Articles de revues sur le sujet « Qatari foreign policy »

Qatar is one of the richest countries in the Middle East region. Qatar is able to supply the third largest gas to the world and become the third largest exporter of liquid natural gas. This paper is interested in analyzing the behavior of the Qatari government amid various conflicts and tensions in the Middle East region. Qatar tends to position itself as a mediator of conflict. The Qatari government believes that by being a mediator in this conflict it can be a neutral position.Qatari governance is based on the basic norm structure that is used as a policy platform, and articulates it openly, with integrity, and is measurable. This is known as clean diplomacy. Qatar manages the crisis by remaining consistent with its image as a guardian of regional peace and stability. The image of Qatar as an 'honest broker' country is able to increase Qatar's legitimacy in the international public arena. This paper builds on arguments based on secondary document data, and interprets the data with a qualitative approach to understanding Qatar's foreign policy behavior. The analysis showed that the choice of governance of Qatar's clean diplomacy proved effective in managing the foreign political pressure of neighboring countries in the form of not escalating conflict, and Qatar's political and economic stability.

This paper presents pertinent aspects of the foreign aid policy of the State of Qatar as a Muslim emerging donor with rising soft power. The study traces and explains the evolution of Qatar’s Foreign Aid Policy (QFAP) and identifies the various critical milestones of the policy that has been successfully transformed from a small Gulf Emirate into one of the leading players on both regional and global issues including aid giving. Although, Qatar’s motivation for aid giving is quite similar to the global setting, the country’s sociocultural background and values play a vital in shaping and inspiring its aid policy. As QFAP is closely tied to the country’s active foreign policy agenda, political and security motives are heavily reflected in the country’s aid practices. In collecting both primary and secondary data this study used various qualitative methods such as face-to-face interviews with key Qatari officials and scrutinized official state documents and quoted speeches, particularly of past and present Emirs as well as other archival sources.

The paper deals with the phenomenon of the Qatari-Saudi rivalry in the Middle East in the context of dissimilarities between political programs and aspirations of the two states in the Middle East.The following research undertakings are realized in the article:• an explanation of the reasons of Qatar and the Saudi Kingdom’s domination in the Arab politics of the last 15 years;• an analysis of the Qatari foreign policy and the regional geopolitical agenda of Qatar;• an inquiry into the reasons and driving forces of the Saudi-Qatari conflict;• a study of the external actors’ influence on the Saudi-Qatari conflict, taking into account the changers in the U.S. foreign policy;• investigation of the different political strategies of the Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen which may lead to disintegration of this country.The author emphasizes four main reasons for the Saudi-Qatari rivalry: support by the Qatari leadership of the international movement Muslim Brotherhood; tribal rivalry among the families of al-Saud and al-Thani; struggle for the ideological heritage of Muhammad Abdel Wahhab; different approaches to Iran, and its role in the region.

The countries of the Arab Gulf have witnessed a wave of production of ‘national’ strategies and ‘vision’ initiatives, most of which have been developed by foreign firms and consultants, and many of which were drafted in English. Two examples of these that form the basis of analysis of this article are the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV) issued in 2008 and followed up by the Qatar National Developmental Strategy 2011–2016 (QNDS) in 2011. Neither document was subjected to public referendum, and many of those directly involved in Qatar's central planning were unable even to obtain copies until after publication in final form. Both are problematic for reason of vague or undefined terms, lack of concrete goals, as well as any explicit mention of political development in the country. Even more serious is the question of citizenship, where the huge expatriate populations and permanent residence concessions granted on the basis of ownership of real estate threaten to undermine Arab Qatari identity – a situation aggravated further when English was made the official language of instruction in education and a primary language of administration. This latter development also had the effect of dwindling participation of Qatari citizens in the labour force – already low at 14% in 2001 – to a mere 6% in 2009. The article examines four major deficiencies inherent in Qatar in light of the QNV and QNDS: economic–productive, labour force, political and security. Of these, mention of the political deficiency is conspicuously absent from both documents (where there is not a single mention of terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘citizenship’ or ‘elections’) and both the labour force and economic–productive deficiencies are addressed in terms more relevant and favourable to foreign concerns than those of native Qataris. In the final analysis, both the QNV and QNDS are reflective of Qatar's severe demographic anomaly where the number of Qatari citizens was estimated to be only 230,000 out of a total population of 1.64 million in 2010; and official policy in terms of both the labour market and the granting of permanent residence on the basis of unregulated foreign purchases of real estate and investment only serves to perpetuate an already precarious situation. If Qatar is unable to restructure and reform its policies to the benefit of the indigenous Arab population, the matter of identity and the future character of the country threaten to be matters of serious doubt by the end date of the QNV in 2030, if not well before then.

Purpose – Extending the extant literature and using Qatar’s equity market as a case study, this paper aims to look into the potential impacts of foreign investor groups’ trading activities on market volatility in comparison with those of Qatar’s domestic investor counterparts. Design/methodology/approach – The dataset is comprised of daily aggregated values of stock purchases and sales made separately by four investor groups, namely, foreign individual investors, foreign institutional investors, domestic individual investors, and domestic institutional investors. An ex post measure of volatility introduced by Rogers and Satchell (1991) is employed. Four proxies for investor trading are considered separately in the analysis. The objective of the study is empirically addressed in the context of the Generalized Method of Moments estimation technique. Findings – In general, there exists substantial contemporaneous price impact associated with foreign equity investment in the Qatari capital market, despite the fact that foreigners’ buy and sell trades are not as large as those of their domestic counterparts. More specifically, foreign institutional sales (purchases) tend to increase (reduce) market volatility. Like those of foreign institutions, the sell trades by foreign individuals have a positive impact on volatility. On the other hand, domestic institutional purchases are significantly negatively related with market volatility, whereas the sell trades by the same category have no impact on volatility. Finally, surprises in foreigners’ trading volumes turn out to be responsible for adding to volatility. Practical implications – Although a sudden reversal of foreign capital flows can pose a real threat to the stability of the Qatari capital market, such capital flows are deemed to be an indispensable vehicle for enhancing the liquidity and efficiency of the market. Accordingly, policy makers in Qatar should overhaul the current foreign investment legislation to make it even more streamlined and better suited to achieving the country’s strategic vision for the market. Foremost in these reforms is relaxing the stringent 25 percent foreign ownership restriction. Such a relaxation process is highly recommended to be phased in only gradually, in order to weigh its pros and cons. In this regard, the authorities concerned should consider embarking on a range of procedures intended to ward off the adverse ramifications of foreign capital outflows. Originality/value – To the author’s best knowledge, no study about the impact of foreign equity flows on domestic markets has been so far conducted using trading data from the Qatari market. This work presents one such attempt.

Qatar will realize its decades-long drive to host a mega sporting event when, in 2022, the opening ceremony of the Fέdέration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup commences. By that time, the Qatari government will have invested at least $200 billion in real estate and development projects, employing anywhere between 500,000 and 1.5 million foreign workers to do so. The scale of these preparations is staggering — and not necessarily positive. Between 2010 and 2013, more than 1,200 labor migrants working in Qatar's construction sector died, with another 4,000 deaths projected by the start of the event. Foreign workers are subject to conditions of forced labor, human trafficking, and indefinite detention. Advocacy groups cite deplorable living and working conditions, coupled with lax legal protections for workers, as the main culprits. Absent significant improvements in worker welfare, Qatar's World Cup will be remembered as a human rights tragedy. This article examines whether it is possible for Qatar's World Cup to forge a different legacy, as an agent of change on behalf of worker welfare reform. In examining the issue, the article takes a two-fold approach. First, it locates the policy problem of worker welfare abuses in the context of the migration life cycle. The migration life cycle represents the range of activities that mediate the relationship between an individual migrant and the labor migration system — from the time the migrant first considers working overseas to his employment abroad to his eventual return to the home country. An understanding of worker welfare abuses in Qatar does not begin or end with reports of migrant deaths. A much broader pattern of abuse exists that, if ignored, will undermine effective policy responses. Second, the article frames worker welfare as a matter that lies at the intersection of business and human rights. Mega events are large-scale, internationally recognized activities that aim to promote regional development and to advance universal values and principles. They also represent an important collaboration between stakeholders across sectors. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, therefore, offer a framework for understanding how worker welfare reform might be in the interests of governmental and corporate actors alike. Ultimately, this paper outlines four policy proposals that may be undertaken by countries of origin, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and Qatari employers: (1) the development of a list of labor-supply agencies committed to ethical recruitment practices; (2) the devising of low-interest, preferential loans for migrants considering employment in Qatar; (3) the establishment of a resource center to serve as a one-stop shop for migrant information and services; and (4) the creation of training programs to aid migrants upon their return home. These options are not meant to diminish the role of the Qatari government in reform efforts, and indeed, the state can — and should — take steps to improve worker welfare, including strengthening worker welfare standards, closing labor law loopholes, and bolstering law enforcement capacity. But these measures are not enough. Therefore, the above four policy proposals put forward a process-specific, rather than actor-specific, approach to reform aimed at capitalizing on the spotlight of the World Cup to bring about lasting, positive change in Qatar's migrant labor practices.

This article explores the Qatari perception of the partnership with China on the basis of three factors: globalisation, the absence of a legacy of colonialism and the principles of non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty professed in China’s foreign policy. China’s perception of its relations with Qatar is embedded within its understanding of the regional order in the Middle East and reflects its assessment of the geopolitical factors that are transforming Gulf countries. It emerges from this analysis that the diplomatic and economic aspects of Qatar–China relations are substantial and well institutionalised. However, military cooperation is still underdeveloped despite the increase of military-to-military contacts.

This paper investigates the role played by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in mediating disputes since its creation in 1981 to 2011, the year of the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’. It analyzes the contributions of the GCC as a conflict mediator by cross-checking this sub-regional group's institutional structure and policy approach, and presents two major findings. Firstly, the GCC was hardly designed as a conflict mediator, given that the Gulf Arab states created it as a vehicle to respond to intra-Gulf and external security threats and challenges. Secondly, in order to promote its foreign policy independence and boost its regional and global diplomatic profile to ensure its security and survival in the dangerous environment of the Gulf region, it is Qatar that has extensively attempted to mediate conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen and Sudan, with varying degrees of success, under the banners of the GCC and the Arab League. Finally, the paper presents a series of policy recommendations, based on critical insights from Qatari mediation experiences, to enable the GCC to be a proactive dispute mediator.

Qatar, a backwater state in regional and international politics until 1995, has in recent years pursued a high-profile foreign policy in the areas of dispute mediations, maintaining balanced relations with allies and adversaries alike, adept use of soft power tools, and even military interventions in fellow Arab states, Libya in particular, to aid the Arab pro-democracy forces. This high-profile foreign policy has aimed at strengthening Qatar's national security in the Gulf neighbourhood and playing a more proactive role in the Arab world. This article examines Qatar's activist foreign policy role in the Arab Spring and probes whether such a role is sustainable in future in view of the constraints Qatar faces at home, in the Gulf neighbourhood and beyond. It concludes that Qatar, as a tiny state, has little choice other than to strike a balance between its oversized foreign policy role and the imperatives of regional and international realities.

By virtue of their economic influence, the Arab States of the Gulf are highly interlinked within the global community. Dimensions of globalization (such as outward looking focus on international trade, openness, growing business opportunities and investment) are shifting their interests to a broad spectrum of partners leading to increased connectivity platforms and links. Apparent deteriorating ties seriously undermines relations among GCC[1] players and adversely affects its functioning. Current dispute, centered on allegations about Qatar’s foreign policy, caused much consternation, in fact, unequivocally conflicted with the interests of other members and escalated tensions. A scheme of prolonged economic isolation for the Gulf state of Qatar presents challenges and opportunities for Romania (particularly in food security initiatives in Qatar), however, in light of inter-regional realignments, a united GCC stance must consequently prevail to promote stability and reinforce its status of regional power in the Arab World, that would develop and maintain a strong bilateral relationship between Romania and the GCC. [1] (Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic union currently consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates)

The paper focuses on the analysis of Brazilian for-eign policy under Jair Bolsonaro since his inaugura-tion as president in January 2019 up to the present moment. This study examines Jair Bolsonaro’s per-sonality and the influence of Brazilian president’s certain character traits on foreign policy decisions. The author concludes that Jair Bolsonaro has won presidential election in autumn 2018 largely due to disenchantment of Brazilians with socially oriented public policy. Due to the fact that Jair Bolsonaro adheres to the right-wing radical views, thinks of himself as anti-globalist and advocates the devel-opment of bilateral relations at the expense of multi-lateral ones, even before he came to power re-searchers and political experts had predicted Brazil’s rapprochement with the USA, Italy and Israel, a cold snap in bilateral relations with China, a coming rup-ture in relations with Cuba and Venezuela and Bra-zil’s withdrawal from the UN, the OAS, Mercosur, UNASUR and the BRICS. Reality, however, turned out to be much more challenging and the forecasts of political experts came true only partially. Since from the very beginning J. Bolsonaro was supported by such various groups as the military, evangelicals, representatives of agribusiness, economists, they often suggested to him absolutely contradictory foreign policy decisions. As a result, almost any step in the international arena was replaced by a retreat: criticism of China's expansion was followed by the signing of economic agreements with him, after the announcement of the intention to move the embas-sy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, followed by visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. Although J. Bolsonaro criticized multilateral diplomacy, he achieved the signing of agreements between Mer-cosur and the EU, Mercosur and EFTA. Nevertheless, the President of Brazil has invariably adhered to the course of automatic alignment with the United States and developed relations mainly with regimes close to him in ideology. It is difficult to judge how correct this strategy was, but in the future the Brazil-ian government must first of all be guided by the interests of the country, remember the need for its autonomy and economic prosperity.

Purpose This paper aims to examine the hypotheses of main international theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) and the development of these theories toward the behavior of foreign policy of small states in the developing world. The theories of international relations, especially the realistic theory, face a theoretical debate and a fundamental criticism. The hypotheses of these theories are not able to explain the external behavior of some small states, especially those in the developing world such as Qatar. In particular, these small states do not have the elements of physical power through which they can play this role. However, they are based on the internal determinants (such as political leadership and the variable of perception) and non-physical dimensions of power to play an effective and influential external role. Design/methodology/approach This topic sheds light on the hypotheses of theories of main international relations, which explain the behavior of foreign policy of small states. This is due to the increased number of such states after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the practice of some countries an effective foreign role and the transformation of the concept of power from the hard power to soft power, and then to smart power Findings The theories of international relations, especially the realistic theory, face a theoretical debate and a fundamental criticism. The hypotheses of these theories are not able to explain the external behavior of some small states, especially those in the developing world such as Qatar. In particular, these small states do not have the elements of physical power through which they can play this role. However, they are based on the internal determinants (such as political leadership and the variable of perception) and non-physical dimensions of power to play an effective and influential external role. Originality/value The importance of the study comes from its interest in small countries in general and the Qatar situation in particular. The small country emerged as a player independent of the Gulf Cooperation Council, unlike what prevailed before, which led to the discussion of a regional role for Qatar despite its small power compared to the strength and size of other factions in the region such as Turkey, Israel and Iran.

The peculiarities of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East in 2002-2020 are studied. Turkey’s intentions to establish itself as an influential Eurasian state, which claims leadership in the Middle East, as well as in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, were noted. The authors indicate the concept and foreign policy doctrine of “Zero Problems with Neighbors” as the ideological basis for Turkey’s transition from a peripheral to a central role in international politics. It is emphasized that the doctrine of “Zero problems with neighbors” has become a revision of traditional Kemalist values in Turkey’s foreign policy. The authors of the article evaluate the practical implementation of the doctrine as an unsuccessful attempt to become a regional leader in the Middle East. It was emphasized that at the beginning of the implementation of the concept of “Zero problems with neighbors” the only goal of the Turkish government was really to establish good neighborly relations, but after the beginning of the “Arab Spring” foreign policy strategy was revised. It was noted that in the last decade the Turkish government has reoriented to a more pragmatic foreign policy direction; it is determined by the main purpose of protecting its national interests; the result was partial Turkey isolation. The article expresses author’s vision that Turkey in its foreign policy has obviously moved from the concept of “Zero problems with neighbors” to the practice of “zero friends”. It is proved that: 1) Turkey’s relations with the Middle East (except Qatar) are quite tense; 2) although there is a partnership with many countries in the Middle East, it is often based on pragmatic mutual interest of countries, and cooperation often does not go beyond trade and economic relations.

This paper investigates the policies of both Ankara and Riyadh toward the ongoing crisis between Qatar and the Saudi-led quartet since mid-2017. The crisis has shaken the balance in the region and laid the foundation for new understandings regarding Gulf unity and regional order. On these grounds, it is worth examining the stances of regional actors through different approaches of foreign policy. By using the “three-dimensional” methodology of Kenneth Waltz, this paper analyzes the rationale behind Turkish and Saudi policy toward the Gulf crisis on individual-, state-, and international-based levels since these two countries are among the most influential actors in the region. It argues that Turkish and Saudi approaches can confront each other if the regional developments carry an ideological nature, as in the case of the Gulf crisis.

Turkey is an important power of Middle East and has a glorious past. On the basis of its victorious history, Turkey is aspiring to become a regional power of the region. In this regard, the domestic environment of Turkey (such as stable political system, democratic norms, economic development and political leadership) is playing significant role on one hand. On the other hand, the regional and global environment is also providing some opportunities and challenges to pursue its ambitions actively. Turkey's foreign policy in 21st century can be divided in two main phase; first decade of 21st century in which Turkey mostly relies on the use of soft power. However, in second decade, Turkey has used soft and hard power to gain its goals. Turkey's foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria are the key focus of this study. Previously, Turkey avoids supporting Iran and Saudi Arabia against each other. However, now Turkish leadership is actively trying to regain the historical influence of Turkey especially in Muslim world. Turkey's relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia are revolving around cooperation Vs competition paradigm. On one hand, Turkey's support for Qatar (2017) and the killing of Jamal Khashogi (October, 2018) has deteriorated the Saudi-Turkey's relations.

The article is an attempt to analyze foreign policy, security and economic preconditions of creation of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and basic beginnings of its historicaldevelopment. Its appearance became the result of internal, regional and international processes during 70-80 years of the XX century which not only created necessary objective conditions ofappearance of the above-mentioned integration organization in the Arabian peninsula but also defined its main particularities, resistance ability and vulnerable points. The 1979 Iran Islamic revolution,signing of the Camp David Accords, the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the USSR aggression in Afghanistan played a decisive role in the appearance of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The article researched the results and particularities of four periods in the development of the above-mentioned integration organization. The article pays special role to understanding of basic objective and subjective factors of the contemporary Qatar crisis and ways of its solving. The article also found out that the main reason that lead to the Qatar crisis was sharpening of serious acute competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the context of the Middle East region. The conclusion is made that the last 38-th summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council “freezed” for some time contemporary state of relations with Qatar, outlined principle directions of deepening of integration processes inside the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as strengthened the role of its nucleus – union of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

The focus of this paper is to discuss the Gulf Arab region, especially Saudi Arabia. This area is known as a region that has a very rich economic source from an abundance of petroleum. There are several countries in the Arab Gulf region, namely, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Kuwait, Iran and also Saudi Arabia. However, this paper is focused on Saudi Arabia. For the first reason, that Saudi Arabia is the center of the spread of Islam in which there are two holy cities of Mecca and Medina which are the center of the gathering of Muslims worldwide, especially during the Hajj seasons. Second, Saudi Arabia's foreign relations with other countries which are part of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, which is known to be very close to the anti-terrorist country, namely the United States. The fundamental problem in the discussion of Saudi Arabia lies in the monarchical government system which is still surviving and undergoing a transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy and Saudi Arabia's foreign relations with other countries that are experiencing unfavorable situations, especially with the United States. Abstrak Fokus kajian tulisan ini adalah membahas tentang kawasan Arab Teluk khususnya Arab Saudi. Kawasan ini dikenal sebagai wilayah memiliki sumber ekonomi yang sangat kaya dari melimpahnya minyak bumi. Ada beberapa negara yang berada pada kawasan Arab Teluk ini yaitu, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Uni Emirat Arab, Yaman, Kuwait, Iran dan juga Arab Saudi. Namun, tulisan ini di fokuskan pada Arab Saudi. Dengan alasan pertama, bahwa Arab Saudi adalah merupakan sentral penyebaran agama Islam yang di dalamnya terdapat dua kota suci Mekkah dan Madinah yang menjadi pusat pertemuan umat Islam sedunia khususnya pada musim-musim haji. Kedua, hubungan luar negeri Arab Saudi dengan negara lain yang merupakan bagian dari kebijakan politik luar negeri Arab Saudi yang dikenal sangat dekat dengan negara anti teroris yaitu Amerika Serikat. Masalah mendasar dalam pembahasan tentang Arab Saudi terletak pada sistem pemerintahan monarki yang masih bertahan dan mengalami transisi dari monarki absolut menjadi monarki konstitusional dan hubungan luar negeri Arab Saudi dengan negara lain yang mengalami situasi yang kurang baik khususnya dengan Amerika serikat.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify the main determinants of foreign direct real estate investments (foreign direct investment (FDI)) in selected Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. Design/methodology/approach – The empirical work of this study is an econometric analysis of FDI in the commercial real estate sector for eight MENA markets, namely Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Tunisia and the UAE during the period 2003-2009. The econometric analysis is carried out using the pooled Tobit model technique for panel data. Findings – The paper finds that both country-specific factors and real estate sector-specific variables consistently support hypotheses explaining commercial real estate-related FDI, and find evidence that political stability explains why some selected MENA countries attract more real estate investments than other MENA countries. Practical implications – The findings should be seriously considered in any policy making effort on the part of governments in the region. Originality/value – The authors contribute to the existing literature in many ways. First, the study aims to develop econometric models, using both conventional and unique variables, to be generalised and applied to any developed or emerging market. The study applies relevant techniques in estimating the models, including the pooled Tobit model. Second, the research studies eight selected MENA real estate markets from 2003 to 2009, a timeframe and geography not examined in previous published empirical work on commercial real estate investments. Lastly, and for the first time in real estate literature, the study applies the location dimension of Dunning’s OLI paradigm as a theoretical explanation for the behaviour of foreign investors in commercial real estate towards the selected MENA markets.

Abstract Arabian Peninsula politics are in a period of enormous transformation. In the context of a new generation of rulers seeking legitimacy through ambitious foreign policy regimes, shifting relations with Iran, the 2017–2021 Qatar crisis, and ongoing conflict in Yemen, this article introduces the July 2021 special section of International Affairs, which examines how the Arab states of the Gulf are adapting to these new realities. Questions addressed include: how have transnational identities been manipulated by states during regional disputes? How have oil and gas revenues been redirected to build up religious soft power and enhance state branding efforts? In an increasingly authoritarian world, how has transnational repression interacted with politicized diasporas to impact opposition mobilization? And, how do disputes over airspace help us understand the process of sovereignty-building in the modern Middle East? In pursuing these questions, the special section challenges the particularism still apparent in many analyses of the Gulf region, and seeks to bridge International Relations with fieldwork-based Gulf studies. The research presented in the section highlights new findings within contemporary research on the Gulf that will be of interest both to policy-makers and others seeking to understand the long-term sustainability and balance of power in this critical region.

Development of information technology and internet today has given the concept of diplomacy a meaning broader than the past. Modern diplomacy is a mixture which has gained a specific position among academic topics. It is worth noting that the modern diplomacy was resulted from the world's changes after the World War II, where governments could no longer be the only players in the international system. The concept of modern diplomacy makes sense in relatively different ways; general diplomacy, real-time diplomacy,Nich diplomacy, etc. But our main focus in the paper is placed on the Jazeera's role in Middle East's evolutions over the recent decades. As a grand manifestation of modern diplomacy in the Middle East during the past decades, Al Jazeera is sometimes considered to be Qatar's foreign policy benchmarks (index), as it has had an effective role in events related to the country's diplomacy from the time it was established. We assume Qatar's political bargaining power in the international system, especially in the Persian Gulf region, as having enhanced over the recent years. In the present paper, therefore, the authors are about to address questions as to how Qatar's modern diplomacy has made it an active country in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East region as well, and to what extent Al Jazeera's role is deemed to be serious in the recent changes happened in the Middle east. The present research's assumption emphasizes the role of establishment of Al Jazeera Media Channel as a diplomacy-enabling tool after changes were made in Qatar's government structure, a role which obviously affects the Middle East's recent evolutions (Movements and revolutions in Arabian Countries). Analytic-descriptive approach has been used in the present paper.

Purpose This study aims to scrutinize and analyze the regional challenges facing Kuwait and their impact on Kuwait’s national security since the outbreak of Arab Spring revolutions in 2011. These challenges are as follows: the Iranian threat, the Arab Spring revolutions and the recent Gulf crisis with Qatar. Design/methodology/approach The study adopts national interest approach, which focuses on a state’s economic, military and cultural objectives. According to this approach, a state seeks to achieve its own national interests. There are multiple national interests, but the ultimate goal is the survival and security of the state. Findings The study concludes that the Gulf countries, including Kuwait, are facing unprecedented challenges as a result of the dire consequences of the Arab Spring revolutions, the control of Houthi group on Yemen’s institutions and the repercussions of negotiations between 5 + 1 group (Russia, China, France, Britain, the USA + German) and Iran on the Iranian nuclear program. These developments are not in the interest of the Gulf countries in general and Kuwait in particular. The study recommends that Kuwait must adopt an external strategy based on achieving the regional balance with the countries of the region and dealing with different challenges according to its national interest. Originality/value The importance of the study stems from the fact that the Arab region witnessed many developments at the political, economic and social levels since the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. These developments posed many threats to Arab countries such as the spread of terrorism, religious extremism, terrorist organizations and non-state actors. They also became a key determinant of foreign policy. Kuwait was affected by these developments. In addition, it faces threats affecting its national security such as the Iranian threat, the Arab Spring revolutions and the Gulf crisis with Qatar. The study addresses these threats and how Kuwait, as a small state, has dealt with such enormous ones.

With agricultural trade negotiations deadlocked, the Doha round of trade talks may appear dead in the water. But every round of trade talks in recent memory has oscillated between near breakthroughs and near breakdowns. Trade negotiations can be like a ride on a roller coaster but, while the roller coaster returns to where it started, multilateral trade negotiations have generally gone on to close successfully. Will this happen with the Doha round? Surprisingly, the answer is yes. Prospects for concluding the round in Hong Kong next month, at the World Trade Organization Ministerial meeting, are indeed bleak; but not the prospects for finishing later. While the initial attempt to launch the WTO's first round of multilateral trade negotiations in Seattle in November 1999 collapsed, the round was finally launched in Doha, Qatar, two years later, with reaffirmation of the twin virtues of democracy and openness to the world economy. While there was a lot of dissent in September 2003 at the next WTO meeting in Cancun, which also collapsed because of the lack of consensus especially on agricultural liberalization, there were nonetheless some important accomplishments in the tabling of most of the “Singapore issues” and an agreement to relax the TRIPS Agreement to permit developing country access to low-cost pharmaceuticals. Cancun was also a turning point insofar as the major developing countries coalesced in the Group of 20 to provide greater balance in the WTO membership and the design of the negotiating agenda. While it appears that agricultural liberalization is still a significant stumbling block facing the Hong Kong Ministerial, it is likely that the EU can be squeezed if there are reciprocal offers in manufactures and services that are forthcoming especially from some of the major developing countries that can be induced to liberalize in their own interests. It will also be helpful if a program of adjustment assistance can be devised in the form of “aid for trade” especially for low-income countries. The outlines of a deal to close the Doha Round are therefore clear. With forceful leadership on the part of Pascal Lamy to rescue the Doha Round in Hong Kong and to convince the WTO member states to follow with an extraordinary meeting within six months, it should be possible to take the penultimate steps to bring the Doha Round to a final conclusion by the end of 2006 and to obtain its approval by early 2007 before the U.S. fast-track negotiating authority expires. Jagdish Bhagwati is Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and University Professor, Economics and Law at Columbia University. He was Economic Policy Adviser to the Director General of GATT and of the WTO-appointed expert group that recently reported on The Future of the WTO. He is currently a member of the Eminent Persons Panel on Enhancing UNCTAD’s Impact and of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Advisory Group on the NEPAD process in Africa. His latest books are Free Trade Today (Princeton, 2002) and In Defense of Globalization (Oxford, 2004).

The Qatar crisis of June 2017 commenced without a warning and restored overlooked regional security dynamics to the state, the political elite, and the Qatari society at large. Qatar was cautious about the diversions of its foreign policy from regional security perceptions of its neighbors, even before the crisis, despite its failure to predict imminent political consequences, emerging from some states within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In the aftermath of the crisis, critical narratives of the neighboring states on Qatar’s independent policies intimidated at the top leadership level and necessitates an analysis of the crisis, navigating through domestic settings facing systemic and regional pressures. This article aims to analyze the impact of the crisis on the perceptions of Qatari decision-makers, its society, and its tribes using the “perceptual shock” concept of neoclassical realism. It contends that despite the ongoing regional isolation of Qatar by the Saudi-led quartet, comprising Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, Qatar’s state apparatus and its relations with the society continued to strengthen due to the complex relationship between the domestic variables and systemic factors, and their relation to regional dynamics.

Qatar has recently become a regional power and an influential actor in international politics. Qatar has adopted a foreign policy of soft power, which played a prominent role in the rise of the international scene. On 5 June 2017, a diplomatic boycott crisis has erupted against Qatar. The Arab Quartet imposed a complete blockade on Qatar and stated 13 demands. The study explores Qatar’s soft power tools such as lobbying, international mediation, scholarships, foreign aids, Al Jazeera network, which has created a national brand for Qatar. With the non-coercive foreign policy, Qatar’s stance in regional politics has transformed from neutrality to influence. This study will investigate the underlying political, ideological, and strategical factors of the 2017 crisis that has manifested the power struggles in the Gulf, the role of Qatar's foreign policy of soft power in the context of the crisis. Finally, the study will analyze whether the current situation demonstrates transient appeasement or a permanent resolution.

This article aims to explore emerging trends for the Sunni religious elite and the Islamic legal tradition in the new context of the Arab Uprisings by focusing on Yusuf al-Qaradawi, arguably the most prominent of these ʿulamāʾ alive today. The article will follow al-Qaradawi’s articulation, transmission and reconstruction of the Islamic legal tradition in his own discourse as he has attempted to negotiate the politically fraught contexts of the Arab Uprisings while also maintaining his horizontal commitments to a diverse base of supporters be they the wider Arab Muslim public, the Muslim Brotherhood or indeed the Qatari royal family. The article will focus on al-Qaradawi’s highly publicised interventions and fatwas in relation to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria from the perspective of Islamic studies, and also draw on personal interviews with al-Qaradawi, his personal staff, as well as supplementary media. In so doing, the article will elucidate al-Qaradawi and his colleagues’ attempts, ranging from the highly creative to the markedly conservative, to respond to unfolding events through the legal tradition and play an increasingly active role in the public sphere while their own status simultaneously becomes ever more vulnerable and unstable.

The article analyzes the military operation of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan, which lasted for 20 years, and the prospects for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country. The author states that the new US President D. Biden does not abandon the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessors earlier to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the new president reaffirmed his commitment to the peace agreement between the United States and the opposition Taliban, reached in the Qatari capital of Doha in February 2020, which provides for the withdrawal of US troops and their NATO allies from the country. However, the author comes to the conclusion that due to a number of objective and subjective factors, the timing of the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may be postponed indefinitely, and even the deadline recently declared by the White House on September 11, 2021, may be far from final and may be repeatedly subjected to revisions. The main obstacle to the implementation of this important clause of the bilateral agreement is the lack of progress in negotiations between the Taliban representatives and the central government, as well as the lack of security guarantees for the withdrawn contingent of the US Armed Forces, NATO and the remaining staff of Western foreign missions in Afghanistan. Not only the radical Taliban wing, but also a number of current ministers in Kabul are trying to sabotage the conclusion of a second peace agreement and the subsequent integration of the Taliban into power. Without a lasting agreement between the Taliban and the central authorities in Kabul and the formation of a new coalition government, the likelihood of a resumption of civil war in the country will remain. New terrorist attacks and outbursts of violence on the part of the radical wing of the Taliban movement against the central government and foreign troops are not excluded. The penetration of Islamic State gangs into Afghanistan, which can undermine the stability of the military-political situation from within and provoke new armed conflicts, also carries certain risks. Much will also depend on the position of one of the main external players in Afghan affairs — Islamabad. Time will show whether Pakistan will be ready to take on part of the functions of a peaceful settlement within the Afghan conflict. The US administration would like more participation in stabilizing the further situation in Afghanistan from other regional forces (China, Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan).

The Arab world witnessed an influx of satellite channels during the 1990s and in the early years of the first decade of the new century. Many analysts in the Arab world applauded this influx as a potential tool for political change in the Arab countries. Two stations were at the heart of the new optimism: Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya, the two most prominent 24-hour news channels in the region. Al-Jazeera proved to be more controversial because in its early years of broadcasting it managed to break taboos in the Arab media by tackling issues of human rights and hosting Arab dissidents. Also, its coverage of international conflicts (primarily Afghanistan and Iraq) has marked it as a counter-hegemonic news outlet. For the first time, the flow of news went from South to North. Some scholars who study Arab satellite media, and Al-Jazeera specifically, have gone so far as to suggest that it has created a new Arab public sphere (Lynch, Miladi). However, the political developments in the Arab world, mainly the recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and what is now happening in Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen, have raised questions as to how credible these suggestions are. And are we going to claim the same powers for social media in the Arab world? This article takes the form of a personal reflection on how successful (or not) Arab satellite channels are proving to be as a tool for political change and reform in the Arab world. Are these channels editorially free from Arab governments’ political and economic interests? And could new media (notably social networking sites) achieve what satellite channels have been unable to over the last two decades? 1996 saw the launch of Al-Jazeera, the first 24-hour news channel in the Arab world. However, it didn’t have much of an impact on the media scene in the region until 1998 and gained its controversial reputation through its coverage of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (see Zayani; Miles; Allan and Zelizer; El-Nawawy and Iskandar). In the Arab world, it gained popularity with its compelling talk shows and open discussions of human rights and democracy (Alterman). But its dominance didn’t last long. In 2003, Al Walid Al Ibrahim, son-in-law of the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (1921-2005) established Al Arabiya, the second 24-hour news channel in the Arab world, just before the start of the Iraq war. Many scholars and analysts saw in this a direct response to the popularity that Al-Jazeera was achieving with the Arab audiences. Al Arabiya, however, didn’t achieve the level of popularity that Al-Jazeera enjoyed throughout its years of broadcasting (Shapiro). Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera Arabic subsequently became rivals representing political and national interests and not just news competitors. Indeed, one of Wikileaks’ latest revelations states that Al-Jazeera changed its coverage to suit Qatari foreign policy. The US ambassador to Qatar, Joseph LeBaron, was reported as saying: The Qatari prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, had joked in an interview that Al-Jazeera had caused the Gulf State such headaches that it might be better to sell it. But the ambassador remarked: “Such statements must not be taken at face value.” He went on: “Al-Jazeera’s ability to influence public opinion throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it is unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be used as a chip to improve relations. For example, Al-Jazeera’s more favourable coverage of Saudi Arabia's royal family has facilitated Qatari–Saudi reconciliation over the past year.” (Booth). The unspoken political rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar on Lebanese domestic disputes, over Iran, and over the Palestinian internal conflict was played out in the two channels. This brings us to my central question: can Arab satellite channels, and specifically Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya, be regarded as tools for democratic political change? In the recent revolution in Tunisia (spring 2011), satellite channels had to catch up with what social media were reporting: and Al-Jazeera more so than Al Arabiya because of previous encounters between Al-Jazeera and Zein Al Abidine bin Ali’s regime (Greenslade, The Guardian). Bin Ali controlled the country’s media and access to satellite media to suit his interests. Al-Jazeera was banned from Tunisia on several occasions and had their offices closed down. Bin Ali allowed private TV stations to operate but under indirect state control when it came to politics and what Ben Ali’s regime viewed as national and security interests. Should we therefore give social networking credit for facilitating the revolution in Tunisia? Yes, we should. We should give it credit for operating as a mobilising tool. The people were ready, the political moment came, and the people used it. Four out of ten Tunisians are connected to the Internet; almost 20 per cent of the Tunisian population are on Facebook (Mourtada and Salem). We are talking about a newly media-literate population who have access to the new technology and know how to use it. On this point, it is important to note that eight out of ten Facebook users in Tunisia are under the age of 30 (Mourtada and Salem). Public defiance and displays of popular anger were sustained by new media outlets (Miladi). Facebook pages have become sites of networking and spaces for exchanging and disseminating news about the protests (Miladi). Pages such as “The people of Tunisia are burning themselves, Mr President” had around 15,000 members. “Wall-posts” specifying the date and place of upcoming protest became very familiar on social media websites. They even managed to survive government attempts to disable and block these sites. Tunisian and non-Tunisians alike became involved in spreading the message through these sites and Arab transnationalism and support for the revolution came to a head. Many adjacent countries had Facebook pages showing support for the Tunisian revolution. And one of the most prominent of these pages was “Egyptians supporting the Tunisian revolution.” There can be little doubt, therefore, that the success of the Tunisian revolution encouraged the youth of Egypt (estimated at 80 per cent of its Facebook users) to rise up and persist in their call for change and political reform. Little did Wael Ghonim and his friends on the “Kolinah Khaled Said” (“We are all Khaled Said”) Facebook page know where their call for demonstrations on the 25 January 2011 would lead. In the wake of the Tunisian victory, the “We are all Khaled Said” page (Said was a young man who died under torture by Egyptian police) garnered 100,000 hits and most of these virtual supporters then took to the streets on 25 January which was where the Egyptian revolution started. Egyptians were the first Arab youth to have used the Internet as a political platform and tool to mobilise people for change. Egypt has the largest and most active blogosphere in the Arab world. The Egyptian bloggers were the first to reveal corruption and initiated calls for change as early as 2007 (Saleh). A few victories were achieved, such as the firing and sentencing of two police officers condemned for torturing Imad Al Kabeer in 2007 (BBC Arabic). However, these early Egyptian bloggers faced significant jail sentences and prosecution (BBC News). Several movements were orchestrated via Facebook, including the 6 April uprising of 2007, but at this time such resistance invariably ended in persecution and even more oppression. The 25 January revolution therefore took the regime by surprise. In response, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and his entourage (who controlled the state media and privately owned TV stations such as Dream TV) started making declarations that “Egypt is not Tunisia,” but the youth of Egypt were determined to prove them wrong. Significantly, Mubarak’s first reaction was to block Twitter, then Facebook, as well as disrupting mobile phone text-messaging and Blackberry-messaging services. Then, on Thursday 27 January, the regime attempted to shut down the Internet as a whole. Al-Jazeera Arabic quickly picked up on the events in Egypt and began live coverage from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, which resulted in Mubarak’s block of Al-Jazeera’s transmission in Egypt and the withdrawal of its operational licences. One joke exchanged with Tunisian activists on Facebook was that Egyptians, too, had “Ammar 404” (the nickname of the government censor in Tunisia). It was not long, however, before Arab activists from across the regions started exchanging codes and software that allowed Egyptians to access the Internet, despite the government blockades. Egyptian computer science students also worked on ways to access the Worldwide Web and overcome the government’s blockade (Shouier) and Google launched a special service to allow people in Egypt to send Twitter messages by dialling a phone number and leaving a voice message (Oreskovic, Reuters). Facebook group pages like Akher Khabar’s “Latest News” and Rased’s “RNN” were then used by the Egyptian diaspora to share all the information they could get from friends and family back home, bypassing more traditional modes of communication. This transnational support group was crucial in communicating their fellow citizens’ messages to the rest of the world; through them, news made its way onto Facebook and then through to the other Arab nations and beyond. My own personal observation of these pages during the period 25 January to 12 February revealed that the usage of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter changed markedly, shifting from being merely social in nature to becoming rapidly and primarily political, not only among Arab users in the Arab world, as Mourtada and Salem argue, but also throughout the Arabian diaspora. In the case of Libya’s revolution, also, social media may be seen to be a mobilising tool in the hands of both Libyans at home and across the Libyan diaspora. Libya has around 4 per cent of its population on Facebook (Mourtada and Salem), and with Gaddafi’s regime cracking down on the Internet, the Libyan diaspora has often been the source of information for what is happening inside the country. Factual information, images, and videos were circulated via the February 17th website (in Arabic and in English) to appeal to Arab and international audiences for help. Facebook and Twitter were where the hash tag “#Feb17th” was created. Omar Amer, head of the UK’s Libyan youth movement based in Manchester, told Channel 4: “I can call Benghazi or Tripoli and obtain accurate information from the people on the ground, then report it straight onto Twitter” (Channel 4 News). Websites inspired by #Feb17th were spread online and Facebook pages dedicated to news about the Libyan uprisings quickly had thousands of supporters (Channel 4 News). Social media networks have thus created an international show of solidarity for the pro-democracy protestors in Libya, and Amer was able to report that they have received overwhelming support from all around the globe. I think that it must therefore be concluded that the role Arab satellite channels were playing a few years ago has now been transferred to social media websites which, in turn, have changed from being merely social/cultural to political platforms. Moreover, the nature of the medium has meant that the diasporas of the nations concerned have been instrumental to the success of the uprisings back home. However, it would be wrong to suggest that broadcast media have been totally redundant in the revolutionary process. Throughout the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, Al-Jazeera became a disseminating tool for user-generated content. A call for Arab citizens to send their footage of unfolding events to the Al-Jazeera website for it to re-broadcast on its TV screens was a key factor in the dissemination of what was happening. The role Al-Jazeera played in supporting the Egyptian revolution especially (which caused some Arab analysts to give it the name “channel of revolutions”), was quickly followed by criticism for their lack of coverage of the pro-democracy protests in Bahrain. The killing of peaceful protestors in Bahrain did not get airtime the way that the killing of Egyptian pro-democracy protestors had. Tweets, Facebook posts and comments came pouring in, questioning the lack of coverage from Bahrain. Al Arabiya followed Al-Jazeera’s lead. Bahrain was put last on the running order of the coverage of the “Arab revolutions.” Newspaper articles across the Arab world were questioning the absence of “the opinion and other opinion” (Al-Jazeera’s Arabic motto) when it came to Bahrain (see Al Akhbar). Al Jazeera’s editor-in-chief, Hassan El Shoubaki, told Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar that they were not deliberately absent but had logistical problems with the coverage since Al-Jazeera is banned in Bahrain (Hadad). However, it can be argued that Al-Jazeera was also banned in Egypt and Tunisia and that didn’t stop the channel from reporting or remodelling its screen to host and “rebroadcast” an activist-generated content. This brings us back to the Wikileaks’ revelation mentioned earlier. Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Bahraini protests is influenced by Qatari foreign policy and, in the case of Bahrain, is arguably abiding by Qatar’s commitment to Gulf Cooperation Council security treaties. (This is one of the occasions where Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera appear to have shared the same editorial guidelines, influenced by Qatari and Saudi Arabian shared policy.) Nevertheless, the Bahraini protests continue to dominate the social networks sites and information has kept flowing from Bahrain and it will continue to do so because of these platforms. The same scenario is also unfolding in Syria, but this time Al-Jazeera Arabic is taking a cautious stance while Al Arabiya has given the protests full coverage. Once again, the politics are obvious: Qatar is a supporter of the Syrian regime, while Saudi Arabia has long been battling politically with Syria on issues related to Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran (this position might change with Syria seeking support on tackling its own domestic unrest from the Saudi regime). All this confirms that there are limits to what satellite channels in the Arab world can do to be part of a process for democratic political reform. The Arab media world is not free of the political and economic influence of its governments, its owners or the various political parties struggling for control. However, this is clearly not a phenomenon unique to the Arab world. Where, or when, has media reporting ever been totally “free”? So is this, then, the age of new media? Could the Internet be a free space for Arab citizens to express their opinion and fulfil their democratic aspirations in bringing about freedom of speech and political freedom generally? Is it able to form the new Arab public sphere? Recent events show that the potential is there. What happened in Tunisia and Egypt was effectively the seizure of power by the people as part of a collective will to overthrow dictators and autocratic regimes and to effect democratic change from within (i.e. not having it imposed by foreign powers). The political moment in Tunisia was right and the people receptive; the army refused to respond violently to the protests and members of bin Ali’s government rose up against him. The political and social scene in Egypt became receptive after the people felt empowered by events in Tunis. Will this transnational empowerment now spread to other Arab countries open to change notwithstanding the tribal and sectarian alliances that characterise their populations? Further, since new media have proven to be “dangerous tools” in the hands of the citizens of Tunisia and Egypt, will other Arab regimes clamp down on them or hijack them for their own interests as they did the satellite channels previously? Maybe, but new media technology is arguably ahead of the game and I am sure that those regimes stand to be taken by surprise by another wave of revolutions facilitated by a new online tool. So far, Arab leaders have been of one voice in blaming the media for the protests (uprisings) their countries are witnessing—from Tunisia to Syria via Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Libya. As Khatib puts it: “It is as if the social, economic, and political problems the people are protesting against would disappear if only the media would stop talking about them.” Yet what is evident so far is that they won’t. The media, and social networks in particular, do not of themselves generate revolutions but they can facilitate them in ways that we are only just beginning to understand. References Allan, Stuart, and Barbie Zelizer. Reporting War: Journalism in War Time. London: Routledge, 2004. Alterman, John. New Media New Politics? From Satellite Television to the Internet in the Arab World. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998. BBC News. “Egypt Blogger Jailed for ‘Insult,’” 22 Feb. 2007. 1 Mar. 2011 ‹http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/6385849.stm›. BBC Arabic. “Three Years Jail Sentence for Two Police Officers in Egypt in a Torture Case.” 5 Nov. 2007. 26 Mar. 2011 ‹http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/middle_east_news/newsid_7079000/7079123.stm›. Booth, Robert. “WikiLeaks Cables Claim Al-Jazeera Changed Coverage to Suit Qatari Foreign Policy.” The Guardian 6 Dec. 2010. 22 Feb. 2011 ‹http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-al-jazeera-qatari-foreign-policy›. Channel 4 News. “Arab Revolt: Social Media and People’s Revolution.” 25 Feb. 2011. 3 Mar. 2011 ‹http://www.channel4.com/news/arab-revolt-social-media-and-the-peoples-revolution›. El-Nawawy, Mohammed, and Adel Iskandar. Al Jazeera. USA: Westview, 2002. Greenslade, Roy. “Tunisia Breaks Ties with Qatar over Al-Jazeera.” The Guardian 26 Oct. 2006. 23 Mar. 2011 ‹http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2006/oct/26/tunisiabreakstieswithqatar›. Hadad, Layal. “Al thowra al Arabiya tawqafet Eindah masharef al khaleegj” (The Arab Revolution Stopped at the Doorsteps of the Gulf). Al Akhbar 19 Feb. 2011. 20 Feb. 2011 ‹http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/4614›. Khatib, Lina. “How to Lose Friends and Alienate Your People.” Jadaliyya 26 Mar. 2011. 27 Mar. 2011 ‹http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1014/how-to-lose-friends-and-alienate-your-people›. Lynch, Marc. Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. New York: Columbia UP, 2006. Miladi, Noureddine. “Tunisia A Media Led Revolution?” Al Jazeera 17 Jan. 2011. 2 Mar. 2011 ‹http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/2011116142317498666.html#›. Miles, Hugh. Al Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World. London: Abacus, 2005. Mourtada, Rasha, and Fadi Salem. “Arab Social Media Report, Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis.” Dubai School of Government 1.1 (Jan. 2011). Oreskovic, Alexei. “Google Inc Launched a Special Service...” Reuters 1 Feb. 2011. 28 Jan. 2011 ‹http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/us-egypt-protest-google-idUSTRE71005F20110201›. Saleh, Heba. “Egypt Bloggers Fear State Curbs.” BBC News 22 Feb. 2007. 28 Jan. 2011 ‹http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/6386613.stm›. Shapiro, Samantha. “The War inside the Arab Newsroom.” The New York Times 2 Jan. 2005. Shouier, Mohammed. “Al Tahrir Qanat al Naser … Nawara Najemm” (Liberation, Victory Channel… and Nawara Najem). Al Akhbar 17 Feb. 2011. Zayani, Mohammed. The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on Arab Media. London: Pluto, 2005.

"Gulf nations are described as blessed twice, firstly by the discovery of hydrocarbon resources and secondly by convenient access to the expatriate pipeline coming from nearby countries (Arnold & Shah, 1986). Throughout recent history, dependency on temporary foreign workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has steadily increased. In the education sector, Arab expatriate teachers account for a significant percentage of the teacher workforce, therefore playing a critical role in determining the quality of the national education systems. This policy paper presents results from a study exploring the perceptions of Arab expatriate teachers in the UAE and Qatar regarding the push and pull factors drawing them to work in the two countries and the implications of this phenomenon for education systems and these countries overall."

In 2014, telecommunications companies Ooredoo and Telenor introduced a 3G phone network to Myanmar, one of the last, great un-phoned territories of the world (“Mobile Mania”). Formerly accessible only to military and cultural elites, the smartphone was now available to virtually all. In 2020, just six years later, smartphones are commonplace, used by every class and walk of life. The introduction and mainstreaming of the smartphone in Myanmar coincided with the transition from military dictatorship to quasi democracy; from heavy censorship to relative liberalisation of culture and the media. This ongoing transition continues to be a painful one for many in Myanmar. The 3G network and smartphone ownership enable ordinary people to connect with one another and the Internet—or, more specifically, Facebook, which is ‘the Internet in Myanmar’ (Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Facebooking in Myanmar” 1). However, the smartphone and what it enables has also been identified as a new instrument of control, with mass-texting campaigns and a toxic social media culture implicated in recent concerted violence against ethnic and minority religious groups such as the Muslim Rohingya. In this article, I consider the political and cultural conversations enabled by the smartphone in the period following its introduction. The smartphone can be read as an anomalous, hybrid, and foreign object, with connotations of fluidity and connection, all dangerous qualities in Myanmar, a conservative, former pariah state. Drawing from Sarah Ahmed’s article, “The Skin of Community: Affect and Boundary Formation” (2005), as well as recent scholarship on mixed race identification, I examine deeply held fears around ethnic belonging, cultural adeptness, and hybridity, arguing that these anxieties can be traced back to the early days of colonisation. During military rule, Myanmar’s people were underserved by their telecommunications network. Domestic landlines were rare. Phone calls were generally made from market stalls. SIM cards cost up to US$3000, out of reach of most. The lack of robust services was reflected by remarkably low connection rates; 2012 mobile connections numbered at a mere 5.4 million while fixed lines were just 0.6 million for a population of over 50 million people (Kyaw Myint, “Myanmar Country Report” 232). In 2013, the Norwegian telecommunications company Telenor and the Qatari company Ooredoo won licenses to establish network infrastructure for Myanmar. In August 2014, with network construction still underway, the two companies released SIM cards costing a mere 1500 kyats or US$1.50 each. At the time, 1500 kyats bought two plates of fried rice at a Yangon street food stall, making these SIM cards easily affordable. Chinese-manufactured handsets quickly became available (Fink 44). Suddenly, Myanmar was connected. By early 2019, there were 105 smart connections per 100 people in the country (Kyaw Myint, “Facebooking in Myanmar” 1). While this number doesn’t count multiple connections within a single household or the realities of unreliable network coverage in rural areas, the story of the smartphone in Myanmar would seem to be about democratisation and a new form of national unity. But after half a century of military rule, what did national unity mean? Myanmar’s full name is The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Since independence in 1948 the country has been torn by internal civil wars as political factions and ethnic groups fought for sovereignty. What actually bound the Union of Myanmar together? And where might discussions of such painful and politically sensitive questions take place? Advertising as a Space for Crafting Conversations of National Identity In a report on Asian Advertising, Mila Chaplin of Mango Marketing, the agency charged with launching the Telenor brand in Myanmar, observes thatin many markets, brands talk about self-expression and invite consumers to get involved in co-creation … . In Myanmar what the consumers really need is some guidance on how to start crafting [national] …] identities. (4) Advertising has often been used as a means of retelling national stories and myths as well as a site for the collective imaginary to be visualised (Sawchuk 43). However, Myanmar was unlike other territories. Decades of heavy censorship and isolationist diplomatic policies, euphemistically named the “closed” period, left the country without a functional, independent national media. Television programming, including advertising, was regulated and national identity was an edict, not a shared conversation. With the advent of democratic reforms in 2011, ushering in a new “open” period, paid advertising campaigns in 2015 offered an in-between space on nationally broadcast television where it was possible to discuss questions of national identity from a perspective other than that of the government (Chaplin). Such conversations had to be conducted sensitively, given that the military were still the true national power. However, an advertising campaign that launched a new way to physically connect the country almost inevitably had to address questions of shared identity as well as clearly set out how the alien technology might shape the nation. To do so required addressing the country’s painful colonial past. The Hybrid in National Narratives of Myanmar In contemporary Myanmar, the smartphone is synonymous with military and government power (mobile Internet traffic in northern Rakhine state, for example, has been shut down since February 2020, ostensibly for security). Yet, when the phone was first introduced in 2014, it too was seen as a “foreign” object, one that had the potential to connect but also “instantiated ... a worldly sensibility that national borders and boundaries are potentially breached, and thus in need of protection from ‘others’” (Sawchuk 45). This fear of foreign influence coupled with the yearning for connection with the outside world is summed up by Ei Phyu Aung, editor of Myanmar’s weekly entertainment journal Sunday:it’s like dust coming in when you open the window. We can’t keep the window closed forever so we have to find a way to minimize the dust and maximize the sunlight. (Thin)Ei Phyu Aung wishes to enjoy the benefits of connecting with the world outside (sunlight) yet also fears cultural pollution (dust) linked with exploitation, an anxiety that reflects Myanmar’s approach to belonging and citizenship, shaped by its colonial history. Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, was colonised in stages. Upper Burma was annexed by British forces in 1886, completing a process of colonisation begun with the first Anglo-Burmese wars of 1823. The royal family was exiled from the pre-colonial capital at Mandalay and the new colony ruled as a province of India. Indian migration, particularly to Rangoon, was encouraged and these highly visible, economic migrants became the symbol of colonialism, of foreign exploitation. A deep mistrust of foreign influence, based on the experiences of colonialism, continued to shape the nation decades after independence. The 1962 military coup was followed by the expulsion of “foreigners” in 1964 as the country pursued a policy of isolation. In 1982, the government introduced a new citizenship law “driven as much by a political campaign to exclude the ‘alien’ from the country as to define the ‘citizen’” (Transnational Institute 10). This law only recognises ethnicities who can prove their presence prior to 1824, the year British forces first annexed lower Burma. As a consequence of the 1982 laws, groups such as the Rohingya are considered “Bengali migrants” and those descended from Chinese and Indian diasporas are excluded from full citizenship. In 1989, the ruling State Law and Order Council (SLORC) changed the country’s name to Myanmar and the anglicised Rangoon to Yangon. Thus the story of Burma/Myanmar since independence is of a nation that continues to be traumatised by colonisation. Given the mistrust of the foreign, how then might an anomalous hybrid object like the smartphone be received? Smartphone Advertising and National Narratives Television advertising is well suited to creating a sense of national identity; commercials are usually broadcast repeatedly. As Sarah Ahmed argues, it is through “the repetition of norms” that “boundary, fixity and surface of ‘social forms’ such as the ‘nation’ are produced” (Cultural Politics of Emotion 12). In her article, “The Skin of Community”, Ahmed describes these boundaries as a kind of “skin”, where difference is recognised through affective responses, such as disgust or delight. These responses and their associated meanings delineate a kind of belonging through shared experience, akin to shared identity—a shared skin. Telenor’s first advertisement in this space, Breakfast, draws from the metaphor of skin as boundary, connecting a family meal with cultural myths and social history. Breakfast was developed by Mango Marketing Services in 2014 and Telenor launched its initial television campaign in 2015, consisting of several advertisements brought to market in the period between 2014 and 2016 (Hicks, Mumbrella). The commercial runs for 60 seconds, a relatively expensive long format typical of a broadly-disseminated launch where the advertiser aims to introduce something new to the public and subsequently, build market share. Opening with images of Yangon, the country’s commercial centre, Breakfast tells the story of May, a newlywed, and the first time she cooks for her in-laws. May’s mother-in-law requests a famous breakfast dish, nanjithoke, typical of Mandalay, where May is from. But May does not know how to cook the dish and blunders around the kitchen as her in-laws wait. Sensing her distress, her husband suggests that she use his smartphone to call her mother in Mandalay and get the recipe. May’s dish is approved by her in-laws as tasty and authentic. In Breakfast, the phone is used as if it were a landline, its mobility not wholly relevant. The locations of both parties, May and her mother, are fixed and predictable and the phone in both instances is closely associated with connecting homes and more significantly, two important cities, Yangon and Mandalay. The advertisement presents the smartphone as solving the systemic problem of unreliable telecommunication in Myanmar as well as its lack of access; there is a final message reassuring the user that calls are affordable. That the smartphone is shown as part of everyday life presents it as a force for stability, a service that locates and connects fixed places. This in itself represented a profound shift for most people, in light of the fact that such communication was not possible during the “closed” period. Thus, this foreign, hybrid object enables what was not previously possible.While the benefits of the smartphone and network may be clear, the subtext of the advertisement nonetheless points to fears of foreign influence and the dangers of introducing an alien object into everyday life. To mitigate these concerns, May is presented in the traditional htamein or longyi and aingi, a long wrap skirt and fitted blouse with sleeves that end on the forearm, rather than western jeans and a t-shirt—both types of clothing are commonly worn in Yangon. Her hair is pulled back and pinned up, her makeup is subtle. She inhabits domestic space and does not have her own smartphone. In fact, it does not even occur to her to call her mother for the nanjithoke recipe, which is slightly surprising given her mother has a smartphone and knows how to use it, indicating that she has probably had it for some time. This subtext reflects conservative power structures in which elder generations pass knowledge down to new generations. The choice to connect Yangon and Mandalay through the local noodle dish is also significant. Breakfast makes manifest historic meanings associated with “place” a mapping of the “hidden” and “already given cultural order” (Mazzarella 24-25). As discussed earlier, Yangon was the colonial capital, known as an Indian city, but Mandalay as the pre-colonial capital remains a seat of cultural sophistication, where the highest form of the Myanmar language is spoken. The choice to connect Myanmar with the phone, as foreign object and bearer of anomaly, should be read as a repudiation of its bordered past, when foreigners (or kalaa, a derogatory term), including European ambassadors, were kept separate from the royal family by walls and a moat. The commercial, too, strongly evokes a shared skin of community through the evocation of the senses, from Yangon’s heat to the anticipation of a tasty and authentic meal, as well as through the visualisation of kinship and inheritance. In one extremely slow dissolve, May and her mother share the screen simultaneously, compressed in space as well as time. It is as if their skin of kinship is stretched before us. As the viewer’s eye passes from left to right across the screen, May’s present, past, and future is visible. She too will become the mother, at the other end the phone, offering advice to her daughter. There is suggestion of a continuum, of an “immemorial past” (Anderson 12), part of a national narrative that connects to pre-colonial Mandalay and the cultural systems that precede it, to the modern city of Yangon, still the commercial of contemporary Myanmar.At first glance, Breakfast seems to position the phone as an object that will enable Myanmar to stay Myanmarese through the strengthening of family connections. The commercial also strives to allay fears of the phone as a source of cultural pollution or exploitation by demonstrating its adoption among the older generation and inserting it into a fantasy of an uninterrupted culture, harking back to pre-colonial Burma. Yet, while the phone is represented in anodyne terms, it is only because it is an anomalous and hybrid object that such connections are possible. Furthermore, the smartphone in this representation also enables a connection between pre-colonial Mandalay to contemporary Yangon, breaching painful associations with both annexation and colonisation. In contrast to the advertisement Breakfast, Telenor’s information video, Why we should use SIM slot 1, does not attempt to disassociate the smartphone with foreignness. Instead, it capitalises on the smartphone as a hybrid object whose benefit is that it can be adapted to specific needs, including faster Internet speeds to enable connection to external video channel, such as YouTube.The video features young women dressed in foreign jeans and short-sleeved tops, wearing Western-style make-up, including sparkly nail polish. Both women appear to own their smartphones, and one is technically adept, delivering the complex information about which slot to use to facilitate the fastest Internet connection. Neither has difficulty with negotiating the complicated ports beneath the back cover of their smartphone to make the necessary change. They are happy to alter their phones to suit their own needs. These women are perhaps more closely in line with other markets, where the younger generation “do not expect to follow their parents’ practice” (Horst and Miller 9). This is in direct contrast to Breakfast, where May’s middle-aged mother has adopted the phone and, in keeping with conservative power structures, is already well-versed in its uses and capabilities. While this video was never intended to be seen by the audience for Breakfast, there remain parallels in the way the smartphone enables a connection within the control of its user: like May’s mother, both women in Breakfast are able to control or mitigate the foreign material through the manipulation of their device, moving from 2G to H+. They can opt in or out of the H+ network.This article has explored discussions of national identity prompted by the introduction of the smartphone to Myanmar during a moment of unprecedented political change. Breakfast, the advertisement that launched the smartphone into the country, offered a space in which the people of Myanmar were able to address questions of national identity and gently probe the discomfort of the colonial past. The communication video Why we should use SIM slot 1 reflects Myanmar’s burgeoning sense of connection with the region and presents the smartphone as customisable. The smartphone in advertising is thus positioned as a means for connecting the generations and continuing the immemorial past of the Burmese nation into the future, as well as a hybrid object capable of linking the country to the outside world. Further directions for this enquiry might consider how the discussion of Myanmar’s national identity continues to be addressed and exploited through advertising in Myanmar, and how the smartphone’s hybridity is used to counteract established national narratives in other spaces.References Adas, Michael. The Burma Delta 1852-1941. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 2011.Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Ahmed, Sara. Cultural Politics of Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2014.———. “The Skin of Community: Affect and Boundary Formation.” Revolt, Affect, Collectivity: The Unstable Boundaries of Kristeva’s Polis. Eds. Tina Chanter and Ewa Płonowska Ziarek. Albany: State U of New York, 2005. 95-111. Chaplin, Milla. “Advertising in Myanmar: Digging Deep to Even Scratch the Surface.” WARC, Mar. 2016. <https://origin.warc.com/content/paywall/article/warc-exclusive/advertising-in-myanmar-digging-deep-to-even-scratch-the-surface/106815>.Charney, Michael W. A History of Modern Burma. Cambridge, Cambridge UP: 2009.Cheesman, Nick. “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 47.3 (2017): 461‑483.Fink, Christine. “Dangerous Speech, Anti-Muslim Violence, and Facebook in Myanmar.” Journal of International Affairs 71.1 (2018): 43‑52.Hicks, Robin. “Telenor Launches First TV Ad in Myanmar.” Mumbrella, 2 Feb. 2015. <http://www.mumbrella.asia/2015/02/telenor-launches-first-tv-ad-myanmar>.Horst, Heather A., and Daniel Miller. The Cell Phone. An Anthropology of Communication. New York: Berg, 2006.Kyaw Myint. “Myanmar Country Report.” Financing ASEAN Connectivity: ERIA Research Project Report. Eds. F. Zen and M. Regan. Jakarta: ERIA, 2014. 221-267. Breakfast. Mango Creative, Mango Media Marketing, Telenor Myanmar. 26 Jan. 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2G2xjK8QFSo>.Mazzarella, William. Shovelling Smoke. Advertising and Globalization in Contemporary India. Durham and London: Duke UP, 2003.“Mobile Mania.” The Economist. 24 Jan. 2015. <https://www.economist.com/business/2015/01/22/mobile-mania>.Nyi Nyi Kyaw. “Adulteration of Pure Native Blood by Aliens? Mixed Race Kapya in Colonial and Post-Colonial Myanmar.” Social Identities 25.3 (2018): 345-359. ———. “Facebooking in Myanmar: From Hate Speech to Fake News to Partisan Political Communication.” Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective 36 (2019): 1-10. Sawchuk, Kim. “Radio Hats, Wireless Rats and Flying Families.” The Wireless Spectrum: The Politics, Practices and Poetics of Mobile Media. Eds. Barbara Crow, Michael Longford, and Kim Sawchuk. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2010.Thin Lei Win. “Beauty Pageants Expose Dreams and Dangers in Modern Myanmar.” Reuters, 26 Sep. 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-foundation-myanmar-beautycontests/beauty-pageants-expose-dreams-and-dangers-in-modern-myanmar-idUSKCN0HL0Y520140926>.Transnational Institute. “Ethnicity without Meaning, Data without Context: The 2014 Census, Identity and Citizenship in Burma/Myanmar.” Amsterdam: TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing, 2014.

Purpose The escalation of Turkish intervention in Arab internal affairs before and after the revolutions of the Arab Spring, particularly the military intervention. Sometimes Ankara threatens with military intervention and sometimes establishes large military bases in Arab countries: Qatar, Somalia and Iraq. Moreover, it carries out extensive military operations within the borders of some Arab countries such as Iraq and Syria. This type of behavior requires a study that takes into consideration the reasons of such behavior and future implications on the relations between the Arab and Turkish parties. Design/methodology/approach The theoretical framework of the study will follow neorealism, as the basis for understanding Turkish pragmatic foreign policy adopted in managing its international relations and interests with various countries. Findings The situation in Afrin after a year of Turkish occupation confirms this. Erdogan may not go ahead with a new military operation in east Euphrates and northern Syria. He may prefer instead he may deem it better to control the safe area in the north through the revival of the agreement of Adana of 1998. However, Turkey's desire to control northern Syria, which represents a quarter of the country, faces tough resistance of Turkish groups, Russian-Syrian rejection and European-American resentment. Control of the Syrian north may be subject to concessions and consensus among these powers without excluding any of them. Research limitations/implications States in the international system, such as companies in the local economy, have the same main interest: that’s survival. It is worth noting that Waltz’s neorealistic theory cannot be applied to domestic national politics. It cannot contribute to the development of state policies relating to its international and internal affairs. His theory only helps to explain the reason behind the similar behavior of countries despite having different forms of governments and diversity of political ideologies. It also explains why the comprehensive international relations have not changed despite the growing decentralization of these countries. Originality/value How does neorealism explain Turkish military intervention in Syria since 2016?

The socio-economic reasons of conflicts are numerous. Their premises are very different factors of the economic history of the arabic states. Among most important is the unevenness of their economic development both in the colonial and in the postcolonial periods. Until gaining independence the arabic states were on the different levels of the socio-economic development. One may explain this by many reasons of the political, geographic and socio-economic character. The most important among them are the level of development of the capitalism, the geographic proximity of the arabic states to Europe and generally to their metropolises, the military-strategic situation, the presence of the colonies of migrants from metropolises and of the national communities from other European states, the discovery of rich resources of raw materials, the influence of of the neighbouring countries’s cultures on the process of their historic and socio-economic development. As a result of long historical influence of these and many others factors different arabic countries achieved independence, but all of them were backward agrarian countries. Therefore the main differences among them manifested themselves in the degree of the backwardness Not a single arabic country had the developed manufacturing industry, which production would go to export. Some mining and oil enterprises, which were present in some of them belonged mainly to the foreign capital and practically were the heterogeneous formation in the extremely backward agrarian economy with undeveloped production forces. Only in some of these countries the light and food industry was functioning. In other branches of economy small and smallest enterprises predominated, based on personal labour of their owners and their families, who used primitive means of production. The poor possibilities of competition, the low efficiency of production mechanisms, the extreme unevenness of available natural potentials, financial and human resources, in particular skilled labour, as well as the impact of the interstate and military conflicts, the processes of globalization and growth rates of the economic development led the arabic countries to in the beginning of the new century to very different and even polar results, the main indicator of which is the gross domestic product per capita. The historic experience demonstrates, that the more is the gross domestic product of any country, the bigger state apparatus, including military forces, it may afford and use it actively for its internal as well as foreign policy. For example, arabic state Qatar in 2011 used its military forces for the overthrow of the Kaddafi regime, what led Libya to the state of collapse, and turned it to a conglomerate of several quasi-states, which are connected together by the necessity to produce and to sell oil. If to take the whole period, more than half of the century, of the existence of the arabic countries as independent states , one would hardly find any years during which the peace persisted in their territories. There have been constant military-political conflicts in different parts of the arabic world, as well as between the arabic countries and their afro-asiatic neighbours.

Michael Watts of Purdue University reviews “Better Living through Economics” edited by John J. Siegfried. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Twelve papers and fourteen comments explore the fundamental contributions of economic research to important public policy decisions over the past half century. Papers discuss the evolution of emissions trading; better living through improved price indexes; economics and the Earned Income Tax Credit;….” Arthur J. Robson of Simon Fraser University reviews “The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences” by Herbert Gintis. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Explores how key concepts from the behavioral sciences can complement game theory in providing insights into human behavior. Discusses decision theory and human behavior; game theory--basic concepts; game theory and human behavior; rationalizability and common knowledge of rationality; extensive for….” Robert A. Margo of Boston University and NBER reviews “Top Incomes: A Global Perspective” edited by A. B. Atkinson and T. Piketty. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Thirteen papers examine top incomes in ten OECD countries and focus on the contrast between continental Europe and English-speaking countries. Papers discuss top Indian incomes, 1922-2000; income inequality and progressive income taxation in China and India, 1986-2015; the evolution of income concentration….” Charles Wyplosz of The Graduate Institute, Geneva reviews “Europe and the Euro” edited by Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Eleven papers with comments, drawn from an NBER conference on “Europe and the Euro” held in October 2008, examine a number of issues related to the euro, including the effects of the euro on reform of goods and labor markets; its influence on business cycles and trade among members; and whether the ….” Anne Krueger of Johns Hopkins University reviews “Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations: Clashing Egos, Inflated Ambitions, and the Great Shambles of the World Trade System” by Paul Blustein. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Explores whether the global trading system, specifically the World Trade Organization (WTO), is at risk of joining the financial system in crisis, and chronicles the major events in the system over the last decade. Discusses the 2001 WTO meeting in Doha, Qatar; the story of the global trading system….” Chong Xiang of Purdue University and NBER reviews “International Trade with Equilibrium Unemployment” by Carl Davidson and Steven J. Matusz. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Considers how to create economic models that accurately reflect the real-world connections between international trade and labor markets using equilibrium unemployment modeling. Discusses the structure of simple general equilibrium models with frictional unemployment; trade and search-generated unemployment….” Raymond Robertson of Macalester College reviews “Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico” by Sidney Weintraub. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Examines the repercussions of the dependent-dominant relationship between Mexico and the United States. Discusses Mexico's political economy; trade--from closure to opening; foreign direct investment and finance--from resistance to welcome; narcotics--effects of profits from U.S. consumption; energy….” Jules H. van Binsbergen of Northwestern University, Stanford University, and NBER reviews “Anticipating Correlations: A New Paradigm for Risk Management” by Robert Engle. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Presents a collection of new methods for estimating and forecasting correlations for large systems of assets. Discusses correlation economics; correlations in theory; models for correlation; dynamic conditional correlation; dynamic conditional correlation performance; the MacGyver method; generalize….” Andreas Bergh of Lund University and Research Institute for Industrial Economics reviews “Nordics in Global Crisis: Vulnerability and Resilience” by Thorvaldur Gylfason, Bengt Holmström, Sixten Korkman, Hans Tson Söderström, and Vesa Vihriälä. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Presents a report on the global financial and economic crisis from the point of view of small open economies, focusing on the Nordic countries. Discusses putting the crisis into perspective; the crisis and the global policy response; the panic of 2007-08--a modern bank run; looking back at volatility….” Teresa A. Sullivan of University of Virginia reviews “Saving Alma Mater: A Rescue Plan for America's Public Universities” by James C. Garland. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Examines how to reform the economic model of public higher education, drawing upon the example of Miami University of Ohio. Discusses where the money comes from; market forces in higher education; why public universities cannot restrain costs; the university prime directive; whether the faculty are ….” Martin Hall of University of Salford reviews “Financing Higher Education Worldwide: Who Pays? Who Should Pay?” by D. Bruce Johnstone and Pamela N. Marcucci.. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Explores the financing of higher education from an international comparative perspective, focusing on the strategy of cost-sharing. Discusses diverging trajectories of higher education's costs and public revenues worldwide; financial austerity and solutions on the cost side; the perspective and policy….” Lee Branstetter of Carnegie Mellon University reviews “Offshoring in the Global Economy: Microeconomic Structure and Macroeconomic Implications” by Robert C. Feenstra. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Presents lectures given by Robert C. Feenstra at the Stockholm School of Economics in September 2008, focusing on the role of trade versus technological change in explaining wage movements and their effect on workers. Lectures discuss microeconomic structure in the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin structure….” James E. Rauch of University of California, San Diego reviews “Emergent Economies, Divergent Paths: Economic Organization and International Trade in South Korea and Taiwan” by Robert C. Feenstra and Gary G. Hamilton. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Studies the business groups in South Korea and Taiwan and what their different paths of development say about economic organization. Discusses the problem of economic organization; interpreting business groups in South Korea and Taiwan; a model of business groups--the interaction of authority and market….” Michael Bikard of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER reviews “The Invention of Enterprise: Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times” edited by David S. Landes, Joel Mokyr, and William J. Baumol. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Eighteen papers examine the history of entrepreneurship throughout the world since antiquity. 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Introduction Since December 2010 the dramatic spectacle of the spread of mass uprisings, civil unrest, and protest across North Africa and the Middle East have been chronicled daily on mainstream media and new media. Broadly speaking, the Arab Spring—as it came to be known—is challenging repressive, corrupt governments and calling for democracy and human rights. The convulsive events linked with these debates have been striking not only because of the rapid spread of historically momentous mass protests but also because of the ways in which the media “have become inextricably infused inside them” enabling the global media ecology to perform “an integral part in building and mobilizing support, co-ordinating and defining the protests within different Arab societies as well as trans-nationalizing them” (Cottle 295). Images of mass protests have been juxtaposed against those of individuals prepared to self-destruct for political ends. Video clips and photographs of the individual suffering of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the Bahraini Abdulhad al-Khawaja’s emaciated body foreground, in very graphic ways, political struggles that larger events would mask or render invisible. Highlighting broad commonalties does not assume uniformity in patterns of protest and media coverage across the region. There has been considerable variation in the global media coverage and nature of the protests in North Africa and the Middle East (Cottle). In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen uprisings overthrew regimes and leaders. In Syria it has led the country to the brink of civil war. In Bahrain, the regime and its militia violently suppressed peaceful protests. As a wave of protests spread across the Middle East and one government after another toppled in front of 24/7 global media coverage, Bahrain became the “Arab revolution that was abandoned by the Arabs, forsaken by the West … forgotten by the world,” and largely ignored by the global media (Al-Jazeera English). Per capita the protests have been among the largest of the Arab Spring (Human Rights First) and the crackdown as brutal as elsewhere. International organizations have condemned the use of military courts to trial protestors, the detaining of medical staff who had treated the injured, and the use of torture, including the torture of children (Fisher). Bahraini and international human rights organizations have been systematically chronicling these violations of human rights, and posting on Websites distressing images of tortured bodies often with warnings about the graphic depictions viewers are about to see. It was in this context of brutal suppression, global media silence, and the reluctance of the international community to intervene, that the Bahraini-Danish human rights activist Abdulhad al-Khawaja launched his “death or freedom” hunger strike. Even this radical action initially failed to interest international editors who were more focused on Egypt, Libya, and Syria, but media attention rose in response to the Bahrain Formula 1 race in April 2012. Pro-democracy activists pledged “days of rage” to coincide with the race in order to highlight continuing human rights abuses in the kingdom (Turner). As Al Khawaja’s health deteriorated the Bahraini government resisted calls for his release (Article 19) from the Danish government who requested that Al Khawaja be extradited there on “humanitarian grounds” for hospital treatment (Fisk). This article does not explore the geo-politics of the Bahraini struggle or the possible reasons why the international community—in contrast to Syria and Egypt—has been largely silent and reluctant to debate the issues. Important as they are, those remain questions for Middle Eastern specialists to address. In this article I am concerned with the overlapping and interpenetration of two ecologies. The first ecology is the ethical framing of a prison hunger strike as a corporeal-environmental act of (self) destruction intended to achieve political ends. The second ecology is the operation of global media where international inaction inadvertently foregrounds the political struggles that larger events and discourses surrounding Egypt, Libya, and Syria overshadow. What connects these two ecologies is the body of the hunger striker, turned into a spectacle and mediated via a politics of affect that invites a global public to empathise and so enter into his suffering. The connection between the two lies in the emaciated body of the hunger striker. An Ecological Humanities Approach This exploration of two ecologies draws on the ecological humanities and its central premise of connectivity. The ecological humanities critique the traditional binaries in Western thinking between nature and culture; the political and social; them and us; the collective and the individual; mind, body and emotion (Rose & Robin, Rieber). Such binaries create artificial hierarchies, divisions, and conflicts that ultimately impede the ability to respond to crises. Crises are major changes that are “out of control” driven—primarily but not exclusively—by social, political, and cultural forces that unleash “runaway systems with their own dynamics” (Rose & Robin 1). The ecological humanities response to crises is premised on the recognition of the all-inclusive connectivity of organisms, systems, and environments and an ethical commitment to action from within this entanglement. A founding premise of connectivity, first articulated by anthropologist and philosopher Gregory Bateson, is that the “unit of survival is not the individual or the species, but the organism-and-its-environment” (Rose & Robin 2). This highlights a dialectic in which an organism is shaped by and shapes the context in which it finds itself. Or, as Harries-Jones puts it, relations are recursive as “events continually enter into, become entangled with, and then re-enter the universe they describe” (3). This ensures constantly evolving ecosystems but it also means any organism that “deteriorates its environment commits suicide” (Rose & Robin 2) with implications for the others in the eco-system. Bateson’s central premise is that organisms are simultaneously independent, as separate beings, but also interdependent. Interactions are not seen purely as exchanges but as dynamic, dialectical, dialogical, and mutually constitutive. Thus, it is presumed that the destruction or protection of others has consequences for oneself. Another dimension of interactions is multi-modality, which implies that human communication cannot be reduced to a single mode such as words, actions, or images but needs to be understood in the complexity of inter-relations between these (see Rieber 16). Nor can dissemination be reduced to a single technological platform whether this is print, television, Internet, or other media (see Cottle). The final point is that interactions are “biologically grounded but not determined” in that the “cognitive, emotional and volitional processes” underpinning face-to-face or mediated communication are “essentially indivisible” and any attempt to separate them by privileging emotion at the expense of thought, or vice versa, is likely to be unhealthy (Rieber 17). This is most graphically demonstrated in a politically-motivated hunger strike where emotion and volition over-rides the survivalist instinct. The Ecology of a Prison Hunger Strike The radical nature of a hunger strike inevitably gives rise to medico-ethical debates. Hunger strikes entail the voluntary refusal of sustenance by an individual and, when prolonged, such deprivation sets off a chain reaction as the less important components in the internal body systems shut down to protect the brain until even that can no longer be protected (see Basoglu et al). This extreme form of protest—essentially an act of self-destruction—raises ethical issues over whether or not doctors or the state should intervene to save a life for humanitarian or political reasons. In 1975 and 1991, the World Medical Association (WMA) sought to negotiate this by distinguishing between, on the one hand, the mentally/psychological impaired individual who chooses a “voluntary fast” and, on the other hand, the hunger striker who chooses a form of protest action to secure an explicit political goal fully aware of fatal consequences of prolonged action (see Annas, Reyes). This binary enables the WMA to label the action of the mentally impaired suicide while claiming that to do so for political protesters would be a “misconception” because the “striker … does not want to die” but to “live better” by obtaining certain political goals for himself, his group or his country. “If necessary he is willing to sacrifice his life for his case, but the aim is certainly not suicide” (Reyes 11). In practice, the boundaries between suicide and political protest are likely to be much more blurred than this but the medico-ethical binary is important because it informs discourses about what form of intervention is ethically appropriate. In the case of the “suicidal” the WMA legitimises force-feeding by a doctor as a life-saving act. In the case of the political protestor, it is de-legitimised in discourses of an infringement of freedom of expression and an act of torture because of the pain involved (see Annas, Reyes). Philosopher Michel Foucault argued that prison is a key site where the embodied subject is explicitly governed and where the exercising of state power in the act of incarceration means the body of the imprisoned no longer solely belongs to the individual. It is also where the “body’s range of significations” is curtailed, “shaped and invested by the very forces that detain and imprison it” (Pugliese 2). Thus, prison creates the circumstances in which the incarcerated is denied the “usual forms of protest and judicial safeguards” available outside its confines. The consequence is that when presented with conditions that violate core beliefs he/she may view acts of self-destruction—such as hunger strikes or lip sewing—as one of the few “means of protesting against, or demanding attention” or achieving political ends still available to them (Reyes 11; Pugliese). The hunger strike implicates the state, which, in the act of imprisoning, has assumed a measure of power and responsibility for the body of the individual. If a protest action is labelled suicidal by medical professionals—for instance at Guantanamo—then the force-feeding of prisoners can be legitimised within the WMA guidelines (Annas). There is considerable political temptation to do so particularly when the hunger striker has become an icon of resistance to the state, the knowledge of his/her action has transcended prison confines, and the alienating conditions that prompted the action are being widely debated in the media. This poses a two-fold danger for the state. On the one hand, there is the possibility that the slow emaciation and death while imprisoned, if covered by the media, may become a spectacle able to mobilise further resistance that can destabilise the polity. On the other hand, there is the fear that in the act of dying, and the spectacle surrounding death, the hunger striker would have secured the public attention to the very cause they are championing. Central to this is whether or not the act of self-destruction is mediated. It is far from inevitable that the media will cover a hunger strike or do so in ways that enable the hunger striker’s appeal to the emotions of others. However, when it does, the international scrutiny and condemnation that follows may undermine the credibility of the state—as happened with the death of the IRA member Bobby Sands in Northern Ireland (Russell). The Media Ecology and the Bahrain Arab Spring The IRA’s use of an “ancient tactic ... to make a blunt appeal to sympathy and emotion” in the form of the Sands hunger strike was seen as “spectacularly successful in gaining worldwide publicity” (Willis 1). Media ecology has evolved dramatically since then. Over the past 20 years communication flows between the local and the global, traditional media formations (broadcast and print), and new communication media (Internet and mobile phones) have escalated. The interactions of the traditional media have historically shaped and been shaped by more “top-down” “politics of representation” in which the primary relationship is between journalists and competing public relations professionals servicing rival politicians, business or NGOs desire for media attention and framing issues in a way that is favourable or sympathetic to their cause. However, rapidly evolving new media platforms offer bottom up, user-generated content, a politics of connectivity, and mobilization of ordinary people (Cottle 31). However, this distinction has increasingly been seen as offering too rigid a binary to capture the complexity of the interactions between traditional and new media as well as the events they capture. The evolution of both meant their content increasingly overlaps and interpenetrates (see Bennett). New media technologies “add new communicative ingredients into the media ecology mix” (Cottle 31) as well as new forms of political protests and new ways of mobilizing dispersed networks of activists (Juris). Despite their pervasiveness, new media technologies are “unlikely to displace the necessity for coverage in mainstream media”; a feature noted by activist groups who have evolved their own “carnivalesque” tactics (Cottle 32) capable of creating the spectacle that meets television demands for action-driven visuals (Juris). New media provide these groups with the tools to publicise their actions pre- and post-event thereby increasing the possibility that mainstream media might cover their protests. However there is no guarantee that traditional and new media content will overlap and interpenetrate as initial coverage of the Bahrain Arab Spring highlights. Peaceful protests began in February 2011 but were violently quelled often by Saudi, Qatari and UAE militia on behalf of the Bahraini government. Mass arrests were made including that of children and medical personnel who had treated those wounded during the suppression of the protests. What followed were a long series of detentions without trial, military court rulings on civilians, and frequent use of torture in prisons (Human Rights Watch 2012). By the end of 2011, the country had the highest number of political prisoners per capita of any country in the world (Amiri) but received little coverage in the US. The Libyan uprising was afforded the most broadcast time (700 minutes) followed by Egypt (500 minutes), Syria (143), and Bahrain (34) (Lobe). Year-end round-ups of the Arab Spring on the American Broadcasting Corporation ignored Bahrain altogether or mentioned it once in a 21-page feature (Cavell). This was not due to a lack of information because a steady stream has flowed from mobile phones, Internet sites and Twitter as NGOs—Bahraini and international—chronicled in images and first-hand accounts the abuses. However, little of this coverage was picked up by the US-dominated global media. It was in this context that the Bahraini-Danish human rights activist Abdulhad Al Khawaja launched his “freedom or death” hunger strike in protest against the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations, the treatment of prisoners, and the conduct of the trials. Even this radical action failed to persuade international editors to cover the Bahrain Arab Spring or Al Khawaja’s deteriorating health despite being “one of the most important stories to emerge over the Arab Spring” (Nallu). This began to change in April 2012 as a number of things converged. Formula 1 pressed ahead with the Bahrain Grand Prix, and pro-democracy activists pledged “days of rage” over human rights abuses. As these were violently suppressed, editors on global news desks increasingly questioned the government and Formula 1 “spin” that all was well in the kingdom (see BBC; Turner). Claims by the drivers—many of who were sponsored by the Bahraini government—that this was a sports event, not a political one, were met with derision and journalists more familiar with interviewing superstars were diverted into covering protests because their political counterparts had been denied entry to the country (Fisk). This combination of media events and responses created the attention, interest, and space in which Al Khawaja’s deteriorating condition could become a media spectacle. The Mediated Spectacle of Al Khawaja’s Hunger Strike Journalists who had previously struggled to interest editors in Bahrain and Al Khawaja’s plight found that in the weeks leading up to the Grand Prix and since “his condition rapidly deteriorated”’ and there were “daily updates with stories from CNN to the Hindustan Times” (Nulla). Much of this mainstream news was derived from interviews and tweets from Al Khawaja’s family after each visit or phone call. What emerged was an unprecedented composite—a diary of witnesses to a hunger strike interspersed with the family’s struggles with the authorities to get access to him and their almost tangible fear that the Bahraini government would not relent and he would die. As these fears intensified 48 human rights NGOs called for his release from prison (Article 19) and the Danish government formally requested his extradition for hospital treatment on “humanitarian grounds”. Both were rejected. As if to provide evidence of Al Khawaja’s tenuous hold on life, his family released an image of his emaciated body onto Twitter. This graphic depiction of the corporeal-environmental act of (self) destruction was re-tweeted and posted on countless NGO and news Websites (see Al-Jazeera). It was also juxtaposed against images of multi-million dollar cars circling a race-track, funded by similarly large advertising deals and watched by millions of people around the world on satellite channels. Spectator sport had become a grotesque parody of one man’s struggle to speak of what was going on in Bahrain. In an attempt to silence the criticism the Bahraini government imposed a de facto news blackout denying all access to Al Khawaja in hospital where he had been sent after collapsing. The family’s tweets while he was held incommunicado speak of their raw pain, their desperation to find out if he was still alive, and their grief. They also provided a new source of information, and the refrain “where is alkhawaja,” reverberated on Twitter and in global news outlets (see for instance Der Spiegel, Al-Jazeera). In the days immediately after the race the Danish prime minister called for the release of Al Khawaja, saying he is in a “very critical condition” (Guardian), as did the UN’s Ban-Ki Moon (UN News and Media). The silencing of Al Khawaja had become a discourse of callousness and as global media pressure built Bahraini ministers felt compelled to challenge this on non-Arabic media, claiming Al Khawaja was “eating” and “well”. The Bahraini Prime Minister gave one of his first interviews to the Western media in years in which he denied “AlKhawaja’s health is ‘as bad’ as you say. According to the doctors attending to him on a daily basis, he takes liquids” (Der Spiegel Online). Then, after six days of silence, the family was allowed to visit. They tweeted that while incommunicado he had been restrained and force-fed against his will (Almousawi), a statement almost immediately denied by the military hospital (Lebanon Now). The discourses of silence and callousness were replaced with discourses of “torture” through force-feeding. A month later Al Khawaja’s wife announced he was ending his hunger strike because he was being force-fed by two doctors at the prison, family and friends had urged him to eat again, and he felt the strike had achieved its goal of drawing the world’s attention to Bahrain government’s response to pro-democracy protests (Ahlul Bayt News Agency). Conclusion This article has sought to explore two ecologies. The first is of medico-ethical discourses which construct a prison hunger strike as a corporeal-environmental act of (self) destruction to achieve particular political ends. 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