Tesis sobre el tema "Qualia"

Thema der Arbeit sind die Konzepte von 'phänomenaler Erfahrung' und 'Bewußtsein' in verschiedenen empirischen und philosophischen Theorien über das Verhältnis von physiologischen und mentalen Prozessen. Der 1. Teil klärt das Umfeld des Problems: Kapitel 1 und 2 erläutern, warum die Diskussion phänomenaler Qualitäten oder Qualia zum Lackmustest der neuen Theorien des Bewußtseins geworden ist. Kapitel 3 und 4 zeigen, inwiefern ein Großteil der Verwirrung bezüglich von Qualia auf den impliziten Annahmen bestimmter Wahrnehmungstheorien beruhen. Sinnesepisoden (und damit zumindest eine wichtige Klasse phänomenaler Episoden) können nur auf der Ebene von Systemen erklärt werden, die in angemessener Weise auf Eigenschaften ihrer Umgebung reagieren können. Von dieser Einsicht ausgehend, verhandelt der 2. Teil mit verschiedenen konkreten Versuchen, Qualia innerhalb empirischer Kontexte zu erklären. Kapitel 5 untersucht konnektionistische Modelle, die sich einer Vektorkodierungsstrategie bedienen (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) und sich an die Theorie der Selektion neuronaler Gruppen (Edelman) anzubinden. Wenn aber das Qualia-Problem nicht so einfach neurophilosophisch gelöst werden kann, so fährt Kapitel 6 fort, ist es verlockend, mentale Zustände als informationstragende neurophysiologische Zustände zu betrachten. Das ist der sogenannte Repräsentationalismus oder Intentionalismus (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Kapitel 7 behauptet, daß diese Versuche, Bewußtsein im direkten Verweis auf die empirische Forschung zu erklären, philosophisch nicht befriedigend sind, weil Bewußtsein keine 'natürliche Art' ist, d.h. kein einheitliches Phänomen, das isoliert durch eine Einzeldisziplin (einschließlich des Funktionalismus) untersucht werden könnte. In Kapitel 8 analysiere ich Damasios Theorie somatischer Marker als Versuch, Searles Intuition bezüglich der phänomenalen Grundierung aller bewußter Prozesse empirisch zu plausibilisieren. Nicht Gehirne (also sub-personale Systeme) sind Träger bewußter Zustände, sondern potentielle Handlungssubjekte. Alle empirischen Theorien etablieren höchstens eine gutbestätigte Kovarianz zwischen Gehirnzuständen und mentalen Zuständen. Im abschließenden Kapitel 9 verteitige ich demgemäß einen nicht-puritanischen, eklektischen Naturalismus, der sich dem Bewußtseinsproblem unter Aufbietung aller theoretischen Paradigmata nähert, die sich als heuristisch produktiv erwiesen haben. Fragen des Bewußtseins involvieren immer auch eine Selbstinterpretation des Fragenden. Das allein ist schon Grund genug zu der Vermutung, keine naturwissenschaftliche Einzeldisziplin werde je für sich allein alle dieser Fragen klären können.
"Qualia - Phenomenal states as a problem for philosophical and empirical theories of consciousness" In this essay, I examine the concepts of 'phenomenal experience' and 'consciousness' in several empirical and philosophical theories about the relation between physiological and mental processes. Part I sets the stage for the problem: Chapters 1 and 2 establish why the discussion of phenomenal qualities or qualia has become a litmus test for current theories of consciousness. Chapters 3 and 4 show how large parts of the confusion about qualia rest on implicit assumptions that characterize certain theories of perception. Against mainstream inferentialist theories, I defend a vaguly Gibsonian direct theory. Sensory episodes (and thus at least one important class of phenomenal episodes) can be explained only on the level of systems that have the ability to usefully react to features of their environment. Using this insight as its point of departure, Part II deals with several concrete attempts to explain qualia in an empirical context. Chapter 5 examines connectionist models using vector coding strategies (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) and tries to connect them to the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (Edelman). If the qualia-problem cannot be simply solved by means of neurophilosophy, I go on to argue in Chapter 6, it is tempting to regard mental states as information-bearing neurophysiological states. This is the position taken by Representationalism or Intentionalism (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Chapter 7 claims that these attempts to explain consciousness with direct reference to empirical research are not philosophically satisfactory because consciousness is no 'natural kind', no unified phenomenon that lends itself to examination in any single scientific discipline (including all kinds of functionalims). In Chapter 8, I analyze Damasio's Theory of Somatic Markers as an attempt to empirically support Searle's intuition concerning the necessary phenomenal grounding of all conscious processes. Bearers of conscious states are not brains (sub-personal systems), but subjects with the potential to act; consciousness is embodied consciousness. All of these theories establish at most a good covariance between brain states and mental states. In the concluding Chapter 9, I defend a non-puritan, eclectic naturalism which approaches consciousness using all theoretical paradigms that have proved themselves to be heuristically productive. Questions about consciousness always involve questions of self-interpretation. This alone is reason enough to suspect that no single scientific discipline will be in a position to solve them all.

Structuralist theories of properties state that properties are individuated by their nomological or causal roles. It has previously been suggested that structuralism is incompatible with robust conceptions of qualia. In this paper, I argue that structuralism should be taken as a theory of de re representation, and under this formulation it is able to accommodate qualia as intrinsic, introspectable properties of experiences. I then turn to various thought experiments used by qualia theorists to expand the notion of qualia, and find the majority of these compatible with structuralism as well. I conclude that the structuralists and qualia theorists need not be at odds with each other.

This is an attempt to arrive at a philosophical understanding of (qualitative) consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, tickles, experienced colors, sounds, tastes, and odors. Consciousness is analyzed as the having of qualia. Qualia (or phenomenal properties) are problematical because nothing (neither physical nor nonphysical, neither actual nor merely possible) can bear them. This suggests qualia eliminativism; but it is argued that qualia should be retained as properties that can be exemplified though nothing bears them. Phenomenal objects are then presented as bundles of qualia. The bundle theory of phenomenal objects is complemented with a bundle theory of the conscious subject. Qualia are crucial elements of the bundle that constitutes a conscious subject. For a subject to have a quale is for this quale to be included in the bundle that is the subject. This account makes consciousness into a noncognitive phenomenon. Having a quale is not a matter of knowing anything, believing anything, or cognizing anything in any way. It is simply to feel a certain way. Two theses are singled out for particular critical attention. Concerning the nature of qualia, David Armstrong has argued that (color) qualia are complexes of primary qualities borne by the surfaces of (actual or possible) physical objects that we perceive or seem to perceive. More than other reductionists, Armstrong is concerned to ensure the phenomenologial adequacy of his reductionist theory. This phenomenological sensibility makes his theory of qualia particularly interesting and also particularly vulnerable. Concerning the question what it takes to have qualia, introspection appears to be the chosen tool of many contemporary theorists. Using John Pollock's introspectionist account of qualitative consciousness as a model, it is argued that introspection can play no part in an adequate explanation of qualitative consciousness. Throughout the investigation the methodological importance of the first-person point of view is emphasized. The primary responsibility of philosophical theory of consciousness is to insure phenomenological adequacy. Straying from the first-person point of view makes it easy to forget this.

Experiences are usually multi-faceted and made up of different features. These features are called qualia, the various ways that colours, sounds, and pains, for example, feel to us - the way that they appear to be. These qualitative features are a central part of our lives and seem to have important connections with the world around us - a world which seems to be largely if not entirely physical.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008.
Thesis Advisor(s): Simeral, Robert ; Bergin, Richard. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on February 2, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-103). Also available in print.

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Propone un enfoque al estudio de la conciencia fenoménica; sentir algo opuesto (qualia invertidos) o, que no sientan nada (qualia ausentes). Se espera que este enfoque resulte en alguna medida compatible con la visión materialista del mundo. Su motivación es contribuir a echar luces sobre un aspecto del que hoy por hoy es considerado el último y más pertinaz escollo en la comprensión de una realidad en la que todos están incluidos. Esta investigación se inscribe dentro de la llamada filosofía analítica y, dentro de ésta, en los estudios concernientes a la filosofía de la mente. Presenta fuerte influencia de la línea naturalista propia de esta tradición en sus diferentes disciplinas durante las últimas cuatro décadas. En tal sentido, no considera que haya una división de principio entre la investigación filosófica y la investigación científica, presumiendo un continuo tanto de orden temático como de orden metodológico entre estas empresas. Tal es la razón por la cual este estudio, además de recurrir al análisis conceptual, lógico y lingüístico, que algunos llamarían filosofía a priori o “filosofía de sillón”, se ve nutrido de resultados y perspectivas provenientes de la neurociencia, la psicología experimental, la biología evolutiva y las ciencias de la computación. Los ideales son la verdad y el conocimiento.
Tesis

The first chapter will elucidate the overall subject of qualia and the evolution of consciousness, and provide current information as of this writing – as well as some key terms that better be clarified than left in obscurity. From there, arguments of both sides, the non-physical and physical status about the existence of qualia and its connection with consciousness will be examined in the following chapter. Equipped with these arguments, the last investigatory chapter will place them within the framework of evolutionary theory in order to clarify the paper thesis, and hopefully narrow down the strongest and weakest arguments so that a reasonable conclusion can be arrived at.

Orientador: Michael B. Wrigley
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Abstract: Not informed.
Mestrado
Mestre em Filosofia

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Comunicação e Expressão. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Linguística.
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Este trabalho se desenvolve ao redor de dois eixos: o teórico, no qual se discutem alguns temas de ontologia filosófica e semântica lexical, como a individuação e a polissemia, o nominalismo e o realismo; e o técnico-prático, no qual se estabelece um conjunto de regras de inferência para ontologias computacionais, que chamaremos de QualiaNet, cujo objetivo é a integração das relações da estrutura qualia do léxico gerativo às árvores de inferência ou hierárquicas. São propostas regras como a seguinte: o constitutivo do formal de X é formal do contitutivo de X. Por fim, aplicamos esta mesma regra a uma parte das relações da Wordnet 2.0, por meio das fontes em PROLOG, e demonstramos que a QualiaNet não apenas incrementa coerência entre as relações semânticas como, também, pode ser utilizada para gerar novos arcos hiperonímicos, os quais são, como se sabe, a espinha dorsal de qualquer rede semântica.

Thesis (M.A.)--Kent State University, 2010.
Title from PDF t.p. (viewed May 26, 2010). Advisor: David Odell-Scott. Keywords: qualia; Whitehead; self-organizing system; chaos; chaotic systems; dynamical systems; subjective experience; actual entity; actual occasion; eternal objects; god; phenomenal stance; process philosophy; hard problem; consciousness; cellular automata. Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-108).

Up to this date there are several scientific disciplines that deal with religion´s underlying mechanisms and certain functions of our consciousness, but there isn´t anyone who takes into account the entire aspect of consciousness. The aim of the present work is to bring the entire aspect of our consciousness into the scientific discussion of religion. To help in doing this, the philosophical concept of qualia is used. First the concept is problematized, then an examination whether the concept has explanatory value in the science of religion and in the understanding of religious experience is done.  The concept of qualia has in this manner been applied to several scientific theories of religion and place-related entity continuity has been used as an example of religious experience. The present work is developed as a literature study and uses literature and theories from de scientific disciplines of philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, neurotheology, cognitive science of religion and psychology of religion. As an underlying method the epistemological theory of holistic coherentism is used because it enables such an interdisciplinary study as this work is.   What this work shows is that qualia have a high explanatory value in the science of religion and in the understanding of religious experience and how we form religious concepts. However, the concept of qualia is problematic and great care must be exercised when inferences are made.

This thesis examines representations of sensation within modernist novels alongside contemporary philosophical debates over the concept of qualia. Concentrating on the work of Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Percy Wyndham Lewis, and Samuel Beckett, it confronts a longstanding critical tradition that has tended to obscure or misunderstand the implications of arguments made by philosophers of mind in relation to literary descriptions of sensation. That the mind is a thing, and that modernist narrative fiction is particularly successful at representing that thing, has become a critical commonplace. In this thesis I argue that interpretations of modernism’s supposed ‘inward turn’ are founded on a mistaken notion of ‘cognitive realism’, a critical position endorsing the idea that it is both possible and desirable to describe the mind (conceived of as a stable and unchanging object) without loss through the development and judicial deployment of new literary techniques. The myth of the inward turn in its various incarnations – the psychologised modernism described by many literary critics in the 50s and 60s, and the neuromodernism subscribed to by many contemporary critics – is, I argue, largely the result of a set of inter-linked misconceptions which attend the cognitive realist paradigm. The notion of qualia is central to my thesis. Defined as the ineffable, irreducible, and subjective properties of conscious experience, qualia emerge concomitantly with modernism, developing out of G. E. Moore’s definition of ‘sense-data’ and Bertrand Russell’s category of ‘sensibilia’. Though still disputed within contemporary philosophy, qualia create huge problems for materialist theories of consciousness, threatening to undermine critical approaches to literature which contend that formal literary strategies can ever hope to transcend the limitations of symbolic language in conveying sensation. The ‘problem’ of qualia referred to in this thesis, therefore, is the problem the concept poses for symbolic descriptions (either mathematic, psychological, or literary) of mental states, especially when those descriptions make special claims (or are interpreted as making special claims) of mimetic veracity. The problem emerged within philosophy at precisely the point at which the representative claims of literature came under direct attack. This thesis argues, therefore, that it is a profoundly literary problem, and that the absence of ‘sensation’ from the written is simply a manifestation of the inherent limitations of language. A critical tendency to re-insert sensory experience into the process of reading – through phenomenological interpretations of modernism, or in contemporary ‘neuroaesthetic’ approaches to literature – thus point to a general anxiety that manifests itself most forcefully in relation to modernist fiction’s ability to ‘write’ sensation. This thesis employs the concept of qualia as a way of contextualising narratives of the mind – philosophical, literary and scientific – from the period. In doing so it seeks to historicise modernism’s ‘crisis of the senses’; locating this argument in a broader theoretical space and questioning the relevance (and novelty) of contemporary approaches to reading the senses in modernism.

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Estudos Portugueses
Esta dissertação parte da leitura do ensaio «A Consciência e o Romance», de David Lodge, que desde logo suscitou fortes entusiasmos e fortes reservas. Nesse ensaio, o autor sugere que os estudos da consciência, designação atribuída à abordagem científica do problema tradicional da consciência, vieram trazer nova luz a campos tão díspares como a teoria da literatura. O objectivo de Lodge é estabelecer analogias entre os dois campos numa clara atitude interdisciplinar. Fá-lo interpretando as várias formas de representação da consciência das personagens, e no decorrer da leitura cedo percebemos que a sua perspectiva é no fundo narratológica. Mas em que medida de facto Lodge consegue relacionar os dois campos? E que mais opções haverá no âmbito interdisciplinar? Se é que oferece algumas respostas, esta dissertação tenta fazê-lo em relação a estas duas perguntas. Num primeiro momento é essencial estabelecer o conceito de consciência expresso na obra de António Damásio, pois o próprio Lodge recorre a este cientista como ponto de partida para o seu intuito interdisciplinar. Depois sim, embarcar na análise do ensaio de Lodge para tentar perceber em que medida é que o conceito que encontramos em Damásio é de facto explorado por Lodge. Feita esta leitura, surge a necessidade de abordar um autor que se assuma claramente como defensor da narratologia (Dorrit Cohn), o que não acontece em Lodge. A terceira e última parte explora algumas possibilidades interdisciplinares não previstas por Lodge, nomeadamente focando a análise na importância dos qualia (característica relevante da consciência) na leitura.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
A experiência consciente é uma das coisas das quais estamos mais certos no mundo, mas ela é um grande mistério. Não temos uma teoria amplamente aceita que justifique racionalmente de que modo um sistema físico como o cérebro pode experienciar (um sabor, a felicidade, a dor, etc), e que esclareça qual a natureza das experiências conscientes. De forma mais clara, experiências conscientes têm uma fenomenologia, isto é, características qualitativas distintas que são apreendidas subjetivamente. Tais propriedades são os qualia e foram associados à consciência fenomênica, pois estes são acessíveis pela consciência do organismo que experiencia. Entretanto, não sabemos como conciliar a experiência consciente com o que sabemos, na medida em que suas propriedades parecem ser essencialmente subjetivas e, portanto, inescrutáveis e indescritíveis sob um ponto de vista de terceira pessoa. Como então conciliar a objetividade de nossas explicações com a subjetividade da consciência? Inúmeros filósofos e filósofas da mente defendem que os qualia são propriedades nãofísicas, adotando um dualismo entre corpo e mente. Neste intricando e complexo debate entre materialistas e antimaterialistas, os últimos costumam elaborar argumentos que desafiam os primeiros. Assim, o capítulo 1 é dedicado ao amplamente debatido argumento do conhecimento de Frank Jackson. Após a apresentação deste argumento, o submeteremos a uma série de objeções que tentam derrubar a sua conclusão antimaterialista. Então, trataremos das respostas que foram oferecidas às objeções. Por fim, ponderaremos as objeções e as respostas fazendo um balanço deste debate. O capítulo 2 é dedicado ao controverso argumento dos zumbis de David Chalmers. Trataremos inicialmente de algumas noções teóricas necessárias para o compreendermos e, então, o apresentaremos. Após isso, o submeteremos a várias objeções que tentam bloquear a sua conclusão antimaterialista e trataremos das respostas às objeções. Então, faremos um balanço das objeções que lhe foram opostas. Em nossas considerações finais sobre a discussão envolvida nos capítulos 1 e 2, será feita uma avaliação global deste debate entre materialistas e antimaterialistas indicando qual o lado tem melhores argumentos.
Conscious experience is one of things that we are more certain in the world, but it is a great mystery. We do not have a broadly accepted theory that rationality justifies how a physical system like a brain can experience (a taste, happiness, pain, etc) and clarify what is the nature of conscious experiences. More clearly, conscious experiences have a phenomenology, that is, distinct qualitative features that are subjectively apprehended. These properties are qualia and they were associated to phenomenal consciousness, because qualia are accessible for the consciousness of the organism that has the experience. However we do not know how to reconcile the conscious experience with our knowledge, insofar as their properties seem to be essentially subjective and inscrutable and indescribable under a third person point of view thus. How reconcile the objectivity of our explanations with the consciousness subjectivity? Several philosophers of mind defend which qualia are non-physical properties, adopting a mind-body dualism. In this puzzling and complex debate among materialists and anti-materialists, it is common the latter make arguments that challenge the formers. Thereby the chapter 1 is dedicated to broadly debated Frank Jackson´s knowledge argument. After the presentation of knowledge argument, I will submit it to several objections that try overthrow its antimaterialist conclusion. Then I will deal with the responses that were provided to these objections. Finally I will ponder objections and responses making a balance of this debate. The chapter 2 is dedicated to controversial David Chalmer´s zombie argument. Initially I will deal with some necessary theoretical notions to we grasp it and then I will present the zombie argument. Thereafter I will submit it to several objections which try overthrow its anti-materialist conclusion and I will deal with the responses to these objections. Then I will make a balance about the objections against zombie argument. In our final considerations about the discussion engaged on chapters 1 and 2, will be make a global evaluation about this debate among materialists and anti-materialists indicating what side have better arguments.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía
El siguiente trabajo establece una relación entre la filosofía del lenguaje y la filosofía de la mente. Específicamente tiene la finalidad de evidenciar la estrecha relación entre el tema del lenguaje privado y el tema de las cualidades fenoménicas de la experiencia o qualia. Sin embargo, para explicitar aquella vinculación, debo recurrir a una revaluación de ambos tópicos. El primer paso para lograr aquello es exponer, de forma separada, el marco general de ambos temas, es decir, presento el problema del lenguaje privado y el problema de los qualia de la manera estándar o tradicional en que se han solido exponer, dando a conocer las posturas, argumentos y dificultades principales que configuran la discusión clásica de ambos problemas, para que así, teniendo la claridad suficiente acerca del estado actual de ambas discusiones, reconstruir ambos temas, modificando o eliminando completamente ciertos aspectos, y agregando nuevos elementos. Esto me permitirá conseguir nuevas perspectivas desde donde visualizar ambos temas, lo que a su vez facilitará el poder articularlos de manera que constituyan un solo tema filosófico, o por lo menos, dos problemas cuyas vidas están en una clara simbiosis que les obliga a necesitarse el uno al otro. Esto último evidenciará cuán unidos están, y por lo mismo, cuán efectiva puede ser una misma solución para ambos temas desde este nuevo enfoque. Finalmente concluyo ciertas ideas que en su mayor parte constituyen posibilidades de reflexión y solución de temas relevantes en la filosofía, y quizás también en las ciencias.

Réduit à sa plus simple expression, ce travail de recherche met face à face deux acteurs s’affrontant dans un duel philosophique : le physicalisme et l’argument de la connaissance de Franck Jackson. La question clé autour de laquelle s’agencera notre discussion ici est (1) Est-il vrai que « Tout est physique » ? Le coeur de la thèse que nous défendons peut être résumé ainsi : (T) Le clivage post-platonicien (tacite) entre les formes objectivées et les formes subjectivées de la pensée, provoque des fossés explicatifs (explicites), qui sont franchis (très souvent) via des sauts conceptuels (mystérieux), intercalés entre les étapes d’une argumentation. Il sera argumenté ici que la distribution actuelle des débats sur l’axe états physiques (objectifs) / états qualitatifs (subjectifs) subit une pression souterraine post-platonicienne. Conséquemment, une bonne partie de l’énergie des penseurs actuels est dépensée à la recherche du « bon saut » ou « crochet » conceptuel permettant d’attacher les rives du mental à celui du physique. Nous soutiendrons que le coeur du problème ne consiste pas à résoudre le différend entre les physicalistes et les avocats des qualia, mais plutôt à trouver la réponse à la question : pourquoi en sommes-nous arrivés là, i.e., à ce clivage sur l’axe phénoménal/physique ?
“Everything is physical” physicalists claim. “Everything except qualia” reply the defenders of the Knowledge Argument. This thesis argues that both parties to this debate are committed to a traditional picture according to which one can tacitly adopt the standpoint of an off-stage narrator, capable of distinguishing ab initio between the different items in this conceptual scenario. The main claim here is that every time we artificially introduce a sharp conceptual distinction separating these two items or levels (mental and physical), we must automatically make a sophisticated conceptual leap in order to link the first-person qualitative perspective with the external physical world. Thus the physicalism/qualia dispute is only a by-product of an extended theoretical conception of the mind/world link which entails two distinct kinds of problems: (i) structural problems (to define and determine conceptually dual items like thought/matter, reason/senses, subject/object, etc.). Such problems require us to question “how are these items supposed to work together?” and this leads us to the second group of problems: (ii) mediation problems. The first group of problems inevitably leads to explanatory gaps; the second ends up needing to appeal to conceptual leaps in order to ensure the necessary link between two separate items. This exerts a powerful influence over the cast of our thoughts: seen from this angle, all philosophical enterprise comes down to the question of where to place the three following parameters: the world as it is, the conceptual picture which aims to represent the world as it is and the theorist-painter gifted with the ability to capture the world picture as it is. We also face the problem of finding the right mediators to assure coherence among the members of this trio, and the problem of setting the valid criteria guaranteeing the theorist-painter that what is captured on his conceptual canvas does indeed correspond to the world as it is, i.e. that he is not laboring under the delusions of an evil genie. In this thesis I argue against this way of putting things

This essay studies the semantic structure of the noun dog with the help of qualia structure and adjectives that collocate with the noun. It also evaluates the idea of qualia structure and how well it works in studying the semantic structure of nouns. More specifically, the aim of this paper is to see how the information contained by the noun dog could be structured in terms of qualia structure. On a more general level the aim is also to evaluate, and add to, the idea of qualia structure as such. In order to accomplish this aim the top 100 adjectives that collocate with the noun dog were searched for in the COCA corpus (Corpus of Contemporary American English). The results were that with the help of qualia structure and some adjectives that collocate with the noun, it was possible to posit some substructures for the noun dog and create a tree that gave an overview of the semantic structure of the noun. However, some problems arose during the process making it clear where qualia structure needs improvement. This led to the discussion of the evolution of qualia structure and where the idea could be, and perhaps should be headed in the near future.

Denna uppsatsen granskar Amy Kinds argument för kvaliarealism. I artikeln från 2008, ”How to Believe in Qualia”, hävdar hon att transparenstesen utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. En stor del av min uppsats handlar därför om att undersöka hennes avfärdande av transparenstesen. Uppsatsen ger henne ett visst, men inte fullt, stöd i detta och följaktligen också ett visst stöd för kvaliarealism. Samtidigt visar uppsatsen på andra argument gentemot transparenstesen, som också utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism.
In this thesis Amy Kind’s argument for qualia realism is scrutinized. In the paper from 2008, “How to Believe in Qualia”, she claims that the transparency thesis pose a threat to qualia realism. A major part of this thesis therefore deals with investigating her refutation of the transparency thesis. The thesis gives her some, but not fully, conclusive support and consequently gives some support for qualia realism. The thesis also sets out other arguments against the transparency thesis, arguments which however pose a threat to qualia realism.

It is argued that physical (and not inherently psychical) properties are insufficient to constitute all else. Specifically they cannot constitute an instance (K1) of our knowledge that the number of existing things is at least one. This employs a new version of entry by entailment: Every fact as to the presence of a constituted trope is entailed by facts about the presence of the ontologically basic, where a property is ontologically basic if and only if the fact of its presence is not entailed (even allowing exhaustive definitions of all tropes in terms of their ultimate constituents) by facts about the presence of things non-identical to it. Existence is a mind-independent presence. Things can be present (to mind) as opposed to existing but must be accompanied by the presence of all of their parts and of anything else that their presence might entail. This includes some existing thing in the case that knowledge that something exists is present, since it is analytic that knowledge cannot be of what is not the case. Purely dynamical properties cannot exist apart from instances of some other property kind (on pain of regress as to what moves). Material properties can make a difference to cognitive states only in virtue of differences they can make to dynamical properties. Thus, any cognitive state present in some dynamical and material scenario must be present in an equivalent purely dynamical scenario, which cannot exist. Hence: 1) There can be no knowledge of existence, or thus trope K1, in a purely dynamical scenario. 2) There can thus neither be a trope K1 if only dynamical and material properties (and what they constitute) are present. So because there is a trope K1, there are one or more ontologically basic properties which are not dynamical or material. It is further argued that nothing ontologically basic is per se (directly and non-obscurely) conceivable except as psychicality or a categorical basis of a disposition to change or constancy (respectively, dynamism and materiality). Thus at least one ontologically basic property is either psychical or not per se conceivable. The latter proposition has less merit.

Svest je u poslednje tri decenije postala predmetom multidisciplinarnih studija svesti (consciousness studies), što je aktualizovalo značaj konceptualne analize pojma svesti i problema koji se javljaju u različitim istraţivačkim pristupima svesti. Da li različite discipline (pa čak i različiti pristupi u okviru iste discipline) govore uopšte o istom predmetu? Na šta se, na primer, odnose savremene neurološke teorije svesti, kakav teorijski status ima koncept svesti u okviru funkcionalnih dijagrama kognitivne psihologije, o čemu govore psihoterapeuti kada naglašavaju značaj svesnosti u psihoterapijskom procesu ili značaj osvešćivanja nesvesnog, šta imaju u vidu fenomenolozi ili praktičari kontemplativnih tradicija kada se bave neposrednim iskustvom i na kraju, šta pod svešću podrazumevaju različite ontološke pozicije o odnosu duha i tela? Konceptualna analiza koja je sprovedena u ovom radu ima za cilj poboljšanje komunikacije izmeĎu disciplina i lokalizaciju teškoća koje stoje na putu interdisciplinarnim istraţivačkim projektima.Analitička filozofija duha (philosophy of mind) je u poslednje četiri decenije izoštrila i locirala problematiku svesti, te razvila novi konceptualni aparat i misaone eksperimente koji omogućavaju preciznije razumevanje ograničenja u pokušaju prirodnonaučne rekonstukcije pojma duha (mind), kakvu su poslednjih decenija, inače sa velikim uspehom, preduzele tzv. mind sciences (poput kognitivne psihologije, veštačke inteligencije, lingvistike, neuronauke) . U radu autorka pokazuje kako različiti savremeni filozofi ukazuju na distinkcije dva lica svesti i duha – Dţekendofovo razlikovanje računarskog duha (computational mind) i fenomenološkog duha (phenomenological mind), Blokovo razlikovanje A-svesti (access consciousness) i P-svesti (phenomenal consciousness) i Čalmersovo razlikovanje „lakog“ i „teškog“ problema svesti. Dok se, na primer, A-svest, odnosi na svest u smislu pristupačnosti, odnosno dostupnosti odreĎenog sadrţaja (mentalne reprezentacije) u kontroli govora, rezonovanja i akcije, P-svest (fenomenalna svest) odnosi se na činjenicu da svesna mentalna stanja poseduju doţivljajne, kvalitativne odlike, koje su dostupne direktno jedino iz subjektivne perspektive prvog lica. Za ovaj aspekat svesti je filozofija duha uvela tehnički termin qualia (lat. sing. quale) i on čini svest drugačijom od ostalih predmeta istraţivanja u dominantnoj objektivističkoj naučnoj paradigmi.U radu autorka diskutuje problem ontološkog statusa qualia, kao problem u formulaciji materijalističkih teorija duha (teza o identitetu, funkcionalističke i reprezentacionalističke teorije), kao i epistemološke probleme qualia – problem spoznajno privilegovanog poloţaja, argument nepotpunog znanja (Dţekson) i problem eksplanatornog jaza (Levajn) i njihove reperkusije za filozofiju nauke – problem odnosa metodologije prvog i trećeg lica, razumevanja i objašnjenja, duhovnonaučnog i prirodnonaučnog pristupa čoveku. Iz ovog ugla je u novom svetlu sagledano istorijsko smenjivanje paradigmi u glavnim tokovima akademske psihologije.Sve dosadašnje strategije eliminacije fenomenalne svesti iz psihološkog i filozofskog diskursa vode produbljavanju jaza izmeĎu sveta iskustva (Lebenswelt, Huserl) i prirodnonaučne slike sveta izgraĎene primenom objektivne metodologije. Psihoterapija je, naprotiv, disciplina koja predstavlja jednu od najvaţnijih spona izmeĎu disciplinovanog pristupa subjektivnom iskustvu i objektivnih naučnih činjenica. Zato je paţnja posvećena savremenom konstitusanju psihoterapije kao naučne discipline, kao i njenom pozicioniranju u odnosu na prirodnonaučnu i duhovnonaučnu paradigmu od osnivanja (Frojdovog osciliranja izmeĎu naklonosti prirodnonaučnom modelu i hermeneutičke prakse), preko niza novina i „dekonstrukcija“ prvobitnog modela kroz njenu istoriju, do savremenog trenda – neuropsihoterapije, koja poslednjih deset godina uvodi nova saznanja neuronauke u sagledavanje psihoterapijskog procesa i unapreĎenje postupaka. Analizirani su značaj i uloga koju različiti psihoterapijski pravci (klasična psihoanaliza, BT, KBT, uključujući i nove mindfulness pristupe, egzistencijalistički, humanistički i konstruktivistički pravci) pridaju svesti, svesnosti i osvešćivanju, te koje značenje ovi pojmovi imaju u svetlu distinkcija na koje je ukazala analiza filozofije duha – reprezentaciono tj. funkcionalno-kauzalno i fenomenalno. Pokazano je i kako se epistemološki problemi svesti koji su ranije opisani pojavljuju i rešavaju u psihoterapiji kao praktičnoj disciplini.Integracija fenomenalne svesti u sliku duha, te povezivanje prirodnonaučnih disciplina i disciplina koje se bave iskustvom i subjektivnošču mora da poĎe dalje od konceptualno-logičke analize na kojoj ostaje filozofija duha. Prvi korak na tom putu je razvoj metodologije prvog lica, koja omogućava opis mentalnih procesa i sadrţaja onako kako se oni manifestuju iz ugla svesnog subjekta. Stoga je najpre prikazano šest metoda prvog lica poreklom iz introspektivne psihologije, fenomenološke filozofije i budističke kontemplativne tradicije, a zatim sprovedena tematska kvalitativna analiza ovih metoda. Postupkom otvorenog kodiranja izdvojeno je deset dimenzija po kojima su uporeĎivane metode. Ovo eksplorativno istraţivanje omogućilo je precizniji uvid u meĎusobne srodnosti i razlike analiziranih metoda, u njihove moći i slabosti, te strategije unapreĎenja, kao i u mogućnosti saradnje sa metodama trećeg lica. Pokazali smo takoĎe da „pogled iznutra“ moţe da otkrije vaţne odlike svesti i duha koji ostaju netransparentni objektivnim metodama.
Consciousness has become the subject of multidisciplinary consciousness studies in last three decades which revived the importance of conceptual analysis of the concept of consciousness and problems that occur in a variety of research approaches to consciousness. Do different disciplines (and even different approaches within the same discipline) speak about the same subject at all? What are modern neurological theories of consciousness related to, for example, what is the theoretical status of the concept of consciousness within functional diagrams of cognitive psychology, what do psychotherapists talk about when they highlight importance of awareness in a psychotherapeutic process and importance of becoming aware of the unconscious, what do phenomenologists or practitioners of contemplative traditions have in mind when dealing with direct experience and, in the end, what do different ontological positions imply with the notion of consciousness in the relationship between mind and body? Conceptual analysis conducted in this paper aims to improve communication between disciplines and localize difficulties that stand in the way of interdisciplinary research projects.Analytic philosophy of mind has sharpened and located the problem of consciousness in last four decades, and has also developed a new conceptual apparatus and thought experiments that enable more accurate understanding of limits in an attempt of a natural science reconstruction of the concept of mind, which in recent decades, usually with large success, have been undertaken by so-called mind sciences (such as cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience). In this thesis, the author shows how different contemporary philosophers suggest distinctions of two faces of consciousness and mind – Jackendoff’s distinction between computational mind and phenomenological mind, Block’s differentiation of A-consciousness (access consciousness) and P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and Chalmers’ distinction between "easy" and "hard" problems of consciousness. While, for example, A-consciousness, refers to consciousness in terms of accessibility and availability of specific content (mental representations) in the control of speech, reasoning and actions, P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) refers to the fact that conscious mental states possess experiential, qualitative characteristics, which are directly available only from the subjective perspective of the first person. Philosophy of mind introduced a technical term qualia (lat. sing. quale) for this aspect of consciousness, and it makes consciousness different from other subjects of research in the dominant objectivist scientific paradigm.In this thesis, the author discusses the problem of the ontological status of qualia, as a problem in the formulation of the materialistic mind theories (the thesis of identity, functionalist and representational theories), as well as epistemological problems of qualia - the problem of privileged access, the argument of incomplete knowledge (Jackson) and the problem of the explanatory gap (Levine) and their repercussions on philosophy of science - the problem of the relationship between first and third-person methodologies, understanding and explanation, a human science and a natural science approach to man. The historical succession of paradigms in the mainstream academic psychology has been viewed from this angle.All previous strategies of eliminating phenomenal consciousness from psychological and philosophical discourse lead to deepening of the gap between the world of experience (Lebenswelt, Husserl) and the natural science picture of the world constructed by using an objective methodology. Psychotherapy, on the contrary, is a discipline that is one of the most important links between a disciplined approach to subjective experience and objective scientific facts. That is why attention has been paid to the contemporary constitution of psychotherapy as a scientific discipline, as well as its positioning in relation to a natural science and a human science paradigm since its establishment (Freudian oscillating between the affection to natural scientific model and hermeneutical practice), through a number of novelties and "deconstructions" of the original model through its history, to the modern trend – neuropsychotherapy which has introduced new findings of neuroscience in understanding psychotherapeutic processes and improvement of procedures in last ten years. We analyzed the importance and the role that different psychotherapeutic views (classical psychoanalysis, BT, CBT, including new mindfulness approaches, existentialist, humanistic and constructivist views) attach to consciousness, awareness, and raising awareness, as well as the meanings of these terms in the light of distinctions identified by the analysis of philosophy of mind - that is, representational, functional-causal, and phenomenal. It was shown how the epistemological problems of consciousness described above occur and get resolved in psychotherapy as a practical discipline.Integration of phenomenal consciousness into an image of the mind, and connection of natural science disciplines and disciplines which deal with experience and subjectivity has to go beyond a conceptual and logical analysis on which philosophy of mind remains. The first step on this road is development of a first-person methodology, which allows a description of mental processes and content as they are manifested from a perspective of a conscious subject. Therefore, the first things presented were six first-person methods originating from introspective psychology, phenomenological philosophy and Buddhist contemplative tradition, and then, a qualitative thematic analysis of the six methods was conducted. The process of open coding singled out ten dimensions by which methods were compared. This exploratory research has allowed for a more precise insight into mutual similarities and differences of the analyzed methods, into their powers and weaknesses, improvement strategies, as well as opportunities for cooperation with third-person methods. It has shown also that “a view from within" can reveal important features of consciousness and mind that remain non-transparent to objective methods.

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Nesta Dissertação, abordamos a proposta do monismo dual (ou de duplo aspecto), sugerida por Thomas Nagel, para analisar os aspectos do mental como a consciência e os qualia. O estudo propõe analisar em que medida essas características mentais podem ser descritas de forma física, ou se, ao efetuar uma análise minunciosa dessas características, podemos concluir que elas não podem ser descritas da mesma forma que descrevemos eventos físicos. Para que possamos, então, as analisar, descrevemos, inicialmente, a abordagem dualista e em que medida ela contribui para nossa compreensão das características mentais como eventos não físicos. Analisamos, também seus problemas e dificuldades em se explicar a interação de processos mentais não físicos com o corpo físico. Em seguida, abordamos a concepção fisicalista, na qual, propomos descrever seus problemas e as razões pelas quais as características mentais não podem ser, simplesmente, explicadas ou mesmo descritas como processos físicos ordinários. No capítulo seguinte, descrevemos a perspectiva de Nagel, sobre a proposta do monismo de duplo aspecto, no qual o autor propõe duas perspectivas epistemológicas sobre a mente consciente, as perspectivas de primeira pessoa, restrita ao próprio ser consciente, e a perspectiva de terceira pessoa, correspondendo ao modo de abordagem típico das ciências empíricas. Nesta abordagem, as qualidades subjetivas (qualia) se restringem à perspectiva de primeira pessoa. Portanto, o monismo de duplo aspecto em Nagel pode ser caracterizado como sendo ontologicamente monista (trata-se de um só ser consciente) e epistemologicamente dualista (este ser é apreendido por si mesmo na perspectiva de primeira pessoa, e abordado cientificamente na perspectiva da terceira pessoa).
We approach the proposal of dual-aspect monism by Thomas Nagel to analyze the conscious mind and related concepts as qualia. To what extent these mental characteristics can be described in a physical way, or, by performing a thorough analysis of these characteristics, should we conclude that they cannot be described in the same way that we describe physical events? We first describe the dualistic approach and to what extent it contributes to our understanding of the mental characteristics as non-physical events. We also analyze the problems and difficulties in explaining the interaction of non-physical mental processes with the physical body. Then we approach the physicalist conception and propose to describe its problems and the reasons why the mental characteristics cannot be simply explained or even described as ordinary physical processes. In the following chapter, we describe Nagel's perspective on the proposition of dual-aspect monism, in which the author proposes two epistemological perspectives on the conscious mind, the first person perspective, restricted to the conscious being itself, and the third person perspective, corresponding to the typical approach of the empirical sciences. In his view, subjective qualities (qualia) are restricted to the first-person perspective. Therefore, dual-aspect monism in Nagel can be characterized as being ontologically monistic (we are one being, body and mind) and epistemologically dualistic (this being is apprehended by herself in the first-person perspective, and approached scientifically from the third person perspective).

Orientador: Alfredo Pereira Junior
Banca: Mariana Broens
Banca: Leonardo Ferreira Almada
Resumo: Nesta Dissertação, abordamos a proposta do monismo dual (ou de duplo aspecto), sugerida por Thomas Nagel, para analisar os aspectos do mental como a consciência e os qualia. O estudo propõe analisar em que medida essas características mentais podem ser descritas de forma física, ou se, ao efetuar uma análise minunciosa dessas características, podemos concluir que elas não podem ser descritas da mesma forma que descrevemos eventos físicos. Para que possamos, então, as analisar, descrevemos, inicialmente, a abordagem dualista e em que medida ela contribui para nossa compreensão das características mentais como eventos não físicos. Analisamos, também seus problemas e dificuldades em se explicar a interação de processos mentais não físicos com o corpo físico. Em seguida, abordamos a concepção fisicalista, na qual, propomos descrever seus problemas e as razões pelas quais as características mentais não podem ser, simplesmente, explicadas ou mesmo descritas como processos físicos ordinários. No capítulo seguinte, descrevemos a perspectiva de Nagel, sobre a proposta do monismo de duplo aspecto, no qual o autor propõe duas perspectivas epistemológicas sobre a mente consciente, as perspectivas de primeira pessoa, restrita ao próprio ser consciente, e a perspectiva de terceira pessoa, correspondendo ao modo de abordagem típico das ciências empíricas. Nesta abordagem, as qualidades subjetivas (qualia) se restringem à perspectiva de primeira pessoa. Portanto, o monismo de duplo aspecto e... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo)
Abstract: We approach the proposal of dual-aspect monism by Thomas Nagel to analyze the conscious mind and related concepts as qualia. To what extent these mental characteristics can be described in a physical way, or, by performing a thorough analysis of these characteristics, should we conclude that they cannot be described in the same way that we describe physical events? We first describe the dualistic approach and to what extent it contributes to our understanding of the mental characteristics as non-physical events. We also analyze the problems and difficulties in explaining the interaction of non-physical mental processes with the physical body. Then we approach the physicalist conception and propose to describe its problems and the reasons why the mental characteristics cannot be simply explained or even described as ordinary physical processes. In the following chapter, we describe Nagel's perspective on the proposition of dual-aspect monism, in which the author proposes two epistemological perspectives on the conscious mind, the first person perspective, restricted to the conscious being itself, and the third person perspective, corresponding to the typical approach of the empirical sciences. In his view, subjective qualities (qualia) are restricted to the first-person perspective. Therefore, dual-aspect monism in Nagel can be characterized as being ontologically monistic (we are one being, body and mind) and epistemologically dualistic (this being is apprehended by herself i... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)
Mestre

Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that there are facts concerning colour experiences that scientific knowledge can neither describe nor explain. Specifically, these facts involve the occurrence of certain non-physical properties of experiences that he calls qualia. The present research considers whether a plausible formulation of the hypothesis that science can accommodate colour experiences is threatened by a version of the knowledge argument. The specific formulation of this problem has two motivations. Firstly, before investigating whether the knowledge argument raises a problem for the claim that science can account for colour experiences, we need a plausible formulation of this claim. I argue that the idea that science can accommodate colour experiences can be formulated as the modest reductionism hypothesis. Roughly speaking, this is the hypothesis that a science that can be explanatory interfaced with current physics of ordinary matter can account for conscious experiences. Secondly, an unintelligible premise figures in Jackson’s version the knowledge argument. Namely, it is assumed that Mary possesses a complete (future or possible) scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, the type of strategy involved in Jackson’s argument can be used to target modest reductionism. By considering contemporary psychophysics and neuroscience, I characterise Mary’s scientific knowledge. First, this characterisation is intelligible. In fact, it is elaborated on the basis of descriptions and explanations of colour experiences involved in current physics and neuroscience. Second, a supporter of modest reductionism can assume that the scientific knowledge ascribed to Mary might account for colour experiences. The main conclusion of the present research is that our version of the knowledge argument fails to threaten the modest reductionism hypothesis. In fact, I endorse what can be called the “two ways of thinking” reply to the knowledge argument. According to this response, the knowledge argument shows that there are different ways of thinking about colour experiences. One way of thinking is provided by scientific knowledge. The other way of thinking is provided by our ordinary conception of colour experiences. However, the existence of these two ways of thinking does not imply the existence of facts and properties that escape scientific knowledge. It might be the case that the ordinary way of thinking about colour experience concerns facts and properties described and explained by science. The principal conclusion of the research results from two investigations. The first line of research aims to reveal and evaluate the implicit assumptions that figure in the knowledge argument. The main body of the research is dedicated to this task. The principal result of this investigation is that the knowledge argument must rely on an account of introspective knowledge of colour experiences. I argue that an inferential model of introspection provides such account. On this model, Mary’s capacity to hold beliefs about her colour experiences when she sees coloured objects requires her mastery of colour concepts. The second main investigation seeks to justify the two ways of thinking strategy. As many opponents and supporters have recently started to realise, this strategy might be charged with being ad hoc. I offer a distinctive justification of this reply to the knowledge argument. Assuming the account of introspection mentioned above, the existence of visual recognitional colour concepts might justify this strategy. A person possesses these concepts when she is able to determine the colours of objects simply by having visual experiences.

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the connections between metaphysical naturalism and the categorical ignorance thesis – offered by Rae Langton (1998), David Lewis (2009), Frank Jackson (1998), and Simon Blackburn (1990) – and determine whether the latter will challenge the former. According to metaphysical naturalism, the actual world contains only metaphysically natural things. According to the categorical ignorance thesis, all we can know about things are their dispositional properties, but the categorical properties that bear these properties remain in principle unknowable. In this dissertation, I will determine whether the ignorance of categorical properties – as Rae Langton (1998), David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson (2007), John Foster (1993) and Alyssa Ney (2007) argue (or worry about) – is consistent with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism), and whether it will lead to a scepticism about the metaphysical naturalness of categorical properties, which will, in turn, significantly decrease the probability that metaphysical naturalism is true. Being attracted to metaphysical naturalism, the categorical ignorance thesis, and also the philosophical position that the two theses are consistent, I will argue that the answer to the former question is yes, and that the answer to the latter question is no. Russellian Monism, an influential doctrine in philosophy of mind that is relevant to the topic, will also be considered. According to the doctrine, our first-person experiences are constituted by their categorical bases in some manner that is not (solely) via the dispositions borne by these bases. Some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell (1992/1927a, 1927b), thus consider categorical properties to be knowable through our acquaintance with those experiences. On the other side, some philosophers, such as Daniel Stoljar (2001a, 2001b, 2006), David Chalmers (1996), and Galen Strawson (2013), argue that Russellian Monism is compatible with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism). In this dissertation, I will determine whether the acquaintance view put forward by some Russellian Monists, understood as an objection to the categorical ignorance thesis, is true and whether it is compatible with metaphysical naturalism; I will argue that the answers to both questions are no.

This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential states arise and their nature. After examining the desiderata for naturalistic explanations, I argue that theories which ascribe nonconceptual content to experiences are the most plausible versions of representationalism. Further, causal covariation and teleological theories yield distinctive and interesting representationalist positions, hence, they become the focus of this study. To assess representationalism, I investigate whether all differences in phenomenal character can be correlated with differences in content. I claim that a useful distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit content, which allows one to best describe the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. I then argue that ambiguous figures show that two experiences can have the same content but different phenomenal character. I explicate the Inverted Earth hypothesis and claim that to identify content and phenomenal character, representationalists either have to condone the possibility of philosophical zombies, or hold that people lack authoritative first-person knowledge of their current experiences. Both these positions are unpalatable. Finally, I argue that representationalists cannot ascribe contents to experiences of novel colours to account for their phenomenal character. I also question, in light of dissociation phenomena, whether there is one distinctive relationship that all experiences bear to the cognitive system. I conclude that phenomenal character cannot be identical with the type of content under investigation, and that naturalistic representationalist theories cannot fully explain conscious experience.

L'argument de la connaissance de Frank Jackson est l'un des arguments les plus célèbres en philosophie analytique. Son objectif est de démontrer que certains de nos états mentaux, nommément les états mentaux associés à l'effet que cela fait de percevoir ou de ressentir, ou qualia, ne peuvent pas être expliqués par une conception exclusivement matérialiste de l'esprit. L'argument de la connaissance s'inscrit dans une famille d'arguments en philosophie de l'esprit qui soulèvent le débat jamais résolu entre matérialisme et dualisme. Depuis sa parution en 1982, l'argument de la connaissance de Jackson a suscité de nombreuses réponses de la part des matérialistes qui ont tenté de le réfuter. Jackson lui-même s'est laissé convaincre par certaines de ces réponses et en 1998, il a finalement renoncé à son célèbre argument. Ce mémoire a pour objectif de présenter une classification des réponses adressées à l'argument de la connaissance ainsi qu'une analyse de chacune d'entre elles. Cette analyse permet de montrer que la seule réponse adéquate à l'argument de la connaissance est celle formulée par Jackson lui-même lorsqu'il a rejeté son argument. Ce mémoire montre également que la réponse de Jackson permet d'entrevoir une réfutation adéquate à tout un ensemble d'arguments dualistes en philosophie de l'esprit.

O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista.
The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

This thesis examines nonhuman phenomenological experiences, communication, and sensory perception in Barbara Gowdy’s The White Bone. Drawing on literary and pedagogical theories by Roman Bartosch, Monika Fludernik, Marco Caracciolo, David Herman, and Judith Langer, the thesis argues that Gowdy’s novel employs narrative strategies and devices that involve nonhuman experientiality evoked from sensorial configurations, narration, and textual cognitive and embodied experiences. These represented experiences disrupt human primacy by establishing a disorientation that challenges the anthropocentric bias in the novel and decenters the human reader. Moreover, the thesis offers suggestions for using the novel in conjunction with envisionment building to discuss animal alterity and anthropocentrism in the Swedish EFL classroom.

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Nowadays we have been observing the expansion of knowledge mainly caused by continuous changes in science and its techniques. Terminology, as an academic subject concerned with the so-called specialized languages, play an important role in this process. The relevance of this research can be justified by the lack of systematic terminological repertoire for a strategic sector of the Brazilian economy, as biofuels/biodiesel. In this sense, our goals are: i) systematize the terminology of biodiesel in Portuguese in order to promote more efficient communication, allowing both scientific and technological information exchange among users and researchers of this area, as well as, generate resources for the subsequent creation of the first dictionary of this knowledge domain; ii) investigate biodiesel terminology from a semantic perspective, choosing the Qualia Structure, model of semantic structure which integrates Pustejovsky s Generative Lexicon Theory (1995) as a theoretical frame. In order to develop this research, the methodology used was based on the one elaborated and improved by GETerm, adopting descriptive terminology of linguistic base, specifically the postulates of the Communicative Theory of Terminology (CTT) (CABRÉ, 1999, 2003). As results of this investigation, we attained: a biodiesel corpus with approximately 1.5 million words, an ontology containing 280 terms and a repertoire of 50 definitions. At the end, we concluded that the application of Qualia Structure in terminological work may support the terminographic activity.
Na contemporaneidade, presenciamos a expansão do conhecimento propiciada, fundamentalmente, pelas mudanças contínuas emanadas das ciências e das técnicas. A Terminologia, na qualidade de disciplina que estuda as chamadas linguagens de especialidade, desempenha um papel primordial nesse processo. A relevância desta pesquisa se justifica pela ausência de qualquer repertório terminológico sistematizado para um setor estratégico da economia brasileira, qual seja, os biocombustíveis/ biodiesel. Nesse sentido, temos como objetivos: i) sistematizar a terminologia do biodiesel em Língua Portuguesa, com vistas a promover uma comunicação mais eficiente, permitindo a troca de informações científicas e tecnológicas entre usuários e pesquisadores desta área, bem como gerar subsídios para a criação, a posteriori, do primeiro dicionário desse domínio do conhecimento; ii) investigar a terminologia do biodiesel a partir de um enfoque semântico, elegendo como quadro teórico a Estrutura Qualia, modelo de estruturação semântica que integra a Teoria do Léxico Gerativo de Pustejovsky (1995). Para a realização deste trabalho, pautamo-nos na metodologia desenvolvida e aperfeiçoada no âmbito do Geterm, sob o viés de uma Terminologia descritiva de base linguística, mais especificamente os postulados da Teoria Comunicativa da Terminologia (TCT) (CABRÉ, 1999, 2003). Como resultados desta pesquisa, obtivemos: o corpus do biodiesel com cerca de 1,5 milhão de palavras, a ontologia contendo 280 termos e um repertório de 50 definições. Por fim, concluímos que a aplicação da Estrutura Qualia em trabalhos terminológicos auxilia na atividade terminográfica.

La información de clase semántica de los nombres es fundamental para una amplia variedad de tareas del procesamiento del lenguaje natural (PLN), como la traducción automática, la discriminación de referentes en tareas como la detección y el seguimiento de eventos, la búsqueda de respuestas, el reconocimiento y la clasificación de nombres de entidades, la construcción y ampliación automática de ontologías, la inferencia textual, etc. Una aproximación para resolver la construcción y el mantenimiento de los léxicos de gran cobertura que alimentan los sistemas de PNL, una tarea muy costosa y lenta, es la adquisición automática de información léxica, que consiste en la inducción de una clase semántica relacionada con una palabra en concreto a partir de datos de su distribución obtenidos de un corpus. Precisamente, por esta razón, se espera que la investigación actual sobre los métodos para la producción automática de léxicos de alta calidad, con gran cantidad de información y con anotación de clase como el trabajo que aquí presentamos, tenga un gran impacto en el rendimiento de la mayoría de las aplicaciones de PNL. En esta tesis, tratamos la adquisición automática de información léxica como un problema de clasificación. Con este propósito, adoptamos métodos de aprendizaje automático para generar un modelo que represente los datos de distribución vectorial que, basados en ejemplos conocidos, permitan hacer predicciones de otras palabras desconocidas. Las principales preguntas de investigación que planteamos en esta tesis son: (i) si los datos de corpus proporcionan suficiente información para construir representaciones de palabras de forma eficiente y que resulten en decisiones de clasificación precisas y sólidas, y (ii) si la adquisición automática puede gestionar, también, los nombres polisémicos. Para hacer frente a estos problemas, realizamos una serie de validaciones empíricas sobre nombres en inglés. Nuestros resultados confirman que la información obtenida a partir de la distribución de los datos de corpus es suficiente para adquirir automáticamente clases semánticas, como lo demuestra un valor-F global promedio de 0,80 aproximadamente utilizando varios modelos de recuento de contextos y en datos de corpus de distintos tamaños. No obstante, tanto el estado de la cuestión como los experimentos que realizamos destacaron una serie de retos para este tipo de modelos, que son reducir la escasez de datos del vector y dar cuenta de la polisemia nominal en las representaciones distribucionales de las palabras. En este contexto, los modelos de word embedding (WE) mantienen la “semántica” subyacente en las ocurrencias de un nombre en los datos de corpus asignándole un vector. Con esta elección, hemos sido capaces de superar el problema de la escasez de datos, como lo demuestra un valor-F general promedio de 0,91 para las clases semánticas de nombres de sentido único, a través de una combinación de la reducción de la dimensionalidad y de números reales. Además, las representaciones de WE obtuvieron un rendimiento superior en la gestión de las ocurrencias asimétricas de cada sentido de los nombres de tipo complejo polisémicos regulares en datos de corpus. Como resultado, hemos podido clasificar directamente esos nombres en su propia clase semántica con un valor-F global promedio de 0,85. La principal aportación de esta tesis consiste en una validación empírica de diferentes representaciones de distribución utilizadas para la clasificación semántica de nombres junto con una posterior expansión del trabajo anterior, lo que se traduce en recursos léxicos y conjuntos de datos innovadores que están disponibles de forma gratuita para su descarga y uso.
La información de clase semántica de los nombres es fundamental para una amplia variedad de tareas del procesamiento del lenguaje natural (PLN), como la traducción automática, la discriminación de referentes en tareas como la detección y el seguimiento de eventos, la búsqueda de respuestas, el reconocimiento y la clasificación de nombres de entidades, la construcción y ampliación automática de ontologías, la inferencia textual, etc. Una aproximación para resolver la construcción y el mantenimiento de los léxicos de gran cobertura que alimentan los sistemas de PNL, una tarea muy costosa y lenta, es la adquisición automática de información léxica, que consiste en la inducción de una clase semántica relacionada con una palabra en concreto a partir de datos de su distribución obtenidos de un corpus. Precisamente, por esta razón, se espera que la investigación actual sobre los métodos para la producción automática de léxicos de alta calidad, con gran cantidad de información y con anotación de clase como el trabajo que aquí presentamos, tenga un gran impacto en el rendimiento de la mayoría de las aplicaciones de PNL. En esta tesis, tratamos la adquisición automática de información léxica como un problema de clasificación. Con este propósito, adoptamos métodos de aprendizaje automático para generar un modelo que represente los datos de distribución vectorial que, basados en ejemplos conocidos, permitan hacer predicciones de otras palabras desconocidas. Las principales preguntas de investigación que planteamos en esta tesis son: (i) si los datos de corpus proporcionan suficiente información para construir representaciones de palabras de forma eficiente y que resulten en decisiones de clasificación precisas y sólidas, y (ii) si la adquisición automática puede gestionar, también, los nombres polisémicos. Para hacer frente a estos problemas, realizamos una serie de validaciones empíricas sobre nombres en inglés. Nuestros resultados confirman que la información obtenida a partir de la distribución de los datos de corpus es suficiente para adquirir automáticamente clases semánticas, como lo demuestra un valor-F global promedio de 0,80 aproximadamente utilizando varios modelos de recuento de contextos y en datos de corpus de distintos tamaños. No obstante, tanto el estado de la cuestión como los experimentos que realizamos destacaron una serie de retos para este tipo de modelos, que son reducir la escasez de datos del vector y dar cuenta de la polisemia nominal en las representaciones distribucionales de las palabras. En este contexto, los modelos de word embedding (WE) mantienen la “semántica” subyacente en las ocurrencias de un nombre en los datos de corpus asignándole un vector. Con esta elección, hemos sido capaces de superar el problema de la escasez de datos, como lo demuestra un valor-F general promedio de 0,91 para las clases semánticas de nombres de sentido único, a través de una combinación de la reducción de la dimensionalidad y de números reales. Además, las representaciones de WE obtuvieron un rendimiento superior en la gestión de las ocurrencias asimétricas de cada sentido de los nombres de tipo complejo polisémicos regulares en datos de corpus. Como resultado, hemos podido clasificar directamente esos nombres en su propia clase semántica con un valor-F global promedio de 0,85. La principal aportación de esta tesis consiste en una validación empírica de diferentes representaciones de distribución utilizadas para la clasificación semántica de nombres junto con una posterior expansión del trabajo anterior, lo que se traduce en recursos léxicos y conjuntos de datos innovadores que están disponibles de forma gratuita para su descarga y uso.
Lexical semantic class information for nouns is critical for a broad variety of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks including, but not limited to, machine translation, discrimination of referents in tasks such as event detection and tracking, question answering, named entity recognition and classification, automatic construction and extension of ontologies, textual inference, etc. One approach to solve the costly and time-consuming manual construction and maintenance of large-coverage lexica to feed NLP systems is the Automatic Acquisition of Lexical Information, which involves the induction of a semantic class related to a particular word from distributional data gathered within a corpus. This is precisely why current research on methods for the automatic production of high- quality information-rich class-annotated lexica, such as the work presented here, is expected to have a high impact on the performance of most NLP applications. In this thesis, we address the automatic acquisition of lexical information as a classification problem. For this reason, we adopt machine learning methods to generate a model representing vectorial distributional data which, grounded on known examples, allows for the predictions of other unknown words. The main research questions we investigate in this thesis are: (i) whether corpus data provides sufficient distributional information to build efficient word representations that result in accurate and robust classification decisions and (ii) whether automatic acquisition can handle also polysemous nouns. To tackle these problems, we conducted a number of empirical validations on English nouns. Our results confirmed that the distributional information obtained from corpus data is indeed sufficient to automatically acquire lexical semantic classes, demonstrated by an average overall F1-Score of almost 0.80 using diverse count-context models and on different sized corpus data. Nonetheless, both the State of the Art and the experiments we conducted highlighted a number of challenges of this type of model such as reducing vector sparsity and accounting for nominal polysemy in distributional word representations. In this context, Word Embeddings (WE) models maintain the “semantics” underlying the occurrences of a noun in corpus data by mapping it to a feature vector. With this choice, we were able to overcome the sparse data problem, demonstrated by an average overall F1-Score of 0.91 for single-sense lexical semantic noun classes, through a combination of reduced dimensionality and “real” numbers. In addition, the WE representations obtained a higher performance in handling the asymmetrical occurrences of each sense of regular polysemous complex-type nouns in corpus data. As a result, we were able to directly classify such nouns into their own lexical-semantic class with an average overall F1-Score of 0.85. The main contribution of this dissertation consists of an empirical validation of different distributional representations used for nominal lexical semantic classification along with a subsequent expansion of previous work, which results in novel lexical resources and data sets that have been made freely available for download and use.

Diese Arbeit bewertet verschiedene Argumente, die nicht nur leugnen, dass Gehirnzustände und bewusste Zustände ein und dasselbe sind, sondern auch behaupten, dass eine solche Identität unverständlich bleibt. Ich argumentiere, dass keiner der Ansätze einen Physikalismus unterminieren, da sie für ihre stillschweigenden Annahmen über die Verbindung zwischen Arten der Präsentation und ihrer Erklärung keine direkte oder unabhängige Begründung liefern. Meiner Ansicht nach sollte die Intelligibilität psychologischer Identität nicht ausschließlich auf einer Meinungsanalyse basieren. Der Haupteinwand sollt dann sein, warum man annehmen sollte, dass eine vollständig intelligible Erklärung auf Beschreibungen der kausalen Rollen als Modi von Präsentationen beruhen sollte. Ich schlage dazu vor, den Blick auf “psychologische Konzepte” zu werfen. Psychologische Konzepte sind Konzepte, die eine Beschreibung von funktionalen Rollen benutzen aber von Erfahrungsqualitäten handeln. Ich schlage vor, diese in Qualitätsraum-Modellen zu analysieren um aufzuklären, warum von phänomenalen Konzepten erwartet wird, dass diese sich durch Beschreibungen der kausalen bzw. funktionalen Rollen auf etwas beziehen sollten. Der Qualitätsraum soll hier verstanden werden als multidimensionaler Raum, der aus mehreren Achsen relativer Ähnlichkeit und Unterschieden in den Anordnungsstrukturen verschiedener Modalitäten bewusster Erfahrung besteht. In meinem Vorschlag ist es möglich, dass einige Achsen des Qualitätsraumes selbst aus ihrem eigenen Qualitätsraum bestehen, so dass wir in die Beschreibungen der funktionalen Rollen “hinein zoomen” und “heraus zoomen” können und damit klarer sehen, wie die Erklärung eines bestimmten Bewusstseinsaspekts gestaltet ist, wenn man ihn in Begriffen psychologischer Konzepte betrachtet.
This thesis evaluates several powerful arguments that not only deny that brain states and conscious states are one and the same thing, but also claim that such an identity is unintelligible. I argue that these accounts do not undermine physicalism because they don’t provide any direct or independent justification for their tacit assumptions about a link between modes of presentation and explanation. In my view intelligibility of psychophysical identity should not be based exclusively on the analysis of meaning. The main concern then should be why expect that fully intelligible explanation must be based on the descriptions of the causal roles as modes of presentation. To this effect I propose that we examine "psychological concepts". The psychological concepts are concepts that use descriptions of the functional roles but are about qualities of our experiences. I propose to analyze them in quality space models in order to unveil why phenomenal concepts are expected to refer via descriptions of the causal or functional roles. The quality space should be understood here as a multidimensional space consisting of several axes of relative similarity and differences among the structures of ordering in different modalities of conscious experience. On my proposal it is possible that some axes in the quality space consist of their own quality spaces so we could “zoom in” and “zoom out” into the descriptions of the functional roles and see more clearly what the explanation of certain aspects of consciousness looks like when thought of in terms of psychological concepts.

This dissertation concerns the location and nature of phenomenal qualities. Arguably, these qualities naively seem to belong to perceived external objects. However, we also seem to experience phenomenal qualities in hallucinations, and in hallucinations we do not perceive any external objects. I present and argue for a theory of the phenomenal qualities, "brain theory", which claims that all phenomenal qualities we experience are physical properties instantiated in the brain, regardless of whether they are experienced in veridical perceptions or in hallucinations. I begin by more carefully identifying the phenomenal qualities, discussing how they are related to "qualia" and "phenomenal character". Then I present brain theory, and investigate its implications for the perceptual relations we stand in to external objects, noting that it is mostly neutral. I also compare brain theory to a similar theory of perception advocated by Bertrand Russell. Next, I provide an overview over the competing theories of phenomenal qualities, and relate them to theories of perception, such as representationalism, qualia theory, sense data theory and disjunctivism. The majority of my argumentation for brain theory focuses on arguing that the phenomenal qualities are instantiated in the brain, rather than on arguing that they are physical properties. Instead, I largely assume physicalism. However, even independently of the physicalism assumption, I show that we have reason to believe that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations, and that qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects, such as our brains or sense data. In the first step towards this conclusion I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations face serious problems. In the next step I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects face serious problems. Finally, an important part of the argumentation is my replies to objections against brain theory, including common sense objections and the "observation objection". From these conclusions, together with the physicalism assumption, I infer that we have reason to believe that brain theory is true about hallucinations. On this basis, I then argue, through a generalizing argument, that the same is the case for veridical perceptions.

Thesis (MA (African Languages))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007.
This study explores semantic analysis of motion verb-hamba in IsiXhosa. In chapter 1 I have stated the aim of the study. I have discussed properties related to the lexical semantic analysis of the verb-hamba as well as Pustejovsky’s theory of the Generative Lexicon. The theoretical framework and the organization of study are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 2 addresses in more detail the type system for semantics. A generative theory of the lexicon includes multiple levels of representation for different types of lexical information needed. These levels include Argument Structure, Event Structure, Qualia Structure and Lexical Inherent Structure. In this chapter there is a more detailed structure of the qualia and the role they play in distributing the functional behavior of words and phrases in composition. In chapter 3 I have examined the lexical semantic analysis of the verb-hamba to account for the range of selectional properties of the NP phrase subject argument of the verb-hamba and various interpretations that arise in terms of composition with its complement arguments. The polysemous behavior of the verb-hamba is examined in sentence alternation constructions with respect to the properties of the event structure. I have also investigated the lexical representation in terms of argument structure and the event structure of the verb-hamba in different sentences. Chapter 4 is the conclusion, summarizing the findings of all the previous chapters in this study on lexical semantic analysis of the motion verb-hamba in IsiXhosa. This is followed by word lists that contain meanings of words in the context in which they are used.

Der Beitrag geht (in Abschnitt I) von zwei allgemeinen Ununterrichtbarkeitsthesen zu der Frage aus, ob und wie ‚Klassik‘ in der Schule unterrichtet werden kann, und entfaltet einen Lösungsansatz aus einer Perspektive ästhetisch-kultureller Edukation, der es darum geht, verschiedene musikalische Praxen erfahrbar zu machen. Die Grundannahmen dieser Perspektive werden in Abschnitt II zusammenfassend dargstellt. Das Wort „außeraustralisch“ soll eine kulturelle Außenperspektive auf die europäische Klassik signalisieren. Im Zentrum des Beitrags (Abschnitt III) steht eine „didaktische Interpretation klassisch-romantischer Musikkultur“, der es um die Formulierung charakteristischer Qualitäten dieser Musik bzw. Musikkultur geht. Als exemplarisch für deren Nachvollziehen erscheint eine Entwicklung von informeller über konventionalisierte und halböffentliche Hausmusik hin zum Konzert. Die entsprechenden Erfahrungsqualitäten bilden den Angelpunkt für die Gestaltung der Unterrichtspraxis. Mit drei abschließenden Inszenierungsskizzen für charakteristische Qualitäten (Abschnit IV) macht der Text einen Schritt weg von der wissenschaftlich geleiteten Analyse hin zur ästhetisch interpretierenden Gestaltung. Insgesamt stellt der Beitrag am Beispiel der Klassik exemplarisch ein allgemeines musikpädagogisches Herangehen dar
The article starts (in part I) from two theses about the impossibility of teaching classical music in the classroom and shows a solution to do so. Part II outlines the actual perspective, which is based on music and music education as and for aesthetical and cultural practice. The word “außeraustralisch” (out of australia) indicates a perspective at classical music from a foreign point of view. The crucial part III claims “characteristic qualities” as the main reference point to stage musical practice in the classroom and developes characteristical qualities of classical-romantic music in a “didactic interpretation of classical-romantic culture of music”. The development from an informal to a conventionalized and half public Hausmusik up to public concerts appears to be generic to comprehend special attitudes and concepts of this kind of music. Part IV goes one step further towards an aesthetical interpretation of classical music as it creates three drafts, which outline how to stage music in such a way, that makes characteristic qualities of classical music perceptible in the classroom. Altogether the article uses the classical music in the classroom as an exemple for a general music pedagogical approach

La reconnaissance des émotions dans la musique est un challenge industriel et académique. À l'heure de l'explosion des contenus multimédias, il devient nécessaire de concevoir des ensembles structurés de termes et concepts facilitant l'organisation et l'accès aux connaissances. Dans les bibliothèques musicales, l'analyse des sentiments et la classification par émotion sont très émergentes et demeurent un objet de recherche ambitieux. La gestion des contenus d'un objet sonaore numérisé répond à une indexation documentaire à trois niveaux : " contenu - auctorialité - matérialisation ". Ce triptyque nous semble tomber en désuétude et ne correspond plus aux attentes de l'usager. L'information musicale appelle ainsi à une production et représentation nouvelle. Notre problématique est la suivante : est-il possible d'avoir une connaissance a priori de l'émotion en vue de son élicitation ? Autrement dit, dans quelles mesures est-il possible de bâtir une structure formelle algorithmique permettant d'isoler le mécanisme déclencheur des émotions? Est-il possible de connaître l'émotion que l'on ressentira à l'écoute d'une chanson, avant de l'écouter ? Suite à l'écoute, son élicitation est-elle possible ? Est-il possible de formaliser une émotion dans le but de la sauvegarder et, ou, de la partager ? Dans ce travail de thèse, nous proposons d'abord un aperçu de l'existant et du contexte applicatif. Plusieurs scénarios très concrets sont envisageables, parmi eux : un répondeur téléphonique triant les messages enregistrés en fonction de leur humeur ; recherche de musique apaisante après une journée de travail ; recherche de musique excitante pour accompagner une activité sportive ; recherche d'opinions sur les réseaux sociaux, etc. ; Dans une seconde partie nous proposons une réflexion sur les enjeux épistémologiques intrinsèques et liés à l'indexation même de l'émotion. La " mise en œuvre d'une solution d'indexation automatique fait appel à de nombreux domaines scientifiques ".1 Afin de saisir la complexité de l'indexation de l'émotion pour l'enrichissement des métadonnées, nous allons adopter une méthodologie exploratoire interdisciplinaire. En effet, à travers une démarche psychologique, physiologique et philosophique, nous proposerons un cadre conceptuel de cinq démonstrations faisant état de l'impossible mesure de l'émotion, en vue de son élicitation. Une fois dit, à travers notre cadre théorique, qu'il est formellement impossible d'indexer les émotions ; il nous incombe de comprendre la mécanique d'indexation cependant proposée par les industriels et académiques. La réalité du terrain est telle que plusieurs interfaces web ou logicielles proposent des services d'expérience de moteur de recherche fouillant une base de données, avec des métadonnées sur les émotions. Dans la dernière partie, nous proposerons, via des enquêtes quantitatives et qualitatives, une analyse afin de soumettre une matrice algorithmique basée sur le web social capable de faire des préconisations d'écoute d'œuvres musicales eu égards aux émotions.

This thesis is an attempt to defend functionalism against the various problems concerning qualia. It consists of five chapters. Chapter I sets forth the fundamental idea of functionalism. Two formulations of functionalism are presented, and related concepts such as realization, functional equivalence and functional identity defined. Functionalism is then contrasted with behaviourism as a theory of the mind. Its relation to physicalism is subsequently examined. The question whether a functional description should be derived from folk psychological theories is finally discussed. I argue that folk psychology plays a role in the sophistication of functionalism. I do two things in chapter II. I start by giving a brief outline of the various qualia problems which I tackle in later chapters. After this, I put down a definition of the notion 'qualia'. By 'qualia' is usually meant the phenomenal qualities of bodily and perceptual experiences. These qualities are understood to be mental qualities revealed to us through introspection. I point out that to understand 'qualia' as such seems to commit the critics of functionalism to a representative or adverbial theory of perception. Chapter III contains my rebuttals of Nagel's and Jackson's arguments which aim to show that qualia are non-physical properties. I argue that their arguments are either ill-founded or ontologically benign. I conclude the chapter with -criticisms of Campbell's New Epiphenomenalism. Chapter IV deals with the inverted qualia argument. I begin with an explicit formulation of the argument, and spectrum inversion is chosen as a paradigmatic case of qualia inversion. Then I elaborate and supplement Churchland's defence of functionalism - his contention that qualia are irrelevant to the type-identities of sensory experiences. I develop my argument in the following two sections. First, basing my argument on some features of colours, I contend that it is highly unlikely to have behaviourally undetectable spectrum inversion. Secondly, I argue that even if spectrum inversion is possible, the colour experience of a spectrum-inverted person is still not functionally identical with the corresponding colour experience of an ordinary person. Chapter V is a refutation of the absent qualia argument. I maintain that functional equivalence constitutes a strong reason for the ascription of qualia. Block's reason for withholding qualia from the homunculi-headed systems he articulates is shown to be question-begging. Finally, I argue that even if we concede to Block that qualia are neurophysiological properties, functionalism can still be defended.

碩士
中原大學
工業與系統工程研究所
104
Nowadays, because of the awakening of self-consciousness, the consumption patterns have changed, from the Product-oriented to the consumer-oriented. In order to make the consumers feel happiness and joy, also to meet their needs, this research combines Kano’s Model and Qualia to discover qualia elements and distinguish quality attributes. And it also establishes a pattern of discussing qualia factor systematically. This research bears out the possibility of the pattern by a case of Tourism Factory called "YILAN PASTRY FOOD CO., LTD". It brings up three Qualia factors through the analysis, and directs the developing trend of individual cases.

碩士
東海大學
企業管理學系碩士班
100
Because of changing consumption habits, consumers not solely focus on "practical" when they consider the product elements. Sony has proposed the concept, QUALIA. That is used to estimate whether products can evoke emotion value, besides the products’ basic function or specifications. If we can put Qualia elements into tangible products and service process, the emotion value and perceived quality will be enhanced. Past studies showed that perceived quality will affect consumers purchase behavior and intension. The current study intends to disentangle the influence of Qualia dimensions on perceived quality. Questionnaire is used to collect data, and the relation between Qualia and perceived quality is tested. Enterprises can refer the results when they design the products or service process. First, this study followed the definition of Qualia and separated them into six dimensions. Second, confirming Qualia element s as questionnaire items by focus group. After pretesting, furniture and decoration was chosen as target which people need to experience before purchasing. The results show two of the six dimensions, "personal style" and "delicacy", are positively related to perceived quality. Besides, when developing questionnaire, it shows that Qualia concept covers a wide range, it cannot be used in all category of products without modification. So it needs to be adjusted when developing the question items.

Wong, Sin Ting.
Thesis M.Phil. Chinese University of Hong Kong 2015.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-107).
Abstracts also in Chinese.
Title from PDF title page (viewed on 27, October, 2016).