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Articles de revues sur le sujet « Action explanation »

Auteur : Grafiati
Publié le 4 juin 2021
Mis à jour le 8 février 2022

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1

O’Brien, Lilian. « Action explanation and its presuppositions ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no 1 (février 2019) : 123–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1518629.

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AbstractIn debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.
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Friebe, Cord. « Psychoanalytic action explanation ». Philosophical Explorations 18, no 1 (17 février 2014) : 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2014.885991.

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Uebel, Thomas. « Narratives and Action Explanation ». Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42, no 1 (15 décembre 2011) : 31–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393111426401.

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Isaacs, T. « Action and Its Explanation ». Philosophical Review 114, no 1 (1 janvier 2005) : 128–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-128.

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Brendan McSweeney, L. « Accounting in organizational action : A subsuming explanation or situated explanations ? » Accounting, Management and Information Technologies 5, no 3-4 (juillet 1995) : 245–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0959-8022(96)00002-1.

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Buckareff, Andrei A., et Jing Zhu. « The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action ». Disputatio 3, no 26 (1 mai 2009) : 73–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2009-0001.

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Abstract The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who have critiqued mentalism. The alternative account of the folk practice of giving reason-explanations of actions she has provided affords features of an agent’s external environment a privileged role in explaining the intentional behaviour of agents. The authors defend the mentalistic orthodoxy from Tanney’s criticisms, arguing that Tanney fails to provide a philosophically satisfying or psychologically realistic account of reason-explanation of action.
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Bennett, Christopher. « The Problem of Expressive Action ». Philosophy 96, no 2 (29 janvier 2021) : 277–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819120000467.

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AbstractRational explanation of action out of emotion faces a number of challenges. The Wrong Explanation Challenge says that explaining action out of emotion by reference to a purpose rather than an emotion gets it wrong. The Redundancy Challenge says that if explanation of an action by reference to emotion is sufficient then rational explanation is redundant. And the No Further Justification Challenge says that there is no more to say, at the level of rational explanation, about why people act as they do out of a particular emotion. Furthermore, even if these challenges can be addressed, there is a Problem of Expressive Action, since many actions out of emotion seem unpromising candidates for being guided by normative practical reasons of the prudential, instrumental, deontic or consequentialist sort. In response, I argue that many actions out of emotions should be understood as expressive actions guided by the agent's conception of normative practical reasons: specifically, their conception of expressive reasons.
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Haji, Ishtiyaque. « Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation ». Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (2005) : 321–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20053041.

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Lansky, Melvin. « The Explanation of Impulsive Action ». British Journal of Psychotherapy 6, no 1 (septembre 1989) : 10–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-0118.1989.tb01259.x.

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Ekström, Mats. « Causal Explanation of Social Action ». Acta Sociologica 35, no 2 (avril 1992) : 107–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000169939203500203.

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Sandis, Constantine. « THE OBJECTS OF ACTION EXPLANATION ». Ratio 25, no 3 (15 août 2012) : 326–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2012.00545.x.

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Risjord, Mark. « Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation ». Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35, no 3 (septembre 2005) : 294–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393105277987.

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Manicas, Peter. « Explanation, Understanding and Typical Action ». Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27, no 2-3 (9 octobre 2008) : 193–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00034.

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Bergström, Lars. « Explanation and interpretation of action ». International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4, no 1 (janvier 1990) : 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698599008573342.

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15

Beni, Majid D. « An integrative explanation of action ». Biosystems 198 (décembre 2020) : 104266. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2020.104266.

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Di Bernardo, Giuliano. « Explanation in the social sciences ». EPISTEMOLOGIA, no 2 (novembre 2012) : 197–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/epis2012-002002.

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This paper treats a classical topic of scientific epistemology from a new point of view. It considers biology to be a science intermediate between physics and sociology, and the transition from physics to biology as proceeding upwards. As a consequence, any type of reductionism will be avoided. The foundation of sociology can now be viewed as an extension of physics and biology. Indeed social reality is built by means of constitutive rules that create those social facts that have been denominated ‘institutional' (such as governments and all state institutions, marriage, and money). Having argued for the connection among values and norms (ought-to-be) and actions (is), the problem is that of justifying this connection. Can values and norms be reasons that explain action? Can reasons be understood as causes? In this paper the thesis is advocated that reasons are not sufficient for causally explaining actions. Taking up the classical analysis of ‘practical inference', I want to point out that, if from the reasons for action (understood as causes) logically followed the action itself, the reasons would be sufficient causes of the action: indeed, this would eliminate free will. For this reason, we must examine the problem of free will. My conclusion is in favor of the position of B. Libet, who has demonstrated free will experimentally, and therefore the nondeterministic nature of the practical-inferential model.
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Stueber, Karsten, et Mark Bevir. « Empathy, Rationality, and Explanation ». Journal of the Philosophy of History 5, no 2 (2011) : 147–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226311x582293.

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AbstractThis paper describes the historical background to contemporary discussions of empathy and rationality. It looks at the philosophy of mind and its implications for action explanation and the philosophy of history. In the nineteenth century, the concept of empathy became prominent within philosophical aesthetics, from where it was extended to describe the way we grasp other minds. This idea of empathy as a way of understanding others echoed through later accounts of historical understanding as involving re-enactment, noticeably that of R. G. Collingwood. For much of the late twentieth century, philosophers of history generally neglected questions about action explanation. In the philosophy of mind, however, Donald Davidson inspired widespread discussions of the role of folk psychology and rationality in mental causation and the explanation of actions, and some philosophers of history drew on his ideas to reconsider issues related to empathy. Today, philosophers inspired by the discovery of mirror neurons and the theory of mind debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists are again making the concept of empathy central to philosophical analyses of action explanation and to historical understanding.
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Ferejohn, John. « Symposium on explanations and social ontology 1 : rational choice theory and social explanation ». Economics and Philosophy 18, no 2 (octobre 2002) : 211–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026626710200202x.

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In the Common Mind, Pettit argues that rational choice theory cannot provide genuine causal accounts of action. A genuine causal explanation of intentional action must track how people actually deliberate to arrive at action. And, deliberation is necessarily enculturated or situated “. . . we take human agents to reason their way to action, using the concepts that are available to them in the currency of their culture” (p. 220). When deciding how to act, “. . . people find their way to action in response to properties that they register in the options before them, properties that are valued in common with others and that can be invoked to provide at least some justification of their choices” (p. 272). That people seek to make justified decisions implies that, at times, their own goals or objectives will be modified in deliberation. Something that rational choice theory cannot allow.
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19

Mandel, Ernest. « How To Make No Sense of Marx ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 15 (1989) : 105–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1989.10716794.

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Professor Jon Elster advances the proposal that Marx – and Marxists–really stand for ‘methodological individualism,’ as opposed to ‘methodological collectivism.’ He defines ‘methodological individualism’ in the following terms: Social science explanations are seen as three-tiered. First, there is a causal explanation of mental states, such as desires and beliefs … Next, there is intentional explanation of individual action in terms of the underlying beliefs and desires … Finally, there is causal explanation of aggregated phenomena in terms of the individual actions that go into them. The last form is the specifically Marxist contribution to the methodology of the social sciences.1
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20

Roqué, Alicia Juarrero. « Non-Linear Phenomena, Explanation and Action ». International Philosophical Quarterly 28, no 3 (1988) : 247–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq198828318.

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Sandis, Constantine. « The Explanation of Action in History ». Essays in Philosophy 7, no 2 (2006) : 200–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip2006725.

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22

Sobel, David. « Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action ». Social Philosophy and Policy 18, no 2 (2001) : 218–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505250000296x.

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These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. As we will see, however, while these debates overlap, the new debate is importantly different from the old debate.
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23

MacDonald, Cynthia, et Graham MacDonald. « Mental Causes and Explanation of Action ». Philosophical Quarterly 36, no 143 (avril 1986) : 145. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219765.

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24

Zwart, Frank de, et Karolina Pomorska. « EU External Action, Intention and Explanation ». International Spectator 54, no 1 (2 janvier 2019) : 121–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2019.1562699.

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25

Pettit, P. « A priori principles and action-explanation ». Analysis 46, no 1 (1 janvier 1986) : 39–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/46.1.39.

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Bryans, Joan. « Substitution and the explanation of action ». Erkenntnis 37, no 3 (novembre 1992) : 365–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00666228.

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27

Lizardo, Omar. « Habit and the explanation of action ». Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 51, no 3 (10 mars 2021) : 391–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12273.

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Zhang, Qiaoning, Xi Jessie Yang et Lionel P. Robert. « Drivers’ Age and Automated Vehicle Explanations ». Sustainability 13, no 4 (11 février 2021) : 1948. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13041948.

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Automated vehicles (AV) have the potential to benefit our society. Providing explanations is one approach to facilitating AV trust by decreasing uncertainty about automated decision-making. However, it is not clear whether explanations are equally beneficial for drivers across age groups in terms of trust and anxiety. To examine this, we conducted a mixed-design experiment with 40 participants divided into three age groups (i.e., younger, middle-age, and older). Participants were presented with: (1) no explanation, or (2) explanation given before or (3) after the AV took action, or (4) explanation along with a request for permission to take action. Results highlight both commonalities and differences between age groups. These results have important implications in designing AV explanations and promoting trust.
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29

Buckareff, Andrei A. « Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action : Protecting Intentions from Mental Birth Control ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, no 1 (mars 2007) : 49–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2007.0009.

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Many, I suspect most, philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I will examine and critique one such challenge. I will consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role in the etiology and explanation of mental actions. Contra Ruben, I will defend the orthodox view that intentions play an indispensable causal and explanatory role with respect to mental actions.
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Weintraub, Ruth. « Naturalism, Explanation, and Akrasia ». Dialogue 38, no 1 (1999) : 63–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300010155.

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RésuméSi on la définit comme une action contraire au bon jugement de l'agent, l'action acrasique se trouve exclue par le principe selon lequel une personne a forcément l'intention de faire ce qu'elle juge devoir faire. Une fois ce principe rejeté, comme je le propose ici, le problème traditionnel de l'acrasie, qui est celui de sa possibilité même, s'évanouit. Je soutiens, cependant, qu'un problème plus limité semble se poser si nous admettons que les actions acrasiques doivent s'expliquer par des raisons, et je requiers que les explications en de tels cas soient de type naturaliste. Je montre que la difficulté se trouve résolue par une compréhension adéquate de la nature des explications naturalistes.
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Yearley, Steven. « Settling Accounts : Action, Accounts and Sociological Explanation ». British Journal of Sociology 39, no 4 (décembre 1988) : 578. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/590502.

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Ginet, Carl. « Reasons Explanation of Action : An Incompatibilist Account ». Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989) : 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214262.

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Burnston, Daniel C. « Interface problems in the explanation of action ». Philosophical Explorations 20, no 2 (4 mai 2017) : 242–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312504.

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Tianfield, H. « Robot action planning via explanation-based learning ». IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics - Part A : Systems and Humans 30, no 2 (mars 2000) : 216–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/3468.833104.

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Čapek, Jakub. « Explanation and Understanding : Action as “Historical Structure” ». Philosophia 36, no 4 (23 avril 2008) : 453–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9132-x.

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Wilks, Yorick. « Moral Orthoses : A New Approach to Human and Machine Ethics ». AI Magazine 40, no 1 (28 mars 2019) : 33–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v40i1.2854.

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I argue that both human and machine actions are more opaque than is generally realized and that the actions of both require explanation that an ethical orthosis might provide as aspects of artificial Companions for both human and machine actors. These explanations might well be closer to ethical accounts based on moral sentiment or emotion in the tradition of the primacy of sentiment over reason in this area of human and machine action.
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37

Opp, Karl-Dieter. « Collective Political Action ». Analyse & ; Kritik 23, no 1 (1 janvier 2001) : 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2001-0101.

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AbstractThis paper describes a research program that focuses on the explanation of political protest and its causes. The starting point is Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action. This theory is modified, extended and applied to explain political protest. In particular, it is argued that only a wide version of Rational Choice theory that includes ‘soft’ incentives as well as misperception is capable of providing valid explanations of protest behavior. Another part of the research program is the utilization of survey research to test the predictions about protest behavior that are generated from the wide version of Rational Choice theory. The research program further aims at (a) comparing empirically Rational Choice and alternative propositions, (b) providing micro-macro explanatory models, (c) dynamic theoretical models, and (d) explaining preferences and beliefs which are usually treated as exogenous variables. The paper further reports, some results of the research program.
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Grgić, Filip. « Aristotle's Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action ». Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 74, no 1 (15 mars 2020) : 53–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433020828856935.

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In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try to show that the similarities between Aristotle's rational powers and powers as they are commonly understood in contemporary accounts of agency, especially regarding their two-sidedness and up-to-usness, are only superficial. Aristotle's rational powers are not genuinely two-sided, and their being up to the agent has nothing to do with the availability of alternative courses of action.
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Papineau, David. « Explanation in Psychology : Truth and Teleology ». Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 (mars 1990) : 21–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005026.

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A number of recent writers have argued that we should explain mental representation teleologically, in terms of the biological purposes of beliefs and other mental states.A rather older idea is that the truth condition of a belief is that condition which guarantees that actions based on that belief will succeed.What I want to show in this paper is that these two ideas complement each other. The teleological theory is inadequate unless it incorporates the thesis that truth is the guarantee of successful action. Conversely, the success-guaranteeing account of truth conditions is incomplete until it is placed in a teleological context.
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J, Derrida,. « ENGLISH WAY OF VOCAL VERBS AND THEIR ITALIAN EXPLANATION : A CROSS-SPOKEN COMPARISON ». CURRENT RESEARCH JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGICAL SCIENCES 02, no 05 (30 mai 2021) : 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.37547/philological-crjps-02-05-06.

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This examination expects to break down the diverse way by which Way of Vocal action words are understood in English and Italian. Following Talmy's differentiation between Satellite-outlined and Verb-outlined dialects, we target exhibiting how the semantic data passed on by these action words might be lost or advanced when changing from English into Italian. To do as such, four contemporary English books just as their Italian interpretations were considered. 83 English MoS action words were distinguished for a sum of 776 events. Their Italian partners (148 among action words and multi-word developments) were in this way dissected inside the Generative Lexicon model (Pustevjosky, 1998). As per our outcomes, English and Italian show a serious level of granularity in the semantic acknowledgment of Way of Vocalaction words. Also, inside this space, the resistance between a Satellite-outlined language like English and a Verb-outlined language like Italian is by all accounts obscured, since the two dialects, as a general rule, pick to conflate Way in the action word root.
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David-Blais, Martin. « Le schème actantiel et l’interactionnisme de Peter L. Berger ». Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 45, no 1 (26 février 2016) : 26–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0008429815622747.

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According to Berthelot, social sciences use several basic schemes in order to develop macro-level explanations, the Action Based Scheme being one of them. In this article, it is argued that one should not assimilate the Action Based Scheme solely to Methodological Individualism even though this tradition has received much credit. One key issue here is the status of cognition within explanation frames. More precisely, one should introduce within the explanation frames several types of cognitive states. It will be argued that there is a conceptual compatibility between the Action Based Scheme and the interactionist sociology that was proposed in the 1950s and 1960s. This theoretical exploration will focus on Peter Berger’s theory of secularization as developed in The Sacred Canopy. It will be claimed that Berger has not only proposed an explanation that brings up cognitive states, he also refers to cognitive states of a modest nature, more modest than those Methodological Individualism usually considers.
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Arnold, Thomas, Daniel Kasenberg et Matthias Scheutz. « Explaining in Time ». ACM Transactions on Human-Robot Interaction 10, no 3 (juillet 2021) : 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3457183.

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Explainability has emerged as a critical AI research objective, but the breadth of proposed methods and application domains suggest that criteria for explanation vary greatly. In particular, what counts as a good explanation, and what kinds of explanation are computationally feasible, has become trickier in light of oqaque “black box” systems such as deep neural networks. Explanation in such cases has drifted from what many philosophers stipulated as having to involve deductive and causal principles to mere “interpretation,” which approximates what happened in the target system to varying degrees. However, such post hoc constructed rationalizations are highly problematic for social robots that operate interactively in spaces shared with humans. For in such social contexts, explanations of behavior, and, in particular, justifications for violations of expected behavior, should make reference to socially accepted principles and norms. In this article, we show how a social robot’s actions can face explanatory demands for how it came to act on its decision, what goals, tasks, or purposes its design had those actions pursue and what norms or social constraints the system recognizes in the course of its action. As a result, we argue that explanations for social robots will need to be accurate representations of the system’s operation along causal, purposive, and justificatory lines. These explanations will need to generate appropriate references to principles and norms—explanations based on mere “interpretability” will ultimately fail to connect the robot’s behaviors to its appropriate determinants. We then lay out the foundations for a cognitive robotic architecture for HRI, together with particular component algorithms, for generating explanations and engaging in justificatory dialogues with human interactants. Such explanations track the robot’s actual decision-making and behavior, which themselves are determined by normative principles the robot can describe and use for justifications.
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43

HUBBS, GRAHAM. « On Humean Explanation and Practical Normativity ». Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1, no 1 (2015) : 78–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2014.6.

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ABSTRACT:If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are ‘entirely different’ matters, then it would seem to follow that endorsing a given account of action-explanation does not restrict the account of practical normativity one may simultaneously endorse. In this essay, I challenge the antecedent of this conditional by targeting its consequent. Specifically, I argue that if one endorses a Humean account of action-explanation, which many find attractive, one is thereby committed to a Humean account of practical normativity, which many find unattractive. The key to this argument is showing that the justificatory base of any anti-Humean normative view is a generic representation of ideal rationality, which precludes any such view from combining coherently with a Humean account of action-explanation. If my arguments are successful, they demonstrate a way in which one's views in action theory can both limit and be limited by the ethical views one endorses.
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Cao, Liyu, Michael Steinborn, Wilfried Kunde et Barbara Haendel. « Action force modulates action binding : evidence for a multisensory information integration explanation ». Experimental Brain Research 238, no 9 (2 juillet 2020) : 2019–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-020-05861-4.

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45

Maser, Siegfried. « Problems of a Causal Explanation of Human Action ». Philosophy and History 19, no 1 (1986) : 12–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philhist19861915.

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46

Sehon, Scott. « Connectionism and the causal theory of action explanation ». Philosophical Psychology 11, no 4 (décembre 1998) : 511–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089808573275.

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이선형. « Jaegwon Kim on Action Explanation and Explanatory Realism ». CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas ll, no 62 (novembre 2016) : 117–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss..62.201611.005.

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Crawford, Sean. « De Re and De Dicto Explanation of Action ». Philosophia 40, no 4 (14 avril 2012) : 783–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9367-4.

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Xu, Zhu. « Laws, causality and the intentional explanation of action ». Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5, no 2 (21 mai 2010) : 280–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-010-0016-3.

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Lockie, Robert. « Knowledge, Provenance and Psychological Explanation ». Philosophy 79, no 3 (juillet 2004) : 421–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910400035x.

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Analytic theories of knowledge have traditionally maintained that the provenance of a true belief is critically important to deciding whether it is knowledge. However, a comparably widespread view is that it is our beliefs alone, regardless of their (potentially dubious) provenance which feature in psychological explanation, including the explanation of action: thus, that knowledge itself and as such is irrelevant in psychological explanation. The paper gives initial reasons why the ‘beliefs alone’ view of explanation should be resisted—arguments deriving ultimately from the Meno indicate that the provenance of a true belief may be relevant to the explanation of action. However, closer scrutiny of these arguments shows that they are incapable of according provenance anything like as central a role in action explanation as provenance has traditionally been given in the theory of knowledge. A consideration of the history of science suggests anyway that all knowledge has a compromised provenance if one looks back any significant distance. It is concluded that the importance of the provenance of our beliefs is something that has been seriously over-emphasised in epistemology.
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