Literatura académica sobre el tema "Proslogion"

Abstract. The Proslogion argument is often still considered as an ontological proof of the existence of God or as its predecessor. Doubtless this misinterpretation does not strike the root of the matter. Anselm requests to reflect upon what is and has always been present to reasoning in an unthematically way. Proslogion chapt. 2 reflects upon the difference between only being thought and being, and points out the characteristic feature of reasoning – to be the disclosure of being. Proslogion chapt. 3 reflects upon the difference between being as being and its origin. Id quo nihil maius cogitari potest is not the highest thinkable (summum cogitabile) but what is showing itself while withdrawing from reasoning.

I argue that (i) the Proslogion 2 argument rests on Meinongian assumptions, and (ii) Meinongianism is more defensible than many metaphysicians think, but (iii) although Meinongianism can be defended from (venerable) objections, the most promising (known) strategies for doing that call into question the cogency of the Proslogion 2 argument, so (iv) that argument is less than convincing, even if Meinongianism is true.

Anselm is commonly credited with two a priori arguments for God's existence, the non-modal argument of Proslogion 2 and a modal argument some find in Proslogion 3. But his Reply to Gaunilo contains a third. The argument as Anselm gives it has flaws, but they are not fatal, and its main premise can serve as the basis of a simpler, stronger argument.

Abstract. Existence and uniqueness are standard questions in cases where definite descriptions are used. In his Proslogion Anselm of Canterbury uses definite and non-definite descriptions of God: He is “id/aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest” (and similar). While Anselm’s proof for the existence of God is widely discussed, including its relations to those famous descriptions, this is not the case for the question of uniqueness. Is there at most one perfect being or might there be more than one? ‘Of course there can at most be one’, one might want to answer – but what reasons for this claim can be found in the Proslogion? In this celebrated work of philosophical theology, Anselm does not prove uniqueness explicitly. But one may try a proof “in the spirit of the Proslogion”.

The first goal of Anselm in the Proslogion is to encourage believers by demonstrating the absolute necessity of the existence of the God of the Bible. Anselm most likely succeeds as the definition of God that he adopts is faithful to the content of special revelation. Whether the argument can function as an argument for the existence of God can be doubted. In this article we look at the various aspects of the question.

Anselm of Canterbury’s Proslogion is a Benedictine prayer-exercise that contains a famous argument for the existence of God. This article highlights how the argument is intertwined with the prayer. The article argues that since the understanding of God leads to a joyous affect, the logic of the argument must be causally connected with joy. While much of the secondary literature applies a division between ‘prayer’ and ‘proof’, this article suggests a reading of the Proslogion proof as a prayer-practice, and the prayer-practice is in turn analyzed through the logic of the proof. The result is a description of how contemplation of the argument drives affect, leading to the conclusion that the affect of joy achieves the intended result of the proof: the joy leads the mind to God. The article thus shows that the Proslogion is an intellectual affective prayer-practice.

Anselmo de Cantuária investiga no Proslogion (caps. 5-12) se o conteúdo de nossas palavras se refere de modo adequado à substância criadora. Essa obra de Anselmo pode ser considerada como uma meditação realizada por um espírito que busca entender aquilo que inicialmente crê a respeito do ser divino. O Proslogion nos oferecerá um caminho para pensar o sentido da busca de razões no domínio exclusivo da fé, do esforço da palavra humana para encontrar aquilo que já fora dito por outra palavra. Este artigo visa a explicitar o sentido dessa racionalidade, naquilo que diz respeito aos "nomes divinos". A designação id quod summum omnium (Proslogion, cap.5) retoma um tema já presente na reflexão anselmiana e impõe ao teólogo um desafio: articular, sob a dialética do melius, o modo propriamente humano de a criatura referir-se a Deus, reconhecido como maius e distante de qualquer relação de continuidade com o mundo.

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Anselm of Canterbury is a figure of the Middle Ages, considered the father of scholastic theology. As archbishop of Canterbury, he gained notoriety from his, later denominated, ontological argument, which presented, by use of philosophical concepts, a unique argument, capable of demonstrating the existence of God. This unique argument is found in the Proslogion, a book that addresses the existence of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived , considered a simplification of the Monologion, his previous work. By reading Anselm, his intension of addressing faith and reason is explicit, as, by working with a rational argument, he sought to explain something in which he previously believed. There is some research on Anselm and his argument, however, the main focus of these works lay on his philisofical reasoning, without exploring their theological matters. From this observation, the present research seeks to demonstrate the exposition of theological ideias in the Proslogion, expounding them under the comment of contemporary dogmatic theology. Also, consideration on the medieval context, the cultural, social, scholastic, theological and philosofical backgrounds and others, help comprehend the anselmian thought.
Anselmo de Cantuária é um personagem da Idade Média, considerado o pai da escolástica. Arcebispo da Catedral de Cantuária, que ficou conhecido basicamente pelo seu argumento denominado posteriormente de ontológico, que visava apresentar, valendo-se de conceitos filosóficos, um argumento único capaz de demonstrar a existência de Deus. Esse argumento único encontra-se no Proslogion, uma obra que trata da existência de um ser do qual é possível pensar nada maior , considerada uma simplificação do Monologion, seu escrito anterior. Ao ler Anselmo, observa-se explicitamente sua intenção de tratar da fé e da razão, pois, valendo-se de um argumento racional, buscou explicar aquilo que previamente já cria. Há algumas pesquisas sobre Anselmo e seu argumento, contudo, observou-se que seus pressupostos filosóficos são comumente ressaltados, sem, contudo, explorar as questões teológicas. Partindo dessa constatação, esta pesquisa objetivou demonstrar que o autor medieval expõe algumas ideias teológicas que estão presentes no Proslogion, e sob essa perspectiva deu-se a pesquisa, explicitando suas questões teológicas em sua obra específica, sob comentários da teologia dogmática protestante contemporânea. Além disso, refletir sobre o seu ambiente medieval, no que diz respeito à cultura, sociedade, contexto eclesiástico, pressupostos teológicos e filosóficos, enfim, entre outras questões, ajudam a compreender melhor o pensamento anselmiano.

Resumo: A pesquisa pretende apresentar uma investigação acerca da caracterização do célebre "argumento ontológico" de Anselmo de Cantuária. Dito de outro modo, o argumento de Anselmo é de fato um argumento ontológico? Embora haja comentadores que afirmam não ser correto chamar de ontológico o argumento anselmiano, poucos se dedicaram a tentar tornar clara tal sutileza conceitual. G. E. M. Anscombe, em 1982, por exemplo, propôs uma nova tradução de uma das premissas do argumento de Proslogion 2, precisamente aquela que seria responsável por tornar um argumento ontológico o argumento de Anselmo. Assim, a nova tradução seria responsável pela interpretação não-ontológica do mesmo. A tradução alternativa de Anscombe foi criticada por Jasper Hopkins em 1986. Segundo Hopkins, a reconstrução do argumento anselmiano por parte de Anscombe não apenas é impossível, bem como Anselmo era, ao contrário da tese de Anscombe, adepto da doutrina da existência como perfeição. Jean-Luc Marion, em 1992, também defendeu de que o argumento de Anselmo não é ontológico. De acordo com Marion, o ponto inicial do argumento anselmiano não é um conceito, mas um não-conceito, visto que não se refere à essência de Deus, mas à incapacidade humana de conceber algo maior que Deus. Além disso, Anselmo não pressupõe qualquer noção ou conceito de essência. Para Marion, o argumento de Proslogion 2 se ocupa com a noção de bem, e não com a de ser, condição esta que, para Marion, tornaria um argumento ontológico. Um estudo de Sandra Visser/Thomas Williams, de 2009, se aproxima da proposta inicial de Anscombe. Novamente há a afirmação de que o argumento de Anselmo não é corretamente interpretado. Porém, diferentemente de Anscombe, Visser/Williams não propõem uma nova tradução do texto anselmiano. Para eles, o argumento de Proslogion 2 é corretamente lido e interpretado se considerado em relação com o Responsio, a resposta de Anselmo a Gaunilo. Quando posto em relação com o Responsio, o argumento anselmiano revela que não há nele qualquer pressuposição da doutrina da existência como perfeição, condição esta para um argumento ser ontológico.

Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.II starts from the contention that 'lq when a Fool hears 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. This is a special feature of the Pros.II argument which distinguishes the argument from other ontological arguments set up by, for example, Descartes and Leibniz. This is also the context which makes semantics necessary for evaluation of the argument. It is quite natural to ask 'lq What is understood by the Fool, and what is in his mind? It is essential for a proper consideration of the argument to identify the object which is understood by the Fool, and so, is in his mind. A semantics gives answers to the questions of 'lq What the Fool understands? and 'lq What is in the Fool's mind? If we choose a semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it makes an effective guide to identify the object. It is a necessary condition for a proper evaluation of the Pros.II argument to fix our universe of discourse, especially since, in the argument, we are involved in such talk about existing objects as Anselm's contention that 'when a Fool hears 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. The ontology to which a semantic theory commits us will be accepted as our scope of objects when we introduce our semantic theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, and this ontological boundary constrains us to identify the object in a certain way. Consistent application of an ontology, most of all, is needed for the evaluation of the logical validity of an argument. If we take Frege's three-level semantics, we are ontologically committed to intensional entities, like meaning, as well as extensional entities. Sluga contends that Frege's anti-psychologism for meanings should not be interpreted as vindicating reification of intensional entities in relation to Frege's contextualism, that Frege's anti-psychologism with his contextualism is nothing but a linguistic version of Kantian philosophy for the transcendental unity of a judgement. There is, however, another possible interpretation of Frege's contextualism. According to Dummett, the significance of Frege's contextualism must be understood as a way of explanation for a word's having meaning. If Dummett's view is cogent, we could say that Frege's contextualism does not prevent our interpreting his semantics as being committed to intensional entities. We need not worry that Frege's over all semantics, especially with his contextualism, would internally deny the ontological interpretation of his theory. We see Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Pros.II is an invalid argument if we introduce Frege's three-level semantics, i.e. if we acknowledge meanings of words as entities in our universe of discourse. We can also employ extensional semantics for the interpretation of the Pros.II argument. According to extensionalists, like Quine and Kripke, we need not assume intensional entities, like meaning, to be part of our ontological domain. They argue that we can employ our language well enough without assuming intensional entities. If we choose extensional semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it commits us only to extensional entities as objects in the Universe of our interpretation. In Sections 1.4 and 1.5, I show that extensional semantics makes the Pros.II argument a valid argument for the existence of God. 'lq Necessary existence is the central concept of Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.III. It has been said that, even if the argument is formally valid, it cannot stand as a valid argument for the existence of God, since 'lq necessary existence is an absurd concept like 'lq round square. And further that even if there is a meaningful combination of concepts for 'lq necessary existence, it cannot quality as a subject of an a priori argument. As objections to the interpretations which make the Pros.III argument valid, it has been argued that even if there is a concept of 'lq necessary existence which is meaningful and there is another concept of 'lq necessary existence which is suitable as a subject of an a priori argument, there is no concept of 'lq necessary existence which is meaningful and at the same time suitable as a subject of an a priori argument. In Chap.2 and Chap.3, I try to show that there can be concepts of 'lq necessary existence which are proof against these objections. Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogian Chap.II and Chap.III are logically valid arguments on some logical principles. Some fideists, K. Barth, for example, argue that Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogion are not proofs for the existence of God even if they are logically valid arguments. I raise the question how this attitude could be possible, in Chap.4 and Chap.5. Barth's fideistic interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion arguments does not find any flaw in the validity of the arguments, and it accepts the meaningfulness and truth of the premises even to the fool in Proslogion. If this is the case, i.e. if Barth's interpretation accepts the validity of the arguments and the truth of the premises, I raise the question, how can the arguments not be interpreted as proofs for the existence of God? How is it possible that the function of the arguments is not that of proving the existence of God? According to Wittgensteinian fideism, premises in the arguments should not be intelligible to those who do not believe in God's existence already, and so the real function of the arguments is the elucidation, the understanding of believer's belief, rather than proving articles of belief to unbelievers. Barth's fideistic interpretation of the arguments, however, fully recognizes the meaningfulness and truth of the premises in the arguments as well as the validity of the arguments. I argue that there could be a justification for the Barthian fideism. As Malcolm notices, there are still atheists who understand Anselm's arguments as valid, but the only possibility for the people who recognize the validity of Anselm's arguments still to remain atheists has been thought to be to challenge the truth of premises employed in the arguments. Now, of the atheistic possibility, we can change the direction of our attention, that is, to the question about the function of a logically valid argument itself. What has not been thought of in relation to Anselm's arguments is the significance of logical truth or the logical validity of an argument. We have not asked such questions as 'lq What does a logical truth say? and 'lq What does a logically valid argument guarantee with true premises? Let us assume that even the premises are accepted by atheists. Do they all convert to theism? If that were so, the disagreement between atheist and believer over the ontological arguments should turn only on the truth of premises. If that is not so, there is some point in raising this other question. If there are people who, recognizing the premises and validity of an argument, are still reluctant to accept the conclusion, we have reason to question the function of a valid argument. I argue that there is a way of being consistently reasonable while accepting the premises and the validity of the ontological arguments and yet remaining an atheist or an agnostic.

Thesis (M.A.)--Cleveland State University, 2008.
Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Nov. 6, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-98). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center. Also available in print.

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This thesis seeks to propose an itinerary to think about the beauty according to Anselm of Canterbury’s thought, from some of his works entitled to be crucial to think about this matter. Based on this primary interest, it came across the importance of thinking about God and His atributes, such as kindness, which is a basic atribute according to the archbishop of Canterbury, as well as the incarnation of the divine word and other theological matters, as sins in the human race, for instance, that brought disorder to creation, being one of the reason of the divine incarnation, which is the reestablishment of order onto all created things. If these matter are not properly approached, focusing on the beauty according to the anselmian conception becomes extremely difficult, once there’s no specific written record about this matter by the archbishop of Canterbury; moreover, the conception of the divine being is fundamental to conceive the perception that Anselm had about the beauty. At first, this thesis treated Anselm’s environment, to try to understand a little about the context in which the archbishop lived. Besides, thinking over possible influences he suffered that helped forming his thoughts helps to enlighten the reason of some of his quotes. To think about the beauty according to Anselm’s works, it’s indispensable to analyze his writings, to propose, under that perspective, an itinerary on his thought about this matter. At last, looking at some of Anselm’s interpreters helps to establish this itinerary, sometimes following them, others moving away from them
A presente tese buscou propor um itinerário para se pensar a beleza, de acordo com o pensamento de Anselmo de Cantuária, a partir de algumas de suas obras que se julgam fundamentais para se pensar esse assunto. Com base nesse interesse primário, deparou-se com a importância de se refletir acerca de Deus e de seus atributos, como a bondade, que é sua qualidade basilar segundo o arcebispo de Cantuária, como também da encarnação do verbo divino e diversos outros temas teológicos, como a questão do pecado na raça humana, por exemplo, o qual trouxe desordem à criação, sendo esse um dos motivos da encarnação divina, a saber, o restabelecimento da ordem nas coisas criadas. Sem esses temas devidamente abordados, focalizar a beleza segundo a concepção anselmiana se torna extremamente difícil, pelo fato de o arcebispo de Cantuária não ter escrito nada especificamente sobre o assunto; além do mais, a concepção do ser divino é fundamental para se conceber a percepção que Anselmo tinha sobre a beleza. Buscou-se inicialmente tratar do ambiente anselmiano, para tentar entender um pouco do contexto que o arcebispo vivera. Além disso, refletir sobre possíveis influências sofridas que ajudaram a formar o seu pensamento ajuda a esclarecer o porquê de algumas colocações. Para pensar a beleza segundo as obras anselmianas, é imprescindível analisar seus escritos, para propor, nessa perspectiva, um itinerário em seu pensamento sobre esse tema. Por fim, olhar para alguns intérpretes de Anselmo auxilia a estabelecer esse itinerário, ora seguindo-os, ora deles se distanciando

Contro l’argomento anselmiano del Proslogion sono state sollevate varie obiezioni, come quelle, molto note, di Gaunilone, di san Tommaso e di Kant. In questo saggio si sostiene la tesi che tutte queste critiche si basano fondamentalmente su una interpretazione imprecisa del testo di Anselmo che, se correttamente letto, ne risulta invece al riparo. Viene quindi offerta una nuova lettura dell’unum argumentum, con la quale, ricercandone lo spirito originario e più autentico, viene messa in risalto innanzitutto la sua struttura formale di dimostrazione per assurdo, illustrando in secondo luogo l’importante rapporto di complementarità che lega questa tipologia di prova a quelle strutturate in modo diverso, che procedono cioè a posteriori per costruzione diretta.
Many important Authors – as Gaunilo, Thomas Aquinas and Kant – have brought many well-known objections against the anselmian argument. This paper proposes the thesis that all these objections are based on an inaccurate interpretation of the Proslogion: in fact, an in-depth analysis of the text shows its fully validity. Therefore, it is offered a new reading of the anselmian argument, that looks for its original and authentic sense: firstly, it is enlightened its formal structure of proof by contradiction, and secondly it is showed its important complementary relationship with the other kind of a posteriori proofs.

Contro l’argomento anselmiano del Proslogion sono state sollevate varie obiezioni, come quelle, molto note, di Gaunilone, di san Tommaso e di Kant. In questo saggio si sostiene la tesi che tutte queste critiche si basano fondamentalmente su una interpretazione imprecisa del testo di Anselmo che, se correttamente letto, ne risulta invece al riparo. Viene quindi offerta una nuova lettura dell’unum argumentum, con la quale, ricercandone lo spirito originario e più autentico, viene messa in risalto innanzitutto la sua struttura formale di dimostrazione per assurdo, illustrando in secondo luogo l’importante rapporto di complementarità che lega questa tipologia di prova a quelle strutturate in modo diverso, che procedono cioè a posteriori per costruzione diretta.
Many important Authors – as Gaunilo, Thomas Aquinas and Kant – have brought many well-known objections against the anselmian argument. This paper proposes the thesis that all these objections are based on an inaccurate interpretation of the Proslogion: in fact, an in-depth analysis of the text shows its fully validity. Therefore, it is offered a new reading of the anselmian argument, that looks for its original and authentic sense: firstly, it is enlightened its formal structure of proof by contradiction, and secondly it is showed its important complementary relationship with the other kind of a posteriori proofs.