Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Ex Officio Application of the choice-Of-Law rule"

Abstract: The Europeanization of national civil procedure law consists out of several pillars. The influence of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is well known. A second pillar of the European influence on civil procedure law is the growing number of European regulations concerning the crossroads of civil procedure law and private international law. This article focuses on the Europeanization of national law by a third, ‘invisible pillar’. The European influence in the ‘invisible pillar’ concerns many topics, such as ex officio application law, burden of proof, means of proof, costs, the free choice of a lawyer, the threshold amount exempt from seizure and arbitration. The first part of this invisible pillar follows from the role of national civil procedure law in enforcing EU law. The European Court leaves the procedural law to the national courts. The second area of the invisible pillar concerns procedural rules in Directives. A close look at several Directives reveals that the list of procedural topics touched upon by Directives is far from small. Directives contain procedural rules relevant for various capita of the civil procedure law of the Member States. This article seeks to shine some light on parts of this pillar by examining three topics: ex officio application, costs and the free choice of a lawyer, and legal expenses insurance. These examples serve to demonstrate that this area covers a wide variety of topics. Three problems relating to this invisible pillar will be identified: uncertainty, external differences, and internal differences.

Resumen: El sistema español de tratamiento de la ley extranjera se construye sobre tres pilares, el que sanciona la imperatividad de la norma de conflicto, las reglas sobre medios de prueba y la previsión de las consecuencias de la falta de prueba de tal ley. La interacción de estos pilares debe traducirse en respuestas diferenciadas según el sector del Derecho en el que nos encontremos. En los procesos matrimoniales no existe espacio para la libertad de los particulares y sí fuertes intereses públicos, lo que significa que el órgano judicial tiene que aplicar no sólo la norma de conflicto sino también el ordenamiento reclamado por ésta, investigándolo de oficio si no lo aportan los litigantes. Único condicionante es el respeto del contradictorio y la interdicción de la indefensión.Palabras clave: procesos matrimoniales, derecho extranjero, imperatividad de la norma de con-flicto, reglamentos europeos.Abstract: The Spanish system of procedural treatment of foreign law is built on three main pillars: the one which sanctions the imperativeness of the choice of law rule, the rules on means of evidence, and the forecast of the consequences of the lack of evidence of such a law. The interaction of these pillars has has to be translated into differentiated responses according to the material sector of the Law in which we find ourselves. In matrimonial proceedings there is no room for the freedom of individuals, because of the strong public interests. Consequently, this means that the judicial body has to apply not only the conflict rule, but also the regulation claimed by it, even investigating it ex officio if it has not been brought by any of the parties. The only constrains are the respect of the right to an adversarial proceeding and the interdiction of the lack of defence.Keywords: matrimonial causes, Foreign Law, mandatory application of the Choice of Laws Ru-les, EU Regulations.

Abstract: This article examines the Asturcom judgment of 6 October 2009 from the angle of ex-officio application of European law, specifically in terms of procedural autonomy, public policy, and international arbitration. In Asturcom, the ECJ was confronted with enforcement proceedings of a final arbitration award made in the absence of the consumer based on an arbitration agreement that contained a potentially unfair term. The ECJ examined the national rule under the principle of procedural autonomy in the form of the effectiveness and equivalence tests. It extended the use of the ‘contextual effectiveness test’ developed in Peterbroeck/van Schijndel to Consumer law. Most remarkably, the ECJ has manipulated the ‘equivalence test’ as to grant certain European norms public policy status on national level. Lastly, in terms of arbitration, the judgment reaches a result that is in conformity with international law. Résumé: Cet article étudie l’arrêt Asturcom rendu le 6 octobre 2009 vue sous l’angle de l’appréciation d’office du droit européen, notamment les aspects de l’autonomie procé-durale, l’ordre public, et l’arbitrage international. Dans Asturcom, la CJUE était confronté par une procédure d’exécution forcée d’une sentence arbitrale définitive rendue en l’absence du consommateur basée sur une convention d’arbitrage qui renferme éventuellement une clause abusive. La CJUE vérifie la règle nationale sous le principe de l’autonomie procédurale en forme des tests d’effectivité et d’équivalence. Elle a élargit l’utilisation du teste de ‘l’effectivité contextualisé’ développé dans Peterbroeck/van Schijndel en droit de la consommation. Digne d’attention la manipulation de la DJUE du ‘teste d’équivalence’ qui reconnait pour certains normes européens statut d’ordre public au niveau national. En dernier, en ce qui concerne l’arbitrage, le jugement aboutit au résultat conforme au droit international.

This article discusses the proposal issued by the European Commission (Commission) on 10 April 2013, for the modernization of the EU's trade defence instruments (TDI). Considering the time that has lapsed since the last TDI review, a modernization aimed at increasing transparency and bringing the application of TDI in line with modern day realities and the WTO Agreements as interpreted in WTO disputes certainly seems opportune. However, the Commission's proposal seems to be a missed opportunity. On the one hand, it champions protectionism by giving primacy to ex officio investigations and the abolition of the lesser duty rule in anti-subsidy investigations and when 'structural raw material distortions' exist, on the other hand, it fails to adequately address administrative transparency, an area in which the EU system has been lacking and compares unfavourably with other traditional TDI users such as the United States (US) and Canada. As many WTO members have patterned their TDI after those of the EU, the butterfly effect will almost certainly come back to haunt EU exporters.

ABSTRACT: Recent case law from arbitration laden jurisdictions has reignited the discussion of an arbitrator's ex officio application of the law when the parties have chosen the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, but have not invoked certain legal arguments during the arbitral proceedings. Specifically, this survey analyzes the issue of an arbitrator's ex officio application of the law from the perspective of the maxim iura novit curia and foreign mandatory rules in order to ascertain whether the recourse to these two tenets by way of analogy are appropriate in the context of international commercial arbitration.

Throughout 2019 the Magetan Religious Court has decided on divorce cases accompanied by the distribution of joint assets in four cases. From the four cases, legal dynamics emerged in their decisions, namely regarding the use of ex officio rights with reference to statutory regulations and the application of the principle of ius contra legem in deciding cases. The focus of the study in this thesis is the application of the ex officio rights of judges and the principle of ius contra legem in the case of sharing assets in the Magetan Religious Court with a progressive legal perspective. The approach used in this research is the progressive legal approach, which studies how the law is applied and whether it is in accordance with the principles of justice that make law for humans. Meanwhile, the theory used is a legal discovery with the characteristics of progressive law. Whereas the use of ex officio rights by applying the principle of ius contra legem solely aims to protect the legal interests of justice seekers by using the spirit of progressive law which is based on the legal interests of justice seekers which must be put forward rather than merely referring to codified rules, however, the judges do not abandon the legal principles which form the basis of the judges' thinking and actions in examining, hearing and deciding cases.

Individual taxpayers can make a direct appeal to EC law which is sufficiently precise and unconditional for national courts of law. However, if a taxpayer fails to make an appeal to a clear infringement of EC law during a court procedure, the question arises whether a national court is authorized, or even obliged, to consider of its own motion whether a domestic tax provision is incompatible with EC law. In this article the applicable Community procedural framework as developed by the ECJ is depicted, which framework can be considered as a minimum harmonization of the national procedural law provisions of the various Member States. Subsequently, the conditions under which a domestic court is obliged to apply EC law of its own initiative are discussed. For illustration purposes the Dutch procedural rules in tax cases are assessed within the Community procedural framework.

Arbitral tribunals with seat in Switzerland are required to apply EU law under various conditions: It seems fairly clear that the arbitral tribunal needs to apply EU law, if the parties have chosen the law of an EU member state as lex causae, as EU law forms in this case part of the chosen law. The same applies when the parties have forgone to make a choice of law and the closest connection test results in the application of the law of an EU member state. In case the parties have chosen a third state’s law as lex causae, the arbitral tribunal needs to consider EU law, if a party invokes its application. Last, the arbitral tribunal may in some instances apply EU law ex officio, even if none of the parties have invoked the application of EU law. Although the arbitral tribunal may be required to apply EU law, the failure to apply or the wrong application of EU law does not necessarily result in setting aside of the award by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The failure to apply or the wrong application of EU law does not violate public policy. Hence, a challenge of the arbitral award based on art. 190 (2) e PILA will be unsuccessful. This holds also true if the arbitral tribunal decides not to apply EU competition law, as the Swiss Federal Supreme Court does not consider EU competition law part of public policy. The failure to apply EU law by the arbitral tribunal will only then result in a successful challenge of the arbitral award based on art. 190 (2) b PILA, if the arbitral tribunal found that EU law would be applicable to the dispute but denies its jurisdiction to decide the EU law issue.

Summary As a response to possible distortive effects of foreign subsidies, which are not covered by the current rules of the World Trade Organization and primary and secondary law of the EU, on 6th May 2021 the European Commission introduced a new regime against foreign subsidies by introducing the proposal of the Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. This new proposal includes three so-called modules: a set of measures of general application that governs the ex officio review of subsidies (Module 1), specific rules on concentrations (Module 2) and specific rules in public procurement in the EU (Module 3). The paper will focus on some of the features of Module 3 and assess the context, feasibility, and possible consequences for the course of public procurement in the EU covered by the public procurement directives

Under European Union (EU) law, arbitrators and national courts are obligated to apply, ex officio, EU competition law. Also according to EU law, any failure by an arbitral tribunal to apply such rules, or any erroneous interpretation or application hereof, constitute grounds for setting aside the subsequent award, if and when such measure is dictated by the Member State’s procedural rules. This article examines the relevant procedural rules in Denmark and Sweden based on two recent decisions by the national Supreme Courts. It concludes that under Scandinavian procedural law, courts will generally limit their inquiry to a superficial review of the premises of the award and will only reluctantly set aside an otherwise valid award based only on matters of merit. The main purpose of this article is to provide an up-to-date analysis of the position of the Scandinavian courts, thus helping to ‘map’ the European arbitration landscape. Even so, we have attempted to include and contribute to a few of the main discussions concerning the landscape in which the decisions were rendered in the introductory section. In the last section, we build on the reasoning of the two Supreme Courts in order to propose a framework for understanding the interplay between national and EU law, at least in the Scandinavian countries.

L’élaboration de règles de conflit de lois uniformes par l’Union européenne accompagne le projet du développement d’un espace européen de justice civile visant à garantir la prévisibilité des litiges. L’uniformisation européenne des règles de conflit de lois ne s’est accompagnée d’aucun régime procédural unifié. L’internationalité du litige et la mise en œuvre de la règle de conflit de source européenne sont ainsi tributaires des ordonnancements procéduraux internes. Si, en droit international privé traditionnel, l’office du juge justifie d’un traitement purement national du fait de sa nature procédurale, l’hétérogénéité des systèmes procéduraux interroge au regard des objectifs poursuivis par l’Union. Plus particulièrement, le caractère optionnel de la règle de conflit généré par un traitement procédural national hétérogène contredit les impératifs d’uniformité et d’effectivité commandés par l’espace judiciaire européen. La création de règles de conflit de lois uniformes ne suffit pas à établir une pratique judiciaire commune.Afin d’assurer le développement d’un espace commun de justice civile, l’uniformisation des règles de conflit de lois doit s’accompagner d’un encadrement procédural général de l’office du juge. La présente étude invite à réfléchir à un modèle d’office européen en conflit de lois, à l’aune de l’européanisation ponctuelle dont fait déjà l’objet la réalisation de la règle de conflit de lois au travers des lois de police et de l’autonomie de la volonté. Il devra être généralisé en systématisant l’application d’office par le juge de la règle de conflit de lois tout en permettant aux parties de se manifester lorsque la règle le permet
The development of uniform choice-of-law rules by the European Union accompanies the project of developing a European area of civil justice the aim of which is guaranteeing the predictability of disputes. The European standardization of choice-of-law rules has not gone along with a unified procedural regime. The internationality of the dispute and the implementation of the conflict rule from European sources consequently depend on internal procedural arrangements. Although the procedural statute of the choice-of-law rule justifies a strictly national treatment because of its procedural nature in traditional private international law, the heterogeneity of the procedural systems raises questions about the objectives pursued by the Union. The optional nature of the choice-of-law rule generated by national procedural treatment, in particular, contradicts the imperatives of uniformity and effectiveness required by the European standard. The creation of uniform conflict-of-law rules does not establish a common judicial practice on its own.To ensure the development of a common area of civil justice, the standardization of choice-of-law rules must go along with a general procedural framework for the procedural statute of the choice-of-law rule. This study suggests us to reflect on a model of a European judicial practice in conflict of laws, in the light of the ad hoc framework that already exists in mandatory provisions and parties’ autonomy. It should be generalized by systematizing an ex officio application of the choice-of-law rule by the judge while allowing the parties to come forward when the rule allows it

Les règles de conflit de lois n’ont pas toutes la même autorité. Les parties, et même le juge, peuvent être autorisés à passer outre à la désignation opérée par la règle de conflit. Les parties sont parfois libres d’écarter par convention la loi objectivement désignée (règles de conflit supplétives), parfois tenues par la désignation opérée, qui s’impose à elles (règles de conflit impératives). Le juge est tantôt tenu, tantôt libre de relever d’office l’internationalité du litige, et d’en déduire l’application de la règle de conflit. Le choix d’envisager ensemble des questions aussi variées peut étonner, mais c’est celui de la jurisprudence. L’autorité des règles de conflit y est définie de manière conjointe, à l’égard des parties comme du juge, à l’aune de considérations substantielles. Ainsi, parce qu’une demande en recherche de paternité relève, en droit substantiel, d’une matière d’ordre public, et qu’elle intéresse l’état des personnes, réputé indisponible, la règle de conflit qui lui est applicable sera impérative et mise en œuvre, au besoin d’office, par le juge. Inversement, si la prétention relève d’une matière largement supplétive ou vise des droits disponibles, la règle de conflit applicable sera supplétive, et le juge ne sera pas tenu de la relever d’office. Ce sont donc des considérations substantielles qui définissent, en jurisprudence, l’autorité des règles de conflit à l’égard des parties comme du juge.Cependant, ce régime n’est plus celui du droit international privé européen. D’abord, les règlements européens n’ont défini l’autorité des règles de conflit qu’à l’égard des parties, laissant à chaque Etat membre le soin de déterminer leur autorité à l’égard du juge. Ensuite, la définition européenne de l’impérativité des règles de conflit fait abstraction de toute considération substantielle, en retenant une supplétivité de principe pour l’ensemble des règles de conflit unifiées à l’échelle européenne. La jurisprudence a-t-elle raison de définir l’autorité des règles de conflits exclusivement à l’aune de considérations substantielles ? Non, car cela revient à nier que l’effet juridique des règles de conflit est imputé selon des considérations propres à la justice conflictuelle. Pour autant, on ne saurait, à l’instar du législateur européen, exclure toute considération substantielle. Le présupposé des règles de conflit vise des questions de droit substantiel. Les règles de conflit sont donc construites en contemplation de considérations substantielles. Dès lors, si ces dernières ne sauraient dicter à elles seules l’autorité des règles de conflit, on ne saurait, non plus, en faire totalement abstraction
Choice-of-law rules do not all have the same authority. The parties, and even the judge, may be allowed to override the designation made by the conflict rule. The parties are sometimes free to depart, by convention, from the designated law (suppletory choice-of-law rules), sometimes bound by the designation made (imperative choice-of-law rules). The judge is sometimes obliged, sometimes free to raise ex officio the internationality of the dispute, and to deduce from it the application of the choice-of-law rule. Considering together such varied questions may be surprising, but it is the approach adopted by French case law. The authority of choice-of-law rules is defined jointly, according to substantive considerations. As a matter of example, an affiliation proceeding is, in French substantive law, a matter of public policy regarding someone’s family status, and deemed to concern an unwaivable right. Therefore, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be imperative and applied ex officio by the judge. Conversely, if the claim falls within a largely suppletory subject matter or relates to waivable rights, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be suppletory, and the judge will not be required to apply it ex officio. Therefore, the authority of choice-of-law rules is defined, with respect to both the parties and the judge, according to substantive considerations.However, this regime is no longer that of European private international law. Firstly, the European regulations have only defined the authority of their choice-of-law rules with respect to the parties, leaving it up to each Member State to determine their authority over the judge. Secondly, the European definition of their authority over the parties disregards any substantive consideration, and retains a whole set of suppletory choice-of-law rules, regardless of the subject-matter. Is case law justified in defining the authority of choice-of-law rules solely on the basis of substantive considerations ? No, because choice-of-law rules designate the applicable law according to choice-of-law considerations. However, one cannot, like the European legislator, exclude any substantive consideration. The supposition of choice-of-law rules concerns substantive law issues. Choice-of-law rules are, thus, devised according to substantive considerations. Therefore, if these alone cannot define the authority of choice-of-law rules, they cannot be totally ignored either

A lawyer or patent attorney requires authority from his client to act as counsel on behalf of the latter. Under such authority to act as counsel, he is authorized to conduct proceedings on behalf of the party represented. It is an instrument of procedural law, subject to the rules of civil law on representation only by way of supplementary application. The UPCA does not contain any rules on authority to act as counsel. Rule 8 UPCARoP stipulates mandatory representation by a lawyer before the UPC (presumed in Art 48(7) UPCA; derogations: Rules 88.4 and 378.5 UPCARoP). Rule 285 UPCARoP provides that the UPC may order counsel to produce written authority if his authority to act as counsel is challenged by the opposing party. This objection may be raised at any time during the proceedings. The UPC is required to take account of any deficiency in authority ex officio. It is not required to verify the authority of a representative identified as a lawyer of its own initiative, except in cases (evident lack of or highly doubtful authority) establishing a duty of care on the part of the Court.