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Articoli di riviste sul tema "Ballistic missile defenses Arms control"

Autore: Grafiati

Pubblicato: 4 giugno 2021

Ultima modifica: 15 febbraio 2022

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1

Sabin, Philip A. G. "Strategic defenses: ballistic missile defense technologies: anti-satellite weapons, countermeasures, and arms control." International Affairs 63, n. 1 (1986): 111–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2620254.

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2

Shoumikhin, Andrei. "Current Russian perspectives on arms control and ballistic missile defense". Comparative Strategy 18, n. 1 (gennaio 1999): 49–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495939908403162.

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3

Katona, Agnes. "NATO Territorial Ballistic Missile Defense and its Implications for Arms Control". Nonproliferation Review 22, n. 2 (3 aprile 2015): 253–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2015.1117314.

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4

Kennedy, Kevin C. "Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The Abm Treaty and “Star Wars” Testing and Development". American Journal of International Law 80, n. 4 (ottobre 1986): 854–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2202066.

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In the latest interpretation of the 13-year-old Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)—one that stunned the arms control community—the Reagan administration announced on October 6, 1985, that the United States is authorized under the Treaty to develop and test advanced technology, spacebased weapons systems such as lasers and particle beam weapons. According to the administration, the ABM Treaty places no restrictions, short of actual deployment, on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the so-called Star Wars program. Although Secretary of State George Shultz has stated that the United States will continue to exercise restraint in the SDI program by limiting the development and testing of weapons according to a “restrictive” interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the question remains whether a legally sound basis exists for the administration’s “permissive” interpretation of the Treaty.

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5

Krepon, Michael. "Are Missile Defenses MAD? Combining Defenses with Arms Control". Foreign Affairs 74, n. 1 (1995): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20047016.

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6

Parshkova, J. Yu. "The Development of the US National Missile Defense and its Impact on the International Security". MGIMO Review of International Relations, n. 1(40) (28 febbraio 2015): 43–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-1-40-43-48.

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The article reflects the US officials' point of view on the development of its national missile defense. The major threat to international security is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to reduce and limit offensive arms. However, presently the proliferation of ballistic missiles spreads all over the world, especially in the Middle East, because of the ballistic missile technology falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies. With the possible attack regional missile defense systems will be promptly mobilized to enhance an effective deterrent. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability. The initiative of the development of US BMD naturally belongs to the United States. That country has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities, exceeding by far those of the other NATO members combined.

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7

Cimbala, Stephen J. "Unblocking inertia: US-Russian nuclear arms control and missile defenses". Defense & Security Analysis 32, n. 2 (2 aprile 2016): 115–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1160485.

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8

Cimbala, Stephen J. "Deal Breakers or Speed Bumps? Missile Defenses and Russian-American Nuclear Arms Control". Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, n. 1 (2 gennaio 2018): 2–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1416842.

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9

Yuan, Jing‐dong. "Chinese responses to U.S. missile defenses: Implications for arms control and regional security". Nonproliferation Review 10, n. 1 (marzo 2003): 75–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700308436918.

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10

Tannenwald, Nina. "U.S. Arms Control Policy in a Time Warp". Ethics & International Affairs 15, n. 1 (marzo 2001): 51–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2001.tb00343.x.

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Abstract (sommario):

There is much hand-wringing in the arms control trenches these days over the role and future of arms control in U.S. policy. Liberal supporters of arms control lament what they see as a decade of missed opportunities to pursue deep cuts in the world's nuclear arsenals and to strengthen the regimes for controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Those on the right, perceiving grave weaknesses in Cold War–era arms control regimes, prefers to move ahead with “assertive isolationism,” happily unencumbered with the comprehensive test ban or soon, they hope, the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. After a promising start in arms control at the beginning of the 1990s, both sides see U.S. arms control policy drifting in purpose and slackening in momentum, with arms control officials spread thin over a proliferating agenda.

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11

Altmann, Jürgen. "New Military Technologies: Dangers for International Security and Peace". Sicherheit & Frieden 38, n. 1 (2020): 36–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0175-274x-2020-1-36.

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New military technologies are being developed at a high pace, with the USA in the lead. Intended application areas are space weapons and ballistic missile defence, hypersonic missiles, autonomous weapon systems, and cyber war. Generic technologies include artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology and gene editing, and soldier enhancement. Problems for international security and peace - arms races and destabilisation - will likely result from properties shared by several technologies: wider availability, easier access, smaller systems; shorter times for attack, warning and decisions; and conventional-nuclear entanglement. Preventive arms control is urgently needed.

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12

Arbatov, A. "Changing of Priorities for the Sake of Coming out from the Strategic Dead-End". World Economy and International Relations, n. 6 (2014): 3–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-6-3-17.

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The article is dedicated to the state and prospects of the US-Russian dialogue on strategic arms control. Military-strategic and political reasons of the deadlock of negotiations existing since 2011 are discussed. Special attention is addressed to the situation in the area of strategic nuclear offensive arms, anti-ballistic missile systems, and advanced offensive conventional long-range weapons. The ways of achieving a breakthrough out of the present dead end and progress towards a next START treaty are proposed. Foremost this implies shifting the accent from the resolution of the BMD problem to the limitation of conventional strategic offensive systems. Also political obstacles and conditions for the progress of negotiations are analyzed.

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13

Yaphe, Judith S. "ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 717. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 432." International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, n. 4 (novembre 2000): 577–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800002890.

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Tony Cordesman has become a veritable institution among Washington policy analysts. Few are more prolific, especially in the area of comparative analysis of weapons systems. He can be depended on to produce data-rich, comprehensive, lavishly documented studies of military doctrine and usage, intentions to acquire or produce weapons systems, and willingness to abide by international arms-control regimes. These two books are no exception. They include indepth analyses of conventional and non-conventional weapons systems. It is the latter that makes these books so important to analysts of regional weapons development and arms control. Cordesman examines Iraqi and Iranian acquisitions, from purchase, absorption, production, and use of conventional weapons to efforts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—the so-called weapons of mass destruction—and the requisite ballistic-missile–delivery systems.

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14

Glaser, Charles L., e Steve Fetter. "Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China". International Security 41, n. 1 (luglio 2016): 49–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00248.

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As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the Soviet force was. Part of the answer depends on the military-technical feasibility of the United States achieving a significant damage-limitation capability: What would be the outcome of military competition over the survivability of China's intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and command and control, and over the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defenses? The answer also depends on the benefits that a damage-limitation capability would provide; these could include contributions to homeland deterrence, extended deterrence, and reassurance of U.S. regional allies. The final piece of the analysis concerns the potential costs of a damage-limitation capability, which could include increased escalatory pressures during crises and growing political tension between the United States and China. A thorough analysis demonstrates that the United States should forgo such a capability because the prospects for preserving a significant damage-limitation capability are poor; the deterrent benefits would be small; and the escalatory and political costs would be relatively large.

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15

Slsmanidis, Roxane D. V. "Theater Missile Defenses: Possible Chinese Reactions; U.S. Implications and Options. By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-154 S, 23 February 1994. 4pp.] - Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies: Implications and Options for the United State By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-422 S, 25 March 1994. 22pp.] - China in World Affairs – U.S. Policy Choice By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-265 S, 31 January 1995. 19pp.] - China After Deng Xiaoping – Implications for the United States. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-465 S, 7 April 1995. 27pp.] - China Policy: Managing U.S.–PRC–Taiwan Relations after President Lee′s visit to the U.S. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-727 S, 19 June 1995. 5pp.]". China Quarterly 146 (giugno 1996): 643–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000045367.

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16

"Missile defenses and western European security: NATO strategy, arms control, and deterrence". Choice Reviews Online 27, n. 01 (1 settembre 1989): 27–0555. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.27-0555.

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