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1
Ndawana, Duduzile. "The role of the judiciary in protecting the right to freedom of expression in difficult political environments: a case study of Zimbabwe." Thesis, University of Fort Hare, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10353/99.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The right to freedom of expression is with no doubt one of the most important rights in all democratic societies. The southern African sub-region is however lacking when it comes to the protection of this right. There are either highly repressive laws which result in the right being practiced but to a limited extent. In other cases the media is owned by the elite in society which results in the majority not being represented in the independent media and at the same time, the public media is often abused by the governing elite. The scene is therefore that both the public media and private media are representative of the elite. The research seeks to explore the protection of human rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression in politically volatile environments. The research focuses on Zimbabwe but comparative analysis has also been drawn with other jurisdictions moreso South Africa. It is important to note that Zimbabwe has ratified both the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights both of which protect the right to freedom of expression. It is however not enough that states ratify international and regional instruments without domesticating the instruments at the national level. The domestication of the international and regional instruments is meant to ensure that individuals enjoy these rights. Freedom of expression is highly volatile in Zimbabwe. The legislature has been accused of taking away the right which has been granted to citizens by the Constitution through its highly repressive laws. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Official Secrets Act are some of the laws which have been put under spotlight in Zimbabwe. There is therefore a conflict between the legislature, the press and individuals in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe like many democratic states, there is separation of powers between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The legislature is the decision making structure that enacts policies in their capacity as representatives of the people; the judiciary is the mediating body that adjudicates decisions between the organs of state as well as between those organs and individuals and the executive enforces decisions. The findings of the research are that despite the ratification of international and regional instruments dealing with the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the right to freedom of expression in the constitution, there still exist repressive laws in Zimbabwe which to a great extent limit the right to freedom of expression. These laws in light of the prevailing environment in Zimbabwe are often used to deprive citizens and journalists of information and their right to freedom of expression. The judiciary finds itself in a difficult position as the executive does not comply with its rulings. The independence of the judiciary, in light of the environment is also compromised by the threats to the judges, the appointment process and ‘gifts’ given to the judges for example, farms. The research analyses the history and theories of freedom of freedom of expression in Zimbabwe, the laws regulating the right and the case law dealing with this right. Finally there is a comparison between Zimbabwe and South Africa and conclusions and recommendations are made based on the discussion in the dissertation. Among the recommendations is that civil society should be involved in educating individuals especially journalists about the right to freedom of expression. Further, the judiciary should also take a more proactive approach in the protection of the right.
2
Clarke, Tamsin Law Faculty of Law UNSW. "Racism, pluralism and democracy in Australia : re-conceptualising racial vilification legislation." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Law, 2005. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/20530.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Australian debates about racial vilification legislation have been dominated by mainstream American First Amendment jurisprudence and popular American notions of 'free speech' to the exclusion of alternative Europeans models. This can be seen from notions of Australian racial vilification legislation as inconsistent with 'free speech' rights as well as the influence of some of the basic assumptions of First Amendment jurisprudence on political speech cases in the Australian High Court. Despite the widespread existence of legislation that penalises racial vilification at State and Federal levels, there has been a rise in Australia over the past 10 years of divisive 'race' politics. Against that background, this thesis considers the scope and limits of racial vilification legislation in Australia. It is argued that First Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate in the Australian context, because it is heavily dependent upon economic metaphors, individualistic notions of identity and outdated theories of communication. It assumes that 'free speech' in terms of lack of government intervention is essential to 'democracy'. It ignores the content, context and effect of harmful speech, except in extreme cases, with the result that socially harmful speech is protected in the name of 'free speech'. This has narrowed the parameters within which racial vilification is understood and hindered the development of a broader discourse on the realities of racist harms, and the mechanisms necessary for their redress. The author calls for the development of an Australian jurisprudence of harmful speech. Failing an Australian Bill of Rights, that jurisprudence would be grounded upon the implied constitutional right of free political speech, informed by an awareness that modern structures of public speech favour a very limited range of speech and speakers. The jurisprudence would take advantage of the insights of Critical Race Theory into the connections between racial vilification and racist behaviour, as well as the personal and social harms of racial vilification. Finally, it is argued that the concepts of human dignity and equality, which underpin European discrimination legislation and notions of justice, provide a way forward for Australian jurisprudence in this area.
3
Janse, van Rensburg Leanne. "The violence of language : contemporary hate speech and the suitability of legal measures regulating hate speech in South Africa." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001866.
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This thesis unites law and social science so as to give a comprehensive account of the phenomenon of racial hate speech in South Africa as an obstacle to transformation. Hate speech is presented as a form of violent language and an affront to the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, equality and dignity. To establish the nature of hate speech, the fluid quality of language is explored so as to show how language can be manipulated, on the one hand, as a means to harm, and employed, on the other hand, as a tool to heal and reconcile. This double gesture is illustrated through the South African linguistic experience of past hate and segregation and the current transformation agenda. It is through this prism that hate speech regulation is discussed as an uneasy fit in a country where freedom of expression is constitutionally protected and where language plays an important role in bringing about reconciliation, and yet words are still being employed to divide and dehumanise. This reality necessitates a clearly articulated stance on the regulation of language. The thesis accordingly interrogates the current legal standards in relation to hate speech with reference to international law that binds South Africa and the constitutional standard set for the regulation of language and the prohibition of hate speech. Thereafter, the current and proposed legislative prohibitions on hate speech, the residual common law provisions governing expression and the regulation of language in the media are outlined and analysed. These legal frameworks are explored in terms of their content and their application in various fora so as to ascertain what the South African approach to hate speech prohibition is, whether it is consistent and, ultimately if it is indeed suitable to the South African experience and the realities of language. This thesis concludes that contemporary hate speech measures lack a coherent understanding of what hate speech entails and a general inconsistency in approach as well as application is found in the treatment of hate speech complaints in South Africa. This is explained through the fallibility of language as a medium to regulate expression and solutions are offered to not only taper current and proposed hate speech provisions but to also consider alternative forms of resolving hate speech complaints
4
Grosshans, Joshua D. "Legislation, litigation, and lunacy : an analysis of Ashcroft V. free speech coalition and the child pornography prevention act of 1996." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2003. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/317.
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This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.<br>Bachelors<br>Health and Public Affairs<br>Legal Studies
5
Fernandez, Joseph M. "Loosening the shackles of the truth defence on free speech : making the truth defence in Australian defamation law more user friendly for media defendants." University of Western Australia. Law School, 2009. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2009.0075.
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Defamation laws truth defence the oldest, most obvious and principal defence has failed Australian media defendants. Few who mount the defence succeed. Many, discouraged by the defences onerousness, do not even attempt it. As a consequence the journalistic articulation of matters of public concern is stifled. This thesis argues that the limitations of the Australian truth defence are inconsistent with established freedom of speech ideals and the public interest in having a robust media. As a result society is constrained from enlightened participation in public affairs. This thesis proposes reforms to alleviate the heavy demands of the defence so as to promote the publication of matters of public concern and to strike a more contemporary balance between freedom of speech and the protection of reputation. These reforms employ defamation laws doctrinal calculus to reposition the speech-reputation fulcrum. While defamation law has for decades attracted reform attention, the truth defence has languished by the wayside. This thesis steps into the breech. The cornerstone of this thesis is a proposal to reverse the burden so that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity of the defamatory publication where: the complainant is a public figure; the matter complained about is a matter of public concern; and the suit involves a media defendant. While this proposal is likely to dramatically alter the prevailing Australian freedom of speech/protection of reputation equilibrium, other measures are proposed to serve as a bulwark against the wanton destruction of reputation.
6
Dryden, Joe. "School Authority Over Off-Campus Student Expression in the Electronic Age: Finding a Balance Between a Student's Constitutional Right to Free Speech and the Interest of Schools in Protecting School Personnel and Other Students from Cyber Bullying, Defamation, and Abuse." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2010. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc33143/.
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In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme Court ruled that students have speech rights in the school environment unless the speech causes or is likely to cause 1) a substantial disruption, or 2) interferes with the rights of others. The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving school officials' authority to regulate electronically-delivered derogatory student speech, and no uniform standard currently exists for determining when school authorities can discipline students for such speech when it occurs off campus without violating students' First Amendment rights. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine 19 federal and state court decisions in which school authorities were sued for disciplining students for electronically delivered, derogatory speech. Eighteen of these cases involved student speech that demeaned or defamed school teachers or administrators. Only one involved speech that demeaned another student. Each case was analyzed to identify significant factors in court holdings to provide a basis for the construction of a uniform legal standard for determining when school authorities can discipline students for this type of speech. The full application of Tinker's first and second prongs will provide school officials the authority needed to address this growing problem while still protecting legitimate off-campus student cyber expression. Predictions of future court holdings and policy recommendations are included.
7
Mushohwe, Knowledge. "An analysis of selected cartoons published during Zimbabwe's 2008 elections." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1609.
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During Zimbabwe’s 2008 harmonised elections the country’s media laws had a direct impact on the way editorial cartoonists expressed themselves. Although the online newspapers were unregulated and the print media published under Zimbabwe’s media laws, Public Order and Security Act and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy act - the editorial cartoons from both sources show deliberate bias towards one candidate and contempt towards the main rival. The study contextualises the understanding of the editorial cartoon, as practised in an environment of freedom of speech and defined by the four categories identified by Press (1981) and Manning and Phiddian (2004), and delineates the effect of media laws on the newspaper industry in Zimbabwe. The four categories of editorial cartoons identified are descriptive editorial cartoons, laughing satirical editorial cartoons, destructive satirical editorial cartoons, and savage indignation editorial cartoons. The study reviews eight editorial cartoons, read using a semiotic framework investigating non-verbal communication, as defined and suggested by Du Plooy (1996), and a text and language grid, as suggested by Leech (1974), according to the criteria of symbols/metaphors, exaggeration/distortion, stereotypes, caricature, irony, captions, and background knowledge, as developed by Fetsko (2001). A comparative analysis of the cartoons reveals that objectives and functions of the unregulated zimonline.co.za and the regulated the Herald newspapers are the same. They constitute propagandistic representations of Zimbabwean politics that are more an extension of political ideology than they are a reflection of the country’s sociopolitical landscape.
8
Musa, Abdul Samat. "Freedom of expression in English law." Thesis, University of Manchester, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.237410.
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9
Waltman, Max. "The Politics of Legal Challenges to Pornography: Canada, Sweden, and the United States." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-109040.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The dissertation analyzes obstacles and potential in democracies, specifically Canada, Sweden, and United States, to effectively address empirically documented harms of pornography. Legislative and judicial challenges under different democratic and legal frameworks are compared. Adopting a problem-driven theoretical approach, the reality of pornography’s harms is analyzed. Evidence shows its production exploits existing inequalities among persons typically drawn from other forms of prostitution who suffer multiple disadvantages, such as extreme poverty, childhood sexual abuse, and race and gender discrimination, making survival alternatives remote. Consumption is also divided by sex. A majority of young adult men consumes pornography frequently; women rarely do, usually not unless initiated by others. After consumption, studies show many normal men become substantially more sexually aggressive and increasingly trivialize and support violence against women. Vulnerable populations—including battered, raped, or prostituted women—are most harmed as a result. The impact of attempts to address pornography’s harms on democratic rights and freedoms, specifically gender equality and speech, is explored through the case studies. Democracies are found to provide more favorable conditions for legal challenges to pornography’s harms when recognizing substantive (not formal) equality in law, and when promoting representation of perspectives and interests of groups particularly injured by pornography. State-implemented approaches such as criminal obscenity laws are found less effective. More victim-centered and survivor-initiated civil rights approaches would be more responsive and remedial—a finding with implications for other politico-legal problems, such as global warming, that disproportionately affect disadvantaged populations traditionally largely excluded from decision-making.
10
Wesley, Donald C. "Hazardous freedom| A cultural history of student freedom of speech in the public schools." Thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2015. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3726022.
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<p> In public schools, student expression commonly calls for the attention of school staff in one form or another. Educators have a practical interest in understanding the boundaries of student freedom of speech rights and are often directed to the four student speech cases decided to date by the Supreme Court (<i>Tinker v Des Moines</i> (1969), <i>Bethel v Fraser </i> (1986), <i>Hazelwood v Kuhlmeier</i> (1988), and <i> Morse v Frederick</i> (2007)). Sources about these cases abound, but most focus on legal reform issues such as the political arguments of opposing preferences for more student freedom or more school district control or the lack of clear guidance for handling violations </p><p> I propose an alternative approach to understanding the Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence focusing not on its correctness but on cultural influences which have worked and continue to work on the Court both from without and within. This approach may lead to a new understanding of Court decisions as legally binding on educators and an appreciation of the necessary rhetorical artistry of the Justices who write them. Not intended in any way as an apologetic of the Court’s decisions on student speech, this study is based particularly on the work of Strauber (1987), Kahn (1999) and Mautner (2011). It takes the form of a cultural history going back to the Fourteenth Amendment’s influence on individual rights from its ratification in 1868 to its application in Tinker in 1969 and beyond. </p><p> Seen as cultural process which begins with the Amendment’s initial almost complete ineffectiveness in restricting state abridgment of fundamental rights including speech to its eventual arrival, fully empowered, at the schoolhouse gate, this study attempts to make student speech rights more accessible to educators and others. The tensions between the popular culture which espouses the will of the people and the internal legal culture of the Court itself and its most outspoken and articulate Justices resolve into decisions which become the law of the land, at least for the moment. The study also offers implications for administrators together with suggestions on how to stay current with free speech case law applicable to the schools.</p>
11
Van, Zwaluwenburg Pamela Joy. "WIDE AWAKE OR SOUND ASLEEP? UNIVERSITIES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ROSENBERGER V. UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA." Oxford, Ohio : Miami University, 2004. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=miami1101827877.
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12
Paton, Elizabeth Katrine. "Privacy law and the media." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/28826.
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This thesis explores the issue of how to reconcile the value of individual privacy with that of freedom of speech. It argues that there ought to be legal protection against invasion of privacy by the media, and that such protection should be seen as complementary to a system of free expression rather than opposed to such a system.
A definition of privacy is outlined which, it is contended, meets the criteria for a coherent, neutral definition. Various reasons for valuing privacy and in favour of protecting the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy are identified. It is argued that lack of precision in the normative realm, in defining with certainty when privacy is invaded, should not be an excuse for leaving the individual without legal protection.
There follows an examination of the protection of privacy against media incursions in English, New Zealand, Australian and Canadian law, other than the coincidental protection afforded by certain common law actions. There has been significant judicial and legislative recognition of the need to safeguard privacy interests, and many interesting developments in recent years are discussed. However, none of the countries considered has yet developed effective recourse for victims of unwarranted and invasive publications.
It is argued that the relationship between privacy and free speech has been wrongly conceptualised, and that in fact both interests serve the same underlying set of values. Problems arise when privacy and free speech interests are balanced in the abstract rather than in context, and when a simplistic view of press freedom is adopted in disregard of the realities of the modern mass media.
Invasive publications generally do not significantly advance free speech interests unless they help to provide the information needed for public decision-making. Furthermore, this information can in many cases be conveyed without detriment by withholding details which disclose identity. A three-step test is proposed to determine whether privacy and free speech interests can be reconciled without compromise to either of them, or whether it is necessary to balance these interests in the context of the case.
It will also be maintained that a contextual approach is preferable to the adoption of categories such as "public figures" and "public places". These concepts tend to be misleading, and should be eschewed as analytical tools, since they confuse important questions which require separate analysis.<br>Law, Peter A. Allard School of<br>Graduate
13
Khan, Adnan. "Blasphemy laws and freedom of speech : a comparative study of Islamic law and modern law." Thesis, University of Lincoln, 2012. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.629938.
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Stricker, Frederick W. "Faith in the law reinterpretation of the free exercise clause, 1940-1993 /." Connect to online version, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1989/3565.
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Šindeikis, Algirdas. "Freedom of speech and other constitutional values: issues of balancing." Doctoral thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2011. http://vddb.laba.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2011~D_20110829_125503-11502.
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Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania sets the principal democratic values of society. Human rights assume special role in the system of constitutional values. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the right of a human being to have his own convictions and freely express them. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the right to everyone to have freedom to express his opinion and convictions and to freely impart them. This is an essential clause for the creation and protection of democracy. Constitutional freedom of expression is realised in ordinary laws. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the principle of freedom of expression that is realised in the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Law on Provision of Information to the Public and other ordinary laws. Freedom of expression, just like other constitutional human rights and freedoms, is not absolute. Employment of the freedom of expression faces such requirements that are required in the democratic society to protect the rights and freedoms of other human beings, as well as the constitutional arrangement. Ordinary courts (general jurisdiction and specialised), which examine cases for determining balance of freedom of expression and other constitutional values, must construe the content of constitutional rights of human beings. Decisions by ordinary courts in the cases of determining the balance of freedom of... [to full text]<br>LR Konstitucijoje įtvirtintos svarbiausios demokratinės visuomenės vertybės. Žmogaus teisėms konstitucinių vertybių sistemoje tenka ypatinga vieta. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. įtvirtinta žmogaus teisė turėti savo įsitikinimus ir juos laisvai reikšti. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. kiekvienam žmogui suteikia galimybę laisvai formuoti savo nuomonę ir pažiūras bei laisvai jas skleisti. Tai būtina sąlyga demokratijai kurti ir saugoti. Konstitucinė saviraiškos laisvė įgyvendinama ordinariniuose įstatymuose. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. įtvirtintas saviraiškos laisvės principas įgyvendintas LR Civiliniame kodekse, LR Visuomenės informavimo įstatyme bei kituose ordinariniuose įstatymuose. Saviraiškos laisvė, kaip ir kitos konstitucinės žmogaus teisės ir laisvės, nėra absoliuti. Naudojantis saviraiškos laisve susiduriama su tokiais reikalavimais, kurie būtini demokratinėje visuomenėje siekiant apsaugoti kitų žmonių teises ir laisves, konstitucinę santvarką. Ordinariniai (bendros kompetencijos ir specializuoti) teismai, spręsdami žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių pusiausvyros nustatymo bylas, turi interpretuoti konstitucinių žmogaus teisių turinį. Priimdami sprendimus žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių pusiausvyros nustatymo bylose ordinariniai teismai turi remtis žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių konstitucine dimensija.
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Barison, Laura <1997>. "Hate speech in international law: searching for the complex balance with freedom of expression." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/21309.
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L’elaborato si propone di analizzare il concetto di Hate Speech (Discorso d’odio) dal punto di vista giuridico, nello specifico nel diritto internazionale, e la sua punibilità. Nonostante non esista una definizione condivisa del concetto di Hate Speech, il termine si usa generalmente in riferimento all’insieme delle forme di espressione che diffondono, incitano o giustificano forme di odio e ostilità basate sull’intolleranza e la discriminazione. L’analisi parte da un approfondimento degli strumenti di diritto internazionale che ad oggi permettono di limitare o punire alcune forme specifiche di espressione, basandosi sulle convenzioni internazionali e sulla case law dei principali attori regionali. Nel secondo capitolo, l’analisi si concentra sulle principali aree critiche relative alla punibilità dei casi di Hate Speech, ovvero il contrasto con il diritto alla libertà di espressione, il problema dell’Hate Speech online e i principali bias individuabili nell’applicazione delle norme correnti. In ultimo, il terzo capitolo analizza tre casi concreti di norme o approcci nazionali al problema.
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Vrana, Amela, and Johanna Andersson. "Article 43 EC - A Freedom with Limitations? : What Constitutes a "Wholly Artificial Arrangement"?" Thesis, Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-816.
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<p>Abstract</p><p>The freedom of establishment in Articles 43 and 48 EC is a fundamental freedom within the EU meaning that companies are free to set up secondary establishments in any other Member State. The freedom of establishment is an important means to achieve the com-pletion of the internal market and therefore it is important that this freedom is protected. Member States are obliged to legislate in accordance with the objectives of the fundamental freedoms, still Member States are restricting Articles 43 and 48 EC by applying discrimina-tory national legislation regarding direct taxation. In the Cadbury Schweppes judgment from September 2006 the ECJ found the British CFC legislation to be contrary to Community law. The purpose of CFC legislation is to prevent tax avoidance by conferring additional tax upon companies having subsidiaries in low tax states. According to the judgment in Cadbury Schweppes, if the CFC rules are too general in its application they are violating the freedom of establishment. Hence, the CFC legislation must be aimed specifically at “wholly artificial arrangements” aimed at circumventing national tax normally payable. Therefore it is of importance, in the context of applying CFC rules, to clarify the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment. It is also important to note that the CFC rules ap-ply even when a subsidiary is established outside the EU.</p><p>The concept of abuse of Community law has been developed through case law and prohib-its companies to improperly use the provisions of Community law in order to circumvent national legislation. Even if an establishment in another State is made to avoid tax in the State of origin, it is not necessarily abuse of the freedom of establishment since companies are allowed to choose to establish subsidiaries in the Member States with least restrictive rules. The ECJ stated that establishing subsidiaries with the sole purpose to benefit from the lower tax regime do not constitute an abuse of the freedom of establishment as long as the subsidiaries pursue genuine economic activity. The criteria for what is regarded as eco-nomic activity has been discussed in both value added tax and direct tax cases. The re-quirements so far is that the subsidiary established has to be physically present in the host State on a durable basis and have staff and equipment to a certain degree. The ECJ has as-sessed the criteria similarly in value added tax and direct tax cases and stated that the activ-ity has to be considered per se and without regard to its purpose or result. The activity also has to be based on objective factors and be ascertainable by third parties.</p><p>The Cadbury Schweppes case is the first case in the area of CFC legislation and the Court has provided little guidance regarding what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement”. As a consequence of this judgement some Member States have already changed their CFC legis-lation to comply with Community law. Nevertheless, there are cases pending before the ECJ that are further questioning the application of CFC rules and how to define a “wholly artificial arrangement”. The judgement of these cases may result in more changes in the na-tional legislation of the Member States. The future development of the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment is important for the protection of the principle of legal certainty. A clarification of what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement” will improve the foreseeability for companies and their cross-border transactions will be more efficient.</p><br><p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Etableringsfriheten i artiklarna 43 och 48 EG är en av de grundläggande friheterna inom EU som innebär att företag är fria att etablera dotterbolag i andra medlemsländer. Etable-ringsfriheten är ett viktigt medel för att uppnå målen med den gemensamma marknaden och därför är det viktigt att denna frihet respekteras. Medlemsländerna är skyldiga att lag-stifta i ljuset av de grundläggande friheterna, trots det finns diskriminerande skattelagstift-ning som strider mot artiklarna 43 och 48 EG. I Cadbury Schweppes domen från september 2006 fann EG-domstolen att de brittiska CFC reglerna strider mot gemenskapsrätten. Syf-tet med CFC regler är att förhindra skatteundandragande genom att löpande beskatta in-komster från dotterbolag etablerade i lågbeskattade länder. CFC regler som tillämpas gene-rellt är enligt Cadbury Schweppes domen i strid med etableringsfriheten. Därmed måste CFC reglerna tillämpas specifikt på ”konstlade upplägg” som har som enda syfte att undvika na-tionell skatt. Det är därför viktigt att klargöra skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av eta-bleringsfriheten. I detta sammanhang är det viktigt att poängtera att CFC reglerna är till-lämpliga även på dotterbolag som är etablerade i ett icke-medlemsland.</p><p>Konceptet om missbrukande av EG-rätten har utvecklats i praxis och förbjuder företag att missbruka bestämmelserna i gemenskapsrätten för att kringgå nationell lagstiftning. Även om ett dotterbolag har etablerats i ett medlemsland enbart för att utnyttja den låga skatteni-vån är det nödvändigtvis inte missbruk av etableringsfriheten eftersom företag har rätt att etablera dotterbolag i det land som är mest fördelaktigt ur skattehänseende. EG-domstolen har fastställt att etablering av dotterbolag enbart för att utnyttja en mer fördelaktig skattere-gim inte utgör missbruk av etableringsfriheten om dotterbolaget bedriver verklig ekono-misk verksamhet. Kriterierna för vad som anses utgöra verklig ekonomisk verksamhet har diskuterats i såväl mervärdesskatterättsliga som företagsskatterättsliga mål. Hittills uppställ-da krav är att det etablerade dotterbolaget måste vara varaktigt fysiskt närvarande i värdsta-ten samt till en viss grad ha personal och utrustning så att tredje part kan förvissa sig om dess ekonomiska verksamhet. Utvärderingen av den ekonomiska verksamheten måste ske självständigt utan hänsyn till dess syfte och resultat.</p><p>Cadbury Schweppes är det första målet angående CFC lagstiftning och EG-domstolen har endast tillhandahållit begränsad vägledning om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg”. Som en konsekvens av denna dom har några medlemsländer redan ändrat sin CFC lagstiftning så att den överensstämmer med EG-rätten. Icke desto mindre finns det en del oavgjorda mål som ytterligare ifrågasätter CFC reglernas tillämpning och definitionen av ”konstlade upplägg”. Avgöranden i dessa mål skulle kunna resultera i att medlemsländerna måste göra ytterligare ändringar i sin lagstiftning. Den framtida utvecklingen av vad som är skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av etableringsfriheten är viktig för rättssäkerheten. Ett klargö-rande om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg” kommer att öka förutsebarheten för före-tag vilket leder till en effektivisering av deras gränsöverskridande transaktioner.</p>
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Lukman, Joshua R. "Right to publicity and privacy versus first amendment freedom of speech." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2003. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/323.
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This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.<br>Bachelors<br>Health and Public Affairs<br>Legal Studies
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Fick, Sarah Johanna. "Consenting to objectifying treatment? Human dignity and individual freedom." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/20286.
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Thesis (LLM)-- Stellenbosch University, 2012.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to determine whether an individual can and/or should be allowed to consent to objectifying treatment. This necessitated the determination of the meaning of dignity, the meaning of freedom and the relationship between dignity and freedom. It was found that both the right not to be objectified and the right to consent to objectification could be found within human dignity. This is due to the broad definition of dignity in terms of which dignity has two, sometimes contradicting, components. One component safeguards autonomy and the right to choose, which supports consent to objectification, whereas the other promotes individual self-worth by prohibiting objectifying treatment.
By investigating the meaning of freedom it was found that freedom as a constitutional value, and possibly also a free-standing constitutional right, could incorporate the right to consent to objectifying treatment.
Three possible solutions to this tension between human dignity and freedom were identified and critically analysed. The first was that an individual cannot and should not be allowed to consent to objectification. This solution is primarily based on the notion that dignity is supreme to freedom and that freedom should yield to communitarian dignity. Furthermore, it is contended that consent to objectification is often invalid due to economic coercion and undue influence.
The second possible solution was that, although an individual might not be able to validly consent to objectifying treatment, such consent should still be allowed under certain circumstances. The example of invalid consent due to economic coercion introduced in the previous solution was examined in relation to prostitution. The contention regarding this approach is that, since our government is unable to fulfil the socio-economic needs of those who consent due to economic coercion, such consent should be allowed and strictly regulated.
The third possible approach was that circumstances do exist in which individuals can give valid consent to objectification and that in these circumstances they should be allowed to do so. In this solution the grounds of the first approach is criticised by contending, for example, that dignity is not supreme to freedom, that a plural society should allow these type of choices and that consent to objectification is already allowed in some instances.
The results of this study were that, although there are situations in which genuine consent is not possible, it can be given under certain circumstances. An individual who cannot give genuine consent to objectification should not be allowed to do so, unless transitional measures dictate otherwise. However, an individual who is capable of giving valid consent to objectification should be allowed to do so. Finally, regardless of whether such consent is genuine or not, strict regulation thereof is required.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie was om vas te stel of 'n individu kan toestem en/of toegelaat behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektiverende behandeling. Dit genoodsaak dat die betekenis van menswaardigheid en vryheid, asook verhouding tussen hierdie twee begrippe vasgestel word. Daar is bevind dat beide die reg om nie te geobjektifeer te word nie en die reg om toe te stem tot objektivering gevind kan word binne die begrip van menswaardigheid. Hierdie is te danke aan die breë definisie van menswaardigheid in terme waarvan menswaardigheid uit twee, soms weersprekende, komponente bestaan. Een komponent beskerm outonomie en die reg om te kies, wat toestemming tot objektivering ondersteun, terwyl die ander komponent individuele waarde bevorder deurdat dit objektiverende behandeling verbied.
Tydens die ondersoek aangaande die betekenis van vryheid is bevind dat vryheid as 'n grondwetlike waarde, en moontlik ook 'n vrystaande grondwetlike reg, die reg om toe te stem tot objektiverende behandeling kan inkorporeer.
Drie moontlike oplossings vir hierdie spanning tussen menswaardigheid en vryheid is geïdentifiseer en krities ontleed. Die eerste is dat 'n individu nie kan toestem en ook nie toegelaat behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektivering nie. Hierdie oplossing is hoofsaaklik gebaseer op die veronderstelling dat vryheid onderworpe is aan menswaardigheid en dat individuele vryheid moet toegee tot die menswaardigheid van die gemeenskap. Verder word dit beweer dat toestemming tot objektivering dikwels ongeldig is as gevolg van die ekonomiese dwang en onbehoorlike beïnvloeding.
Die tweede moontlike oplossing was dat, alhoewel 'n individu nie noodwendig instaat is om geldige toestemming tot objektiverende behandeling te verskaf nie, sodanige toestemming onder sekere omstandighede steeds toegelaat behoort te word. Die voorbeeld van ongeldig toestemming as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang wat in die vorige oplossing bekendgestel is, is ondersoek aan die hand van prostitusie. Die bewering ingevolge hierdie benadering is dat, aangesien ons regering is nie in staat is om die sosio-ekonomiese behoeftes van diegene wat toestem tot objektivering as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang te vervul nie, sodanige toestemming toegelaat en streng gereguleer behoort te word.
Die derde moontlike benadering is dat daar wel omstandighede bestaan waar individue geldige toestemming kan gee tot objektivering en dat hulle in hierdie omstandighede toegelaat behoort te word om dit te gee. In terme van hierdie oplossing word die gronde waarop die eerste benadering gebaseer is gekritiseer, deur byvoorbeeld te argumenteer dat menswaardigheid nie verhewe is bo vryheid nie, dat in ons huidige diverse samelewing sulke soort keuses aanvaar behoort te word en dat toestemming tot objektivering reeds in sommige geval toegelaat word.
Die resultate van hierdie studie was dat, alhoewel daar omstandighede bestaan waaronder geldige toestemming nie moontlik is nie, dit wel onder sekere omstandighede gegee kan word. 'n Individu wat nie daartoe instaat is om geldige toestemming tot objektivering te gee nie, behoort nie toegelaat word om dit te doen nie, tensy oorgangsmaatreëls anders bepaal. Waar 'n individu egter in staat is om geldige toestemming tot die objektivering te gee, behoort dit toegelaat word. Ten slotte is streng regulering van toestemming tot objektiverende behandeling nodig ongeag of sodanige toestemming geldig is of nie.
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Dickinson, Sandra J. "Campus hate speech regulation can survive strict judicial scrutiny because campus hate speech impairs equal educational opportunity." Connect to resource, 1996. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1241181028.
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Whitaker, Robert A. "Freedom of a speech| The speeches of the Warren Court Justices and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court." Thesis, State University of New York at Albany, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10246592.
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<p> While justices of the U.S. Supreme Court routinely claim they do not deliver speeches to audiences outside the Court, or that the content of their remarks is unimportant, scholars have long recognized that the justices speak frequently off the bench. Despite this recognition, studies of judicial speech view it largely as a potential transgression of legal norms, risking the images of neutrality and independence that are widely seen as the primary bases of the Court’s legitimacy; few studies have explored judicial speech in any detail, and surprisingly little is known about the actual content of the justices’ speeches. In this dissertation, I pose two primary questions: first, what do the justices say, and second, what does the content of judicial speech tell us about institutional legitimacy? Reviewing approximately 400 speeches by the justices of the Warren Court (1953–1969), I find the justices’ speeches generally appear as any one of four primary themes: advocating future policy and signaling outside actors to prepare for implementation, in advance of a major ruling by the Court; defending the Court’s rulings on the basis of projecting favorable images of democracy abroad; defending the Court’s rulings on the basis of constitutional claims and understandings and defending against broader attacks on judicial authority, such as court-curbing legislation; and last, articulating idealized visions of democracy and future politics. Further, I find evidence of these themes in the speeches of the justices of the Roberts Court in 2012. Contrary to the judicial “lockjaw” conception of speech as a threat to neutrality and legitimacy, I find judicial speech, while shaped by legal norms, frequently draws upon values and structures associated with democracy, enabling the justices to rework and construct political narratives about the Court and its rulings in speeches that attend to the Court’s institutional legitimacy.</p>
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Paterson, Patrick. "Money Talks: Free Speech and Political Equality in Campaign Finance Reform." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/263.
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Justifications for campaign finance regulations in the United States have traditionally taken one of two approaches. The first and most common has been to allege that unrestricted campaign contributions and expenditures lend themselves to corruption, or to the appearance of corruption. The second, used far less often than the first, has argued that unchecked spending on an election compromises the principle of political equality--the idea that each individual should have equal say in the democratic process. This paper defends political equality as a value worth preserving, demonstrates that our current campaign finance system is dangerous to political equality, proposes some solutions to that problem, and evaluate the constitutionality of those solutions.
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Crawford, G. Mark. "Free speech : the Canadian model; a study of freedom of expression under the Charter of Rights of Freedoms." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.390317.
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Nilsson, Therese. "Taxation on loans from foreign undertakings : The Swedish legislation and its compatibility with the freedom of establishment within the European Union." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Commercial Law, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-12277.
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<p>On January 1, 2010, the Swedish government changed the national rule on taxation of loans between Swedish companies and their shareholders to also comprise loans granted by foreign companies. By changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies, the government aimed to eliminate the newly discovered tax planning which is carried out by an owner establishing a holding company in another Member State from which he lends tax-free means for private consumption. These proceedings result in major tax revenue losses for Sweden since the shareholder’s income was not taxable in Sweden before the change. This change has been subject for criticism by the consultative bodies in the government bill and in the legal debate. The expression of discontent is due to the fact that the changes do not comply with the freedom of establishment. As far as is known, no one has analyzed whether this statement is correct. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide an answer to whether the changes of the rule on taxation of prohibited loans are compatible with the freedom of establishment and consequently whether the Swedish government made a mistake when changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies. Due to the freedom of establishment, it is prohibited for the Member States to take measures which restrict or make nationals refrain from establishing abroad. Intra-state loans are prohibited why they hardly ever occur and the taxation on loans therefore in practice only applies to foreign companies. Legislation in a Member State which only applies to foreign persons constitutes prohibited discrimination. Further, the high tax burden hinders nationals from taking advantage of another Member State’s more favourable legislation and makes the nationals refrain from establishing in other Member States. It is therefore considered that the rule is restrictive to the freedom of establishment. However, such a restrictive rule as in this case is justified by the aim of preventing tax avoidance taken together with the balanced allocation of taxing power between the Member States. Thus, the government makes Sweden breach EU law since the rule is not proportionate despite the justifications. The rule is too general designed since it is restrictive to all foreign undertakings and not just the holding companies with which the tax planning are performed. Further, there are other less restrictive solutions to the problem which have the same effect as the rule in question.</p>
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Al-Jamal, Sultan. "Freedom of speech as a universal value : a comparative approach from international human rights law, the First Amendment, and Islamic law." Thesis, University of Hull, 2007. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:6439.
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The issue of universalism in the human right of freedom of speech is one of several that continue to be debated among Muslims and Westerners. As evidence of incompatibility of Islamic law with the international law of freedom of speech, Westerners, on the basis of Muslims' reactions towards the Satanic Verses and Danish cartoons, point to the blasphemy law in Islam (Sab Allah wa Sab al-Rasul). Four other controversial areas are often raised as an indication of differences between these two laws, namely, speech threatening nation security (Fitnah), defamatory speech (Qadhf and Iftira), obscenity (al-Fihsh), and hate speech. This study examines the important question of whether or not the Islamic law of freedom of speech is compatible with the international law of freedom of speech. The study argues that the Islamic law of freedom of speech is not contrary to the international law of freedom of speech, represented in two of the most significant legal sources of the right to freedom of speech, namely, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR, both based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which this study presumes to be the standard of the human right of freedom of speech. Rather, the study goes further and concludes that Islamic law, as embedded in the Quran and Sunnah, urges the international concept of freedom of speech and calls for it. This compatibility between Islamic law, on the one hand, and international law, on the other, is not restricted to the level of the concept of freedom of speech. Rather, even the interpretation and application of freedom of speech in the light of Islamic law are, to a considerable degree, consistent with the interpretation and application of the international law of freedom of speech by the Human Rights Committee and European Court. Although there are some differences in interpretation and implementation of moral limitations on freedom of speech between Islamic Law and the international law of freedom of speech, this does not create a general state of dissonance between them. The study argues that such differences are even more pronounced among liberal democracies. In order to demonstrate the differences among liberal democracies in this regard, American law of freedom of speech (the First Amendment) is analysed in depth. The discussion of these free speech laws reveals that although there is universality of freedom of speech among liberal democracies (which refers to the universal quality or global acceptance of the idea of freedom of speech), universalism in the right to free speech (referring to a universally applicable interpretation of freedom of speech) has not been achieved.
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Anand, Sanjeev Singh. "Expressions of racial hatred and criminal law : the Canadian response /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp04/mq21231.pdf.
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Jones, Christopher David. "Rocks Can Turn to Sand and be Washed Away but Words Last Forever: A Policy Recommendation for New Zealand's Vilification Legislation." The University of Waikato, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10289/2350.
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Free speech and free expression are values that are highly prized in western society. The mention of removing or altering that right creates great debate. In 2004 a Select Committee was set up to inquire into what New Zealand's stance on Hate Speech should be. The submissions to that committee made it clear that free expression was a highly held right in New Zealand. While the submitters were overwhelming opposed to any legislation, it was clear that many had no understanding of what hate speech was, and why people would want to restrict it. The select Committee needed to provide the public with more information about what was intended and what the international situation is. If nothing else this thesis should provide that comprehensive background information to ground any further debate. This thesis makes a policy recommendation for the New Zealand Government. The policy that is examined and contrasted with international experiences is that of hate speech legislation. What should New Zealand do in regards to hate speech? The general debate is examined and the free expression versus legislation debate is analysed to provide a comprehensive background to the topic. The reasons why free expression is important to society and democracy are examined. Alongside free expression, the harms of hate speech are also analysed in order to demonstrate what harm occurs and if such harms should be legislated against. The international situation is contrasted with the New Zealand experience. The legislation of the United States, Canada and Australia, is analysed in order to compare and contrast with New Zealand's legislation. These three countries are closely aligned with New Zealand in terms of language, politics and culture. These countries provide equivalent characteristics and are therefore the most useful for comparison. The United States is especially important as it has no hate speech legislation and provides a valuable baseline from which the effects of legislation can be compared against. The New Zealand situation is then examined to point out its strengths and weaknesses. Where there are weaknesses this thesis recommends changes that could be made in varying political circumstances. Hate speech and free speech issues are not largely discussed in New Zealand literature and scholarly work. This thesis follows some work that has been previously done on the topic in New Zealand. The bulk of the work written about hate speech and free speech issues has been completed internationally and needs to be adjusted to fit the New Zealand situation. This recommendation has gone some way to doing that. An area of particular interest in this paper is the categories of people that deserve protection. Historically just 'race' has been provided protection from hate speech in New Zealand and this thesis examines why. Central to this investigation is why other categories are not protected.
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Bird, Wendell. "Freedoms of press and speech in the first decade of the U.S. Supreme Court." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1a9de49a-b8c8-4500-a214-12a1719f6425.
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This thesis examines the views of freedoms of press and speech held by the twelve earliest justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the Sedition Act of 1798 raised their earliest First Amendment questions including the breadth of those freedoms and of seditious libel. The thesis discusses three aspects of the early justices' views, which add to existing studies. First, the context of those justices' views was growing challenges to the restrictive Blackstone and Mansfield definition of freedom of press as only freedom from prior restraint (licensing) and as not also freedom from subsequent restraint such as seditious libel prosecution. Those challenges were reflected in broad language protecting freedoms of press and speech, and in the absence of language stating that the English common law of rights or of seditious libel was left unaltered. That crucial context of growing challenges has not been detailed in existing literature. (Chapter 3.) Second, the views of each early justice on press and speech are chronicled for the period 1789-1798. That discloses express commitments to those freedoms, which are absent from existing literature, and no adoption of the Blackstone definition before the 1798 crisis. (Chapters 4-5.) Third, the cases and reasoning of the six sitting justices upholding the Sedition Act of 1798 are chronicled and assessed, along with the views of the six remaining justices. That reveals that most remaining justices and also a significant minority within the Federalist party rejected the Sedition Act. Yet positions on the Sedition Act have been only cursorily discussed for four sitting justices and have been overlooked for the other eight justices, as well as for the Federalist party's minority, for the critical period 1798-1800. (Chapters 6-7.) The thesis proposes reasons for that divergence between the pre-1798 commitment of all justices to freedoms of press and speech, and the support given by most sitting justices to the Sedition Act, in contrast to apparent opposition by most remaining justices. The primary reasons are their opposing positions on several connected issues: the extent of rights to dissent, the challenges to the Blackstone definition and to seditious libel, the effect of new state and federal constitutions on seditious libel and on common law rights, strength of attachment to freedoms of press and speech and to seditious libel, and most sitting justices' changes of position to embrace the Blackstone definition. The thesis calls into question conventional views in existing literature on each of those three aspects. First, Levy and others express the dominant view that freedom of press in state declarations of rights and the First Amendment 'was used in its prevailing common law or Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints and a subjection to subsequent restraints for licentious or seditious abuse,' so that contrary evidence 'does not exist,' and that 'no other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798' existed. Instead, opposition to the essence of seditious libel had been mounting over the decades. Second, the early justices are usually portrayed as having nothing to say about freedoms of press and speech before 1798. Instead, nearly all exhibited commitment to those freedoms before that crucial year, though half the early justices upheld the Sedition Act during 1798-1800. Third, the Federalist party, the early justices, and the states except Virginia and Kentucky are all usually described as unanimously supporting the Sedition Act. Instead, the Federalists divided over the Act, and the early justices did as well, with an unrecognized but significant minority of the party, and nearly half of the early justices, opposing the Sedition Act, as did several additional states.
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Cheng, Raymond, and 鄭維民. "Tough law for a tough press?" Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2001. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B3197238X.
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Kerr, Evelina. "CFC legislation and its compliance with Community Law : Sweden's lack of double CFC tax relief." Thesis, Jönköping University, Jönköping University, Jönköping University, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-11041.
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<p>CFC legislation has become an instrument to protect national tax bases and minimize the abusive effects of international tax planning. The Swedish CFC legislation is found in chapter 39a of the ITA whereas it is established under what circumstances CFC taxation can arise. If a shareholder of a foreign legal entity is liable of CFC taxation in Sweden such a holder is also entitled to deduct tax paid by the CFC abroad. The purpose of the granted tax credit is to avoid double taxation, although if foreign tax is paid by another entity than the foreign entity in question such CFC-tax cannot be credited. The situation at hand can result in that the holder is liable of paying double CFC tax, contrary to the purpose of tax credit.</p><p>The freedom of establishment is part of the fundamental freedoms concluded in the EC Treaty. The general goal of the Community is to establish an internal market. The freedom of establishment, stated in Article 43 EC stipulates that restrictions on the freedom of establishment on nationals shall be prohibited. However, restrictions on the freedom of establishment can be justified under certain circumstances. The ECJ has developed a rule of reason test which can justify prohibited restrictions if certain criterias are fulfilled. Concerning tax matters the grounds of justification that have been accepted by the ECJ are the cohesion of the tax system, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the counteraction of tax avoidance, the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of the power to tax between the Member States and a combination of grounds of justification.</p><p>An exemplification scheme serves as a mean to illustrate in what instance double CFC taxation can arise. The scheme concerns a corporate group whereas a Swedish parent company owns a subsidiary in the U.K. through which the parent company plans to establish another subsidiary in the UAE. Swedish tax legislation provides that the Swedish parent company is subject to corporation tax on its worldwide profits in Sweden. However, the parent company is generally not taxed on the profits of its subsidiaries as they arise nor is it taxed on dividends distributed by a subsidiary established in Sweden. Although, when subsidiaries are not resident in Sweden and CFC legislation applies tax exempt according to the intercorporate share holding legislation will not be applicable. Therefore, in order for double CFC taxation to arise it is established that CFC legislation will be applicable to the exemplified scheme. Profits accrued in the UAE will be subject to CFC taxation in both the U.K. and Sweden and double taxation relief will not be granted in Sweden for the CFC tax paid in the U.K. It is questionable if double CFC taxation and the lack of tax relief in such a situation is in compliance with the freedom of establishment.</p><p>The analysis, whereas the purpose of this thesis is concluded, follows the reasoning of the ECJ in accordance with the rule of reason. The purpose is to examine if the lack of double CFC tax relief is in compliance with Community law. It is established that since relief is not granted for double CFC taxation, national legislation hinders the freedom of establishment by forcing a parent company to avoid or modify an intra group structure which leads to the unfavorable consequences in taxation. The tax disadvantage must be seen as making it less attractive for Sweden’s own resident to establish in another Member State and the hindering nature of the lack of double CFC taxation relief constitutes a prohibited restriction to the freedom of establishment. The grounds of justification previously accepted by the ECJ are examined in order to establish if such grounds can justify the lack of double CFC tax relief as a prohibited restriction on the freedom of establishment. None of the acknowledged grounds of justification are able to justify the lack of double CFC tax relief and such a restricted measure is therefore not found to be in compliance with Community Law. Lastly, potential adjustments to CFC legislation, regarding the lack of double CFC tax relief, are discussed to enable compliance with Community law.</p>
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Elbahtimy, Mona Ahmed Hassan. "The right to be free from the harm of hate speech in international human rights law : an analysis of a difficult evolutionary path." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648696.
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Bergdahl, Becky. "Yo ban? Rape rap and limits of free speech in India : An argument analysis of the debate about banning the artist Honey Singh." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-200874.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This thesis consists of an argument analysis of three columns published in the Indian newspaper The Indian Express in the aftermath of the gangrape and murder of a young woman in Delhi in December 2012, and the following debate about glorification of rape in Indian popular culture. One of the columnists is arguing in favour of including gender as a category in the Indian law on hate speech, thereby banning an artist called Honey Singh and his lyrics about rape. The two other columnists are arguing against new restrictions on free speech in India. The analysis of the columns shows that there are several relevant arguments for and against including gender in the Indian hate speech legislation. The argumentation against a new law is similar to argumentation found in Western liberal theory, and the argumentation in favour of a new law is similar to argumentation found in Western radical feminist and critical race theory. However, both strands of philosophy are contested by postcolonial theorists, arguing that no Western theory is applicable in a non-Western context, such as India. Indian postcolonial feminists argue in favour of a third approach to sexist speech in India; a counter-speech approach. Counter-speech theorists agree with liberals about the importance of freedom of speech, and with feminists about the harm in hate speech. According to counter-speech theory, hate speech shall thus not be outlawed, but the state shall try to counter the harmful effects of hate speech, for example by strengthening groups targeted by hate speech so that they can speak back to hatemongers. The conclusion of this thesis is that a counter-speech approach is the most sustainable regarding freedom of speech and gender in India. Such an approach does not only appeal to Indian postcolonial theorists, it is also a middle way in-between a liberal and a radical feminist approach. In the conclusion, the relevance of hate speech legislation as a whole is also questioned. Laws such as in India, that protect only racial and religious groups from being targeted by hate speech while categories such as gender, sexual orientation and disability are not included, can be deemed discriminatory. An abolishment of hate speech prohibitions and an adoption of a counter-speech approach to all forms of hate speech is discussed.
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Cerutti, Christina N. "One Click to Suicide: First Amendment Case Law and its Applicability to Cyberspace." Thesis, Boston College, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1190.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Thesis advisor: Dale Herbeck<br>Websites counseling dangerous activity such as suicide represent uncharted legal territory. To date, most legal scholarship regarding these sites considers whether they incite imminent lawless action. As an alternative to incitement, this paper argues that these websites are more productively characterized as instruction manuals that aid and abet unlawful activity. In support of this approach, this paper proposes a three-tiered legal test for distinguishing between protected and unprotected instruction manuals under the First Amendment<br>Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010<br>Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences<br>Discipline: Communication Honors Program<br>Discipline: Communication
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Gamlashe, Thembinkosi. "Freedom of the press, or the infringement of the right to privacy?: media coverage of President Kgalema Motlanthe from October 2008 to April 2009 in three newspapers." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1010118.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The researcher attempts to assess in which respect the privacy of former President Kgalema Motlanthe may have been invaded during his presidency, in view of journalistic ethics and press codes currently in effect. The study will explore media practices based on media freedom at the time of publication, and assess whether this freedom is understood to suggest the infringement of the right to privacy in the coverage of the private lives of politicians in the media. This study will therefore examine a sample of articles from the Sunday Times, City Press and Mail and Guardian, covering former President Kgalema Motlanthe’s public behaviour that related to his private life, assess which aspects of his demeanour became the subject of media coverage, and correlate such reporting trends with fluctuations in his political career. The researcher will focus on the period when Kgalema Motlanthe was at the helm as the Head of State – from October 2008 to April 2009, and consider particularly the trends in the sampled press reports regarding his private life. The study furthermore examines some of the legislative and normative changes that affected the media in South Africa after democratisation, to correlate the trends observed in the press coverage with legislation. This further serves to identify possible gray areas that arise from reporting on the freedom of the press and may lead to the invasion of privacy.
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Loaiza, Tapia José Sebastián, Falcon Diana Vanessa Ocampo, and Castillo Alfredo Junior Torres. "Freedom of expression on everyone's lips Interview with Dr. Betzabé Marciani." Derecho & Sociedad, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118623.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The present interview seeks for giving answers to some questions referred to the freedom of speech and some of the emerging challenges of these days. The interviewed give us her informed opinion referred to the reach, the limits and the content for freedom of speech in some particular situations where this freedom is put into challenge, mainly in context of demand of tolerance and cultural diversity.<br>La presente entrevista busca dar respuesta a algunas interrogantes referidas a la libertad de expresión y los desafíos que se le presentan en la actualidad. La entrevistada nos da su autorizada opinión referida a los alcances, los límites y el contenido del derecho a la libertad de expresión en situaciones particulares donde dicho derecho se ve puesto a prueba, principalmente en un contexto de exigencia de tolerancia y respeto a la diversidad cultural.
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BhaskarDoss, Franklin Sherwin. "The impact of anti-conversion laws in India a biblical and historical study /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2006. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p001-1106.
Texte intégral
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Chen, Yongxi, and 陳詠熙. "An empty promise of freedom of information? : assessing the legislative and judicial protection of the right of access of government information in China." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/197074.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This thesis assesses and explains the effectiveness of the legal regime for government transparency in China, with a focus on the legislative and judicial protection of citizens’ right of access to information (ATI), through a combination of normative doctrinal analysis and empirical investigation. In 2007, China promulgated the Regulation on Open Government Information (ROGI),which implicitly created a general and legally enforceable ATI right, thereby establishing a regime akin to the freedom of information (FOI) regimes that prevail in many countries worldwide. However, this nascent regime appears to have had mixed, and rather confusing, effects. Existent assessments of the regime’s effectiveness have concentrated either on the ROGI text or on data concerning bureaucratic performance and the extra-legal factors affecting that performance, but have failed to consider sufficiently the perplexities and peculiarities of the Chinese legal system that bear heavily on the ROGI’s operation. This thesis constitutes an attempt to make both substantive and methodological contributions to research in this field.
The thesis is organized into three main areas. First, it analyses the relation between the ruling Communist Party’s policies and the making of local and national transparency legislation. It finds that the legislative endorsement of an ATI right resulted from several of the Party’s reform goals, which include not only the facilitation of economic prosperity and social progress but also the fostering of government accountability and public participation. These goals, although with respective limitations, overlap with the values underlying FOI law. Second, it examines the labyrinth of Chinese laws, regulations and other legal norms that regulate the disclosure of government information, particularly the ROGI and Law on Guarding State Secrets, and evaluates them against international best practice standards on FOI law. It finds that the overall legislative framework lags behind international standards, largely because it fails to stipulate a presumption of disclosure and contains multi-layered restrictions on access, thereby leaving administrative organs with an enormous degree of discretion. Third, it reviews 169 judicial decisions collected through methods specially designed to ensure their representativeness. It distils the major trends in the interpretations made and rules set by the courts and finds that, by placing restrictions on access to court, imposing a need test, failing to scrutinize state secret claims, deferring to administrative discretion in applying exemptions and avoiding injunctive relief, the courts have further reduced the normative scope of the ATI right. It argues that this inadequate judicial protection is caused not by limitations on judicial power with respect to that right, but primarily by the abandonment of duty on the part of most courts, which have either misapplied the law or deviated from the guiding cases and legal doctrine that maintain the coherence of laws and judicial autonomy. Owing to the combined effect of a weak legislative framework and largely impotent judicial protection, the ATI right has been virtually deprived of its function to enable the citizenry to monitor and check the government. It has also failed to fulfil its potential in protecting citizens’ personal and property rights. In this regard, China’s ATI right falls far short of a genuine right to freedom of information.
These findings provide a necessary basis for a more accurate assessment of China’s open government information regime and a more perceptive comparison of this peculiarly Chinese regime with the FOI regimes of other countries. They also shed new light on the operation of judicial review in China. Furthermore, they indicate the barriers that must be overcome in future reforms to achieve a genuine FOI environment and highlight the interconnectedness of any such reform measures.<br>published_or_final_version<br>Law<br>Doctoral<br>Doctor of Philosophy
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Segolsson, Lola. "Den kommunala arbetstagarens rätt till yttrandefrihet kontra lojalitetsplikten gentemot arbetsgivaren : The municipal employees freedom of speech versus the duty of loyalty towards the employer." Thesis, Karlstads universitet, Fakulteten för ekonomi, kommunikation och IT, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-7693.
Texte intégralRésumé :
SAMMANFATTNING Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att beskriva och analysera gällande rätt, vad avser förhållandet mellan den kommunala arbetstagarens rättigheter till yttrandefrihet kontra den lojalitetsplikt som denne genom anställningsavtalet har gentemot sin arbetsgivare. Eftersom det finns en hel del praxis inom området främst från Justitieombudsmannen (JO), eftersom det rör sig om kommunal verksamhet, använder jag mig i uppsatsen av flera uttalanden och beslut från denna instans. Yttrandefriheten är en av de mest grundläggande rättigheterna i ett demokratiskt samhälle och är i Sverige en grundlagsfäst rättighet. Rätten att fritt kunna uttrycka sin uppfattning är viktig för att information skall kunna spridas, och att alla skall kunna vara med och påverka samhället via dialog och debatt. Teknikens utveckling och sociala mediers utbredning gör att information och åsikter blir lättillgängliga för en stor krets av mottagare. Att använda sig av sociala medier och via bloggar och facebook ge uttryck för åsikter och attityder blir allt mer frekvent förekommande, och det är inte helt ovanligt att man som arbetstagare kommenterar sin arbetsplats, chef eller verksamheten man är anställd inom. Arbetstagaren i den kommunala verksamheten har ett förstärkt skydd för sin yttrandefrihet gentemot arbetsgivaren (det allmänna) genom den grundlagsfästa meddelarfriheten och meddelarskyddet. I uppsatsen redogör jag för de rättigheter och det skydd som den kommunala arbetstagaren har när det gäller att utnyttja sin yttrandefrihet i form av kritiska uttalanden gentemot arbetsgivaren. Förutom rättigheten att uttrycka kritik gentemot sin arbetsgivare har den kommunala arbetstagaren också skyldigheter att anmäla missförhållanden inom vissa områden, Detta via lex Maria och lex Sarah, vilket jag också redogör för. I uppsatsen beskriver jag även det betänkande som i april i år (2011) presenterats angående lex Sarah inom skolan. I uppsatsen konstaterar jag att rätten till yttrandefrihet går före den lojalitetsplikt som i och med anställningsavtalets ingående uppstår. Jag konstaterar att lojalitetsplikten i kommunal verksamhet inte existerar när det gäller negativa eller kritiska yttranden gentemot arbetsgivaren. Lojalitetsplikten handlar för den kommunala arbetstagaren i själva verket enbart om hur man skall utföra sina arbetsuppgifter, inte vad arbetstagaren uttrycker om sin arbetsgivare.<br>Abstract The purpose of this essay is to explain and analyze the law, how the relations between the municipal employee towards freedom of speech work against the duty of loyalty the employee has towards the employer through the employment contract. Because of the high amount of standardized practice within this field, especially from the ombudsman, and because this essay is about the municipal functions, the essay will consist of multiple statements and decisions from these instances. The freedom of speech is one of the most fundamental rights in a democratic society – and in Sweden a right that is supported by the constitution. The right to freely express your own opinion is important for the information to spread, and for everybody to be able to affect the society via dialog and debate. The technological development and social media’s spread make information and opinions more accessible to a larger audience. The use of this kind of media such as blogs and the extensive use of Facebook to express opinions and different attitudes become used more frequently, it is not uncommon for a employee to make comments about his or hers workplace, boss or the field of work in one of these digital medias. The Employee in the municipal operation has a strong protection when it comes to freedom of speech towards the employer, through the constitutional freedom of information and the protection of sources. The essay will cover the rights and the protections that the municipal employees have when it comes to the use of freedom of speech in criticism towards the employer. Aside from the right to express criticism towards the employer, the municipal employee also have obligations to address anomalies within some fields, which will be described in the essay. Lex Maria and lex Sarah regulate this. I also describe a report that just has been presented concerning the lex Sarah in schools. In the essay I note that the freedom of speech will be prioritized before the duty of loyalty the employee has against the employer. And I note that the duty of loyalty in municipal operations does not exist when it comes to negative opinions or criticism against the employer. The duty of loyalty for the municipal employee is only about how the employer should carry out his work duties, and not what the employee, express about their employer.
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Meyer, Stella. "Conspiracy theories and freedom of speech in the online sphere : An analysis of QAnon’s ban from Facebook and Twitter." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-455063.
Texte intégralRésumé :
At the crossroads of law, conspiracy theory research and philosophy, this thesis investigates the permanent ban of QAnon from Facebook and Twitter, determining whether their deplatforming constitutes a violation of free speech. By first conducting a content analysis of free speech legislation in Germany and the US, it becomes evident that the matter needs to be approached from an ethical perspective rather than a legal one. To this end, I am testing an ethical framework suggested by Cíbik and Hardoš (2020). Based on the concept of ethical unreasonableness, the framework will be used to determine whether QAnon is harmful and its ban was justified. The case study consists of an in-depth analysis of QAnon’s evolution, distribution and core narratives in Germany and the US, followed by an examination of Facebook and Twitter’s justifications for deplatforming all QAnon assets. The ethical framework will then be applied to selected QAnon narratives based on their prevalence in the time from February 2020 to February 2021. It becomes clear that the ethical framework at hand needs to be adjusted and is unsuitable for everyday content moderation but should still be used by the social media companies for training purposes to improve decision making. The question of whether deplatforming QAnon was a violation of free speech is not easily answered as depending on the point of view it is or is not a violation of freedom of speech. Ultimately, big social media companies need to be redefined as to their role and responsibilities in today’s societies before any content moderation measures can be adequately examined.
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McGowan, Wayne S. "Thinking about the responsible parent : freedom and educating the child in Western Australia." University of Western Australia. Graduate School of Education, 2004. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2005.0014.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This study is concerned with how educational legislation shapes and uses freedom for the purpose of governing the parent. The key question guiding the study was: How does the Act constitute the ‘parent’ as a subject position responsible for schooling the child? Central to the work is an examination of the School Education Act 1999 (the Act) using Foucault’s thinking on governmentality. This is prefaced by historical accounts that bring together freedom and childhood as contrived styles of conduct that provide the governmental logic behind the Act. The study reveals how the Act shapes and uses the truth of freedom/childhood to construct the responsible parent as a style of conduct pegged to a neo-liberal political rationality of government. It is this political rationality that provides the node or point of encounter between the technologies of power and the self within the Act which forms the ‘responsible’ identity of the parent as an active self-governing entrepreneur made more visible by the political construction of ‘others.’ This is a legal-political subjectivity centred on the truth of freedom/childhood and a neo-liberal rationality of government that believes that any change to our current ethical way of being in relation to educating the child would ruin the very freedoms upon which our civilised lifestyle depends. In essence, the Act relies on the production of ‘others’ as the poor, Aboriginal and radical who must be regulated and made autonomous to constitute the ‘parent’ as an active consumer whose autonomous educational choices are an expression of responsibility in relation to schooling the child
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Guy, Robert L. Holsinger M. Paul. "Religious expression in public education." Normal, Ill. Illinois State University, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ilstu/fullcit?p3006619.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Thesis (D.A.)--Illinois State University, 2001.<br>Title from title page screen, viewed April 25, 2006. Dissertation Committee: M. Paul Holsinger (chair), Moody Simms, John Freed. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 161-167) and abstract. Also available in print.
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Wood, Jenny, and Karolina Sparrman. "Gränsdragningen mellan yttrandefrihet och hets mot folkgrupp : En undersökning av gällande rätt utifrån ett samtida perspektiv." Thesis, Karlstad University, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Communication and IT, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-271.
Texte intégralRésumé :
<p>Abstract</p><p>This essay begins with a presentation of the complex set of problems which relate to the interaction between freedom of speech and the ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith or sexual preference (BrB 16:8, incitement to racial hatred). Can conflicts arise between freedom of speech and the ban against discrimination? To shed light on this question, we have chosen to look at the issue from a new perspective. This perspective is based on the new challenges faced by Swedish society as a result of the changed composition of our population, our membership in the EU and our acknowledgment of certain international conventions concerning human rights.</p><p>Fifty years ago our population almost solely comprised of “native Swedes”. Today, because of massive immigration, our country can be described as multiracial and multicultural. This gives rise to questions concerning protecting minority groups from discrimination whilst also attempting to ensure that the non-discrimination acts do not compromise our freedom of speech. Our membership in the EU and our acknowledgement of certain international conventions means that European law and international law sometimes override Swedish law. This restricts our freedom to decide the extent of our non-discrimination statutes, but can have positive effects on the right to freedom of speech and religion.</p><p>The arguments that are put forward in our essay may give rise to many questions but we will focus on two major issues. First, where does the law draw the line between the freedom of speech and the ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference? Second, are there inherit flaws in the law as a result of both the inner changes our society has gone through and our new responsibilities due to our membership in the EU and our acknowledgement of certain international conventions?</p><p>The purpose of this essay is to answer these questions through studying and reflecting on the theory of law (doctrine). We will also analyse the existing written law and its sources, and consider court rulings and related judicial decisions. This analysis will enable us to make the following conclusion concerning the previously mentioned questions.</p><p>The freedom of speech is extensive and is not explicitly defined. Without explicit definition, no specific statements automatically become illegal. Therefore a person's freedom to express his own opinion in public is wide-ranging. Unfortunately our freedom of speech is not guaranteed for ever and therefore we have to both treasure and guard it from potential threats. Popular public opinion, populist interests or other specific interests may seek changes, which might effect our freedom of speech. The ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference is a specific interest of this kind. The purpose of this ban is based solely on good intentions. None the less, this ban could be a wolf in sheep’s clothing, as it might have a negative influence on the freedom of speech. When two justifiable causes come into conflict with one another – in this case the freedom of speech versus non-discrimination – a society must make difficult choices. Do we sacrifice part of our freedom of speech which will effect the whole population in order to protect minority groups, or do we sacrifice the rights of the minority in order to secure freedom of speech for all?</p><p>During the last few years there has been an increase in Nazi-organisations in Sweden, which have grown strong in terms of both the number of their supporters and the amount of attention which is paid to them by the press. These groups have used our democratic rights – which includes our freedom of speech – in order to spread their scornful opinions based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference. Through our study of court rulings concerning Nazis, we came to the conclusion that there is a strong tendency to convict Nazis. This is certainly the case if they call out “Sieg Heil” or salute Hitler. They are also often convicted if they are wearing the Nazi cross.</p><p>When the courts find that they are unable to convict a Nazi for the actions just mentioned, they often base their judgement on either one or two premises. If the prosecutor can not prove that it has been the Nazi's intention to spread a scornful message concerning a group defined by it's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference, he can not be convicted with reference to the non-discrimination act (uppsåtsrekvisitet). Moreover, if it can not be proven that the message has reached a considerable number of people and not just the Nazis private sphere, this also warrants the verdict of acquittal (spridningsrekvisitet). From our study of court rulings however, we found that the non-discrimination statute does fulfil its purpose. Most scornful or hate-filled messages are in fact disseminated to the wider public. This being the case, the Nazi is almost certain to be convicted.</p><p>Religious fundamentalism is not something entirely new in our society. Sweden has always had a few religious groups free from the state church and the members of the free churches have often held conservative religious beliefs, much like some Muslim movements today. Freedom of speech and religious freedom are of course two important elements of any democratic society, but through a court case concerning a Christian priest in a free church, the freedom of speech related to preaching has arguably become unacceptably extensive. In effect this court case means that as long as you can relate your scornful statement about a specific group included in the non-discrimination statute to a religious scripture like the Bible or the Koran, you can not be prosecuted.</p><p>This somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion is a result of Sweden adopting the European Convention of Human Rights. In this case the European Rights Law overrides the Swedish non-discrimination law and this leads to a flaw in our legal system relating to the protection of certain minority groups. It must be mentioned, however, that the European Convention of Human Rights is part of Swedish law, and therefore Swedish law can not contradict European law, RF 2:23. Given that we are bound by the European Rights Law, there is nothing Sweden can do about this flaw, which in the future might have even greater consequences in and on our multicultural society. For instance, what would happen if messages filled with hatred were spread by priests from the Christian free churches and fundamentalist Muslims. If these statements concerned the other group and the origin of the statements could be traced to the Bible and the Koran, the courts would have no way of convicting the preachers as this would go against the European Convention on Human Rights. This could result in serious social instability. Indeed, riots could break out as a result of such religious propaganda. The law would be powerless to halt the dissemination of the religious scorn which caused the riots.</p><p>We have come to three conclusions concerning intrinsic flaws in the law concerning the ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith or sexual preference. We therefore recommend that the following changes should be made:</p><p>1. Concerning BrB 16:8, this act should include an unmistakable and transparent definition of the word “missaktning” (scornfulness or disrespect).</p><p>2. With reference to the High Court’s ruling regarding the priest and the European Convention on Human Rights, we recommend that Sweden should attempt to find a legal solution which will enable our courts to more easily convict scornful statements regarding certain minority groups, even if the origin of the statement can be traced to religious writings.</p><p>3. With reference to the instruction in the Freedom of Press Act (TF 1:4), we find it necessary to clarify which statements that can be looked upon as legal and which statements are unlawful.</p>
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Chesbrough, Emily Alice. "Freedom of Speech through the Looking Glass: Reflections on the Governance of Political Discourse in China, the United States, and the European Union." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/93.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Freedom of speech is a right guaranteed by the US, the EU, and China; however, just because a right is guaranteed does not mean the government cannot manipulate the right to achieve its ends. Freedom of speech is commonly associated with the power of language; citizens speak in order to take control of those governing them, in order to assert their desires. In reality, freedom of speech is far more beneficial for governments, who can use this dissent to better control a population. In order to control the population, though, the governments must first control the dissenting speech, the discourse, surrounding an issue. In the case studies that follow, these three governments with very different regimes will manipulate discourses elicited in the name of free speech in order to advance the governments’ plans, even when these plans went against the stated public interest and ignored the dissenting citizens. This thesis, in essence, examines how freedom of speech can become a tool of power for regimes.
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Cederbrink, Petter, and Jim Gunnarsson. "Den nya kompletteringsregeln i 39a kap. 7a § IL : En analys av dess förenlighet med etableringsfriheten." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Commercial Law, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-7430.
Texte intégralRésumé :
<p>Den första svenska CFC-lagstiftningen trädde i kraft den 1 januari 1990 och har sedan dess genomgått flera omarbetningar. Syftet med de svenska CFC-reglerna är att förhindra skatteplanering med bolag i lågbeskattade länder och på så sätt försvara den svenska skattebasen. I kort innebär de svenska CFC-reglerna en möjlighet att beskatta ägaren till ett i utlandet beläget CFC-bolag löpande för dess inkomster från CFC-bolaget.</p><p>EG-domstolens dom <em>Cadbury Schweppes</em> föranledde att flera av medlemsländerna, däribland Sverige tvingades ändra sina CFC-lagstiftningar. EG-domstolen konstaterade att CFC-lagstiftning utgör en inskränkning av etableringsfriheten och skall förbjudas såvida CFC-bolaget inte utgör ett rent konstlat upplägg och då etableringen sker i syfte att undvika nationell skatt. CFC-beskattning får inte vidtas om det kan visas att det föreligger en verklig etablering från vilken det bedrivs en faktisk ekonomisk verksamhet. Bedömningen om en sådan etablering föreligger, skall grundas på objektiva omständigheter som kan kontrolleras av utomstående, däribland i vilken grad CFC-bolaget existerar fysiskt i form av lokaler, personal och utrustning.</p><p>Den svenska regeringen valde att införliva utgången av målet genom en ny kompletteringsregel i 39a kap. 7a § IL. Regeringen valde att formulera lagstiftningen som att en inkomst hos en utländsk juridisk person som hör hemma i en stat inom Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet inte anses lågbeskattad om den utländska juridiska personen i den stat där den hör hemma utgör en verklig etablering från vilken en affärsmässigt motiverad verksamhet bedrivs. För att göra denna prövning listar regeringen tre omständigheter som särskilt skall beaktas. Den utländska juridiska personen skall för det första förfoga över egna resurser i form av i form av lokaler och utrustning i den utsträckning som är nödvändig för dess verksamhet. För det andra skall den förfoga över personal med den kompetens som är nödvändig för att självständigt bedriva verksamheten och slutligen skall den utländska juridiska personens personal självständigt fatta beslut i den löpande verksamheten. Formuleringen av lagstiftningen har fått mycket kritik i förarbetena och i doktrinen framförallt eftersom den svenska lagstiftningens formulering avviker från EG-domstolens formulering i domen.</p><p>Magisteruppsatsen syftar till att utreda och analysera den nya kompletteringsregelns i 39a kap. 7a § IL förenlighet med etableringsfriheten med särskilt beaktande av utgången i målet <em>Cadbury Schweppes</em>. Dessutom kommer eventuella tillämpnings- och tolkningsproblem att klargöras och analyseras. Slutsatsen är att den nya kompletteringsregeln löper stor risk att anses som oförenlig med etableringsfriheten samt att formuleringen skapar tolkningsproblem och väcker osäkerhet inför framtida tillämpning. Eftersom den nya kompletteringsregeln syftar till att förena den svenska CFC-lagstiftningen med EG-rätten borde det mest förnuftiga istället varit att den nya kompletteringsregeln endast innehöll grundelementen som kommer till uttryck i EG-rättens dom, medan detaljerna istället överlåts till rättsutvecklingen.</p><br><p>The first Swedish CFC legislation came into force on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1990 and has since undergone several revisions. The purpose of the Swedish CFC rules is to prevent tax avoidance by companies located in low tax countries and thus defend the Swedish tax base. In short, the Swedish CFC legislation implies an opportunity to tax the owner of a foreign located CFC of its revenue from the CFC.</p><p>The ECJs ruling in the <em>Cadbury Schweppes</em> case caused several of the member states, including Sweden to change its CFC legislation. The ECJ ruled that the CFC legislation constitutes a restriction on the Freedom of Establishment and should be prohibited unless the CFC does not constitute a wholly artificial arrangement intended to escape the national tax normally payable. CFC-taxation may not be made if it is proved that there is an actual establishment intended to carry on a genuine economic activity. The finding if such an establishment exists must be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment.</p><p>The Swedish government chose to incorporate the outcome of the ruling by implementing a new CFC-legislation - 39a. 7a § IL. The government chose to formulate the legislation so an income of a foreign legal entity which belongs in a state within the European Economic Area is not considered to be low taxed if the foreign legal entity in the home State is an actual establishment from which a commercially motivated business is managed. To make this finding, the government lists three factors that require specific consideration. The foreign legal entity must according to the first factor have their own resources in the form of in the form of premises and equipment to the extent necessary for its activities. The second factor sates that the control of staff with the skills necessary to independently carry out the activity and finally shall the staff independently make decisions in the ongoing activities. The wording of the legislation has received much criticism in the preparatory work and in the literature especially since the wording of the Swedish legislation differs from the one made by the ECJ.</p><p>This Master's thesis aims to investigate and analyze the new Swedish CFC-legislation in 39a. kap. 7a § IL and to analyze if it is compatible with the Freedom of Establishment with specific regard to the outcome of the <em>Cadbury Schweppes </em>case. Moreover, any application or interpretation problems will be clarified and analyzed. The conclusion is that the new Swedish CFC legislation threatens to be incoherent with the freedom of establishment and that the wording creates problems of interpretation and raises uncertainty about the future application. As the new CFC legislation intends to reconcile the Swedish CFC legislation with EC law it should be more reasonable if the new rule only contained the basic elements as reflected in the ruling, while details instead were left to the legislative development.</p>
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Stepanauskaitė-Kubilienė, Renolda. "Žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės teisės ribų problema." Master's thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2008. http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2007~D_20080125_100809-61808.
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Magistro baigiamajame darbe nagrinėjama žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės teisės ribų teisinio reglamentavimo Lietuvoje problema.
Aptarti žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės teisės istorinės ištakos, raidos etapai, žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės teisės vieta žmogaus teisių sistemoje. Pabrėžiama, jog žodžio laisvė nėra absoliuti, o norint apsaugoti svarbesnius visuomenės interesus arba atskirų asmenų teises nustatomos tam tikros žodžio laisvės ribos. Taip pat prieita nuomonės, jog žodžio laisvės teisė ir informacijos laisvės teisė yra dvi skirtingos fundamentinės žmogaus teisės – informacijos gavimo teisė yra socialinė kategorija, tuo tarpu žodžio laisvė, kaip žmogaus saviraiškos būdas, yra greičiau dvasinė kategorija.
Analizuojant žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės ribojimo pagrindus, aptarta teisės ir moralės santykio problema. Aptariant minėtą problemą, rėmėmės I.Kanto žmogaus valios autonomija. Paaiškėjo, jog teisėta veikla išplaukia ne iš išorinio reglamentavimo, o iš vidinio asmens apsisprendimo veikti moraliai, iš pagarbos proto principams. Moralės dėsnis “įrašytas” žmogaus dvasioje ir žmogus yra laisvas, jei jis veikia vadovaudamasis moralės įstatymu.
Filosofiniu požiūriu analizuota žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės teisės struktūra. Žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės teisę lemia tiesos ir gėrio filosofinės kategorijos. Žodžio (išraiškos) laisvė sietina su tiesos skelbimu gera valia ir gėrio siekimu. Tiesa sudaro intelektualinį žodžio (išraiškos) laisvės naudojimo aspektą, o gėris valinį aspektą.
Darbe... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]<br>In this Master’s paper the legal regulation issue of free speech limits in Lithuania is analyzed.
Historical fountainhead of free speech, its process and position in the system of human rights are discussed. It is emphasized that the freedom of speech is not absolute, and on purpose to protect the public interest that are more important or the rights of each individual person some particular limits of free speech are set down. It has also been considered that freedom of speech and freedom of information are two different kinds of fundamental human rights. The freedom of information is a social category whereas the freedom of speech that is like a way of a person’s self-expression is rather a moral category.
While analyzing the basis of free speech limits the problem of relation between law and morality has been discussed appealing to I. Kant autonomy of human will. It appeared that good will is one that acts from duty in accordance with the universal moral law that the autonomous human being freely gives itself. This law obliges one to treat humanity — understood as rational agency, and represented through oneself as well as others — as an end in itself rather than as means.
The structure of free speech has been analysed philosophically. It occurred that freedom of speech is conditioned by the philosophical categories of the truth and the good. The free speech is related to proclamation of the truth, good will and endeavor to seek the good. The truth makes an intellectual... [to full text]
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Kessinger, Jonathan A. "Bartnicki V. Vopper : a first amendment "clean hands" exception to electronic interception law." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2001. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/230.
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This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.<br>Bachelors<br>Health and Public Affairs<br>Legal Studies
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Van, Loenen Bastiaan. "Access to Geographic Scientific and Technical Data in an Academic Setting." Fogler Library, University of Maine, 2001. http://www.library.umaine.edu/theses/pdf/vanLoenenB2001.pdf.
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Moro, Nikhil. "Freedom of expression and the information society a legal analysis toward a libertarian framework for libel /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1158715837.
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Holm, Cyril. "F. A. Hayek's Critique of Legislation." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-236890.
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The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection.
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Call, Ian. "Secondary pre-service teachers' knowledge and confidence in dealing with students' First Amendment rights in the classroom." [Tampa, Fla.] : University of South Florida, 2008. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0002339.
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