Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Criminal elites »

The criminal association was a criminal offense of the Joint Plan and Conspiracy, or a special form of Crime against Peace, which was highlighted as such in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In the recent practice of international criminal courts, this institute is used in a certain way, but its function is often subordinated to political abuses. By labeling certain political regimes as a “criminal association” by the so-called international political elites are provided with a wide margin of maneuver to justify their “humanitarian interventions” which are the consequence of a common criminal goal. From the middle of the 20th century until today, it is possible to identify violations of international law that occurred as a result of the activities of a criminal association, which continues with increased intensity. If the covert activities of real criminal associations continue, the main outcome will not be the achievement of world peace, but hegemony. In order to prevent this tendency, it is necessary to redefine the place of the Criminal Association in international criminal law, to point out the permanent cases of their actions, their subjects and the ways in which these same subjects avoid responsibility.

This article claims that cross-national variation in criminal violence in new democracies is highly dependent on whether elites adopt transitional justice processes to address a repressive past. State specialists in violence who repress political dissidents under authoritarian rule often play a crucial role in the operation of criminal markets and in the production of criminal violence in democracy. Some of them defect from the state to become the armed branch of criminal organizations in their deadly fights against the state and rival groups; others remain but protect criminal organizations from positions of state power; and still others use state power to fight criminals through iron-fist policies. When post-authoritarian elites adopt transitional justice processes to expose, prosecute, and punish state specialists in violence for gross human rights violations committed during the authoritarian era, they redefine the rules of state coercion and deter members of the armed forces and the police from becoming leading actors in the production of criminal violence. Using a dataset of 76 countries that transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy between 1974 and 2005, we show that the adoption of strong truth commissions is strongly associated with lower murder rates; we also find that the implementation of trials that result in guilty verdicts is associated with lower homicide rates only when the trials are jointly implemented with a strong truth commission. In contrast, amnesty laws appear to stimulate criminal violence. Our findings are particularly robust for Latin America and remain unchanged even after addressing selection effects via matching techniques.

This article examines the effect of crime on support for criminal justice systems in Latin America. Scholars empirically demonstrate a strong negative effect of crime on support for institutions and satisfaction with democracy. Others provide thick descriptions of the prevalence of creeping authoritarianism in response to crime—the infamous “mano dura” or “iron fist.” I test the effectiveness of elite political messaging across different countries. In other words, do politicians that promote “iron-fist” policies reassure their intended audience and shore up support for the police and the criminal justice system? Analyzing survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project and Wiesehomeier and Benoit’s expert survey of Latin American political party platforms, I find that elite political opinion about insecurity conditions the effect of crime victimization and fear of crime on mass support for the police and the justice system as well as on perceptions of police and justice system effectiveness. When political elites emphasize mano dura (“iron fist”) solutions, fearful citizens and victims are less critical of the police and the justice system in general.

This article examines homicide in the Metropolitan Area of Brasilia (MAB), analysing social representations from elites in the criminal justice system, including police chiefs, prosecutors and judges. It draws on the theory of social representations (TSR) to explore the imaginaries constructed around the criminal justice system’s inability to adequately investigate the rise in homicides. The representations from focus group participants highlight a lack of resources, infrastructure, equipment and human resources, as well as unsatisfactory working conditions. In seeking to understand and situate themselves in new realities and contexts, these elite criminal justice actors ultimately place themselves within the available reserve of knowledge, in which they claim that ‘nothing works’. Hence, this enables these powerful actors to justify themselves and blame others, while denying their inability to adequately investigate homicides. A hidden rationale emerges that represents the homicide victims of drug crimes and gang feuds as unworthy of investigation.

Abstract Economic arguments seem to be the most promising avenue for driving reform of America’s bloated penal state in the aftermath of mass incarceration. Raising human rights concerns has limited appeal beyond cultural elites and, on occasion, courts, but today reform is coming from elected branches. Talk of human rights for criminals, or human dignity for prisoners, can risk backlash as happened around the death penalty in the 1970s. This essay challenges this conventional account in three ways. First, I argue that historical conditions make the potential for backlash limited. Second, that economic arguments will always be limited by the political and institutional frameworks that define the current meanings of criminal justice; only a human rights approach can drive a truly abolitionist reform agenda, one aimed at rethinking the institutions themselves, not just their budgets. Third, human rights campaigns can, if properly conceived, expand the constituency for deep criminal justice reform.

The article is focused on one specific aspect of organized crime during the period of social transformation of Bulgarian society. It views the capacity of organized crime to offer additional power resources and encouragement for the political elite, whose power and domination have been threatened by the changes. The analysis is based on the thesis that to sustain and to strengthen their power and domination the elites have applied the strategy of increased secrecy and informality of power sources and of the means of their exertion via the establishment and control of criminal structures. The applied research methods include participant observation, in-depth interviews and document analysis.

Public attention is increasingly being focused on law enforcement practices with regard to senior public figures suspected of committing crimes. Indeed, it is only natural for special sensitivity to be shown in relation to the behavior of public figures in general, and senior public figures in particular. Their authority, social connections, and access to material and other state or public resources, locating them with the “power elite” — or at least the “sub-elites”1— provide them with unusual power in modern society. It could even be argued that their position contains a “constant structural temptation” for misuse or abuse of this power. Even if public figures are believed to be honest and of impeccable character, it is clear that they have opportunities for abuse of their authority that must be taken into account by law enforcement agencies. Moreover, public trust is an important asset on the part of public figures and civil servants. Accordingly, it might be argued that the criminal justice system should perceive breaches of this trust as more severe than similar offenses committed by private citizens.

Opening ParagraphIn a previous essay (Austen, 1986a) I attempted to trace a particular type of deviant hero in African history and culture: a ‘social bandit’ or criminal figure identified in the popular imagination with resistance against alien or indigenous oppressive elites. The search proved frustrating within its original terms of reference but it did suggest an alternative paradigm for identifying the entire relationship between cultural norms and criminal behaviour in Africa. The present article attempts to develop this paradigm through the analysis of six African narratives dealing with heroic and/or anti-heroic figures in a variety of contexts.

A proposta do artigo consiste em analisar alguns aspectos da atuação intelectual e política de membros das elites jurídicas brasileiras na Primeira República (1889–1930), nos quadros do assim chamado bacharelismo liberal. A Antropologia Criminal ou Nova Escola Penal pretendeu inovar no campo tanto do Direito quanto da Medicina no período, o que permitiu a projeção intelectual e política de alguns médicos e juristas defensores dessa “escola”. Apresentamos aqui a trajetória de Candido Motta que, além de contar com relações de pertencimento às elites, conseguiu se projetar como intelectual, professor da Faculdade de Direito em São Paulo e, sobretudo, como político, a partir da condição de um dos principais defensores e disseminadores da Nova Escola Penal em São Paulo.

A growing body of research has revealed that the financial cost and physical harmfulness of elite deviance overshadow the impact of street crime on society (Knowlton et al., 2011; Landrigan et al., 2002; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Herbert & Landrigan, 2000; Rebovich & Jiandani, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2010). However, despite such discrepancies, crimes of the poor continue to outshine white-collar offenses in the news media (Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et al., 1991; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Lynch, Nalla & Miller, 1989; Lynch, Stretesky & Hammond, 2000), the criminal justice system (Calavita, Tillman, & Pontell, 1997; Maddan et al., 2011; Payne, Dabney, & Ekhomu, 2011; Tillman & Pontell, 1992) and even academia (Lynch, McGurrin & Fenwick, 2004; McGurrin, Jarrell, Jahn & Cochrane, 2013). Surprisingly, scholarly efforts that have investigated societal response to crimes of the powerful have limited their field of inquiry to public opinions about white-collar crime (e.g., Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010; Kane & Wall, 2006; Rebovich et al., 2000; Schoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007, etc.). While these studies have provided valuable empirical evidence of a growing concern among Americans regarding the danger posed by elite offenses, their failure to include a valid measure of lay knowledge about white-collar crime significantly limits our ability to infer the extent to which the public is familiar with the scope and magnitude of this social issue. The present study seeks to address such limitation by providing the first measure of public knowledge about elite deviance. Four hundred and eight participants completed an online questionnaire that comprised measures of respondents' knowledge and sentiments (i.e., perceived seriousness and punitiveness) about white-collar crime. Results of statistical analyses revealed that participants were not sufficiently informed about elite deviance and suggest the existence of popular "myths" about white-collar crime; more specifically, a substantial number of subjects were not inclined to acknowledge hard-earned empirical evidence such as the greater physical harmfulness of elite deviance over street crime and to recognize that some elite offenses - which they admit are common in underdeveloped nations (e.g., human trafficking) - can be committed in the United States with little to no legal repercussion for the perpetrators. Further, less knowledgeable subjects and "myth" adherers (including men, those with higher income levels, more politically conservative subjects, Republicans, conservative Protestants, and those who believed that white-collar offenders see no wrong in their actions) were often more lenient in their attitudes towards elite deviance, both in terms of perceived seriousness and punitiveness, compared with street crime. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are thoroughly discussed.

Both elite deviance, committed by the upper echelons of society, and organized crime threaten development and the rights and security of people across and within nations; however empirical research on these topics is limited, especially in the field of criminology. This study addresses this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses derived from Simon’s symbiotic theory of elite deviance, which posits that direct and indirect relationships exist between elite deviance, organized crime, and conventional crimes exist (2008). The intervening effects of national culture and political economic ideology are also considered. To test the research hypotheses, this study uses homicide rates, corruption and organized crime measures, and indicators of national culture from 114 nations. Findings suggest that empirical linkages exist between elite deviance, organized crime and conventional deviance at the cross-national level. These data suggest the level of corruption and organized crime within a nation are better predictors of homicide than conventional explanations of violent crime (e.g., modernization/development, opportunity/routine activities). Furthermore, organized crime partially mediated the relationship between corruption and homicide rates in the same (positive) direction. This implies that the criminogenic effect of elite deviance on non-elite deviance operates indirectly through organized crime. The corruption-homicide relationship was also partially mediated by a national culture of moral cynicism and capitalist economic conditions. Although not definitive given methodological concerns and alternate theoretical explanations, this study provides avenues for future research into the underlying social processes that influence the crime rate within nations.

Este trabalho trata do processo de incorporação, pela Polícia Civil gaúcha, de explicações científicas para o crime e de procedimentos técnicocientíficos na investigação criminal. A partir da análise de uma série de documentos produzidos pelas elites policiais desde o final do século XIX, investigaram-se as implicações da relação entre os conhecimentos dos especialistas e o saber policial. O objetivo da pesquisa foi determinar em que medida os saberes científicos e técnicos colaboraram na afirmação da polícia como instância legitimamente autorizada a investigar o crime e detectar o criminoso. Considerando-se os aspectos analisados, concluiu-se que a utilização desses conhecimentos adequou-se às funções da instituição policial. O emprego da papiloscopia e da fotografia no registro criminal, introduzidas no início deste século, ampliou e tornou mais eficiente o controle policial sobre os grupos sociais tidos como potencialmente criminosos. Dessa forma, compatibilizou-se com o exercício de um poder de caráter seletivo por parte da polícia. O uso dessas teorias e de procedimentos técnico-científicos implicou na necessidade do trabalho de divulgação de tais meios entre os policiais, que se caracterizou pela preocupação das elites policiais em transmitir uma nova imagem profissional, valorizando o emprego do raciocínio e da lógica, a habilidade de identificar vestígios e o conhecimento prático relativo às formas de investigar o crime. A partir do final da década de 40, consolidou-se o grupo de peritos. Constatou-se que entre eles também era valorizado o conhecimento adquirido na prática e adequado às necessidades da investigação policial. Assim, o conhecimento dos peritos referendou a forma policial de investigar o crime e a cultura profissional do policial.

Depuis plus de deux décennies, un nombre d’Etats africains dits du champ de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs sont enlisés dans des conflits armés à la fois intra-étatiques et internationalisés. Du génocide rwandais aux guerres civiles au Congo-Brazzaville, en Angola, en Ouganda, au Burundi, ou encore aux violences politiques armées incessantes en Centrafrique, en passant par la Grande Guerre Africaine en RDC, nombreux et importants sont les mécanismes de résolution de conflits qui ont été expérimentés, de nature aussi bien bilatérale, communautaire, régionale, qu’onusienne. Malheureusement, les concepts de sortie de crise et de reconstruction post-conflit demeurent de vains mots, eu égard aux résurgences et aux prolongements des conflits dans cette Région. Ainsi, en mobilisant l’approche néo-élitiste s’inscrivant dans un dépassement de la réalité empirique, après avoir passé en revue toutes les grandes théories philosophico-politico-sociologiques des élites, défendues par les auteurs classiques comme Wilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca etc., d’un côté, et en recourant à la théorie de Johan Galtung de paix négative versus paix positive, d’autre part, cette étude se propose de mettre en évidence le rôle des élites dirigeantes dans la dynamique de pacification de la Région. Et après avoir défini et déterminé celles-ci, le travail démontre la difficulté de résoudre les conflits due à l’hétérogénéité sociologique caractérisant la Région. Puis, il souligne les mécanismes de l’entretien d’une paix négative par les élites dirigeantes, en interaction avec les autres protagonistes
For more than two decades, a number of African States within the scope of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region have sunk into both armed intrastate and domestic conflicts. From the Rwandan genocide to civil wars in Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Uganda, and Burundi, or the constantly armed political violence in the Central African Republic (CAR), through the Great African War in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), numerous and important mechanisms for conflict resolution have been experienced, bilateral, communitarian, regional, as well as Onusian. Unfortunately, the concepts relative to the end of crisis and post-conflict reconstruction still remain empty words, given the revivals and extensions of conflicts in that Region. Thus, by mobilizing the neo-elitist approach which goes the empirical reality, after reviewing all the major elitist philosophical, political and sociological theories defended by the classical authors such as Wilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, etc. On one hand, and by resorting to Johan Galtung’s theory on negative peace versus positive peace, on the other, this dissertation aims at highlighting the role played by governing Elites in the peace process within the Region. After defining these elites, this monography shows the difficulties of solving conflicts due to the regional sociodemographic heterogeneity. Then, it emphasizes mechanisms for keeping negative peace by the governing Elites, in interaction with other protagonists

La Brigade militaire de Rio Grande do Sul a été créé comme un Etat militaire, de sorte que ses officiers ont formé une classe de militaires professionnels et qualifiés dans l'art de la guerre. Ainsi, les officiers de la brigade militaire est devenu une élite militaire repose sur trois éléments: la mission de l'instructeur que l'armée a commencé à former la brigade depuis 1909, le cours de préparation militaire et la vaste expérience acquise dans les guerres de guerre insurrectionnelle. L'Union, à partir de 1934, supprime le caractère belliqueux des Armée d'État en les transformant en de la police militaire. L'armée reste exclusivement militaire jusqu'en 1950 quand l'Brigade militaire commence son long processus de policialização, déclenchant l'affrontement entre les valeurs culturelles et la militaire. Le fonctionnaire professionnalisé que militaires et entraînés à la guerre ont été d'immenses difficultés à s'adapter aux modèles et aux vicissitudes des services de police où il n'y avait pas de médailles, la gloire ou glamour qui étaient habitués. Les officiers formés par l'éthos militaire, pour la plupart, à peu près résisté policialização imposées par l'Union n'a pas été facile pour les fonctionnaires, les militaires professionnels et qualifiés dans l'art de la guerre, la famine de l'adaptation des services de police. Le militaire en dépit de tout, a cimenté son policialização par le biais manifestes de police préventive, tout en gardant une grande partie de valeurs militaires. La brigade militaire policialização caractérisé comme trois types de police: ordre, la sécurité et pénales. Ainsi, la police militaire l'Armée de terre a été transformée en police d'Etat militaire et que la Constitution de 1988, sa recherche officiers du cycle complet de la police. La sédimentation de la brigade militaire et de police - qui, dans cette thèse est appelé policialização - il a été l'une des marques les plus importantes et significatives de la sécurité publique l'état. Ainsi, l'insertion de la police militaire en tant qu'organe de la sécurité publique, a redéfini le sens du rythme de police à Rio Grande do Sul.
A Brigada Militar do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul foi criada como exército estadual, de modo que seus oficiais formaram uma classe de militares profissionais e especializados na arte da guerra. Assim, os oficiais da Brigada Militar tornaram-se uma elite militar com base em três elementos: a Missão Instrutora do Exército que a passou a treinar a Brigada Militar desde 1909; o Curso de Preparação Militar e a grande experiência bélica adquirida nas guerras insurrecionais. A União, a partir de 1934, retira o caráter bélico das milícias estaduais transformando-as em polícias militares. A Brigada Militar permanece exclusivamente exército estadual até 1950 quando tem início o seu longo processo de policialização, desencadeando o choque cultural entre os valores bélico-militares e os de polícia. Os oficias profissionalizados como militares e treinados para a guerra tiveram imensas dificuldades em se adaptar aos desígnios e agruras dos serviços policias onde não havia medalhas, glória ou glamour a que estavam acostumados. Os oficiais formados pelo ethos militar, na sua maior parte, resistiram a policialização, grosso modo imposta pela União. Não foi fácil para os oficiais, militares profissionais e especializados na arte da guerra, adaptar-se aos serviços do policiamento. A Brigada Militar a despeito de tudo, sedimentou a sua policialização, através da polícia ostensiva preventiva, mantendo ainda muito dos valores bélico-militares. A Brigada Militar, no processo de policialização, avançou em três dimensões de polícia: de ordem, durante o regime militar; de segurança antes e depois do regime militar e comunitária dentro de uma perspectiva democrática. Dessa forma, a Brigada Militar foi transformada de exército estadual em força policial-militar e desde a Constituição de 1988, o sua oficialidade busca, mais abertamente, o ciclo completo de polícia. A sedimentação da Brigada Militar como polícia militar – que nesta tese é denominada de policialização - se constituiu uma das marcas mais importantes e significativas na segurança pública estadual. Assim, a inserção da Brigada Militar como órgão de segurança pública, redefiniu os rumos do policiamento ostensivo no Estado do Rio Grande do Sul.
The Military Brigade of Rio Grande do Sul was created as a military state, so that his officers have formed a class of military professionals and skilled in the art of war. Thus, the officers of the Military Brigade became a military elite based on three elements: the mission of the instructor that the Army began to train the Brigade since 1909, the Course for Military Readiness and the extensive experience gained in the wars insurrectionary war. The Union, from 1934, removes the warlike character of the state militias turning them into military police. The State Army remains exclusively until 1950 when the state begins its long process of policialização, triggering the clash between cultural values and the military and military police. The official professionalized as military and trained for war were immense difficulties in adapting to the designs and travails of police departments where there were no medals, glory or glamor that were accustomed. The officers trained by the military ethos, mostly endured policialização roughly imposed by the Union was not easy for officials, military professionals and skilled in the art of war, starvation of adapting services to policing. The Military in spite of everything, cemented his policialização through overt preventive police, still keeping much of military values and military. The Military Brigade policialização characterized as three types of police equipment order, security and criminal. Thus, the State Army was transformed into military police force and since the Constitution of 1988, its officers search the complete cycle of police. The sedimentation of the Military Brigade and police force - which in this thesis is called policialização - it was one of the most important brands and significant public safety statewide. Thus, the insertion of the Military Police as an organ of public security, has redefined the direction of beat policing in Rio Grande do Sul.

La thèse a été évaluée par les personnes suivantes: Carlo Morselli, directeur de recherche et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Anthony Amicelle, président du jury et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Jean Bérard, membre du jury et professeur à l'École de criminologie; Carla Nagels, évaluatrice externe et professeur à l'Université libre de Bruxelles L'auteur aimerait remercier le Fonds de recherche du Québec - Société et culture (FRQSC), le Centre international de criminologie comparée (CICC) et l'École de criminologie pour le support financier octroyé à différentes étapes de la rédaction de la thèse.
La recherche trouve ses origines d’un scandale touchant l’industrie de la construction et les milieux politiques au Québec de la fin des années 2000 (à travers les allégations de corruption et de collusion soulevées par les médias) à la fin novembre 2015 (avec le dépôt du rapport final de la Commission d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction, ci-après CEIC). L’argument principal est que les années de scandale ont permis au Québec de transiter d’une province considérée comme la terre mythique de la corruption au Canada à une entité développant une des structures anticorruptions les plus novatrices et sophistiquées dans le monde. La thèse est construite comme une étude de cas qui s’intègre aux trois grandes sphères de l’étude du phénomène criminel telles que définies par Sutherland et Cressey, à savoir le passage à l’acte, la réaction sociale et le contrôle social (1947, p.1). Dans l’étude du passage à l’acte, le concept de crime étatico-corporatif est mis à profit afin d’exposer l’aspect symbiotique des systèmes criminels alimentés à travers une interaction fondamentale entre poursuite d’intérêts publics et poursuite d’intérêts privés. De tels systèmes furent en effet identifiés dans plusieurs municipalités du Québec. Pour cette partie de la thèse, les données relatives à l’ensemble des contrats de construction octroyés par appel d’offres public par la ville de Laval dans son histoire (1965-2013) sont analysées à travers diverses mesures de réseaux sociaux. Cette portion de la thèse utilise également les témoignages issus des travaux de la CEIC, et des entretiens semi-directifs réalisés avec des acteurs provenant de diverses autorités de lutte à la collusion (truquage des appels d’offres) et à la corruption au Québec. La combinaison de ces méthodes permet d’évaluer la nature intégrée, historique et spatiale des délinquances recensées au sein de diverses municipalités, avec des indicateurs de collusion qui remontent aussi loin qu’à la création de la municipalité lavalloise dans les années 1960. Dans l’étude de la réaction sociale, un modèle d’analyse intégratif emprunté au domaine de la sociologie de l’action publique (Lascoumes et LeGalès, 2012) est utilisé pour mettre en relief les forces structurelles, organisationnelles et individuelles derrière la constitution du scandale québécois. Cette deuxième grande section de la thèse illustre comment ce scandale s’insère dans des tendances nationales et internationales d’intolérance accrue du public et d’intensification des contrôles à l’égard des actes criminels (corruption, collusion, pots-de-vin, fraude) révélés au coeur du scandale. Enfin, dans l’étude du contrôle social, l’analyse des témoignages issus des audiences de la CEIC est jumelée aux données découlant d’entretiens semi-directifs réalisés avec 22 acteurs provenant d’agences de contrôle créées à la suite du scandale : l’Unité permanente anticorruption (UPAC), le Bureau de l’inspecteur général (BIG) de la ville de Montréal, et le Bureau d’intégrité et d’éthique de Laval (BIEL). Cette dernière section illustre comment la transition d’une scène réglementaire permissive et hautement déficiente à un environnement réglementaire axée sur une mobilisation sans précédent de ressources policières, sur le partage d’information et sur la poursuite des conduites illégales au pénal s’avère très avantageuse, mais s’est accomplie – et s’accomplit toujours – à travers de nombreux défis pour les contrôleurs.
The research originated from a political scandal which spanned several years (2009-2015) in the province of Quebec. The thesis’ main argument is that the scandal years saw Quebec transformed from being considered the “historical golden land” of Canadian corruption into a province which developed one of the country’s most sophisticated systems of corruption and white-collar crime control. The thesis was constructed as a case-study, and addressed the three principal objects of criminological analysis: the breaking of laws, the making of laws, and the reaction to the breaking of laws (Sutherland and Cressey, 1947, p.1). The study applied multiple methods to achieve these goals. In the study of criminal decision-making (breaking of laws), Kramer and Michalowski’s (2006) state-corporate crime concept was applied to demonstrate the presence of multifactorial features of criminal systems fuelled by misbehaving at the intersection of private and public interests. Such conspiracies were found to be generalized across several municipalities throughout the province. For this portion of the thesis, data on all construction contracts awarded through public procurement in the entire history of what appeared to be one of Canada’s most corrupt municipalities, Laval (the 13th largest in the country), was systematically collected from 1965 to 2013. It was then analyzed using various social network measures. Testimonies from Quebec’s Commission of inquiry on the awarding and management of public contracts in the construction industry (hereafter, CEIC) were also coupled with a dozen of interviews conducted with regulators and corruption authorities in Quebec. The combination of methods helped assess the integrated, spatial and historical nature of illicit activities which undergirded many municipalities, Laval being one of the most notorious one. Traces of bid-rigging indicators in public procurement were indeed traced back to as early as the city’s founding in the 1960s. In the study of the making of laws, Lascoumes and Le Galès’ (2002) sociology of public action framework was expanded to investigate the structural, organizational, and individual forces behind the Quebec scandal. This section of the thesis unravels the sudden urge to legislate and investigate schemes that were deeply rooted in the province’s history. By making sense of the Quebec scandal, this sub-section demonstrates how larger structural and contextual factors gradually established increased incentives for elected officials to enhance legal and institutional controls on white-collar and corporate crimes which were found to be systemic across Quebec’s construction and political scenes. Finally, in the study of the reaction to the breaking of laws, testimonies from the CEIC were combined with interviews conducted with 22 actors in control agencies established as a direct result of the scandal: the Permanent Anticorruption Unit (UPAC in French), the Inspector General Bureau (BIG in French) of the city of Montreal, and the Bureau of integrity and ethics of Laval (BIEL in French). This last section shows how transitioning from a state of practical passivity to one of intense controls, monitoring, institutional rearrangements, and legislative efforts was accompanied, for regulatory and police authorities, by several benefits but substantial challenges as well.

This chapter explores the phenomenon of backlash against international criminal tribunals, defining backlash as ‘intense and sustained government disapproval of tribunal conduct, accompanied by aggressive steps to resist such conduct and to remove its legal force’. After promising beginnings, post-Cold War international criminal tribunals have increasingly faced strident criticism from important constituencies, including previously supportive governments. This has prompted concern about declining support for and ‘backlash’ against such tribunals, amidst broader debates about similar tendencies affecting international adjudication more generally. Drawing on International Relations theories, this chapter analyzes drivers and inhibitors to backlash against international criminal tribunals, specifically the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It identifies several factors relevant for explaining tribunal backlash: domestic politics and the preferences and interests of powerful elites; external actors, particularly engaged regional and great powers; and transnational social pressure.

This chapter asks whether international tribunals are capable of healing a traumatized society. In that sense, it is not enough that a tribunal punish the guilty, it must also produce a social awakening concerning the community’s own culpability for the wrongdoing. Drawing on an empirical evaluation of the social response to the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the chapter questions whether this can occur. At least in the case of the ICTY—otherwise regarded as one of the most successful international tribunals—the work of the Tribunal has been shockingly ineffective because some sectors of the public simply refuse to accept the conclusions that the Tribunal has drawn. The chapter then broadens this conclusion into a general theory: that the work of a tribunal will be viewed positively by the local population unless the Tribunal is a threat to local elites who have the power to shape public opinion against the Tribunal.

Chapter 2 tracks the way American political elites talked about justice and punishment before and during the rise of mass incarceration. The authors show how these concepts were once closely connected with the religious imagination. When that link was severed, justice was reduced to the proper functioning of the law, to a criminal justice system, and a new set of ideas and institutions promoting law and order and victims’ rights took over. The chapter demonstrates how, at the level of political rhetoric, religion—along with economics and race—was essential for promoting incarceration as the sole mechanism for effecting justice.

This chapter is main analysis data. It specifically presents the empirical data collected in the field which includes interview responses on the problems with security sector reform, police reform, the rule of law and corruption. In addition, low-ranked police officer’s perceptions on corruption, recruitment, training, salaries and the cost of living are examined with responses on the survey and structured interviews conducted. All these reactions are illustrated via the theoretical framework that is based on the political, economic and cultural drivers of corruption. The political drivers reveal that meritocratic recruitment is severely tarnished from patronage, nepotism and favouritism and police officers retain loyalty to local commanders and warlords rather than the state. In addition, criminal entities have captured main parts of the state to entice political elites in illicit drug-trading which has hindered anti-corruption investigations and promoted cronyism to protect political elites from serious forms of corruption. The economic drivers show that low pay intensifies petty forms of corruption, namely bribery and roadside extortion, to supplement income. The cultural drivers infer that pride, motivation and sense of mission are lacking in the current Afghan police force and unprofessionalism is a main meaning of police corruption.

Dangerous Harvest, the title of this volume, is an especially appropriate metaphor with which to begin to discuss and understand the ongoing, protracted, and increasingly violent struggle over coca in Bolivia—the third most-important coca leaf–producing country in the world (BINM 1998: 65). Such a metaphor—which suggests the reaping of a product that is potentially precarious, menacing, ominous, and even deadly—points to the fact not only that coca is an inherently conflict-ridden arena or social space but also that the most enduring and significant upshot of the current drive against coca, what is being “harvested” by recent counternarcotics efforts, is the potential for long-term structural instability and conflict in Bolivian society. In this chapter I pay special attention to this struggle over coca in Bolivia, particularly from the late 1980s to the early part of 2000. I will argue that the contest over coca in Bolivia reflects and embodies numerous and inherently conflictive claims and counterclaims (social, political, economic, and ideological) by different segments of Bolivian society, many of which entail fundamental questions about legitimacy, hegemony, and challenges to the exercise of power by elites and state elites. That is, to view the coca conflict as essentially one between “evil” or “criminal” coca growers and traffickers, on the one hand, and enlightened, law-abiding authorities and citizens, on the other—precisely the criminal justice perspective that ideologically informs, guides, and justifies current anticoca policy by U.S. and U.S.-funded counternarcotics agencies and programs—is not only not enlightening but also fundamentally counterproductive in that it fails to provide the necessary insights with which to grapple with and arrive at a just solution to some of the most important roots of the current coca strife in Bolivia. I will also try to understand and explain the seemingly successful coca eradication efforts in the late 1990s and first half of the year 2000, as well as how and why resistance to these efforts by coca cultivators in the Chapare appear to have been particularly ineffective in recent years.

This is another theoretical chapter that generates a framework to thread through the context of Afghan policing. Theories related to a political economy approach to examine the interrelationship between bureaucratic agents and economic elites and the coping strategies of poorly waged public officials and police officers. This theoretical basis informs some aspects of the political and economic drivers of corruption. The political drivers specifically cover systemic corruption which is when corruption becomes institutionally embedded from the top to the lower levels. In addition, patronage, nepotism and ethnic favouritism forms a ‘moral economy’ to deter meritocratic recruitment. Moreover, state capture occurs when main parts of the state are infiltrated by narrow criminal and affiliated political interests for profit making, usually with illicit markets. The economic drivers are focused on corruption as a means of economic necessity, namely low pay, and opportunities to engage in corruption due to weak oversight or limited sanctions if detected for malpractice. The cultural drivers cover culture, motivation and the socialisation of behaviour within police forces and specific anti-corruption training that can help to mitigate police corruption.