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Scheler, Max y Petro Gusak. "Religion and philosophy". Ukrainian Religious Studies, n.º 80 (13 de diciembre de 2016): 100–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2016.80.728.
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The views of the philosophers and theologians diverge and disagree on the issues whether or not the objects of religious faith: the existence and essence of God, the immortality of the soul and similar content, as well as the extent to which the belief and assertion of the existence of those objects can be objects of philosophical knowledge. It can be stated that, in contrast to the teachings that reigned in minds from the XIII and the end of the XVIII century, the 19th century gave birth to an almost immense number of "positions" to the above-mentioned issues, which did not go beyond the scope of their adoption in narrower circles of scientific schools. These "positions" to this day are mutually fighting, without the prospect of winning any of them.
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Zuckert, Rachel. "Hidden Antinomies of Practical Reason, and Kant’s Religion of Hope". Kant Yearbook 10, n.º 1 (4 de octubre de 2018): 199–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2018-0010.
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AbstractIn the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that morality obliges us to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. I argue, however, that in two late essays – “The End of All Things” and “On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” – Kant provides moral counterarguments to that position: these beliefs undermine moral agency by giving rise to fanaticism or fatalism. Thus, I propose, the Kantian position on the justification of religious belief is ultimately antinomial. One ought, moreover, to understand Kant’s considered position concerning the immortality of the soul and the existence of God to be similar to that he proposes concerning the theoretical ideas of reason in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason: they are necessary as regulative ideas guiding moral action, not endorsed or even postulated as propositions. In other words, they are subject matters not of belief, but of hope.
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Stevenson, Leslie. "Opinion, Belief or Faith, and Knowledge". Kantian Review 7 (marzo de 2003): 72–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001746.
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Kant famously said he 'had to deny knowledge (Wissen) in order to make room for faith (Glaube)’ (B xxx). But what exactly was his conception of Glaube, and how does it fit into his epistemology? In the first Critique it is not until the concluding Method section that he explicitly addresses these issues. In the Canon of Pure Reason he lists three questions that sum up ‘all interest of my reason’: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? (A 805/B 833). Kant here put hope on the agenda of philosophy. In his essays on history he argued that we can hope for secular progress in the development of human culture; but in his moral and religious philosophy he was also concerned with eschatological hopes that we can perfect our characters in a life after death, and that the moral governor of the universe will ensure that happiness is eventually proportionate to virtue. About immortality and the existence of God, his constant refrain is that we can have only a practical kind of faith (Glaube).
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Buijs, Joseph. "RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN MAIMONIDES, AVERROES, AND AQUINAS". Medieval Encounters 8, n.º 2-3 (2002): 160–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700670260497033.
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AbstractOn the problem of religion and philosophy, there are a number of points in common among Maimonides, Averroes, and Aquinas. They all attempt to incorporate Aristotelian philosophy into their respective religious framework and thus link faith closely to reason, to the rational justification offered by philosophy. Nevertheless, on the precise relationship between religion and philosophy, between faith and reason, Maimonides differs significantly from both Averroes and Aquinas. His approach is shown to be less rational than that of Averroes and yet more rational than that of Aquinas. Maimonides' approach is distinctive among his medieval counterparts and of interest to the contemporary debate concerning religion and science.
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ZAMULINSKI, BRIAN. "Reconciling reason and religion: a response to Peels". Religious Studies 46, n.º 1 (20 de enero de 2010): 109–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990205.
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AbstractIn ‘The ethics of belief and Christian faith as commitment to assumptions’, Rik Peels attacks the views that I advanced in ‘Christianity and the ethics of belief’. Here, I rebut his criticisms of the claim that it is wrong to believe without sufficient evidence, of the contention that Christians are committed to that claim, and of the notion of that faith is not belief but commitment to assumptions in the hope of salvation. My original conclusions still stand.
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Ellis, Addison. "The Internality of Moral Faith in Kant’s Religion". Kant Yearbook 10, n.º 1 (4 de octubre de 2018): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2018-0001.
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AbstractWood (1970) convincingly argues that Kant’s notion of moral faith is a response to a “dialectical perplexity” or antinomy. Specifically, moral faith is a response to the threat of moral despair. In line with this suggestion, I make the case that moral faith is the resolution of a crisis about how to go on with one’s life in the face of the threat of moral despair. If this is right, then we have a potential solution to two related anxieties: (1) why the matter of our moral faith or despair deserves to be a topic of practical philosophy instead of empirical psychology, and (2) how despair could be a real threat even though Kant holds that rational beings could never truly lack faith. But, to fully see how these concerns can be answered, we must go beyond Wood’s initial analysis. I first argue that Kant’s philosophy suggests two kinds of moral faith: external and internal. I then argue that internal moral faith is analogous to self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit) in the second Critique’s practical antinomy. Together, these arguments suggest that moral faith is a response to a real threat of moral despair, and that both dialectically require one another within practical reason.
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Tsepeleva, Nadezhda V. "Apophaticism of the Christian Faith". Study of Religion, n.º 4 (2020): 102–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.22250/2072-8662.2020.4.102-107.
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. The article examines the traditional philosophy problem of reason and faith, which has two aspects regarding the subject of knowledge. This problem is revealed in the context of the patristic Christian tradition, since the traditional approach in philosophy connects the study of this problem in the course of philosophy only with the West European medieval tradition. Hence the understanding of this problem, ending with the opposition of reason and faith, which, in the end, is enshrined in the philosophy of I. Kant. The author of the article compares the conceptual approach of Western European philosophy to the problem of reason and faith and Russian religious tradition. In Russian religious philosophy of the 19th – 20th centuries the problem of reason and faith was solved on the basis of the idea of integral knowledge, which, as we know, presupposes not a juxtaposition of faith and knowledge, but a harmonious combination of religion, science and philosophy. We believe that the idea of integral knowledge has developed in Russian religious philosophy also under the influence of Western European philosophy, and more precisely, under the influence of European rationalism, as an alternative to the strict separation of religion and science. The article shows that the theory of whole knowledge is not consistent with the patristic Christian tradition. The patristic tradition speaks of “knowledge-ignorance”, it contrasts the conceptual theology and contemplation, dogmas, and experience of indescribable secrets. In conclusion, the author concludes that the opposite of reason and faith, but on a completely different methodological basis. This allows the author to talk about the apophaticism of the Christian faith in the patristic tradition.
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Hutton, Sarah. "Philosophy, Religion, and Heterodoxy in the Philosophy of Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and Anne Conway". Church History and Religious Culture 100, n.º 2-3 (3 de septiembre de 2020): 157–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18712428-10002002.
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Abstract Philosophers who hold the compatibility of reason and faith, are vulnerable to the charge of opening the way to atheism and heterodoxy. This danger was particularly acute when, in the wake of Cartesianism, the philosophy of Spinoza and Hobbes necessitated a resetting of the relationship of philosophy with religion. My paper discusses three English philosophers who illustrate the difficulties for the philosophical defence for religion: Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and Anne Conway, for all of whom philosophical and religious truth were deeply intertwined. But each of them also subscribed to heterodox religious beliefs. This raises questions of whether there is a direct the relationship between their philosophy and religious heterodoxy—whether they exemplify the charge that philosophy undermines religion, or indeed whether their defence of religion was a cover for heterodoxy.
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Markham, Ian. "Faith and Reason: Reflections on MacIntyre's ‘Tradition-constituted Enquiry’". Religious Studies 27, n.º 2 (junio de 1991): 259–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020886.
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The problem at the heart of the faith/reason relationship can be set out as follows. Faith implies total commitment whilst reason requires a certain detachment. One cannot be totally committed yet rationally detached at the same time. Therefore faith and reason are two mutually exclusive approaches to religion. Alasdair MacIntyre in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? has offered a very interesting perspective on this problem. He has argued, albeit indirectly, that this faith/reason question is a modern problem generated by a certain set of liberal and relativist presuppositions. This paper will summarize Maclntyre's contribution to the discussion, and then point to some of the inadequacies of his account. I will be arguing that commitment to a tradition is largely justified by internal explanations for disagreement. Faith seems to need an intolerant explanation for different traditions. Therefore, MacIntyre is, in fact, handling liberalized forms of the traditions. By tackling MacIntyre's work from the faith/reason angle, I hope to show certain more fundamental problems with his work.
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Bugajak, Grzegorz. "“REASON AND FAITH”. THE PROBLEM OF THE SEPARATION OF DISCIPLINES". Studia Philosophiae Christianae 56, S2 (31 de diciembre de 2020): 137–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.s2.07.
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The paper maintains and reinforces a viewpoint that science and religion (theology) are methodologically and epistemologically independent. However, it also suggests that this independence can be overcome if a “third party” is taken into account, that is – philosophy. Such a possibility seems to follow from the thesis of incommensurability and the thesis of underdetermination formulated and analysed in the current philosophy of science.
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Madung, Otto Gusti Ndegong. "Post-Secularism as a Basis of Dialogue between Philosophy and Religion". Jurnal Filsafat 31, n.º 2 (27 de agosto de 2021): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jf.65189.
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This article tackles the problem of religious radicalism. Religious radicalism is here interpreted as a protest against the pathology of secularism characterized by the privatization of religion. The privatization of religion is a process in which religion is regarded as an irrational and personal element, so that it cannot play a public role. In order to meet the pathology of privatization, this article offers the paradigm of post-secularism as proposed by Juergen Habermas that opens up the possibility for religion to actively participate in the public sphere. Furthermore, this writing argues that in post-secular society characterized by the public role of religion, it is essential to build a democratic and rational dialogue between religion and philosophy, faith and reason. A bridge that connects both is public reason. This article also shows that the post-secular condition opens up opportunities for theology to promote tolerance in a pluralistic society and to strengthen the public engagement of religion. This can avoid reducing religion to private piety without public responsibility while promoting the public engagement in religion in order to liberate the marginalized and oppressed.
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Rossi, Philip J. "Building Bridges and Crossing Boundaries: Philosophy, Theology, and the Interruptions of Transcendence". European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, n.º 1 (21 de marzo de 2014): 161–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.196.
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Discussions about theological realism within analytic philosophy of religion, and the larger conversation between analytic and continental styles in philosophy of religion have generated relatively little interest among Catholic philosophers and theologians; conversely, the work of major figures in recent Catholic theology seems to evoke little interest from analytic philosophers of religion. Using the 1998 papal encyclical on faith and reason, Fides et ratio, as a major point of reference, this essay offers a preliminary account of the bases for such seeming mutual indifference and offers some suggestions for future dialogue.
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Sabih, Joshua A. "Post-Enlightenment of Leibowitz and al-Jaberi: Philosophy and Religion". Tidsskrift for Islamforskning 10, n.º 1 (28 de noviembre de 2016): 228. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/tifo.v10i1.24883.
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The issue of the relation between religion and philosophy has re-surfaced in modern Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Muslim philosophical discourses. Facing unprecedented waves of re-traditionalisation and radicalisation in both Israel and Arab-Muslim societies this issue has become a privileged terrain upon which many ideological, cultural and political “wars” have been waged. In this paper, I shall focus on how two prominent philosophers and public thinkers, Leibowitz (d. 1994) and al-Jaberi (d. 2010), have brought the issue of the relation between faith and reason – and with it critical thinking – back to centre stage by engaging both their own philosophical and theological traditions and European philosophical thought.
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Ilin, Ivan Yu. "Religious Philosophy as an Experience of Knowledge of God: Sergei Bulgakov and Semyon Frank on the Relationship between Philosophy and Religion". History of Philosophy 25, n.º 2 (2020): 29–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2020-25-2-29-39.
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This article attempts to analyze the historical and philosophical views of S.N. Bulgakov and S.L. Frank about the meaning of religion, the nature of philosophy, and the essence of philosophical knowledge in the structure of religious experience. The article considers the correlation of religious and philosophical ideas of two thinkers and their positioning relative to each other. The article formulates the problem of the relationship and mutual influence of religious faith and philosophical reason in the legacy of Bulgakov and Frank, and raises the question of what role these outstanding authors of the Silver age assign to religious philosophy in the spiritual life of a Christian. The question of the place of conceptual thinking in the experience of understanding the Absolute is being clarified. The thesis about the role and significance of religious philosophy as a necessary beginning of discursive comprehension of the truths of faith (Bulgakov) and a holistic understanding of being (Frank) is being put forward.
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Sherman, Jacob Holsinger. "Deprovincializing Philosophy of Religion: From “Faith and Reason” to the Postcolonial Revaluation of Religious Epistemologies". Journal of the American Academy of Religion 86, n.º 2 (20 de enero de 2018): 341–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfx069.
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ZAMULINSKI, BRIAN. "Christianity and the ethics of belief". Religious Studies 44, n.º 3 (4 de agosto de 2008): 333–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412508009426.
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AbstractThe ethics of belief does not justify condemning all possible forms of religion even in the absence of evidence for any of them or the presence of evidence against all of them. It follows that attacks on religion like the recent one by Richard Dawkins must fail. The reason is not that there is something wrong with the ethics of belief but that Christian faith need not be a matter of beliefs but can instead be a matter of assumptions to which the faithful person is committed. It follows that Christianity can be compatible with scientific rationality.
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Bertman, Martin. "Hobbes on Miracles (and God)". Hobbes Studies 20, n.º 1 (2007): 40–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187502508x283137.
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AbstractHobbes accepts only one proof for God's existence: God as first cause of nature. Thus, the laws of nature express God's will, nothing else is knowable about God. The state projects God's will because it responds to the deepest natural -- security and prosperity -- by opposing anti-social tendencies. Thus, the sovereign, by right reason, is the public measurer of religion. In private, religion is a matter of faith. Christianity is based on the sole proposition that salvation comes by Christ. That scriptural message was attested to by miracles in the Apostolic era but is now a matter of faith. The contemporary assertion of miracles is suspect; especially, when it is institutionalized and endangers the power of the sovereign.
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Marcelo, Gonçalo. "Paul Ricœur: traços do religioso numa filosofia sem absoluto". Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77, n.º 2-3 (23 de septiembre de 2021): 1027–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2021_77_2_1027.
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This paper assesses the ways in which Transcendence and the question of God appear in the philosophy of Paul Ricœur. Taking stock of the debate on the theological turn of French phenomenology, the paper aims to show the unique position held by Ricœur among French phenomenology and hermeneutics, in that in spite of his Christian faith, Ricœur strove to put forward a philosophy of limits ‘without absolute’ while, at the same time, developing inquiries in phenomenology and hermeneutics of religion. The paper follows the development of Ricœur’s thought on this matter, from his early phenomenological works, through the hermeneutical turn and until the essay of fundamental anthropology of Oneself as Another, unpacking the Kantian and Hegelian influences, the approach on religion ‘within the limits of reason alone’ and also the way in which the Kantian undertones of hermeneutics as philosophy of finitude at the same time open the space to hope and imagination. Ricœur’s philosophy therefore appears as a rigorous descriptive and interpretive effort that strives not to mix the genres of discourse, while, at the same time, we can still find some ethical and supra-ethical traits in his practical philosophy that do stem from his Christian faith – but whose status is inspirational and therefore does not dent the overall theoretical framework of his philosophy of limits.
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Westphal, Kenneth R. "Noumenal Causality Reconsidered: Affection, Agency, and Meaning in Kant". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27, n.º 2 (junio de 1997): 209–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1997.10717478.
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The lead question of Kant's first Critique, indeed his whole Critical Philosophy is ‘How is Metaphysics as a Science Possible?’ Neo-Kantian and recent Anglophone interpretations of Kant's epistemology have concentrated on the ‘Transcendental Analytic’ of the first Critique, and have taken Kant's positive and legitimate sense of metaphysics to concern the necessary conditions of our knowledge of mathematics, natural science, and of course, our common sense knowledge of a spatio-temporal world of objects and events. However, in the ‘Canon of Pure Reason’ in the first Critique Kant indicates quite clearly that, although two of the leading sub-questions of metaphysics — ‘What should I so?’ and ‘What may I hope?’ — cannot be answered on theoretical grounds, they may be answered on practical grounds (A804-05=B832-33). Those practical grounds are elaborated and supplemented (mainly) in the latter two Critiques and the Religion. In each case, however, a definite and positive answer to a metaphysical question involves giving ‘objective reality’ to a concept, e.g., the concepts of freedom or immortality. ‘Objective reality’ involves possible reference to an object, where ‘possible reference’ involves more than merely describing a logical possibility.
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Cumming, Richard Paul. "Revelation as apologetic category: a reconsideration of Karl Barth's engagement with Ludwig Feuerbach's critique of religion". Scottish Journal of Theology 68, n.º 1 (9 de enero de 2015): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930614000891.
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AbstractThis article examines Karl Barth's engagement with the philosophy of religion of Ludwig Feuerbach. InThe Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach proposes that religion is a function of human projection and that the Christian concept of God represents the crystallisation in one objectified subject of all the finite perfections of individual human beings. InChurch Dogmatics, I/2, Barth seeks to respond to Feuerbach's critique of Christianity by affirming Feuerbach's critical account of the nature of religion but arguing that, since the original impetus of Christianity issues not from human projection but from God's act of self-revelation in Jesus Christ, Feuerbach's critique of religion does not apply to the Christian faith. Glasse notes that this response, whilst satisfactory to the Christian, would be ‘not intelligible’ to those who do not accept the Christian faith. Furthermore, Barth's apologetic manoeuvre, Vogel claims, entails that Barth is unable to defend the plausibility of the Christian faith on the terms set by secular culture, and that Christian theology is therefore required to abandon any attempt to participate constructively in general public discourse. Vogel recognises that this is a drastic recourse indeed, observing that it would be judicious for Christian theology to seek to elaborate a response to Feuerbach's critique which can stand without requiring the critic to assume the veracity of the Christian faith. This article argues that, by taking into account the role of Feuerbach's earlier work,Thoughts on Death and Immortality, for constituting the philosophical impetus of Feuerbach's critique of Christianity, the Christian theologian is able, using Barth's theological anthropology, to provide a response to Feuerbach's critique on Feuerbach's own terms. InThoughts on Death and Immortality, Feuerbach argues that Protestant Christianity, as the paradigmatic expression of religion, conceives the individual as an absolute being, and that, due to the fact that everyday existence clearly counter-indicates this absolutisation of the human individual, Protestantism posits a second, eternal life, in which the limits bound up with individual existence are eradicated. Using Barth's theological anthropology inChurch Dogmatics, III/2 and III/4, this article proposes that Barth concurs with Feuerbach's critique of the absolutisation of the individual, but that he is positioned to deny that this absolutised conception of the individual has anything to do with the Christian faith insofar as he accurately represents it.
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Tomaszewska, Anna. "Kant on the Relations between Church and State: An Introduction to the Special Edition". Diametros 17, n.º 65 (29 de septiembre de 2020): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.33392/diam.1652.
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This introduction is divided into two parts. First, drawing on Paul Guyer’s suggestion that we should turn to Kant to reinvestigate the foundations of religious liberty, I outline Kant’s views on the relations between the ethical (‘church’) and the political (‘state’) community, as presented in Part Three of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, focusing in particular on his arguments for separation between religion and the state. Examining critically the idea to employ Kant in contemporary debates, I claim that Kant’s account of pure moral faith and the church as its ‘vehicle’ may pose difficulties for any argument for religious liberty that appeals to his thought. For Kant is better equipped to offer resources to overcome rather than to accommodate the fact of so-called “moral pluralism,” i.e. the condition in which the principle of religious liberty can find its application. In the second part, I summarise the arguments of the authors who contribute to this volume: D. Jakušić, W. Kozyra, S. Lo Re, G.E. Michalson Jr., and S.R. Palmquist.
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Swinburne, Richard. "Arguments from Design". Think 1, n.º 1 (2002): 49–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175600000087.
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Is it reasonable to believe in God? Many suppose that belief in God is a matter of faith, not reason. Here, Richard Swinburne, Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford University, argues that there are a number of arguments which, taken together, actually provide good grounds for supposing that God exists.
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SÁENZ-BADILLOS, Ángel. "Fe, razón y hermenéutica en el pensamiento de los judíos hispanos". Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 3 (1 de octubre de 1996): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.21071/refime.v3i.9714.
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Faith, reason and hermeneutic in the thought of The Spanish Jews. The history of the Jewish Philosophy differenciates two big tendencies among the Spanish Jews in the Middle Ages: the philosophy and the cabbala. However I think that we must take into consideration other aspects such as the mussulman culture and religion, the living together with the Christian culture and the contact with the European Jews whose problem was similar to the difficulties of the Spanish Jews.
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Schulting, Dennis. "The Functionality of Christian Life: Problems of The Early Hegel's Epistemology of Religion". Hegel Bulletin 27, n.º 1-2 (2006): 107–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200007564.
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In this paper I want to explore a central line of reasoning in Hegel's early philosophy of religion, which he expounded in fragments he wrote while he was in Bern and Frankfurt in the 1790's. These fragments are known under the titles, Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum (dated around 1793–94), Die Positivität der christlichen Religion (1795–96), Entwürfe über Religion und Liebe, and a later essay entitled Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksat, they were written sometime between 1798 and 1800, a few years before Hegel published his seminal Jena texts, but they remained unpublished in his lifetime. These texts have, since Nohl's edition of 1907, come to be known collectively as Hegel's ‘theologische Jugendschriften’. I believe that they contain the inchoate system of Hegel's thought in general and his mature philosophy of religion in particular. My main claim here is that Hegel believes that there is an intimate relation between reason and religion, so much so in fact that one can argue that there is reason in religion.In the first section of my paper, I elaborate on some general problems concerning the relation between faith and reason, in particular, concerning the criterion of truth and viewpoint-neutrality. In the second section, I introduce Hegel's well-known problematic of the sublation of conceptual oppositions, which in the context of an account of the positivity of religion he already articulates, in some form, in these early documents and which may provide a solution for the problems that, in the first section, I argue arise around the relation between faith and reason. This will be merely a rough outline. I subsequently discuss, very briefly, some central aspects of Kant's philosophy of religion, to which to an important extent Hegel's is indebted. In the fourth section, I go on to indicate, also very broadly, the sense in which Hegel attempts to improve upon Kant and thus apparently proves to be more consistent than him. I then raise an issue concerning Hegel's particularist position in his epistemology of religion, which does not sit well with the notion of rationality as viewpoint-neutral. To illustrate this, I look at Hegel's reading of the Eucharist. This is all very sketchy and is meant mainly to elucidate the sense in which, according to Hegel, there is reason in religion.
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Benhabib, Seyla. "Habermas’ neue Phänomenologie des Geistes: Zwei Jahrhunderte nach Hegel". Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 69, n.º 4 (1 de agosto de 2021): 507–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0046.
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Abstract Jürgen Habermas’s opus magnum, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, synthesises his impressive work of the last half century. His thesis is that the modern project of the normativity of “rational freedom” can be reconstructed as a learning process of the conflictual dialogue between reason and faith, philosophy and religion in the West. Furthermore, under conditions of a world society, cross-cultural communication across lifeworlds, based on such normative principles, is possible. I argue that Habermas’s argument recapitulates a claim first made in The Phenomenology of Spirit by Hegel, who presented the normativity of modernity through a narrative unfolding between two epistemological standpoints, namely, that of consciousness and “we.” Just like Hegel, in order to defend the idea of a Lernprozess, Habermas too must presuppose a unified subject called “we;” furthermore the development of such subjectivity unfolds in a homogeneous temporal process that is then assumed to be the same for all mankind. I call this a form of “historicism,” and juxtapose recent historical writing that presents the narrative of modernity and the emergence of world-society as a much more diverse and fractured process than Hegel’s and Habermas’s methodology. “Die Einbeziehung der Anderen,” I argue, must involve including the voices of those others who do not experience the normative of modernity as a process like the one unfolding between faith and reason in the West. Nevertheless, I conclude that this plea for a more complex narrative that “provincialises Europe,” (Dipesh Chakrabarty) is not a rejection of the normative legacy of modern rationality and freedom that are based on the ideals of fallibilism, refutability and revisability through a rational community of inquirers.
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Early, Christian E. "Beyond Faith and Reason: The Consequences of Alasdair Maclntyre's Conception of Tradition-Constituted Rationality for Philosophy of Religion". Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 19, n.º 2 (abril de 2002): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026537880201900212.
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Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. "Kierkegaard contra Hegel on the ‘Absolute Paradox’". Hegel Bulletin 30, n.º 1-2 (2009): 54–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000914.
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In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel propounds three interrelated theses:(1) The radical continuity of religion and philosophy:The subject of religion as of philosophy is the eternal truth in its objectivity, is God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is not worldly wisdom, but knowledge of the non-worldly, not knowledge of the outer substance, of empirical being and life, but knowledge of what is eternal, of what God is and what emanates from his nature. For this nature must reveal and develop itself. Philosophy therefore explicates itself only by explicating religion, and by thus explicating itself, explicates religion … Hence religion and philosophy collapse into each other; philosophy is indeed itself religious service [Gottesdienst]. (Hegel 1986c: 28)(2) The view that philosophy renders in conceptual form the essence of what Christianity consists in and thus transcends the merely subjective vantage-point of faith:In philosophy religion obtains its justification from the thinking consciousness … Faith already contains the true content, but it still misses the form of thought. All previously considered forms — feeling, representation — can have the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true form which makes the true content necessary. Thought is the absolute judge before whom the content needs to prove and justify itself, (ibid.: 341)(3) Philosophy alone shows Christianity to be rational and necessary:This vantage-point [of philosophy] is therefore the justification of religion, especially of the Christian, the true religion; it apprehends [erkennen] the content in its necessary form [nach seiner Notwendigkeit], according to reason; at the same time it also knows the forms in the development of this content. (ibid.: 339)
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Frolova, E. A. "The “Arab Reason” in Islamic Culture (Middle Ages)". Islam in the modern world 15, n.º 4 (8 de enero de 2020): 37–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.22311/2074-1529-2019-15-4-37-54.
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The expression “Arab reason” is quite multifaceted: it poses different problems at the same time: the problem of reason as such and its connection with the Arab language and Arab culture. In order to understand the complexity of the task or at least part of it we need to immerse ourselves in different layers of culture: in religion of Islam, theology, science of law, philosophy, poetry and folklore. Historical and cultural view on the “reason” makes it possible to highlight its epistemological aspects, its ambiguity and even plurality of the familiar phenomenon of “reason”. The perspective on the “reason” in close connection with the changes happening in Arab culture and nations that entered the Caliphate allows you to see its preserved connection with the pre-islamic worldview. It allows you to see remnants of consciousness of the “jahiliyya” era and the emergence of new forms of perception, understanding of the world, such as the “science of faith”, logic, philosophy, natural sciences and society.
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Vroom, Hendrik M. "Does Theology Presuppose Faith?" Scottish Journal of Theology 45, n.º 2 (mayo de 1992): 145–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003693060003862x.
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One reason why the legitimacy of theology as an academic discipline is disputed, is the claim that theology presupposes faith. Such a presupposition, it is said, constitutes a danger for the academic nature of theology and, indirectly, its place in the university; in an academic discipline a scholar cannot proceed from a specific consideration which can not be discussed and which one can not give up without placing oneself outside that discipline, i.e., Christian theology. Therefore, while Christian theology is a valid intellectual pursuit for Christians who reflect on the content of their faith, it does not fall within the contours of an academic discipline which is universally accessible. Such is the rationale, and it involves not only Christian but Jewish and Islamic theology as well and in general all reflection on religion and philosophy of life which is undertaken in particular circles and which proceeds from unverifiable assumptions which lack universal endorsement. In this article we are concerned with the objection that theology is not properly academic (‘wissenschaftlich’) because of its unverifiable presupposition that God exists and its being connected to a particular religious community. Theology presupposes faith, it is said, and the point of dispute is whether any academic discipline may have such a presupposition. Three different things may be implied by this objection.
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Crowe, Ben. "Fichte, Eberhard, and the Psychology of Religion". Harvard Theological Review 104, n.º 1 (23 de diciembre de 2010): 93–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017816011000071.
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In marked contrast to much of twentieth-century psychology and philosophy, prevailing accounts of affect, emotion, and sentiment in the eighteenth century took these phenomena to be rational and, to a certain extent, cognitive.1 Because of a combination of disciplinary diffusion and general lack of physicalist assumptions, accounts of affectivity in the eighteenth century also tended to be quite flexible and nuanced. This is particularly true of an influential stream of Anglo-Scottish and German thought on morality, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. Following Shaftesbury, many of the most prominent philosophers of the century regarded affective states and processes as playing a crucial role in accounts of value. In most cases, this tendency was combined with a sort of anti-rationalism, that is, with a tendency to minimize the role of reason in everything from common sense perceptual knowledge to religious belief. Hutcheson's moral sense theory and his well-known and influential criticisms of moral rationalism exemplify this trend.2 It is perhaps more pronounced in Lord Kames, who followed the lead of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in aesthetics, moral theory, philosophy of religion, anthropology, and history.3 In Germany, this stream of thought was quite well-received by philosophers both inside and outside the dominant Wolffian tradition.4 Particularly important and influential in this respect were Johann Georg Hamann, who drew upon Hutcheson, Hume, and the “Common Sense” school to defend a conception of faith as “sentiment (Empfindung),” and Johann Gottfried Herder, a polymath and philosophical pioneer whose work in psychology, anthropology, history, aesthetics, biblical criticism, and theology consistently stresses the fundamental role of passion, affect, and sensibility in every aspect of human culture.5
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Carter, Lief H. "Faith, Reason, and Political Life Today Edited by Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 272p. $70.00 cloth, $24.00 paper." American Political Science Review 96, n.º 3 (septiembre de 2002): 615–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402280363.
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These 14 essays range as far and wide as the sprawling title of this collection implies. The papers originated at a 1999 interdisciplinary conference at Berry College on politics, religion, and community. Most of the authors teach at Southern colleges. They come not only from political science and government departments but also from philosophy, English, sociology, religion, and theology departments. Twelve of the 14 are male. On first glance the collection might appear to be “traditional.” Indeed, many of the essays, e.g., Daniel Mahoney's treatment of Solzhenitsyn on “Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations,” explicitly raise religious themes and questions.
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Omotayo Foluke, Siwoku-Awi. "Philosophy of Religion and Religious Pluralism from Biblical Perspective and Their Implications for Christian Education". International Journal of Culture and Religious Studies 2, n.º 1 (2 de julio de 2021): 45–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.47941/ijcrs.603.
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Purpose: Students of Christian Religious Studies should be encouraged to learn about other religions in order to enhance their personal conviction and be tolerant and competent in engaging in meaningful negotiation when mediating in crises. It is an exploratory research that has deployed resources from documents, media and personal interaction and inquiries. Religion is a cause of disunity, tribal disparity, ethnic cleansing and wars in most parts of the world. Religion has empowered some individuals to kill, maim, rape, enslave and self-impose on others. It has been mingled with politics in some countries like Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Middle East, most African countries and many others. The practice of religion has been used to discriminate against job seekers and in matters of welfare. It brings tremendous gains to some people while others are impoverished. Methodology: Real life occurrences as published by the media of people who have been victims of religious intolerance, violence, psychological and sexual slavery. For instance, in the Middle East entire communities are eliminated by murder and rape of children and youths who are abducted to be subjected to indoctrination or kept as hostages until some money is paid on them. These destructive tendencies forestall development. Findings: The findings are: A God-centered religion should emphasize divine qualities in the lives of believers. Compliance with the National Constitution of one’s country is more beneficial than man-made tenets and laws that are of the least benefits to the general public or human progress and which cause dissension and do not necessarily reflect the nature of God, the Creator but that of an invisible personality that only forms a part of human imagination. Faith in God should be a reason to love fellow humans 1John 4:20. Learning philosophy of religion is training in peaceful coexistence. Religion arouses intense emotions; therefore, it may not deploy rationality in fostering good human relations and respect of the rights of opponents. Unique Contribution To Theory, Practice And Policy: This article contributes to contemporary realities by proposing that democratic governments should institute peace and order by enabling equal rights of worship, freedom of religion, of choice and of self-expression. The research leans heavily on the Bible and the claims of Jesus Christ, a fact of history, whose moral perfection, peaceful lifestyle, teaching and philosophy express values that are worthy of emulation for human development, progress and peace. Key words: pluralism, philosophy of religion, Bible tenets, Islam, Ba’hai, Buddhism
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Arcadi, James M. y Joshua R. Farris. "Editorial: New Themes in Analytic Dogmatic Theology". TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2, n.º 1 (27 de marzo de 2018): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.14428/thl.v2i1.1673.
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Analytic theology (AT) is a particular approach to theology and the study of religion that engages with the tools, categories, and methodological concerns of analytic philosophy. As a named-entity, AT arrived on the academic scene with the 2009 Oxford University Press publication, Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, edited by Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea. AT was arguably represented, prior to this publication, by the proto-analytic theologian Richard Swinburne in his noteworthy works on Christian doctrine (e.g. Providence and the Problem of Evil, Responsibility and Atonement, The Christian God, Faith and Reason, and The Resurrection of God Incarnate), as well as by other professional philosophers of religion such as Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Richard Swinburne, William Alston, Eleonore Stump, Robert and Marilyn McCord Adams, Basil Mitchell, Keith Yandell, Paul Helm, and Stephen T. Davis, among others. These philosophers were addressing such topics as the coherence of theism, the rationality of religious belief, and the contributions of such philosophical theologians of the medieval past including Thomas Aquinas or William Ockham and those from modernity including René Descartes and Jonathan Edwards. Yet, the impetus for utilizing analytic philosophy to treat these topics emerged, not from the theological side of the conversation, but from the philosophical side. Anachronistically, then, the term “analytic theology” seems to aptly describe the work of these philosophers of religion.
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METTINI, EMILIANO. "UNDER AN UNSTARRY SKY: KANTIAN ETHICS AND RADICAL EVIL". Arhe 27, n.º 34 (17 de marzo de 2021): 241–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.19090/arhe.2020.34.241-274.
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Kantian ethics and concept concerning “radical evil” represent one of the most interesting facets of moral reflection of German philosopher. Using anthropological and philosophical approach based on well-known critical method, I. Kant tried to find a comprise between “natural” behavior (i.e. not regulated by synthetic a priori judgments) but based only on sensation of pleasant unpleasant and “rational” behavior when humans tried to exit the realm of appearance and personal egoism for entering a new ethical dimension based on right (not pathological, if using I. Kant’s word) maxims being able to make human beings better than they are. In the paper it is underscored that main goal of Kantian ethics is the creation of a community where religion is a fact of reason and not of faith and reason, having as main actors men reaching an high level of self-consciousness and virtue that I. Kant granted as the greatest happiness one can have. The author tried to highlight the passage from “human being” as individuum (representative of a species) to ethically autonomous member of social consortium using as sources different Kantian works where this problem has been studied deeply and gave great emphasis to story of Job, representing in the best way the passage the Author wrote of. At the same time, he set for himself the goal of exploring progressive character of Kantian ethics aimed at making human beings better than they are, but not the best, considering noumenic nature of ethics hidden in the “Realm of goals”. Given such assumptions, the Author leads a debate with scholars distorting Kantian ethical thought by interpretation from Lacanian standpoints so that those scholars made I. Kant original source of totalitarianisms, where, in scholars’ opinion, humans do their duty both for saving their lives and express their sadistic tendencies and makes clear that Kantian ethics, throughout contradictory and complicated, is oriented to correction and education of human behavior for saving humans being from their own passions.
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Joubin, Rebecca. "ISLAM AND ARABS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE: THE “OTHER” AS A CASE OF FRENCH CULTURAL SELF-CRITICISM". International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, n.º 2 (mayo de 2000): 197–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800021085.
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The 18th-century European Enlightenment championed rational philosophy and scientific methodology, rather than any form of traditional theology, as the way to understand the objective truth.1 In their quest for the fundamental truth, France's philosophes, the rational and anticlerical intellectuals of the Age of Reason, were forced to brave official censorship, persecution, and imprisonment as they disentangled themselves from their Christian heritage. Thus, the French Enlightenment was informed by a dualistic view of history—an ongoing contest between reason and faith. Although faith had gained ascendancy with Christianity's triumph over classical antiquity in the late 3rd and 4th centuries, according to the philosophes, many of whom served as key contributors to the Encyclopédie, religion and science had once again joined battle in the 18th century, this time with science and reason poised to overcome religious irrationality.2 In this context, the renowned philosophe Voltaire, in his highly controversial Dictionnaire Philosophique (1764), attacks Christian dogma, refutes the tenet of Christ's divine nature, and rejects the possibility of miracles as running contrary to all scientific evidence.3 Similarly, in Système de la Nature (1770), another philosophe, d'Holbach, deplores man's pursuit of the chimeras of religious revelation and refusal to engage in rational methods of inquiry.4 The arguments of Voltaire and d'Holbach are just two examples of the French Enlightenment tenet that knowledge can be based only on science and reason.
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Kuznetsova, Kateryna. "The dynamics of secularization as a process of mutual learning of philosophy and religion". Filosofiya osvity. Philosophy of Education 26, n.º 2 (25 de junio de 2021): 43–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2020-26-2-3.
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The article deals with the current stage of development of society, associated with the formation of a new type of relationship between the secular and the religious consciousness. If in the secular society of the recent past, these relations were based on the domination of secular ideology, and religious consciousness was interpreted as the evolutionary past of society, the significance of which decreases with social progress until the complete disappearance of religion, then post-secular culture is associated with the formation of a new constructive attitude towards the religious consciousness as an immanent component of social consciousness, which does not disappear with the development of society, but only changes the forms of expression, as well as with the formation of an equal dialogue between secular and religious. Post-secularism does not mean a return to the dominant position of religion and does not cancel the achievement of the secular paradigm. Secularism has transcoding the cultural matrix, therefore, it is no longer possible to take a central meaning and value-forming place in the culture of religion and confessional traditions that once gave birth to this culture. In addition, globalization creates a situation of interaction of religious traditions, unprecedented in the history of mankind, within the framework of one cultural and legal field. We are no longer talking about oppression by more progressive traditions of spiritually primitive traditions (Christianity or Islam in relation to paganism) - traditions with highly developed spiritual, intellectual and missionary potential have to interact with each other. Post-secularity means not only a critical revision of the stage consciousness, but also openness, receptivity, and at least interest in all the various forms of human religiosity. Secularization must be understood, according to J. Habermas, as the dual and complementary learning. Modernization embraces religious and secular consciousness, modifying them. This process of learning, change and enrichment is the essence of the post-secular era. The main characteristic of post-secular society is the "two-way learning process" of faith and reason, or their correlation. In the field of education, the necessary result of the formation of a post-secular society is the introduction of dialogue and tolerance as necessary principles of educational activity and the absence of discrimination on religious grounds.
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Levy, Gabriel. "Biblical Prophecy in Recent American Theological Politics". Postscripts: The Journal of Sacred Texts, Cultural Histories, and Contemporary Contexts 2, n.º 1 (20 de mayo de 2007): 59–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/post.v2i1.59.
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This article argues for the relevance of biblical thought to progressive political philosophy. One of the most significant problems for political philosophy is the role that religion, and particularly the role that biblical faith, ought to play. Philosopher Leo Strauss provided some of the most influential answers to this problem. He is also often credited with providing some of the intellectual foundation for the “neoconservative” movement. In particular, Strauss addressed two questions relevant to today’s political environment: What is the role of truth in politics? And, what is the relation between philosophical reason and prophetic revelation? This article offers a genealogy of the concept of prophecy with particular focus on sexuality and media technology. It juxtaposes a biblical story with a modern one about how religious sovereigns come to acquire information about things beyond their control. It concludes with the argument that the Bush doctrine is an anathema to Straussian political philosophy. Neither Bush’s invocation of prophecy nor his neoconservatism provide him any theoretical ground to walk on.
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Sandkaulen, Birgit. "Glaube und Vernunft". History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 18, n.º 1 (5 de abril de 2015): 52–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01801006.
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The question of the relationship between faith and reason marks one of the fundamental issues for classical German philosophy. The paper is guided by a systematic interest in identifying some common features in the approaches taken by Kant and Hegel that are also of interest for the contemporary discussion: 1. The specific modernity of Kant’s and Hegel’s considerations, evident in their rejection of the resources traditionally appealed to by religion and rationalist metaphysics; 2. the anti-naturalist conviction that, in contrast to animals, a metaphysical dimension is inscribed into the human mind; and 3. the thesis that metaphysical questions are existential questions arising from an impulse toward freedom, and hence that a purely theoretical approach is inadequate to address them.
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Gołębiewska, Maria. "Miguel de Unamuno’s Anthropological Theses – From Tragedy to Transcendence". Tekstualia 1, n.º 5 (31 de diciembre de 2019): 135–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.4106.
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The aim of the text is to provide a preliminary discussion of the assumptions and anthropological theses in Miguel de Unamuno’s philosophy, mainly because of his best-known book from 1912 Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (Tragic Sense of Life). Unamuno’s extensive deliberations can be considered in many contexts: ontological, epistemological, ethical and axiological. However, anthropological theses seem to be dominant in his thoughts. In Unamuno’s anthropological theses, especially in his affi rmation of human existence, it is easy to see references to religious thought and theology (Catholic and Protestant). Unamuno infl uenced the further development of philosophy and his theses can be considered as a presentation of the main philosophical problems of the 20th century: the identity of the individual, the sense of existence, the individualisation of life goals and choices, freedom as a task facing the individual, the impermanence of norms and the search for lasting values, senses and meanings. It is easy to notice that what makes Unamuno’s theses stand out is the anthropocentrism of his theses, i.e. the belief in the original – in an ontological sense – essence of humanity. Unamuno, in his anthropological theses, captures the essence and existence of humanity, but the starting point is always the concrete, individual human being and its existence. In characterising humans, Unamuno describes the human effort and desire for immortality, adopts the assumptions of historical relativism, referring at the same time to the permanent and unchanging sphere of transcendence. He assumes an inherently diverse human being, which is internally contradictory. This internal contradiction results in different anthropologies, but also in a differentiated identity of the individual. The tragic character of the mundane existence relates to the irremovable aporias of the spiritual and the material in humans, as well as reason and will, aspiration and inability. Faith in God is the decisive element in the tragic existence of humans, which is nevertheless affi rmed by Unamuno. It is this existence in a mundane form that we wish to preserve through immortality and our way towards transcendence.
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Davison, Aidan. "Ruling the Future? Heretical Reflections on Technology and Other Secular Religions of Sustainability". Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology 12, n.º 2-3 (2008): 146–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853508x359958.
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AbstractI argue that the quest for sustainability in Western societies has been shaped by the secular religion of technology. Technological endeavor and moral reflection have been held apart in this quest, with the result that reformist and transformative approaches to sustainability often overlook articles of modern faith in technology. Instrumentalist appeals to eco-efficiency and environmentalist appeals to nature implicitly invest technology with transcendent significance. In response, I rely upon accounts of practical reason in outlining a secular strategy for constituting sustainability as practical moral endeavor. Characterizing this endeavor as faithfulness in the task of sustaining a good world, I suggest that skillful handling of the moral and ontological substance of technology is the very essence of sustainability.
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Mantzanas, Michail. "Reincarnation in Plato and in the Christian Perspective". Peitho. Examina Antiqua, n.º 1(6) (9 de febrero de 2016): 195–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2015.1.10.
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The present study focuses on research about reincarnation in order to formulate some preliminary conclusions concerning various philosophical theories. The overview extends over a considerable period range, from ancient Greek and up to the patristic tradition. The relevant issues include the problem of evil, the question of human decomposition and death as well as reincarnation (metempsychosis) in the Platonic thought. The problem of evil is a problem of reason that emerges from the philosophical background of ancient Greek thought but also from the subsequent Christian patristic thought and transforms itself into diverse concepts (e.g. the significance of justice). According to the original thought of Socrates, evil is associated with ignorance and good with knowledge. This point of view is given a brief review in the philosophical thought of several important representatives of the patristic tradition (e.g., Origen and Gregory of Nyssa). On the other hand, the idea of immortality of the soul, which dates to the religious movement of the Orphic mysteries (seventh century BC) means that the persistence of the immortal soul at the moment of death needs the use of a new body. This essay will try to analyze the ancient character of the myth of reincarnation through the perspectives of philosophy and religion.
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Zainuddin, M. "AKSIOLOGI DALAM PERSPEKTIF ISLAM". El-HARAKAH (TERAKREDITASI) 4, n.º 2 (12 de agosto de 2008): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/el.v4i2.4632.
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<p>Islam is the religion of Allah which contains the teachings and guidance that must be held and used as a guidance by its adherents to the happiness of the world and in the afterlife. The teachings of Islam include the teachings of monotheism and shari'a or faith and charity. Of course these aspects of Islamic teachings must be understood well through learning or seeking knowledge. This is where science is necessary and important. Thus science is part of the religion itself. It occupies a position or as part of religion and has a function as an instrument or means to obtain the goal of religion, which is to obtain the happiness of the world and the hereafter. In other words, the relationship between religion and science is symbiotic, because religion calls on the pursuit of science and gives a noble position to the scientist. Similarly, the relationship occurs between religion and philosophy. Both have the same direction. Philosophy is the knowledge of what is right. The religion explains what is right and good based on revelation and reason.</p><p> </p><p>Islam adalah agama Allah SWT yang berisikan ajaran-ajaran dan tuntunan yang harus dipegang dan dijadikan pedoman oleh pemeluknya untuk kebahagiaan dunia maupun di akhirat. Ajaran-ajaran Islam tersebut meliputi ajaran tauhid dan syari’ah atau iman dan amal. Sudah barang tentu aspek-aspek ajaran Islam tersebut harus dipahami dan dimengerti melalui belajar atau mencari ilmu. Di sinilah ilmu itu perlu dan penting. Dengan demikian ilmu merupakan bagian dari agama itu sendiri. Ia menempat posisi atau kedudukan sebagai bagian dari agama dan memiliki fungsi sebagai instrumen/sarana untuk memperoleh tujuan agama, yaitu memperoleh kebahagiaan dunia maupun akhirat. Dengan kata lain, hubungan agama dan ilmu bersifat simbiotik, karena agama menyeru pada pencarian ilmu dan memberikan posisi mulia bagi ilmuwan. Demikian pula hubungan antara agama dan filsafat. Keduanya memiliki arah yang sama. Filsafat adalah pengetahuan tentang apa yang benar. Adapun agama menerangkan apa yang benar dan baik berdasarkan wahyu dan akal.</p>
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Dube, Bekithemba. "Is Gabola a Decolonial Church or Another Trajectory of Freedom of Religion in Post-Colonial South Africa? Rethinking Ethical Issues in Religious Praxis". Religions 10, n.º 3 (7 de marzo de 2019): 167. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10030167.
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In this paper, I interrogated the Gabola church in terms of its origins, purpose and its distinctiveness as a postcolonial manifestation of freedom of religion in South Africa. I answered two questions, is Gabola church a representation of a decolonial church and could it be a manifestation of trajectories of the postcolonial ill-defined freedom of religion? In responding to these questions, I used decoloniality, a theory whose agenda among many others is geared to usher a future free from oppression, where all can participate in modernity and in postmodernity. Data was generated through participatory action research. The approach enabled us to unearth the theology of Gabola, philosophy and the gap they seek to fill in the religious space. Ten Gabola church members and five church members from a mainline Christian movement participated in this research. The findings indicated that Gabola church presents a new religious movement that is socially inclusive, that seeks to promote social justice and social transformation. On the other hand, the research revealed that the lack of a regulating body for religious movement is the reason for the rise of questionable movements such as Gabola, a serious threat in the praxis of the Christian faith. To this end, I concluded that while freedom of religion is a good idea in line with the decolonial move, there is a need for participative and collaborative regulation of religious movement to eliminate criminal elements that overshadowed the beauty of religion manifested through ‘unthinkable’ ethical irregularities.
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Krasnova, A. G. "V.S. Solovyov on the dynamics of religious consciousness". Solov’evskie issledovaniya, n.º 4 (15 de diciembre de 2019): 71–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.17588/2076-9210.2019.4.071-082.
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This article deals with the concept of the dynamics of religious consciousness in the philosophy of V. S. Solovyov, where one of the main characteristics of religious consciousness is the process of its gradual formation. It analyzes the basic concepts which help to understand Solovyov’s idea of the dynamics of religious consciousness : consciousness, self-consciousness, spirit, personality, reason. The article presents Solovyov’s views on the dynamic aspect of religious consciousness as a God-human process in which the content of religious consciousness is the divine revelation. This aspect is considered in the article both from the point of view of the historical process of development of religious consciousness, and at the level of individual religious consciousness. The understanding of human freedom and human immortality as two basic truths of human nature from the point of view of both universality and unity of the human spirit is proposed. The author substantiates the idea that in the individual human life the process of disclosing of the divine revelation is sense-forming, in the sense that it constitutes the essence of man’s spiritual being, but this process is impossible without free human volition. It is concluded that this process involves all the spiritual forces of the individual (volition, reason and feelings), as well as religious faith, the creative activity of the individual, and the human spirit being understood by Vl. Solovyov as an integral intelligent being. It is proposed to consider the three temptations of mankind, set out in Vl. Solovyov’s "Lectures on Godmanhood" on the historical path of Western Christianity, at the level of individual religious consciousness in the context of modernity. It is revealed that it is the religious consciousness of the individual, where the "meeting place" of God and the individual human spirit happens.
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Michelsen, William. "Om Grundtvigdebatten med svar til mine kritikere". Grundtvig-Studier 43, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 1992): 97–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/grs.v43i1.16078.
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About the Grundtvig Debate, with Answers to my CriticsBy William MichelsenThis article has been written from the general principle that a distinction must be made between ascertaining what Grundtvig wrote in poetry or prose, and the individual scholars’ personal (existential) attitudes to it, even though such attitudes will inevitably colour their mode of expression. The essential thing is to maintain the fundamentally objective attitude as crucial to research. Kim Arne Pedersen's »Hermeneutic Reflections« in »Grundtvig Studier«, 1991, on the articles in Grundtvig’s »Danne-Virke«, 1816-19, consist by and large in an excellent summary of my introductions to these articles. The English summary, however, claims that it was his intention to give »a new interpretation« of these articles. As a matter of fact, the main view in his interpretation is the same as that taken by Henning Høirup in his thesis »Grundtvig’s view of faith and cognition« from 1949, viz. that Grundtvig’s thinking is influenced by the philosophy which he had learned at the University of Copenhagen, and which mainly reflected Leibniz and Wolff, while not including Kant’s philosophy. - However, Kim Arne Pedersen claims himself that he is »fascinated« by the post-Kantian idealistic philosophy, thus siding with Grundtvig’s contemporaries.He is right, of course, that this is an existential question. I can only answer that as far as I myself am concerned. I do not consider it possible to combine pre-Kantian thinking with a post-Kantian philosophy of idealism. In fact, I do not believe it is at all possible to combine the Christian faith or a Christian view of life with an idealistic philosophy.I think I have learned this from Grundtvig whom I regard as the best guide I know, if - that is true - the development that he underwent through his lifetime is carefully followed. A religion which builds its truth on a philosophy of one kind or the other, is no genuine religion. It will collapse the moment this philosophy is contradicted by reality. In his »Prospect of the World Chronicle« 1817, Grundtvig writes about Leibniz referring to his Theodic.: »..Pillars may collapse, and what rests on them totters, when they are shaken; thus also a disciple of Leibniz nearly tore them down before they had been erected, and this disciple, who meant to surpass his master by tearing down the Church and building a world on the remains, was, as is well-known, nobody else but Christian Wolff from Breslau« (p.409).With these words in mind, it seems impossible to me to regard Grundtvig as only a pupil of Leibniz and Wolff, though his teacher in philosophy undeniably was. The only contemporary thinker that absorbed Grundtvig for a short time, was Schelling. Grundtvig’s relationship to him has been discussed in C.I. Scharling’s book »Grundtvig and Romanticism« (1947), which was reviewed by me in Grundtvig Studier 1948. The book is important because it definitely refutes the view claimed by Edvard Lehmann in 1931, viz. that Grundtvig was actually a pupil of Schelling, and thus a philosophical idealist. But, as does Grundtvig himself, Scharling points out that even after 1810 Grundtvig could give credit to Schelling where he found he was right.As a literary historian with the methodology of the history of ideas as the foundation for my work, I must of course record these essential prerequisites for Grundtvig’s thinking and writings. My overall approach is this: What was the peculiar character of Grundtvig’s work and thought? From such an approach it seems to me quite reasonable that in my discussion of the manuscript »Grenzen der Menschheit« I distinguish between what Grundtvig accepts in Schelling, and what as a Christian he must reject.Grundtvig’s relationship to Kant depends on what he has read from him, and when he read it. He does not enter into a philosophical critique of Kant, of whom he had shown unreserved recognition in »Brief View of the World Chronicle« 1812. He confines himself to proposing an alternative to Kant’s philosophy, which, it is true, is founded on pre-Kantian philosophy, but at the same time - and this is crucial - in the faith in the Almighty Trinity who allows of no selfcontradiction, and whose power Grundtvig thought, as late as 1817, could be demonstrated through the course of world history.As long as Grundtvig only knew Kant’s philosophy of religion, i.e., in 1812, he thought that the reservation implied in the title, »Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blo.en Vernunft« was enough to ensure that faith did not succumb to reason. When, in 1815, he read »Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft« he understood that faith had succumbed to reason, that man’s limitation had been exceeded, and that the maxim of contradiction had been reduced to a rule of formal logic. That is why his evaluation of Kant, in the World Chronicle of 1817, turns out to be very different.The intention of my article in Grundtvig Studier 1991 about .The Way from Force to Freedom in Grundtvig’s Life and Writings. was not to contradict Kaj Thanings thesis »Man first... « (1963), as it is claimed in the »Reply«, preceeding the present article. My approach in that article was a different one from Thaning’s; hence the difference in the treatment of the same texts which anyone can see, and which it would be absurd of me to deny. We see the texts from different points of view, and that is why they look different.In the view of both Thaning and myself, the watershed in Grundtvig’s body of work is .Norse Mythology., 1832. What I have added is the essential explanation of why this is so, viz. that after becoming a clergyman in 1811, Grundtvig found himself compelled to dissociate himself from the view that had taken him back to a religious view of life in the first place, namely Norse mythology. Thaning is right in claiming that it was internal causes that led to the ruptures that occurred in Grundtvig’s development. But they were provoked by external circumstances. I am not just referring to his parents’ demands on him in 1810, but also to the demands of the State Church on anyone who is a clergyman.I agree with Thaning that the relation between human life and Christianity was the main problem in Grundtvig’s life. When one is a clergyman, this relation becomes a theological problem, which it does not necessarily have to be if one is not a clergyman. I would describe what happened in Grundtvig’s life in 1832 like this: »The scales fell from Grundtvig’s eyes when he decided to write his new Norse Mythology«. He now dared to write that book without being afraid of losing his Christianity in doing so. He was free and could freely accept becoming a vicar to a congregation that wanted him. He was free to describe Norse mythology as a language of symbols which lent itself to historical explanation and to poetical consideration, without, in so doing, making it into his religion. The essential thing, in my view, is that he had given up wanting to demonstrate the truth of Christianity by means of history. Christianity remains a faith which is inextricably bound up with the Mosaic-Christian view, which is therefore the »only divine, true, and eternal one«. This new attitude depends on his discovery that faith must be a free matter if it is to be honest and true at all.In my opinion, it is no weakness to admit the justification of other views than one’s own. It is a prerequisite for cooperation and team-work.
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Schmidt, Josef. "TEOLOGIA FILOSÓFICA E DIÁLOGO RELIGIOSO". Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 42, n.º 134 (1 de mayo de 2016): 423. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v42n134p423-441/2015.
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Resumo: O diálogo entre as diversas concepções do mundo, hoje tão urgente, especialmente o diálogo com as religiões e entre as religiões, só poderá ter sucesso se os parceiros estiverem dispostos a e forem capazes de levar a sério uns aos outros no cerne de suas convicções. Já que se trata de convicções últimas que de per si contêm uma pretensão universal, a razão é o espaço comum de tal diálogo. O seu cultivo é tarefa da filosofia, que se torna neste caso um parceiro qualificado, porque a transcendência como tema das religiões é também seu objeto. É o que mostram os diferentes argumentos da transcendência elaborados na filosofia, que como demonstrações de Deus constituem a ponte para a religião. São argumentos nucleares da filosofia, já que neles a razão tematiza sua capacidade para superar em princípio seus limites. Os tipos particulares desses argumentos são maneiras intimamente relacionadas da autoexplicitação da razão universal. A dimensão da normatividade e da bondade que assim emerge leva ao problema da teodicéia com o qual a filosofia e a teologia são conjuntamente confrontadas. A respeito desse problema a fé cristã possui um potencial racional especial que tem intensificado nos últimos tempos o diálogo com o budismo.Abstract: The dialogue between the different conceptions of the world, so urgent nowadays, especially the religious dialogue and that between religions, can only succeed if partners are willing and able to take each other seriously, at the heart of their own convictions. As these ultimate convictions contain per se a universal claim, reason must be the common ground for such a dialogue. The task of philosophy, acting here as a qualified partner, is therefore to cultivate dialogue since transcendence is an object of study for both religions and philosophy. This is what the different arguments of transcendence, developed in philosophy, show. Their demonstrations of God serve as a bridge to religion. They are core philosophical arguments since it is through them that reason expresses its ability to overcome, in principle, its own limits. The particularities of these arguments are closely related to the self-explanation of the universal reason. The dimension of normativity and kindness that emerge, brings the problem of theodicy to which both philosophy and theology are confronted. Regarding this issue, the Christian faith has a rational potential that has recently favoured the dialogue with Buddhism.
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Possent, Vittorio. "A ALIANÇA SOCRÁTICO-MOSAICA PÓS-METAFÍSICA, DESELENIZAÇÃO, TERCEIRA NAVEGAÇÃO". Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 36, n.º 116 (5 de enero de 2015): 325. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v36n116p325-353/2009.
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O diálogo entre pensamento secular e pensamento religioso permanece uma encruzilhada recorrente na história do Ocidente (cfr. o debate Habermas-Ratzinger e Bento XVI em Regensburg). No diálogo entram em jogo a crise pós-metafísica da razão e a deselenização, entendida como ruptura da aliança socrático-mosaica, ou seja do acordo entre fé e razão em torno da idéia de verdade. Tal aliança religa filosofia grega (Sócrates) e discurso bíblico (Moisés): a diferença mosaica entre verdadeiro e falso nas religiões se encontra com a diferença socrática entre verdadeiro e falso na razão. A quaestio de veritate e o tema da religio vera não são portanto estranhos ao âmbito da Revelação, enquanto a moderna crítica da religião sustenta que a religião se refere apenas à piedade e ao culto (Spinoza). No interior daquela aliança situa-se o destino da metafísica. Após a ‘segunda navegação’ da metafísica helênica, aconteceu com a filosofia do ser/ actus essendi de Tomás de Aquino uma ‘terceira navegação’, atuada por uma metafísica trans-ôntica que leva a termo a centralidade ontológica do energeia/actus. Para mobilizar a razão pós-moderna contra o derrotismo e o niilismo que a assediam, importa uma retomada da aliança socrático-mosaica. O seu novo pacto poderá acontecer reconhecendo a capacidade veritativa da razão natural, além do âmbito das ciências e da ética, no qual muitos quereriam deter-se.Abstract: The dialogue between secular and religious thinking is still a recurring theme in Western History (see the Habermas/Ratzinger debate and the lecture by Benedict XVI in Regensburg). Within this dialogue, the post-metaphysical crisis of the reason and the dehellenization process are at play, the latter being understood as the breaking of the Socratic-Mosaic alliance, that is, of the agreement between faith and reason regarding the question of truth. Such an alliance reconnects Greek philosophy (Socrates) and biblical discourse (Moses): the Mosaic difference between true and false with regard to religions encounters the Socratic difference between true and false concerning reason. Therefore, the quaestio de veritate and the topic of religio vera are not absent from the context of Revelation, although the modern criticism of religion holds that religion is only a question of piety and cult (Spinoza). The destiny of metaphysics is situated within that alliance. After the second navigation of the Greek metaphysics, a third navigation took place with Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of being/actus essendi, setin motion by a trans-ontic metaphysics leading to the ontological centrality of the energeia/ actus. In order to mobilize the postmodern reason against the defeatism and nihilism by which it is assailed, it is important to return to the Socratic-Mosaic alliance. This new covenant is possible due to the veritative capacity of modern reason which goes beyond the realms of science and ethics, areas where many would like to remain.
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Kostin, Petr. "Philosophy of Responsibility in Mastering the Integrity of Social Life". Logos et Praxis, n.º 1 (diciembre de 2020): 43–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/lp.jvolsu.2020.1.5.
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The author connects the demand for social and philosophical research of the responsibility phenomenon with the need to strengthen the processes of self-identification, due to the decrease in the influence of the value and cultural space of modern society on the individual. The article substantiates the position on the irreducibility of the content of the responsibility category only to its ethical content due to the wider range of its social functions and socio-project potential. It is emphasized that in the space of social relations and their structures, the necessary condition for maintaining the influence of the moral and value world on organizational and technological processes is the development of relations between a person and society based on the relationship of responsibility. For this reason, the importance of a fundamental sociophilosophical study of the content of the responsibility category is associated in the article with overcoming the one-sidedness and incompleteness of its study in certain areas of social relations – medicine, business ethics, law, pedagogy, ecology – and identifying its integrative and project meanings as a factor of sustainable functioning and development of society. Revealing a number of historical and philosophical approaches to the analysis of responsibility, the author shows the connection of this category with the category of "freedom" both in its personal (existentialism of J.-P. Sartre) and transpersonal (representative of the philosophy of the Russian Diaspora S.A. Levitsky) dimensions. However, historical and philosophical experience testifies to the similarity of different methodological positions, which are determined by the fact that the content of the responsibility category reveals the forms of finding the personal meaning of life. The directions of philosophical searches of the XX century also point to the need to take into account, through the perspective of responsibility, the diversity of possibilities in different social circumstances and the understanding that only one of them will be realized. The disclosure of the meaning of responsibility as a norm of intersubjective interaction, in which the interests and needs of society are manifested, indicates its multidimensional nature and differences in the manifestation of the activities of individual and collective subjects of responsibility. Proceeding from this, it is shown that responsibility can be represented as a complex hierarchical system in which the levels that characterize it at the level of general and specific, as well as systemic and specialized knowledge are organically linked. Specifying the working model of connections that reveal the socio-philosophical content of responsibility, the author identifies a number of categories: general theory (society, person, state, social institution, nation, family, etc.); philosophy of Economics (property, labor, production, money, etc.); ethics (justice, conscience, duty, etc.); philosophy of religion and religious studies (God, fate, faith, sin, etc.); axiology (values). Based on the research, it is concluded that the socio-philosophical study of the category "responsibility" is promising, linking its philosophical, ethical and specifically scientific aspects, which is important for the theoretical and practical development of the human dimension and the morally-oriented development of modern society.
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Sudakov, Andrey K. "The Embodied Practical Ideal: Kant’s Ethicotheology and Godmanhood". Kantian journal 40, n.º 2 (2021): 67–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2021-2-3.
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The metaphysical layer of what can be called philosophical Christology in Kant’s treatise on religion reflects his idea of the embodiment of the archetype of moral perfection. Kant raises the problem of the ontology of the ideal in the shape of the question about the conditions that make actual experience possible: the ideal of holiness resides in reason, i. e. in the human being, but the dominance of radical evil over the human will puts it out of human reach either in thought or in practice. For rational thought it is more natural to imagine the practical reality of the archetype as the embodiment of the authentic man proceeding from God. Using the Gospel narrative about Jesus, Kant interprets the human nature of the archetype in the light of his general notions about the properties of this nature. It is widely believed that Kant’s ethical theology eliminates the divine nature of the archetype by stating that an entirely holy will cannot be a moral example for the infirm human will. Kant however says, merely as a critical philosopher, that there are not enough rational grounds for thinking divine nature. Rational philosophy can think the archetype of perfection only as its pure and whole moral attitude through all the maxims and acts. Philosophy would transcend its boundaries if it claimed more and expected recognition of the prototypical theology of the ideal as the content of church faith. But it is not by chance that Kant sets forth the philosophical theory of the archetype as the content of faith in the subjunctive mood. According to Kant, the preaching of the divine character of the archetype as extra-philosophical supplement of the paradoxes and symbols of philosophical theology is only possible on condition that this statutory preaching does not obstruct the overall aspiration toward the actualisation of the pure moral attitude. If these conditions are observed the philosopher and the biblical theologian remain each with their theologies and within their rights.
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ملكاوي, أسماء حسين y حنان لطفي زين الدين. "عروض مختصرة". الفكر الإسلامي المعاصر (إسلامية المعرفة سابقا) 20, n.º 79 (1 de enero de 2015): 215–05. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/citj.v20i79.2563.
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