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1
Thompson, Graeme. « Reframing Canada’s Great War : Liberalism, sovereignty, and the British Empire c. 1860s–1919 ». International Journal : Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 73, no 1 (mars 2018) : 85–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702018765936.
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This article examines how Canadian Liberals understood Canada’s international relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, situating their political thought within the British imperial world and their views of the Great War in a broader historical context. It argues that while Liberals regarded Canadian participation in the war as an affirmation of nationhood, they nonetheless conceived of Canada as a “British nation” and an integral part of a British imperial community in international politics. The article further illuminates the growth of an autonomous Canadian foreign policy within the British Empire, and shows that even the staunchest Liberal proponents of independence upheld the Dominion’s British connection. In so doing, it connects the history of Canadian Liberalism to a wider British Liberal tradition that advocated the transformation of the relationship between the United Kingdom and its settler Dominions from one of imperial dependence to that of equal, sovereign, and freely associated nations.
2
Sherington, Geoffrey. « British academics, liberalism, and the First World War ». History of Education Review 45, no 2 (3 octobre 2016) : 198–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/her-09-2015-0019.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the War on two prominent academic liberal historians. Design/methodology/approach The research is based on a narrative of their lives and careers before and during the War. Findings The findings include an analysis of how the War engaged these academic liberals in the pursuit of the War effort. Originality/value By the end of the War, both sought to reaffirm much of their earlier academic liberalism despite the political and social changes in the post-war world.
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Nagel, Jack H., et Christopher Wlezien. « Centre-Party Strength and Major-Party Divergence in Britain, 1945–2005 ». British Journal of Political Science 40, no 2 (24 mars 2010) : 279–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123409990111.
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British elections exhibit two patterns contrary to expectations deriving from Duverger and Downs: centrist third parties (Liberals and their successors) win a large vote share; and the two major parties often espouse highly divergent policies. This article explores relations between the Liberal vote and left–right scores of the Labour and Conservative manifestos in the light of two hypotheses: the vacated centre posits that Liberals receive more votes when major parties diverge; the occupied centre proposes a lagged effect in which major parties diverge farther after Liberals do well in the preceding election. Data from elections since 1945 confirm the vacated-centre hypothesis, with Liberals benefiting about equally when the major parties diverge to the left and right, respectively. The results also support the occupied-centre hypothesis for Conservative party positions, but not for Labour’s. After considering explanations for this asymmetry, we identify historical events associated with turning points that our data reveal in post-war British politics.
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Vranic, Bojan. « Toward ideational collective action : The notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century social liberalism ». Filozofija i drustvo 30, no 3 (2019) : 369–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1903369v.
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The aim of this paper is to analyze notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century British social liberalism and their relation to collective action of the citizens. The author shows that British social liberals argued for a type of state that uses top down strategy to encourage collective action in order to transform individuals into a socially responsible groups, i.e. good citizens. The paper focuses on philosophical works of F. H. Bradley, ethics of T. H. Green and political philosophy of B. Bosanquet, analyzing their efforts to reconceptualize ideas of classical liberalism and utilitarian doctrine of the individual, society and the state in light of emerging influence of leftist social movements. The author argues that the works of British social liberals are a foundation of the state and society which will dominate liberalism in the second half of 20th century, i.e. the idea of the welfare state.
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WEINSTEIN, BENJAMIN. « LIBERALISM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM, AND POLITICAL EDUCATION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH INDIA, 1880–1886 ». Historical Journal 61, no 1 (9 avril 2017) : 181–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x1600056x.
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AbstractThis article attempts to shed new light on the character of late Victorian Liberalism by investigating its political priorities in British India. It takes as its particular focus the debates which raged between 1881 and 1883 over the Government of India Resolution on Local Self-Government. Along with the Ilbert Bill, the Resolution comprised the centrepiece of the marquis of Ripon's self-consciously Liberal programme for dismantling Lytton's Raj. When analysed in conjunction with contemporaneous Liberal discourse on English local government reform, the debates surrounding the Resolution help to clarify many of the central principles of late Victorian Liberalism. In particular, these debates emphasize the profound importance of local government reform to what one might call the Liberal project. Beyond its utility in effecting retrenchment, efficiency, and ‘sound finance’, local government reform was valued by Liberals as the best and safest means of effecting ‘political education’ among populations, in both Britain and India, with increasingly strong claims to inclusion within the body politic.
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Smith, James Patterson. « Empire and Social Reform : British Liberals and the “Civilizing Mission” in the Sugar Colonies, 1868–1874 ». Albion 27, no 2 (1995) : 253–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4051528.
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In contrast to the spirit of laissez-faire, the Colonial Office under Gladstone's first government served as a large-scale social engineering agency concerned with the cautious restructuring of volatile societies in the sugar-producing colonies of the West Indies and the Indian Ocean. From the perspective of the Colonial Office civilizing the barbarian made him more governable. There is a revealing paradox in the fact that so much of what Victorian Liberals did in the name of civilizing benighted natives involved active government initiatives in imperial settings. Under the banner of “peace, retrenchment, and reform” nineteenth-century British Liberals advocated cost-cutting and laissez-faire at home and non-expansion abroad. Liberal leaders' public statements in this vein helped set the historiographical stereotype of supposed Gladstonian Liberal “little Englandism” versus a dramatic imperial policy shift toward “forward movement” in the Disraelian Conservative era. Scholarship over the last thirty years has refuted this older view and has stressed the continuity of British imperialism throughout the nineteenth century. However, a careful examination of the details of policy reveals that from 1868–74 the Liberals not only valued the Empire, but were willing to sacrifice their own theories of limited government in order to strengthen the British hold—even on their bankrupt sugar colonies in the Caribbean and Indian oceans. Initiatives in colonial religion, education, health, justice, and labor regulation demonstrate a surprising Liberal bent toward government activism in the non-white Empire. Moreover, the self-conscious and energetic manipulation of such a wide range of policy tools reveals a serious Liberal commitment to empire, which further belies the old notion that from 1868–74, “little Englandism” reached its high point.
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Whiteley, Giles. « HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL'S PHONTISTERION (1852) ». Victorian Literature and Culture 46, no 2 (16 mai 2018) : 485–514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150318000104.
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Established in 1859, as a merger of the Whigs, Radicals and Peelites, the British Liberal Party and their ideological forerunners won 15 out of a total of 20 parliamentary elections between 1832–1910. Responsible for passing socially progressive legislation domestically, Victorian liberalism can lay claim to being the most significant political ideology of the period. By bringing together aspects of classical social liberalism and liberal free-market conservatism, this specifically Victorian brand of liberalism enabled Britain to take a place at the center of world affairs. Indeed, by the mid-1850s, the emergence of Victorian liberalism had begun to be seen as something of a political necessity, as demonstrated by Thomas Babington Macaulay's The History of England from the Accession of James II (1848–61), a foundational text of Whig historicism, in which Lord Charles Grey's 1832 Reform Bill was characterized as the teleological culmination of British history. But while the liberals styled themselves as progressives and their opponents as reactionaries, Whig history has tended to oversimplify the dynamics of this narrative. In this context, Henry Longueville Mansel's closet drama Phontisterion offers a fascinating glimpse into a contemporary Tory response to the seemingly irresistible rise of Victorian liberalism.
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GARASIMCHUK, Anna Nikolaevna. « THE REACTION OF THE LIBERAL CIRCLES OF ENGLAND AT THE FORMATION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN THE COVERAGE OF THE NEWSPAPER “THE MORNING POST” (1867) ». Tambov University Review. Series : Humanities, no 175 (2018) : 177–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/1810-0201-2018-23-175-177-182.
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The reaction of the liberal circles of England to the formation of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1867 is considered. The material, on which the study is based, was the Bri- tish newspaper “The Morning Post”, which expressed the interests of the middle class of the bourgeoisie and was the so-called “megaphone” of the Liberal party of Great Britain. Analysis of the newspaper material showed that in the British newspaper the most often raised and considered Austria-Hungary issues are the following: 1) the personality of Emperor Franz Joseph I; 2) the reorganization of the political system of Austria-Hungary on the basis of liberal laws; 3) the adoption of the Constitution of 1867 and the subsequent domestic changes. The study of the journalistic material led to the conclusion that the British liberals met very positively the formation of Austria-Hungary, because in its original form the reforms carried out by the Austrian government were a vivid example of the liberal ideology defended by the liberal community of Great Britain. Nevertheless, the emotionally expressive tone of newspaper articles shows that British liberals, having accepted the changes taking place in Austria-Hungary positively, were not always able to give an objective assessment of what was happening, so the newspaper often does not talk about the real problems of Austrian society.
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Novicic, Zaklina. « Globoscepticism of classical liberals ». Medjunarodni problemi 67, no 1 (2015) : 45–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp1501045n.
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In the past few years, after 50 years on academic margins the debate on a world government (or world state) is renewed. Traditionally it is followed by aversion toward world state, nowdays called globoscepticism. The paper focuses on classical liberal thinkers of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and their views on a world state, that have been rooted in early federal peace proposals and analyses of modern political thinkers (Rousseau, Bentham, Cobden, Mill, Smith, Mill). The author points out on Kant?s ?federalism of free states?, to show it did not imply support for world state but improved international law. Also, it is confirmed that globoskepticism of the classical British liberals, or their distrust of a world organization, arises from general liberal distrust of a big state political organization. The classical liberal attitude has been abandoned by new liberal internationalists at the beginning of the twentieth century, but classical liberal doctrine continues to have both an academic influence and practical outcomes.
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BEHRENT, MICHAEL C. « LIBERAL DISPOSITIONS : RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON FRENCH LIBERALISM ». Modern Intellectual History 13, no 2 (20 février 2015) : 447–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244314000845.
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The story of French liberalism is, we are often told, one of exceptions, eccentricities, and enigmas. Compared to their British counterparts, French liberals seem more reluctant to embrace individualism. Whereas liberals in the English-speaking world typically espouse what Isaiah Berlin called “negative liberty”—a sphere of private autonomy from which the state is legally excluded—French liberals have often proved highly accommodating towards “positive liberty”—that is, liberty insofar as it is tethered to collectively defined ends. Most crucially, rather than seeking to shield individuals and civil society from an intrusive state, French liberals—consistent with a broader trend in French political culture—are inclined to see the state as an essential and even emancipatory political tool. In this vein, Jean-Fabien Spitz writes in a recent collection entitledFrench Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day,Contemporary historians, political scientists, and philosophers all seem to share a simple idea: French political culture, marked as it is by legalism and statism, constitutes an exception to the main trend in modern political thought, which has been to discover and assert the principles of modern liberty.In addition to departing from some of Anglo-American liberalism's main tenets, French liberalism exhibits other oddities: as Larry Siedentop argued in an important essay, its idiom has tended to be historical (rather than theoretical), institutional (as opposed to ethical) and sociological (not legal or political).2This somewhat idiosyncratic variation on “normal” liberalism has led some scholars to characterize liberalism's French iteration as a “chaotic mixture.”3Others have questioned the extent to which liberalism is really a significant French political tradition at all. France's Revolutionary culture has been described as ultimately “illiberal,” leading some historians to speak of a FrenchSonderweg,4in which France's “special path” consists in the fact that it entered the modern age without having developed genuinely liberal institutions.
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Bernstein, George L. « Yorkshire Liberalism during the First World War ». Historical Journal 32, no 1 (mars 1989) : 107–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00015326.
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For some time now, the narrative of the Liberal party's demise during the First World War has been fairly firmly defined. The war imposed strains on liberal ideology by forcing Liberals to compromise long-cherished policies such as free trade, a free market and a volunteer army. Concurrently, a growing division among Liberals emerged over how to conduct the war. H. H. Asquith and his supporters were increasingly reluctant to accept further compromises of voluntarism and the market mechanism for allocating resources; David Lloyd George and his supporters demanded massive government intervention in every aspect of the economy to mobilize the nation for total war. The replacement of Asquith by Lloyd George as prime minister in December 1916 marked the triumph of the latter approach. Traditional liberalism as a practical ideology of government was now discredited. The Liberal party was left with no unity or purpose. The leaders disliked and distrusted each other; there was no agreement on policy or the future direction of the party. Thus, it was in no position by the end of the war to compete with the resurgent Conservative and Labour parties for the allegiance of the British voter.
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CHATTERJEE, PARTHA. « THE CURIOUS CAREER OF LIBERALISM IN INDIA ». Modern Intellectual History 8, no 3 (27 septembre 2011) : 687–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244311000412.
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There is a long-standing myth that the history of modern India was foretold at the beginning of the nineteenth century by British liberals who predicted that the enlightened despotic rule of India's new conquerors would, by its beneficial effects, improve the native character and institutions sufficiently to prepare the people of that country one day to govern themselves. Lord William Bentinck, a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, while presenting as governor-general his case for the opening up of India to European settlers, speculated on the possibility of “a vast change to have occurred in the frame of society . . . which would imply that the time had arrived when it would be wise for England to leave India to govern itself”, but added that such change “can scarcely be looked for in centuries to come”. The doctrinal basis within liberal theory for justifying a democratic country like Britain exercising despotic power in colonies such as Ireland and India was securely laid out by mid-century liberals such as John Stuart Mill. The project of “improvement” was revived at the end of the nineteenth century by Gladstonian liberals who inducted elite Indians into new representative institutions based on a very narrow franchise in preparation for some form of self-government. When power was ultimately transferred to the rulers of a partitioned subcontinent in 1947, the history of liberal progress in India was complete. The storyline was laid out, for instance, in Thompson and Garratt's Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India or in Percival Spear's revised edition of the hugely successful textbook by Vincent Smith. Even nationalist Indian scholars adopted at least a part of this story, nowhere more so than in the histories of constitutional law which traced the foundations of the postcolonial Indian republic to the progressive expansion of liberal state institutions under British rule.
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Powell, David. « The New Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, 1886–1906 ». Historical Journal 29, no 2 (juin 1986) : 369–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00018781.
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The political history of Liberalism in the twenty years after 1886 was dominated by two great concerns: the need to find a unifying platform for the party which would be capable of sustaining it as an effective political force in the post-Gladstonian era and the need to come to terms with the growing economic and political strength of organized Labour. It was axiomatic that the two concerns were closely connected and that ‘social reform’ was the crucial link between them. It seemed clear that a more active social policy would not only renew the reforming impetus of Liberalism, but would also enable the Liberals to retain working-class support and so help to prevent the formation of a separate Labour party. This was the assumption that spurred Liberals to a redefinition of their political creed and led to the formulation of a ‘new Liberalism’ committed to policies of state intervention and social reform of the kind implemented by Asquith, Churchill and Lloyd George after 1906.3 However, while the New Liberalism may have acted as a cohering influence on the Liberal party (itself a moot point) and provided a firm intellectual justification for its policies, it proved less successful as a means of retaining Labour's undivided electoral support. With the formation, first of the Independent Labour Party in 1893, and then of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900, there was set in train the formal organizational separation of the Liberal and Labour parties that was so drastically to affect the subsequent fortunes of Liberalism and so decisively to shape the pattern of modern British politics. The question that remains is whether this rift was the result of the tardiness with which the Liberals adopted their new policies, whether it was the product of other, quite separate factors, or whether in some way the nature of the New Liberalism itself may have contributed to the breach.
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Peden, George. « NEOLIBERAL ECONOMISTS AND THE BRITISH WELFARE STATE, 1942–1975 ». Journal of the History of Economic Thought 39, no 4 (4 octobre 2017) : 413–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837216001085.
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Liberal economists’ attitudes towards the welfare state are examined to see how clearly neoliberalism can be distinguished from other forms of liberalism. Three questions are asked. First, how could Friedrich Hayek believe he could accommodate elements of the welfare state agenda set by William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes into his thinking? Second, why did Hayek become increasingly critical of the welfare state? Third, how far did Lionel Robbins, John Jewkes, and Alan Peacock agree with him? All three might be regarded as neoliberals according to the litmus test set by Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe: that is, membership of the Mont Pèlerin Society or a think tank associated with the Atlas Economic Research Foundation. Yet, Robbins, Jewkes, and Peacock are on a spectrum between Mirowski’s definition of neoliberalism as a belief that freedom is to be found in the unfettered market, and classical and democratic liberals’ belief that people have to be nurtured to become effective citizens and have to be protected from the market’s disruptive effects. It is suggested that a nuanced approach is required in explaining why liberal economists came to believe the welfare state should make more use of markets and pricing systems for registering preferences and apportioning resources.
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BERNSTEIN, GEORGE L. « SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND APPEASEMENT : LIBERAL POLICY TOWARDS AMERICA IN THE AGE OF PALMERSTON ». Historical Journal 41, no 3 (septembre 1998) : 725–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x98007973.
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There was constant tension between Britain and the United States from 1840 to 1865. The Liberals, who dominated British government during this period, had no doubt why: American governments, pandering to the democratic mob, provoked crises with Britain for domestic electoral purposes. They did this by encouraging acts of aggression or provocation by American citizens, and by threatening and bullying the British government, in order to get their way on issues of contention. Furthermore, they succeeded, even though Britain's leaders usually thought either that right was clearly on the British side or was sufficiently ambiguous to justify greater concessions by the Americans than were finally secured. This policy of appeasing the United States was forced on Liberal governments because their middle-class constituency perceived a ‘special relationship’ between the two countries, based on blood, religion, liberal traditions, and trade. They would not contemplate the threat of war with the United States, and since no important British interest was involved, the British government usually gave way. When it did not, as during the Trent affair, the British interest was to prevent further crises.
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Pilbeam, Bruce. « What Ever Happened to Economic Liberalism ? » Politics 23, no 2 (mai 2003) : 82–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00183.
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This article challenges conventional portrayals of the status of economic liberalism within the contemporary British and American intellectual Right. Specifically, it seeks to correct two misconceptions. First, that within the intellectual Right economic liberalism is the dominant ideological component; and second, that it is a wholly confident and triumphalist ideology, with economic liberals unambiguously committed to an assertive individualist creed. In fact, many are far more pessimistic, defensive and insecure than is frequently acknowledged.
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Randall, Kelvin. « Are Liberals Winning ? A Longitudinal Study of Clergy Churchmanship ». Journal of Empirical Theology 30, no 2 (11 décembre 2017) : 148–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15709256-12341355.
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Abstract Surveys indicate a growing liberal consensus within British churches as well as in British society. Is this because each succeeding generation is more liberal than the previous one. Or is it that individuals as they grow older become more liberal? In a longitudinal study of churchmanship among Anglican clergy in England and Wales, the results indicate that individual clergy, male and female, older and younger, are becoming less Conservative and more Liberal.
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Galston, William A. « Moral Pluralism and Liberal Democracy : Isaiah Berlin's Heterodox Liberalism ». Review of Politics 71, no 1 (2009) : 85–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670509000072.
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AbstractWhile Isaiah Berlin considered himself principally as a political theorist in the liberal tradition, his was an unorthodox liberalism in both method and substance, rooted in the confluence of three traditions—British, Russian, and Jewish. Unlike many liberals, he wrestled with the tension between universalism and particularism, and also between individualism and communalities. He rejected all monistic approaches to morality (including liberal monism) but repudiated as well the moral relativism of much modern thought, espousing instead value pluralism. While we cannot arrive at a universally valid conception of the summum bonum, we can specify the summun malum—the great evils of the human condition. Berlin saw political theory as a branch of moral philosophy but drew political morality from political life rather than imposing it on politics. The range of goods and principles that human beings rightly prize cannot be combined into harmonious wholes in either our individual or collective existence. Some goods exclude others, and we must choose among them.
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PHILIP, ALAN BUTT. « EUROPEANS FIRST AND LAST : BRITISH LIBERALS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ». Political Quarterly 64, no 4 (octobre 1993) : 447–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.1993.tb00371.x.
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Kovic, Milos. « The eastern question in the parliament of the United Kingdom in 1876 ». Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no 178 (2021) : 189–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn2178189k.
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This article scrutinizes the attitude of the British political elites towards the Eastern question, in the year of the beginning of the Serbian liberation and unification wars of 1876-1878. It is based on diverse sources, Hansard?s Parliamentary Debates being the most important one. The Eastern question, as geopolitical problem of the future of the Balkan and Levantine lands from which the Ottoman Empire was gradually retreating, has been considered through the confrontation of Great Britain and Russia on the wider Eurasian stage, especially in relation to their conflict in the Central Asia. The article is mainly devoted to the different interpretations, debates and conflicts in the British Parliament and public opinion, provoked by the Serbian uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia, atrocities in Bulgaria, and the beginning of the Serbian-Turkish Wars. The divisions went mainly through the party lines. Behind almost all events in the East, the Conservatives perceived the hand of Russia and League of the Three Emperors (Dreikaisebund). These ?foreign influences? were attributed mainly to Russia and Serbia, as the alleged Russia?s tool in the Balkans. Thus, according to the Conservatives, the Serbs and Russians were to blame for the sufferings of Bulgarians in the hands of the Turks. Additionally, they were repeating that Turkish crimes were committed in self-defence, and that the numbers of victims were hugely exaggerated by the Russian, Serbian and Bulgarian propaganda and the British liberal press. The Conservatives had similar attitudes towards the atrocities committed by the Turks in the Eastern Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Liberals, on the other hand, were insisting that the main causes of these uprisings and wars were national feelings, economical problems, and the misrule of the Turks. They were directing their moral indignation not only to the Turks, but to the British government as well. According to the Liberals, by despatching of the British fleet in the vicinity of the Ottoman capital, the British government encouraged the Turks and made Great Britain co-responsible for the atrocities committed in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Clarke, Harold D., et Gary Zuk. « The Dynamics of Third-Party Support : The British Liberals, 1951-79 ». American Journal of Political Science 33, no 1 (février 1989) : 196. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111259.
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Muriuki, Godgrey, et Dickson A. Mungazi. « The Last British Liberals in Africa : Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd ». International Journal of African Historical Studies 33, no 2 (2000) : 438. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/220702.
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Maddox, Gregory H., et Dickson A. Mungazi. « The Last British Liberals in Africa : Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd ». American Historical Review 105, no 5 (décembre 2000) : 1845. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2652208.
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Sloman, Peter. « Partners in Progress ? British Liberals and the Labour Party since 1918 ». Political Studies Review 12, no 1 (janvier 2014) : 41–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12038.
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Гаврикова, А. С. « Socio-political Discourse Addressing Liberal Values in Russia in the Early 20th Century ». Вестник Рязанского государственного университета имени С.А. Есенина, no 1(70) (17 mars 2021) : 40–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.37724/rsu.2021.70.1.004.
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В статье рассматривается обращение либеральных кругов российской общественности начала ХХ века к исследованию избирательного права, гражданских свобод, организации выборов, проведению политической агитации и британского опыта в этих вопросах. Внутриполитические кризисные явления в России в начале ХХ века и рост революционных настроений сказались на повестке отечественной общественно-политической мысли. Работа первого российского парламента — Государственной думы, и становление многопартийности находились под пристальным вниманием отечественных либералов. Выборы и процесс введения всеобщего избирательного права изучался с учетом уже имеющегося западного опыта, в том числе английского выборного права. Анализируются оригинальные взгляды В. В. Водовозова, Н. И. Лазаревского, В. Ф. Матвеева, В. Ф. Дерюжинского, весьма остро реагировавших на происходящее в стране и проявлявших высокий интерес к изучению британского опыта партийного строительства и демократических ценностей. В кругах либералов появился практический интерес к исследованию политической жизни Великобритании. В статье отражены и обобщены их взгляды на дальнейшую демократизацию России, включение населения в политическую жизнь, расширение политических и гражданских прав и свобод населения, свободы печати, собраний, союзов, петиций. The article focuses on the way Russian liberals of the early 20th century treated the investigation of suffrage, civil freedoms, election system, political propaganda, and the British election practices. Domestic political problems experienced by Russia in the early 20th century and the proliferation of revolutionary ideas produced a significant impact on the socio-political discourse. The work of Russia’s first Parliament, the State Duma, and the development of a multi-party parliamentary system were scrutinized by Russian liberals. Election practices and the introduction of universal suffrage were assessed against the backdrop of foreign election practices, British election practices in particular. The article analyzes V. V. Vodovozov’s, N. I. Lazorevsky’s, V. F. Matveev’s, V. F. Deryuzhinsky’s views on the changes pervading the Russian political system. It underlines the political philosopher’s keen interest in the investigation of British party practices and democratic values. The article maintains that Russian liberals were interested in the investigation of British political life. It deals with Russian liberals’ views on further democratization of Russia, people’s engagement in political life, the proliferation of political and civil rights and freedoms, including the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of association, and the freedom of petition.
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Easton, Christina. « Educating in Respect : Against Neutral Discourse as a Norm for Respectful Classroom Discussion ». Philosophy 93, no 2 (13 février 2018) : 187–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819117000602.
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AbstractSince 2014, British schools have been required to ‘actively promote’ the value of ‘mutual respect’ to the children in their care. This is relatively unproblematic: liberals are agreed that good citizenship education will involve teaching mutual respect. However, there is disagreement over how ‘respect’ should be understood and what it should imply for norms of respectful classroom discussion. Some political liberals have indicated that when engaging in discussion in the classroom, students should provide only neutral reasons to defend their views. This paper provides a number of arguments against this claim. For example, I argue that this norm relies on a distorted understanding of what it is to respect others and that it stifles the development of civic and epistemic virtue in the next generation of citizens. Even from within the perspective of political liberalism, there are good reasons to favour critical discussion of non-neutral reasons. Education policy should therefore accord greater priority to discussion of students’ actual motivating reasons than to discussion constrained by a norm of neutral discourse.
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Clark, Anna. « Humanitarianism, Human Rights and Biopolitics in the British Empire, 1890–1902 ». Britain and the World 9, no 1 (mars 2016) : 96–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/brw.2016.0216.
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The 1890s were a key time for debates about imperial humanitarianism and human rights in India and South Africa. This article first argues that claims of humanitarianism can be understood as biopolitics when they involved the management and disciplining of populations. This article examines the historiography that analyses British efforts to contain the Bombay plague in 1897 and the Boer War concentration camps as forms of discipline extending control over colonized subjects. Secondly, human rights language could be used to oppose biopolitical management. While scholars have criticized liberal human rights language for its universalism, this article argues that nineteenth-century liberals did not believe that rights were universal; they had to be earned. It was radical activists who drew on notions of universal rights to oppose imperial intervention and criticize the camps in India and South Africa. These activists included two groups: the Personal Rights Association and the Humanitarian League; and the individuals Josephine Butler, Sol Plaatje, Narayan Meghaji Lokhande, and Bal Gandadhar Tilak. However, these critics also debated amongst themselves how far human rights should extend.
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Colbrook, Stephen. « Sectarianism, the Nonconformist Conscience, and ‘British Pluralism’ : The Digital Humanities and the Language of Home Rule, c.1910–1914 ». Twentieth Century British History 31, no 2 (31 décembre 2019) : 145–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwz042.
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Abstract In recent years, historians have reassessed the political importance of the third Home Rule Bill. Important works by G. K. Peatling, Daniel Jackson, and David Thackeray have overturned the once-dominant view that the measure was a straightforward distraction from social reform. Yet, this scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the response of Unionists to Home Rule, and few works discuss the measure’s significance for Edwardian Liberals. This article rectifies this historiographical oversight by comparing the Liberal and Unionist response to the third Home Rule Bill in Devonshire and Lancashire. Using techniques from the digital humanities, I have shown that the measure dominated the grassroots political discourse of both parties before the First World War.
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Green, Lara. « Russian revolutionary terrorism, British liberals, and the problem of empire (1884–1914) ». History of European Ideas 46, no 5 (7 avril 2020) : 633–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2020.1746083.
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Bélanger, Éric, Richard Nadeau et Michael S. Lewis-Beck. « Forecasting the Vote for a Third Party : The British Liberals, 1974–2005 ». British Journal of Politics and International Relations 12, no 4 (25 août 2010) : 634–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2010.00427.x.
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Ajzenstat, Janet. « Modern Mixed Government : A Liberal Defence of Inequality ». Canadian Journal of Political Science 18, no 1 (mars 1985) : 119–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900029243.
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AbstractEighteenth-century British Whig and Tory accounts of mixed government and the balanced constitution are examined together with the similar doctrine favoured by British liberals of the Great Reform Bill period, among them Lord Durham. Durham's Report of 1839 is particularly interesting, it is argued, since it purports to demonstrate the superiority of mixed government to the kind of majoritarian democracy put forward in those years by British and colonial radicals. Durham's proposal to curtail the powers of the democratic branch of government in Lower Canada—the Legislative Assembly, he wrote, had “endeavoured to extend its authority in modes totally incompatible with the principles of constitutional liberty”—is compared to the eighteenth-century “court” party argument for a strong political executive. It is suggested that Durham and the eighteenth-century thinkers together provide grounds for supposing that even today the egalitarian aims of modern societies are furthered by a political system that recognizes man's natural inequalities.
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Smith, James Patterson. « The Liberals, Race, and Political Reform in the British West Indies, 1866-1874 ». Journal of Negro History 79, no 2 (avril 1994) : 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2717624.
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Bourne, Ryan. « Why did the British Brexit ? and What are the Implications for Classical Liberals ? » Economic Affairs 36, no 3 (octobre 2016) : 356–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12205.
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Nikitin, Dmitry S. « To the History of the Formation of the Indian Parliamentary Committee in the British House of Commons ». Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no 462 (2021) : 142–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/15617793/462/18.
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The aim of this article is to study the history of the formation of the Indian Parliamentary Committee (IPC) in the British House of Commons in 1893. To achieve this aim, the following objectives are envisaged: determination of reasons for establishing the IPC; analysis of the activities of the Indian National Congress and British liberals; analysis of the election campaign of Dadabhai Naoroji, which enabled him to get a seat in the House of Commons in 1892. The sources of the study are the pamphlets of the Indian National Congress members, which explain the need for Indian representatives to participate in the British Parliament; records of parliamentary hearings on the Indian issue; materials of the press describing the course of the election campaign of 1892 and the tasks of the Indian Committee in Parliament. In the course of the study, the author came to the following conclusions. The moderate branch in the Indian liberation movement considered the British Rule in India to be a progressive phenomenon in the Indian life. The defects of the British administration were due to the fact that the English people and Parliament did not understand the problems that the Indian population faced under the British Rule. The Parliamentary Committee dealing exclusively with the Indian issue could contribute to solving this problem. The main conductor of this idea in India was the National Congress, which, since its inception, began work on the formation of the IPC. In the late 1880s, an Indian political agency, which intensified attempts to organize an Indian committee in Parliament, was established in London. The interests of the Indians in the House of Commons at that time were defended by the Liberal MP Charles Bradlaugh. On the basis of the proposals of the National Congress, he prepared a bill on Indian councils, which came into force in 1892. Nevertheless, the creation of the Indian Parliamentary Committee became possible only in 1893, when Dadabhai Naoroji and William Wadderburn (founders of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress) were elected to the House of Commons as Liberal MPs. In general, the creation of the IPC was a progressive step in the development of the Indian liberation movement because the IPC gave the moderate nationalists and their British liberal supporters new tools of fighting for the rights of Indian subjects of the British Empire. The appearance of supporters of Indian reforms in Parliament was the evidence of the success of the IPC’s course of expanding political agitation in England, although it did not guarantee significant achievements in solving of the Indian question.
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Ellis, John S. « “The Methods of Barbarism” and the “Rights of Small Nations” : War Propaganda and British Pluralism ». Albion 30, no 1 (1998) : 49–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4052383.
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The “methods of barbarism” and the “rights of small nations” are perhaps the most recognizable of British slogans arising out of the wars of the early twentieth century. They are instantly associated with the Boer War and the First World War respectively, but seldom are they associated with each other. However, the Pro-Boer rhetoric of “the methods of barbarism” and the First World War propaganda of “the rights of small nations” are intimately linked through their roots in the pluralist Liberal vision of Britishness.These slogans and the propaganda campaigns that they epitomized must be understood within the context of a multicultural Britain and opposing notions of British national identity. Defining “barbarism” as the oppression of small nations through the brutal use of force, the Pro-Boers associated the term with the Anglocentric vision of the British nation reflected in the “New Imperialism” of the Conservatives. Through their belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, the Conservative imperialists maintained that small nations like those of the Irish, the Welsh, and the Boers would either be assimilated or swept aside by the historical progress of an expanding Anglo-Saxon nation state. In contrast to this notion of Conservative “barbarism,” the Pro-Boer Liberals drew on the Gladstonian heritage of their party in defining the United Kingdom as a multinational state at the center of a multinational empire. They eschewed the use of force in the maintenance of empire and argued that the bonds of imperialism must be based upon mutual goodwill, voluntarism, and the recognition of the principle of nationality.When the First World War broke out in 1914, propagandists drew upon these contrasting constructions of Liberal cultural pluralism and Conservative cultural uniformity. In terms similar to those employed by the Pro-Boers, British propagandists depicted the First World War as a struggle against German “barbarism” and as a fight to vindicate the “rights of small nations.” Solidly based upon the Liberal construction of the multicultural and multinational nature of Britishness, Britain's role as the champion of the principle of nationality was proclaimed with an eye not only to the international context of Europe but to the domestic context of the British state and empire as well.
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Mancke, Elizabeth. « Early Modern Imperial Governance and the Origins of Canadian Political Culture ». Canadian Journal of Political Science 32, no 1 (mars 1999) : 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900010076.
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AbstractFor the last three decades, scholars of Canadian political culture have favoured ideological explanations for state formation with the starting point being the American Revolution and Loyalist resettlement in British North America. This article challenges both the ideological bias and the late eighteenth-century chronology through a reassessment of early modern developments in the British imperial state. It shows that many of the institutional features associated with the state in British North America and later Canada—strong executives and weak assemblies, Crown control of land and natural resources, parliamentary funding of colonial development and accommodation of non-British subjects—were all institutionalized in the imperial state before the American Revolution and before the arrival of significant numbers of ethnically British settlers to Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Quebec. Ideological discourses in the British North American colonies that became Canada, unlike those that became the United States, traditionally acknowledged the presence of a strong state in its imperial and colonial manifestations. Rather than challenging its legitimacy, as had Americans, British North Americans, whether liberals, republicans or tories, debated the function of the state and the distribution of power within it.
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BELL, DUNCAN, et CASPER SYLVEST. « INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN VICTORIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT : T. H. GREEN, HERBERT SPENCER, AND HENRY SIDGWICK ». Modern Intellectual History 3, no 2 (août 2006) : 207–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244306000837.
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, British liberal ideology contained an open-ended vision of international order. The vision usually included a notion of an incipient or immanent international society composed of civilized nations. The fundamental distinction between civilized and barbarian nations meant that while this perceived society was international, in no sense was it global. In this essay we outline some of the broader characteristics of the internationalist outlook that many liberals shared and specifically discuss the claims about international society that they articulated. Liberal internationalism was a broad church and many (but not all) of its fundamental assumptions about the nature and direction of international progress and the importance of civilization were shared by large swathes of the intellectual elite. These assumptions are analysed by exploring the conceptions of international society found in three of the most influential thinkers of the time, T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer and Henry Sidgwick. Finally, the essay turns to the limitations of this vision of international society, especially in the context of the role of empire.
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Murton, J. « Creating Order : The Liberals, the Landowners, and the Draining of Sumas Lake, British Columbia ». Environmental History 13, no 1 (1 janvier 2008) : 92–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/envhis/13.1.92.
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SMITTENAAR, RICHARD. « “FEELINGS OF ALARM” : CONSERVATIVE CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY IN MID-VICTORIAN BRITAIN ». Modern Intellectual History 14, no 2 (10 mars 2016) : 365–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244316000019.
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This article is an account of the mid-Victorian conservative reaction to the increasing prominence of the notion of nationality in British debates on European affairs. Conservatives perceived the idea of nationality as a threat, which they tried to deflect by deploying three sets of arguments. They attempted to marginalize the notion by reframing nationality as neither a valuable nor a fundamental aspect of political life; they argued that the sentiment of nationality increased aggression in international affairs and was a threat to the European order; and they argued that nationality was often incompatible with constitutional liberty and a proper patriotism, thereby presenting liberals’ support for nationality as inconsistent with their own values. This conservative rejection and problematization of nationality in mid-Victorian Britain has been absent from existing scholarly work, which has focused on the qualified acceptance of the notion by Victorian liberals and Edwardian conservatives.
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Lloyd-Jones, Naomi. « The 1892 general election in England : Home Rule, the Newcastle programme and positive Unionism* ». Historical Research 93, no 259 (21 janvier 2020) : 73–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hisres/htz009.
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Abstract Largely ignored as an anomaly, the 1892 general election represents a major gap in the scholarship on late nineteenth-century British politics. This article is the first to analyse the issues on and electioneering rhetoric with which it was fought, with a focus on England’s constituencies. It argues that the early 1890s saw the inauguration of a new, ‘positive’ kind of political appeal. It explores how Liberals embraced the radical reforms of the National Liberal Federation’s ‘Newcastle programme’ and how Unionists constructed a self-referential ‘positive Unionism’ that trumpeted their achievements in government. In addition, by considering the limits of Home Rule as an electoral strategy, the article challenges accepted narratives of Liberalism’s slide into ‘faddism’ and Unionist dominance. The article draws on my databases of election addresses. Addresses were an essential medium for the communication of political appeals; by analysing their content, the article highlights the utility of quantitative methodologies for studying shifts in and the transmission of political discourses.
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JONSSON, FREDRIK ALBRITTON. « THE COAL QUESTION BEFORE JEVONS ». Historical Journal 63, no 1 (23 avril 2019) : 107–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x19000153.
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AbstractIn the early nineteenth century, political economists, politicians, and geologists debated the size and duration of the British coal supply. For mineral Malthusians, the argument about a dwindling supply sharpened anxieties about population pressure, fuel demand, and limited resources. They introduced a new sense of geological limits and long-term obligations into the theology of atonement. But for cornucopian liberals, the shift to a mineral energy regime supplied a powerful refutation to the Malthusian forecast. Inexhaustible coal promised growth without end.
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TOMLINSON, JIM. « CHURCHILL'S DEFEAT IN DUNDEE, 1922, AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY ». Historical Journal 63, no 4 (13 novembre 2019) : 980–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x19000475.
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AbstractThis article uses Churchill's defeat in Dundee in 1922 to examine the challenges to liberal political economy in Britain posed by the First World War. In particular, the focus is on the impact of the war on reshaping the global division of labour and the difficulties in responding to the domestic consequences of this reshaping. Dundee provides an ideal basis for examining the links between local politics and global economic changes in this period because of the traumatic effects of the war on the city. Dundee depended to an extraordinary extent on one, extremely ‘globalized’, industry – jute – for its employment. All raw jute brought to Dundee came from Bengal, and the markets for its product were scattered all over the world. Moreover, the main competitive threat to the industry came from a much poorer economy (India), so that jute manufacturing was the first major British industry to be significantly affected by low-wage competition. Before 1914, the Liberals combined advocacy of free trade with a significant set of interventions in the labour market and in social welfare, including trade boards. The Dundee case allows us to examine in detail the responses to post-war challenges to these Liberal orthodoxies.
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Bernstein, George L. « Liberals, the Irish Famine and the role of the state ». Irish Historical Studies 29, no 116 (novembre 1995) : 513–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021121400012268.
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The Irish mythology of the Great Famine of the 1840s explained the failure of the British government to prevent the deaths of some one million people in terms of a Whig government and ruling élite driven by a commitment to laissez-faire ideology which left them indifferent to the loss of Irish lives. At its most extreme, this mythology attributed a wilful genocide to the English. The term myth as used here does not necessarily imply that the account is untrue. Rather, the myth comprises a combination of fact, fiction and the unknowable in a narrative of such power that, for the people who accept it, the myth provides a guide to future understanding and action. In this respect, Irish mythology about the English and the Famine is rooted in facts: the resistance of the Whig government to any interference with the market; the staunch commitment to ideology of central figures in the making of famine policy such as Charles Trevelyan (assistant secretary to the treasury) and Sir Charles Wood (chancellor of the exchequer) and shapers of liberal opinion such as the political economists Nassau Senior and James Wilson (editor of The Economist); and the indifference to Irish suffering, and indeed the hostility to the Irish, as demonstrated in the language of the radical M.P.J.A. Roebuck.
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Murray, Robert. « Liberalism, Culture, Aboriginal Rights : In Defence of Kymlicka ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29, no 1 (mars 1999) : 109–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10717507.
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In their 1969 so-called White Paper on Indian Policy,Pierre Trudeau's government argued that it was time to abolish the group-specific rights differentiating Aboriginal people from other Canadians, including, in some Aboriginal societies, the group-specific right to restrict voting, residency, public office, and other social goods, to their Aboriginal members. Given the negative impact the loss of such so-called collective or group rights would have on the security of their cultures, Aboriginal people were incensed, and, consequently, the federal liberals backed down. More recently, Gordon Campbell maintained as a 1996 election promise that, were his provincial liberal party to be elected in British Columbia, he would oppose group-specific rights for Aboriginal people in British Columbia. Both Trudeau and Campbell argued that it is wrong for Aboriginal people to have group-specific rights by appeal to the idea that such collective rights are discriminatory because they assign opportunities to individuals on the basis of culture or race. Political elites are not alone in thinking that collective rights override individual rights. In fact, it has become a national motif that Section 15 (1) of the Canadian Charter, which makes it illegal to discriminate on the grounds that citizens are to be guaranteed equal protection of the law, is incompatible with group-specific rights for Aboriginal people.
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Hayton, Richard. « British conservatism after the vote for Brexit : The ideological legacy of David Cameron ». British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no 1 (10 novembre 2017) : 223–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148117737278.
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Following the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU), this article assesses the ideological legacy of David Cameron on Conservative politics in Britain. It focuses on three areas of ideological tension in contemporary conservatism, namely, European integration, the divide between social liberals and traditionalists, and the future of the Union post-Brexit. Applying the concept of heresthetics to offer a theoretically informed account, it argues that while Cameron enjoyed some successes in ‘the art of political manipulation’ with electoral benefits, his desire to modernize conservatism was ultimately undone by his failure to restructure the key issue dimensions animating his party’s ideology. Ultimately, this failure undid his premiership, leading to his downfall.
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Eklöf Amirell, Stefan. « Civilizing pirates : Nineteenth century British ideas about piracy, race and civilization in the Malay Archipelago ». HumaNetten, no 41 (19 décembre 2018) : 25–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.15626/hn.20184102.
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This article investigates how British officials and observers of the Malay Archipelago in the nineteenth century explained the prevalence of piracy in the region, particularly in terms of race and civilization. The writings by, among others, Thomas Stamford Raffles, John Crawfurd, James Brooke and Peter Benson Maxwell on contemporary Malay piracy are analysed. Whereas there was broad agreement among these observers that the alleged lack of civilization on the part of the Malays was a major reason for the prevalence of piracy in the region, there was considerable disagreement about the Malays’ capacity for civilizational progress and improvement. The degree to which the Malays were deemed capable of civilization in turn influenced the policies and measures implemented by the British to suppress piracy, ranging from the promotion of free trade to the wholesale extermination of entire villages and communities of suspected pirates. Criticism from humanitarians and liberals in London against the brutality of the latter tactics, however, led to a more restrained British deployment of violence in the Malay Archipelago from the middle of the nineteenth century.
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Fletcher, Ian Christopher. « “Prosecutions…are Always Risky Business” : Labor, Liberals, and the 1912 “Don't Shoot” Prosecutions ». Albion 28, no 2 (1996) : 251–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4052461.
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In the spring of 1912, the British syndicalist leader Tom Mann was prosecuted under the Incitement to Mutiny Act 1797 for his opposition to the use of troops during the great coal strike. He was convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment, but an outcry from socialists, trade unionists, and progressives forced the Liberal government to reduce his sentence and release him early from prison. This much is familiar to historians of early twentieth-century Britain and Ireland. It is often forgotten, however, that Mann was only one of eight syndicalists and socialists who were prosecuted for their involvement in the “don't shoot” agitation. It is likewise forgotten that Mann went on trial just days before the suffragette leaders Emmeline Pankhurst and Frederick and Emmeline Pethick Lawrence shared a similar fate, amid demands that Sir Edward Carson, the leading opponent of Irish home rule, join them in the dock. Indeed, the Nation, a progressive Liberal weekly, complained that “the country is…getting somewhat tired of political trials.” Perhaps because we assume the relative transparency of the law, historians have failed to scrutinize in detail the origins and outcome of the “don't shoot” prosecutions. George Dangerfield devoted one sentence to them, Elie Halévy a few more; although the “don't shoot” episode has been invoked to symbolize the increasingly fragile relations between Liberalism and the working classes, it continues to receive only brief mention in accounts of Edwardian labor and politics. Even Tom Mann's biographers have shed little new light on his case.
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Morissette, Benoît. « “The Foundations of Freedom and Civilization” : The Durham Report, Municipal Institutions and Liberalism ». World Political Science 15, no 1 (27 mai 2019) : 99–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/wps-2019-0003.
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AbstractLord Durham was sent to Canada to investigate the causes of the Rebellions of 1837–1838 and to propose constitutional reforms to restore stability in the province. In his report, presented to the Colonial Office on February 4, 1839, he recommended the legislative union of the two Canadas, as well as the implementation of responsible government. He also noted that the proper functioning of such a government required the creation of a system of municipal institutions. This article offers a new reading of Lord Durham’s recommendations concerning municipal institutions, included in the last section of his famous report. By placing the document in the context of the debates raised by the constitutional and administrative reforms conducted in Britain during the 1830s, it shows that its author understood autonomous municipalities as an essential components of a modern mixed government. Such language was then employed by reformist Whigs in order to justify the policies which they thought were necessary to strengthen the country’s political institutions by adapting them to changing social circumstances. The analysis presented here challenges the interpretation provided by most contemporary commentators on the report. Many of them have concluded that Lord Durham’s understanding of local institutions is based on a liberal conception of political life, found in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. These studies tend to reduce early British liberalism to philosophical radicalism. They seek to demonstrate that liberals wish to deprive local communities of their political autonomy by integrating their institutions into the juridical structure of a highly centralized state. By focusing on the rhetoric used by Lord Durham to write his report, this article allows us to appreciate the heterogeneity of the definition of the municipality developed by liberalism.
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Denver, David, et Hugh Bochel. « Merger or Bust : Whatever Happened to Members of the SDP ? » British Journal of Political Science 24, no 3 (juillet 1994) : 403–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400006918.
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The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was perhaps the nearest thing to a ‘flash’ party seen in British politics in modern times. It was formed in March 1981, largely on the initiative of four leading figures in the Labour party (Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams and William Rogers), following the apparent success of the left in dominating the party, and initially it had a sensational impact on British politics. It had thirty MPs by March 1982 (mostly as a result of defections by Labour MPs); in alliance with the Liberals it immediately went to first place in the opinion polls and stayed in that position until May 1982. The Alliance won four by-elections between 1981 and 1983, and in the 1983 general election, with 25.4 per cent of the vote, came within two points of ousting Labour from its second place. For the next four years the Alliance held its position and in the 1987 election its vote fell only slightly to 22.6 per cent.
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Tonry, Michael. « Why Aren't German Penal Policies Harsher and Imprisonment Rates Higher ? » German Law Journal 5, no 10 (1 octobre 2004) : 1187–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s207183220001316x.
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It is common for reformist academics, human rights advocates, and political liberals to bemoan harsher public attitudes towards crime and criminals, populist posturing by politicians, and more repressive penal policies. Some years ago, sociologist David Garland, a leading scholar of this subject, described increasingly repressive strategies of crime control in contemporary Britain, Australia, and the United States, ‘and elsewhere, too'. Some years later Hans-Jörg Albrecht called Garland to task for that ‘and elsewhere, too,’ noting that what happens in English-speaking countries does not inexorably happen elsewhere and that penal policies in many Western countries were not becoming more repressive or more politicised in parallel with American and British developments.