Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Bonus incentive scheme »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Bonus incentive scheme"
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KAPLANSKI, GUY, et HAIM LEVY. « EXECUTIVE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE, RISK-TAKING AND LEVERAGE-NEUTRAL INCENTIVE SCHEME ». Annals of Financial Economics 07, no 01 (avril 2012) : 1250003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010495212500030.
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In 23 out of 26 US industries, the annual CEO bonus is larger than the annual salary, suggesting that the bonus strongly affects the CEO's decisions. As the high leverage of financial institutions is often blamed for the 2008 financial crises, in this study we focus on leverage as a factor determining risk, particularly in financial institutions. The typical bonus scheme is not a leverage-neutral bonus scheme (LNBS), as the agent's optimal policy is to employ a corner solution: either zero or exteremely high leverage. Thus, consistent with Ross (2004), the bonus scheme does not neccesarily induce the agent to take greater risks. However, although more leverage is not prefered by all preferences, in most cases it is prefered. Thus, we suggest a combination of incentive parameters, which makes the agent indifferent to leverage, thereby preventing conflict beween the agent and the principal (stockholders).
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Van Zyl, Gerhardus. « The impact of incentive schemes on employee productivity in the South African workplace ». Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 8, no 2 (30 juillet 2015) : 633–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jef.v8i2.113.
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The aim of this article is to determine the impact that various incentive schemes have on employee productivity in the South African workplace. A firm-based model is used to estimate the dimensional relationships (different skill levels, gender-mix, firm size, firm-sponsored training incentives) of the incentive scheme-employee productivity link. The main conclusions of the study are, firstly, that finance-based incentive schemes (especially performance-linked bonus schemes) have a greater positive impact on employee productivity for the higher-skilled segment, secondly, that non-financial incentives (especially consultative committee incentive schemes) have a greater positive impact on employee productivity for the lower-skilled segment, and, finally, that greater female participation in the workplace and the awarding of incentive schemes is important if general employee productivity is to be enhanced.
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Purwanto, Gresia Meriana, et James Tumewu. « PENGARUH PAJAK, TUNNELING INCENTIVE DAN MEKANISME BONUS PADA KEPUTUSAN TRANSFER PRICING PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA ». Equilibrium : Jurnal Ekonomi-Manajemen-Akuntansi 14, no 1 (30 avril 2018) : 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.30742/equilibrium.v14i1.412.
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The aim of this research is to test the influence of tax tunneling incentive and bonus scheme on transfer pricing decision in manufacture companies that listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange. Sample selection was using purposive sampling with final sample 44 from 2012 observation. The result shows that tax and tunneling incentive have an influence on transfer pricing decision, besides than bonus scheme doesn’t have an influence on transfer pricing decision. The determination coefficient is 31,8% that is reflect to variation of tax, tunneling and bonus scheme affect transfer pricing decision. The influence of tax and tunneling is also statistically significant affect transfer pricing. Otherwise the influence of tax and bonus scheme doesn’t have statistically significant affect transfer pricing. The findings give any opportunities to next researchers to investigate the effect of any others variable on transfer pricing decision, such as bonus scheme that based on income. The measurement of transfer pricing using sales to related parties is also relevant proxy and also investigate the effect of any others variable on transfer pricing decision, such as tariffs to the next research.
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Ayshinta, Patriot Jaya, Henri Agustin et Mayar Afriyenti. « Pengaruh Tunneling Incentive, Mekanisme Bonus Dan Exchange Rate Terhadap Keputusan Perusahaan Melakukan Transfer Pricing ». JURNAL EKSPLORASI AKUNTANSI 1, no 2 (9 juin 2019) : 572–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/jea.v1i2.96.
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This research aims to examine to analyze the effect of tunneling incentive, bonus scheme and exchange rate on the company’s decision to do transfer pricing. The population in this research are manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2014 until 2017. The sample of study was determined by using purposive sampling method, and that total sample 48 manufacturing companies. The data used is secondary data. The technique of collecting data by documentation at www.idx.com. The analytical method used is Panel Regression Analysis with SPSS22 software. /This research use logistic regression analysis as analysis /method.The result of analysis in this research showed that tunneling incentive and bonus scheme had no effect on ithe company’s decision to do transfer pricing. Exchange rate had a significant effect on the company’s decision to do transferi pricing
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Halac, Marina, Elliot Lipnowski et Daniel Rappoport. « Rank Uncertainty in Organizations ». American Economic Review 111, no 3 (1 mars 2021) : 757–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200555.
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A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses contingent on team success. We study the principal’s optimal incentive scheme that implements work as a unique equilibrium. This scheme leverages rank uncertainty to address strategic uncertainty. Each agent is informed only of a ranking distribution and his own bonus, the latter making work dominant provided that higher-rank agents work. If agents are symmetric, their bonuses are identical. Thus, discrimination is strictly suboptimal, in sharp contrast with the case of public contracts (Winter 2004). We characterize how agents’ ranking and compensation vary with asymmetric effort costs. (JEL D23, D62, D81, D82, D86)
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Huang, Min, Xingwei Wang, Fu-Qiang Lu et Hua-Ling Bi. « A Coordination of Risk Management for Supply Chains Organized as Virtual Enterprises ». Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2013 (2013) : 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/931690.
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As a new management mode, great attention has been paid to virtual enterprise (VE). While there is much research material on risk management of VE, a relationship perspective on owner and partner performance assessment and management can bring an added dimension. The coordination of risk management in fashion and textiles (FTs) supply chain organized as a VE is studied in this paper. The aim of this study is to find proper decision mechanisms that can improve the overall performance of risk management for the whole VE as well as each member. For the risk management problem in VE, a centralized mechanism is given as the base case, and then a distributed decision-making (DDM) mechanism with incentive scheme is introduced to establish a practicable strategic partnership. Under the DDM mechanism, a relationship performance definition that incorporates the financial dimension is investigated. For the two resulting optimization problems, a particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm is designed. In the numerical examples, the study shows that the DDM mechanism with incentive scheme can improve the overall benefit of risk management beyond the centralized one. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is conducted with respect to the bonus parameter, and suggestions are made for further research.
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Zubanov, Nikolay. « Risk aversion and effort under an incentive pay scheme with multiplicative noise ». Evidence-based HRM : a Global Forum for Empirical Scholarship 3, no 2 (3 août 2015) : 130–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ebhrm-01-2014-0003.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on the effectiveness of incentive pay schemes, by examining the link between individual effort and risk aversion in situations where outcome uncertainty multiplies with effort. Such “multiplicative noise” situations are common, occurring whenever payment is awarded per success rather than per attempt. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a theoretical model which predicts a negative risk aversion-effort link under multiplicative noise without a performance target (PT), and a weaker negative link once the target is introduced. This model is then taken to the data from a lab experiment where participants were randomly assigned to a control group, which received fixed pay, and a treatment group, which received a piece rate awarded with a certain probability, with and without a PT. Risk aversion is measured with a menu of lottery choices offered at the end of the experiment. Findings – Compared to their peers in the control group, the more risk-averse participants in the treatment group put in progressively less effort in the absence of a PT. The introduction of a PT substantially weakens this negative risk aversion-effort link, so that there are no more significant differences in performance between the more and the less risk averse. Research limitations/implications – The paper’s findings speak to the empirical puzzles of incentive pay schemes backfiring and of the proliferation of PTs. The negative risk aversion-effort link may be one reason behind the failure of incentive schemes to deliver improved performance, whereas the weakening of this link may be one justification for the existence of PTs. Practical implications – In the multiplicative noise environments, managers should take their workers’ risk preferences into account when designing incentive pay schemes. A PT may be a useful motivational tool for the risk-averse workers who are more likely to under-perform. Originality/value – The multiplicative noise environment has been largely overlooked by the existing literature, yet it is common in practice. An example is the work of a sales agent who receives a bonus per sales which succeeds with a certain probability after each customer contact. This paper is one of the first to model, and test experimentally, worker performance in this environment.
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Jager, Tibor, et Andy Rupp. « Black-Box Accumulation : Collecting Incentives in a Privacy-Preserving Way ». Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2016, no 3 (1 juillet 2016) : 62–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/popets-2016-0016.
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Abstract We formalize and construct black-box accumulation (BBA), a useful building block for numerous important user-centric protocols including loyalty systems, refund systems, and incentive systems (as, e.g., employed in participatory sensing and vehicle-to-grid scenarios). A core requirement all these systems share is a mechanism to let users collect and sum up values (call it incentives, bonus points, reputation points, etc.) issued by some other parties in a privacy-preserving way such that curious operators may not be able to link the different transactions of a user. At the same time, a group of malicious users may not be able to cheat the system by pretending to have collected a higher amount than what was actually issued to them. As a first contribution, we fully formalize the core functionality and properties of this important building block. Furthermore, we present a generic and non-interactive construction of a BBA system based on homomorphic commitments, digital signatures, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. For our construction, we formally prove security and privacy properties. Finally, we propose a concrete instantiation of our construction using Groth-Sahai commitments and proofs as well as the optimal structure-preserving signature scheme of Abe et al. and analyze its efficiency.
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Arif, Abubakar, et Wida Cintya Dewi. « Pengaruh Laba Antar Divisi, Pajak, Dan Tunneling Incentive Pada Keputusan Transfer Pricing Perusahaan Manufaktur Terbuka ». JURNAL INFORMASI, PERPAJAKAN, AKUNTANSI, DAN KEUANGAN PUBLIK 7, no 2 (6 mai 2019) : 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.25105/jipak.v7i2.4497.
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<p class="Style2">Transfer Pricing is a price transaction happened between companies with special relationship. Transfer pricing phenomenon could happened is based on the management motivation in order to tax avoidance or any opportunistic behaviour, especially to do wealth transfer among related parties. For multinational corporate view, transfer pricing is one of the effective strategies to compete with their competitors. The aim of this research is to test the influence of profit among division, taxes, and tunneling incentive on transfer pricing decision in manufacture companies that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange. Sample selection was using purposive sampling with final sample 95 companies and 243 observationa from 2009-2012 the result shows that profit among division and tunneling have an influence on transfer pricing decision, while taxes have not influence on transfer pricing decision.This is due a business decision driven by economic fundamentals such as rate of return and not the tax considerations. The findings give any opportunity to the next researchers to investigate the effect of other variables on transfer pricing decision, such as bonus scheme that based on income.</p>
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Vyas, Preeta Hemang. « Incentive Outlay Ratios in Fast Moving Consumer Goods Sector in India ». Vikalpa : The Journal for Decision Makers 30, no 4 (octobre 2005) : 39–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920050404.
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Inflationary trends in the economy have led to increased media costs forcing many companies to increase their expenditure on sales promotion activities. It has been recognized that well-planned sales promotion activities have a strategic role to play in brand building and enhancing customer loyalty. This study examines the nature of schemes offered in the fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) category, finds out the ratio of incentive and outlay (which the consumer is expected to make/pay to avail sales promotion offers), explores the relationships, finds out the rationale behind these offers, and provides guidelines to managers designing sales promotion activities. Eight different product categories were selected for the study. Information on actual offers made in these categories in a quarter was compiled and tabulated through content analysis in terms of brand, maximum retail price (MRP), offer (size of the incentive offered), nature of the scheme, pack being promoted, and outlay. The following findings emerged from the data gathered and analysed: Variations in incentive outlay (I/O) ratios across product categories revealed that non-food category exhibits more variations (range) than food category. The level of incentive offered in non-food category was higher than that of food category. Bonus pack followed by free gift and price-offs were the popular tools used across product categories indicating use of similar type of schemes without much innovation. More often, medium to large pack-size was promoted in all categories except the toilet soap category indicating �load the consumer� as the main objective and thereby warding off competition temporarily. The findings suggest that managers need to be creative to create an impact; otherwise, consumers would tend to be less loyal to any brand in a category and drift from one promoted brand to another. They need to give careful thought as to what objectives need to be achieved from whom (loyal, competitive loyal, switchers or non-users). They also need to do a proper analysis by linking sales during promoted period to overall sales, baseline sales, competing brand sales, and impact on trade and consumer behaviour and evolve guidelines with respect to terms and conditions of the offer in terms of size of the incentive, terms, whether immediate or delayed incentive, what efforts are required on the part of the consumer, etc. Before determining the size of incentive to be offered to the consumers, managers need to consider several factors such as level of competition, available budget for the brand, reputation of the company introducing a brand, consumer behaviour, competitive promotional offers, and level of price of a brand vis-�-vis competition. A study of I/O ratios across product categories reveals interesting practices followed by companies. Exploring reasons behind such practices would give insights to managers as to why practices differ from theory and provide guidelines in managing these activities.
Thèses sur le sujet "Bonus incentive scheme"
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Shahin, Mahmoud. « Three essays on bank profitability, fragility, and lending ». Thesis, University of Exeter, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/18675.
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We present three chapters on theoretical issues of banking. These deal with bank runs, risk sharing, lending and profitability. In the first chapter, we examine the agency problem in the bank-depositor relationship. Depositors are the principals and banks are the agents. Banks choose investment portfolios and are subject to moral hazard in that they have incentive to take on more risk than desirable to depositors because they are residual claimants. We study an incentive-compatible mechanism that prompts banks to follow a safe investment policy. This mechanism leaves the bank a profit margin in a similar manner to a CEO being paid a bonus by a company. In the second chapter, we extend Allen and Gale (1998) by adding a long-term riskless investment opportunity to the original portfolio of a short-term liquid asset and a long-term risky illiquid asset. Through portfolio diversification, we identify the risk-sharing deposit contract in a three-period model that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility of depositors. Unlike Allen and Gale, there are no information-based bank runs in equilibrium. In addition, our model can improve consumers' welfare over the Allen and Gale model. I also show that the bank will choose to liquidate the cheaper investments, in terms of the gain-loss ratios for the two types of existing long-term assets, when there is liquidity shortage in some cases. Such a policy reduces the liquidation cost and enables the bank to meet the outstanding liability to depositors without large liquidation losses. In the third chapter, we study the role of banks in providing loans to borrower firms. This paper extends the theory of designing optimal loan contracts (for profits) in the Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) model to a setting where asymmetry of information exists. Based on the verifiability of information structure, we analyze complete and incomplete contracts. Through this analysis, optimal, incentive-compatible loan contracts that maximize the expected profit of the bank are characterized. Our analysis suggests that a bank could be induced to liquidate a borrower's project under specific conditions. Furthermore, we identify implementable mechanisms for the renegotiation game given the bargaining power between a borrower and a bank.
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Pai, Ti-Ching, et 白滌清. « Modeling an Incentive Bonus Scheme for Sales Forces ». Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87749602350111620425.
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博士淡江大學
管理科學研究所
84
This dissertation intends to use a mathematical model to investigate the interrelationship between bonus scheme and sales forces for the design of a reward system combining bonus and commission. The firm is unable to foresee sales forces' reaction to the bonus scheme during the design period. Therefore, what can be done is to analyze the sales forces with some basic assumptions according to the existing circumstances. First of all, the firm owns several sales forces the aims of which are all searching for the optimization of their own rewards. Second, sales forces are permitted to decide the prices of the product by themselves. The firm is unable to predict the complicated interrelationship of practical selling behavior among the sales forces. Therefore, the firm can only figure out a reasonable situation based on the general principles of demand. Besides, each sales force has its own particular market segment the size of which will influence the sales force's policy toward bonus scheme. This dissertation attempts to construct both sales forces' reward models when they face firm's bonus scheme and firm's reward model, mathematically by using the calculus of variation to derive the optimal solution. Through the characteristics of the optimal solution of the model, the policy type of sales forces and the factors which influence the firm's design bonus scheme can be found. Moreover, this dissertation studies the differences of sales forces' market segment rate, their influences on bonus scheme and the characteristics of bonus scheme under different demand states.
Livres sur le sujet "Bonus incentive scheme"
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Langley, Mike. Executive bonus schemes. London : IDS Top Pay Unit in association with the Institute of Personnel Management, 1987.
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Bonus : A study of incentive schemes operating in the construction industry. London : International Thomson Publishing, 1986.
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Blain, B. C. R. Bonus, a study of incentive schemes operating in the construction industry. London : International Thompson Publishing, 1986.
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Services, Incomes Data, dir. Incentive bonus schemes. London : Incomes Data Services Ltd, 1989.
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Society, Industrial, dir. Bonus and incentive schemes. [Birmingham] : The Industrial Society, 1998.
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Labour Research Department., dir. Bonus schemes : A negotiator's guide. London : LRD Publications, 1988.
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Langley, Mike, Incomes Data Services et Institute of Personnel Management. Executive Bonus Schemes. Hyperion Books, 1987.
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Blain, C. R. Bonus : Study of Incentive Schemes Operating in the Construction Industry. Routledge, 1998.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Bonus incentive scheme"
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Fox, Chris, et Kevin Albertson. « Outcomes-based contracts in the UK public sector ». Dans Marketisation and Privatisation in Criminal Justice, 31–46. Policy Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447345701.003.0003.
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A major innovation in public sector commissioning in recent years is the recourse of the state to so called ‘Outcomes-based Contracts’ particularly Payment by Results (PbR) in the UK. A PbR contract contains three elements, a commissioner, a service provider and an outcomes metric. The outcomes metrics is designed, in theory, to align the incentive structures of the commissioner and the service delivery agency so as to achieve efficient results. Thus, PbR is theorised to allow public commissioners to pay a provider of services on the basis of specified outcomes achieved rather than the inputs or outputs delivered. A related innovation is that of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). SIBs are distinguished from PbR contracts in that they supposedly allow financiers to contribute to the social innovation process by providing working capital. The return on the SIB is calculated using PbR methodology. Compared to a PbR contract, the SIB contract seeks to align the incentive structures, not only of commissioners and providers, but also financiers through an appropriate metrics-based payments scheme. PbR and SIBs have been referred to as key tools for delivering change. In this chapter we set out the theoretical and practical challenges arising from the development and application of PbR and SIBs and consider the evidence of their efficacy or otherwise.
Rapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Bonus incentive scheme"
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Haider, Huma. Financial Incentives to Reduce Female Infanticide, Child Marriage and Promote Girl’s Education : Impact. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), décembre 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2021.004.
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This review examines evidence on the key design features and impact of programmes that use Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) or baby bonds to reduce female infanticide, child marriage and promote girl’s education. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes have been adopted to promote the survival and well-being of girls. They provide parents with financial incentives to raise daughters; to delay marrying them until age 18, and to reduce the gender imbalance in school. Given that many CCT programmes aimed at addressing girl children are relatively new, it has in many cases been too early to evaluate their effectiveness. There is thus limited evidence of the impact of their implementation and outcomes. This helpdesk report focuses on recent studies, published in the past five years, on select programmes implemented in South Asia, particularly in India, for which there is the most available information. Evidence suggests that CCT programmes aimed at supporting the girl child have succeeded in promoting school enrolment and delaying marriage in South Asia. It is less clear, however, the extent to which these transfers have affected gender-biased sex selection.