Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « International and municipal law – Germany »

Thesis (S.J.D.)--Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, 2003.<br>Title from title screen (viewed 21st January, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. Bibliography: leaves 356-396. Also available in print form.

The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether or not there is a universal human right to water. The problem of water scarcity and high death rates due to a lack of access to clean water is still prevalent across the globe today, making it hard to believe that a human right to water is still not codified in international law. This dissertation analyses international as well as national law to assess whether a human right to water is universally acknowledged by the international community despite not being codified. It is argued, that there is still no explicit universal human right to water in international law. However, this dissertation acknowledges that a human right to water does exist as a derivate right, which is almost universally acknowledged. As a derivative right, it is, however, not as equally strong as explicitly acknowledged rights in the core international human rights instruments. This dissertation also provides a brief overview of corporate involvement under the human right to water. An assessment is made as to whether or not international law imposes direct obligations and responsibilities on companies. It is argued in this dissertation that companies have a particular responsibility for the implementation of the human right to water despite states remaining the primary subjects responsible.

Thesis (LL M )--Stellenbosch University, 1990.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: According to Rumpf£ CJ in the Nduli decision, Roman-Dutch law is the fons et origo of the statement that customary international law is part of South African law. His sources, Fran~ois and Huber, are open to criticism because they are not Roman-Dutch authorities on this specific question, but the decisions in Ncumata v Matwa (1881-2), Du Toit v Kruger (1905), and Rex v Lionda (1944) emphasise that the reception of customary international law in South African law has taken place through Roman law. Various court decisions emphasise that the term Roman-Dutch law should not be interpreted narrowly, as it includes the common law of the whole of Western Europe and not only of the province Holland. If this quotation is interpreted in an ius commune context, it is clear why Rumpf£ CJ did not cite specific sources to prove his point: he accepted it as a given fact- as the jurists did in the middle ages. Roman-Dutch law serves only as a frame of reference out of which international law has developed. The courts therefore apply international law as international law and not as, for example, common law. Two important implications follow: firstly it means that customary international law need not to be transformed before the courts can apply the relevant rule and secondly that new rules of customary international law automatically form part of the law of South Africa. From the eighty South African court decisions discussed, it is clear that the courts do take judicial notice of customary international law. This justifies the statement that the judiciary regards customary international law as part of the law of South Africa since 1879. The influence of English law on this section of South African law must, according to Rumpf£ CJ, also be taken into account. The reason is that English law is the common law of the South African constitutional law which influences the application of international law by the courts. This can extend the courts' frame of reference. Only a fifth of the cases discussed refer to Roman-Dutch writers, and then only in a comparative sense. The South African courts rely mainly on Anglo-American decisions and tendencies. The South African courts follow their English counterparts by accepting the same qualifications on the general rule that customary international law forms part of the law of the land. The willingness of the courts to apply customary international law has diminished over the years especially in cases where state security features. It seems that politically contentious questions play an inhibiting role on the readiness of the courts to apply customary international law where conflict, real or imaginary, between customary international law and municipal law appears. Acts of state constitute the most important obstacle in the application of customary international law, because they could lead to the court abandoning its independent judicial function in favour of the executive. Because the South African courts follow the English law in this area also, it is assumed that safety measures developed there would be adopted by the South African courts to prevent their jurisdiction from being limited too easily. It is recommended that more attention should be given to the existence and application of customary international law principles and that a conscious effort must be made by the judiciary to resolve conflict between customary international law and municipal law and to do it in such a manner that due account is taken of the fact that in South Africa customary international law is part of the law of the land.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Volgens Rumpff HR se uitspraak in die Ndu/i-beslissing, is Romeins-Hollandse reg die fons et origo van die stelling dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg dee! van Suid-Afrikaanse reg is. Sy bronne, Fran<;ois and Huber, is vatbaar vir kritiek omdat hulle nie Romeins-Hollandse gesag op hierdie spesifieke vraag is nie. Die beslissings in Ncumata v Matwa (1881-2), Du Toit v Kruger (1905), en Rex v Lionda (1944) beklemtoon egter dat die gelding van volkeregtelike gewoontereg in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg we/ deur die Romeinse reg plaasgevind het. Verskeie hofbeslissings beklemtoon verder dat die term Romeins-Hollandse reg nie eng gei"nterpreteer moet word nie, aangesien dit die gemenereg van die hele Wes-Europa omvat, en nie net die van die provinsie Holland nie. Indien hierdie aanhaling in 'n ius commune konteks gei"nterpreteer word, is dit duidelik waarom Rumpff HR nie spesifieke bronne aangehaal het om sy punt te bewys nie: hy het dit as 'n gegewe feit aanvaar - soos ook die juriste in die middeleeue. Romeins-Hollandse reg geld dus slegs as 'n verwysingsraamwerk waaruit die volkereg ontwikkel het. Die howe pas dus volkereg toe as volkereg en nie as, byvoorbeeld, gemenereg nie. Twee belangrike implikasies volg hieruit: eerstens beteken dit dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg nie getransformeer hoefte word voordat die howe die relevante reel toepas nie, en tweedens dat nuwe volkeregtelike gewoonteregreels outomaties dee! vorm van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Uit die tagtig Suid-Afrikaanse hofbeslissings wat bespreek is, is dit duidelik dat die howe wei geregtelik kennis neem van volkeregtelike gewoontereg. Dit regverdig dus die stelling dat die reg bank volkeregtelike gewoontereg reeds sedert 1879 as dee! van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg beskou. Die invloed van die Engelse reg op hierdie dee! van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg behoort volgens Rumpff HR ook in ag geneem te word. Die rede hiervoor is dat die Engelse reg die gemenereg van die Suid-Afrikaanse staatsreg vorm. Dit bei"nvloed die toepassing van die volkereg deur die howe- gevolglik kan dit die howe se verwysingsraamwerk uitbrei. Slegs 'n vyfde van die beslissings verwys na Romeins-Hollandse skrywers, en dan slegs in 'n vergelykende sin. Die Suid-Afrikaanse howe steun hoofsaaklik op Anglo-Amerikaanse beslissings en tendense. Die Suid-Afrikaanse howe volg hulle Engelse ewekniee deur dieselfde beperkinge op die algemene reel dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg dee! vorm van die reg van die land, te aanvaar. Die bereidwilligheid van die howe om volkeregtelike gewoontereg toe te pas het deur die jare afgeneerri, vera) waar staatsveiligheid ter sprake is. Dit blyk dat polities-kontensieuse vrae 'n striemende faktor is by die toepassing van volkeregtelike gewoontereg deur die howe, vera) waar daar 'n botsing tussen volkeregtelike gewoontereg en munisipale reg voorkom. Staatshandelinge is die verna.amste struikelblok by die toepassing van vol-keregtelike gewoontereg, aangesien dit daartoe kan lei dat die howe afstand kan doen van hul onafhanklike regsfunksie ten gunste van die uitvoerende gesag. Omdat die Suid-Afrikaanse howe die Engelse reg ook in hierdie gebied navolg, kan dit aanvaar word dat die veiligheidsma.atreels wat reeds daar ontstaan bet, deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe gevolg sal word om te verhoed dat hul jurisdiksie ligtelik beperk sou kon word. Dit word dus aanbeveel dat aanda.g gegee word aan die bestaan en toepassing van volkeregtelike gewoonteregbeginsels en dat 'n daadwerklike poging deur die regbank gemaak moet word om botsings tussen volkeregtelike gewoontereg en munisipale reg te vermy, en om dit op so 'n wyse te doen dat in ag gehou word dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg in Suid-Afrika deel is van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg.

Award date: 1 October 2018<br>Supervisor: Professor Deirdre Curtin<br>Enhanced cooperation is the EU’s most general, multi-purpose, and thus differentiation-friendly possibility to legislate without binding all Member States. After years of initial reluc-tance, it has been put into practice in a number of cases in the last years. In light of these developments, many perspectives on enhanced cooperation are worth revisiting. At the same time, the EU has recently been facing numerous fundamental challenges, and enhanced co-operation could be one of the tools for policy makers to consider when searching for solutions. It does so by analysing two crucial legal aspects of the enhanced cooperation mechanism in depth: the last resort principle and the principle of openness. Both principles stand out among the law governing enhanced cooperation as particularly important, defining notions – indeed, cornerstones of enhanced cooperation.

Thesis (S.J.D.)--Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, 2003.<br>Title from title screen (viewed 21st January, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. Bibliography: leaves 356-396. Also available in print form.