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Mawhorter, Peter, Carmen Zegura, Alex Gray, Arnav Jhala, Michael Mateas y Noah Wardrip-Fruin. "Choice Poetics by Example". Arts 7, n.º 3 (6 de septiembre de 2018): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/arts7030047.
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Choice poetics is a formalist framework that seeks to concretely describe the impacts choices have on player experiences within narrative games. Developed in part to support algorithmic generation of narrative choices, the theory includes a detailed analytical framework for understanding the impressions choice structures make by analyzing the relationships among options, outcomes, and player goals. The theory also emphasizes the need to account for players’ various modes of engagement, which vary both during play and between players. In this work, we illustrate the non-computational application of choice poetics to the analysis of two different games to further develop the theory and make it more accessible to others. We focus first on using choice poetics to examine the central repeated choice in “Undertale,” and show how it can be used to contrast two different player types that will approach a choice differently. Finally, we give an example of fine-grained analysis using a choice from the game “Papers, Please,” which breaks down options and their outcomes to illustrate exactly how the choice pushes players towards complicity via the introduction of uncertainty. Through all of these examples, we hope to show the usefulness of choice poetics as a framework for understanding narrative choices, and to demonstrate concretely how one could productively apply it to choices “in the wild.”
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Kiyonari, Toko. "Detecting Defectors When They Have Incentives to Manipulate Their Impressions". Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science 1, n.º 1 (4 de mayo de 2010): 19–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5178/lebs.2010.5.
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We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.
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McNamara, J. M. "A Stochastic Differential Game with Safe and Risky Choices". Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences 2, n.º 1 (enero de 1988): 31–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269964800000607.
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This paper considers a two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game. The dynamics of the game are given by a one-dimensional stochastic differential equation whose diffusion coefficient may be controlled by the players. The drift coefficient is held constant and cannot be controlled. Player l's objective is to maximize the probability that the state at final time, T, is positive, while Player 2's objective is to maximize the probability that the state is negative.
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Burgess, Jacqueline y Christian M. Jones. "“Is It Too Much to Ask That We’re Allowed to Win the Game?”: Character Attachment and Agency in the Mass Effect 3 Ending Controversy". Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 37, n.º 3 (octubre de 2017): 146–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0270467618819685.
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The interaction between the concepts of character attachment, agency, and choice in a video game narrative was investigated using BioWare’s Mass Effect trilogy. Posts on a BioWare forum discussing the depiction of their player characters in the ending sequences of Mass Effect 3, the final game in the trilogy, were downloaded and analyzed using thematic analysis. Players demonstrated emotional attachment for the characters and narrative and expected to see the consequences of their choices play out, as in the previous games. Furthermore, players conflated winning the game with achieving a narratively satisfactory ending for the game world and its characters indicating emotional consequences for players that developers should consider when designing games with a high degree of player choice and agency. However, for some players character attachment is incongruous as they described Shepard as “acting out of character,” which needs further research.
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Мохонько, Елена Захаровна y Elena Mokhonko. "Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game". Mathematical Game Theory and Applications 12, n.º 1 (30 de marzo de 2020): 3–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8.
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The gain functions depend on the choices of players and time. The set of choices of the second player is changed in time according to one of some variants. The true variant is ascertained during the game. The current information about the set of choices and about partner's choices is received as sample data. An optimal discrete procedure of obtaining information is found that allows preserving the equilibrium.
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Arifovic, Jasmina y Giuseppe Danese. "Homophily and Social Norms in Experimental Network Formation Games". Games 9, n.º 4 (19 de octubre de 2018): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040083.
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Field studies of networks have uncovered a preference to befriend people we perceive as similar according to some dimensions of our identity (“homophily”). Lab studies of network formation games have found that adherence to social norms of reciprocity and inequity aversion are also drivers of network choices. No study so far has attempted to investigate the role of both homophily and social norms in a controlled environment. At the beginning of our experiment, each player fills in a personal profile. Each player then views the profile of all other players and expresses a degree of perceived similarity between his/her profile and the profile of the other player. At this point, a repeated network formation game ensues. We find that: (1) potential homophily considerations triggered by the profile rating task did not measurably change the players’ behavior compared to the baseline; (2) reciprocity plays a significant role in the formulation of the players’ strategies, in particular lowering the probability that the player naively best responds to the network observed in the previous period. We speculate that reciprocation of past choices might be a more “available” aid in strategy-formulation than considerations related to the similarity of the other players.
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Cummings, James J. y Travis L. Ross. "Optimizing the Psychological Benefits of Choice". International Journal of Gaming and Computer-Mediated Simulations 3, n.º 3 (julio de 2011): 19–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jgcms.2011070102.
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This paper suggests that the paradox of choice can be resolved in game environments by promoting heuristics-based decision-making, thereby maintaining player freedom while also avoiding the potential negative consequences of excessive deliberation. To do this, the informational cues relevant to such decisions must be made transparent, allowing players to employ fast and frugal tools from the brain’s adaptive toolbox to make the same optimal choices that they might otherwise make after extended deliberation. Developers can design for such transparency not only by creating choice experiences in which options can be assessed and compared through clear metrics and attributes, but also by designing social systems in which the choices and successes of others can be easily identified and used for informing one’s own future decisions.
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JIA, WEIJIA y ZHIBIN SUN. "ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF HIERARCHICAL OPTIMIZATION". International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science 13, n.º 05 (octubre de 2002): 667–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129054102001369.
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In this work, the computational complexity of a hierarchic optimization problem involving in several players is studied. Each player is assigned with a linear objective function. The set of variables is partitioned such that each subset corresponds to one player as its decision variables. All the players jointly make a decision on the values of these variables such that a set of linear constraints should be satisfied. One special player, called the leader, makes decision on its decision variables before of all the other players. The rest, after learnt of the decision of the leader, make their choices so that their decisions form a Nash Equilibrium for them, breaking tie by maximizing the objective function of player. We show that the exact complexity of the problem is FPNP-complete.
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Souza, Cássio Castro y Justo Reyna. "Pushing for Sustainability through Technology: administrative consensuality by default and online dispute resolutions tools". International Journal of Digital Law 2, n.º 1 (27 de abril de 2021): 47–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.47975/ijdl/1souzareyna.
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The Brazilian Public Administration is a repeat player and, often, predatory and strategic player. The behavior of the Public Administration is oriented towards the litigation and contributes to the increase in the congestion rate of the Judiciary, limiting access to justice. In this article, it was reflected whether a more adequate choice architecture could make the Public Administration start to show a more consensual and less litigious behavior. It was found that an architecture of choices appropriate to the greater promotion of access to Justice must create an administrative consensus by default, implemented based on an online dispute resolution system that presents an architecture of choices that makes the standard choice of individuals who wish to resolve a conflict with the Public Administration is self-composition.
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Frąckiewicz, Piotr. "On Correlated Equilibria in Marinatto–Weber Type Quantum Games". Applied Sciences 10, n.º 24 (16 de diciembre de 2020): 9003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app10249003.
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Players’ choices in quantum game schemes are often correlated by a quantum state. This enables players to obtain payoffs that may not be achievable when classical pure or mixed strategies are used. On the other hand, players’ choices can be correlated due to a classical probability distribution, and if no player benefits by a unilateral deviation from the vector of recommended strategies, the probability distribution is a correlated equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to investigate relation between correlated equilibria and Nash equilibria in the MW-type schemes for quantum games.
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Kufel, Tadeusz, Sławomir Plaskacz y Joanna Zwierzchowska. "Strong and Safe Nash Equilibrium in Some Repeated 3-Player Games". Przegląd Statystyczny 65, n.º 3 (30 de enero de 2019): 271–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.0540.
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The paper examines an infinitely repeated 3-player extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We consider a 3-player game in the normal form with incomplete information, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage, players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from previous stages of all the players. A strategy of a player in the repeated game is a function defined on the convex hull of the set of payoffs. Our aim is to construct a strong Nash equilibrium in the repeated game, i.e. a strategy profile being resistant to deviations by coalitions. Constructed equilibrium strategies are safe, i.e. the non-deviating player payoff is not smaller than the equilibrium payoff in the stage game, and deviating players’ payoffs do not exceed the nondeviating player payoff more than by a positive constant which can be arbitrary small and chosen by the non-deviating player. Our construction is inspired by Smale’s good strategies described in Smale’s paper (1980), where the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma was considered. In proofs we use arguments based on approachability and strong approachability type results.
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Askari, Gholamreza y Madjid Eshaghi Gordji. "Decision Making: Rational Choice or Hyper-Rational Choice". Statistics, Optimization & Information Computing 8, n.º 2 (28 de mayo de 2020): 583–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.19139/soic-2310-5070-638.
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In this paper, we provide an interpretation of the rationality in game theory in which player consider the profit or loss of the opponent in addition to personal profit at the game. The goal of a game analysis with two hyper-rationality players is to provide insight into real-world situations that are often more complex than a game with two rational players where the choices of strategy are only based on individual preferences. The hyper-rationality does not mean perfect rationality but an insight toward how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions. The findings of this research can help to enlarge our understanding of the psychological aspects of strategy choices in games and also provide an analysis of the decision-making process with cognitive economics approach at the same time.
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Gravlee, Jocelyn R. y Thomas L. Schwenk. "Management Choices for Splenic Injury in a Collegiate Football Player". Current Sports Medicine Reports 2, n.º 4 (agosto de 2003): 211–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1249/00149619-200308000-00007.
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Consalvo, Mia, Thorsten Busch y Carolyn Jong. "Playing a Better Me: How Players Rehearse Their Ethos via Moral Choices". Games and Culture 14, n.º 3 (17 de noviembre de 2016): 216–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1555412016677449.
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This article is an exploration of players’ understandings of games that offer moral dilemmas in order to explore player choice in tandem with game mechanics. We investigate how game structures, including the presence of choice, a game’s length, and avatar presentation, push players in particular ways and also how players use those systems for their own ends. We explore how players “rehearse their ethos” through gameplay and how they are continually pushing back against the magic circle. It is based on two-dozen semi-structured interviews with players conducted in 2012. It illustrates that there are no clear-cut answers—game structures, including narratives, character designs, length, or save systems, can push players to act in certain ways that may or may not align with their own beliefs and goals.
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Borges, João Bosco, Carmen Li Juy, Izac Sidarta De Andrade Matos, Paulo Vitor Angelo Silveira y Ticianne De Gois Ribeiro Darin. "Player Experience Evaluation: Which instrument should I use?" Journal on Interactive Systems 11, n.º 1 (9 de diciembre de 2020): 74–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/jis.2020.765.
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The influences, metrics, and applications of User Experience (UX) have been investigated in various contexts and is acknowledged as a driving force to promote game development choices. Recently, there has been a growing interest and need to explore the experience in the context of digital games, which require particular forms of Player Experience (PX) components due to their interaction. These particularities of digital games bring some specific models, characteristics and evaluation methods based on this field. Therefore, both industry professionals and researchers must make informed choices when planning these assessments. This research aims to provide a brief panorama on how PX have been evaluated, and discuss its related concepts, based on the analysis 58 PX evaluation instruments. The data analysis provides a glance on the directions the research on PX evaluation is taking and indicates future research opportunities.
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Grosskopf, Brit y Rajiv Sarin. "Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment". American Economic Review 100, n.º 5 (1 de diciembre de 2010): 2187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2187.
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We investigate the impact of reputation in a laboratory experiment. We do so by varying whether the past choices of a long-run player are observable by the short-run players. Our framework allows for reputation to have either a beneficial or a harmful effect on the long-run player. We find that reputation is seldom harmful and its beneficial effects are not as strong as theory suggests. When reputational concerns are at odds with other-regarding preferences, we find the latter overwhelm the former. (JEL C91, D12, D82, D83, Z13)
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OSIECKA, Gabriela y Maciej JASIŃSKI. "Solution of Traveler’s Dilemma". Central European Review of Economics and Management 2, n.º 3 (27 de septiembre de 2018): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.29015/cerem.502.
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Aim: The aim of the article is to show: 1) that the reasoning of perfectly rational players presented in 1994 by the author of the Traveler's Dilemma Kaushik Basu is incorrect and therefore leads to wrong conclusions, 2) how the reasoning of these players should look like and what solution it leads to. Design / Research methods: Logical analysis. Conclusions / findings: Perfectly rational Traveler’s Dilemma players should use, according to game theory, so-called retrograde (iterative) induction. This is wrong, as in the set of Traveler’s Dilemma games results the principle of transitivity is not met. We believe that perfectly rational players will achieve a better result when they make a random decision from a suitably limited set of decisions. After applying this method of decision making, perfectly rational players will achieve a result similar to those obtained by real players in experiments. Thus, the paradox described in the theory of games disappears, that perfectly rational players achieve worse results than real players Originality / value of the article: A new way of making decisions in the Traveler’s Dilemma game. Implications of the research: A new way of making decisions in other games similar to the Traveler’s Dilemma may allow to find new solutions in these games. Limitations of the research: The described decision-making method can potentially be used in decision-making situations when the following five conditions are met: 1) the set of possible decisions of each player is greater than 2, 2) the winning matrix is known to both players and both know the purpose of their choices, 3) when it is played once with an unknown opponent, 4) when both players have to make their decision without knowing the opponent's choice, 5) when there is no decision, which is a stable balance point or when it is, but its choice means that the player does not achieve a satisfying result.
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Rass, Stefan y Sandra König. "Password Security as a Game of Entropies". Entropy 20, n.º 5 (25 de abril de 2018): 312. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e20050312.
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We consider a formal model of password security, in which two actors engage in a competition of optimal password choice against potential attacks. The proposed model is a multi-objective two-person game. Player 1 seeks an optimal password choice policy, optimizing matters of memorability of the password (measured by Shannon entropy), opposed to the difficulty for player 2 of guessing it (measured by min-entropy), and the cognitive efforts of player 1 tied to changing the password (measured by relative entropy, i.e., Kullback–Leibler divergence). The model and contribution are thus twofold: (i) it applies multi-objective game theory to the password security problem; and (ii) it introduces different concepts of entropy to measure the quality of a password choice process under different angles (and not a given password itself, since this cannot be quality-assessed in terms of entropy). We illustrate our approach with an example from everyday life, namely we analyze the password choices of employees.
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WANG, XIAOYANG, YANG YI, HUIYOU CHANG y YIBIN LIN. "USING PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION TO EVOLVE COOPERATION IN MULTIPLE CHOICES ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME". International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Applications 12, n.º 03 (septiembre de 2013): 1350013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1469026813500132.
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Mechanisms of promoting the evolution of cooperation in two-player, two-strategy evolutionary games have been discussed in great detail over the past decades. Understanding the effects of repeated interactions in n-player with n-choice is a formidable challenge. This paper presents and investigates the application of co-evolutionary training techniques based on particle swarm optimization (PSO) to evolve cooperation for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game with multiple choices. Several issues will be addressed, which include the evolution of cooperation and the evolutionary stability in the presence of multiple choices and noise. First is using PSO approach to evolve cooperation. The second is the consideration of real-dilemma between social cohesion and individual profit. Experimental results show that the PSO approach evolves the cooperation. Agents with stronger social cognition choose higher levels of cooperation. Finally the impact of noise on the evolution of cooperation is examined. Experiments show the noise has a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation.
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Grigorescu, Ilie y Yi-Ching Yao. "Maximizing the variance of the time to ruin in a multiplayer game with selection". Advances in Applied Probability 48, n.º 2 (junio de 2016): 610–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apr.2016.17.
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Abstract We consider a game with K ≥ 2 players, each having an integer-valued fortune. On each round, a pair (i,j) among the players with nonzero fortunes is chosen to play and the winner is decided by flipping a fair coin (independently of the process up to that time). The winner then receives a unit from the loser. All other players' fortunes remain the same. (Once a player's fortune reaches 0, this player is out of the game.) The game continues until only one player wins all. The choices of pairs represent the control present in the problem. While it is known that the expected time to ruin (i.e. expected duration of the game) is independent of the choices of pairs (i,j) (the strategies), our objective is to find a strategy which maximizes the variance of the time to ruin. We show that the maximum variance is uniquely attained by the (optimal) strategy, which always selects a pair of players who have currently the largest fortunes. An explicit formula for the maximum value function is derived. By constructing a simple martingale, we also provide a short proof of a result of Ross (2009) that the expected time to ruin is independent of the strategies. A brief discussion of the (open) problem of minimizing the variance of the time to ruin is given.
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Bergemann, Dirk y Stephen Morris. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium". American Economic Review 106, n.º 5 (1 de mayo de 2016): 586–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161046.
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A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an “information designer” who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.
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PAUL, SOUMYA y R. RAMANUJAM. "DYNAMICS OF CHOICE RESTRICTION IN LARGE GAMES". International Game Theory Review 15, n.º 04 (18 de noviembre de 2013): 1340031. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400318.
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We study games in which the number of players are large, and hence outcomes are independent of the identities of the players. Game models typically study how choices made by individual rational players determine game outcomes. We extend this model to include an implicit player — the society, who makes actions available to players and incurs certain costs in doing so. In the course of play, an option a may be chosen only by a small number of players and hence may become too expensive to maintain, so the society may remove it from the set of available actions. This results in a change in the game and the players strategize afresh taking this change into account. We highlight the mutual recursiveness of individual rationality and societal rationality in this context. Specifically, we study two questions: When players play according to given strategy specifications, which actions of players should the society restrict and when, so that the social cost is minimized eventually? Conversely, assuming a set of rules by which society restricts choices, can players strategize in such a way as to ensure certain outcomes? We discuss solutions in finite memory strategies.
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Askar, Sameh S. y A. Al-khedhairi. "Dynamic Effects Arise Due to Consumers’ Preferences Depending on Past Choices". Entropy 22, n.º 2 (3 de febrero de 2020): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22020173.
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We analyzed a dynamic duopoly game where players adopt specific preferences. These preferences are derived from Cobb–Douglas utility function with the assumption that they depend on past choices. For this paper, we investigated two possible cases for the suggested game. The first case considers only focusing on the action done by one player. This action reduces the game’s map to a one-dimensional map, which is the logistic map. Using analytical and numerical simulation, the stability of fixed points of this map is studied. In the second case, we focus on the actions applied by both players. The fixed points, in this case, are calculated, and their stability is discussed. The conditions of stability are provided in terms of the game’s parameters. Numerical simulation is carried out to give local and global investigations of the chaotic behavior of the game’s map. In addition, we use a statistical measure, such as entropy, to get more evidences on the regularity and predictability of time series associated with this case.
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VAN DER GENUGTEN, BEN. "A WEAKENED FORM OF FICTITIOUS PLAY IN TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES". International Game Theory Review 02, n.º 04 (diciembre de 2000): 307–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000202.
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Fictitious play can be seen as a numerical iteration procedure for determining the value of a game and corresponding optimal strategies. Although convergence is slow, it needs only a modest computer storage. Therefore it seems to be a good way for analysing large games. In this paper we introduce a weakened form of fictitious play, where players at each stage do not have to make the best choice against the total of past choices of the other player but only an increasingly better one. Theoretical bounds for convergence are derived. Furthermore, it is shown that this new form can speed up convergence considerably in practice. It is seen that weakened fictitious play can be extended to models in which the game matrix itself becomes better known as the number of stages increases.
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Csirik, János A. "Optimal Strategy for the First Player in the Penney Ante Game". Combinatorics, Probability and Computing 1, n.º 4 (diciembre de 1992): 311–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963548300000365.
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In the Penney Ante game two players choose one binary string of length k each in turn, and toss a coin repeatedly. If at some stage the last k outcomes match one of their strings, the player with that string wins. The case k ≤ 4 is somewhat exceptional and in any case easily done. For k ≥ 5, Guibas and Odlyzko proved that the second player's optimal strategy is to choose the first k − 1 digits of the first player's string prefixed by 0 or 1. They conjectured that these two choices are never equally good. We prove that this conjecture is correct. Then we prove that 01…100 (with k − 1 ones) is an optimal strategy for the first player, and find all the strategies that are equally good.
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Bosch-Rosa, Ciril y Thomas Meissner. "The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses". Experimental Economics 23, n.º 4 (11 de febrero de 2020): 1129–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09642-2.
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Abstract Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs about the behavior of other players. Typically, these two dimensions cannot be disentangled as belief formation crucially depends on the understanding of the game. We present the one-player guessing game, a variation of the two-player guessing game (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008), which turns an otherwise strategic game into an individual decision-making task. The results show that a majority of subjects fail to understand the structure of the game. Moreover, subjects with a better understanding of the structure of the game form more accurate beliefs of other player’s choices, and also better-respond to these beliefs.
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FeldmanHall, Oriel, Joseph E. Dunsmoor, Alexa Tompary, Lindsay E. Hunter, Alexander Todorov y Elizabeth A. Phelps. "Stimulus generalization as a mechanism for learning to trust". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, n.º 7 (29 de enero de 2018): E1690—E1697. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1715227115.
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How do humans learn to trust unfamiliar others? Decisions in the absence of direct knowledge rely on our ability to generalize from past experiences and are often shaped by the degree of similarity between prior experience and novel situations. Here, we leverage a stimulus generalization framework to examine how perceptual similarity between known individuals and unfamiliar strangers shapes social learning. In a behavioral study, subjects play an iterative trust game with three partners who exhibit highly trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or highly untrustworthy behavior. After learning who can be trusted, subjects select new partners for a second game. Unbeknownst to subjects, each potential new partner was parametrically morphed with one of the three original players. Results reveal that subjects prefer to play with strangers who implicitly resemble the original player they previously learned was trustworthy and avoid playing with strangers resembling the untrustworthy player. These decisions to trust or distrust strangers formed a generalization gradient that converged toward baseline as perceptual similarity to the original player diminished. In a second imaging experiment we replicate these behavioral gradients and leverage multivariate pattern similarity analyses to reveal that a tuning profile of activation patterns in the amygdala selectively captures increasing perceptions of untrustworthiness. We additionally observe that within the caudate adaptive choices to trust rely on neural activation patterns similar to those elicited when learning about unrelated, but perceptually familiar, individuals. Together, these findings suggest an associative learning mechanism efficiently deploys moral information encoded from past experiences to guide future choice.
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Turbay, Gabriel y Giovanni E. Reyes. "On the Solutions of Games in Normal Forms: Particular Models based on Nash Equilibrium Theory". Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 10, n.º 3 (1 de mayo de 2019): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/mjss-2019-0035.
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Abstract The main objective of this paper is to present in a deductive way, solutions for general games played under normal conditions following competitive paths, applying core principles of Nash equilibrium. Here the normal approach implies strategic choices available for each player, formulated and implemented without any information concerning specific choices to be made by others players. It is convenient to keep in mind that John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern outlined a set of conditions for Nash equilibrium for a game in normal form, proposed as the basic framework to analyze the conditions and requirements for a particular Nash equilibrium to be the solution of the game. Theorems that exhibit imbedding relations among the Nash equilibriums of the game are given to examine the role of pre-play communication and the imbedding order in equilibrium selection. A core argument to claim here is that a generic case of Nash equilibriums that are strategically unstable relative to maxi-min strategies is given to emphasize the role of moves of the third kind and pre-play communication in correlated and coordinated solutions and the need to account for cases where Nash equilibriums are not plausible or even desirable as solutions for a game in normal form.
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Barnett, Jane y Mark Coulson. "Virtually Real: A Psychological Perspective on Massively Multiplayer Online Games". Review of General Psychology 14, n.º 2 (junio de 2010): 167–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0019442.
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Massively multiplayer games (MMOs) are immersive virtual three-dimensional fantasy worlds in which people cooperate and compete with each other, as well as with the computer-generated denizens of that particular game world. Although typically seen as games, their strong social aspect suggests that they are a form of online communication tool, with which players interact to form friendships, create communities, and work together to accomplish a variety of goals. After an introduction to MMOs, this review explores how social aspects of the game imitate the real world in terms of choices that players make when interacting with others. Furthermore, player-to-player interactions are examined in terms of in-game group formation and how efficient communication is imperative for goal achievement. The review also explores how leadership skills learned in-game may be transferred to real-world scenarios. The reasons why people play MMOs are examined in terms of player motivations and how aspects of game play may have both positive and negative consequences for a player's well-being. The latter half of the review describes how MMOs are used as afterschool virtual teaching environments where students can use aspects of game play to learn, for example, leadership qualities. The review concludes with recommendations for using MMOs as virtual laboratories to explore aspects of human behavior.
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BACH, CHRISTIAN W. y CONRAD HEILMANN. "AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION". International Game Theory Review 13, n.º 02 (junio de 2011): 195–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002940.
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We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework. Moreover, we provide an epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Besides, it is argued that the epistemic independence assumption underlying backward induction is stronger than usually presumed.
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BRÂNZEI, RODICA, STEF TIJS y JUDITH TIMMER. "COLLECTING INFORMATION TO IMPROVE DECISION-MAKING". International Game Theory Review 03, n.º 01 (marzo de 2001): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198901000300.
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In this paper, we consider information collecting (IC) situations where an action taker in an uncertain situation can improve his action choices by gathering information from some players who are more informed about the situation. Then the problem of sharing the gains when cooperating with informants is tackled by constructing an appropriate game, the IC-game corresponding to the IC-situation. It turns out that the cone of IC-games, given a fixed set of players, coincides with the cone of 0-normalized monotonic games with a veto player. Also special classes of convex IC-games and big boss IC-games are considered, for which more is known about the solution concepts.
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Ryfman, Philippe. "Non-governmental organizations: an indispensable player of humanitarian aid". International Review of the Red Cross 89, n.º 865 (marzo de 2007): 21–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383107000926.
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AbstractAlthough the humanitarian landscape is constantly evolving, one factor which stands out among the players of aid, and particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is the significance of the private, not-for-profit dimension. After tracing the historical origin of those organizations, defining them and stressing how well known and well regarded they are, the article goes on to discuss the main questions they set. It points out that although each one has its own specific characteristics, their operating methods have much in common. In conclusion the role NGOs play on the international stage is also mentioned, as well as their position regarding UN plans to overhaul the international humanitarian system. Faced with a transnational environment and a growing demand for accountability both to beneficiaries and to sponsors, with uncertain times ahead and difficult choices to make, NGOs must be even more humanitarian in the approach they take.
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Jajja, M. Shakeel S. y Syed Zahoor Hassan. "SIL: Value Chain and Strategic Choices". Asian Journal of Management Cases 15, n.º 1 (26 de diciembre de 2017): 59–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0972820117737169.
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Prior to 2011, Service Industries Limited’s (SIL) production for the Pakistani market was sold through the marketing and retailing network of Service Sales Corporation (SSC), as both SIL and SSC were owned by the Service Group. However, in 2011, the companies parted ways based on two main conditions. First, SSC would continue to buy shoes worth at least PKR 3.8 billion from SIL till 2021. Second, SIL would give exclusive license to SSC to use Servis brand for the shoe business till 2021. Omar Saeed, CEO of SIL, is reflecting on the previous four years’ performance for the shoe business division. It has not met the sales target for 2014, domestic sales are dependant on SSC and Klara (SIL’s own brand of wholesale), the European market is presurizing SIL to reduce prices as well as provide high variety and low volume orders, and more efforts need to be made to utilize SIL’s manufacturing facilities. Omar has to make SIL’s strategy for 2021, when SSC may not be there to give business worth PKR 3.8 billion, as well as plan the necessary roadmap. SIL’s top management wants to see SIL as a global player in its line of business.
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Oved, Nadav, Amir Feder y Roi Reichart. "Predicting In-Game Actions from Interviews of NBA Players". Computational Linguistics 46, n.º 3 (noviembre de 2020): 667–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/coli_a_00383.
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Sports competitions are widely researched in computer and social science, with the goal of understanding how players act under uncertainty. Although there is an abundance of computational work on player metrics prediction based on past performance, very few attempts to incorporate out-of-game signals have been made. Specifically, it was previously unclear whether linguistic signals gathered from players’ interviews can add information that does not appear in performance metrics. To bridge that gap, we define text classification tasks of predicting deviations from mean in NBA players’ in-game actions, which are associated with strategic choices, player behavior, and risk, using their choice of language prior to the game. We collected a data set of transcripts from key NBA players’ pre-game interviews and their in-game performance metrics, totalling 5,226 interview-metric pairs. We design neural models for players’ action prediction based on increasingly more complex aspects of the language signals in their open-ended interviews. Our models can make their predictions based on the textual signal alone, or on a combination of that signal with signals from past-performance metrics. Our text-based models outperform strong baselines trained on performance metrics only, demonstrating the importance of language usage for action prediction. Moreover, the models that utilize both textual input and past-performance metrics produced the best results. Finally, as neural networks are notoriously difficult to interpret, we propose a method for gaining further insight into what our models have learned. Particularly, we present a latent Dirichlet allocation–based analysis, where we interpret model predictions in terms of correlated topics. We find that our best performing textual model is most associated with topics that are intuitively related to each prediction task and that better models yield higher correlation with more informative topics. 1
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Ohnishi, Kazuhiro. "Non-altruistic Equilibria". Indian Economic Journal 67, n.º 3-4 (diciembre de 2019): 185–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019466220953124.
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Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, that is, one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal-form games and extensive-form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive-form games as equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts.
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Zhong, Chongyi, Hui Yang, Zixin Liu y Juanyong Wu. "Stability of Replicator Dynamics with Bounded Continuously Distributed Time Delay". Mathematics 8, n.º 3 (16 de marzo de 2020): 431. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8030431.
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In this paper, we consider evolutionary games and construct a model of replicator dynamics with bounded continuously distributed time delay. In many circumstances, players interact simultaneously while impacts of their choices take place after some time, which implies a time delay exists. We consider the time delay as bounded continuously distributed other than some given constant. Then, we investigate the stability of the evolutionarily stable strategy in the replicator dynamics with bounded continuously distributed time delay in two-player game contexts. Some stability conditions of the unique interior Nash equilibrium are obtained. Finally, the simple but important Hawk–Dove game is used to verify our results.
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KIERSTEAD, H. A. y A. V. KOSTOCHKA. "Efficient Graph Packing via Game Colouring". Combinatorics, Probability and Computing 18, n.º 5 (septiembre de 2009): 765–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963548309009973.
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The game colouring number gcol(G) of a graphGis the leastksuch that, if two players take turns choosing the vertices of a graph, then either of them can ensure that every vertex has fewer thankneighbours chosen before it, regardless of what choices the other player makes. Clearly gcol(G) ≤ Δ(G)+1. Sauer and Spencer [20] proved that if two graphsG1andG2onnvertices satisfy 2Δ(G1)Δ(G2) <nthen they pack,i.e., there is an embedding ofG1into the complement ofG2. We improve this by showing that if (gcol(G1)−1)Δ(G2)+(gcol(G2)−1)Δ(G1) <nthenG1andG2pack. To our knowledge this is the first application of colouring games to a non-game problem.
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HAWKE, PETER. "THE LOGIC OF JOINT ABILITY IN TWO-PLAYER TACIT GAMES". Review of Symbolic Logic 10, n.º 3 (27 de marzo de 2017): 481–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020316000496.
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AbstractLogics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-typecoordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we callTwo-Player Strategic Coordination Logic(SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality.
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Terton, U., G. Smyth y H. Wright. "CliNCare: An Educational Game—The Reasoning Behind the Graphic Choices and Their Impact on Player Opinions". Computer Games Journal 9, n.º 3 (13 de julio de 2020): 331–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40869-020-00111-7.
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GARRATT, ROD, JAMES E. PARCO, CHENG-ZHONG QIN y AMNON RAPOPORT. "POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION". International Game Theory Review 07, n.º 04 (diciembre de 2005): 407–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000612.
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A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strong/coalition-proof Nash equilibrium are also tested.
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Huang, Feng, Ming Cao y Long Wang. "Learning enables adaptation in cooperation for multi-player stochastic games". Journal of The Royal Society Interface 17, n.º 172 (noviembre de 2020): 20200639. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2020.0639.
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Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and population biology. However, the key question of how individuals, in the middle of challenging social dilemmas (e.g. the ‘tragedy of the commons’), modulate their behaviours to adapt to the fluctuation of the environment has not yet been addressed satisfactorily. Using evolutionary game theory, we develop a framework of stochastic games that incorporates the adaptive mechanism of reinforcement learning to investigate whether cooperative behaviours can evolve in the ever-changing group interaction environment. When the action choices of players are just slightly influenced by past reinforcements, we construct an analytical condition to determine whether cooperation can be favoured over defection. Intuitively, this condition reveals why and how the environment can mediate cooperative dilemmas. Under our model architecture, we also compare this learning mechanism with two non-learning decision rules, and we find that learning significantly improves the propensity for cooperation in weak social dilemmas, and, in sharp contrast, hinders cooperation in strong social dilemmas. Our results suggest that in complex social–ecological dilemmas, learning enables the adaptation of individuals to varying environments.
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Papakonstantinidis, Leonidas y Christina Barbarousi. "A Social Welfare Economics Proposal Through Bargaining Theory: a Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model Approach Inserting Overall Arbitrator Player to the Local Development Game". INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3, n.º 6 (2018): 55–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.18775/ijied.1849-7551-7020.2015.36.2004.
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In this study, we investigate the impact of Social Bargain on Welfare Problem adopting the win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model inserting the Overall Arbitrator Player into the local development game. This deals with (a) the failure of Public Choice in the production of social welfare, (b) the Bargaining Process as a proposal for generating social capital in the field of Welfare Economics. The purpose of this research is to indicate that Public Choice fails to lead to Economic Development. Instead, this can be achieved by implementing Social Bargaining Process into the game of social welfare. In particular, the gap between development and underdevelopment (regional problem) in the community is being investigated, while it is identified as being real and unresolved in the literature of Social Choice Theory and Regional Science. This gap can be corrected – cured through Social Bargaining Process as a solution to the Welfare Problem. The above is being interpreted as follows: the agents of the game or voters of the community can make such collective decisions that eliminate regional disparities by choosing strategies or politicians that will make the appropriate assessments/choices for the community. The key questions are: a) why Public Choice fails to solve the problem of regional disparities and to lead to social welfare, (b) what makes the Social Bargaining Process the appropriate solution to the social welfare problem (or regional problem) and above it should be dealt with. As a methodology is being proposed the Mediation Theory model among two other processes: (1) The “Principal-Agent” process, considering Principal’s position as strong, and (2) the Leadership of a community and a single Member of the same community (“Leader-Member Exchange” – LMX), considering the Leader’s position as strong. The research findings proposed the creation of a social player in the bargaining process, where introduces the generation of social capital, that leads to social welfare to which Public Choice fails to lead and this point is also the originality of the paper.
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Abdullah, Piter. "BANKING CRIME ANALYSIS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BANKING SUPERVISION: COMBINING GAME THEORY AND THE ANALYTICAL NETWORK PROCESS APPROACH". Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan 13, n.º 2 (22 de noviembre de 2010): 215–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v13i2.391.
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A failed bank can spark a deep financial crisis throughout the whole country when ironically it may simply have been triggered by a banking crime perpetrated by an insider, i.e. the banker. Although banking crimes may pose a significant threat to financial sector stability, the potential risk of internal fraud has, hitherto, not been taken into account in banking supervision processes. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of banking supervision to uncover potential risks of banking crimes by combining game theory and the analytical network process approach. In this paper, the author conducts two games with three players; the banker, the bank supervisor and the police. The banker has two strategies: to offend or not to offend. The bank supervisor has two choices: to supervise or not to supervise. The police can choose to enforce or not to enforce. In the first part, the effectiveness of bank supervision is analyzed theoretically using game theory. The effectiveness of banking supervision will depend on the behavior of each player as reflected in their decisions. Further analysis will confirm the previous result using an analytical network process. At this stage, the analytical network process is used to calculate the probability of each strategy being chosen by considering all criteria or sub criteria. Any decision made by one player will influence the other players in choosing their alternative strategies and vice versa.JEL Classificiation: C78, E58Keywords: Analytical Network Process, banking crimes, game theory
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Eladhari, Mirjam Palosaari. "Players Imbuing Meaning: Co-creation of Challenges in a prototype MMO". Comunicação e Sociedade 22 (15 de diciembre de 2012): 50–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17231/comsoc.22(2012).1274.
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This article discusses how components in a game world can carry meaning relevant to individual players. The discussion is grounded in work with a massively multi-player online (MMO) proto- type where players in guided play-tests created their own opponents that they battled in groups of three. The opponents are called Manifestations, and can be compared to the “boss monsters” that in adventure and role-playing games pose the greatest challenges in terms of tactical game play, or battle. When creating Manifestations players define how these shall behave in play, and what they say under different circumstances. The game play mechanics in the world is centred on emotions and social relations. One of the design goals in the creation of the prototype was to cater for a system where tactical game play can be closely tied to the potential narrative contents. The Manifestations players created in the play tests were of four main categories; reflec- tions of persons they had complicated relationships with in real life, difficult situations, abstract concepts, or purely fictional entities. In several cases players brought material into the game that had personal meaning to them. These meanings were developed further when players saw how their Manifestation behaved within the rule system of the world. For example, one player created a Manifestation of an anticipated exam, while another made a Manifestation called “Mother”. The Mother cast spells called “Focused Aggression” and “Cold Ripple of Fear”. It was able to perform acts called “Blame”, “Threaten”, and “Disagree”. The group experimented with tactical choices, while reasoning about the Mother’s potential motivations. They managed to overcome the Mother by alternating between giving each other resistance and casting spells, the winning stroke being a rapid series of spells called “Forgive”.
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Pambudi, Rio, Aulia Rosa Nasution y Muazzul Muazzul. "Tindak Pidana Perjudian Dalam Tinjauan Hukum Pidana (Studi Kasus Putusan Nomor 491/Pid.B/PN Mdn Tahun 2017)". JUNCTO: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum 2, n.º 2 (11 de septiembre de 2020): 110–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.31289/juncto.v2i2.321.
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Gambling is basically a game where there are parties who bet each other to choose one choice among several choices where only one choice is correct and being a winner means that the player who loses the bet will give the bet to the winner. Gambling rules and bets are determined and agreed before the match starts. Talking about "Gambling" which is forbidden by religion, is also expressly prohibited by positive law. This can be seen from the provisions of article 303 of the Criminal Code, Jo. Law No.7 of 1974 concerning Control of Gambling Jo. PP.No. 1981 Jo. Presidential Instruction and Minister of Home Affairs Instruction No.5, April 1, 1981. The type of research used in writing this thesis is to use normative legal research methods. Normative legal research is research that studies the study of documents, namely using various secondary data such as statutory regulations laws, court decisions, legal theories, and can be in the form of opinions of scholars. As for efforts to prevent gambling so that it can be overcome, it is desirable for religious leaders and law enforcers to often conduct socialization such as lectures at places of worship so that they are aware that gambling is prohibited in any form.
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Ojala, Anna-Liisa. "Being an athlete and being a young person: Technologies of the self in managing an athletic career in youth ice hockey in Finland". International Review for the Sociology of Sport 55, n.º 3 (2 de octubre de 2018): 310–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1012690218801303.
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Engaging in youth sports is a major investment, and it requires choosing and balancing between an athlete’s life and other practices and ways of life important to adolescents. In this Foucauldian year-long ethnographic study on Finnish 18–20-year-old elite male ice hockey players I consider an athletic career as a moral question and examine what aspects of their behaviour are affected when these players submit to the external and internal control they encounter when advancing themselves and their careers, and how they problematize the codes that govern their actions. The players expressed six modes of subjection altogether that were important to cultivation of the self: exercising, nutrition, rest, motivation, player role and emotions. The processes of cultivation were strongly guided by coaches and well internalized by the players. However, the hockey players were also young people with interests and choices quite different from a disciplined athletic life, and the coaches also helped in the construction of these spheres. I propose in this study that these spheres may be important in managing the training load and the career pressure that athletes necessarily face during the ‘investment years’ (15+) in sport.
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Belhaiza, Slim. "On Perfect Nash Equilibria of Polymatrix Games". Game Theory 2014 (29 de septiembre de 2014): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/937070.
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When confronted with multiple Nash equilibria, decision makers have to refine their choices. Among all known Nash equilibrium refinements, the perfectness concept is probably the most famous one. It is known that weakly dominated strategies of two-player games cannot be part of a perfect equilibrium. In general, this undominance property however does not extend to n-player games (E. E. C. van Damme, 1983). In this paper we show that polymatrix games, which form a particular class of n-player games, verify the undominance property. Consequently, we prove that every perfect equilibrium of a polymatrix game is undominated and that every undominated equilibrium of a polymatrix game is perfect. This result is used to set a new characterization of perfect Nash equilibria for polymatrix games. We also prove that the set of perfect Nash equilibria of a polymatrix game is a finite union of convex polytopes. In addition, we introduce a linear programming formulation to identify perfect equilibria for polymatrix games. These results are illustrated on two small game applications. Computational experiments on randomly generated polymatrix games with different size and density are provided.
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Siregar, Renenata Ardilesmana. "Seleksi Penyerang Utama Menggunakan K-Means Clustering Dan Sistem Pendukung Keputusan Metode Topsis". Technomedia Journal 2, n.º 1 (27 de agosto de 2017): 37–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.33050/tmj.v2i1.314.
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Untuk menentukan penyerang ideal dalam sepak bola agar sesuai karakter dan kriteria yang diharapkan, diperlukan pelatih yang mempunyai naluri tajam dan juga sistem yang bisa membantu pelatih dalam memberikan pilihan. Biasanya dalam proses penentuan pemain masih dilakukan secara manual dengan melihat dari karakter dan kriteria dari pemain tersebut. Tetapi terkadang hanya dengan melihat dari karakter dan kriteria dari pemain tersebut saja masih kurang cukup sehingga jauh dari apa yang diharapkan. Untuk mempermudah dalam pemilihan penyerang ideal, maka diperlukan suatu sistem yang dapat membantu pelatih untuk memilih penyerang yang dibutuhkan sesuai dengan kebutuhan tim yaitu dengan menggunakan teknik K-Means Clustering dalam metode data mining sebagai proses dalam menyeleksi pemain untuk bergabung dalam suatu tim dan juga didukung dengan metode Sistem Pendukung Keputusan (Decision Support Systems) The Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) sebagai proses dalam menentukan penyerang yang akan bermain sebagai pemain utama dalam tim yang menggunakan beberapa kriteria untuk memilih pemain yang tepat. Dengan hasil penelitian ini, diharapkan dapat membantu pelatih dalam proses seleksi pemain dan dapat mengubah cara penilaian terhadap sifat subjektif agar lebih obyektif dalam pengambilan keputusan.
Kata Kunci :Data Mining, K-Means Clustering, Sistem Pendukung Keputusan
To determine the ideal attacker in football to match the expected character and criteria, a coach who has a sharp instinct and a system that can assist the coach in providing choices. Usually in the process of determining the player is still done manually by look ing at the characters and criteria of the player. But sometimes just by look ing at the characters and criteria of the player is still not enough so far from what is expected. To facilitate the selection of ideal attackers, a system that can help the trainer to select the attacker needed according to the needs of the team is by using K-Means Clustering technique in the method of data mining as a process in selecting players to join a team and also supported by Decision Support Systems method The Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) is the process of determining which attack er will play as a major player in the team using multiple criteria to select the right player. With the results of this study, it is expected to assist trainers in the selection process of players and can change the way the assessment of the subjective nature to be more objective in decision making.
Keywords: Data Mining, K-Means Clustering, Decision Support System.
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Skouteris, Helen, Michael Do, Leonie Rutherford, Amy Cutter-Mackenzie y Susan Edwards. "Call for Research – The Consuming Child-in-Context in Unhealthy and Unsustainable Times". Australian Journal of Environmental Education 26 (2010): 33–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0814062600000811.
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AbstractChildhood obesity is a highly complex issue with serious health and environmental implications. It has been postulated that young children (preschool-aged in particular) are able to internalise positive environmental beliefs. Applying a socioecological theoretical perspective, in this discussion paper we argue that although children may internalise such beliefs, they commonly behave in ways that contradict these beliefs as demonstrated by their consumer choices. The media directly influences these consumer choices and growing evidence suggests that media exposure (particularly commercial television viewing) may be a significant “player” in the prediction of childhood obesity. However, there is still debate as to whether childhood obesity is caused by digital media use per se or whether other factors mediate this relationship. Growing evidence suggests that researchers should examine whether different types of content have conflicting influences on a child's consumer choices and, by extension, obesity. The extent to which young children connect their consumer choices and the sustainability of the produces they consume with their overall health and wellbeing has not previously been researched. To these ends, we call for further research on this socioecological phenomenon among young children, particularly with respect to the influence of digital media use on a child's consumer behaviours.
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Di Stasio, Antonio, Aniello Murano, Vincenzo Prignano y Loredana Sorrentino. "Improving parity games in practice". Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 89, n.º 5-6 (23 de enero de 2021): 551–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-020-09721-3.
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AbstractParity games are infinite-round two-player games played on directed graphs whose nodes are labeled with priorities. The winner of a play is determined by the smallest priority (even or odd) that is encountered infinitely often along the play. In the last two decades, several algorithms for solving parity games have been proposed and implemented in , a platform written in OCaml. includes the Zielonka’s recursive algorithm (, for short) which is known to be the best performing one over random games. Notably, several attempts have been carried out with the aim of improving the performance of in , but with small advances in practice. In this work, we deeply revisit the implementation of by dealing with the use of specific data structures and programming languages such as Scala, Java, C++, and Go. Our empirical evaluation shows that these choices are successful, gaining up to three orders of magnitude in running time over the classic version of the algorithm implemented in .