Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Excess compensation »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Excess compensation"
ChoiWooseok, Maria A. Leach-López et 이은서. « Excess Compensation and Corporate Governance ». Korea International Accounting Review ll, no 86 (août 2019) : 165–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.21073/kiar.2019..86.008.
Texte intégralFeito-Ruiz, Isabel, et Luc Renneboog. « Takeovers and (excess) CEO compensation ». Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 50 (septembre 2017) : 156–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.06.003.
Texte intégralByun. Seol-Won et 박상봉. « Accounting Conservatism and Excess Executive Compensation ». Management & ; Information Systems Review 37, no 2 (juin 2018) : 187–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.29214/damis.2018.37.2.010.
Texte intégralSauerwald, Steve, Zhiang (John) Lin et Mike Peng. « Board Social Capital and Excess CEO Compensation ». Academy of Management Proceedings 2013, no 1 (janvier 2013) : 12567. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2013.154.
Texte intégralChoi, Kyong-Soo, et Kyung-Hye Kim. « CEO’s Excess Compensation and Real Earnings Management ». Korea Association of Business Education 34, no 2 (30 avril 2019) : 347–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.23839/kabe.2019.34.2.347.
Texte intégralTing, Hsiu-I. « Why Do Board Members Receive Excess Compensation ? » Managerial and Decision Economics 37, no 8 (7 juillet 2015) : 552–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.2744.
Texte intégralRodda, Gordon H., et Kathryn Dean-Bradley. « Excess density compensation of island herpetofaunal assemblages ». Journal of Biogeography 29, no 5-6 (mai 2002) : 623–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2699.2002.00711.x.
Texte intégralKalelkar, Rachana, Sarfraz Khan et Sung Jin Park. « Excess audit committee compensation and audit pricing ». International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 14, no 2/3 (2018) : 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijaape.2018.091062.
Texte intégralPark, Sung Jin, Rachana Kalelkar et Sarfraz Khan. « Excess audit committee compensation and audit pricing ». International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 14, no 2/3 (2018) : 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijaape.2018.10012071.
Texte intégralRobinson, John R., Yanfeng Xue et Yong Yu. « Determinants of Disclosure Noncompliance and the Effect of the SEC Review : Evidence from the 2006 Mandated Compensation Disclosure Regulations ». Accounting Review 86, no 4 (1 avril 2011) : 1415–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10033.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Excess compensation"
Dah, Mustafa A. « Essays on the Effect of Excess Compensation and Governance Changes on Firm Value ». Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2012. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5179.
Texte intégralID: 031001341; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Title from PDF title page (viewed April 15, 2013).; Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Central Florida, 2012.; Includes bibliographical references.
Ph.D.
Doctorate
Business Administration
Business Administration; Finance
Antenucci, Robert P. « Impact of Corporate Governance, Excess CEO Compensation, and CEO Stock Option Grants on Firm Performance during Recessionary Periods ». Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1386339174.
Texte intégralAntenucci, Robert P. « Impact of corporate governance, excess CEO compensation, and CEO stock option grants on firm performance during recessionary periods ». Thesis, Kent State University, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3618935.
Texte intégralThere is much debate over the efficacy of corporate governance in mitigating agency costs and improving the correlation between firm performance and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay. Research on this topic ranges from theories which maintain that CEO compensation in the U.S. is commensurate with CEO ability, and is therefore justified, to theories which maintain that CEOs are little more than overpaid rent extractors.
I investigate the above dichotomy in the executive compensation literature by examining the impact of corporate governance on excess CEO compensation and firm performance during recessions. Business cycle contractions are challenging times for firms, and arguably a period when stronger corporate governance and CEO ability is significant to the success of the firm. I posit that better governed firms with lower levels of excess compensation outperform their peers in subsequent challenging recessionary periods.
Stock option grants, a frequently used component of CEO pay packages, are thought to better align CEO and shareholder interests. However, with recent financial scandals there is much concern over this form of equity compensation. I examine the use of employee stock option grants in CEO compensation packages and whether such stock option compensation improves the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance.
My research achieves several aims: it extends the literature on the impact of corporate governance on firm performance by using a recessionary period metric, it examines the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating agency costs, it examines excess CEO compensation and this excess compensation connection with CEO ability or CEO rent extraction during recessionary periods, and it examines the impact of stock option grants in CEO pay packages on firm performance during recessionary periods. I find support for a decrease in abnormal return associated with trading on stronger corporate governance and support for rent extraction in the CEO compensation process during the 2001 recession.
Serrano, Sara Coelho. « Analysis of the reinsurance treaty for a workers ? Compensation portfolio ». Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/8995.
Texte intégralEste relatório assenta numa análise à sustentabilidade do ramo de Acidentes de Trabalho no contexto do estágio realizado na Allianz Portugal. Inicialmente é explicado o contexto legal do ramo de forma a compreender-se melhor as características específicas deste. Por conseguinte serão detalhados os modelos e pressupostos, utilizados pela Companhia, no cálculo das provisões técnicas de Acidentes de Trabalho. O foco principal será na análise ao tratado de resseguro de Excedente de danos que cobre os custos com sinistros de Acidentes de Trabalho e o seu impacto no resultado técnico. A análise é feita com base no Modelo de Risco coletivo e em indicadores estatísticos como o Value-at-Risk, coeficiente de assimetria, variância e valor esperado.
This report resumes the analysis of the sustainability of Worker's Compensation within the internship at Allianz Portugal. The legal framework of the business is primarily explained as it is important to understand the business specifications. Models and assumptions used, by the Company, in the calculation of technical provisions for Worker's Compensation will be detailed. The main focus of this paper will be in the analysis of the Excess of Loss reinsurance treaty that covers costs from Worker's Compensation and its impact in the technical result. The analysis is based on the Collective Risk Model and statistical indicators, such as Value-at-Risk, skewness coefficient, variance and expected value.
WU, JIAN-YING, et 吳建穎. « The Association between Compensation Committee Quality and Directors' Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/867z6g.
Texte intégral國立中正大學
會計與資訊科技研究所
105
This study examines the relationships between compensation committee quality and directors' excess compensation. This study measures compensation committee quality using variables of compensation committee independence, compensation committee with overlapping more than three companies, the size compensation committee, professional background and overlapping audit and compensation committees. The sample is collected from Taiwan listed companies for the period of 2012 to 2014, which is excluded financial, insurance, securities and investment trust industries. The result indicated that the higher proportion of independent directors serve in compensation committee can reduce directors' excess compensation. The higher proportion of scholars serves in compensation committee can reduce directors' excess compensation. The higher proportion of overlapping membership on compensation and audit committees increases directors' excess compensation. In sum, this study finds compensation committee independence, professional background and overlapping membership on compensation and audit committees can enhance monitoring effects of compensation committee and set reasonable directors' compensation policies, and then improve the company's governance quality.
Ni, Shi-Jun, et 倪士鈞. « Excess Ultimate Owners Compensation and Financial Restatements ». Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32175472009702221226.
Texte intégral國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
95
This research examines the effect of excess ultimate owners compensation on financial restatements. When ultimate owners control corporation effectively through pyramid structures, and cross-holdings among firms, they can get low cash flow right and high control right . This situation is provide the incentive to denationalize corporation resources and to extort minority shareholder by ultimate owners, and ultimate owners can use their control power to manipulate the number of financial statements for camouflage the encroachment。Therefore, this research expects that ultimate owners would manipulate the number of financial statements for getting excess compensation. So The financial statements were misrepresentative and will be restated in the future. This research uses ultimate owners compensation data from 1998-2003 to compute excess ultimate owners compensation and discusses the effect of excess ultimate owners compensation in the current year and last year on financial restatements in the next year. The primary result is found that ultimate owners in last year would manipulate financial statements for getting excess compensation. The financial statements were misrepresentative and will be restated in the next year.
Ya-HsuanTai et 戴亞萱. « Mandatory XBRL adoption and CEO excess compensation ». Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/436u8d.
Texte intégral國立成功大學
會計學系
106
This study uses XBRL to reduce investor information processing cost, to improve the transparency of information, and to enhance the effectiveness of external oversight to discuss whether XBRL can effectively reduce CEO excess compensation. We use the companies reporting in the XBRL format from the SEC in the U.S. to examine the changes in CEO excess compensation before and after XBRL reporting. We find that XBRL reporting can reduce CEO excess compensation in the positive sample group. However, we find that XBRL reporting has no effect on the reduction of CEO excess compensation in the negative sample group. Furthermore, we also analyze and find that the effect of XBRL reporting is stronger in reducing CEO positive excess pay in companies with more serious agency problems. This study shows that the adoption of XBRL can help reduce investor information processing cost, enhance the effectiveness of external monitoring in the market, and reduce the agency problems between management and investors.
Wan-TingHuang et 黃婉婷. « Mandatory XBRL Adoption and Director Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8gmfvm.
Texte intégralYing-Hsing, Fu, et 傅盈馨. « Corporate Governance, Executive Excess Compensation, and Firm Performance ». Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30121205950638536233.
Texte intégral東吳大學
國際經營與貿易學系
103
This study is to explore the relationships among corporate governance、excess compensation、Institutional investors and firm performance and then derive the following findings. First, the higher director holding ratio、the lower director pledge ratio、no CEO duality and the higher manager and foreign shareholding ratio are, showing the better corporate governance is. And when Institutional investors have more effective supervision way, firm performance would be better. Second, current ratio and debt ratio have negative effect on firm performance. Firm which has relative more capital on current asset and not use it with a better way so that affect its profitability, because of excessive current ratio. But a firm which has too high debt ratio will be risky thus harmful to firm performance. Besides, the bigger the firm scale is, the more risky it can tolerate. The firm relatively won't have cash flow problems when a single year loss, so it has positive impact on firm performance. Third, when CEO duality and director holding ratio get higher, Chief executive will easily get excess compensation because of self-interest. The higher director holding ratio and director pledge ratio are, with corporate interest, CEO might get limited compensation on the contrary. This study results suggest that investors should not only consider financial report information but also consider non-financial information, such as corporate governance、institutional investors、excess compensation for reference of investment decisions.
Ting-MunTsai et 蔡婷曼. « The Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on Executive Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04041496032802565973.
Texte intégral國立成功大學
會計學系碩博士班
100
In recent years, executive excess compensation has aroused public discontent and has become a very controversial issue. Most prior studies find that excess compensation has a negative effect on firms’ performance; we therefore consider excess compensation as symptoms of agency problem, that is, pay without performance in our study. As expected, we find that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is significantly and negatively related to CEO and CFO excess compensation; in particular, total CSR scores and CSR strengths have a negative effect on executive excess compensation, and CSR concerns is positively related to executive excess compensation. These results indicate that firms with higher CSR performance may exhibit stricter compensation oversight in order to be responsible to stakeholders and to meet the ethical expectation of society, that is, they may be more inclined to constrain executive excess compensation. Additionally, corporate governance is negatively related to CEO excess compensation, suggesting that firms with stronger governance are less likely to pay excessive compensation to CEOs. This finding is congruent with the argument that excess compensation can be regarded as a sign of poor governance. However, we do not observe a significantly negative relationship between corporate governance and CFO excess compensation in our study.
Livres sur le sujet "Excess compensation"
National Council on Compensation Insurance. Excess loss factor calculations [for 2005] : [Name of state]. [Boca Raton, FL] : National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2005.
Trouver le texte intégralInsurance, National Council on Compensation. Excess loss factor calculations [for 2007] : [Name of state]. [Boca Raton, FL] : National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2007.
Trouver le texte intégralNational Council on Compensation Insurance. Excess loss factor calculations [for 2006] : [Name of state]. [Boca Raton, FL] : National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2006.
Trouver le texte intégralNational Council on Compensation Insurance. Excess loss factor calculations [for 2004] : [Name of state]. [Boca Raton, FL] : National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2004.
Trouver le texte intégralNational Council on Compensation Insurance. Excess loss factor calculations [for 2010 : [Name of state]. [Boca Raton, FL] : National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2010.
Trouver le texte intégral(Organization), WorldatWork. Handbook of compensation & benefits formulas. [United States] : WorldatWork Press, 2012.
Trouver le texte intégralThe Competitive Market Supervision Act, S. 2107 : Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, second session on S. 2107, to amend the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to reduce securities fees in excess of those required to fund the operations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to adjust compensation provisions for employees of the Commission, and for other purposes, February 28, 2000. Washington : U.S. G.P.O., 2001.
Trouver le texte intégralGreat Britain. Colonial Office. Lower Canada : Copies of all ordinances, except those already presented to the House, passed by the Special Council and governor of Lower Canada, since the 24th day of November 1838. [London : HMSO, 2001.
Trouver le texte intégralExcess loss factors. [Boca Raton, FL] : National Council on Compensation Insurance, 1995.
Trouver le texte intégralNational Council on Compensation Insurance., dir. Excess loss factors [for 2002]. [Boca Raton, FL] : National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2002.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Excess compensation"
Formisano, Ron. « The Profitable World of Nonprofits ». Dans American Oligarchy. University of Illinois Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252041273.003.0008.
Texte intégralMartin, Christopher. « Rethinking News about US Workers ». Dans No Longer Newsworthy, 180–208. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501735257.003.0008.
Texte intégralLockwood, Alan H. « Economic Considerations of Climate Change and Health ». Dans Heat Advisory. The MIT Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262034876.003.0009.
Texte intégralMoore, Ryan M., et Raj M. Vyas. « Orthognathic Surgery ». Dans Operative Plastic Surgery, sous la direction de Gregory R. D. Evans, 609–22. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780190499075.003.0058.
Texte intégralLock, Tobias. « Article 17 CFR ». Dans The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198759393.003.537.
Texte intégralRashid, Tayyab, et Martin Seligman. « Psychopathology ». Dans Positive Psychotherapy, sous la direction de Tayyab Rashid et Martin Seligman, 22–32. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med-psych/9780195325386.003.0003.
Texte intégralGross, Michael L. « Care and Compensation for Civilian Victims of War ». Dans Military Medical Ethics in Contemporary Armed Conflict, sous la direction de Michael L. Gross, 138–56. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780190694944.003.0008.
Texte intégralClements, Richard, et Ademola Abass. « 14. Breach of trust ». Dans Complete Equity and Trusts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198787549.003.0014.
Texte intégralPlassmann, Clemens. « Rule 133 Value- based fee for the determination of damages ». Dans Unified Patent Protection in Europe : A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198755463.003.0315.
Texte intégralBerg, Jessica W., Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz et Lisa S. Parker. « Legal Rules for Recovery ». Dans Informed Consent. Oxford University Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195126778.003.0012.
Texte intégralActes de conférences sur le sujet "Excess compensation"
Azzouni, Soumaya, Nizar Khitouni et Med Salim Bouhlel. « Excess loop delay compensation techniques in continuous-time ΔΣ modulators ». Dans 2019 International Conference on Advanced Systems and Emergent Technologies (IC_ASET). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/aset.2019.8870998.
Texte intégralAfifi, M., M. Keller, Y. Manoli et M. Ortmanns. « Excess loop delay compensation technique for tunable bandpass delta sigma modulators ». Dans 2009 52nd IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mwscas.2009.5236078.
Texte intégralZhang, C., L. J. Breems, G. Radulov, M. Bolatkale, Q. Liu, H. Hegt et A. van Roermund. « Current-mode multi-path excess loop delay compensation for GHz sampling CT ΣΔ ADCs ». Dans 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iscas.2017.8050369.
Texte intégralKozlov, Victor V., A. B. Matsko et V. B. Smirnov. « Compensation method for cancellation of excess noise in quantum nondemolition measurements of optical solitons ». Dans Laser Optics 2000, sous la direction de Serguei A. Gurevich et Nikolay N. Rosanov. SPIE, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.418820.
Texte intégralKim, Song-Bok, Stefan Joeres et Stefan Heinen. « A compensation method of the excess loop delay in continuous-time complex sigma-delta modulators ». Dans 2007 European Conference on Circuit Theory and Design (ECCTD 2007). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ecctd.2007.4529556.
Texte intégralZhang, Yi, Chia-Hung Chen, Tao He, Xin Meng et Gabor C. Temes. « A continuous-time ΔΣ ; modulator with a digital technique for excess loop delay compensation ». Dans 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iscas.2014.6865290.
Texte intégralCai, Chen-Yan, Yang Jiang, Sai-Weng Sin, Seng-Pan U et Rui P. Martins. « A passive Excess-Loop-Delay compensation technique for Gm-C based continuous-time ΣΔ ; modulators ». Dans 2011 IEEE 54th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mwscas.2011.6026455.
Texte intégrald’Entremont, B. P., et J. M. Ochterbeck. « Investigation of Loop Heat Pipe Startup Using Liquid Core Visualization ». Dans ASME 2008 Heat Transfer Summer Conference collocated with the Fluids Engineering, Energy Sustainability, and 3rd Energy Nanotechnology Conferences. ASMEDC, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ht2008-56387.
Texte intégralGupta, Akhil, Shahrokh Ahmadi et Mona Zaghloul. « A 400 MHz delta-sigma modulator for bandpass IF digitization around 100 MHz with excess loop delay compensation ». Dans 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iscas.2011.5937828.
Texte intégralPushpam, P. Emi, J. Arockia Twinkle et Premanand V. Chandramani. « Excess loop delay compensation using RZ DAC for the third order CT ΔΣ modulator with CRFB-FF structures ». Dans 2019 2nd International Conference on Power and Embedded Drive Control (ICPEDC). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icpedc47771.2019.9036709.
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