Literatura académica sobre el tema "Syndicat Northcrest v"

“Arbiter of religious dogma,” first expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem ([2004] 2 SCR 551), has had a lasting and pervasive effect on the Canadian lawscape. Developed in an effort to remove the State (and therefore Court apparatus) from a decision-making capacity in questions related to religious doctrine, this expression has become an inevitable mantra when discussing issues related to religion in Canada. This article argues, however, that the presence of this expression should not be understood as the end of a conversation, but rather, the beginning of a novel one on the legitimacy of religion in law. Through discourse analysis, this article will endeavor to suggest that this “marriage march” between law and religion is inevitable in the Canadian context.

In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the Supreme Court of Canada reconfigured its approach to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms by holding that the final step of the R. v. Oakes test—the requirement of proportionality between a measure’s salutary and deleterious effects—provided the critical framework for its analysis. The author suggests that the Court’s emphasis on the last step of the Oakes test was not the most appropriate response to the specific minimal impairment argument Alberta presented. Alberta argued that the reason it could not safely offer an exemption from its licence photo requirement to Hutterites who objected to photos on religious grounds was because Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem restricted government inquiries into the sincerity of religious beliefs. Ontario intervened in support of Alberta’s concerns. Although the Court did not address this minimal impairment argument, the author argues that it reflects an unnecessarily strict reading of how Amselem’s guidelines would apply in this context. In support, the author presents an exemption that would have cohered with Amselem and achieved Alberta’s safety objectives. The author then argues more broadly that the provinces’ concerns in Hutterian Brethren demonstrate the critical role the minimal impairment step of the Oakes test plays in generating solutions to clashes between laws of general application and minority religious practices. The Court’s new emphasis on the proportionate effects test, in contrast, may unfortunately discourage both parties from formulating potentially innovative alternatives.

Defining religion for the purposes of constitutional or human rights protection is a challenge shared by UK and Canadian courts in this era after the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1988 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1985, respectively: neither defines what is to be protected. Canadian courts have been impressed with this task since 1982 and, unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has considered the content and scope of section 2(a), the fundamental right to freedom of conscience and religion, on a number of occasions, most recently in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem. The outcome in Amselem is a salutary reminder that, for post-modern courts, religion can be whatever they want it to be, and, indeed, be nothing in particular, which merits protection or not at the whim of these courts. In Amselem, a 5–4 majority of the SCC reduced religion for Charter purposes to any beliefs which the complainant calls religion and persuades a court to be sincerely held. A court then has the discretion to decide whether to extend legal protection to those beliefs (and their allegedly offensive practice) without giving credible reasons beyond the complainant's sincere belief in them. Amselem may, therefore, be of considerable interest to British lawyers regarding the potential lurking within ostensibly generous constitutional protections for religion ultimately to reduce religion to nonsense undeserving of legal protection.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) returned to the test of individual sincerity for determining whether there has been an infringement of freedom of religion pursuant to section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) in SL c Commission scolaire des Chênes. Sincerity of belief or in practice as necessary for religious expression on the part of a complainant has been accepted from some of the earliest Charter cases as the triggering requirement for a section 2(a) claim, and, in itself, sufficient to establish a claim which a court must then balance against conflicting claims pursuant to section 1 (‘reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’) or section 15 (equality rights). In SL, the court confirmed that mere sincerity is no longer sufficient and that an objective burden of proof now rests on a claimant to show how a state-sanctioned requirement infringes the fundamental right to freedom of religion before competing claims will be assessed. In SL, the court found that the complainants had failed to show how a religious education course mandated for all students without exception by the Government of Quebec interfered with what they argued was their religious freedom as Roman Catholic parents to pass on their faith to their children. This result has also been interpreted to mean that the state has a right prior to parental rights in the religious formation of their own children, and, on this reading, has been highly controversial. The court's new formulation of a sincerity test may be of interest elsewhere. The earlier formulation in Syndicat Northcrest v Anselem was adopted by the House of Lords in R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, and the subsequent spread of its use has since been subject to consideration in England.

This thesis contends certain contentious court cases can be traced beyond their legal roots to deep, sometimes incommensurable philosophical disagreements. However, the unitary nature of the judicial system effectively forces the court to take sides, putting its institutional weight and moral authority behind one set of principles and not another. Following Cover, I contend that this encourages future litigants to rephrase their claims in the court’s preferred normative language, thus influencing our normative environment. The theories which guide judicial decisions, however, are generally insufficiently attentive to the court’s normative influence. In response, I attempt adapting Dworkin’s Law as Integrity around Cover’s more sociological view. Chapter 1 examines Cover’s view, Chapter 2 explores Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem and Delmaagukw v. B.C. as case studies, and Chapter 3 adapts Dworkin around Covers view. My conclusions argue that further inspiration can be drawn from EU Coordinate Constitutionalism and Sui Generis aboriginal rights.