Tesis sobre el tema "Incitations à la recherche"
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Laronche, Hélène. "Evolution et impacts des incitations fiscales à la recherche-développement industrielle en France (1958-1991)". Caen, 1993. http://www.theses.fr/1993CAEN0547.
Texto completoThe acts of parliament passed from 1958 to 1991 which included tax benefits for research-development (R-D) have been scrutinized. Many contradicting and inconsistent lawmakers decisions have been pointed out. No guideline can be delineated to establish a coherent link between them and to claim there is a genuine fiscal status for industrial R-D. From this inconsistency's acknowledgement, the economic outcome by the surveying of the R-D results released over the same period from 1958 to 1989 have been looked for. Four periods which are in according with the four presidents of the fifth republic have been found. This surveying has showed too that 2 3 of industrial R-D were relying on a few big businesses sectors, ie, aeronautics, electronics, the car, chemical, pharmaceuticals and energy industries as well in 1958 as in 1989. The lawmakers have unsuccessfully tried, through taxation, (research tax credit), to dampen this concentrating trend by creating R-D incentives for medium and small sized businesses. Through many interviews with big French companies, it has been made clear that these firms deny there being a genuine fiscal policy in favor of R-D and that they do not include it in their decision-making process. This work leads to acknowledging the R-D tax incentive policy failure since 1958. Only research tax credit was a relative success, by operating on the innovating process when cash-flow problems are more important. It is capital for lawmakers
Lelarge, Claire. "Les déterminants du comportement d'innovation des entreprises : facteurs internes et externes". Thesis, Paris 10, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA100021/document.
Texto completoIn a context where both business and government consider innovation as crucial, this thesis aims at contributing to the debate on the determinants of firms' innovative behavior, and on the design of devices to be set up to support it. the four proposed contributions are primarily empirical and show the importance of considering two dimensions often ignored so far: first, organizational aspects, and the structure of internal incentives; second, firm heterogeneity, especially in terms of technological level. the first chapter shows that centralized and decentralized organizations rely on differentiated processes of information management, which make them more or less favorable to innovation depending on the firm’s age, technological level or on the magnitude of heterogeneity observed in its environment. the second chapter shows that competition arising from low cost countries is a significant determinant of reallocation in firms’ product portfolios, but that more productive firms only are able to introduce genuine product innovations. the third chapter adopts a structural approach to examine the incentives conferred by the patent system. patents affect the intensity, but also the direction of firms’ innovative efforts, since they convey incentives that are biased towards product innovation and against process innovations. the final chapter provides a joint analysis of two programs aiming at supporting the innovative effort of young businesses. we highlight their differential attractiveness within this population of firms
Bernard, Olga. "Essais en économie de la science : qualité de publication et incitations à faire de la recherche". Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020TOU10055.
Texto completoIn the first chapter of the thesis, I study how incentives for refutation affect publication quality. An insight from this chapter is that the impact of refutation rewards on publication quality depends on the difference of speed between pioneer research and refutation activity. If the former is higher than the latter, publication quality decreases with refutation rewards. Otherwise, the opposite result holds. Compared to this framework, the publication quality is always lower when the publication quality is uncertain. This last result suggests that transparency improves research quality. In the two remaining chapters of the thesis, I examine the tradeoff of scientists, who have access to citizen science (CS) or traditional science (TS) to undertake their research. By using CS, the scientists involve the citizens' help, which is costly and makes the research process faster. However, the quality of the research outcomes is lower. In the second chapter, I find that a monopolist scientist chooses CS if a scientific project is socially desirable. Otherwise, she chooses TS. If she faces a rival, competition occurs if both scientists choose CS. An interesting result arises if scientific projects are moderately socially desirable: scientists randomly mix between CS and TS. The policy implications depends on the lottery's outcome. If they make different choices, there is no efficiency loss, which is in favor of no government intervention. If they both choose TS, the research speed is slowed down compared to the monopolist scientist case. Consequently, the government should encourage the CS use with subsidies. In the third chapter, scientists fight for priority to publish a pioneer idea. By contrast with the second chapter, competition occurs when they both choose TS. CS is an option that they can exert at the idea's discovery time. An insight from the analysis is that the scientists' choice between CS and TS does not depend on the time at which they discover the idea. If CS is low-cost, they both choose CS. Otherwise, they both choose TS. Compared to a research environment where the CS choice does not exist, these results have two implications. First, scientists have no time to adapt to the existence of the CS choice. Second, the possibility to use CS increases preemption fear. In terms of policy implications, if the government aims at increasing the publication speed, then he should encourage the CS use
Sicsic, Michaël. "Les incitations fiscales au travail et à la recherche et développement en France et leurs effets sur le marché du travail". Thesis, Paris 2, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA020068.
Texto completoThis thesis focuses on the financial incentives to work and invest in R&D in France, their evolution and their effects. First, we simulate the incentives to work of the French population both at the intensive and extensive margin, taking into account all taxes on labor income and means-tested benefits. Our estimations show that incentives have increased at the bottom of the income distribution since 1998 as a result of reforms that occured in the 2000s, and that marginal tax rates have shifted from a U-shaped form based on income levels to a tilde-shaped form. Between 1998 and 2014, incentives to work at the intensive margin rose for very low incomes due to the implementation of several reforms. Then, individuals' behavioural responses to these incentives to work are evaluated exploiting tax and means-tested reforms that took place between 2006 and 2015. It shows that the effects of marginal tax rates on labour income are relatively small overall but very heterogeneous depending on individual characteristics. Reactions would be stronger for income tax reforms than for means-tested benefit reforms. Finally, we study the subsidies and tax incentives for R&D (Research Tax Credit and contribution reduction for Young Innovative Firms). We show that R&D support rates increased mostly for small firms in the 2000s. For these firms, we highlight the effect of the sharp increase in R&D public support on employment devoted to R&D activities. This effect would have been positive and increasing between 2004 and 2010, but less than the increase in aid received between 2008 and 2010
Figureau, Anne-Gaëlle. "Conception et évaluation d’instruments de gestion de l’eau combinant incitations économiques et préférences sociales : cas des prélèvements agricoles en eau souterraine". Thesis, Montpellier, SupAgro, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015NSAM0005/document.
Texto completoIn order to prevent overexploitation of natural resources, decision makers have been implementing individual quota-based systems. Yet, in the particular case of groundwater abstraction for irrigation, farmers' demand is likely to vary relevantly from year to year, due to annual agricultural, environmental and economic conditions. In this thesis, we wonder how to reconcile environmental aims with farmers' need for flexibility. We propose two instruments for regulating groundwater withdrawals for irrigation that ensure compliance with the total abstractable volume while introducing flexibility in the quota-based management. The first one relies on penalties applied to farmers who exceed their allocation, which are totally redistributed as financial compensations to farmers who have saved water. The second instrument gives farmers the opportunity of pooling water allocations within a contract that makes them jointly liable for the collective allocation compliance. We evaluate both instruments through a participatory approach followed by an experimental approach. Results show that farmers' irrigation choices are not only driven by profit maximization but that their utility function also depends upon non-economic parameters, such as social and ethic preferences. Thus, in order to strengthen their efficiency, instruments must include both economic and social incentives, respectively weighted as to be adapted to local economic conditions and social tissue
Portier-Maynard, Anne. "La fabrique de programmes de recherche incitatifs innovants". Paris 9, 2011. http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/handle/123456789/7674.
Texto completoThe French National Research Agency is a public organisation devoted to competitive research projects. This funding agency is part of the incentive public policy dedicated to research. In the current context of rationalization of public funding, this organisation supports the efficiency of the research system thanks to its major tool, the thematic research programme. The study of this tool design, both at the strategy level and at the object level, is based on four approaches: the stakeholders and their actor games, the use of concepts, the creation of collective knowledge and, the prescription printed in the calls for proposals and the one perceived by research teams. This work leads us to characterize the process of programme design regarding to industrial models and to the strategy-as-practice approach. It also highlights leverages that can be mobilized in order to design innovative research programmes
Parenty, Sébastien. "Quelle organisation globale de l’amélioration des plantes pour favoriser une diversification des cultures ?" Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018GREAE009/document.
Texto completoThis project focuses on innovation in the seed industry, in a context where it is desirable to diversify agricultural production. It is now well recognized that crop diversification is an important leverage for successfully deintensifying agriculture (i.e. limiting the use of fertilizers and pesticides) while maintaining a sufficient level of productivity. The success of this strategy depends, among other things, on the research effort carried out on each species. However, modern agronomy notes on this point that genetic progress on diversification crops (e.g. protein peas, lupins) is lower than that observed on major crops, which constitutes a major brake on diversification.The aim of this thesis in economics is to understand the drivers of R&D investments in the seed sector, and more particularly the arbitrage between investments made on different crops. The literature in industrial organization considers four determinants that encourage firms to invest in R&D: market size, competition, ownership capacity and technological opportunities. We analyse here how these four determinants are likely to lead to the creation of "orphan markets", with a particular focus on the behaviour of multi-product firms and cooperatives.This thesis is structured around 4 chapters: Chapter 1 examines strategiesin product range of firms through an empirical analysis of the French marketover the three years 2001, 2006 and 2011. Chapter 2 is a modelization ofthe economic behaviour of a firm, which may decide to invest or not on two different products. Chapter 3 presents some of the alternative systems to R&D funding that have been found in different countries and are known to be successful. Finally, Chapter 4 compares incentives for innovation in orphan markets when the supplier is either a profit maximizing firm or a cooperative
Liabot, Michael. "Etude de l'impact des aides à l'innovation sur l'exportation des firmes". Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017GREAA009/document.
Texto completoThis thesis investigates the impact of public subsidies for innovation on firms’ export activity. Previous research has focused mainly on understanding the effects of innovation support on investment in R&D (additional effect). While R&D investment is logically the primary indicator of innovation aid effectiveness, this approach ignores potential impact on strategy, particularly on export. Our research framework draws on two distinct streams of literature that have not been mobilized so far. First, the literature which evaluates the impact of aid shows that these devices can induce strategic R&D decisions in firms. Secondly, the work of Constantini and Melitz (2007) and Aw, Roberts and Xu, (2008) emphasizes the interdependence between firms' innovation and export decisions. Particular attention is paid in this study on the effect of innovation tax credits. The empirical methodology utilizes two econometric methods, bi-varied recursive and propensity score matching, generating three main results:First, (1) innovation support impacts the causal relationship between product innovation and export in the short term. This result is also observed when the analysis focuses on the effect of tax incentives. Then, (2) innovation subsidies impact the export activity of firms directly and simultaneously This effect occurs for firms that have benefited only from tax incentives. However, benefiting from both direct and tax subsidies for innovation does not affect? joint decisions regarding innovation and export. Finally, (3) considering the central role of R&D investments reveals that the impact of innovation subsidies on exports is an extension of the effectiveness of innovation policies. These results lead to several policy recommendations that can be used to improve public support effectiveness for both innovation and export activities
Sioncke, Yoann. "Fiscalité et innovation". Thesis, Paris 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA01D082.
Texto completoToday, innovation is one of the essential variables of the growth of the economy and employment. However, its financing is complex. This justifies the intervention of public authorities. In France, the public powers therefore have two main tools for encouraging companies to increase their R&D expenses, direct aids (and similar) and tax incentives. However, the main mechanism in support of innovation in France is a fiscal aid measure, namely the research tax credit. A powerful instrument for encouraging R&D since 1983, it has become, since its last major reform in 2008, the preferred incentive measure of companies and, at the same time, the State's second leading expenditure. A departure from anonymity followed by a step into controversy, since due to its increasing weight within the French economy, the research tax credit is prompting many questions. The most widely-shared question naturally relates to the reality of its efficiency, with supporters and detractors in equal measure. But this mechanism also elicits other questions and other observations. Since while it seems to be agreed that this credit offers many advantages for its beneficiaries, the fiscal security of the latter nevertheless appears to be fragile. Moreover, the very choice of a fiscal expenditure as a support measure is of concern, both with regard to its actual advisability within the internal order and in terms of its linkage with the European regulations relative to State aid. This could justify an adaptation of the mechanism on the basis of the provisions of another system used in another sector, but that does not currently have the same deficiencies as the research tax credit
Thomas, Lionel. "Incitations, incertitudes et marchés publics". Montpellier 1, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997MON10003.
Texto completoCormier, Pascal. "Contrats, incitations, et organisation hiérarchique". Paris 10, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995PA100171.
Texto completoThe principal-multiagents modeling are applied to the study of hierarchical organization. In chapters 1 and 2, the firm is viewed as a centralized contractual arrangement between a principal, who provides directly no productive input, and several non-cooperative productive agents. This approach is due to Alchian and Demsetz. Through some results of information economics, chapter 1 shows that proper incentive devices can be as efficient as supervision to resolve the free riding problem in team production settings. Chapter 2 is a survey of the main results about the comparative performance evaluation of the agents. In the last two chapters, the firm is viewed as a nexus of contracts, a more recent approach in information economics. Recent models considering the effects of coalitions on the efficacy of the organization are surveyed in chapter 3. And chapter 4 is an original analysis of the comparison of centralized and decentralized organization modes in a moral hazard setting which team production of the agents
Hili, Amal. "Essais sur les incitations salariales". Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013AIXM1088/document.
Texto completoWe aim at modeling various incentive mechanisms, determining the conditions of their implementation and analyzing their effects on employees’ efforts, the firm’s performance and the social welfare. These effects are studied in static and dynamic frameworks. The first two chapters (2 and 3) are parts of the static analysis. In the last three chapters (4, 5 and 6), we take into account a temporal dimension. In the chapter 2, we analyze the factors which determine the employee ownership implementation and estimate its impact on agents’ welfare. We prove the importance to consider jointly the effort disutility and size in the explanation of employee ownership implementation. We also show that large firms are going to distribute sub-optimal capital shares to their employees. We compare in the chapter 3, from the viewpoint of the various economic agents, two scenarios of profit sharing: the first one where the part of profit results from a negotiation and the second where this part is unilaterally fixed by capitalists. We show that those shareholders may prefer bargaining while it is possible for the employees to prefer a unilateral fixing of profit shares. We also justify the necessity of a regulator’s intervention as the interests of both capitalists and social planner never converge. The chapter 4 examines the optimal strategy of divesting actions by the large shareholder in an infinite horizon game where divesting shares allows an increase in the company’s value through its incentive effect on the managers’ efforts
Prévet, Antoine. "Incitations et contractualisation dans le secteur public". Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01E014.
Texto completoThis thesis focuses on the structural specificities of the public sector and how they impact incentives and performance. It uses the microeconomic tools of contract theory and econometric analysis. Among these characteristics, special attention is paid to monitoring, information management and budget constraints by applying a theoretical lens, that allows to provide new insights into the incentive systems in place in the public sector. The first chapter contributes to the debate on transparency in the public sector by considering one of its major features, i.e. a limited budget. This issue is studied as an information design problem and employ a principal-agent model with moral hazard to show that if the principal has to choose between total transparency and total opacity, then transparency is more likely to be optimal when tasks are least valuable and budgets are lowest. The second chapter aims at capturing a new theoretical explanation for the widespread intuition that more bureaucracy could lead to less effort and quality despite improved control. To that end, the idea of “the extra mile” is introduced in a classic principal-agent model with moral hazard. Bureaucratic management is characterized by the use of procedures, defined as the association of codification and verification. A procedure allows for more accurate verification of the agent’s action, but is socially inefficient. In the third chapter, using both theory and regression analysis, we propose a new explanation for price differences in the French water industry based on organizational arguments
Hourcade-Behaghel, Cécile. "Processus de choix de projets dans l'industrie pharmaceutique et politique de santé". Phd thesis, Ecole Polytechnique X, 2003. http://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/pastel-00000734.
Texto completoLemeunier, Sébastien. "Incitations des promoteurs de fonds à la qualité". Aix-Marseille 3, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008AIX32024.
Texto completoQuality incentives for Mutual funds promoters: Are there incentives for mutual funds promoters to improve the quality of their funds given that it can be costly to do so with uncertain results and that their target is to maximise their sales? This thesis consists of three sections that propose to answer this question. 1) The first part explains how the justification for the study of incentives in portfolio management has been brought about by academic literature and recapitulates the principal results found. 2) Then, by proposing a definition of what constitutes quality in relation to a fund, the second part outlines the conditions required to establish quality incentives for mutual fund promoters within vertically differentiated duopolies. 3) The system of fees and incentives present in the United States are then examined in order to ascertain whether a conflict of interests could exist between investor and financial advisor. Finally, this paper raises issues about alternative strategies other than performance based ones for promoters to increase their sales
Bensaid, Bernard. "Information, incitations et mécanismes séquentiels d'allocation des ressources". Paris 1, 1989. http://www.theses.fr/1989PA010008.
Texto completoGordah, Ahmed Maher. "Théorie des incitations et aide internationale au développement". Nice, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010NICE0003.
Texto completoIn Recent years, some critiques toward the efficiency of foreign aid have appeared in the economic literature. The allocation of foreign aid toward corrupt governments induces the failure of development policies. Donors have to control the use of aid in order to avoid the risk of kleptocracy. Our work is based on the role of principal-agent and multiprincipals models as an analysis tool of the allocation of foreign aid. One uses the principal-agent and multiprincipals models to formalize the problem of aid efficiency. We find that foreign aid allocation without any coordination between donors induces inefficiency of development policies
Valero, Vanessa. "Incitations et engagements dans les partenariats Public-Privé". Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011MON10027.
Texto completoThis thesis investigates three questions related to the role of private sector involvement in the provision of public goods or services. The State withdrawal from such provision has led to the use of partnerships between the public and the private sectors. They take place through a variety of contracts from the traditional form of public procurement to the modern form, Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The first chapter analyzes the contracting out of public services through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) subject to government opportunism. The construction of a public infrastructure and its operation are carried out by a private sector firm. Due to bundling of these two tasks, the PPP efficiency is affected by government's commitment power, contrarily to the traditional procurement, in which the two tasks are contracted out separately. We find that the PPP cost efficiency is damaged by the government opportunism but not sufficiently to recommend the use of TP contract. PPP contract should still be preferred by the government. We conclude that, contrarily to the widespread view, government commitment is not the key factor determining the success of PPP. The second chapter offers an empirical study to contribute to the debate over the efficiency of private provision of water services, looking at the main policy lessons that can be drawn from recent French experience. The purpose of this paper is to accurately evaluate the impact of private management on water prices after taking into account the selection bias. To do so, we use a treatment effect approach in a latent variable framework following the Carpentier et al. (2006) methodology. Two specific treatment parameters are reexamined: the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT). Contrary to the previous empirical findings, we show that private management does not have a significant impact on water prices. The third chapter examines the provision of a public good subject to a risk of disruption in a dynamic setting. To hedge against this risk, a public authority may use a dual sourcing policy. Instead of awarding the entire production to one firm (sole sourcing), he may split production among two firms (dual sourcing). If the production of one firm is disrupted, the other firm may take over. However, ensuring the continuity of production increases the procurement cost since a less efficient firm may be awarded part of the production. The public authority thus faces a trade-off when deciding upon the procurement policy. We first examine the optimal choice between sole and dual sourcing. Then, we determine the optimal share of production awarded to each firm in case of dual sourcing. We also consider how asymmetry of information on the secondary firm's efficiency affects the optimal procurement policy since an informational rent is given up to this firm. Finally, we extend our model to consider the influence of lobbying on the public authority's choice of procurement policy
Athias, Laure. "Incertitude, renégociations et incitations dans les partenariats public privé". Phd thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2007. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00226000.
Texto completoJeanjean, François. "Les incitations à investir dans les réseaux de télécommunications". Thesis, Montpellier, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015MONTD065/document.
Texto completoThis thesis presents four research papers studying the relationship between market structure, competition, regulation and investment in telecommunications networks. Telecommunications networks require regular and substantial investments. These investments are essential to incorporate the technical progress in the network and have a large impact on growth and employment. This is why the issue of investment incentives is especially important. The first paper examines the relationship between regulation (price of the access charge to legacy network, copper wholesale access share) and penetration of different technologies (copper, optical fiber and cable). It shows that a regulation which is too favorable to copper, decreases incentives to invest in other technologies and may slow down their development , especially the new generation technologies. The second paper examines the relationship between investment in mobile telephony and the average prices of the traffic (in megabytes). It shows that traffic growth depends on investments and technical progress. Regular investment yields an exponential growth of traffic. It also shows that the fall in average prices of the megabyte is mainly due to traffic growth and therefore investment. The third paper examines the relationship between margin and investment of mobile telephony operators. It shows a break in operators behavior based on their level of profit margin. It also shows that there is a level of investment that maximizes profit. This level of investment depends on the structure of the market and consumers’ demand. When the margin of the operator is sufficient, the level of investment to maximize profit is reached, otherwise, the investment is lower which slows down the incorporation of technical progress in the network, traffic growth and ultimately the fall in megabyte prices to the detriment of consumers. The fourth paper empirically examines precisely the relationship between the rate of margin (margin/revenues) and investment in mobile telephony. It highlights an inverted U-shaped relationship. The maximum investment is achieved for a 37.2% rate of margin. A theoretical model complements this study and shows that technical progress, that is to say, the response to the investment in terms of usefulness to consumers, plays an important role inshaping the relationship between the rate of margin and investment. When technical progress is weak, the relationship ismonotonic and decreasing. The likelihood of having an inverted U relationship increases with technological progress andwhen the relationship is inverted U, the peak of the curve shifts to higher rates of margin
Bernard, Christophe. "Incitations dans les organisations : tournois et juste-à-temps". Toulouse 1, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997TOU10038.
Texto completoIn this thesis, we study some aspects of the basic problem of incentives in, and among, organizations. In western countries, a certain number of current organizational changes are inspired by the Japanese production system. In a first step, we are interested in an incentive mechanism frequently used in this production system: the tournaments. In a second step, we consider the effects of the productive structure and the methods used to manage it on the incentives of the actors of production. In the first chapter, we survey the existing literature on tournaments. The second chapter focuses on the effects of the heterogeneity, common knowledge, of the agents on this type of contract. In particular, we consider the case in which the principal can not discriminate, by payments, among the agents and we regard in which degree the no-discrimination can induce an asymmetric evaluation of the agents in competition. The third chapter proposes an analysis of the Japanese production system in the light of the theory of incentives and shows that there is, in this system, a very great number of complementary incentives schemes. The fourth chapter studies the influence of the choice of the production's management methods on the quality of manufactured products. We show that the "just-in-time" production system, often considered only as a stock management system, is more essentially a system which creates stronger incentives on quality
Ben, Hamed Nadia. "Incitations et mobilité géographique des couples à double carrière". Bordeaux 4, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010BOR40024.
Texto completoWhen involved in a relocation decision, dual career couples may adopt different patterns of mobility. The choice is based on a maximisation of resources perspective, but it implies a loss of resources. External resources, such as social support, may intervene either to counter the losses or to induce geographic mobility. The aim of this research is to discover psychological mechanism involved in the mobile way of living. The study consisted in collecting life strories. Data analysis was performed using Tropes 6. 2. Our results show an influence of motivational mechanism on geographic mobility management. Results also show a strong professional commitment at the expense of organizational commitment. Moreover, whatever the quality of adjustment, role performance is not affected, in the contrary to extra-role performance. With regard to the couple and the family, workf-family conflict is exacerbated by mobility and in some cases, marital satisfaction is undermined. These trends are more salient among women the among men. Finally, we found sex differences in mobility patterns. The research showed the existence of a link between decision and adjustment during mobility. It enriched career literature by addressing some specific phenomena of starting employees' mobility. The results call to further research avenues. In particular, we suggest studying the employees' interest in family-friendly policies in a comparative manner as welle as their probable impact on organizational justice perceptions. We also studying the effects of mobility on the logevity of the relationship and taking into account subjective dimensions of mobility
Ennasri, Ahmed. "Incitations optimales dans un contexte de concurrence entre agences". Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010MON10068/document.
Texto completoThis dissertation analyzes the effects of the competition on the managerial incentives and effort. The dissertation is made of three essays, each dealing with a particular aspect of the general setting. Firstly, based on a model, we focus on the compensation schemes and the effort level of the manager in equilibrium. We examine the effects of a firm entry on the monopolistic market on these schemes and on the effort level. In this model we then introduce an additional assumption that managers are averse to inequity. We show that the firm entry affects negatively both the incentive compensation and the effort level. Furthermore, the firm has to propose a high compensation so as to implement the same effort level if the manager is inequity averse. Secondly, we test the theoretical predictions of these models in the laboratory. We confirm that the firm entry reduces the incentive compensation. In return, the manager continues to supply the same effort level in spite of the reduction of the incentive compensation. Finally, we implement, in a new experiment, the competition between the managers. We show that the competition allows the firm to reduce the compensation for her manager in the duopoly environment. Furthermore, the manager compares his compensation to the firm's profit and to the other manager's compensation. These comparisons have significant effects on the manager's level of effort
Bonnard, Claire. "Le marché du travail des scientifiques : capital humain, incitations, proximité". Phd thesis, Université de Bourgogne, 2011. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00655967.
Texto completoNikolova, Radoslava. "Essais en Théorie des Organisations : Incitations et Structure des Organisations". Phd thesis, Université Montpellier I, 2007. http://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/pastel-00003401.
Texto completoGranier, Laurent. "Incitations économiques aux fusions et acquisitions : Modèles de fusions endogènes". Montpellier 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008MON10024.
Texto completoChentouf, Leila. "Incitations et organisation du travail : étude de cas : l'économie algérienne". Paris 10, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001PA100179.
Texto completoIn spite of economic reform programs Algerian companies did not achieve a productivity improvement. Among others, this is a consequence of a complete lack of considerations for labor relations that barely evolved since the sixties. Starting with this observation, the thesis focuses on the incentive factors that allow increasing the work productivity of the Algerian labor force. This implies the analysis of an alternative incentive policy. However, an incentive change has to take place in accordance with the firm's organizational logic. We therefore have analyzed this interdependency between the firm's organization and its incentives using a theoretical model, justified by studying some stylized facts of firms in Germany, Japan, Sweden and the USA. We examined the workers' expectations with respect to the firm's incentives in an Algerian company (GL2Z) and the incentive policy in a company partly owned by foreign investors (Hélios). The first empirical result reflects the innovative policy (within the Algerian context) of Hélios with respect to its work organization and its incentive policy. As for the second, it reflects the willingness shown by GL2Z workers to improve the internal functioning of their company and the work relations between the various constituents of the staff. Having seized the incentive factors of GL2Z workers, we examined alternative organizational and incentive policies aimed at improving GL2Z's labor productivity. The thesis recalls, however, the institutional factors that are able to favor the preservation of traditional work relations caused by economic and political reasons, preventing the adoption of an alternative incentive policy
Gagnepain, Philippe. "Efficacite, incitations et reglementation / econometrie des contrats de transports urbains". Toulouse 1, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998TOU10041.
Texto completoThe aim of this thesis is to show how the global inefficiencies attached to a production process as well as the associated consumers' welfare depend on the regulatory environment that interfere on the actions of a producer regulated by an authority. It proposes a micro- econometric framework with an application to the industry of the french urban transport. The contractual relationships between an authority and an operator in a context of asymmetric information are considered. A first part provides a measure of the effects of the current regulatory mechanisms on the industry's operating costs. It suggests that the effort of productivity is lower since the observed mechanism is low powered in term of cost reducing activities. A second part presents the tools of the literature which are necessary to construct the structural operating cost function that integrates the unobservable parameters denoting technical inefficiency and productivity effort. The new theory of regulation and the econometrics of frontiers serve as a background of the model. The new theory of regulation provides the theoretical guidelines to treat inefficiencies generally considered by econometricians in a proper way. In a last part, an original procedure is developed in order to construct the operating cost function of the industry. The empirical approach considers simultaneously the estimation of the cost function and a transport demand function. The estimations of operators' inefficiencies, demand elasticities and costs of public funds associated with the different urban areas enable us to work out the first best regulatory mechanisms that achieve the maximum social welfare attainable. Such a maximal social welfare is not allowed by current mechanisms. The welfare level associated with the implementation of first best mechanisms is calculated and compared to the current welfare level and to the level associated with the implementation of second best regulatory mechanisms generally proposed by a regulator facing informational asymmetries. The evaluations of the different welfare levels shed light on significant discrepancies between the three situations
Dussault, Anne-Renée. "Incitations et instruments économiques d'innovation et de vente d'un antibiotique breveté". Thesis, Université Laval, 2011. http://www.theses.ulaval.ca/2011/28508/28508.pdf.
Texto completoVarenio, Céline. "L'efficacité énergétique dans les bâtiments existants : déficit d'investissement, incitations et accompagnement". Phd thesis, Université de Grenoble, 2012. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00783705.
Texto completoAkari, Abdallah. "La coordination planificateur-peripherie (un essai sur le role des incitations)". Grenoble 2, 1986. http://www.theses.fr/1986GRE21063.
Texto completoThis work has two goals. The first is to analyze the effect of the strategic behaviour of production units on the functionning of decentralized procedures for the purpose of determining an optimal plan. The second is to point out, in the light of such analysis, that incentive mechanisms, which form the basis of incentive theory, are efficient means to counteract such behaviour
Castay, Valérie. "Instruments de régulation et incitations à l'amélioration des technologies de dépollution". Bordeaux 4, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001BOR40039.
Texto completoThe degree with which policy instruments encourage the adoption of new pollution control devices is one ofthe most important criteria on which to judge environmental policies. In fact, the implementation of new technologies could reduce the contradiction between economic growth and environmental Quality. First, we study the agreements concluded with the industrialists and the Water Agencies, the organisation responsible for incentive-based instruments in France. Our work is based on the principal-agent theory extended to asymetric information problems. .
Hartmann, Laurence. "Tarification, régulation et incitations dans le secteur hospitalier privé en France". Aix-Marseille 3, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000AIX32064.
Texto completoLi, Ninglan. "Theorie des incitations et gouvernement d'entreprise : le cas des entreprises chinoises". Toulouse 1, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998TOU10020.
Texto completoThis thesis analyses corherently the issue of corporate governance in the chinese state-owned enterprises (soes). This these is organized in five chapters. Chapter i analyses theoretically and empirically the governance reform in the soe. It sexplains why corporate governance matters in the soes in the framework of transaction cost economics and incomplete contract approach the empirical results are as follow. The traditional state-owned enterprises have set up the internal institutions of corporate governance like those in the capitalist firms. As different enterprises will have different ownrship structures, corporate governance structures of the soes will be diversified. Chapter ii discusses the issue of over-leverage of the soes and the role of bankruptey in corporate governance. It proposes a bankruptey procedure which intends to restructure the finance of the bankrupt enterprises through a two-step debt-equity swap or a particular rearrangement of the relationship between debtorsthis is a modification to the ahm procedure for the merit of taking into account the political constraint. Chapter iii deals with the insider control problem of the soes through the role of banks. To counterbalance the insider control, the bank is prefered to act as an institutional outsider to monitor the insiders given imperfect capital and management markets. Although banks in china tend to be more important in the enterprise financing, they need to be reformed and provided incentives in order to curb the insider control. From this perspective, this chapter proposes a bank reform through spinning off the vast network of the existing central bank as multiple regional commercial banks. Chapter iv addresses the ownership issue in the chinese enterprise reforms by emphasizing that introducirs. According to stylized characteristics of soes, the arrangements of their ownership should be carried out in a discriminative way. Chapter v is an analytical discussion of the relation between performances and managerial pay in the soes. Although after the economic reform since 1978, managerial pay is linked to the performance of the enterprise, namely, the profits, empirical evidence tells us that their relativity is not obvious. Besides, managerial pay increases slower than workers's wages. This means that managers are lack of meaningful incentives to improve the performance. A better
Mottis, Nicolas. "Coordination, incitations et modeles-types organisationnels : le pilotage de l'informatique bancaire". Palaiseau, Ecole polytechnique, 1993. http://www.theses.fr/1993EPXX0007.
Texto completoJublot, Guillaume. "L'attractivité territoriale : rôle des incitations et des institutions et conditions de l'innovation". Thesis, Tours, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012TOUR1009/document.
Texto completoFaced with a succession of crisis and global competition, States seek solutions to get out. In this long period of financial scarcity at all stages of the rocket territorial France, it is appropriate to consolidate all that contributes to the attractiveness of a country, a region, a city. The lack of communication, abserved so far between complementary sectors in the same territory involved yet the attrativeness of it, makes the excercise very complicated. However, these independent sets of each other on the same territory, would be well advised to focus their efforts in terms of economic attrativeness. The reforms implemented so far didn't yield the desired results. The need and need strutural reform has never been stronger and unavoidable for the proper functioning of our economies. Faced with this crisis, France is not safe in terms of macro-economic variables: lockouts, deficit, debt
Dupas, Pascaline. "Informations, incitations et comportements de santé : trois essais en économie du développement". Paris, EHESS, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006EHES0014.
Texto completoThis thesis uses evidence from four programs implemented in Kenya to identify types of informations and incentives that can increase preventive health behaviors. We find that teenagers are responsive to information on relative risks, thus providing information on the distribution of HIV prevalence disaggregated by gender and age group can have a much larger impact that simply providing teenagers with information on the average prevalence. We also find that reducing the cost of education generates effective incentives for teenagers to avoid teen pregnancy or marriage, and thus can have the triple benefit of increasing educational attainments, reducing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, and reducing the incidence of teenage pregnancy. Last, we find that conditional in-kind subesidies (in the form of mosquito nets given to pregnant women enrolling for prenatal care) can be used effectively to overcome private inertia in the take-up of public health services, including HIV testing
Daniel, Christophe. "Conditions de travail et salaires compensations, négociations et incitations : théories et tests". Orléans, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995ORLE0503.
Texto completoSince the debate between smith and stuart mill about wages and working conditions relationships, there are in the literature two opposite theories of matching between workers and jobs : the theory of compensating differentials and the theory of segmentation which predicts a positive relationship between wages and good working conditions. The main factor explaining differences between these two theories is the existence of an income effect (wealth effect or heterogeneity of individual productivities effect). Combining the hedonic wage model (according to which the shadow price of working conditions is a wages differential) and the wages employment collective bargaining model, we show off another factor : an union power effect. So, we shift from a competitive situation to a bilateral monopoly situation in which pareto optima are located on an upward-sloping contract curve in the (wage, good working conditions) space. Then, we test the validity of this union effect from cross-sectional 19861987 insee data. We before explain why it is necessary to correct (simultaneously or not) negative biases of productivities or individual preferences omitted variables, of working conditions endogeneity and of sample selection when one estimates a wage function in which working conditions are introduced. We find out at one and the same time the existence, for the whole sample, a negative relationship between wages and several general indexes of good working conditions, and a positive relationship in highly unionized sectors. Besides, these results are more strongly marked for women than for men. Thus, this research constitutes one of the firsts in france which analyses working conditions influences on wage gaps, but also on relationships between wages and their standard independent variables
Marc, Céline. "Les déterminants qualitatifs des comportements d'activité des femmes : au-delà des incitations financières". Phd thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2006. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00136533.
Texto completoRochet, Jean-Charles. "Le Contrôle des équations aux dérivées partielles issues de la théorie des incitations". Grenoble 2 : ANRT, 1986. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37600740j.
Texto completoPhoungsub, Montiya. "Conception d'un dispositif d'aide à la rédaction en FLE par incitations et socialisation". Phd thesis, Université de Grenoble, 2013. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00959834.
Texto completoLeroy-Arlaud, Sonia. "Droit social et incitations : contribution à l’étude des transformations de la normativité juridique". Thesis, Paris 10, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA100175.
Texto completoThe concept of incentive is at the heart of modern economic theories. It aims to get involved some behavior by the promise of a reward, behavior that would not be rational for agents to adopt without the presence of this advantage. As a legal rule, the incentive can be defined as a mechanism seeking to guide the behavior of its recipients in a given direction, with the promise of a reward. These incentives are developed in all legal matters. However, it is a particular area of law in which they are particularly interested to study: social law. If the legislature let the recipient free to adopt or not the behavior encouraged, it does not count less on rational reasoning. It is unlikely to find such rules in matters largely governed by the public order.Through the analysis of the incentive legal system in an area as vast and complex as the social law, it is a study of the transformation of legal normativity that we deliver. This legal instrument gives to see the richness that can provide the law at the same time it reveals the several ways its developers have to take to produce the expected effects
Jeon, Doh-Shin. "Essais sur la théorie des incitations : collusion, flux d'information et réduction des effectifs". Toulouse 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000TOU10009.
Texto completoKambia-Chopin, Bidénam. "Prévention des risques, marché d'assurance et responsabilité environnementale : essais en théorie des incitations". Paris 10, 2004. http://www.theses.fr/2004PA100182.
Texto completoPart I : The first chapter recalls the properties of the equilibrium under adverse selection, and secondly, under moral hazard. In chapters 2 and 3, we consider both adverse selection and moral hazard. In chapter 2, agents differ with respect to their cost of self-protection, whereas they also differ with respect to their performance in the reduction of the probability of accident in chapter 3. In both chapters, we show that the equilibrium has the same properties as in Rothschild and Stiglitz's paper (1976), although it may take three forms in chapter 2. In chapter 3, we show that adverse selection reduces the less risky agent's coverage, increasing likewise his preventive action with respect to the hidden action situation. Part II : The fourth chapter is devoted to the economic analysis of accident law. Lastly, in chapter 5, we show that a judgement-proof firm may take an optimal level of prevention. A financial responsibility, may implement the social optimum in some cases
Rochet, Jean-Charles. "Le contrôle des équations aux dérivées partielles issues de la théorie des incitations". Paris 9, 1986. https://portail.bu.dauphine.fr/fileviewer/index.php?doc=1986PA090103.
Texto completoFagart, Marie-Cécile. "Concurrence, asymétrie d'information et théorie des incitations : quelques développements du modèle principal-agent". Paris 1, 1991. http://www.theses.fr/1991PA010044.
Texto completoThis work is dealing with asymmetry of information in pricipal-agent shemes, when several competitive pricinpals coexist. In a first time, a principal-agent framework is presented. In particular, we are interesting with the fact that reservation utility may depend on private information. In a second time we summary the conclusions of the literature, which studies markets caracterized by asymmetry of information. The work of rothschild and stiglitz is extendes. With some hypotheses, the competitive contrat doesn't depend on asymmetry of information. Then, dynamic of contracts in a repeated framework is studied. After a summary of literature, we deal with a repeated game. Competition looks like a way to commit in the future
Ammi, Mehdi. "Analyse économique de la prévention. Offre de prévention, incitations et préférences en médecine libérale". Phd thesis, Université de Bourgogne, 2011. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00859358.
Texto completoCamara, Alia. "Un exemple de coopération Nord-Sud : les incitations fiscales au développement économique en Guinée". Paris 2, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007PA020037.
Texto completoLemistre, Philippe. "Ancienneté, formation et incitations au travail : contribution à l'analyse des carrières salariales en France". Toulouse 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000TOU10025.
Texto completoKanso, Fadi A. "Corruption et fiscalité : un essai sur le rôle des incitations et de la gouvernance". Aix-Marseille 3, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008AIX32032.
Texto completoThe aim of this thesis is to contribute to the study of factors that decrease corruption in tax administration (the problem of collusions between tax inspectors and taxpayers). First, we studied many theoretical and empirical models proposed by the economic literature in order to understand more the role of incentives in the fight against corruption, then we tried to propose many other methods (like the role of wages and sanctions, staff rotation, external audit, etc…) trying to add new elements on the existing literature, finally we mentioned the role of public governance on reducing corruption in tax administration after discovering the reality of the Lebanese governance (empirical survey) and the necessity to implement a good environment built on a good governance before the establishment of any anti corruption instruments