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Literatura académica sobre el tema "Takeover premium"

Autor: Grafiati

Publicado: 4 de junio de 2021

Última modificación: 1 de febrero de 2022

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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Takeover premium"

Raad, Elias. "Why Do Acquiring Firms Pay High Premiums To Takeover Target Shareholders: An Empirical Study". Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, n.º 4 (28 de junio de 2012): 725. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i4.7055.

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The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the relationship between several factors reported in the literature to affect the premium received by takeover target shareholders. Using a sample of 190 successful takeovers during the period 1995-2005, our results suggest that high leveraged target firms' shareholders receive, on average, 13.34 percent more premium than stockholders of low leveraged target firms. Controlling for leverage, target firms which have high leverage and oppose the takeover receive significantly larger premiums than those with high leverage but do not oppose the takeover. Moreover, controlling for the size of managerial ownership in target firms, the association between leverage and premiums becomes more significant when managerial ownership is high and less significant when it is low.

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Canil, Jean M. y Bruce A. Rosser. "How toeholds become footholds". Corporate Ownership and Control 4, n.º 3 (2007): 25–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p2.

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We document empirical evidence that bidders tailor their takeover strategy when facing entrenched target managers. Key elements of a takeover strategy comprise the toehold purchase and the initial bid premium. We find that toeholds are acquired in cognizance of the principal outsider and target management block. Bidders’ free rider cost savings are measured by the product of the toehold and the initial bid premium. Several relationships are identified. Initial bid premiums for targets characterized by entrenchment are comparatively low and result in low free rider benefits to bidders. To avoid overpayment, bidders do not compensate entrenched managers for lost private benefits. Instead, in entrenchment scenarios toeholds are optimized with respect to the principal outsider as well as the target management block in order to create a foothold that neutralizes entrenchment. At the median toeholds match the spread between the principal outsider and the target management block in entrenchment scenarios, are about double the spread for shareholder-aligned targets and much smaller for owner-managed targets. Takeovers of owner-managed targets rely more on a higher offer price.

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Holmén, Martin, Eugene Nivorozhkin y Rakesh Rana. "Do anti-takeover devices affect the takeover likelihood or the takeover premium?" European Journal of Finance 20, n.º 4 (24 de julio de 2012): 319–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847x.2012.703141.

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Lin, Ji-Chai y Yanzhi (Andrew) Wang. "The R&D Premium and Takeover Risk". Accounting Review 91, n.º 3 (1 de septiembre de 2015): 955–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51270.

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ABSTRACT To explain why firms with high research and development (R&D) intensity offer their investors higher stock returns, we argue that (1) high R&D capacity relative to firm valuation makes R&D-intensive firms attractive takeover targets, and that (2) the higher takeover probability leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, as proposed by Cremers, Nair, and John (2009), and require higher returns. We find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Furthermore, we find that takeover probability also relates to large R&D increases, but not to innovation efficiency. Accordingly, we expect and find that takeover risk helps to explain the premium associated with large R&D increases, but not the innovation efficiency premium previously documented. JEL Classifications: G12; O31.

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Thraya, Mohamed Firas. "Are controlling shareholders extracting private benefits from European public acquisitions?" International Journal of Managerial Finance 11, n.º 1 (2 de febrero de 2015): 80–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-07-2012-0081.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with voting rights structures that are highly concentrated. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder’s concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. The author argues that with higher levels of entrenchment, takeover premiums reflect the private benefits of control which controlling shareholders in bidding firms seek to extract from a public transaction. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses cross-sectional regression analyses to examine the relationship between takeover premiums and the extent to which bidding firm shareholders exert control as well as the arrangement which underlie this. The sample is composed by 210 deals. The data are collected from various databases (Thomson Financial’s Mergers and Acquisition; Faccio and Lang’s (2002); Datastream/Worldscope, LexisNexis). Findings – The premium paid in European M&A transactions is affected by the level of ownership exerted by the controlling shareholder. The results show premiums are positively and significantly associated with higher levels of voting rights, as well as, the level of separation of ownership and control when controlling shareholder ownership is low. Pyramiding structure seems to be the means of separation the most associated with takeover premiums. Research limitations/implications – This paper can be improved by other specifications. First, it would be interesting to analyze premiums paid by firms with dispersed ownership structure and to compare these premiums with those paid by firms with controlling shareholders. Second, the author suggests to examine whether a controlling shareholder occupy the seat of a CEO or a chairman. In these cases, the author assumes that the controlling shareholder can benefit from more discretion and can extract more private benefits. Third, the author suggests extending the sample period to 2007 at least to include the sixth wave. This wave was even more significant than the high-tech wave and has not been studied much. In these cases, the author assumes that the controlling shareholder can benefit from more discretion and can extract more private benefits. Originality/value – Previous studies show that the premium reflects the private benefits of control in privately negotiated transactions (mainly block transactions). In the present study, the author shows that the premium can also reflect private benefits in public merger transactions.

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Hanamura, Shinya, Kotaro Inoue y Kazunori Suzuki. "Bidder and target valuation and method of payment of M&As in Japan: Evidence against the misvaluation-driven transactions". Corporate Ownership and Control 8, n.º 3 (2011): 406–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i3c3p5.

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We analyze 377 takeovers that occurred in Japan between 2000 and 2007. Our focus is on the choice of payment method between cash and shares, the bidding premium, the market valuation of a bidder and a target, and the share price reaction. We relate the findings to the two complimentary theories of takeover motives; the Q-theory and the misevaluation theory. We have found that in Japan cash offers tend to occur when an acquirer and a target are highly valued on B/P basis, and when target’s size in terms of market cap. is larger relative to bidder’s size. The bidding premium tends to be higher when a bidder’s valuation is higher, when a target’s valuation is lower, and when target’s market cap. is smaller relative to bidder’s market cap. The choice of payment method (cash or stock) does not affect the bidding premium. Buyer’s CARs are higher when target’s market cap. is larger relative to bidder’s market cap. Target’s CARs are higher when a bidder’s valuation is higher, when a target’s valuation is lower, and when cash is used to pay for a takeover. Japanese takeover market was very small before the late 1990s and then quickly expanded in the 21st century, so that we are among the first to explore it. Our findings under the recent merger wave in Japan are in contrast with Dong et al. (2006), and are consistent with the Q-theory. We believe that the Japanese management has so far conducted a takeover based on managerial and strategic objectives. Our results also provide an explanation for the finding of Kang et al. (2000) and others who report that that on average a takeover announcement in Japan is greeted with positive share price reaction of both a bidder and a target.

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Das, Varsha. "The New Takeover Code by the Securities and Exchange Board of India". Journal of Social and Development Sciences 4, n.º 7 (30 de julio de 2013): 303–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v4i7.765.

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Merger & Acquisition in India have been governed by the age-old takeover rules. It seems that now, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has realized that these rules need to be revamped to keep them in line with the ever-changing global scenario. On September 2011, the SEBI amended the new set of takeover rules i.e.; the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011. The main purpose is to prevent hostile takeovers and at the same time, provide some more opportunities of exit to innocent shareholders who do not wish to be associated with a particular acquirer. With these rules coming into force, both promoter and public shareholders of a listed company would now get the same price for their shares being purchased by an acquirer. In another shareholder-friendly move, SEBI has scrapped the noncompete fee or control premium, which were being paid to only the promoters earlier and could have been as much as 25% of the public offer price. The SEBI has successfully done one part of the reform process by preparing the new takeover code, the other part requires it successful implementation.

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Covrig, Vincent, Daniel L. McConaughy y Mary Ann K. Travers. "Takeover Premia and Leverage: Theory, Empirical Observations and Recommendations". Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis 12, n.º 1 (24 de mayo de 2017): 123–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jbvela-2015-0002.

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AbstractThe greater a target company’s leverage, the less cash or shares an acquirer needs to control the target enterprise. Given the benefits of acquiring a target, the equity takeover premium is spread over relatively more assets in a more highly leveraged target, thus reducing the premium paid relative to the entire enterprise. This suggests that more levered targets may receive greater equity premia, expressed as a percent of the unaffected share price, other things equal. To test this, we examine takeover transactions that occurred during the 2003–2013 time period. We find that higher equity takeover premia are related to higher pre-deal leverage levels, consistent with theory. Our results are robust with respect to size, industry, profitability, year of transaction, synergy potential, and type of acquirer (strategic, horizontal or financial). Our empirical analyses support the Appraisal Foundation Working Group’s recommendation for best practices, namely, to adjust takeover premia for leverage.

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Pinto, Catarina y Miguel Sousa. "Impact of double taxation treaties on cross-border acquisitions". Notas Económicas, n.º 48 (14 de junio de 2019): 39–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-203x_48_2.

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In order to evaluate the impact of Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), we analysed the impact of a DTT implementation on both the number of cross-border acquisitions and the average value of M&A deals between companies from the countries that signed the DTT. Moreover, the impact of DTTs on the takeover bid premiums is analysed in order to access if companies are willing to pay higher premiums after the DTT is implemented and whether the impact on the premium is immediate or gradual. Overall, our findings lead us to conclude that DTTs effectively promote FDI.

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Bris, Arturo. "Toeholds, takeover premium, and the probability of being acquired". Journal of Corporate Finance 8, n.º 3 (julio de 2002): 227–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00055-4.

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Más fuentes

Tesis sobre el tema "Takeover premium"

Eriksson, Per y Christofer Hedlund. "Företagsförvärv". Thesis, Halmstad University, School of Business and Engineering (SET), 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-1422.

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Antar, Joyce, Donya Gholamifar y Robert Viberg. "Acquisitions & Market Performance : A study of the relation of takeover bids, premiums, and financing methods to the OMXS index". Thesis, Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-293.

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Scientific problem: In order to maintain a competitive position in the market, companies need to create an environment of sustained development. Growing companies basically have two choices: expand internally, known as organic growth, or expand externally by a merger or acquisition (M&A). It is widely known that in almost all acquisitions the price paid by the acquiring firm tends to be much higher than the market value of the target firm before the bid, this is called an acquisition premium. There are different ways of financing an acquisition, for example with cash or stock. Previous research within this topic have concluded the M&As follow the market, as well as premiums. Therefore, an assumption made by the authors is that when there is a boom in the market, the stock exchange quota-tion takes a certain movement and the number of acquisitions that are made increases, as well as the premiums paid, and further to check if the means of payment changes whether there is a bull or bear market.

Purpose: “The general aim of this thesis is to examine acquisitions on the Swedish market in order to estimate the relation between the OMXS index and the number of acquisition bids, the acquisitions pre-mium and the means of payment.”

Method: To investigate whether a relation between the OMXS and the amount of take-over bids, simple regression analyses was the preferred model, having the bids as being de-pendent upon market performance of the OMXS index. This way, any significant lag ef-fect, the time it takes for a bidder to present a bid offer, could be recognized and used as a benchmark. This model was carried on to the remaining questions as well; whether premi-ums are affected by the stock market, and which way the acquisitions was financed, cash or stock. The time period selected for data collection was 1994 to 2004, allowing the authors a wide enough time-span to interpret at least one bull, and one bear market. The model will be based upon secondary data of market quotes and a quantitative approach will be util-ized.

Results: The authors claim that a relation between the number of acquisition bids and market movement does exist. This evidence shows that an important decision as the one of deciding whether or not to merge or acquire another firm, might not be as rational as tho-ught. Instead, it is influenced on the environment around it, with the OMXS index as one of them. When it comes to the two remaining questions, if premiums and means of pay-ment are affected by the OMXS index, the obtained answers do not provide a positive rela-tion. And thus, this thesis cannot support earlier studies that state that a relation is present.

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Blease, John Robert. "The effect of the portfolio of takeover provisions on operating performance, takeovers, and takeover premiums /". view abstract or download file of text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3045084.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-118). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

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Axelsson, Viktor y Sebastian Söderberg. "Positiv avkastning är en kostnad : En eventstudie om svenska och norska målföretags runup och dess påverkan på premien vid företagsförvärv". Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-24270.

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Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka hur målföretags runup påverkar den premie sombetalas vid företagsförvärv utifrån substitutions- och markup-prissättningshypotesen. Metod: Studien har en deduktiv ansats där en eventstudie har tillämpats för att samla in relevant sekundärdata från databaserna Thomson Reuters Eikon och Zephyr. För att studera sambandet mellan förvärvspremie och målföretagets runup har en enkel regressionsanalys genomförts och för att studera förklarande variablers påverkan på runup har en multipel regressionsanalys tillämpats. Resultat & slutsats: Studiens resultat visar att det förekommer ett samband mellan runup och den förvärvspremie som betalas vid företagsförvärv. Utifrån substitutions- och markup-prissättningshypotesen visar studien att om runup ökar med 1 % ökar förvärvspremien med 0,879% vilket innebär att en ökning av målföretagets runup är en kostnad för det förvärvande företaget. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Förslag på vidare forskning är att studera fler förklarande variabler för ett målföretags runup samt att studera volymskillnader i handel av målföretagets aktier dagarna före offentliggörande av bud på exempelvis den svenska marknaden för att se huruvida resultatet skiljer sig från tidigare forskning och andra marknader. Uppsatsens bidrag: Studiens resultat bidrar med kunskap som kan förklara den variation i förvärvspremier som förekommer samt kunskap om att ett målföretags runup är en förvärvskostnad för det förvärvande företaget.
Aim: The purpose of this study is to investigate how the target companies’ runup affects thetakeover premium in mergers and acquisitions based on the substitution and markup pricing hypothesis. Method: The study has a deductive approach in which an event study has been applied to collectrelevant secondary data from the databases Thomson Reuters Eikon and Zephyr. To study the relationship between the acquisition premium and the target company’s runup a simple regression analysis has been conducted and to study the influence of explanatory variables on runup a multiple regression analysis has been applied. Result & Conclusions: The study’s results show that there is a relationship between runup and the takeover premiums. Based on the substitution and markup pricing hypothesis, the study shows that if runup increases by 1 % the takeover premium increases by 0.879 % which means that an increase in the target company's runup is a cost to the acquiring company. Suggestions for future research: Suggestions for further research are to study more explanatory variables for a target company's runup and study volume differences in trading of the target company's shares the days prior to bid announcement on the Swedish market to see if the results differ from previous research and other markets. Contribution of the thesis: The study’s results contribute knowledge that can explain the variation in takeover premiums and knowledge that a target company’s runup in an acquisition is a cost for the acquiring company.

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Koranda, Vladimír. "Protiplnění při povinné nabídce převzetí a vypořádávání při nedobrovolném snížení podílu akcionáře". Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-16374.

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This work deals with valuable consideration when changes of ownership of equity securities occur in connection with corporate changes in joint-stock company, especially with unwilling changes -- rise of registered capital with excluding the priority subscription right (§ 204a/5 of the Commercial Code), unwilling transfer of shares on the major shareholder (§ 354 of the "Act on the changes of commercial companies and associations") and squeeze out (§ 183i of the Commercial Code). Valuable consideration defines relatively in detail the Takeover Bid Act. This framework could be to certain extent analogically used for valuable consideration in unwilling transaction. However, its definition itself offers a considerable room for interpretation, so is also seized as the independent secondary topic (chapter 1). The main topic concerns two basic aspects. The first is a company evaluation. In this aspect we will take a look only at the dependence of the expert providing the evaluation on major shareholder (chapter 5). Work aims at the second problematic aspect of unwilling transaction - a premium over the valuable consideration for the infringement of right (chapter 2, especially section 2.4.). The work also deals with unevaluated risks of minority shareholders in the period beginning the day to which the company was evaluated to time of the pay out of ownership (chapter 4).

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Cotrim, Eduardo Lucas. "Alienação de controle e benefícios privados no Brasil: uma releitura sob novo ambiente regulatório e de governança corporativa". reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18774.

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In the last decades several papers have tried to estimate and explain the existence of control block premium in a number of countries. A lot of factors are related to it, like the private benefits of control, shareholder structure, the stage of corporate governance development in each country, idiosyncratic characteristics of the companies, etc. This paper studies the Brazilian stock market taking into account the evolution occurred since the early 2000 in terms of laws and rules of corporate governance. It was found that a high premium is paid to take control of the companies in Brazil and that larger premiums are verified in transaction involving companies with lower corporate governance practices.
Nas últimas décadas diversos estudos tiveram por objetivo quantificar e explicar a existência de prêmios pago por blocos de controle em inúmeros países. Muitos fatores estão relacionados a tal variável, como benefícios privados derivados do controle, estrutura acionária, estágio de evolução da governança corporativa em cada economia, aspectos específicos referentes às companhias, etc. Este trabalho aborda o mercado de capitais brasileiro em um ambiente mais desenvolvido em termos de leis e governança corporativa se comparado aos trabalhos acadêmicos do início da década de 2000. Foi verificado que existe um prêmio de controle significante nas transações com alienação de controle no país, além de haver indícios de que os maiores prêmios sejam pagos em transações envolvendo empresas listadas em segmentos de governança corporativa mais baixos.

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Duong, Lien Thi Hong. "Australian takeover waves : a re-examination of patterns, causes and consequences". UWA Business School, 2009. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2009.0201.

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This thesis provides more precise characterisation of patterns, causes and consequences of takeover activity in Australia over three decades spanning from 1972 to 2004. The first contribution of the thesis is to characterise the time series behaviour of takeover activity. It is found that linear models do not adequately capture the structure of merger activity; a non-linear two-state Markov switching model works better. A key contribution of the thesis is, therefore, to propose an approach of combining a State-Space model with the Markov switching regime model in describing takeover activity. Experimental results based on our approach show an improvement over other existing approaches. We find four waves, one in the 1980s, two in the 1990s, and one in the 2000s, with an expected duration of each wave state of approximately two years. The second contribution is an investigation of the extent to which financial and macro-economic factors predict takeover activity after controlling for the probability of takeover waves. A main finding is that while stock market boom periods are empirically associated with takeover waves, the underlying driver is interest rate level. A low interest rate environment is associated with higher aggregate takeover activity. This relationship is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992)'s liquidity argument that takeover waves are symptoms of lower cost of capital. Replicating the analysis to the biggest takeover market in the world, the US, reveals a remarkable consistency of results. In short, the Australian findings are not idiosyncratic. Finally, the implications for target and bidder firm shareholders are explored via investigation of takeover bid premiums and long-term abnormal returns separately between the wave and non-wave periods. This represents the third contribution to the literature of takeover waves. Findings reveal that target shareholders earn abnormally positive returns in takeover bids and bid premiums are slightly lower in the wave periods. Analysis of the returns to bidding firm shareholders suggests that the lower premiums earned by target shareholders in the wave periods may simply reflect lower total economic gains, at the margin, to takeovers made in the wave periods. It is found that bidding firms earn normal post-takeover returns (relative to a portfolio of firms matched in size and survival) if their bids are made in the non-wave periods. However, bidders who announce their takeover bids during the wave periods exhibit significant under-performance. For mergers that took place within waves, there is no difference in bid premiums and nor is there a difference in the long-run returns of bidders involved in the first half and second half of the waves. We find that none of theories of merger waves (managerial, mis-valuation and neoclassical) can fully account for the Australian takeover waves and their effects. Instead, our results suggest that a combination of these theories may provide better explanation. Given that normal returns are observed for acquiring firms, taken as a whole, we are more likely to uphold the neoclassical argument for merger activity. However, the evidence is not entirely consistent with neo-classical rational models, the under-performance effect during the wave states is consistent with the herding behaviour by firms.

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Goldman, Martin y Paul Nissan. "Minority Discount in Publicly Traded Firms". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-354630.

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This paper examines the minority discount due to lack of control by looking at tender offer premiums on Swedish publicly traded firms from 2007 to 2018. We analyze how ownership structure, the acquired stake and distribution of shares affect the minority discount. Variables focusing on control of shares are tested individually but also included in models addressing additional impacts. Our findings suggest that a bidder’s ownership of the target firm prior to the announcement lowers the bidder’s valuation of the remaining shares. However, the relation between premium and ownership seem to depend on a threshold of having a toehold which justifies the argument of toeholds attaining control and influence of the target firm. Correspondingly, the premium per share increases with the partial interest acquired, suggesting a non pro-rata valuation. We find no evidence of additional premium for minority shareholders in squeeze out events. However, equally powerful blockholders in target firms tend to increase bid premiums, arguably due to increased competition which aligns bid premium valuation to the valuation of control between dual class shares.

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SEHN, TZU-YU y 沈姿余. "Bargaining Power and Takeover Premium". Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/45479020632502828509.

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碩士
國立暨南國際大學
財務金融學系
104
Using U.S. mergers over the period from 1984 to 2014 as a sample, this study establish a link between acquirer’s bargaining power and takeover premium. The results indicate that acquirers with greater bargaining power are unwilling to paid higher price to takeover targets. Further, merger type and target size are also considered in the association between bargaining power and takeover premium. We find that acquiring firms with greater bargaining power provide less influence on diversifying takeover premium relative to non-diversifying mergers. Additionally, the negative impact of acquirers’ bargaining power on takeover premium is weaker for large targets than small targets. Finally, I also examine the influence of bargaining power on post-merger operating performance. The results show that the post-merger operating performance improves significantly as bargaining power increases. The finding indicates that the bargaining power of acquiring firms can persistently provide positive influence on operating performance even after merger.

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Wu, Yu-Chang y 吳昱璋. "Does Corporate Governance Affect Takeover Premium?" Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/36033488197373701187.

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碩士
元智大學
財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)
104
Mergers and acquisitions are suited events for studying corporate governance. Corporate G-index and E-index is a good indicator to test corporate governance is good or bad. I use bidder’s corporate governance index to examine takeover premium. Using a sample of 421 takeovers announced from 1990 to 2007. I find that bidder’s corporate governance index, Hostile and more competitors are positively correlated with takeover premium.

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Libros sobre el tema "Takeover premium"

Jovanovic, Boyan. Bidder discounts and target premia in takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002.

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Rosett, Joshua George. Do union wealth concessions explain takeover premiums?: The evidence on contract wages. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989.

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Burkart, Mike. Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders: Tender offers when dilution is endogenous. London: London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance, 1995.

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Eckbo, B. Espen. "Information disclosure, means of payment, and takeover premia. Public and private tender offers in France". Fontainbleau: INSEAD, 1986.

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Capítulos de libros sobre el tema "Takeover premium"

Bessler, Wolfgang y Colin Schneck. "Excess Takeover Premiums and Bidder Contests in Merger & Acquisitions: New Methods for Determining Abnormal Offer Prices". En Analysis of Large and Complex Data, 323–33. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25226-1_28.

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Kershaw, David. "Regulating Board Discretion: Directors’ Duties". En Principles of Takeover Regulation. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199659555.003.0010.

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This Chapter steps away from the Code’s regulation of the deal process to consider UK company law’s regulation of target and bidder directors’ discretion in an offer. Here we consider the constraints that UK directors’ duties impose on bid decision making, including the decisions to make, to recommend or to reject an offer. The Chapter considers three duties: the duty to promote the success of the company in Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006; the duty to use powers for their proper purposes in Section 171(b) of the Act, which was formally known as the proper purpose doctrine; and the duty of care in section 174. With regard to Section 172, the Chapter argues that it is important to understand the distinction between the standard as a standard of expected behaviour and the standard as a standard of liability. As a standard of expectation the standard should in theory impose restraint on bidder hubris and requires target boards to focus on value, which in some instances will require the recommendation of a premium bid where the value of the bid exceeds the discounted long term value of the company. But as a standard of liability, directors are highly unlikely to be found to violate this duty as the standard is a subjective duty, which in application creates a plausibility or rationality standard. With regard to section 171(b), although the duty is rarely invoked in a public takeover context as it is pre-empted by the non-frustration rule, its consideration is central to understanding the nature, effects and potential reform of the non-frustration rule considered in Chapter XI. Accordingly, it is considered here with other relevant duties. Finally, the Chapter considers the nature and effect of the duty of care. Drawing on the recent example of the Royal Bank of Scotland’s takeover of ABN and Ambro as well as comparative law, the Chapter explores the meaning of the requirements of the duty of care is a deal context.

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Jemielniak, Dariusz. "Online Revolution". En Thick Big Data, 5–22. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198839705.003.0002.

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This chapter discusses three major changes resulting from the emerging communication technologies. It addresses the new forms of shaping relations online. Friendships, intimacy, the rise of weak ties, as well as an increased fluidity of relations are discussed. Next, the chapter addresses the demise of expert knowledge. Starting with McDonaldization of higher education and the rise of anti-intellectual sentiments, the chapter addresses the new trends in democratizing knowledge. While recognizing highly positive aspects of the turn, such as citizen science, Wikipedia, or free/open source movement, it also addresses the darker and more troubling processes, such as anti-scientific sentiments, pseudotheories, and the takeover of knowledge production and distribution by quacks. Finally, the chapter focuses on sharing economy. By problematizing the “sharing” premise, as well as by showing the impact of the ongoing change reaching far beyond economy itself, the chapter introduces the notion of collaborative society, as better covering the social change we witness.

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Actas de conferencias sobre el tema "Takeover premium"

Meier, Jan Hendrik, Tetiana Paientko y Kristina Reschke. "Takeover law regulations and their influence on the takeover premium – An empirical study of the OECD Member States". En 21st International Joint Conference Central and Eastern Europe in the Changing Business Environment : Proceedings. University of Economics in Bratislava, Vydavateľstvo EKONÓM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/pr.2021.krn.4816.14.

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Aquino, Eduardo. "Copacabana Non-Public: Toward a New Public Attitude". En 2018 ACSA International Conference. ACSA Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.35483/acsa.intl.2018.52.

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More than a physicality, public space is a condition beyond an urban fragment or locality. Before it becomes a place, public space exists as a shared value. The devastation of the Amazon forest by multinational meat producers, the launch into space of a Tesla Roadster by Elon Musk, shootings in public schools, and the development of a new Trump tower in a big city somewhere in the world are just some examples of spaces being taken over by the relentless neoliberal advances into places that were once shared or not claimed at all, or simply considered “public.” This process of takeover happens persistently in our cities, through ever-subtle or overstated methods by corporations and governments, by disfranchised groups, empowered tribes, or simply disguised by over-regulation. Starting from the premise that, in fact, “public space” as we know does not exist, this paper explores the notion of “non-public” as a critical foundation for a new reclamation of our cities. The paper plays the devil’s advocate to counterpoint the frequent academic discourse that references public space as a normalized urban entity. Taking on a shifted direction Copacabana Non-public challenges the notion of what constitutes “public space” to change so many fixed assumptions. Instead of dancing around the subject, it exercises the consideration of the conditions that make public space in reality non-public—its constituencies and jurisdictions, its stakeholders and claimants, its crisis and promises. Taking Copacabana beach as a study case, Copacabana Non-public seeks to map out the real actors of public space to locate new strategies of engagement to transform its pseudo-public character, to identify policy and design strategies that reclaim urban spaces for more democratic citizenries.

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Informes sobre el tema "Takeover premium"

Jovanovic, Boyan y Serguey Braguinsky. Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, junio de 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9009.

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Rosett, Joshua. Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on Contract Wages. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, noviembre de 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3187.

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