Literatura académica sobre el tema "Radio West (Kosovo, Serbia)"

AbstractThis article critically examines contemporary narratives which frame Serbian politics as a conflict between supporters of a pro-European Union (EU) policy and supporters of closer ties with Russia. Contrary to this narrative, contemporary Serbian political actors increasingly present policies and platforms oriented towards both the European Union and Russia. These developments reflect the contradictory legacies arising from the history of Serbian and Russian diplomatic relations along with the sometimes ambivalent implications of Russia's stance on the issue of Kosovo's independence, Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, and recent developments in Serbian-Russian economic relations. Given the long time frame for EU membership and the current impasse over issues like Kosovo and Serbia's potential NATO membership, Serbia's leaders currently enjoy the luxury of simultaneously deepening ties with both the EU and Russia. However, a future linkage between Kosovo's independence and EU membership and/or the possibility of Serbia's joining NATO will likely present Serbian political elites with mutually-exclusive choices bearing important implications for their relations with either Russia or the EU.

The article is devoted to one of the most dramatic events in the history of Serbia - the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, in terms of analyzing two key aspects. Firstly, numerous inconsistencies, discrepancies, contradictions and outright falsifications were revealed on the part of the official investigation and the official version of the attentate, in which it was not possible to reliably establish the motives, methods of committing the crime and the true perpetrators of the prime minister's death. Consequently, the reason for the murder of the prime minister, which, no doubt, lies precisely in the politics, remains hidden. In the Serbian political dimension, Kosovo and Metohija have long been the main stumbling blocks. Secondly, the authors of the article analyze the radical change in Zoran Djindjic's policy, which took place in general across a wide range of issues, and in particular, on the indicated "Kosovo problem". The Serbian prime minister had a sharp change in political orientations due to specific measures taken by the US, the EU and the "world community" towards Serbia, among which there were extremely destructive tendencies covered by double standards and humanistic rhetoric. The West did not need a "renewed Serbia", moreover, Serbia, renewed on the basis of a combination of democratic and national-state principles, which, in fact, became the policy of Zoran Djindjic a few months before the attentate, was a direct threat to the West. In particular, it hindered the implementation of the plans to build a certain order (characterized through the formula "constant chaos of low intensity"). Pax Americana, or the "new globalized order", can only be established in the Balkans on the rubble of Serbia, with dysfunctional state institutions, a devastated economy and destroyed national consciousness. The West needs Serbia only in the form of a failed state. The key point is the deprivation of its main attribute of statehood - sovereignty, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. The withdrawal from Serbia of its southern region, Kosovo and Metohija, occurred contrary to the UN Charter, the entire complex of international legal acts on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, a number of UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution No. 1244, the Constitution and legislation of Serbia. Without idealizing or romanticizing the image of this Serbian statesman, the authors consistently identify the steps taken by Zoran Djindjic in the Kosovo direction at the international and regional levels, testifying to his firm desire to implement the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, to reconsider relations with the West in general and build democratic Serbian state on national basis. All undertakings were interrupted by an unknown sniper's bullet fired on March 12, 2003. English version of the article on pp. 402-409 at URL: https://panor.ru/articles/role-of-zoran-dindic-in-resolving-the-kosovo-issue/66002.html

In the context of public international law and relations between principles of territorial integrity and right to self-determination, independence of Kosovo will never be legal if it is not recognized by Serbia. This can be concluded from the examples of violent secession of Bangladesh and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. That is why Serbia still has a right to decide about the independence of Kosovo and Metohija despite signing Brussels Agreement and the fact that 100 UN member states recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Forty years after the secession of northern part of the island, Nicosia has not recognized Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus, which caused that this secessionist creation does not become a member of the UN. Its independence is not full from the perspective of international law, and this fact that cannot be disputed in spite of the factual occupation of the northern part of island by Turkey. On the other side, Pakistan recognized the independence of Bangladesh and forever lost half of its population and state territory. In return, half of its foreign debt was written off, 90,000 prisoners were released and 13,000 square kilometers of territory in western part of Pakistan, controlled by India, were returned. However, no one is offering anything similar to Serbia to recognize the independence of Kosovo. Debts of Kosovo towards IMF and World Bank are paid by Serbia. In addition, if Serbia recognized the independence of Kosovo, Serbia would lose about 100,000 Serbs living on that territory and about 1,200 square kilometers of territory in the northern part of Kosovo which is not controlled by Pristina. In that context, it is clear that principles of territorial integrity are still stronger in international law then right to self-determination. Postmodernist theories have a goal to hide that fact. Key of the independence of so-called ?Kosovo? is still in hands of Belgrade. That is why there are so many persistent attempts and strong pressures from the West to recognize the independence of ?Kosovo?. Example of Cyprus shows how to resist those attempts within the framework of public international law (by applying the principles of territorial integrity). However, if in the future Serbia chooses the same approach as Pakistan in the case of Bangladesh, Kosovo will be lost forever. At that moment, it would be clear that the relations of great powers in the world have changed.

This article suggests a rethinking of Serbian-Albanian relations. Contemporary research tends to reduce this problem exclusively to the Serbia-Kosovo issue, which is usually regarded with a value-based approach. As a result, the issue of Serbia’s foreign policy strategy in the south-west and south direction, which also includes the Republic of Albania and other states (Montenegro, North Macedonia), where the role of the Albanian factor is signifi cant, remains outside the scope of the analysis. The purpose of this article is to examine more closely the logic of Serbia’s foreign policy activities in the south-western (Albanian) direction, taking into account the historical context and current trends associated with the active implementation of infrastructure projects in the entire Balkan region. Given that these projects cover both Serbia and Albania, it is appropriate to assume that Belgrade and Pristina have a mutual interest in forming a predictable non-confl ict space and in certain coordination of their approaches to conducting politics in their border area. This, in turn, requires a rethinking of Serbia’s foreign policy strategy in the southwestern (Albanian) direction. To this end, the author analyzes both the historical evolution of Belgrade’s position on the Albanian-Kosovo issue and considers it in the context of modern regional infrastructure projects. Considering the structural regional changes, taking place since the second half of the 2010s, the author comes to the conclusion that Belgrade is facing a dilemma between the self-signifi cant signifi cance of the Kosovo issue and the interest in forming a predictable and stable space to the southwest of its own borders. This dilemma determines the logic of modern Serbia’s foreign policy actions.

The year 2019 marked the 20th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the end of the Kosovo War. I take this as an opportunity to reflect on the role, importance and impact of the NATO bombing victims’ redress. This article unwraps the process of policymaking aimed at the redress for victims of the NATO bombing, exploring how policymakers formulated policies and, among other issues, what role the families of the Radio Television of Serbia employees who died in the NATO bombing have in the formulation of these policies.

Two events in 2008 shaped the political map of the Caucasus: the West's decision on the independence of Kosovo and the Russo-Georgian War. First, on 17 February, Kosovo authorities unilaterally declared the independence of what was at the time a UN protectorate. This declaration enjoyed much support in the West, including near-immediate recognition by key states such as the US, Germany, France, the UK, and a dozen others. But it also faced strong opposition from Serbia and Russia and strong skepticism from prowestern countries such as Georgia. Russia opposed not only the Kosovo declaration itself but more importantly the western adoption of it. From the Russian perspective, by supporting Kosovo's accession to sovereignty western states were violating the rules set at the moment of collapse of the federal states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: to invite the former union republics to join the international clubs of sovereign states, but not extend such invitation to any other sub-units. In other words, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia became members of the United Nations, but sub-entities like Chechnya, Kosovo, or Tatarstan did not receive the same recognition.

Kosovo is part of South-Eastern Europe, inside the Balkan Pe-ninsula. It has a surface area of 10.877 square kilometres, surroun-ded by Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.[1] Kosovo for-ms a geographical unit surrounded by impressive mountains and hills.[2] Kosovo’s location in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula defi-nes itself as the crossroad of important terrestrial routes, crossing from Northern and Central Europe towards South and West Euro-pe.[3] The Kosovo’s relief, taken in general, is a mountainous one. Kosovo does have agricultural land, which is generally arable, considerable forest land, large water bodies, flora and fauna rich areas, and considerable ground resources.[4]These and other resources Kosovo is endowed with represent the key supporting factors of Kosovo’s development, current and future. In fact, as any other country, Kosovo is also characterized by limiting elements in terms of extent of natural resources that may be available for utilization.As it is widely known, in conditions of free market economy and privatization, possibilities of ensuring a proper planning for the utilization of all natural resources available are considerably relative. Setting from the fact that there are no inexhaustible resources, it is necessary that relevant mechanisms are in place and authority to undertake all possible measures to provide for a diligent and rational utilization thereof. To achieve such a goal, modern countries, including Kosovo, have passed relevant laws. Setting from such terms, this article aims to present the current situation of Kosovo in terms of legal norms on utilization of natural resources it is endowed with.[1] Kosovo, an encyclopaedic view, Tirana, 1999, pg. 7.[2] Kosovo, a short history, Noel Malcolm, Tirana, 2001, pg. 1.[3] Kosovo, an encyclopaedic view, Tirana, 1999, pg. 8.[4] Ibid, pgs. 26-44.

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia’s reactions to NATO’s military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite’s need to have Russia’s identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia’s reactions to NATO’s intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia’s image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the RussianeWestern relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.

<p>West Rumelian Turkish (WRT) refers to the dialects of Turkish spoken in the western Balkans. It is now spoken primarily in Macedonia and Kosovo, but was previously spoken more broadly in Bosnia, Greece, Albania, and Serbia. They differ from other dialects of Turkish in that they have been heavily affected by neighboring Indo-European languages like Serbian, Albanian, Aromanian, Romani, and Greek, and have undergone many of the changes characteristic of the Balkan Sprachbund (Friedman 2003). In this paper, I present a pattern of multiply-marked relative clauses in Pulevski’s Turkish that has not been attested elsewhere in Turkic, in which relative clauses can be marked with one of six different combinations of overt participial morphology. I argue that this variation is caused by two factors: first, the fusion of the constructions {<em>ći</em> + finite verb} and {participle} into a new construction {<em>ći</em> + participle} and second, the introduction of relative marking using the interrogative ‘which’ based on models in surrounding Indo-European languages.</p>

Introduction. Primary health care in the Republic of Serbia is predominantly funded by the Republic Health Insurance Fund (RHIF). From the total income of health centers and institutes at the primary level, with no pharmacy and pharmacies (Kosovo excluded), 84% in 2008 was paid by RHIF. Frequency of participation ranged from 63-95% and it was stable in all observed years. The aim of this study was to determine the expenditures for primary health care for each insured person in statistically defined districts in the Republic of Serbia, with an emphasis on prevention participation. Material and Methods. Retrospective and comparative analysis of health statistics from the database of the Institute of Public Health of Serbia (IPHS) and financial data from the RHIF for the period 2006-2008 was done. Results. Observed by the districts in 2008, in Vojvodina, the lowest expenditure for primary health care had North Backa District (5,207 RSD) and greatest was in West Backa District (6,632 RSD) per capita. In the central Serbia territorial difference was much greater, ranging from 3,574 RSD in the District Morava to 6,701 RSD per capita in the District Toplica and Nisava. Expenditures for direct health care of RHIF per capita in the reporting period continuously have grown. Conclusion. The results showed that the largest cost for primary care for the insured person in the districts of Serbia was registered in the Nisava and Toplica (6,701 RSD) and lowest in the district of Morava (3,574 RSD) per capita.

Serbian security forces expel half the Albanian population from Kosovo during the NATO air campaign. Russia remains in the Contact Group, but the cooperative relationship on the Balkans between Moscow and the West becomes seriously strained. As NATO bombs fall on Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia, Pardew becomes a special diplomatic channel between Washington and the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. Serbian security forces withdraw from Kosovo.