendiği noktada irdelemek ve Hume skeptisizmini özgün yanlarıyla ortaya koyabilmektir.
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Zaterka, Luciana. "A reconfiguração do empirismo: química, medicina e história natural a partir do programa baconiano de conhecimento". DoisPontos 15, n.º 1 (18 de julio de 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/dp.v15i1.57190.
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O conceito de empirismo evoca tanto uma tradição histórica quanto uma rede de questões filosóficas. Ambas frequentemente associadas a nomes como os de Francis Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753) e David Hume (1711-1776). Porém, lembremos que nenhum desses filósofos utilizaram o termo empirismo, e nem compartilharam de uma única escola epistemológica. Do ponto de vista histórico é comum encontrarmos estudos de História e Filosofia da Ciência que relacionam o conceito de ‘empirismo’ com a chamada Escola Empírica Médica, desenvolvida na Grécia Antiga (século III a.C.). Porém, mais uma vez, temos que ter cautela com essas simplificações históricas, afinal se por uma Escola médica compreendemos um número de médicos que se reconhecem como pertencentes a um grupo que defendem exatamente as mesmas ideias e conceitos, a Escola Empírica Médica é simplesmente uma invenção histórica. De fato, observaremos alguns elementos comuns dentro dessas escolas, mas não correntes unívocas. Essa postura historiográfica usualmente acarreta sérias consequências. Assim, por exemplo, os estudos que marcam a diferença entre as filosofias do continente europeu e as da Inglaterra do século XVII, distinguindo-a por meio de noções amplas, tais como racionalismo e empirismo, podem cair em reducionismos importantes. Se, por um lado, vincular o empirismo moderno à escola médica antiga acarreta numa compreensão histórica equivocada; por outro lado, aceitar a dicotomia empirismo x racionalismo como a única narrativa possível para compreendermos a gênese da filosofia moderna carrega consigo problemas de cunho epistemológico. Dos vários problemas que surgem dessa perspectiva historiográfica, isto é, de aceitarmos acriticamente a narrativa padrão, dois deles nos importam mais de perto: ela fornece uma ênfase às questões de cunho epistemológico, subestimando, então, a importância dos debates em outras áreas, como filosofia natural, ética e política, por exemplo; e deixa de lado pensadores que combinam elementos das duas correntes e, portanto, não operam stricto sensu com a dicotomia entre razão e experiência. Nesse sentido, objetivamos problematizar e aprofundar essa questão, ao discutir aspectos epistêmicos e metodológicos do chamado “programa baconiano” de conhecimento, bem como alguns de seus desdobramentos, especialmente no âmbito da química e da medicina no século XVII inglês.