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1
KAPLANSKI, GUY, et HAIM LEVY. « EXECUTIVE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE, RISK-TAKING AND LEVERAGE-NEUTRAL INCENTIVE SCHEME ». Annals of Financial Economics 07, no 01 (avril 2012) : 1250003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010495212500030.
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In 23 out of 26 US industries, the annual CEO bonus is larger than the annual salary, suggesting that the bonus strongly affects the CEO's decisions. As the high leverage of financial institutions is often blamed for the 2008 financial crises, in this study we focus on leverage as a factor determining risk, particularly in financial institutions. The typical bonus scheme is not a leverage-neutral bonus scheme (LNBS), as the agent's optimal policy is to employ a corner solution: either zero or exteremely high leverage. Thus, consistent with Ross (2004), the bonus scheme does not neccesarily induce the agent to take greater risks. However, although more leverage is not prefered by all preferences, in most cases it is prefered. Thus, we suggest a combination of incentive parameters, which makes the agent indifferent to leverage, thereby preventing conflict beween the agent and the principal (stockholders).
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Van Zyl, Gerhardus. « The impact of incentive schemes on employee productivity in the South African workplace ». Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 8, no 2 (30 juillet 2015) : 633–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jef.v8i2.113.
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The aim of this article is to determine the impact that various incentive schemes have on employee productivity in the South African workplace. A firm-based model is used to estimate the dimensional relationships (different skill levels, gender-mix, firm size, firm-sponsored training incentives) of the incentive scheme-employee productivity link. The main conclusions of the study are, firstly, that finance-based incentive schemes (especially performance-linked bonus schemes) have a greater positive impact on employee productivity for the higher-skilled segment, secondly, that non-financial incentives (especially consultative committee incentive schemes) have a greater positive impact on employee productivity for the lower-skilled segment, and, finally, that greater female participation in the workplace and the awarding of incentive schemes is important if general employee productivity is to be enhanced.
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Purwanto, Gresia Meriana, et James Tumewu. « PENGARUH PAJAK, TUNNELING INCENTIVE DAN MEKANISME BONUS PADA KEPUTUSAN TRANSFER PRICING PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA ». Equilibrium : Jurnal Ekonomi-Manajemen-Akuntansi 14, no 1 (30 avril 2018) : 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.30742/equilibrium.v14i1.412.
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The aim of this research is to test the influence of tax tunneling incentive and bonus scheme on transfer pricing decision in manufacture companies that listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange. Sample selection was using purposive sampling with final sample 44 from 2012 observation. The result shows that tax and tunneling incentive have an influence on transfer pricing decision, besides than bonus scheme doesn’t have an influence on transfer pricing decision. The determination coefficient is 31,8% that is reflect to variation of tax, tunneling and bonus scheme affect transfer pricing decision. The influence of tax and tunneling is also statistically significant affect transfer pricing. Otherwise the influence of tax and bonus scheme doesn’t have statistically significant affect transfer pricing. The findings give any opportunities to next researchers to investigate the effect of any others variable on transfer pricing decision, such as bonus scheme that based on income. The measurement of transfer pricing using sales to related parties is also relevant proxy and also investigate the effect of any others variable on transfer pricing decision, such as tariffs to the next research.
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Ayshinta, Patriot Jaya, Henri Agustin et Mayar Afriyenti. « Pengaruh Tunneling Incentive, Mekanisme Bonus Dan Exchange Rate Terhadap Keputusan Perusahaan Melakukan Transfer Pricing ». JURNAL EKSPLORASI AKUNTANSI 1, no 2 (9 juin 2019) : 572–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/jea.v1i2.96.
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This research aims to examine to analyze the effect of tunneling incentive, bonus scheme and exchange rate on the company’s decision to do transfer pricing. The population in this research are manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2014 until 2017. The sample of study was determined by using purposive sampling method, and that total sample 48 manufacturing companies. The data used is secondary data. The technique of collecting data by documentation at www.idx.com. The analytical method used is Panel Regression Analysis with SPSS22 software. /This research use logistic regression analysis as analysis /method.The result of analysis in this research showed that tunneling incentive and bonus scheme had no effect on ithe company’s decision to do transfer pricing. Exchange rate had a significant effect on the company’s decision to do transferi pricing
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Halac, Marina, Elliot Lipnowski et Daniel Rappoport. « Rank Uncertainty in Organizations ». American Economic Review 111, no 3 (1 mars 2021) : 757–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200555.
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A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses contingent on team success. We study the principal’s optimal incentive scheme that implements work as a unique equilibrium. This scheme leverages rank uncertainty to address strategic uncertainty. Each agent is informed only of a ranking distribution and his own bonus, the latter making work dominant provided that higher-rank agents work. If agents are symmetric, their bonuses are identical. Thus, discrimination is strictly suboptimal, in sharp contrast with the case of public contracts (Winter 2004). We characterize how agents’ ranking and compensation vary with asymmetric effort costs. (JEL D23, D62, D81, D82, D86)
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Huang, Min, Xingwei Wang, Fu-Qiang Lu et Hua-Ling Bi. « A Coordination of Risk Management for Supply Chains Organized as Virtual Enterprises ». Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2013 (2013) : 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/931690.
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As a new management mode, great attention has been paid to virtual enterprise (VE). While there is much research material on risk management of VE, a relationship perspective on owner and partner performance assessment and management can bring an added dimension. The coordination of risk management in fashion and textiles (FTs) supply chain organized as a VE is studied in this paper. The aim of this study is to find proper decision mechanisms that can improve the overall performance of risk management for the whole VE as well as each member. For the risk management problem in VE, a centralized mechanism is given as the base case, and then a distributed decision-making (DDM) mechanism with incentive scheme is introduced to establish a practicable strategic partnership. Under the DDM mechanism, a relationship performance definition that incorporates the financial dimension is investigated. For the two resulting optimization problems, a particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm is designed. In the numerical examples, the study shows that the DDM mechanism with incentive scheme can improve the overall benefit of risk management beyond the centralized one. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is conducted with respect to the bonus parameter, and suggestions are made for further research.
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Zubanov, Nikolay. « Risk aversion and effort under an incentive pay scheme with multiplicative noise ». Evidence-based HRM : a Global Forum for Empirical Scholarship 3, no 2 (3 août 2015) : 130–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ebhrm-01-2014-0003.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on the effectiveness of incentive pay schemes, by examining the link between individual effort and risk aversion in situations where outcome uncertainty multiplies with effort. Such “multiplicative noise” situations are common, occurring whenever payment is awarded per success rather than per attempt. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a theoretical model which predicts a negative risk aversion-effort link under multiplicative noise without a performance target (PT), and a weaker negative link once the target is introduced. This model is then taken to the data from a lab experiment where participants were randomly assigned to a control group, which received fixed pay, and a treatment group, which received a piece rate awarded with a certain probability, with and without a PT. Risk aversion is measured with a menu of lottery choices offered at the end of the experiment. Findings – Compared to their peers in the control group, the more risk-averse participants in the treatment group put in progressively less effort in the absence of a PT. The introduction of a PT substantially weakens this negative risk aversion-effort link, so that there are no more significant differences in performance between the more and the less risk averse. Research limitations/implications – The paper’s findings speak to the empirical puzzles of incentive pay schemes backfiring and of the proliferation of PTs. The negative risk aversion-effort link may be one reason behind the failure of incentive schemes to deliver improved performance, whereas the weakening of this link may be one justification for the existence of PTs. Practical implications – In the multiplicative noise environments, managers should take their workers’ risk preferences into account when designing incentive pay schemes. A PT may be a useful motivational tool for the risk-averse workers who are more likely to under-perform. Originality/value – The multiplicative noise environment has been largely overlooked by the existing literature, yet it is common in practice. An example is the work of a sales agent who receives a bonus per sales which succeeds with a certain probability after each customer contact. This paper is one of the first to model, and test experimentally, worker performance in this environment.
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Jager, Tibor, et Andy Rupp. « Black-Box Accumulation : Collecting Incentives in a Privacy-Preserving Way ». Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2016, no 3 (1 juillet 2016) : 62–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/popets-2016-0016.
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Abstract We formalize and construct black-box accumulation (BBA), a useful building block for numerous important user-centric protocols including loyalty systems, refund systems, and incentive systems (as, e.g., employed in participatory sensing and vehicle-to-grid scenarios). A core requirement all these systems share is a mechanism to let users collect and sum up values (call it incentives, bonus points, reputation points, etc.) issued by some other parties in a privacy-preserving way such that curious operators may not be able to link the different transactions of a user. At the same time, a group of malicious users may not be able to cheat the system by pretending to have collected a higher amount than what was actually issued to them. As a first contribution, we fully formalize the core functionality and properties of this important building block. Furthermore, we present a generic and non-interactive construction of a BBA system based on homomorphic commitments, digital signatures, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. For our construction, we formally prove security and privacy properties. Finally, we propose a concrete instantiation of our construction using Groth-Sahai commitments and proofs as well as the optimal structure-preserving signature scheme of Abe et al. and analyze its efficiency.
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Arif, Abubakar, et Wida Cintya Dewi. « Pengaruh Laba Antar Divisi, Pajak, Dan Tunneling Incentive Pada Keputusan Transfer Pricing Perusahaan Manufaktur Terbuka ». JURNAL INFORMASI, PERPAJAKAN, AKUNTANSI, DAN KEUANGAN PUBLIK 7, no 2 (6 mai 2019) : 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.25105/jipak.v7i2.4497.
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<p class="Style2">Transfer Pricing is a price transaction happened between companies with special relationship. Transfer pricing phenomenon could happened is based on the management motivation in order to tax avoidance or any opportunistic behaviour, especially to do wealth transfer among related parties. For multinational corporate view, transfer pricing is one of the effective strategies to compete with their competitors. The aim of this research is to test the influence of profit among division, taxes, and tunneling incentive on transfer pricing decision in manufacture companies that listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange. Sample selection was using purposive sampling with final sample 95 companies and 243 observationa from 2009-2012 the result shows that profit among division and tunneling have an influence on transfer pricing decision, while taxes have not influence on transfer pricing decision.This is due a business decision driven by economic fundamentals such as rate of return and not the tax considerations. The findings give any opportunity to the next researchers to investigate the effect of other variables on transfer pricing decision, such as bonus scheme that based on income.</p>
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Vyas, Preeta Hemang. « Incentive Outlay Ratios in Fast Moving Consumer Goods Sector in India ». Vikalpa : The Journal for Decision Makers 30, no 4 (octobre 2005) : 39–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920050404.
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Inflationary trends in the economy have led to increased media costs forcing many companies to increase their expenditure on sales promotion activities. It has been recognized that well-planned sales promotion activities have a strategic role to play in brand building and enhancing customer loyalty. This study examines the nature of schemes offered in the fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) category, finds out the ratio of incentive and outlay (which the consumer is expected to make/pay to avail sales promotion offers), explores the relationships, finds out the rationale behind these offers, and provides guidelines to managers designing sales promotion activities. Eight different product categories were selected for the study. Information on actual offers made in these categories in a quarter was compiled and tabulated through content analysis in terms of brand, maximum retail price (MRP), offer (size of the incentive offered), nature of the scheme, pack being promoted, and outlay. The following findings emerged from the data gathered and analysed: Variations in incentive outlay (I/O) ratios across product categories revealed that non-food category exhibits more variations (range) than food category. The level of incentive offered in non-food category was higher than that of food category. Bonus pack followed by free gift and price-offs were the popular tools used across product categories indicating use of similar type of schemes without much innovation. More often, medium to large pack-size was promoted in all categories except the toilet soap category indicating �load the consumer� as the main objective and thereby warding off competition temporarily. The findings suggest that managers need to be creative to create an impact; otherwise, consumers would tend to be less loyal to any brand in a category and drift from one promoted brand to another. They need to give careful thought as to what objectives need to be achieved from whom (loyal, competitive loyal, switchers or non-users). They also need to do a proper analysis by linking sales during promoted period to overall sales, baseline sales, competing brand sales, and impact on trade and consumer behaviour and evolve guidelines with respect to terms and conditions of the offer in terms of size of the incentive, terms, whether immediate or delayed incentive, what efforts are required on the part of the consumer, etc. Before determining the size of incentive to be offered to the consumers, managers need to consider several factors such as level of competition, available budget for the brand, reputation of the company introducing a brand, consumer behaviour, competitive promotional offers, and level of price of a brand vis-�-vis competition. A study of I/O ratios across product categories reveals interesting practices followed by companies. Exploring reasons behind such practices would give insights to managers as to why practices differ from theory and provide guidelines in managing these activities.
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HOLLAND, J., N. J. A. VAN EXEL, F. T. SCHUT et W. B. F. BROUWER. « Some pain, no gain : experiences with the no-claim rebate in the Dutch health care system ». Health Economics, Policy and Law 4, no 4 (octobre 2009) : 405–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744133109004861.
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AbstractTo contain expenditures in an increasingly demand driven health care system, in 2005 a no-claim rebate was introduced in the Dutch health insurance system. Since demand-side cost sharing is a very controversial issue, the no-claim rebate was launched as a consumer friendly bonus system to reward prudent utilization of health services. Internationally, the introduction of a mandatory no-claim rebate in a social health insurance scheme is unprecedented. Consumers were entitled to an annual rebate of ₠ 255 if no claims were made. During the year, all health care expenses except for GP visits and maternity care were deducted from the rebate until the rebate became zero. In this article, we discuss the rationale of the no-claim rebate and the available evidence of its effect. Using a questionnaire in a convenience sample, we examined people’s knowledge, attitudes, and sensitivity to the incentive scheme. We find that only 4% of respondents stated that they would reduce consumption because of the no-claim rebate. Respondents also indicated that they were willing to accept a high loss of rebate in order to use a medical treatment. However, during the last month of the year many respondents seemed willing to postpone consumption until the next year in order to keep the rebate of the current year intact. A small majority of respondents considered the no-claim rebate to be unfair. Finally, we briefly discuss why in 2008 the no-claim rebate was replaced by a mandatory deductible.
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Brown, Duncan. « ‘We Are All in This Together’. Collective Bonuses and Incentives in the United Kingdom and Europe : The Real Performance-Related Pay ? » Compensation & ; Benefits Review 52, no 4 (18 août 2020) : 175–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886368720947328.
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‘We are all in this together’ has been a common leadership cry during the coronavirus crisis. But do their rewards designs generally reinforce collective performance? Why have collective bonus and incentive plans made little headway in Europe and what is the evidence on their effectiveness? The author presents findings from a bonus and incentive research review carried out for a major oil company. He found two-thirds of companies operate variable pay plans, with three-quarters of them based on individual performance. Collective plans are, however, spreading in incidence. The research literature he found replicates the North American evidence, indicating collective schemes are associated with higher performance across a variety of metrics. But they are not universally successful. Risks include diminishing effectiveness over time and lack of employee understanding. The research highlights success depends on tailoring to suit the culture and using a range of high-performance work practices. The author concludes success is more likely where collective plans are viewed ‘not just as a vehicle for disseminating incentives but for imparting a sense of shared ownership’.
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Friebel, Guido, Matthias Heinz, Miriam Krueger et Nikolay Zubanov. « Team Incentives and Performance : Evidence from a Retail Chain ». American Economic Review 107, no 8 (1 août 2017) : 2168–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160788.
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In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus scheme, the performance of the treatment and control shops converges, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect. (JEL D22, J31, J33, L25, L81, M53, M54)
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Maestri, Lucas. « The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations ». Games and Economic Behavior 87 (septembre 2014) : 412–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.015.
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Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian. « An agency theory approach towards bribery ». Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 27, no 2 (13 mai 2019) : 160–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-03-2018-0041.
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Purpose This paper aims to discuss the role of agency theory in combatting bribery in multinational corporations. It is shown how a combination of bonus and malus payments could help to create the right incentives for agency. Design/methodology/approach Based on the analysis of 15 formal and 15 informal expert interviews with both prevention experts and corrupt individuals, concrete ways of more effectively combatting bribery have been developed. Findings As a result, it is suggested that matrix systems could help to adjust incentives systems to take compliance issues into account. It is found that multinational corporations should eliminate. Research limitations/implications This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 30 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time would have led to different results. Practical implications The identification of the potential role of incentive systems in compliance mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective. This can help to both improve compliance mechanisms. Originality/value While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.
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Basuroy, Suman, Kimberly C. Gleason et Yezen H. Kannan. « CEO compensation, customer satisfaction, and firm value ». Review of Accounting and Finance 13, no 4 (4 novembre 2014) : 326–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-11-2012-0120.
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Purpose – The purpose of this article is to examine whether the design of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation generates incentives to engage in managerial behavior that enhances customer satisfaction and whether these incentives, in turn, lead to higher firm value. Design/methodology/approach – A unique dataset combining customer satisfaction and executive compensation data was used, and the relationship between option sensitivity, customer satisfaction and performance was modeled using simultaneous equations modeling with industry and year fixed effects. Findings – Findings suggest that CEO compensation plays an important role in explaining the variation in customer satisfaction and firm value. Specifically, CEO short-term compensation (salary or bonus) has no affect on customer satisfaction or firm value; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes is positively related and also exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with customer satisfaction; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes interacts negatively with CEO longevity and industry concentration but positively with advertising expenses in affecting customer satisfaction; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to both stock price changes and customer satisfaction positively affect firm value; and the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes interacts positively with customer satisfaction to affect firm value. Research limitations/implications – This study suffers from several limitations. First, the sample is limited to firms with ACSI scores available. Second, this study is limited to only publicly traded firms, which limits our ability to generalize regarding customer satisfaction, option sensitivity and firm value. Practical implications – This study has several important implications for researchers and managers. The first is that the corporate board appears to view investment in customer satisfaction as similar to an investment in other intangible assets or technology, in that they reward managers with a nonlinear payoff profile. To encourage managers to invest discretionary funds wisely, incentive compensation is important. Second, compensation committees of corporate boards should not allow the option sensitivity to reach extreme levels because, at some point, managers’ incentives appear to shift more toward short-term earnings objectives and away from investment in intangibles, which have a longer-term payoff. Third, if boards are concerned about customer satisfaction and market value, when designing compensation packages, they should shift their focus from the structure of pay to the sensitivity of pay to performance. The exception to this is that for CEOs with very long tenures (or for those close to retirement), high levels of option sensitivity may distort incentives away from a focus on customer satisfaction. Finally, our results indicate that strategies that enhance customer satisfaction provide an incremental benefit in terms of firm value, beyond incentive compensation strategies. Social implications – The results indicate that a “stakeholder focus” which includes customers is value adding for shareholders as well. The results also imply that perhaps using a “balanced scorecard” approach to assessing performance in terms of customer satisfaction outcomes, or at least acknowledging the drives of customer satisfaction explicitly, could be an alternative to using highly sensitive incentive-based compensation when such compensation schemes are less desirable. Originality/value – Prior research has found that the structure of fixed versus incentive-based compensation impacts customer satisfaction. However, this is one of the first papers to investigate the relationship between the sensitivity of CEO compensation and customer satisfaction. Findings have important implications for boards who seek to structure CEO pay so that CEOs have incentives to enact policies that benefit customers and, in turn, firm performance.
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Rajan, Madhav V., et Stefan Reichelstein. « Objective versus Subjective Indicators of Managerial Performance ». Accounting Review 84, no 1 (1 janvier 2009) : 209–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.209.
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ABSTRACT: Managerial bonus payments are frequently determined by both objective and subjective indicators of managerial performance. By its very nature, subjective information is not verifiable for contracting purposes. The inclusion of such information in managerial bonus schemes therefore requires a principal to retain discretion in authorizing actual bonus payments. At the same time, the principal must be able to commit to an overall bonus pool that will be paid out either inside or outside the agency. Our analysis examines the structure of optimal bonus pool arrangements. The non-verifiability of the subjective indicators changes many of the predictions obtained in traditional agency settings with verifiable performance indicators. In particular, our results address the contractual value of additional information variables, the desirability of compressed incentive schemes, and the nature of relative performance evaluation in settings with multiple agents.
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Aron, D. J., et P. Olivella. « Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems ». Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10, no 1 (1 avril 1994) : 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/10.1.1.
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Walder, Andrew G. « Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests ». China Quarterly 109 (mars 1987) : 22–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000017458.
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China's industrial wage reforms, initiated with much fanfare in 1977, have currently reached an impasse. Despite large increases in wages over the past decade, the expansion of incentive pay, and several new schemes to link incentive funds to factory performance, low labour productivity and lax work discipline remain major problems in state industry. Moreover, the reforms have created consequences that were unintended: they have heightened contention over wage matters in the work place; they led in the initial years of the reform to uncontrolled increases in bonus expenditures that outstripped increases in productivity and profitability; and they have inadvertently provided an incentive for sharp business practices and financial deception, both of which hinder broader industrial reform.
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Herweg, Fabian, Daniel Müller et Philipp Weinschenk. « Binary Payment Schemes : Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion ». American Economic Review 100, no 5 (1 décembre 2010) : 2451–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2451.
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We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Kőoszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold. (JEL D82, D86, J41, M52, M12)
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Sutcliffe, C. M. S. « Pension Scheme Asset Allocation with Taxation Arbitrage, Risk Sharing and Default Insurance ». British Actuarial Journal 10, no 5 (1 décembre 2004) : 1111–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135732170000297x.
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ABSTRACTThe asset allocation is a crucial decision for pension funds, and this paper analyses the economic factors which determine this choice. The analysis proceeds on the basis that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation between equities and bonds is indeterminate and governed by the risk/return preferences of the trustees and the employer. If the employing company and its shareholders are subject to taxation, there is a tax advantage in a largely bond allocation. Risk sharing between the employer and the employees often means that one group favours a high equity allocation, while the other favours a low equity allocation. Underpriced default insurance creates an incentive for a high equity allocation. When taxation, risk sharing and underpriced default insurance are all present, it is concluded that the appropriate asset allocation varies with the circumstances of the scheme; but that a high equity allocation is probably inappropriate for many private sector pension schemes.
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Essl, Andrea, et Stefanie Jaussi. « Choking under time pressure : The influence of deadline-dependent bonus and malus incentive schemes on performance ». Journal of Economic Behavior & ; Organization 133 (janvier 2017) : 127–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.001.
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Fontes-Filho, Joaquim Rubens, et Moisés Balassiano. « The problem of incentives in building corporate governance models ». Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no 2 (2008) : 352–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i2c3p4.
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The attempt to align interests of executives with those of shareholders has been addressed in the corporate governance context from a predominantly economic outlook based on the agency theory. The models that combine monitoring and control systems in association with financial incentive mechanisms, such as profit and income sharing, stock options, bonds and other benefits, consider an individual to be individualist, opportunist and self-interested, diverging from the assumptions of other theories and contemporary ideas in the area of human resources management. Based on the criticism related to the agency theory, particularly when drawing up incentive schemes, this article aims to look at alternative theories to build corporate governance practices that include considerations on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of agents.
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Anebo, Lantera Nadew. « Debenture as Alternate Scheme of Raising Investment Fund and Its Prospects under Ethiopian Company Law ». Mizan Law Review 13, no 3 (31 décembre 2019) : 333–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v13i3.1.
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With a view to attracting investors, the Government of Ethiopia has offered a variety of incentives and financing schemes. However, the incentives or loan options can be inadequate, susceptible to corrupt practices and inaccessible to many business undertakings. This article examines other possible options of raising investment fund privately from the general public by issuing debt security (debenture). Instead of looking for hand outs of governments or sole reliance on bank loan, investors can raise investment fund from the general public –even beyond national borders– by offering debenture bonds for public subscription. A debenture is debt security that entitles its holder to collect periodic interest until the loan is paid back. Compared to bank loans, raising investment fund through the instrumentality of debentures is more advantageous. The rate of interest, the volume of loan needed for running business, and the time for repayment can be determined by investors. Moreover, the loan is not generally subject to collateral. This article highlights the nature, form, and class of debenture under Ethiopian law, and discusses the legal requirements for the issuance of debenture, the amount of money that can be raised by issuing debentures, the status of debentures in Ethiopia, and legal safeguards for repayment of the loan.
Key terms
Debenture, Bond, Investor, Floating charge, Creditor, Debtor, Ethiopia
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Petrick, Martin. « Incentive provision to farm workers in post-socialist settings : evidence from East Germany and North Kazakhstan ». International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 20, no 2 (8 mars 2017) : 239–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.22434/ifamr2016.0020.
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This article explores the current practice of motivating agricultural workers in post-socialist settings. In addition, it attempts to evaluate the different wage systems observed in reality and better understand under which conditions they are reformed. It does so by contrasting the experience of two extreme cases representing fast and slow reform advance, East Germany and North Kazakhstan. The primary data for the analysis comes from cross-sectional farm surveys conducted by various researchers in both countries. East German farmers quickly replaced the inherited Soviet-style piece rate payment system by simple time rate schemes, augmented by wage premia for certain performance parameters, especially in livestock. To the contrary, the piece rate approach persists in many farms in North Kazakhstan. Moreover, the latter rarely use non-wage incentives to motivate their workers. In Kazakhstan, farms using either mixed systems or pure piece rates were more productive than the reference group using pure time rates. Labour cost per worker were lowest for pure time rate systems in both countries, followed by mixed bonus systems, whereas pure piece rate systems implied the highest cost in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani managers tend to move away from the Soviet piece rate system if external investors become engaged in farming operations.
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Madero Gómez, Sergio Manuel. « Factores de la teoría de Herzberg y el impacto de los incentivos en la satisfacción de los trabajadores ». Acta Universitaria 29 (16 octobre 2019) : 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.15174/au.2019.2153.
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Nowadays, companies need to develop and design attraction and retention strategies to help their employees be more productive and to find, through financial compensations, a stable source of income that meets their economic needs. This research work shows the preference and impact that the factors of the Herzberg’s theory have on job satisfaction. In this quantitative research, a questionnaire with 25 items was designed and applied to 423 people who work in Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico. It is highlighted that the recognition schemes (AV = 4.64 SD = 0.77) and the autonomy to make decisions (AV = 4.64 SD = 0.68) are the most important non-monetary aspects, whereas the Christmas bonus (AV = 4.69 SD = 0.62) is the most important from the monetary perspective.
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Berger, Leslie, Kenneth J. Klassen, Theresa Libby et Alan Webb. « Complacency and Giving Up Across Repeated Tournaments : Evidence from the Field ». Journal of Management Accounting Research 25, no 1 (1 février 2013) : 143–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50435.
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ABSTRACT Tournament incentive schemes involve individuals competing against each other for a single or limited number of rewards (e.g., promotion, bonus, pay raise). Although research shows tournament schemes can have positive effects on performance, there is also evidence of dysfunctional intra-tournament behavior by top performers (complacency) and weak performers (giving up). However, few studies have examined behavior in organizational settings, not uncommon in practice, where tournaments are conducted on a repeated basis. We predict that complacency and giving up will generalize to settings where individuals repeatedly compete in successive short-duration tournaments. We test our predictions using archival data from a reservation center of a major hotel chain that employs repeated four-week tournaments where performance does not carryover from one competition to the next. Results show top performers quickly become complacent in response to success in early tournaments. The lowest-performing losers in early tournaments eventually appear to give up, but additional analysis indicates they only do so after unsuccessfully changing task strategy. Our results contribute to a better understanding of individual behavior in settings where individuals repeatedly compete against largely the same group of employees. Our evidence also suggests that tournaments are less effective at sustaining the motivation of the most capable performers and other approaches may be necessary.
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Morgan, Glenn, et Yuko Takahashi. « Shareholder Value in the Japanese Context ». Competition & ; Change 6, no 2 (juin 2002) : 169–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10245290213672.
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The paper argues that for the discourse of shareholder value to be significant and effective, there needs to be an institutional structure which supports it. This institutional matrix consists of the interaction of the following features: firstly, the dominance of forms of collective investment in equities and bonds, managed by institutional investors competing for funds from savers; secondly, the existence of liquid markets in shares and bonds which enables institutional investors to exercise choice; thirdly, the provision of information to outsiders enabling choice to be exercised on the basis of existing performance as reflected (and constructed) in financial accounting data; fourthly, the power of managers to exercise choice over patterns of merger, acquisition and organizational restructuring in order to meet shareholder requirements; finally, the development of senior management compensation schemes and career hierarchies which links incentives to share prices. The paper examines how this institutional matrix contributes to the formation of shareholder value. It then considers the specific example of Japan and shows that in spite of some commitment to the rhetoric of shareholder value and the existence of certain tensions and changes, these institutional conditions do not exist and therefore there is no prospect of Japan moving to a shareholder value based model in the foreseeable future.
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Banks, C. J., A. M. Salter et M. Chesshire. « Potential of anaerobic digestion for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and production of renewable energy from agriculture : barriers and incentives to widespread adoption in Europe ». Water Science and Technology 55, no 10 (1 mai 2007) : 165–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wst.2007.319.
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The paper considers the role of anaerobic digestion in promoting good agricultural practice on farms and the contribution this would make to reducing the environmental impacts associated with manure management. There are no regulatory drivers to promote the use of digestion in Europe, and the technology has only been widely adopted where economic drivers and coherent policies have been implemented at a national level. These measures have included direct subsidy on the energy price paid for “green electricity”, and exemption of tax when biogas is used as a vehicle fuel. In those countries where financial incentives are not available or where a financial penalty is incurred through the regulatory regime, the uptake of digestion has been poor. Even with subsidies, digestion of animal manures as a single substrate is not common, and countries with successful schemes have achieved this either by permitting the import of wastes onto the farm or offering bonus subsidies for the use of energy crops. Both of these measures improve the energy efficiency of the process by increasing the volumetric methane production, although concerns are expressed that attention could concentrate on energy production at the expense of improving manure management.
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Coval, Joshua, Jakub Jurek et Erik Stafford. « The Economics of Structured Finance ». Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, no 1 (1 janvier 2009) : 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.23.1.3.
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This paper investigates the spectacular rise and fall of structured finance. The essence of structured finance activities is the pooling of economic assets like loans, bonds, and mortgages, and the subsequent issuance of a prioritized capital structure of claims, known as tranches, against these collateral pools. As a result of the prioritization scheme used in structuring claims, many of the manufactured tranches are far safer than the average asset in the underlying pool. This ability of structured finance to repackage risks and to create “safe” assets from otherwise risky collateral led to a dramatic expansion in the issuance of structured securities, most of which were viewed by investors to be virtually risk-free and certified as such by the rating agencies. At the core of the recent financial market crisis has been the discovery that these securities are actually far riskier than originally advertised. We examine how the process of securitization allowed trillions of dollars of risky assets to be transformed into securities that were widely considered to be safe. We highlight two features of structured finance products—the extreme fragility of their ratings to modest imprecision in evaluating underlying risks, and their exposure to systematic risks—that go a long way in explaining the spectacular rise and fall of structured finance. We conclude with an assessment of what went wrong and the relative importance of rating agency errors, investor credulity, and perverse incentives and suspect behavior on the part of issuers, rating agencies, and borrowers.
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Grigoiadis, Chrisilla, et Mark Bussin. « Current practice with regard to short-term incentive schemes for middle managers ». SA Journal of Human Resource Management 5, no 1 (30 novembre 2007). http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajhrm.v5i1.107.
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This study aimed to determine what the current practice is with regard to short-term incentive schemes for middle managers. This was done by means of a quantitative study through a structured research survey completed by a sample of forty-eight organisations. The design elements, performance measures and payout practices of the various schemes in use were surveyed, as well as the participants’ view on the perceived effectiveness of their short-term incentive schemes. Evidence shows that the majority of organisations have a short-term incentive scheme in place for middle managers, and that the type of scheme used in most of the organisations is a performance-related bonus scheme, introduced mainly to drive business performance and reward superior performance.
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Castro, Juan F., et Bruno Esposito. « The Effect of Bonuses on Teacher Retention and Student Learning in Rural Schools : A Story of Spillovers ». Education Finance and Policy, 29 avril 2021, 1–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/edfp_a_00348.
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Abstract We estimate the direct and indirect effects of recruitment bonuses paid to teachers working in rural schools in Peru on their retention and student learning. This is the first study to estimate the indirect effects of a bonus aimed at attracting teachers to disadvantaged schools. This is important for assessing whether the incentive has improved the distribution of teaching resources and for estimating the direct effect without bias. We exploit the exogenous variation produced in the size of the bonus by the rule used to classify rural schools, and allow ineligible schools to be affected if they have an eligible school nearby. We find the bonus produces positive direct effects on teacher retention but also a negative spillover on the probability of filling teacher vacancies in neighboring schools. This spillover indicates that the bonus is redistributing resources between equally disadvantaged schools. We also find that the bonus has no direct effects on student learning and produces a positive spillover on the scores of students in neighboring schools. We argue these results are due to the poor pedagogical skills of the teachers being mobilized by the scheme. A reasonable policy alternative is a scheme that targets talented teachers with larger bonuses.
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Karanja, Stanley Chege, Muathe S. M. A. et Thuo J. Kuria. « Effects of Distribution Strategy on MSP Intermediary Organisations Performance in Nairobi County, Kenya ». Journal of Supply Chain Management Systems 4, no 1and2 (2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.21863/jscms/2015.4.1and2.003.
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This study sought to determine the effect of the Distribution Strategy on the performance of MSP intermediary organizations. It is imperative to note that there has been a high recognition of the role played by the telecommunication sector towards Kenyas economic growth and has multiplier effects on other aspects. This has underscored its importance in the countrys development agenda. However, it still remains validly appreciated that there exist intermediary organizations in the same fast-growing telecommunication sector whose contribution in this acclaimed progress is little appreciated. Thus, the MSP intermediary organizations must implement the appropriate distribution strategies that will enable them deliver their own objectives and those of their parent organizations. The study employed a descripto-explanatory cross-sectional survey research design and collected primary data from 219 respondents from a target population of 397. This study established that choice of distribution strategy contributed significantly to the MSP Intermediary organizations performance. The study recommends that the sales manager need to lobby its management to invest in more people and an ICT system that will enable tracing, tracking and trending of performance of each salesperson and route to ensure adequate coverage of the territory. In addition, sales managers need to lobby the management to approve a performance compensation plan and bonus/incentive scheme that will motivate the salesperson to ensure efficient routing of the customers thus improved performance of the MSP intermediary organization.
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Cadsby, C. Bram, Fei Song et Francis Tapon. « Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat ? An Experimental Investigation ». B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & ; Policy 10, no 1 (19 avril 2010). http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.2481.
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Abstract We compare, through a laboratory experiment using salient financial incentives, misrepresentations of performance under target-based compensation with those under both a linear piece-rate and a tournament-based bonus system. An anagram game was employed as the experimental task. Results show that productivity was similar and statistically indistinguishable under the three schemes. In contrast, whether one considers the number of overclaimed words, the number of work/pay periods in which overclaims occur, or the number of participants making an overclaim at least once, target-based compensation produced significantly more cheating than either of the other two systems. While earlier research has compared cheating under target-based compensation with cheating under non-performance-based compensation, which offers no financial incentive to cheat, this is the first study that compares cheating under target-based schemes to cheating under other performance-based schemes. The results suggest that cheating as a response to incentives can be mitigated without giving up performance pay altogether.
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Giné, Xavier, Ghazala Mansuri et Slesh A. Shrestha. « Mission and the Bottom Line : Performance Incentives in a Multigoal Organization ». Review of Economics and Statistics, 11 décembre 2020, 1–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01001.
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We assess the role of monetary incentives in a mission-oriented organization by randomly assigning workers to one of two bonus schemes, incentivizing either the performance of a microcredit program (bottom line) or the empowerment of clients (mission). We find that the credit bonus improved credit-related outcomes but undermined the social mission, while the social bonus did not harm the bottom line. These results are consistent with a multitasking model with production spillovers or with prosocial behavior. We show that, when missionrelated rewards are unfeasible, organizations that care about both the mission and the bottom line prefer flat wages to incentives.
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Hoppe, Felix. « The Incentive and Signaling Effects of Annual Bonus Schemes : Evidence from Firm Innovation ». SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1269444.
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Drechsler, Martin. « On the Cost-Effective Design of Agglomeration Bonus Schemes for the Conservation of Multiple Competing Species ». Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution 9 (3 août 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2021.695764.
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An important mechanism of species co-existence in spatially structured landscapes is the competition-colonisation trade-off which states that co-existence of competing species is possible if, all other things equal, the better competitor is the worse coloniser. The effectiveness of this trade-off for the facilitation of co-existence, however, is likely to depend on the spatial arrangement of the habitat, because too strong agglomeration of the habitat may overly benefit the strong competitor (being the poor disperser), implying extinction of the inferiour competitor, while too much dispersion of the habitat may drive the superiour competitor (being the inferiour coloniser) to extinction. In working landscapes, biodiversity conservation is often induced through conservation payments that offset the forgone profits incurred by the conservation measure. To control the spatial arrangement of conservation measures and habitats in a conservation payment scheme, the agglomeration bonus has been proposed to provide financial incentives for allocating conservation measures in the vicinity of other sites with conservation measures. This paper presents a generic spatially explicit ecological-economic simulation model to explore the ability of the agglomeration bonus to cost-effectively conserve multiple competing species that differ by their competition strengths, their colonisation rates and their dispersal ranges. The interacting effects of the agglomeration bonus and different species traits and their trade-offs on the species richness in the model landscape are analysed. Recommendations for the biodiversity-maximising design of agglomeration bonus schemes are derived.
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Arifoğlu, Kenan, Hang Ren et Tolga Tezcan. « Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program Does Not Provide the Right Incentives : Issues and Remedies ». Management Science, 14 septembre 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3649.
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The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) reduces Medicare payments to hospitals with higher than expected readmission rates where the expected readmission rate for each hospital is determined based on the readmission levels at other hospitals. Although similar relative performance-based schemes are shown to lead to socially optimal outcomes in other settings (e.g., cost-cutting efforts), HRRP differs from these schemes in three respects: (i) deviation from the targets is adjusted using a multiplier; (ii) the total financial penalty for a hospital with higher than expected readmission rate is capped; and (iii) hospitals with lower than expected readmission rates do not receive bonus payments. We study three regulatory schemes derived from HRRP to determine the impact of each feature and use a principal-agent model to show that (i) HRRP overpenalizes hospitals with excess readmissions because of the multiplier and its effect can be substantial; (ii) having a penalty cap can curtail the effect of financial incentives and result in a no equilibrium outcome when the cap is too low; and (iii) not allowing bonus payments leads to many alternative symmetric equilibria, including one where hospitals exert no effort to reduce readmissions. These results show that HRRP does not provide the right incentives for hospitals to reduce readmissions. Next, we show that a bundled payment-type reimbursement method, which reimburses hospitals once for each episode of care (including readmissions), leads to socially optimal cost and readmissions reduction efforts. Finally, we show that, when delays to accessing care are inevitable, the reimbursement schemes need to provide additional incentives for hospitals to invest sufficiently in capacity. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management.
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Salimi, Meysam, et Edoardo Della Torre. « Pay incentives, human capital and firm innovation in smaller firms ». International Small Business Journal : Researching Entrepreneurship, 26 septembre 2021, 026624262110432. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02662426211043237.
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This study advances the literature on human resource management in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by analysing how individual and collective forms of performance-related pay (PRP) influence SMEs’ propensity for product and process innovation and how such influence varies depending on the firm’s level of human capital. We used the microdata of more than 12,000 European SMEs, controlled for endogeneity, and found that both individual (i.e. piece rate and commissions) and collective (i.e. group-bonus and profit-sharing) PRP are positively associated with higher levels of firm innovation. Interestingly, when both individual and collective PRP schemes are adopted, their association with firm innovation is significant but negative, indicating that the adoption of multiple pay incentives may be detrimental to SMEs’ innovation. Moreover, our results revealed that the effect of individual PRP on innovation is stronger in SMEs with high levels of human capital, whereas the effect of collective PRP is stronger in SMEs with low levels of human capital.
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Tannuri, Guillermina, Sueli Farias, Ernesto Fernando Rodrigues Vicente, Hans Michael van Bellen et Luiz Alberton. « AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF INCENTIVE SCHEMES ON THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF COMPANIES LISTED IN IBRX-50 OF BM&FBOVESPA ». Revista Contabilidade e Controladoria 5, no 1 (15 mai 2013). http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rcc.v5i1.27292.
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As organizações estão inseridas em um mercado exigente e competitivo, e nesse contexto, buscam alternativas estratégicas a fim de obter bons resultados; e um dos desafios consiste em fazer com que os colaboradores atuem de forma a alinhar suas metas pessoais às da organização, conforme abordagem da teoria da agência de Jensen e Meckling. Nesse sentido, como forma de motivar e obter o comprometimento dos colaboradores, as organizações concedem inúmeros benefícios como participação nos lucros, benefícios pós-emprego, remuneração baseada em ações entre outros. O objetivo desta pesquisa consiste em avaliar efeitos perceptíveis no desempenho econômico das empresas listadas no Índice Brasil IBrX-50 da Bovespa decorrentes do tipo e quantidade de incentivos concedidos aos empregados entre os anos de 2006 a 2010. A metodologia utilizada consistiu em coletar as notas explicativas e as demonstrações consolidadas dessas empresas e aplicar testes estatísticos para comparar o desempenho médio de acordo com tipos e quantidades de benefícios oferecidos. Os resultados demonstraram que apenas em alguns anos, as empresas que ofereceram mais tipos de benefícios, apresentaram maiores índices de rentabilidade. Concluiu-se que, embora as organizações tenham aumentado a quantidade de benefícios concedidos no decorrer dos anos pesquisados, estatisticamente, os dados não apresentaram evidências para afirmar que o desempenho econômico das empresas é afetado pelos benefícios oferecidos aos seus empregados em todos os períodos analisados.
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Dai, Tinglong, Xiaofang Wang et Chao-Wei Hwang. « Clinical Ambiguity and Conflicts of Interest in Interventional Cardiology Decision Making ». Manufacturing & ; Service Operations Management, 16 juillet 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0969.
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Problem definition: Among the most vexing issues in the U.S. healthcare ecosystem is inappropriate use of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) procedures, also known as overstenting. A key driver of overstenting is physician subjectivity in eyeballing a coronary angiogram. Advanced tests such as fractional flow reserve (FFR) provide more precise and objective measures of PCI appropriateness, yet the decision to perform these tests is endogenous and not immune to clinical ambiguity associated with eyeballing. Additionally, conflicts of interest, arising from revenue-generating incentives, play a role in overstenting. Academic/practical relevance: Conventional wisdom suggests more precise diagnostic testing will help reduce overtreatment. However, the literature rarely recognizes that the testing decision is itself endogenous. Our research highlights the role of endogeneity surrounding interventional cardiology decision making. Methodology: This study uses stochastic modeling and simulation. Results: Under a low conflict-of-interest level, the physician performs the advanced test for intermediate lesions. Under a high conflict-of-interest level, however, the physician would perform the advanced test only for high-grade lesions, because of a financial disincentive: Performing the advanced test may lower PCI revenue if the test results argue against the procedure. Surprisingly, despite this disincentive, a more revenue-driven physician can be more inclined to perform the advanced test. Managerial implications: Our model leads to implications for various efforts aimed at tackling overstenting: (1) Attention should be paid not only to the sheer quantity of FFR procedures but to which patients receive FFR procedures; (2) reducing the risk of the advanced test has a behavior-inducing effect, yet a modest risk reduction may lower patient welfare; and (3) offering a bonus to the physician for performing FFR procedures equal to a third of its reimbursement rate will cause only a 5% increase in average physician payment while inducing a 26% decline in overstenting. In addition, we show implementing a bundled payment scheme may discourage the use of FFR procedures and lead to more salient overstenting.
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Barber, James. « ‘Photosystem II : the water splitting enzyme of photosynthesis and the origin of oxygen in our atmosphere’ ». Quarterly Reviews of Biophysics 49 (2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0033583516000093.
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AbstractAbout 3 billion years ago an enzyme emerged which would dramatically change the chemical composition of our planet and set in motion an unprecedented explosion in biological activity. This enzyme used solar energy to power the thermodynamically and chemically demanding reaction of water splitting. In so doing it provided biology with an unlimited supply of reducing equivalents needed to convert carbon dioxide into the organic molecules of life while at the same time produced oxygen to transform our planetary atmosphere from an anaerobic to an aerobic state. The enzyme which facilitates this reaction and therefore underpins virtually all life on our planet is known as Photosystem II (PSII). It is a pigment-binding, multisubunit protein complex embedded in the lipid environment of the thylakoid membranes of plants, algae and cyanobacteria. Today we have detailed understanding of the structure and functioning of this key and unique enzyme. The journey to this level of knowledge can be traced back to the discovery of oxygen itself in the 18th-century. Since then there has been a sequence of mile stone discoveries which makes a fascinating story, stretching over 200 years. But it is the last few years that have provided the level of detail necessary to reveal the chemistry of water oxidation and O–O bond formation. In particular, the crystal structure of the isolated PSII enzyme has been reported with ever increasing improvement in resolution. Thus the organisational and structural details of its many subunits and cofactors are now well understood. The water splitting site was revealed as a cluster of four Mn ions and a Ca ion surrounded by amino-acid side chains, of which seven provide direct ligands to the metals. The metal cluster is organised as a cubane structure composed of three Mn ions and a Ca2+ linked by oxo-bonds with the fourth Mn ion attached to the cubane. This structure has now been synthesised in a non-protein environment suggesting that it is a totally inorganic precursor for the evolution of the photosynthetic oxygen-evolving complex. In summary, the overall structure of the catalytic site has given a framework on which to build a mechanistic scheme for photosynthetic dioxygen generation and at the same time provide a blue-print and incentive to develop catalysts for artificial photo-electrochemical systems to split water and generate renewable solar fuels.