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1
Schwenzfeuer, Sebastian. "Über den Gelehrten als Erzieher der Menschheit. Fichte im Kontext der Bildungsdiskurse bei Kant und Schiller". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20204818.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The paper deals with Fichte’s concept of education in his popular Jena Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s Vocation. There, Fichte thinks the scholar as the educator of mankind. The aim is to show that the concept of being human, as interpreted by practical philosophy, can, in Fichte’s viewpoint, only find its realization in a society based on division of labour, as a place of reciprocal perfection. His social theory is markedly contrary to Schiller’s critical evaluation of this division of labour as fragmentation and one-sidedness of humanity in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind published in 1795. Starting from the Kantian premise of human being as a project, that is as an object of practical philosophy and education, Fichte and Schiller both articulate its consequences in opposite directions: Fichte in the form of the scholar as the expression of a specialized education, Schiller in the form of the artist as the expression of an all-round and harmonic education.Der Beitrag behandelt Fichtes Begriff der Erziehung in seinen bekannten Jenenser Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. Dort bestimmt Fichte den Gelehrten als Erzieher der Menschheit. Ziel ist es, zu zeigen, dass der praktizistisch gedeutete Begriff des Menschseins seine Realisation nach Fichtes Auffassung nur in einer arbeitsteiligen Gesellschaft als Ort wechselseitiger Vervollkommnung finden kann. Seine Gesellschaftstheorie steht damit in deutlichem Kontrast zu Schillers kritischer Bewertung dieser Arbeitsteiligkeit als Fragmentierung und Vereinseitigung des Menschseins in den 1795 erschienenen Briefen über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. Ausgehend von der kantischen Pramisse des Menscheins als Projekt, d.h. als Gegenstand von praktischer Philosophie und Erziehung, artikulieren Fichte und Schiller deren Konsequenzen gegensätzlich: Fichte in der Gestalt des Gelehrten als Ausdruck einer spezialisierten Bildung, Schiller in der Gestalt des Kunstlers als dem Ausdruck einer allseitigen und harmonischen Bildung.
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Ralickas, Eduardo. "La Doctrine de la science à l’usage des artistes". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 305–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20204821.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This paper addresses some of the figurative properties of Fichte’s philosophical discourse. In many texts from the so-called Spätphilosophie the WL is depicted as an »image of knowing«. In keeping with this idea, the author examines how figure and discourse are inextricably bound up in the space of Fichtean philosophy. The 1794 lectures Concerning the Difference Between the Sprit and the Letter Within Philosophy are particularly telling in this respect, for they foreground metaphor as the necessary vehicle for philosophical expression. Thus, Fichtean philosophy, understood both as discourse (in the sense of pragmatic linguistics) and as »material image«, openly embraces figural modes of knowing, for knowing itself is fundamentally an imagistic activity. In the final analysis, Fichte’s discourse does not separate concept and figure, philosophy and metaphor; instead, it opens up philosophy to the space of the figural – a space from which it ultimately stems and which constitutes the medium of the Wissenschaftslehre as such. In closing, the author reconsiders one of Fichte’s most striking metaphors, i.e., philosophy as Eucharist, in order to shed new light on a famous portrait of Fichte from 1812. He argues that the latter sustains in painterly form a meditation on the place of the figurative in philosophical discourse.Cet article est consacré à la question de la figurabilité du discours philosophique chez Fichte. La WL, on le sait grâce aux textes de la Spätphilosophie, incarne ce que Fichte appelle en 1812 l’»image du savoir«. Cet énoncé constitue le point de départ de notre réflexion sur les liens entre figure et discours dans la philosophie fichtéenne. À la lumière de quelques énoncés métaphilosophiques incontournables pour l’intelligence de la WL nous envisageons, dans un premier temps, le rôle de la métaphore dans l’enseignement fichtéen. Nous démontrons que la philosophie fichtéenne, entendue comme discours (au sens de la linguistique pragmatique) et comme »image matérielle«, doit épouser les traits d’une figure afin qu’on puisse la transmettre à autrui. Ainsi, loin de séparer concept et figure, philosophie et image, le dispositif fichtéen ouvre au contraire l’espace de la philosophie sur l’espace figural dont il est issu et qui en constitue le véritable médium. Dans un deuxième temps, en revenant sur une des métaphores les plus prégnantes dans le discours de Fichte, à savoir la philosophie comme Eucharistie, nous proposons l’analyse d’un célèbre portrait de Fichte qui n’a pas encore reçu l’attention philosophique qui lui revient et qui constitue, selon notre hypothèse, une réflexion inédite sur la figurabilité du discours en philosophie.
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Alessiato, Elena. "Fichte im Wilhelminischen Reich: Idealisiertes Bild, patriotische Vorbildhaftigkeit und nationale Bildung". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 358–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20204823.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In Germany at the turn of the 20th century the interest in Fichte’s philosophy was growing remarkably.This phenomenon has to be considered as a part of a broader “German movement”, i. e. a collective cultural trend aiming at pinpointing what had been properly “German” in the last two centuries. This need became even more acute by the outbreak of the Great War.In that context Fichte’s work was used as a benchmark for creating and elaborating on the myth of “the German character.” Many intellectuals of that time interpreted Fichte’s personality and thought as representing ideas, ethical values, spiritual positions, cultural attitudes and political stances which accounted for the specificity of “Germanness”. Since these ideas and values were believed to be particular to the German culture, Fichte was celebrated all across the nation as an exemplary German.Harkening back to contemporary sources the following paper aims to illustrate how Fichte’s image was moulded in order to meet needs and issues emerging from the War and its philosophical-ideological interpretations. At the same time it suggests that the “Fichte case” from the beginning of the 20th century can be interpreted as a paradigmatic example of how philosophical and cultural issues can be ideologically (mis-) interpreted and used to give support to a particular political view.Die Jahrzehnte um die Jahrhundertwende erlebten im wilhelminischen Deutschland eine starke Zunahme des Interesses an der Philosophie Fichtes.Die kollektive Begeisterung für Fichte lässt sich auf der Folie einer ‚deutschen Bewegung‘ betrachten, deren Ziel die Suche nach dem eigentumlichen ‚Deutschen‘ in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten war. Diese Suche intensivierte sich noch mit dem Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges.In diesem Zusammenhang wurde Fichtes Denken zu einem Bezugspunkt fur die Ausarbeitung des Mythos von der Besonderheit des deutschen Wesens. Viele Intellektuelle zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts und während der Kriegszeit wollten Fichte als Vorbild einer Persönlichkeit sehen, die edle Ideale, anspruchsvolle Vorstellungen, deutschen Geist und starken Willen vertrat gegenüber einer geistlosen, ethisch verdorbenen Welt, gegen ein intellektualisiertes Leben und die ‘zivilisierte Un-Kultur’ der modernen Menschheit.Im Bezug auf die Verflechtung von philosophischen Begriffen, idealisierter Kriegsvergeistigung, patriotischem Glauben und Willen nach nationaler Bildung setzt sich das Paper zum Ziel die Vorbildhaftigkeit, die Fichte damals zugeschrieben wurde, zur Darstellung zu bringen und quellenmäßig zu analysieren. Der ‚Fall Fichte‘ wird aber zugleich als historisch kontextualisiertes Erlebnisbeispiel des Ineinanderfließens von kulturellen Überhöhungen und politischen Anforderungen betrachtet: ein exemplarischer Fall vom ideologischen (Miss-) Verständnis des Geistigen.
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Imhof, Silvan. "Realität durch Einbildungskraft. Fichtes Antwort auf Maimons Skeptizismus in der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte2020484.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Concluding the deduction of imagination in § 4 of the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte remarks that one lesson of the Wissenschaftslehre is that all reality is a product of imagination. One of the greatest thinkers of the age, Fichte writes, is teaching the same, but calls it a deception of imagination. Fichte’s remark is aimed at Salomon Maimon, and it shows that his deduction shouldn’t be read only as part of the systematic development of the theoretical Wissenschaftslehre, but should also be considered as an argument against a specific kind of scepticism. In order to examine this overlooked anti-sceptical aim in the first Wissenschaftslehre, an overview of the deduction of § 4 with a focus on the systematic role of imagination will first be given. Second, Maimon’s sceptical argument against transcendental philosophy will be explained. In the centre again will stand Maimon’s Humean concept of imagination. Finally, it will be shown in which sense Fichte’s deduction of imagination has to be taken in order to be an adequate response to Maimonian scepticism.An die Deduktion der Einbildungskraft in § 4 der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre schließt Fichte die Bemerkung an, es werde hier gelehrt, dass alle Realität durch die Einbildungskraft hervorgebracht wird. Einer der größten Denker des Zeitalters – gemeint ist Salomon Maimon – lehre das Gleiche, nur nenne er es eine Täuschung durch die Einbildungskraft. Diese Bemerkung lässt erkennen, dass die Deduktion der Einbildungskraft nicht nur im Dienst der Entwicklung des theoretischen Teils der Wissenschaftslehre steht, sondern dass sie auch im Sinne eines antiskeptischen Arguments verstanden werden muss. Um diesen Aspekt von Fichtes Konzeption der Einbildungskraft genauer zu beleuchten, wird erstens die Deduktion in § 4 mit Blick auf die systematische Rolle der Einbildungskraft dargestellt. Zweitens wird Maimons skeptisches Argument gegen die Transzendentalphilosophie präzisiert, auf das sich Fichte mit seiner Äußerung bezieht, wobei Maimons sich an Hume orientierendes Verständnis der Einbildungskraft im Zentrum steht. Zuletzt wird geprüft, in welchem Sinn Fichtes Deduktion der Einbildungskraft als Antwort auf Maimons Skeptizismus verstanden werden muss.
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Binkelmann, Christoph. "Seinssuche. Fichte – Heidegger – Fichte". Fichte-Studien 37 (2013): 281–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20133737.
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lrie, Yukio. "Fichte-Studien (Fichte-Kenkyu)". Fichte-Studien 8 (1995): 345–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte1995837.
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Zhou, Xiaolong. "Erfassen des Absoluten durch das Gefühl". Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 64, n. 1 (20 aprile 2022): 93–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0005.
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Zusammenfassung Das Verhältnis zwischen Fichtes WL (1801/02) und Schleiermachers Reden (1799/1806) wurde heftig diskutiert. Dieser Aufsatz hält den Einfluss von Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre auf Schleiermacher für nicht stichhaltig. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass es verschiedene Modelle der Beziehung zwischen dem Gefühl und dem Absoluten bei Fichte und bei Schleiermacher gibt: Fichte betrachtet das „Gefühl der Abhängigkeit“ vom Absoluten oder vom absoluten Sein als eine Selbstvernichtung der formalen Freiheit, während Schleiermacher zufolge das Individuum mit dem Absoluten im Gefühl vereinigt wird.
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Thomalla, Erika. "Befragungen im Bordell. : Hubert Fichtes ,,Interviews aus dem Palais d’Amour etc.“ (1972/78)". Zeitschrift für Germanistik 34, n. 1 (1 gennaio 2024): 132–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/92165_132.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Abstract Der Beitrag untersucht die Fragetechniken, mit denen das Personal aus dem Rotlichtmilieu in Hubert Fichtes Interviews aus dem Palais d’Amour etc. (1972/78) zum Sprechen gebracht wird. Angesichts zeitgenössischer Diskussionen über die Hierarchien und die impliziten Vorannahmen, die bei der Befragung subalterner Gruppen wirksam sind, ist in Fichtes Interviews der Zweifel des Fragenden an seiner eigenen Position und Perspektive allgegenwärtig. Als Reaktion auf diese Problematisierung der eigenen Rolle kombiniert Fichte heterogene Praktiken des Fragens. Er verknüpft Wissensbereiche und -techniken, die auf den ersten Blick keine Berührungspunkte haben, und unterbricht den Gesprächsverlauf immer wieder durch kontraintuitive thematische Sprünge. Auf diese Weise werden implizite Erwartungshaltungen an die Selbstbeschreibung subalterner Milieus unterlaufen.This article examines the questioning techniques through which personnel from the red-light milieu are made to speak in Hubert Fichte’s Interviews aus dem Palais d’Amour etc. (1972/78). Given contemporary discussions about the hierarchies and the implicit presuppositions at work when interviewing subcultural groups, the questioner’s doubt about his own position and perspective is omnipresent in Fichte’s interviews. In response to this problematization of his own role, Fichte combines heterogeneous practices of questioning. He links areas and techniques of knowledge that at first glance have no points of contact and repeatedly interrupts the course of the conversation with counterintuitive thematic leaps. In this way, implicit expectations of the self-description of subaltern milieus are subverted.
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Dimić, Zoran. "PESTALOZZI AND FICHTE – THE POWER OF EDUCATION". ГОДИШЊАК ЗА ПЕДАГОГИЈУ 6, n. 2 (30 dicembre 2021): 71–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.46630/gped.2.2021.5.
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The text explores the relationship between Pestalozzi and Fichte. The author argues that, with the exception of Kant, Pestalozzi had probably the strongest influence on the development of Fichte’s philosophy, and especially on his placing education in the focus of his philosophy. The influence of Pestalozzi on Fichte is most visible in Fichte’s critique of the existing education and the construction of a completely new conception of educational activity. It is at this point that Fichte directly relies on Pestalozzi’s insights into the importance of independence and self-activity in pedagogical practice. At the same time, there are significant differences between the two of them, clearly visible in Fichte’s conception of national education. This conception of Fichte must by no means be viewed only from the context of The Addresses to the German Nation but must be viewed as a whole of the development of Fichte’s philosophy, and especially in relation to the historical and educational circumstances that prevailed at the time. Keywords: education, independence, self-activity, selfishness, nation.
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Gaspar, Francisco Prata. "Wahrheit und Einbildungskraft". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 25–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte2020485.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
At the end of the “Foundations of theoretical Knowledge”, in the second part of the first exposition of the Doctrine of Science (1794/5), Fichte says: imagination “does not delude, but gives truth and the only possible truth”. Although the expression – “only possible truth” – appears in the text only once, it seems to play a key role in structuring the doctrine of science, insofar it defines Fichte’s own point of view, whether in relation to pre-Kantian metaphysics, or in relation to Kantianism. The aim of this paper is to understand the notion of the “only possible truth” and its internal relation to imagination. In order to do that we need to revisit the background discussion that leads Fichte to establish imagination as the fundamental activity of human spirit and the ground of the only possible truth. Such discussion takes place as a confrontation with the skepticism of Salomon Maimon, precisely the philosopher who (as a result of his critique of Kant’s philosophy) says, as Fichte said, that reality is produced by the imagination, but who regards such reality to be an illusion.Am Ende der «Grundlage des theoretischen Wissens», des zweiten Teils der Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre 1794/5, behauptet Fichte: die Einbildungskraft „täuscht ... nicht, sondern sie giebt Wahrheit, und die einzige mögliche Wahrheit”. Obwohl die Bezeichnung “die einzige mögliche Wahrheit” in dieser Darstellung sonst nicht mehr vorkommt, scheint sie eine zentrale Rolle zu spielen, insofern sie Fichtes Standpunkt sowohl gegenüber der vorkantischen, als auch der Kantischen Philosophie bestimmt. In diesem Beitrag geht es darum, den Begriff von “einzig-möglicher Wahrheit” und seine innere Verbindung zur Einbildungskraft zu verstehen. Dazu ist es erforderlich, die im Hintergrund stehende philosophische Auseinandersetzung darzulegen, die Fichte zu der Auffassung führt, dass die Einbildungskraft die grundlegende Tätigkeit des menschlichen Geistes und Grund dieser einzig-möglichen Wahrheit ist. Es geht hierbei um eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Skeptiker Salomon Maimon, der ausgehend von einer Kritik an Kants Philosophie wie Fichte sagt, dass „die Realität durch die Einbildungskraft hervorgebracht wird”, der aber im Gegensatz zur Wissenschaftslehre diese Realität als eine Tauschung betrachtet.
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Höfele, Philipp. "Zwischen Selbsttätigkeit und Passivität. Ein Beitrag zur Rolle der Einbildungskraft und des Bildes bei Fichte und Heidegger". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 67–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte2020487.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This paper outlines a systematic relation between Fichte and Heidegger concerning their interpretations of imagination (Einbildungskraft) and image, drawing on their early and in particular their later writings. In 1929, Heidegger deems it necessary to develop his interpretation of the concept of imagination as referring to the temporality of Dasein in opposition to its interpretation as a subjective faculty in idealism, particularly in Fichte. At the same time, however, an affirmative use of the concept of imagination (Einbildung), in analogy to Fichte, can also be observed in Heidegger’s writings, as, in the 1930s, he uses it to describe the unavailable ‘event’ of Being. Moreover, in spite of his pronounced criticism of the modern understanding of the ‘world as image’, Heidegger is also aware of a positive concept of the image, that he claims for art: understood that way, the image, according to Heidegger, is able to disclose the ‘happening of truth’ (das Geschehen der Wahrheit) in the ‘shape’ (Ge-bild) of art. Conversely, in his early writings Fichte already interprets the imagination as a structure generating time and preceding the I. Yet it is only after 1800 that Fichte’s interpretation shows some analogies to Heidegger’s concept of the image, when he argues for the pictorial character of all apparent reality. Fichte conceptualises this specific character of reality both as a generating principle and as something that both originates from and is related to a concept that is situated behind reality and cannot be visualised.Der Beitrag zeigt mit Blick auf die frühen und insbesondere spateren Schriften Fichtes und Heideggers eine Nahe zwischen beiden Denkern hinsichtlich ihrer Deutungen der Einbildungskraft und des Bildes auf. Zwar meint Heidegger 1929 zunächst, seine auf die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins bezogene Interpretation der Einbildungskraft in einen Gegensatz zu der vermögenstheoretischen Auslegung derselben im Idealismus und insbesondere bei Fichte rücken zu müssen. Doch lässt sich bei ihm zugleich auch ein affirmatives Heranziehen des Einbildungsbegriffes analog zu Fichte beobachten, insofern er ihn in den dreißiger Jahren sogar zur Beschreibung des unverfügbaren ‚Ereignissesʻ des Seins heranzieht. Trotz seiner vehementen Kritik des neuzeitlichen Begreifens der ‚Welt als Bildʻ kennt überdies auch Heidegger einen positiven Bildbegriff, den er für die Kunst einklagt, die im ‚Ge-bildʻ das ‚Geschehen der Wahrheitʻ offenzulegen vermöge. Umgekehrt lässt sich auch schon beim frühen Fichte eine Interpretation der Einbildungskraft nachweisen, die diese als eine Zeit generierende und dem Ich vorgelagerte Struktur herausstellt. Doch erst nach 1800 betont Fichte ähnlich wie Heidegger die bildliche Verfasstheit aller erscheinenden Wirklichkeit, welche er in ihrem Werdecharakter sowie in ihrer Verwiesenheit auf und Abkünftigkeit von etwas dahinter noch zu Situierendem und nicht zu Verbildlichendem herauszustellen sucht.
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Kravitz, Amit. "Nature in God, Nature of God. Kant, Fichte and Schelling". Philosophisches Jahrbuch 122, n. 1 (2015): 24–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2015-1-24.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Abstract. This essay focuses on the systematic role that the concept of “nature in God” plays in Kant’s philosophy, and on the way Fichte and Schelling have drawn on this concept in their respective philosophies. Having expounded Kant’s argument regarding “nature in God” and established Fichte’s and Schelling’s point of congruence, I argue that Schelling’s criticism of Fichte discloses an inherent inconsistency in the latter’s position. I ground my explanation on the difference between the claim that Fichte’s concept of nature is “dead” – mistakenly ascribed to Schelling – and Schelling’s genuine claim, according to which Fichte’s concept of nature is “not even dead”. In the last section I concisely explain why this controversy between Fichte and Schelling is intertwined with Kant’s concept of Ding an sich.
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Bazzan, Marco Rampazzo. "Le Vorbild comme clef de voûte de l’image et de l’usage de Platon chez Fichte". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 185–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20204814.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The question whether Fichte was or not Platonist is not to be considered harmless. This is first and foremost a question that Fichte asks himself in front of his students during his Lecture on Ethics at the University of Berlin (SL-1812 GA II /13, 318). In this way Fichte pretended to clarify a point that he considered decisive for characterizing his conception of ethics. Thus, the question of his Platonism no longer concerns his knowledge nor his interpretation of Plato, but rather his manner and reasons for referring to him. In the following pages I try to identify the features and stakes of Plato’s image in Fichte’s texts. In this way, my aim is at identifying the function that the reference to Plato deploys in Fichte’s arguments. That means to elaborate an ethic to be thought over the formalism that Fichte imputed to Kant. From this angle, ,Plato‘ becomes to all effects a ,conceptual person‘ allowing Fichte to forge a singular concept, that of ,Vorbild’. My thesis is finally that Fichte’s Platonism enigma – or the deepest meaning that we can attach to this question – is recovered by that concept. The Vorbild is the keystone for a new conception of ethics, which Fichte elaborated under the name of ,superior morality‘.La question de savoir si Fichte a été ou non ‘platonicien’ ne peut pas être considérée comme anecdotique. Déterminer s’il a été ou non platonicien, c’est avant tout une question que Fichte se pose lui-même devant ses étudiants, durant le cours de La Doctrine de l’éthique (Sittenlehre) à l’Université de Berlin (SL-1812 GA II/13, 318). Ce questionnement de sa part nous intéresse ici parce que, par ce biais, Fichte veut éclaircir un point qui est à ses yeux décisif pour caractériser sa conception de l’éthique. Ainsi, la question de son platonisme ne porte plus sur ses connaissances ou son interprétation de Platon, mais plutôt sur sa manière et sur ses raisons de s’y référer. Dans les pages suivantes, nous tâcherons de cerner les traits et les enjeux de l’image de Platon dans les textes de Fichte.Nous voulons ainsi dégager le rôle que la référence à Platon joue dans ses argumentations en vue de l’élaboration d’une éthique qui puisse être pensée par-delà le formalisme que Fichte impute à Kant. Sous cet angle, ‚Platon‘ devient alors un ‘personnage conceptuel’ permettant à Fichte de forger un concept singulier, celui de ‚Vorbild‘. La thèse que nous allons donc défendre est que l’énigme du platonisme de Fichte – ou bien le sens le plus profond que nous pouvons attacher à cette question – tient exactement au concept de Vorbild qui deviendrait, ainsi, la clef de voûte pour une nouvelle conception de l’éthique, élaborée sous le nom de ‘morale supérieure’.
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Phillips, Rory Lawrence. "Transcendental Idealism and Naturalism: The Case of Fichte". Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1, n. 1 (26 marzo 2020): 43–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2019-0013.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
AbstractIn this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
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Westphal, Merold. "Fichte". International Philosophical Quarterly 31, n. 1 (1991): 109–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199131160.
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Westphal, Merold. "Fichte". International Philosophical Quarterly 34, n. 2 (1994): 264–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199434221.
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Snow, Dale E. "Fichte". International Philosophical Quarterly 35, n. 4 (1995): 501–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199535453.
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Harris, H. S. "Fichte". International Studies in Philosophy 30, n. 1 (1998): 148–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil1998301117.
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Fuchs, Erich. "Fichte". Idealistic Studies 41, n. 1 (2011): 113–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies2011411/29.
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Martin, Wayne M. "In Defense of Bad Infinity: A Fichtean Response to Hegel's Differenzschrift". Hegel Bulletin 28, n. 1-2 (2007): 168–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000690.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Hegel's very first acknowledged publication was, among other things, an attack on Fichte. In 1801, Hegel was still laboring in almost complete obscurity, while Fichte was an international sensation, though already somewhat past the peak of his meteoric career. In the 1801 Differenzschrift, Hegel cut his teeth by criticizing Fichte's already widelycriticised Wissenschaftslehre, and by demonstrating that Schelling's philosophical system was not simply to be equated with it. Fichte himself never bothered to respond to Hegel's criticisms; indeed he never publicly acknowledged their existence. This was not because he was unconcerned with criticisms of his views; quite the contrary. But at the time he had bigger fish to fry. He responded to Jacobi's criticisms, and to Schelling's; he replied in great detail to critical questions raised by Reinhold, and with vituperative intensity to objections raised by skeptics and purportedly loyal Kantians. But Hegel's Differenzschrift was left without a Fichtean rebuttal. This is a pity, both because of the missed opportunity to illuminate by controversy central issues at stake in the post-Kantian period, but also because it made it easier for Hegel simply to reiterate his youthful criticism as if it were the last word. And reiterate it he did: in one form or another Hegel's early criticisms of Fichte reappear at every subsequent stage of his career: in the Phenomenology, in the Science of Logic, in the Encyclopaedia, as the final chapter in Hegel's History of Philosophy, and in countless other minor works and documents from the Nachlass and correspondence.
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Hanzina, E. G. "Johann Fichte: moral-legal order". Alma mater. Vestnik Vysshey Shkoly, n. 7 (luglio 2021): 70–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.20339/am.07-21.070.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Discussed are views of the known German philosopher J. Fichte about foundations of organization of society. J. Fichte has offered a variant of formation of the bases for the sustainable functioning of society. This variant is connected with criticism which was carried out by the philosopher concerning of his epoch. Research has shown that features of an epoch of the Fichte's epoch are peculiar to an epoch of a postmodern. J. Fichte’s philosophical views on the organization of society are reconstructed in the form of a model of the moral-legal order. Prominent feature of model is structure and orderliness of intrinsic elements of the order. The model characterizes communications of interaction, functioning and management. The typological characteristic of the links allows us to define specific characteristics of the order. First, this is presence of the certain type of attitudes which have moral-legal character. Secondly, this is presence of the factor which forms hierarchical structure of the organization of the order. Thirdly — presence of a coordination between members of a society; in-fourth, it is the factor of detection of the order. According to the author, the model of the moral and legal order is an option for the sustainable functioning of society.
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Henrich, Dieter. "O Eu de Fichte". Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 23, n. 1 (30 aprile 2021): 161–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v23i1.43448.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
ResumoNo presente texto (“O Eu de Fichte”), no qual identifica duas épocas distintas na história da filosofia concernente ao desenvolvimento da teoria da consciência, D. Henrich volta-se, após caracterizar os componentes de cada período, à teoria da consciência do primeiro Fichte, o da Doutrina da Ciência de 1794, pondo ênfase sobre algumas aporiaspresentes nessa sua primeira formulação, na medida em que Fichte foi o primeiro a encarar o problema da consciência em sua perspectiva, no fundo, mais agônica, deixado sem tratamento pela tradição da filosofia pré-kantiana e kantiana. AbstractIn the present text (Fichte’s Self), in which he identifies two distinct epochs in the history of philosophy concerning the development of the theory of consciousness, D. Henrich turns, after characterizing the components of each period, to the theory of consciousness of the first Fichte, that of the Doctrine of Science of 1794, placing emphasis on some of the aporias present in his first formulation, insofar as Fichte was the first to face the problem of consciousness in its essentially more agonistic perspective, left untreated by the tradition of pre-Kantian and Kantianphilosophy.
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Seidel, George J. "The Imagination in Kant and Fichte, and Some Reflections on Heidegger’s Interpretation". Forum Philosophicum 21, n. 2 (1 giugno 2017): 215–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2016.2102.12.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The paper deals with the meaning of the transcendental imagination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, comparing it with the productive imagination proposed by Fichte in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1794. It also presents Heidegger’s views concerning both Kant and Fichte. Regarding Kant there is also a discussion of the difference between the first and second editions of the First Critique. It may be noted that Heidegger prefers the first edition to the second, since, in his view, the latter leads into German Idealism. In Fichte’s philosophy the imagination plays a considerably larger role than it does in Kant. And Heidegger early on (in 1929) recognizes the importance of Fichte as a philosopher in its own right, and not just, as was customary in the period, a mere transitional figure between Kant and Hegel. The paper concludes with a critique of Heidegger’s views regarding both Fichte and Kant. Though there is an addendum discussing the function of the imagination in the aesthetics of Kant (classicism), in that of Fichte (romanticism), and a brief comparison with Heidegger’s own aesthetics.
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Kornilaev, Leonid Yu. "The Image of Fichte’s Philosophy in German Neo-Kantianism". Kantian journal 41, n. 4 (2022): 76–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2022-4-4.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Neo-Kantianism is traditionally seen as a philosophy that was formed to develop and actualise Kant’s philosophy and Kantian transcendental methodology. However, Kant was the determining, but by no means the only, influence on the emergence of the neo-Kantian tradition. Neo-Kantianism was strongly influenced by the entire German post-Kantian philosophy, especially by Fichte and Hegel, although neo-Kantians have repeatedly tried to dissociate themselves from the great idealists. In many ways neo-Kantianism was cultivated by the Fichtean reading of Kant, which enabled succeeding philosophers, notably H.-G. Gadamer, to consider neo-Kantianism to be “hidden neo-Fichteanism”. The main goal of this study is a historical-philosophical reconstruction of the image of Fichtean philosophy formed within German neo-Kantianism. To achieve this aim I have analysed the key projects of the German neo-Kantians in which the influence of Fichte’s philosophy, in particular his interpretation of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, is most clearly manifested. I show that the theory of values of the Southwest neo-Kantians and the ethics of pure will of the Marburg neo-Kantians are associated with the Fichtean revision of Kant’s doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. The following, in my opinion, are the main features of the image of Fichte’s philosophy: it is close to neo-Kantians precisely because it strives to combine theoretical and practical reason; it is in ethics that Fiche’s ideas are most manifest in neo-Kantianism; neo-Kantian original theories contain the ideas of self-consciousness “in the spirit” of Fichte. The conclusion is drawn that the growth of the metaphysical component in neo-Kantian doctrines may be connected with the influence of Fichte’s philosophy.
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Lukyanov, Arkadiy V., e Marina A. Pushkareva. "Johann Gottlieb Fichte as a theologian". Issues of Theology 3, n. 2 (2021): 243–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu28.2021.207.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article examines the philosophical work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) in terms of his theological views. An analysis of Fichte’s accusations of atheism is provided. The paradoxes of “spirit” and “spiritual” in human life itself and in Fichte’s own doctrine of religion are considered. A creative reconstruction is carried out for those parts of “science”, where the productivity of the very idea of theology and philosophy of religion is presented. The article investigates the theoretical implications of the idea of Fichte’s “I” and, on the basis of the inclusion of historical and philosophical generalizations, the so-called “pre-Fichte” criticism of I.Kant. The relevance of the philosophy of Fichte’s religion is revealed and its connection with the modern era is investigated. The thesis that theology is the science of the Absolute as the subject of a person’s creative search is substantiated. Also, the article supports the creative productivity of the very idea of theology and philosophy of religion. The authors compare the views of K.Forberg and Fichte. God, according to Forberg, is the regulatory principle of ethics, and religion itself is not a theory, but the duty of a moral person. But man, according to Fichte, is not called upon to create a moral “world order”. On the contrary, he himself is created and supported by it. The work concludes that the time of reason does not cover the entire totality of time. The people are not just the majority of the population, their basis lies in the moral substance. Therefore, one of the main tasks of the state is to develop the humanitarian culture of the people.
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Drilo, Kazimir. "Wissen - nihilismus – bejahung: Fichtes transzendentalphilosophischer offenbarungsbegriff". Filozofija i drustvo 21, n. 2 (2010): 167–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1002167d.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In dem Zeitraum zwischen 1792 und 1805 entwickelt Johann Gottlieb Fichte zwei verschiedene Bestimmungen des Offenbarungsbegriffs: 1. Offenbarung ist eine auf der g?ttlichen Autorit?t beruhende Lehre, mit der das sittliche Handeln gef?rdert werden soll, 2. Offenbarung ist das Zusammenhalten des Wissens im Sein und so die Rettung vor dem Nihilismus. In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass Fichte in seiner sp?ten Wissenschaftslehre und in st?ndiger Auseinandersetzung mit Jacobis Kritik, Idealismus sei Nihilismus, mit dieser letzten Bestimmung eine tragf?hige Alternative zu dem ersten, traditionellen Offenbarungsbegriff gibt. Offenbarung, so wie Fichte sie in seiner Sp?tphilosophie versteht, dient weder der F?rderung der Moral, noch h?lt sie den Prozess der Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten im Gang oder ist eine Ent?u?erung Gottes. Der Begriff der transzendentalphilosophischen Offenbarung hat vielmehr seine Bedeutung als der Garant der Realit?t des Wissens. Als Beleg f?r diese These dienen die Schriften ?Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung?, ?Erlanger Wissenschaftslehre? und ?Erlanger Logik?. Dar?ber hinaus wird auf die Interpretation der Fichte?schen Religionsphilosophie von Emanuel Hirsch eingegangen, der Fichtes Offenbarungsbegriff im Rahmen der theologischen Fragestellung mit dem Gedanken der ?Bejahung? des Absoluten produktiv weiterf?hrt.
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Oren, Yady. "Fichte and Hegel on Advancing from the Beginning". Review of Metaphysics 77, n. 3 (marzo 2024): 483–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a922072.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Abstract: In the Science of Logic , Hegel criticizes Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre for advancing from the beginning through external reflection and thus failing to understand both the nature of the beginning and the proper method to advance from it. This article shows that Fichte's advance from the beginning preempts Hegel's critique and shares Hegel's premises with respect to the method of advancing. The author first analyzes Hegel's critique of Fichte in the Science of Logic , which he follows by showing that Fichte levels a similar critique against Schelling's conception of the beginning set out in his system of 1801. Turning to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/5, the author then demonstrates that Fichte's method of advancing from the beginning addresses every point of Hegel's critique. He concludes by identifying the similarity and difference between Fichte's and Hegel's methods of advancing.
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Radrizzani, Ives. "De la gestion des fantômes du nihilisme. La réponse de la Destination de l’homme". Fichte-Studien 47 (2019): 34–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte2019475.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The accusation of Nihilism, which Jacobi expressed in his Letter to Fichte, marks a caesura in Fichte’s production. Reputed to be the paradigmatical representantive of a philosophical tradition letting any reality dissolve in a simple game of shadows, Fichte sees himself constrained to clarify the status of the image in his system. This paper aims to examine the strategy to which he has recourse in the Destination of Man, in order to find an answer to the attack.
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Arrese Igor, Hector Oscar Oscar. "The Idea of Liberty in the Fichtean Natural Right". Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36, n. 2 (27 maggio 2019): 407–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/ashf.57896.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
En este trabajo se discute la interpretación de Isaiah Berlin de la filosofía política fichteana en términos de un organicismo. Esta interpretación muestra que las libertades individuales juegan un rol fundamental en la educación de los ciudadanos futuros en tanto que ésta es una tarea realizada por los padres y no por el Estado. Sin embargo, Fichte no defiende una idea de la libertad individual como no-interferencia, aun cuando las similitudes entre su teoría y la de Humboldt sugieran lo contrario. Del mismo modo, Fichte no defendió tampoco la idea de la libertad como no-dominación, como revela la comparación con la teoría de Philip Pettit. Por el contrario, Fichte sostuvo que la educación de los futuros ciudadanos tiene sentido únicamente cuando las libertades individuales son consideradas como inextricablemente unidas con la propiedad.
This paper discusses Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation of Fichtean political philosophy in terms of organicism. It shows that individual liberties play a fundamental role in the education of future citizens as a task performed by parents, not the state. However, Fichte did not defend an idea of individual liberty or non-interference, even if similarities between his theory and Humboldt’s suggest the contrary. At the same time, Fichte also did not espouse the idea of freedom as non-domination, as a comparison with Philip Pettit’s theory reveals. By contrast, Fichte posited that the education of future citizens makes sense only if individual liberties are considered inextricably linked to property.
30
Corsico, Luciano. "El idealismo de J. G. Fichte y la pragmática trascendental de K.O. Apel". Daímon, n. 78 (27 ottobre 2019): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon/376251.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
En el presente artículo, mi objetivo es ofrecer un análisis de la posible comparación entre la filosofía de Fichte y la pragmática trascendental de Apel. A pesar de algunas coincidencias importantes, la comparación no resulta completamente satisfactoria. En realidad, el pensamiento de Fichte corresponde al paradigma moderno de una filosofía de la conciencia. Por consiguiente, su reflexión trascendental no pretende descubrir las condiciones intersubjetivas del discurso, sino las condiciones subjetivas del pensamiento. Según Fichte, el fundamento último de la filosofía no se encuentra en la dimensión pragmática del lenguaje o en una comunidad ideal de comunicación, sino más bien en la unidad de la autoconciencia subjetiva en el pensamiento, el conocimiento y la acción. In this paper, my aim is to offer an approach to the possible comparison between Fichte's idealism and Apel's transcendental pragmatics. Despite some relevant similarities, the comparison of these philosophical theories is not completely satisfactory. Indeed, Fichte's thought corresponds to the modern paradigm of a philosophy of consciousness. Therefore, his transcendental reflection does not intend to discover the intersubjective conditions of discourse, but the subjective conditions of thought. According to Fichte, the ultimate foundation of philosophy cannot be found in the pragmatic dimension of language or ideal community of communication, but in the unity of subjective self-awareness in thinking, knowledge and action.
31
Moggach, Douglas. "Contextualising Fichte". Fichte-Studien 45 (2018): 133–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20184510.
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Oesterreich, Peter L., e Hartmut Traub. "Fichte quer". Fichte-Studien 45 (2018): 223–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20184514.
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Ries, Klaus. "Mythos Fichte". Fichte-Studien 45 (2018): 242–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20184515.
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34
Ralickas, Eduardo. "Fichte, poéticien". Revue de métaphysique et de morale 81, n. 1 (2014): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rmm.141.0125.
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35
Radrizzani, Ives. "Reinhold – Fichte". Archives de Philosophie 65, n. 4 (2002): 643. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.654.0643.
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36
Goddard, Jean-Christophe. "Actuel Fichte". Espaces Temps 49, n. 1 (1992): 86–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/espat.1992.3813.
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Huss, J. "Die Fichte". Holz als Roh- und Werkstoff 46, n. 5 (maggio 1988): 190. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02619549.
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Becker, Hans Joachim. "Fichte und das Judentum - das Judentum und Fichte". Fichte-Studien 22 (2003): 19–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20032257.
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Lohmann, Petra. "The Aesthetic Implications of Fichte on Feeling". ETHICS IN PROGRESS 13, n. 1 (28 luglio 2022): 57–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/eip.2022.1.5.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article discusses the connection between art and emotion in Fichte’s work and its contemporary reception by the architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel. For the latter, not only selected architectural theoretical studies but also Schinkel’s ideal architectural designs are consulted. Schinkel knew Fichte personally and held him in high esteem. This is evidenced by some of Schinkel’s verbatim references to various forms of the Wissenschaftslehre and its sub-disciplines, as well as his extremely precise transcripts of lectures around the Berlin versions of the Wissenschaftslehre (around 1800). Schinkel was not only interested in the political and religious implications of Fichte’s theory of a cultural history of humankind, but his engagement with Fichte is also characterized above all by the theory of consciousness. This aspect plays a central role in the article. In recourse to the aesthetic emotion of the mind, a main concern of Fichte’s philosophy is to be placed in the horizon of architecture, which manifests itself in these questions: how does one convey a realisation in such a way that the recipient reconstructs it almost independently and it becomes a practical value for him as a criterion for his orientation in life? And furthermore – related to the research discourse on Fichte, which has only recently taken note of his aesthetic position and in particular his comments on architecture – how can this model of cognition be applied in his work from an architect’s point of view? In the investigation part on Fichte for this, first the feeling is reconstructed within the framework of the scientific-systematic philosophy as the reason of consciousness, in order to show with it the instance of the question relevant for Schinkel about the pedagogical effectiveness of a life-practical cultivating architecture. In the examination section on Schinkel, it is shown how Schinkel, in the horizon of Fichte, undertakes a determination of the relationship between feeling and ratio, with which he, for his part, establishes architecture as an instrument of cultivation.
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Kosch, Michelle. "The Ethical Context of Either/Or". Konturen 7 (23 agosto 2015): 84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5399/uo/konturen.7.0.3667.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This is a sequel to an earlier paper ('Kierkegaard's Ethicist' Archiv 2006) in which I argued that J.G. Fichte (rather than Kant or Hegel or some amalgam) was the primary historical model for the ethical standpoint described in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or II. Here I offer some new support for that claim. In the first section I present some evidence for Fichte’s prominence in the landscape of philosophical ethics in the 1830s and ’40s in Germany and Denmark. I argue that Kierkegaard’s use of Fichte as a foil was not idiosyncratic, but was rather the obvious choice in the historical context. In the second section I describe some additional substantive and textual reasons for thinking Fichte was the figure looming largest in the background of Kierkegaard’s construction of the ethical standpoint in Either/Or.
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DeMoor, Michael J. "RATIONAL AUTONOMY AND AUTONOMOUS RATIONALITY: Dooyeweerd, Kant and Fichte on Subjectivity, Objectivity and Normativity". Philosophia Reformata 72, n. 2 (29 novembre 2007): 105–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000414.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This article is an attempt to discuss Dooyeweerd’s epistemology in the light of German Idealism. First, a characterization of the thought of Kant and Fichte is offered, focusing in particular on three themes: normativity, autonomy and reflexivity. Second, Dooyeweerd’s criticisms of Kant and Fichte are reviewed, and it is argued that, in both cases, Dooyeweerd focuses in on a central paradox that he seeks in his own thought to avoid. Third, Dooyeweerd’s epistemology is examined and it is argued that, not only does his thought exhibit the primary themes of Idealist thought discussed previously, but that it falls into the same apparent paradox as do Kant and Fichte. Finally, the paradox itself is examined and a way forward for Reformational thought is suggested, by analogy with Fichte’s inter-subjective turn.
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Ivanenko, Anton A. "The “absolute I” and the “absolute” in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte". Issues of Theology 3, n. 3 (2021): 384–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu28.2021.306.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article deals with the relationship between the concepts of the “absolute I” and “absolute” in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and the relationship of the latter with faith and religion. These concepts play the role of the principle of his philosophy in the early and late period of his work, respectively. The topic of the article is relevant to the issues of religion and theology, first of all, in the sense that in the tradition of interpretation of Fichte’s doctrine, the following two ideas are fixed. First, the principle of the “absolute I” is interpreted as subjective-idealistic, which is why Fichte in the early period of his work had to place the object of faith outside and above knowledge. Second, many researchers are of the view that in his later years, Fichte proceeds to a religious motivated philosophizing that finds expression in his doctrine to change the principle of the “absolute I” with the principle of “absolute”, which is the philosophical equivalent to the concept of God. In the first part of the article, based on the texts of Fichte himself, the unsatisfactoriness of these ideas and the identity of the content of the concepts of the “absolute I” and “absolute” in Fichte are shown. Further, it is demonstrated that the identical content of these concepts is the unconditional first cause of both being and cognition. From the beginning of his work, Fichte sought to understand the true nature of the original and thereby reveal his own definiteness of the subject of religious faith. According to Fichte, his philosophy should overcome the limitations of the theological teachings that preceded it in questions about the essence of the first cause, divine creation and the possibility of its knowledge, and therefore, in fact, represents the experience of creating a new theology.
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Dozzi, Marco. "The Problem of the Unconscious in Fichte’s Later Jena Wissenschaftslehre". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 434–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20204826.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This essay argues for the applicability and importance of the notion of the unconscious (in the limited sense of any form of mental activity of which one is not or cannot be aware) in Fichte’s Jena period, with a focus on the ,second’ Wissenschaftslehre (1796–99). The essay begins by arguing for the existence of a fundamental tension in Fichte’s philosophy: namely, between a ,transcendence’ principle – that the conditions for consciousness cannot themselves be present within experience, since they ground that experience – and an ,immanence’ principle that there is no genuine reality outside of consciousness. It is shown that this tension is particularly evident if one observes some of the conflicting ways in which Fichte employs the notions of ,intellektuelle Anschauung’ and ,unmittelbares Bewusstsein.’ Fichte seems to violate the immanence principle especially insofar as he characterizes the conditions of the possibility of consciousness as a series of ,actions,’ which, qua actions, must be ,real’ in some sense: insofar as they are both real and not present to consciousness, it is argued, they must be unconscious. Although Fichte does not wholly embrace the notion of unconscious mental activity due to his adherence to the immanence principle, his conception of the ,two series’ of the Wissenschaftslehre as well as some of his uses of the notion of ,unmittelbares Bewusstsein’ in particular allow the recognition that Fichte has a rich but inchoate conception of the unconscious.
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Beiser, Frederick C. "La paradoja de la metafísica romántica". Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 2, n. 2 (18 dicembre 2015): 255. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201521208.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Resumen Se presenta, en primer lugar, la metafísica romántica como un intento de fusionar el idealismo fichteano con el realismo spinozista. Se muestran, en segundo lugar, las dificultades encontradas por este intento a la hora de reconciliar las principales afirmaciones de ambas concepciones filosóficas: la creencia de Fichte en la primacía del yo y la fe de Spinoza en la prioridad de la naturaleza. Palabras clave: Romanticismo, Fichte, Spinoza, idealismo, realismo, naturalismo, auto-determinación Abstract Romantic Metaphysics is presented as an attempt to fuse Fichtean idealism and Spinozist realism. It is argued that the problem with this attempt is that it not always achieved to reconciliate the main tenents of both idealism and realism: that for the first the self is everything and that for the second it is the world which is everything. Keywords: Romanticism, Fichte, Spinoza, idealism, realism, naturalism, self-determination.
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Hoffmann, Susan-Judith. "Breathing Life into Primal Beauty". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 293–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20204820.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In Über den Unterschied des Geistes u. des Buchstabens in der Philosophie, Fichte writes that man’s most fundamental tendency to philosophize is simply the drive to represent for the sake of representing—the same drive which is the ultimate basis of the fine arts. The process of representing for the sake of representing is grounded in “spirit”, which is nothing other than the power of the imagination to raise to consciousness images of das Urschöne. In this paper, I suggest that the affinity between artistic activity and Fichte’s transcendental philosophy is closer than previously thought. I further suggest that for Fichte, transcendental philosophy is a performance and that such an interpretation of Fichte’s thought points to a way out of the circularity in his transcendental project.
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Corsico, Luciano. "Image and Freedom in Fichte’s Doctrine of the State of 1813". Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 240–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte20204817.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In this paper, my aim is to offer an approach to the practical meaning of the concept of image in Fichte’s Doctrine of the State of 1813. The word “image” (Bild) plays an important role within Fichte’s philosophical terminology, especially during the last period of his intellectual production and his academic life, after leaving the University of Jena. Even a superficial reading of the several different versions of the Doctrine of Science allows one to recognize that the above-mentioned term is used by Fichte more frequently during his years in Berlin (1800–1814). Despite this, the determination of the concrete meaning of the term “image” represents a difficult interpretative challenge for readers of Fichte’s philosophy. From my point of view, Fichte uses the term “image” not only at the level of theoretical or methodological reflection, but also at that of praxis. For this reason, Fichte’s transcendental reflection in the Doctrine of the State contains not only an analysis of the negative relationship between image and being, but also, necessarily, an analysis of the positive relationship between image and freedom (Freiheit). Although his Doctrine of the State is based on a theological-religious conception, which could be questioned from the perspective of a secularized rationality, Fichte maintains a consistent conception of knowledge as an image of a world ordered by the moral law. Definitively, this image plays a central role as an original model for the action of every rational being in the sensible world.
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Kultaieva, Mariia. "Education and Self-knowledge: On Actuality of philosophical-educational ideas of Hryhorii Skovoroda and Johann Gottlieb Fichte". Filosofiya osvity. Philosophy of Education 28, n. 2 (30 gennaio 2022): 8–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2022-28-2-1.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The paper considers the relationship between self-knowledge and education on the material of Skovoroda’s and Fichte’s philosophical and educational explorations. Verification of the methodological statement of the unity of theory and biography is carried out, which finds its confirmation in the cases of both Skovoroda and Fichte. These two figures, despite their opposing positions on religion, embody the contradictory nature of the Enlightenment and the expectations associated with it. First of all, that affects the perspective of the emancipation of human and society both in secular versions and in the projects of renewed religion, with the framework prerequisites for the transformation of the latter proposed by Skovoroda and Fichte. The paper compares approaches by Skovoroda and Fichte to solving the problem of humanizing human nature through self-discovery, carried out on the basis of the improvement of worldview education necessary for the assertion of rational freedom; the complementarity of the concepts of “naturalness” (Skovoroda) and “vocation” (Fichte) is substantiated. The paper reveals the heuristic potential of Skovoroda’s anatomical metaphors as a visualization of the transition from the optics of the visible to the invisible in the formation of a “new person”. The distinction between the visible and the invisible and Christian ethics, according to Skovoroda, form the basic foundations of the educational process, and the Bible is the main textbook and teacher, – while Fichte, on the other hand, proclaims the scholar to be the educator and teacher of humanity. In his views on human, Fichte possesses a position opposite to Skovoroda, rejecting arguments in the spirit of Neoplatonism. His philosophical and educational explorations are focused on the improvement of the human race, which after the Napoleonic wars is reduced to the German nation, whose salvation under the situation of political dependence is proclaimed to be national education based on German culture and language.
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Gillett, Robert. "Eschewing the First Person: Post-Subjective Autobiography in Hubert Fichte and his Geschichte der Empfindlichkeit / History of Sensitivity". European Journal of Life Writing 4 (16 marzo 2015): VC37—VC55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5463/ejlw.4.107.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Despite the uncanny similarities between the known facts of Hubert Fichte's life and the events depicted in his works, opinion is still divided as to whether Fichte's work constitutes an autobiography or not. This is partly because, rather than adopting the classic first person or using the same name on the cover as in the inside of the book, Fichte gives his protagonists fictitional names: Detlev, Jäcki. The designation of many of his works as 'novels' does not help either. The thesis of this article is that in his literary works, Fichte deliberately drew on the events of his own life, and deliberately invoked the various genres and procedures of life writing in order to construct what I call 'post-subjective autobiography'. In putting forward this thesis, I demonstrate how, from his third novel onwards, Fichte is not writing from the position of a secure subject, but employing a whole range of devices to interrogate the subject of autobiography. And the conclusion is that this post-subjective autobiography is a únique aesthetic and ethical achievement which we would do well to emulate. This article was submitted to the European Journal of Life Writing in May 2014 and published on 16 March 2015.
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MARCHEGIANI, GIULIO. "ALTERITY, FACTICITY AND FOUNDATION OF FINITE FREEDOM IN LEVINAS. A COMPARISON WITH FICHTE". HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 11, n. 1 (2022): 73–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-73-92.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Starting with the emphasis that Levinas puts on the role of otherness in the constitution of subjective dimension, this paper discusses how the articulation of this process and the consequences that derive from it recall specifically Fichtean themes. Although the relation between Levinas and Fichte has not been thoroughly examined in the literature yet, it can nevertheless be shown that themes such as the “call” of the subject from the outside, from the unattainable dimension of an otherness irreducible to any immanence and the factual and finite character of its correlative freedom can be understood by reference to the categories that Fichte develops in his texts on law and morals. The reference to Fichte, who already in his considerations on the Wissenschaftslehre recognizes an external Anstoß as determining the reality of the subject, will allows to elucidate the fundamental structure of Levinas’ thought. Particular attention is paid in Levinas to the belonging of otherness to an immemorial past, which in the impossibility of being traced back to the presence of consciousness finds the guarantee of its radical transcendence. Thus, another temporal (or rather, extra-temporal) dimension is configured which also in Fichte refers to an “exteriority” that cannot be assumed by the subject, but only ascertained a posteriori, hence its factual character. Through an interpretation of the fundamental meaning that the primacy of otherness over sameness has in Levinas and the attempt to reflect this relationship through the reference to similar Fichtean motifs, it becomes clearer that the basic meaning of a radical thought of otherness does not cancel the sameness of subject, but on the contrary allows to found it by referring it to its constitutive, unavoidable heteronomy.
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Wittekind, Folkart. "Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Protestant Theology". Religions 15, n. 3 (28 febbraio 2024): 302. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel15030302.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s thinking is part of the Sattelzeit, in which the foundation for the modern use of important concepts is laid. The stages of Fichte’s philosophy and his various theories of religion and Christianity reflect attempts to determine the function of religion in a modern society. Important is the philosophical foundation of religion, which is transformed from a moral theology based on Kant to a unified theory of the philosophy of mind. Fichte thus offers an alternative to Hegel and Schelling. This alternative has only been taken up in Protestant theology at a small number of points, but all the more intensively.