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1
Laine, Veera. "“Biggest Nationalist in the Country”". Contributions to the History of Concepts 16, n.º 2 (1 de diciembre de 2021): 108–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/choc.2021.160206.
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Nationalism is an ism rarely used as self-description. This article suggests that nationalist discourses are on the move, meaning the concept may be used in novel ways. In Russia, for example, the president recently identified himself as a nationalist, claiming ownership of the concept in the long-standing struggle against manifestations of oppositional nationalism. The article asks who describes themselves as nationalists in contemporary Russia, how do they define the concept, and how did it change during the years 2008–2018 when nationalism as a political idea became increasingly important in Russian politics? Drawing from Russian newspaper sources, the article suggests that diverse, self-proclaimed nationalist actors rely on narrow ethnic understandings of the concept and do not embrace the president’s interpretation of multinational nationalism.
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Horvath, Robert. "The Euromaidan and the crisis of Russian nationalism". Nationalities Papers 43, n.º 6 (noviembre de 2015): 819–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1050366.
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This article examines the reverberations in Russia of the Euromaidan protests and the fall of the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine. It shows how the events in Kyiv provoked a major crisis in the Russian nationalist movement, which was riven by vituperative denunciations, the ostracism of prominent activists, the breakdown of friendships, the rupture of alliances, and schisms within organizations. Focusing on pro-Kremlin nationalists and several tendencies of opposition nationalists, it argues that this turmoil was shaped by three factors. First, the Euromaidan provoked clashes between pro-Kremlin nationalists, who became standard-bearers of official anti-Euromaidan propaganda, and anti-Putin nationalists, who extolled the Euromaidan as a model for a revolution in Russia itself. Second, the events in Ukraine provoked ideological contention around issues of particular sensitivity to Russian nationalists, such as the competing claims of imperialism and ethnic homogeneity, and of Soviet nationalism and Russian traditionalism. And third, many nationalists were unprepared for the pace of events, which shifted rapidly from an anti-oligarchic uprising in Kyiv to a push for the self-determination of ethnic Russians in Crimean and southeast Ukraine. As a result, they were left in the uncomfortable position of appearing to collaborate with the oppressors of their compatriots.
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Bobrov, Ivan Vladimirovich y Dmitry Alekseevich Mikhailov. "Three Enemies of Russia: Dmitrii Galkovskii and Strategies of “Enemification” in Contemporary Russian Nationalism". Nationalities Papers 47, n.º 2 (marzo de 2019): 280–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.2.
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AbstractThis article focuses on ideological constructions of contemporary nationalism shaped by the influence of Dmitrii Galkovskii. At the dawn of the Russian Internet, Galkovskii’s website, Samizdat, became the birthplace for intellectuals of contemporary Russian nationalism who emerged around Voprosy natsionalizma magazine and the online magazine Sputnik i Pogrom. Enemification strategies described in this article are understood as forms of self-representation of contemporary Russian nationalism. The goal of this article is to characterize one of the ideologies of contemporary Russian nationalism, which serves as a moral justification for some odious manifestations—xenophobia and racism. Three forces are characterized by contemporary Russian nationalists as the most dangerous challenges for the nation: the West, internal enemies, and migrants. Traditional and fundamental anti-Western rhetoric has turned into Anglophobia in the ideology of contemporary Russian nationalism. The most profound evidence might be found in Galkovskii’s conception of the history of international relations. This idea is also used when defining the internal enemy. Caucasians have taken the place of Russian nationalism’s previous main internal enemies, Jews, and are treated as representatives of the British colonial administration. The third enemy of modern Russian nationalism is migrants. They are seen as tools of the degradation policy toward Russians.
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TANRISEVER, OKTAY F. "Why Are Federal Arrangements not a Panacea for Containing Ethnic Nationalism? Lessons from the Post-Soviet Russian Experience". Japanese Journal of Political Science 10, n.º 3 (30 de octubre de 2009): 333–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109909990065.
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AbstractFederal arrangements have been considered by some thinkers as a panacea for containing ethnic nationalism in the ethnically defined regions. This article challenges this view by arguing that federal institutions may enable ethnic nationalists in the ethnically defined regions to consolidate their power through the guarantees that they receive from the federal centre. Although the post-Soviet Russian leadership under Boris Yeltsin sought to use federalism as a tool for containing ethnic nationalism, Russia's this experiment with federalism demonstrates that federalism may serve not to contain but to strengthen ethnic nationalism. Disillusioned with Yeltsin's failed use of federalism in containing ethnic nationalism, the overwhelming majority of the Russian people supported Vladimir Putin's anti-federalist reforms since 2000 which made federalism redundant in Russia. While undermining the basis for Western style democracy in Russia, Putin's centralism proved to be more effective than Yeltsin's federalism in containing ethnic nationalism.
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Laine, Veera. "Contemporary Russian nationalisms: the state, nationalist movements, and the shared space in between". Nationalities Papers 45, n.º 2 (marzo de 2017): 222–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1272562.
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For several years, various nationalist groups and the Russian state have been competing over nationalism as a political concept and for popular support to nationalist claims. This paper analyzes the relationship between the state and anti-government, ethnocentric nationalistic groups that gather annually in an event called “the Russian March.” Emphasis is on the change in that relationship that happened in 2014, when the state added efforts to channel and mobilize the nationalists to its previous repressive and controlling measures. The article conceptualizes the competition over the nationalist argument in contemporary Russia as a case of dissentful and consentful contention in hybrid regimes, and shows how the dissentful nationalists have been forced to make way for the more consentful ones. Until recently, the room for maneuver for the radical nationalists was relatively wide. The events in Ukraine, however, divided the nationalists, and since 2014 radical nationalists have faced increased state repression. At the same time, pro-government nationalist actors have strengthened, and new players have appeared in the field. These developments tell us not only about the Kremlin's diminished tolerance for dissentful contention, but also about the importance of the nationalist argument in Russian politics today.
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Bacon, Edwin. "Reflexive and Reasoned Religious Nationalism: The Exploratory Case of Russia". Politics and Religion 11, n.º 2 (26 de marzo de 2018): 396–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048318000019.
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AbstractNationalism theory has long acknowledged that in its relation to nationalism, “religion” can refer both to a reflexive identity attached to a people group, and to a reasoned value-based position articulated by an élite. Even this bifurcation remains insufficiently precise. Religio-nationalisms reasoned ex patria—that is, beginning with the nationalist and proceeding from there to incorporate religion—tend toward values of exclusivity and animosity toward “the other”. They have been charged with hijacking religion as an identity while being at odds with those who actively practice that religion or lead its practicing community. The exploratory case of the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism allows a comparison of ex patria religio-nationalism with its ex religio counterpart. It supports the hypothesis that when reasoned religio-nationalism begins with the religious and proceeds to the nationalist, emphases such as inclusivity and benevolence—rather than exclusivity and animosity—are to the fore.
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Offord, Derek. "Nation-Building and Nationalism in Karamzin's History of the Russian State". Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography 3, n.º 1 (2010): 1–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221023810x534342.
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AbstractThis essay analyzes Karamzin's contribution, through his History of the Russian State, to the formation of national identity and to the development of nationalism in early nineteenth-century Russia. It explores Karamzin's argument that the development of a unified state gave Russia an equal claim to membership in Europe's family of nations, and thus underlines the way that, for Karamzin, Russia's national identity was subsumed in imperial expansion. Karamzin was first and foremost a political nationalist. Yet the essay also explores the humane, cosmopolitan elements of Karamzin's thinking – elements that were in some tension with his statism and which pointed toward a cultural nationalism more complex than this statism.
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Knox, Zoe. "Russian Orthodoxy, Russian Nationalism, and Patriarch Aleksii II". Nationalities Papers 33, n.º 4 (diciembre de 2005): 533–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990500354004.
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The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is a highly visible institution in Russia, and arguably the most prominent and influential religious or cultural body. The Orthodox Church figures prominently in various discussions as the driving force behind Russia's post-Soviet renewal and recovery. Surveys show that Russians trust the Orthodox Church more than any other public institution, including law courts, trade unions, mass media, the military, the police and the government. Estimates of the number of self-identified Orthodox adherents range from 50 million, which amounts to slightly more than one-third of Russia's population, to 70 million, or roughly one half of the population. A leading newspaper consistently ranks Patriarch Aleksii II, head of the Moscow Patriarchate, the governing body of the Orthodox Church, in the top 15 of the country's most influential political figures. These indicators confirm that the Orthodox Church has a significant role in Russia's post-Soviet development. This is widely accepted by commentators both within and without the Orthodox Church, and within and without Russia.
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Kuzio, Taras. "Nationalism and authoritarianism in Russia: Introduction to the special issue". Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49, n.º 1 (7 de enero de 2016): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.12.002.
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This article discusses different aspects of the political evolution of Russian President and former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the impact of his evolution upon the type of regime that has evolved from soft authoritarianism to a ‘militocracy‘ and ‘consolidated authoritarian regime.’ The article discusses eight contributions to this special issue by placing them within the broader context of how the West misread two areas pertaining to Russia. The first is how the West by wrongly believing that Russia, being a member of G8, the NATO-Russia Council and other Western structures, continued to be interested in becoming a Western political and economic system. The second is the tradition, stretching back to Sovietology, of ignoring and downplaying the issue of how the nationalities question and different nationalisms interact with democratic revolutions, transitions and, specifically, with Russian politics. The introductory article next discusses the eight contributions within the context of: Russian messianism, the Russkii Mir (Russian World), how and when nationalists and fascists became mainstream in Russian politics, Putin’s great power nationalism, Ukrainophobia and Russian chauvinism, historical myths and re-Stalinization of Putin’s political system. The final section compares Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014 respectively and the growing xenophobia in Russian foreign policy.
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ROCCHI, T. "REVOLUTION FROM THE RIGHT: THE RUSSIAN BLACK HUNDREDS MOVEMENT AND ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS Part II-I: the Black Hundred understanding of Russianness in the general European context of the history of nationalism and the consolidation of nations: origins and development of varieties of nationalism in the Russian Empire and Europe". Historical and social-educational ideas 10, n.º 3/2 (4 de agosto de 2018): 54–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.17748/2075-9908-2018-10-3/2-54-71.
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This series of articles investigates the Black Hundreds’ understanding of Russianness in the general European context of the history of nationalism. In brief, Russianness is the totality of nationally specific characteristics that define Russians as Russians and that distinguish Russians from other peoples. Through Russianness, according to the Black Hundreds, Russians should form a cohesive, selfidentifying community united in loyalty to the triple formula “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality”. The Black Hundred understanding of Russianness strongly differed from the definition of Russianness by other Russian nationalists of the period. Several historians have noted that the Black Hundreds’ definition of a “true Russian” indicated not an ethnic but rather a political affiliation - loyalty to the triple formula “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality”. The Black Hundreds’ understanding of Russianness had contradictory applications. The Black Hundreds emphasized the allembracing nature of the Russian people and considered many members of the non-Russian peoples as members of the Russian nation. However, they also excluded entire categories of Russians from the ranks of the Russian people and divided the non-Russian peoples of the Empire into the categories of “friendly to Russia” and “hostile to Russia”. The Black Hundreds also often used eschatological themes of demonization of external and especially internal enemies of Russia and the Russian people. Note that the Black Hundreds followed general European trends in political eschatology. It is important to note that the debates about Russianness were an integral part of the general European process of the consolidation of both ethnic and political nations against the background of competing understandings of identity of individuals, groups, and societies. The articles will give a comparative analysis of the Black Hundreds’ concept of Russianness with the concepts of Frenchness in the French Revolution and Germanness in Nazi Germany. The articles’ theme has a huge contemporary relevance in light of debates about national identities and values in the Russian Federation and many European countries.
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Gayda, Fyodor A. "Белоруссизм в контексте столыпинского национализма". Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 58 (1 de agosto de 2020): 237–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2020-0-2-237-242.
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The article examines the political potential of the two programs and practices of nation-building at the beginning of the twentieth century associated with all-Russian and Belarusian national movements. The all-Russian project was formulated by the Prime Minister of the Russian Empire P.A. Stolypin. He proceeded from the idea of gradual and inevitable erosion of the estate system and democratization of the social system of Russia. Stolypin envisioned the creation of the political nation, the core of which would be the Russian people, quite traditionally understood as the trinity of Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians. According to Stolypin, the creation of the Russian nation led not to the restriction of the rights of ethnic minorities, but to their gradual expansion in the future, but on condition of loyalty to the state system and the national development of Russia. Until 1917, Russian nationalism in the Northwest region was much more influential than Belarusianism. The latter was represented by only a small circle of «Nasha Niva» journal supporters. Unlike Stolypin’s project, Belarusianism had no impact on any significant part of the local population.
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Kuzmin, Aleksandr G. y Anastasia V. Mitrofanova. "Russian nationalists in the Komi Republic: a case study of the Frontier of the North". Nationalities Papers 45, n.º 2 (marzo de 2017): 238–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1277514.
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The article examines some generic traits of the “new” Russian ethnic nationalism, namely, de-ideologization of the nationalist milieu and its inclination for civic activism. It results from a case study of the Frontier of the North (FN – Syktyvkar), an ideologically ambivalent organization that combines dual Russian/Komi ethnic nationalism, anti-migration sentiments, white racism, and fragments of other ideologies. The article demonstrates that, unlike nationalists of the previous generation, FN is not hostile to public authorities and is ready to cooperate with them. FN's grassroots activism, as well as sports and healthy recreational activities, attracts young people. The organization tackles the most acute social problems, often neglected by everyone else, and has become a working civil society institution. The authors argue that these tactics win the “new” nationalists sympathy among ordinary people and makes the groups politically stronger and more influential than the previous nationalist generation. However, state anti-extremist policy hampers the advancement of nationalists into mainstream politics.
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Sergeev, Sergey Alexeevich. "Русский оппозиционный внепарламентский национализм: все цвета спектра?" Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 42, n.º 3 (19 de octubre de 2015): 298–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04203005.
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This article examines various types of Russian oppositional extra-parliamentary natio- nalism from the 1990s to the 2010s, such as imperial national conservatism, monarchy- Black Hundreds nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, Russian Nazism, and National Democrats. It analyzes major Russian oppositional nationalist organizations as well as their transformations and evolution. The author gives particular attention to revolutionary nationalism (National Bolshevism) and National Democracy.
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George, Julie A. "Contingent Communities: Regional Ethnic Mobilization in the Yeltsin Era". Russian History 39, n.º 3 (2012): 379–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763316-03903007.
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Scholars disagree regarding the interests and impulses that drive secessionist ethnic nationalism. In Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia’s Republics, Elise Giuliano argues that, in the first decade of the Russian Federation’s independence, nationalist groups that highlighted economic discrimination by ethnic Russians against titular ethnic minorities were more able to spark ethnic and territorial separatist demands. She argues that the precise nature of economic experience, where often the actual economic discrimination was more ambiguous than that perceived, was less important than the nationalist groups’ message. In all, this book offers a compelling counterpoint to other work on ethnic separatism in Russia, which has emphasized long-standing historical grievances, institutional legacies, and the interests of political entrepreneurs rather than public interests.
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Kuzio, Taras. "Soviet and Russian anti-(Ukrainian) nationalism and re-Stalinization". Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49, n.º 1 (8 de enero de 2016): 87–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.12.005.
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The term ‘fascist’ has been misused by both the Soviet totalitarian system and Russian authoritarian nationalist militocracy to such an extent that it is detached from scholarly understanding and openly manipulated for political purposes. In Vladimir Putin’s Russia World the term ‘fascist’ is manipulated even further by political technology and massive state control of television that spews Ukrainophobic and anti-Western xenophobic propaganda. The article investigates a hitherto under-researched field of Tsarist, Soviet and Russian continuity in the denigration of ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ that goes back as far as the early 18th century. The article focuses on the Soviet and post-Soviet eras by showing how the growth of Russian nationalism, ‘conservative values’ and anti(Ukrainian)nationalism has taken place during specific periods that have combined re-Stalinization through the glorification of Joseph Stalin and downplaying and ignoring of his mass crimes against humanity with anti-Western xenophobia. Putin’s re-Stalinization is therefore in line with a tradition that requires domestic and external enemies to sustain the authoritarian nationalist militocracy.
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Gaut, Greg. "Can a Christian Be a Nationalist? Vladimir Solov'ev's Critique of Nationalism". Slavic Review 57, n.º 1 (1998): 77–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2502053.
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If my entire argument could fit under this rubric: Russia is a Christian nation andthereforeshould always act in a Christian way, my opponents’ argument can be expressed in the following formula: The Russian nation…is the only truly Christian nation, butnevertheless,it should act in a pagan way in all of its affairs.—Vladimir Solov'ev, Preface toThe National Question in Russia, Part II(1891)In the 1880s and 1890s, Vladimir Solov'ev worked out a Christian approach to nations and nationality, and a moral critique of nationalism, while waging a polemical battle against the Russian conservative nationalists of his day. His ideas emerged primarily from his own social gospel theology, but they were marked by both the Slavophile romanticism of his early career and the western liberalism of his later years. Solov'ev is most often treated as a philosopher, a mystic, or a literary figure, and as a result, his journalistic writings on nationalism and other topics have often been overlooked by scholars, even though they constitute at least a third of his published output.
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Laqueur, Walter. "Russian Nationalism". Foreign Affairs 71, n.º 5 (1992): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20045406.
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Lohr, Eric. "Russian Economic Nationalism during the First World War: Moscow Merchants and Commercial Diasporas". Nationalities Papers 31, n.º 4 (diciembre de 2003): 471–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0090599032000152924.
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While accounts of the end of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires have often stressed the rise of Turkish and German nationalisms, narratives of the Romanov collapse have generally not portrayed Russian nationalism as a key factor. In fact, scholars have either stressed the weaknesses of Russian national identity in the populace or the generally pragmatic approach of the government, which, as Hans Rogger classically phrased it, “opposed all autonomous expressions of nationalism, including the Russian.” In essence, many have argued, the regime was too conservative to embrace Russian nationalism, and it most often “subordinated all forms of the concept of nationalism to the categories of dynasty and empire.”
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Surzhko Harned, Lena. "Russian World and Ukrainian Autocephaly: Religious Narratives in Anti-Colonial Nationalism of Ukraine". Religions 13, n.º 4 (12 de abril de 2022): 349. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13040349.
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The paper examines the role of religious narratives in the on-going Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The literature on religious nationalism offers several ways in which religion plays a role in national identity narratives. The strong connection between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian state have been well-known. The narrative of the “chosen” nation and “third Rome” have fueled Russian neo-imperial national discourse of Russkii Mir (Russian World) which shapes Russian Foreign Policy in the “near abroad”. The Church is used as tool to shape and disseminate these narratives, as a means for justification of Russian aggression in Ukraine. This paper seeks to analyze the role of the religious narratives of Russia neo-colonial and post-colonial nationalism in Ukraine. It argues that Ukrainian religious nationalism, should it develop, will do so in response to the Russian actions driven by the ideological religious narrative. President Poroshenko’s decision to support the recognition of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in 2018 was a valiant effort to aid in the construction of Ukraine’s anti-colonial religious national narrative. Prior to the Russian invasion, there seemed to be relatively weak public support for the religious nationalist narrative in Ukraine. The evidence shows that commitment to religious pluralism continues to be prevalent in Ukrainian society.
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Neumann, Iver B. "Russia’s Return as True Europe, 1991-2017". Conflict and Society 3, n.º 1 (1 de junio de 2017): 78–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2017.030107.
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Since the reign of Peter the Great, Russia has identified itself in opposition to Europe. In the late 1980s, Michael Gorbachev and associates forged a liberal representation of Europe and initiated a Western-oriented foreign policy. Against this westernizing or liberal representation of Europe stood what was at first a makeshift group of old Communists and right-wing nationalists, who put forward an alternative representation that began to congeal around the idea that the quintessentially Russian trait was to have a strong state. This article traces how this latter position consolidated into a full-fledged xenophobic nationalist representation of Europe, which marginalized first other forms of nationalism and then, particularly since 2013, liberal representations of Europe. The official Russian stance is now that Russia itself is True Europe, a conservative great power that guards Europe’s true Christian heritage against the False Europe of decadence and depravity to its west.
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Ekaterina, Ivanova, Kinyakin Andrey y Stepanov Sergey. "The European and Russian Far Right as Political Actors: Comparative Approach". Journal of Politics and Law 12, n.º 2 (30 de mayo de 2019): 86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v12n2p86.
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The article is devoted to the comparative analysis of the far right (nationalist) as political actors in Russia and in Europe. Whereas the European far-right movements over the last years managed to achieve significant success turning into influential political forces as a result of surging popular support, in Russia the far-right organizations failed to become the fully-fledged political actors. This looks particularly surprising, given the historically deep-rooted nationalist tradition, which stems from the times Russian Empire. Before the 1917 revolution, the so-called «Black Hundred» was one of the major far-right organizations, exploiting nationalistic and anti-Semitic rhetoric, which had representation in the Russian parliament – The State Duma. During the most Soviet period all the far-right movements in Russia were suppressed, re-emerging in the late 1980s as rather vocal political force. But currently the majority of them are marginal groups, partly due to the harsh party regulation, partly due to the fact, that despite state-sponsored nationalism the position of Russian far right does not stand in-line with the position of Russian authorities, trying to suppress the Russian nationalists. This is sharply contrasting with the situation with the far right in Europe, which are more well-established and institutionalized as political actors, using conventional forms of political activity. However, despite some differences with the European counterparts, the Russian far right have obvious potential as political actors, which can be realized under certain circumstances, enabling them to play more significant in the political system of Russia.
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Müller, Martin. "Market meets nationalism: making entrepreneurial state subjects in post-Soviet Russia". Nationalities Papers 39, n.º 3 (mayo de 2011): 393–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2011.565320.
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This paper argues that nationalism and neoliberalism should not be considered as conflicting ideologies, but can enter into a productive association. This association creates an entrepreneurial nationalism that people can actively embrace as self-governing subjects in pursuit of a good life and successful career, rather than as subjects governed through state-mandated projects from above. The paper illustrates this argument with material from nine months of fieldwork at a Russian elite university. While students at that university strive to develop their potential and increase their market value to be successful in the competition for the best jobs, they also emphasize that developing themselves is not antithetical to serving Russia and being true to one's country. On the contrary, advancing Russia and advancing one's own career are articulated as two sides of the same coin. At the same time, the Russian nationalist project is reframed in entrepreneurial terms: making the Russian nation strong is about developing its potential and raising its competitiveness in the global marketplace.
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Blank, Stephen. "The Return of the Repressed? Post-1989 Nationalism in the “New” Eastern Europe". Nationalities Papers 22, n.º 2 (1994): 405–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999408408336.
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The intractable war in Yugoslavia, the breakup of Czechslovakia, the nationalist rumblings in Hungary and Romania, and manifestations of imperial and nationalist longings in Russian politics signify nationalism's enduring potency in Central and Eastern Europe. While some foreign observers worried about this potency, the new elites largely believed that liberalism in power could overcome those forces. Liberal democracy's triumph supposedly meant the end of History,inter alia,aggressive nationalism in Eastern Europe. They believed that these national liberation movements had cooperative, mutually supportive relationships that would flower after Communism ended. Nationalist discords were due to Eastern Europe's previous historical post-1914 nightmares, but the new post-1989 states would have amicable relations with their neighbors. Ostensibly, nationalism, once freed from Soviet repression, would bring an end to Soviet rule and usher in a new ‘springtime of nations.'
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IVANOVA, ELENA M. "RHETORICAL MODE OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF MODERN RUSSIAN NATIONALISM". Cherepovets State University Bulletin 4, n.º 103 (2021): 30–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.23859/1994-0637-2021-4-103-3.
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The article examines the rhetorical mode of discursive practices related to modern Russian nationalism as a set of all linguopragmatic methods and means of implementing the communicative strategy of a nationalist text; the author analyses the rhetorical architectonics of the nationalist text by the specific material (media texts by Egor Kholmogorov).
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Sursanova, Iuliia V. "Representation of everyday nationalism practices on “Russia 1” TV channel". Ars Administrandi (Искусство управления) 13, n.º 1 (2021): 31–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-9173-2021-1-31-48.
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Introduction: the article focuses on how everyday practices are used by the state to project the image of a Russian patriot. State-owned and state-related media discourse models are traditionally studied from the top down. We will analyze how the state and the media manage the display of daily nationalism, which has usually been seen in a bottom-up approach. Thus, the combination of both approaches − banal and everyday nationalisms − will highlight the state’s interest in encouraging Russians to use their version of patriotism in everyday life. For this, a qualitative study of the video reports of the “Vesti Nedeli” program on “Russia 1” TV channel was carried out. The period between 2011−2012 has been chosen for content analysis which is known as a “protest year” and the zenith of the new identity policy of the modern Russian state. Objectives: to describe how everyday practices are used by the state to project the image of a real Russian patriot. Methods: M. Billig’s theory of banal nationalism, discourse analysis, content analysis. Results: the key practices of projecting the image of a real Russian patriot have been identified. This is the asceticism of a Russian person and the ability to live in the most modest conditions. This paradoxically combines with the unprecedented generosity of the Russian people and, provided the resources are available, the ability to live on a grand scale, without knowing the measure. The ability tocombinethesetwopolarities,asasignoftrueRussianness,isillustratedbystoriesabout current and historical characters. The third routine practice, reproduced from story to story on “Russia 1” TV channel, is paternalism, which is expressed both in caring for children, women and the elderly, and in the patronage of the state. The readiness to sacrifice is the central theme of the “Vesti Nedeli” program on the “Russia 1” TV channel. Conclusions: preventive mobilization through daily practices as the goal of identity politics implemented through “Russia 1” TV channel can easily be traced in the “Vesti Nedeli” stories using the framework of “banal nationalism” theory tools. A sacrifice, not only a great one as in war, but also small − in limiting consumerism, in the readiness to work and serve in hard conditions , to defend the honor of the country in sports competitions − all of these, with the involvement of national anger, can is easily transform from daily practice into action.
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Antonova, N. V. y V. G. Stepanenko. "Brand Loyalty and Economic Nationalism of Russian Consumers". Social Psychology and Society 11, n.º 4 (2020): 198–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.17759/sps.2020110414.
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Objectives. The study of the relationship between economic nationalism and loyalty to foreign and domestic brands among Russian consumers. Background. Due to the peculiarities of the political and economic situation in the world, the problem of maintaining the national economy and domestic producer has become more acute in many countries. This problem is especially relevant for Russia, which is under sanctions. It was found In a number of foreign studies, that one of the factors of consumer loyalty is economic nationalism, however, the influence of this factor on the behavior of Russian consumers remains unexplored. Study design. The significance level of the differences between loyalty to the domestic and foreign brands was analyzed using the one-way ANOVA analysis of variance. The relationship between economic nationalism and brand loyalty was established using Spearman nonparametric correlation coefficient. Participants. 96 respondents aged 18 to 45 years (M = 22.51; SD = 4.63), 110 men and 86 women. Measurements. To assess the economic nationalism, the CENTSCALE (Consumer Economic Nationalistic Tendencies Scale) methodology of Cheah and Phau was translated in Russian and adapted. To measure brand loyalty, the author’s technique was used. Results. The main hypothesis was not confirmed: there were no significant correlations between economic nationalism and brand loyalty, while a higher loyalty of Russians to foreign brands than to domestic ones was found. Conclusions. Russian consumers have a significantly higher loyalty to foreign brands than domestic ones, while the correlation between economic nationalism and the level of brand loyalty among Russian consumers has not been revealed.
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Achkasov, Valeriy. "Power and Russian nationalism in contemporary Russia". Vlast i Elity (Power and Elites) 5 (2018): 180–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.31119/pe.2018.5.7.
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Gronsky, Alexander D. "Alexander Solzhenitsyn Through the Eyes of Byelorussian Publicists". Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 66 (20 de febrero de 2019): 317–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2019-0-1-317-326.
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For Byelorussian nationalists Alexander Solzhenitsyn was the symbol of struggle against Soviet regime. But his essay «Rebuilding Russia» changed the attitude to Solzhenitsyn. Byelorussian publicists started to see Solzhenitsyn as supporter of Russian imperial policy. Nevertheless, for Byelorussian nationalism anti-Soviet Solzhenitsyn was more important than Solzhenitsyn imperial views supporter.
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Gorokhov, Vitalii Aleksandrovich. "Forward Russia! Sports mega-events as a venue for building national identity". Nationalities Papers 43, n.º 2 (marzo de 2015): 267–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.998043.
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This paper contributes to the discussion of links between sports, nationalism, and globalization by focusing on the political aspects of the preparation of Russian national teams for sports mega-events staged in Russia. By analyzing the cases of the XXVII Summer Universiade in Kazan, the XXII Winter Olympics in Sochi, and the XXI FIFA World Cup scheduled to take place in 12 Russian cities, the paper provides a comparative study of the benefits that mega-events provide for the host nation in terms of building national identities. To involve the sports component in the study of the nation-building processes, the paper applies the concept of the “spillover effect” of sporting nationalism which presumes that nationalist sentiment or ideology configured and promoted through sports affects non-sporting political processes, actors, and institutions. The paper argues that the “spillover effect” of sporting nationalism allows for the converting of excellence in sports mega-events – the centerpiece of global sports – into political excellence and displays the strengths of the nation to both the global and domestic public. Therefore, showing excellence as the host nation is the main objective that Russian political actors pursue in both their rhetoric and course of action.
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Tokarev, A. A. "Institutionalization of Ukrainian Nationalism: Difference of "Svoboda" ("Liberty") and "Praviy Sektor" ("Right Ssector") Ideology". MGIMO Review of International Relations, n.º 6(39) (28 de diciembre de 2014): 144–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-6-39-144-152.
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The article examines the history of the formation of Ukrainian nationalist parties "Svoboda" and "Praviy sektor". First, that they express a structured nationalism and Russophobia in Ukrainian political space. Secondly, in Russia it has become customary to identify one with another. The paper gives an overview of the basic civil identities in Ukraine, Eastern and Western. The author postulates that their conflict lies at the heart of the growing popularity of both nationalist parties. In addition, this process was provoked by the reunion of Crimea and Russia and by the civil war in the south-east of Ukraine. Before the Crimean crisis Ukrainian nationalism had primarily historical roots, and in many respects it was created by attitude of empire elites (the Russian and Soviet Empires) to Ukrainians and their nation-state formations. After March-2014 it began to acquire a geopolitical indication exactly - Russia is perceived as an enemy. Two of the most famous actors of the Ukrainian nationalists and anarchists parties in modern Russia are "Svoboda" and "Praviy sektor". They have fundamentally different origins. "Svoboda" is a systematic force in Ukrainian politics for almost 20 years. Unlike it "Praviy sektor" was established like a party only in December 2013 within a framework of the Euromaidan. Due to the inability to compare the electoral history of both parties the author pays attention to the comparative analysis of their ideologies. Specific manifestations of extremism of "Svoboda" and "Praviy sektor" are not subjects of this research.
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Mitrofanova, A. y O. Mikhailenok. "Right Wing Populist Civic Movements: Western Experience and the Situation in Russia". World Economy and International Relations 65, n.º 3 (2021): 120–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-3-120-129.
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The article aims at identifying the characteristics shared by the right-wing populist civil movements of Western Europe and the USA and evaluating the possibility to use them for researching right-wing nationalist organizations in Russia. The movements selected for the comparison range from party-like electoral actors to unorganized protesters. They include as follows: The Five-star Movement (Italy), PEGIDA and the like (Germany), the English Defence League (the UK), the Tea Party Movement (the US). The authors identified several interrelated characteristics shared by these movements: (1) dealing with local, usually social, issues, (2) network-like structure of autonomous local groups building the agenda from below, (3) ideological ambivalence leading to replacing ideology with subculture, (4) digitalization of activism. Although in Russia there are no civic movements structurally or functionally identical to Western right-wing populists, the authors demonstrate that local social issues and civic responsibility have become important topics for some Russian nationalists (right-wing radicals) since the mid 2000s. The trends of deideologization and dealing with non-political local issues are researched mainly on the example of the “Frontier of the North” (Komi Republic). The authors conclude that some of the radical Russian nationalists are gradually declining their own independent agenda, following local protests instead. This opens up the possibility for right-wing organizations to become local civil society institutions and to participate successfully in local elections, similar to the “electoral break-through” of right-wing populists in the West. Although it is too early to speak about the deideologization of Russian nationalism, the article suggests that some nationalists are ready to mitigate ideological tensions to secure expanded social support. At the moment, nationalist organizations in Russia remain frozen between right-wing radicalism and emulating Western right-wing populism.
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Schenk, Caress. "Nationalism in the Russian media: content analysis of newspaper coverage surrounding conflict in Stavropol, 24 May–7 June 2007". Nationalities Papers 40, n.º 5 (septiembre de 2012): 783–805. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2012.705271.
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This paper considers the role of Russian print media and government in forming and publicizing nationalist sentiment through a content analysis of newspaper coverage of ethnic conflict in Stavropol in 2007. It shows that though the government officially pursues an inclusive multicultural approach (which I call associative nationalism), newspapers owned by Kremlin-loyal business holdings printed quite nationalist and sensationalist versions of the events in question. I argue that this is a passive promotion of a dissociative type of nationalism on the part of the Kremlin, which works against its stated purposes of bringing together all those in the Russian territory into a united national identity.
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Ponarin, E. D. y M. O. Komin. "Dilemma of Russian Nationalism (“Imperial” and Ethnic Nationalism in Post-Soviet Russia)". Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 83, n.º 4 (2016): 82–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2016-83-4-82-93.
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Brandenberger, David. "Stalin's populism and the accidental creation of Russian national identity". Nationalities Papers 38, n.º 5 (septiembre de 2010): 723–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2010.498464.
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This article argues that the formation of a mass sense of Russian national identity was a recent, contingent event that first began to take shape under Stalin. Surveying the new literature on Russian nationalism, it contends that elite expressions of “Russianness” and bureaucratic proclamations of “official nationality” or russification should not be conflated with the advent of a truly mass sense of grassroots identity. Borrowing from an array of theorists, it argues that such a sense of identity only becomes possible after the establishment of necessary social institutions – universal schooling, a modern army, etc. Inasmuch as these institutions come into being only after the formation of the Soviet Union, this article focuses on how a mass sense of Russian national identity began to form under a rapid and unpredictable series of ideological shifts that occurred during the Stalinist 1930s and 1940s. This article's major contribution is its description of this development as not only contingent, but accidental. Drawing a clear line between russocentric propaganda and full-blown Russian nationalism, it argues that the ideological initiatives that precipitated mass identity formation in the USSR were populist rather than nationalist. In this sense, Stalinism has much more in common with Perónism than it does with truly national regimes.
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Dunlop, John B. "Russian Nationalism Today: Organizations and Programs". Nationalities Papers 19, n.º 2 (1991): 146–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999108408196.
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Russian nationalists in the Soviet Union have, of course, always claimed to speak and act on behalf of the narod, the common folk, but the folk they have had in mind have been largely the inhabitants, and particularly the older inhabitants, of the fast-disappearing traditional Russian village. Aware that this narod has indeed been vanishing, Russian nationalist writers and publicists have stressed that the task at hand is to graft the “ethics and esthetics,” the accumulated wisdom and mores of this traditionalist populace, onto the life of deracinated modern Soviet man. The really existing and largely urbanized Russian narod—factory workers, miners, truck drivers, cashiers, and waitresses—has remained beyond the purview of most nationalists, with the exception of a few like the gifted writer and filmmaker Vasilii Shukshin (d. 1974), who focused upon the plight of a people torn away from its roots.
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Rutland, Peter. "Perspectives on Russian nationalism". Nationalities Papers 45, n.º 2 (marzo de 2017): 159–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1306936.
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Laruelle, Marlene. "Russian Nationalism and Ukraine". Current History 113, n.º 765 (1 de octubre de 2014): 272–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2014.113.765.272.
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"Russia has openly questioned the legitimacy of the international system, claiming the right to a distinctive sovereignty that makes the protection of its cultural body abroad a moral duty." Second in a series on resurgent nationalism around the world.
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Evans, Alfred B. "Yel'Tsin and Russian Nationalism". Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 21, n.º 1 (1994): 29–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633294x00089.
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Panfilov, Oleg y Arch Tait. "Rebirth of Russian Nationalism". Index on Censorship 35, n.º 1 (febrero de 2006): 142–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03064220500532461.
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Kuzio, Taras. "Russian and Ukrainian elites: A comparative study of different identities and alternative transitions". Communist and Post-Communist Studies 51, n.º 4 (23 de octubre de 2018): 337–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.10.001.
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The deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations heightened in 2014 but did not begin then and has deeper roots. Both Russian presidents have had troubled relations with all five Ukrainian presidents irrespective if they were described as ‘nationalist’ or ‘pro-Russian.’ This article is the first to explain why the roots of the crisis go deeper and it does this by investigating three areas. The first is the different sources of elites in 1991 when independent Russia captured Soviet institutions and undertook top-down state building while Ukraine inherited far less and set course with bottom up state-building. The second is divergent Russian and Ukrainian national identities. The third is the resultant different transitions with Russia reverting to great power imperial nationalism and Ukraine quadruple and post-colonial transitions.
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Adibayeva, Aigul y Gulnara Dadabaeva. "Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Nationalism and Language Issues". Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 37, n.º 2 (2010): 125–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633210x536861.
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AbstractThe main outcome of the Kazakh language implementation policy in Kazakh society was a result of mutual infl uence and interconnection between three groups: the state, the Russian–speaking population and Kazakh nationalists. e claims on the part of each of these groups in pursuit of their goals were the following: Russians wanted to retain the status quo and reject Kazakh as the state language, Kazakh nationalists wanted to transform the whole state system into Kazakh and, thus, to provide more opportunities for the native population and the state's task was to achieve its own goal without extremes from both sides. Was the state strong enough to promote its goals? During the first decade of independence, the state was able to use some claims from both the nationalists and the Russians to fulfi ll its tasks. As a result of these processes, the state created its own strategy premised on state nationalism. e paradox of post-Soviet Kazakhstan is its state nationalism which became the main obstacle in the way of the establishment of the Kazakh language in order to obtain the position of the only “homogenizing factor” in an ethnically and culturally diverse society.
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Ijabs, Ivars. "Another Baltic Postcolonialism: Young Latvians, Baltic Germans, and the emergence of Latvian National Movement". Nationalities Papers 42, n.º 1 (enero de 2014): 88–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.823391.
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This article looks at the emergence of Latvian nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century from the intercultural perspective of postcolonial theory. The writings of early Young Latvians, and the reaction to them from the dominant Baltic German elite, show that the emergence of a modern Latvian nationalism is to a large extent due to postcolonial mimicry, as described by Homi Bhabha. Attempts to imitate German cultural models and to develop a Latvian high culture lead to hostile reactions from the German side, which, in their turn, lead to increasing consolidation of Latvian nationalism. Since the Baltic German elite increasingly legitimized its rule in terms of cultural superiority, the Young Latvians’ alliance with the Russian Slavophiles led it to treat the Latvian nationalists as culturally inferior and partly Asiatic, like the Russians.
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Ivanov, Andrey y Ivan Ambartsumov. "Apologia and Criticism of Russian Nationalism in the Journalistic Writings by Bishop Andrey (Ukhtomsky". State Religion and Church in Russia and Worldwide 38, n.º 3 (2020): 255–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2073-7203-2020-38-3-255-283.
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Using the views of bishop Andrey ( Ukhtomsky) as an example, the article discusses an understudied problem of the attitude of Russian Orthodox priests to the theory and practice of Russian nationalism of the late 19th — early 20th centuries. The authors analyze the bishop’s views on national empowerment, political nationalism and the issue of the non-Russians (inorodtsy). It is demonstrated how bishop Andrey’s Slavophil views shaped his Russian nationalism. The authors also consider the reasons for bishop Andrey’s cooperation with rightwing parties and unions, as well as the events that led to his disillusionment with these political forces. This turn is documented by the inedited materials showing the debate on “the national issue” in press between bishop Andrey and right-wing politicians in 1910, which led to their final break. Based on bishop Andrey’s journalistic texts published between 1899 and 1917 the authors conclude that he endorsed Russian national self-assertion but never aligned himself with nationalism that he condemned as anti-Christian as long as it acquired xenophobic, racist and secular aspects. Ultimately, while remaining the supporter of the Russian national idea in its Orthodox and Slavophil interpretation, by 1917 he had become a staunch opponent of Russian political nationalism.
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Giuliano, Elise. "Secessionism from the Bottom Up: Democratization, Nationalism, and Local Accountability in the Russian Transition". World Politics 58, n.º 2 (enero de 2006): 276–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0025.
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Do ethnic federations undergoing democratization promote or discourage regional secessionism? This article argues, based on evidence from the Russian Federation, that when democratization produces a transfer of political accountability from center to region, the incentives of regional leaders shift, forcing them to react to local constituencies in order to retain office. If these constituencies desire autonomy, regional leaders must respond, making separatism not merely an opportunistic strategy but a necessary one for their own political survival. Democratization, then, can transform administrative regions into electoral arenas.However, the case of Russia also demonstrates that regional demands for autonomy are not inevitable and may dissipate after they have begun. Popular support for nationalism and separatism varied significantly among Russia's sixteen ethnic republics in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period. This variation is explained by showing that mass nationalism, contrary to conventional wisdom, is neither a latent attribute of federal regions, nor a simple function of natural resource endowments, nor something summoned into existence by the manipulations of regional leaders. Rather, it is argued that increasing competition for jobs in the Soviet Union's failing economy allowed particular issues articulated by nationalist leaders to resonate with ethnic populations. Through the framing of issues of ethnic economic inequality, nationalist leaders were able to politicize ethnicity by persuading people to view their personal life chances as dependent on the political fate of their ethnic community. Thus, secession in democratizing ethnic federations can be best understood by directing attention toward the origins of popular support for nationalism and the role that support plays in the elite contest for power within subfederal regions.
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Gregor, A. James. "Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism". Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, n.º 1 (1 de marzo de 1998): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(97)00025-1.
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This article provides a broad comparison between Italian Fascism and the new nationalism that has arisen in post-Soviet Russia. The focus is on that nationalism which has, in the immediate past, merged with what used to be the Marxism-Leninism of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The ideas of Gennadii Ziuganov, leader of the CPRF, are traced to Sergei Kurginian and Alexander Prokhanov-and compared to those of the ideologues of historic Fascism.
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Jordan, Katya. "“It’s All One Big Fantasy”: The Critique of Modernity in Dostoevsky’s Novel The Idiot". Dostoevsky and world culture. Philological journal, n.º 2 (2021): 65–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/2541-7894-2021-2-65-88.
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The opposition between Europe and Russia runs through Dostoevsky’s novel The Idiot, culminating in Mme Epanchina’s declaration that both Europe and the Russians who travel to Europe are “one big fantasy” [Dostoevsky, 2002, p. 615]. In the novel, Dostoevsky uses the exile trope as a literary tool for expressing his Russian idea. Although the spiritual underpinnings of Dostoevsky’s nationalism have been well studied, the secular side of this concept bears further exploration. Peter Wagner argues that nationalism constitutes a response to the nostalgia that is developed in exile following one’s breaking away from tradition. Nineteenth-century nationalism specifically “was an attempt to recreate a sense of origins in the face of the disembedding effects of early modernity and capitalism” [Wagner, 2001, p. 103]. By applying Wagner’s theoretical framework to Dostoevsky’s narrative, the author demonstrates that in its secular essence, Dostoevsky’s nationalism is not a merely localized manifestation of a uniquely Russian sentiment, but a symptom of a larger phenomenon that was taking place in late nineteenth-century Europe. Because Mme Epanchina gets to say the final word in Dostoevsky’s novel, her role and the subtleties of her message will be the primary focus of the present analysis.
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Jordan, Katya. "“It’s All One Big Fantasy”: The Critique of Modernity in Dostoevsky’s Novel The Idiot". Dostoevsky and world culture. Philological journal, n.º 2 (2021): 65–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/2619-0311-2021-2-65-88.
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The opposition between Europe and Russia runs through Dostoevsky’s novel The Idiot, culminating in Mme Epanchina’s declaration that both Europe and the Russians who travel to Europe are “one big fantasy” [Dostoevsky, 2002, p. 615]. In the novel, Dostoevsky uses the exile trope as a literary tool for expressing his Russian idea. Although the spiritual underpinnings of Dostoevsky’s nationalism have been well studied, the secular side of this concept bears further exploration. Peter Wagner argues that nationalism constitutes a response to the nostalgia that is developed in exile following one’s breaking away from tradition. Nineteenth-century nationalism specifically “was an attempt to recreate a sense of origins in the face of the disembedding effects of early modernity and capitalism” [Wagner, 2001, p. 103]. By applying Wagner’s theoretical framework to Dostoevsky’s narrative, the author demonstrates that in its secular essence, Dostoevsky’s nationalism is not a merely localized manifestation of a uniquely Russian sentiment, but a symptom of a larger phenomenon that was taking place in late nineteenth-century Europe. Because Mme Epanchina gets to say the final word in Dostoevsky’s novel, her role and the subtleties of her message will be the primary focus of the present analysis.
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Rotar, Nataliia. "Political Mechanisms of the Integration of Russian Nationalism into Crimea’s Political Area". Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, n.º 33-34 (25 de agosto de 2017): 353–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2016.33-34.353-368.
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In the article the author defined the peculiar properties and structure of the political mechanisms for the integration of Russian nationalism into Crimea’s Political Area in 1991-2014. It is proved that Russian nationalism formed a political strategy of integration into the political space of the Ukrainian autonomy on the principles of creating a manageable set of actors and subjects of the regional political process and civil space, as well as the incorporation of its agents of influence into the institutions of political power of the ARC. It is substantiated that the essence of the political component of the strategy of the activities of Russian imperial nationalism in the Crimea consisted in the creation on the basis of the Russian national minority (by status) of an independent ethno-social organism with a claim to its own state-territorial formation.
In the conclusions, the author notes that structurally, the process of using the political mechanisms for the integration of Russian nationalism in the ARC is presented in three consecutive stages. At the first stage, the political goals of Russian nationalism in the Crimea were identified, which were of an imperial nature, and therefore included the definition of key directions and a system of organizational measures that were oriented toward the political, economic, ethno-national, sociocultural and information spheres of life in the Crimean peninsula. At the second stage, the political institutes of the Russian Federation developed a system of advanced initiatives aimed at weakening the influence of the institutions of Ukraine's political power on the territory of the autonomy and a set of tactical methods that enabled them to react quickly to the actual challenges of pro-Ukrainian initiatives. At the third stage, a system of effective mechanisms of lobbying, institutional interaction, forms, methods and methods of reproducing the meanings of Russian imperial nationalism in the ARC at the level of all levels of the given social space – political, ethnonational, socio-cultural and economic – was formed.
Keywords: Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Russia, Russian nationalism, political integration, integration mechanisms, political meanings
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Lechowska, Marta. "“Kenotic” messianism. About the Russian Idea by Vyacheslav Ivanov". Świat i Słowo 35, n.º 2 (26 de noviembre de 2020): 183–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.5471.
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The paper presents the key theses of Vyacheslav Ivanov’s concept of the national idea, both in a general (concerning every nation) and a specific (concerning the Russian nation) perspective. The starting point are the youthful intuitions of the philosopher, who from the very beginning was not able to accept nationalist views of the great minds of his times. This rejection of nationalism (understood as national egoism) becomes the basis for formulating the religious national idea (for every nation); against this background Ivanov perceives Russia as an exceptional country at the beginning of 20th century. The philosopher claims that Russia has an extraordinary historical mission, but he also sees potential obstacles in realizing this mission.
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Moen-Larsen, Natalia. "Brothers and barbarians: Discursive constructions of ‘refugees’ in Russian media". Acta Sociologica 63, n.º 2 (9 de enero de 2019): 226–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0001699318817597.
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This article maps the unexplored terrain of representations of refugees in Russian media, using discourse theory and the concepts of subject positions and symbolic boundaries to analyse these representations. The research questions are: Who are the refugees? What discourses do they feature in? What kinds of symbolic boundaries do these representations maintain? This study analyses the three Russian newspapers Izvestija, Novaya gazeta and Rossiiskaya gazeta, focusing on how, between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2015, these newspapers came to employ the term ‘refugee’ for persons from Ukraine and for those from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Analysis of the subject position of ‘refugee’ in discourses about security, humanitarianism, integration and nationalism reveals contrasting images of refugees from Ukraine and MENA refugees. The latter are represented as ‘threatening’ and ‘alien’: symbolic boundaries are maintained between Russians and these refugees as well as between ‘superior’ Russia and ‘inferior’ Europe. In contrast, refugees from Ukraine are often presented as similar to Russians. Nationalist discourse merges with security, humanitarian and integration discourses, creating contrasting symbolic boundaries between these two groups of refugees and Russians. Refugees are classed as ‘preferred’ or ‘non-preferred’ migrants on the basis not of their situation, but their ethnicity.