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1
Dah, Mustafa A. « Essays on the Effect of Excess Compensation and Governance Changes on Firm Value ». Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2012. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5179.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm's performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation is not significantly inversely related to the firm's future performance, it has an indirect negative effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators' objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines the relationship between the firm's governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders' wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.ID: 031001341; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Title from PDF title page (viewed April 15, 2013).; Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Central Florida, 2012.; Includes bibliographical references.
Ph.D.
Doctorate
Business Administration
Business Administration; Finance
2
Antenucci, Robert P. « Impact of Corporate Governance, Excess CEO Compensation, and CEO Stock Option Grants on Firm Performance during Recessionary Periods ». Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1386339174.
Texte intégral
3
Antenucci, Robert P. « Impact of corporate governance, excess CEO compensation, and CEO stock option grants on firm performance during recessionary periods ». Thesis, Kent State University, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3618935.
Texte intégralRésumé :
There is much debate over the efficacy of corporate governance in mitigating agency costs and improving the correlation between firm performance and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay. Research on this topic ranges from theories which maintain that CEO compensation in the U.S. is commensurate with CEO ability, and is therefore justified, to theories which maintain that CEOs are little more than overpaid rent extractors.
I investigate the above dichotomy in the executive compensation literature by examining the impact of corporate governance on excess CEO compensation and firm performance during recessions. Business cycle contractions are challenging times for firms, and arguably a period when stronger corporate governance and CEO ability is significant to the success of the firm. I posit that better governed firms with lower levels of excess compensation outperform their peers in subsequent challenging recessionary periods.
Stock option grants, a frequently used component of CEO pay packages, are thought to better align CEO and shareholder interests. However, with recent financial scandals there is much concern over this form of equity compensation. I examine the use of employee stock option grants in CEO compensation packages and whether such stock option compensation improves the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance.
My research achieves several aims: it extends the literature on the impact of corporate governance on firm performance by using a recessionary period metric, it examines the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating agency costs, it examines excess CEO compensation and this excess compensation connection with CEO ability or CEO rent extraction during recessionary periods, and it examines the impact of stock option grants in CEO pay packages on firm performance during recessionary periods. I find support for a decrease in abnormal return associated with trading on stronger corporate governance and support for rent extraction in the CEO compensation process during the 2001 recession.
4
Serrano, Sara Coelho. « Analysis of the reinsurance treaty for a workers ? Compensation portfolio ». Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/8995.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Mestrado em Ciências ActuariaisEste relatório assenta numa análise à sustentabilidade do ramo de Acidentes de Trabalho no contexto do estágio realizado na Allianz Portugal. Inicialmente é explicado o contexto legal do ramo de forma a compreender-se melhor as características específicas deste. Por conseguinte serão detalhados os modelos e pressupostos, utilizados pela Companhia, no cálculo das provisões técnicas de Acidentes de Trabalho. O foco principal será na análise ao tratado de resseguro de Excedente de danos que cobre os custos com sinistros de Acidentes de Trabalho e o seu impacto no resultado técnico. A análise é feita com base no Modelo de Risco coletivo e em indicadores estatísticos como o Value-at-Risk, coeficiente de assimetria, variância e valor esperado.
This report resumes the analysis of the sustainability of Worker's Compensation within the internship at Allianz Portugal. The legal framework of the business is primarily explained as it is important to understand the business specifications. Models and assumptions used, by the Company, in the calculation of technical provisions for Worker's Compensation will be detailed. The main focus of this paper will be in the analysis of the Excess of Loss reinsurance treaty that covers costs from Worker's Compensation and its impact in the technical result. The analysis is based on the Collective Risk Model and statistical indicators, such as Value-at-Risk, skewness coefficient, variance and expected value.
5
WU, JIAN-YING, et 吳建穎. « The Association between Compensation Committee Quality and Directors' Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/867z6g.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立中正大學
會計與資訊科技研究所
105
This study examines the relationships between compensation committee quality and directors' excess compensation. This study measures compensation committee quality using variables of compensation committee independence, compensation committee with overlapping more than three companies, the size compensation committee, professional background and overlapping audit and compensation committees. The sample is collected from Taiwan listed companies for the period of 2012 to 2014, which is excluded financial, insurance, securities and investment trust industries. The result indicated that the higher proportion of independent directors serve in compensation committee can reduce directors' excess compensation. The higher proportion of scholars serves in compensation committee can reduce directors' excess compensation. The higher proportion of overlapping membership on compensation and audit committees increases directors' excess compensation. In sum, this study finds compensation committee independence, professional background and overlapping membership on compensation and audit committees can enhance monitoring effects of compensation committee and set reasonable directors' compensation policies, and then improve the company's governance quality.
6
Ni, Shi-Jun, et 倪士鈞. « Excess Ultimate Owners Compensation and Financial Restatements ». Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32175472009702221226.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
95
This research examines the effect of excess ultimate owners compensation on financial restatements. When ultimate owners control corporation effectively through pyramid structures, and cross-holdings among firms, they can get low cash flow right and high control right . This situation is provide the incentive to denationalize corporation resources and to extort minority shareholder by ultimate owners, and ultimate owners can use their control power to manipulate the number of financial statements for camouflage the encroachment。Therefore, this research expects that ultimate owners would manipulate the number of financial statements for getting excess compensation. So The financial statements were misrepresentative and will be restated in the future. This research uses ultimate owners compensation data from 1998-2003 to compute excess ultimate owners compensation and discusses the effect of excess ultimate owners compensation in the current year and last year on financial restatements in the next year. The primary result is found that ultimate owners in last year would manipulate financial statements for getting excess compensation. The financial statements were misrepresentative and will be restated in the next year.
7
Ya-HsuanTai et 戴亞萱. « Mandatory XBRL adoption and CEO excess compensation ». Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/436u8d.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立成功大學
會計學系
106
This study uses XBRL to reduce investor information processing cost, to improve the transparency of information, and to enhance the effectiveness of external oversight to discuss whether XBRL can effectively reduce CEO excess compensation. We use the companies reporting in the XBRL format from the SEC in the U.S. to examine the changes in CEO excess compensation before and after XBRL reporting. We find that XBRL reporting can reduce CEO excess compensation in the positive sample group. However, we find that XBRL reporting has no effect on the reduction of CEO excess compensation in the negative sample group. Furthermore, we also analyze and find that the effect of XBRL reporting is stronger in reducing CEO positive excess pay in companies with more serious agency problems. This study shows that the adoption of XBRL can help reduce investor information processing cost, enhance the effectiveness of external monitoring in the market, and reduce the agency problems between management and investors.
8
Wan-TingHuang et 黃婉婷. « Mandatory XBRL Adoption and Director Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8gmfvm.
Texte intégral
9
Ying-Hsing, Fu, et 傅盈馨. « Corporate Governance, Executive Excess Compensation, and Firm Performance ». Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30121205950638536233.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士東吳大學
國際經營與貿易學系
103
This study is to explore the relationships among corporate governance、excess compensation、Institutional investors and firm performance and then derive the following findings. First, the higher director holding ratio、the lower director pledge ratio、no CEO duality and the higher manager and foreign shareholding ratio are, showing the better corporate governance is. And when Institutional investors have more effective supervision way, firm performance would be better. Second, current ratio and debt ratio have negative effect on firm performance. Firm which has relative more capital on current asset and not use it with a better way so that affect its profitability, because of excessive current ratio. But a firm which has too high debt ratio will be risky thus harmful to firm performance. Besides, the bigger the firm scale is, the more risky it can tolerate. The firm relatively won't have cash flow problems when a single year loss, so it has positive impact on firm performance. Third, when CEO duality and director holding ratio get higher, Chief executive will easily get excess compensation because of self-interest. The higher director holding ratio and director pledge ratio are, with corporate interest, CEO might get limited compensation on the contrary. This study results suggest that investors should not only consider financial report information but also consider non-financial information, such as corporate governance、institutional investors、excess compensation for reference of investment decisions.
10
Ting-MunTsai et 蔡婷曼. « The Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on Executive Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04041496032802565973.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立成功大學
會計學系碩博士班
100
In recent years, executive excess compensation has aroused public discontent and has become a very controversial issue. Most prior studies find that excess compensation has a negative effect on firms’ performance; we therefore consider excess compensation as symptoms of agency problem, that is, pay without performance in our study. As expected, we find that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is significantly and negatively related to CEO and CFO excess compensation; in particular, total CSR scores and CSR strengths have a negative effect on executive excess compensation, and CSR concerns is positively related to executive excess compensation. These results indicate that firms with higher CSR performance may exhibit stricter compensation oversight in order to be responsible to stakeholders and to meet the ethical expectation of society, that is, they may be more inclined to constrain executive excess compensation. Additionally, corporate governance is negatively related to CEO excess compensation, suggesting that firms with stronger governance are less likely to pay excessive compensation to CEOs. This finding is congruent with the argument that excess compensation can be regarded as a sign of poor governance. However, we do not observe a significantly negative relationship between corporate governance and CFO excess compensation in our study.
11
Wan-ChinChen et 陳婉菁. « The Effect of Mandatory XBRL Adoption on CEO Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/y5j3w5.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立成功大學
財務金融研究所碩士在職專班
106
In this study, we examine whether mandatory XBRL adoption reduces CEO excess compensation during SEC mandated years. The mandatory adoption of XBRL, in addition to eliminating costly manual procedures, can likely enhance transparency in financial reporting, timeliness in data analysis, increase the accessibility of firm-specific financial information by a variety of user groups, and strengthen the monitoring of CEO compensation, helping reduce the agency problem. This study takes US listed companies from 2006 to 2014 as its research objects, and it uses the differences in different research methods to explore the impact of mandatory XBRL on CEO over- or undercompensation and to conduct empirical research in a regressive manner. The results show that the situation of CEOs who are overcompensated is improved after XBRL adoption, while there is no difference on the situation of CEOs who are undercompensated.
12
CHEN, YI-FANG, et 陳沂芳. « The Determinants of Compensation Committee Quality - An Analysis from the Perspective of Excess Executive and Director Compensations ». Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3ueud6.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立東華大學
會計與財務碩士學位學程
101
The Securities and Exchange Law was amended to request listing companies establishing compensation committees at the end of 2011. It is still too early to evaluate if the compensation committee functions for the short period of existence. For this reason, we focus mainly on the determinants of compensation committee quality, especially on firms with excess executive and director compensations. Using Taiwanese listed firms as samples in 2011, empirical evidences indicate significantly negative relationships between excess executive compensations and a firm’s compensation committee quality. This implies that firms with excess executive compensations demand weaker monitoring from compensation committee on management remuneration. However, we find positive although weak associations between excess director compensations and compensation committee quality, perhaps due to the overwhelmed media and legislator attentions on directors’ compensation. Our results are consistent and robust after a battery of tests using different years and method to measure excess compensations. Furthermore, we find firms with higher pay-performance sensitivity incline to form compensation committee at lower quality. The literature on compensation committee quality is quite limited and we are the first exploring the relationships between excess compensation and compensation committee quality using samples from the emerging market. The results contribute to the literature and provide policy implications.
13
Yang, Zhe-Jia, et 楊哲嘉. « The Effect of Internationalization and Managers' Excess Compensation on Firm Performance ». Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76226249345794046854.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
104
With the advent of globalization, the company for cross-border operations is inevitable, but after the 2008 financial crisis, making the managers' compensation issue surfaced again. This study investigated the association of managers' excess compensation and internationalization of the company, and the impact of managers' excess compensation and company performance caused by the internationalization. In this study, from 2005 to 2014 between the Taiwan Stock Exchange cabinet companies for the study, empirical results show that the higher the internationalization of the company in the case of managers and licensed excess compensation is heightened. Furthermore, by excess compensation due to the internationalization of corporate performance in the long run it would detract from the value of the company.
14
LI, HSING-YEH, et 李幸曄. « Effects of Board Structure and Manager’s Compensation on Debt : Excess Cash ». Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mcdqx6.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士長榮大學
經營管理研究所
105
Abstract This study was an analysis of the influences of executive compensation and the configuration of the board of directors on corporate debt structure; the overall samples were categorized according to excess cash holdings to observe the said influences. The empirical results revealed that the percentage of independent directors had a significant negative correlation with the debt ratio of the company. The same result was also observed regarding the shareholdings of directors, supervisors, and managers, as well as board members. Significant positive correlation existed between managerial compensation and debt ratios. In addition, categorizing the samples according to excess cash holdings revealed that when the company has insufficient cash, it has the same results as above. However, when the company had abundant cash, the result was different. Keywords: Board Structure, Excess Cash, Long and Short Term Financial Liabilities
15
Chen, Mei-Chu, et 陳玫竹. « The Effect of Top Managers and Directors’ Excess Compensation on Firm Performance ». Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05321960505761618159.
Texte intégral
16
Wu, Cing-Sheng, et 吳清盛. « The Effects on Establishing Compensation Committee – Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Excess Director Compensations : And the Effect of Family Control ». Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ctzgxp.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
107
The objective of this study is exploring the effects on establishing compensation committee from pay-performance sensitivity and excess director compensations, and further examines the impact of family control on the effectiveness of the compensation committee. Using samples from 2005 to 2017, the empirical results indicate that the establishment of compensation committees can improve the association between relative accounting performance and director non-incentive compensation or incentive compensation, and the family firm is less effective than the non-family firm. Compared with the mandatory establishment of compensation committees, there is a positive and significant difference in the relationship between the excess director compensations and the future performance, and supports the implicit contract view. The result difference between family firm and non-family firm is not significant. However, if independent director is not well enough, the establishment of compensation committees is still effective.
17
LIANG, YU-LING, et 梁瑜玲. « The Study of Excess Directors Compensation, Corporate Governance Ranking System, and Firm Valuation ». Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04850788436898073319.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立高雄應用科技大學
會計系
98
The study examines the association between excess director compensation, corporate governance ranking system and firm valuation by dividing samples, which are the firms listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange during the period 2005-2008, into four groups: the firms with higher ROE and higher director’s compensation than the industry’s average, the firms with higher ROE and lower director’s compensation than the industry’s average, the firms with lower ROE and higher director’s compensation than the industry’s average, and the firms with lower ROE and lower director’s compensation than the industry’s average. The empirical result shows that the valuation of the firms with lower ROE and higher director’s compensation than the industry’s average will be significantly less than those of the other groups. And the firms with high corporate governance score will get higher valuation than those with low score. But the relation between corporate governance ranking system and excess director compensation is insignificant. Finally, the positive relation between corporate governance ranking system and firm valuation will be weakened once the firm has lower ROE and higher director’s compensation than the industry’s average.
18
Wang, shun-Cheng, et 王順正. « The Effect of the Excess Compensation of Directors and Supervisors on Earnings Management ». Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82106356513172670973.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
100
Abstract The purpose of this research lies in exploring the relationship between directors and supervisors’ excess compensation and earnings management. In recent years, due to the outbreak of the financial tsunamis, the compensation problem formerly regarded as an internal management problem of a company has once again gained attention. During the period in which the average profits go down, the earnings of directors and supervisors go up rather than go down, which is brought into question. Furthermore, most of the directors and supervisors in Taiwan companies are not only the management level of the companies but also the major shareholders. Under the combination of management and ownership, the directors and supervisors who concentrate all the power on themselves are questioned whether they will make use of their advantages to manipulate profits and losses by means of earnings management in order to gain excess compensation, to increase their own riches and infringe upon the right and interests of the small shareholders. This research takes the information of the directors and supervisors’ compensation to calculate the excess compensation. And uses the samples to explore the influence of directors and supervisors’ excess compensation on earnings management. The results verify and reveal that the directors and supervisors will not use the method of earnings management to manipulate profits and losses in order to gain more excess compensation and to increase their own wealth.
19
Hsu, Pei-chen, et 許佩蓁. « The Relationships between Compensation Structure, Excess Remuneration and Performance of Taiwanese Family Listed Companies ». Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/48007689679539126292.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立高雄第一科技大學
會計資訊研究所
103
Family controlled firms are popular phenomena in Taiwan; their operation performance is determinant to the economic stability and future development of Taiwan. Our paper is aimed to explore the impacts of family control on firm performance. The active participations of the family members in the top management, especially as a family CEO, may affect this connection, will be positively enhanced or negatively abated? In this paper we exam the empirical links between family ownership, CEO incentive compensation contract and family CEOs using a sample of 3,813 firm-year observations during the 3-year period from 2010 to 2012. As hypothesized, we find a positive and significant relation between performance, family ownership and family CEOs. Also consistent with expectations, we find a positive and significant correlation between CEO fixed compensation proportion and performance, and a significant negative connection between CEO variable compensation proportion. In contrast to our expectation, the relationship to excess remuneration is negative and significant. Overall, our analyses indicate that the presence of the family control and family CEOs has a significant and positive impact on firm performance. While it aligns the interest of shareholders and managers, it strengthens family power and aggravates agency conflicts between small and large shareholders when a family member serves as the CEO; it also mitigates agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The interest conflicts between small and large stockholders is compensated with the reduction of agency cost contributed by the interest alignment of family ownership and management. The performance motivation mechanism of family firm should be built in the variable compensation component of the contract, like the non-family firm. The negative correlation regarding excess remuneration could be resulted from the value creating performance of the family CEOs, which still compatible or even under compensated.
20
LIN, HUI-JU, et 林慧茹. « Top Management Team Excess Compensation and Employee Excess Pay : The Moderating Effects of Divergence between Voting Rights and Cash-flow Rights and Employee Productivity ». Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9ur685.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士中國文化大學
會計學系
106
This study examines the impact of top management team (TMT) excess compensation on employee excess pay as well as whether divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights and employee productivity affect the above relationship. Our findings indicate that TMT excess compensation, divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights, and employee excess productivity all have significantly positive effects on employee pay. Specifically, employees are better paid in cases where top managers receive higher rewards, employees are more productive and firms having larger divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights. In addition, the interaction variable of TMT excess compensation with divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights is positively related to employee excess pay, indicating that a closer link occurs between TMT compensation and employee pay in cases where firms experience larger divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights. Such a result is in line with the managerial entrenchment argument that managers may tend to use compensation as a tool to secure their power in their work place when they only hold little equity. The interaction variable of TMT excess compensation with employee productivity is positively associated with employee excess pay, showing the link is closer between TMT compensation and employee pay. Such a result may imply that pay fairness is better in firms having higher productivity.
21
Lan, Kai-Li, et 藍凱莉. « The Relationship between CEO Excess Compensation and Managerial Performance in the Taiwan''s Banking Industry ». Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13576815895668352058.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士逢甲大學
經營管理碩士在職專班
93
The major objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between managers’ compensations and firm performances in the Taiwan’s banking industry. The empirical study proceeds as two stages. First, a nonparametric frontier approach, DEA, is utilized to estimate various efficiency scores of the 43 sample banks over the period of 1997 to 2002. Then, both OLS and Tobit regressions are utilized to examine the associations between the cost efficiency and 8 explanatory managerial control mechanisms with 3 control variables. Consistent with the findings of Huang (2004), the empirical result provides positive evidence to support the existence of the incentive–compensation hypothesis.
22
Tai, Yi-Hui, et 戴怡蕙. « An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between InsideDirector’s Excess Compensation and Firm’s FuturePerformance : Implicit Contract Perspective ». Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/07829088367057438216.
Texte intégralRésumé :
博士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
100
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between inside director’s excess compensation and firm’s future performance. This paper takes the "inside director" as the research subject due to the following concerns. Firstly, the compensation of the outside director is usually only travel allowances and his chance to collude with the manager is lower. Moreover, comparing to simply taking the high-level manager as the research subject, we can learn more due to the duality of inside director. Finally, few prior papers study the relation between inside director’s excess compensation and firm’s future performance. Therefore, the firm’s future performance is expressed as a function of the two excess compensations as derived from the inside director’s respective roles of director and executive. Besides that, this paper also tests the relation between total excess compensation and firm’s future performance. The excess compensation’s relation to the firm’s future performance has been explained in the literature based on the two perspectives: cronyism versus implicit contract theory. According to cronyism, it views the excess compensation as an agency problem that the agent exploits from the information asymmetry between principal and agent. To the contrary, implicit contract theory argues that if corporate boards optimally use both observable and unobservable measures of performance and the unobservable measures are correlated with firm future performance, then unexplained variation in current compensation should predict future variation in firm performance. In addition, even if there exists excess compensation paid to inside director and no significant growth of firm future performance, it could be due to other factors than cronyism. Therefore, this study chooses implicit contract theory as the basis to develop hypotheses. This study defines excess compensation as the compensation unexplained by current observable financial and market performance measures. In other words, the excess compensation means the compensation explained by unobservable performance measures and is the difference between the actual pay and the reasonable pay. The latter is determined by the outsiders who use public information to derive their view on inside director’s reasonable pay and this paper use agency theory to define the combination of reasonable pay. Firstly, the compensation for an agent shall be in accordance with the performance. Also, the weight allocated to the performance measures should have a negative correlation with the level of uncertainty, and this paper divided the uncertainty involved into two dimensions: complexity and risk. Here we defined reasonable compensation as the function with the following factor: (1) performance, (2) complexity, and (3) risk. Empirical evidence shows that the inside director’s total excess compensation and the inside director’s excess compensation from director’s role are both positively related to the firm’s future performance as measured by the Tobin’s q of the first or second succeeding period. This result supports the view base on implicit contract theory. Also, the prior empirical result is supported by non-electronics companies. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that the inside director’s excess compensation from executive role is unrelated to the firm’s future performance as measured by the Tobin’s q of the first or second succeeding period or ROA of the succeeding period. Lastly, the inside director’s excess compensation from director’s role is not negatively related to the firm’s future performance in the firm with CEO duality.
23
Jia-WeiLin et 林佳緯. « The Relationship between Top Executive Excess Compensation and Corporate Governance, Firm Characteristics, Firm Performance, and Earnings Management ». Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66805861094753699345.
Texte intégral
24
MAO-CHUAN, HUNG, et 洪茂銓. « The Research of Excess Distribution of Last Un-expensed Employee Bonus and Director Compensation and Firm Characteristics ». Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35697741495297762475.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
97
After the revision of Article 64 of Business Accounting Law, employee bonus and director compensation should be treated as an expense in income statement. In general, there is cushion period between amendment date and effective date if the laws and regulations are revised. Enterprises will usually use this period to adjust organizational policies and systems. Employee bonus and director compensation should be treated as an expense starting from January 1, 2008. Therefore, the year of 2007 can be regarded as a cushion period when Taiwan enterprises face this changeover. Enterprises in Taiwan probably use the last year（year 2007）when employee bonus and director compensation were not be treated as an expense to distribute future possible rewards ahead of time to avoid future increase in expenses and, thus, decrease future net income. Accordingly, the study examines whether Taiwan enterprises distribute excess employee bonus and director compensation in the cushion period（year 2007）than in the past. In addition, the study further examines the relationships among excess distribution, firm characteristic, and corporate governance. To examine the distribution of employee bonus and director compensation in 2007, the study measures employee bonus and director compensation either separately or jointly. The results show that some Taiwan enterprises indeed distribute excess employee bonus and director compensation in the cushion period（year 2007）than in the past. And the proportions of these enterprises are all higher than 40% whichever measurement method is used. The proportions are not insignificant. In addition, the empirical results find that as enterprise distribute more employee bonus and director compensation in the cushion period（year 2007）than in the past, their size of board and percentage of independent directors tend to be lower. And the concurrence of both Chairman and CEO, and the deviation of control rights from the cash flow rights are positively associated with excess distribution. Besides, firm size and growth opportunity are also positively associated with excess distribution. However, enterprises that distributed more employee bonus and director compensation in the cushion period（year 2007）than in the past are not just limited to the electronic technology industry.
25
Chen, Yi-Ting, et 陳怡廷. « The Relationship of Family Control with Excess Management Compensation : A Further Discussion on the Impact of Information Disclosures ». Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54dqfp.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士中國文化大學
會計學系
103
This study aims to examine the impact of family-business characteristics, control ownership and information disclosures on excess top management compensation. To conduct this research, a sample consisting of listed and OTC companies trading in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2013 is used and the excess compensation model developed by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) is employed. The results show that the interaction variable of controlling ownership and family firms positively associated with excess top management compensation. Such results indicate that family-business characteristics alter the relationship between controlling ownership and excess top management compensation, in line with the argument of core-agency problems. In addition, the result shows that transparency moderates the impact of controlling ownership and family firms own excess top management compensation. This finding indicates that improving information transparency can reduce the impact of family-business characteristics on the relationship between controlling ownership and excess top management compensation, which may lead to mitigate the fat-cat problems.
26
Feng, Hsuan-Ling, et 馮軒綾. « Does Enhanced Financial Statement Comparability Mitigate Agency Problems ? Evidence from Internal Capital Market Efficiency and CEO Excess Compensation ». Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/egf4fu.
Texte intégralRésumé :
博士國立東華大學
企業管理學系
107
This study explores from two perspectives whether enhanced the comparability of financial statement information can mitigate agency problem in the context of mandatory adoption of XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) which SEC began to implement in 2009. XBRL provides a standard language for reporting financial information. XBRL is a type of XML (extensible markup language), and uses tags to identify each piece of financial data, which reduces the cost of information processing and increase the efficiency of data processing. XBRL makes it easier to compare and analyze data between enterprises. The first part of this paper studies the impact of mandatory adoption of XBRL on the internal capital market efficiency of American diversified companies. Empirical results show that mandatory adoption of XBRL is associated with improvement in internal capital market efficiency. Specifically, increased efficiency of internal capital market is more obvious in companies with higher agency problems. In addition, we find that internal capital market efficiency and negative excess value are related during XBRL. After the mandatory adoption of XBRL, it is easier for investors to detect the inefficiency of the company's internal capital market and then give negative evaluation, which means that the improved efficiency of the internal capital market is due to the monitoring benefits of XBRL. In the past three decades, the CEO’s compensation has increased greatly, while the abnormally high compensation reflects the failure of corporate governance. Thus, the second part of this paper discusses the impact of mandatory adoption of XBRL on CEO excess compensation. Our results indicate that mandatory adoption of XBRL is negatively associated with CEO excess compensation. Further, reduction of CEO excess compensation is more significant for companies with higher agency problems. The overall results suggest that the internal capital market is more efficient and CEO excess salary is significantly reduced during XBRL. After the mandatory adoption of XBRL, the comparability of financial statement information is enhanced, the investor's information environment is improved, and then the agency problem between managers and shareholder is reduced.
27
WANG, YU-JU, et 王妤如. « The Relationships of Directors and Chief Executive Officers’ Excess Compensations with Employee Pay ». Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/53696367495572936273.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士中國文化大學
會計學系
105
This study aims to examine the relationships of directors and chief executive offic-ers’ excess compensations with employee pay as well as whether governance style af-fects such relationships. To conduct this research, firms trading in the Taiwan and Taipei Stock Exchanges in the period from 2013 to 2015 are used as the sample. The results show that directors and CEOs’ excess compensations are positively associated with em-ployee pay, respectively. Such findings, in line with equity theory, indicate that firms awarding directors or CEOs higher excess compensation offer their employees a higher level of pay. In addition, the interaction variable of directors’ excess compensation and CEO duality is positively related to employee pay, showing that directors’ excess com-pensation has a stronger effect on employees’ pay level in case where board chairs also serve as CEOs. Such a finding implies that there exists a closer link between directors and employees’ rewards where companies operate in the style of stewardship.
28
Chen, Kuan-Yu, et 陳冠妤. « Excess Pay and Firm Performance : An Examination of Various Combinations of Directors and CEO Compensations ». Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/g6yh8d.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士中國文化大學
會計學系
103
This study aims to examine the impact of various combinations of board and CEO compensation on subsequent firm performance. To fulfil this purpose, I partition my sample firms into four groups, firms overpaying both directors and CEOs, underpaying both directors and CEOs, overpaying directors but underpaying CEOs, and underpaying directors but overpaying CEOs. The results show that firms paying incentive compensation to both directors and CEOs or overpaying directors but un-derpaying CEOs have higher market return and return on assets in the subsequent years compared to firms underpaying both directors and CEOs. Such results indicate that incentive compensation serves as a force driving top management to work harder. However, this study also shows that firms offering extra fixed pay to both directors and COEs or overpaying directors but underpaying CEOs have lower subsequent performance than firms underpaying both directors and CEOs. Such findings indicate that awarding extra fixed compensation cannot help promote performance, which may lead to fat-cat problems.
29
Benterki, Isma. « Rôles des facteurs de croissance dans la prolifération de la cellule β-pancréatique en réponse à un excès de nutriments : étude du facteur de croissance HB-EGF et du récepteur à l’EGF ». Thèse, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/13131.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Le diabète de type 2 (DT2) résulte d’une résistance à l’insuline par les tissus périphériques et par un défaut de sécrétion de l’insuline par les cellules β-pancréatiques. Au fil du temps, la compensation des îlots de cellules β pour la résistance à l’insuline échoue et entraine par conséquent une baisse progressive de la fonction des cellules β. Plusieurs facteurs peuvent contribuer à la compensation de la cellule β. Toutefois, la compréhension des mécanismes cellulaires et moléculaires sous-jacents à la compensation de la masse de la cellule β reste à ce jour inconnue. Le but de ce mémoire était d’identifier précisément quel mécanisme pouvait amener à la compensation de la cellule β en réponse à un excès de nutriments et plus précisément à l’augmentation de sa prolifération et de sa masse. Ainsi, avec l’augmentation de la résistance à l’insuline et des facteurs circulants chez les rats de six mois perfusés avec du glucose et de l’intralipide, l’hypothèse a été émise et confirmée lors de notre étude que le facteur de croissance HB-EGF active le récepteur de l’EGF et des voies de signalisations subséquentes telles que mTOR et FoxM1 impliquées dans la prolifération de la cellule β-pancréatique. Collectivement, ces résultats nous permettent de mieux comprendre les mécanismes moléculaires impliqués dans la compensation de la masse de la cellule β dans un état de résistance à l’insuline et peuvent servir de nouvelles approches thérapeutiques pour prévenir ou ralentir le développement du DT2.Type 2 diabetes (T2D) results from insulin resistance in peripheral tissues and impaired insulin secretion from the pancreatic β-cell. Over the time, compensation of the β cell islets for insulin resistance fails, and therefore leads to a gradual decline in β-cell function. Several factors may contribute to β-cell compensation. However, the cellular and molecular mechanisms underlying β-cell compensation remain unknown. The purpose of this thesis was to identify what mechanism could lead to β cell compensation in response to nutrients excess and specifically the increase in proliferation and β-cell mass. Thus, with increasing insulin resistance and circulating factors in the 6 month rats infused with glucose + intralipid, the hypothesis was made and confirmed in our study that the growth factor HB-EGF would activate the EGF receptor, and subsequent signaling pathways such as mTOR and FoxM1, both involved in the proliferation of the pancreatic beta-cell. Collectively, these results allow us to understand better the molecular mechanisms involved in the β cell compensation in the insulin resistance state and may serve as a potential new therapeutic approach to prevent or delay T2D development.