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1
Novak, K. "Game theory." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2016. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/46882.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Game theory is a section of applied mathematics that studies various
mathematical models of optimal decision making in conflict situations. J.
Von Neumann and O. Monhenshternom in 1944 wrote the work "Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior." From the very beginning of its
development, it was aimed at solving economic problems. Later it began to
be applied in other areas related to the conflict. Theoretical and playing
methods of optimal solutions are widely used in medicine, in economic and
social planning and forecasting, and other matters of science and
technology.Today, the game theory is widely used in various sciences such
as economic, political, computer, social, etc. Game theory attempts to
identify strategic behavior in different situations mathematically in which
success is the subject of the decision-making and depends on the moves of
other players.
2
Mehta, Aranyak. "Algorithmic Game Theory." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/7220.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The interaction of theoretical computer science with game theory and
economics has resulted in the emergence of two very interesting
research directions. First, it has provided a new model for algorithm
design, which is to optimize in the presence of strategic
behavior. Second, it has prompted us to consider the computational
aspects of various solution concepts from game theory, economics and
auction design which have traditionally been considered mainly in a
non-constructive manner. In this thesis we present progress along both
these directions. We first consider optimization problems that arise
in the design of combinatorial auctions. We provide an online
algorithm in the important case of budget-bounded utilities. This
model is motivated by the recent development of the business of online
auctions of search engine advertisements. Our algorithm achieves a
factor of $1-1/e$, via a new linear programming based technique to
determine optimal tradeoffs between bids and budgets. We also provide
lower bounds in terms of hardness of approximation in more general
submodular settings, via a PCP-based reduction. Second, we consider
truth-revelation in auctions, and provide an equivalence theorem
between two notions of strategy-proofness in randomized auctions of
digital goods. Last, we consider the problem of computing an
approximate Nash equilibrium in multi-player general-sum games, for
which we provide the first subexponential time algorithm.
3
Majure, William Robert. "Disequilibrium game theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11660.
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4
Blankinship, Erik Jackson 1974. "Who's got game (theory)?" Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33877.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Architecture and Planning, Program in Media Arts and Sciences, 2005.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-88).<br>Many players enjoy the challenge of outwitting computer opponents in strategy games. Devising strategies to defeat a computer opponent may enhance certain cognitive skills (e.g., analysis, evaluation, planning). This thesis takes a constructionist approach to gaming, hypothesizing that players may learn more about strategic planning by building their own computer opponents and then playing them to understand how their strategic theories play out in real experiments. I have developed a graphic toolkit for designing strategy games and computer opponents. The goal is to help students learn the underlying mathematical and computer science theories used to win these games. The tools have been designed to eliminate the overhead of using conventional programming languages to build games and focus students on the pedagogical issues of designing and understanding game theory algorithms. I describe the tools as well as initial evaluations of their effectiveness with populations of teenage students. Teenagers in this study posed their own problems, in the form of games they designed, and then hypothesized about winning strategies. Of their own volition, most teenagers iterated on their strategic designs, reformulated problems and hypotheses, isolated variables, and informed next generation versions of this tool with astute suggestions.<br>(cont.) The toolkit designed for this thesis has a low floor, making it easy for people to quickly start playing with mathematical concepts, and a high ceiling for sophisticated exploration.<br>by Erik Jackson Blankinship.<br>Ph.D.
5
Rigos, Alexandros. "Essays in game theory." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/37520.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis explores interactions among agents whose rationality is bounded in distinct ways. It consists of three self-contained chapters/papers. Chapters 2 and 3 consider myopic and hard-wired strategy revisions based on evolutionary game dynamics, while Chapter 4 deals with rationally inattentive agents who acquire costly information in a flexible manner. The thesis, thus, spans two extremes of the range of models with boundedly rational agents. The first paper proposes a novel way to formalize matching mechanisms in evolutionary games. The proposed formalization nests group selection models such as the haystack (Maynard Smith, 1964) and trait-group models (Wilson, 1975). It is shown that evolutionary optima can be obtained as Nash equilibria under appropriately defined matching rules. In the second paper matching rules are endogenized and the co-evolution of cooperation and matching is studied in social dilemma situations. It turns out that only full-or-null assortativity levels are evolutionarily stable. The extent to which efficient outcomes are achieved by this endogenization process is evaluated, which crucially depends on the structure of the particular interaction considered. The third paper extends recent models of flexible information acquisition to an uncountable-action-space setting: a beauty contest coordination game. Necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria with well-behaved strategies are derived. It is established that affine equilibria exist only if the fundamental is normally distributed. A higher coordination motive, a more concentrated prior distribution of the fundamental and higher information costs lead to less attention being paid to the fundamental. Moreover, flexible information acquisition technology is shown to result in equilibrium multiplicity under certain parameter combinations.
6
CAPPELLETTI, GIUSEPPE. "Essays in game theory." Doctoral thesis, Università Bocconi, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/11565/4050398.
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7
Leclerc, Philip. "Prospect Theory Preferences in Noncooperative Game Theory." VCU Scholars Compass, 2014. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/3522.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The present work seeks to incorporate a popular descriptive, empirically grounded model of human preference under risk, prospect theory, into the equilibrium theory of noncooperative games. Three primary, candidate definitions are systematically identified on the basis of classical characterizations of Nash Equilibrium; in addition, three equilibrium subtypes are defined for each primary definition, in order to enable modeling of players' reference points as exogenous and fixed, slowly and myopically adaptive, highly flexible and non-myopically adaptive. Each primary equilibrium concept was analyzed both theoretically and empirically; for the theoretical analyses, prospect theory, game theory, and computational complexity theory were all summoned to analysis. In chapter 1, the reader is provided with background on each of these theoretical underpinnings of the current work, the scope of the project is described, and its conclusions briefly summarized. In chapters 2 and 3, each of the three equilibrium concepts is analyzed theoretically, with emphasis placed on issues of classical interest (e.g. existence, dominance, rationalizability) and computational complexity (i.e, assessing how difficult each concept is to apply in algorithmic practice, with particular focus on comparison to classical Nash Equilibrium). This theoretical analysis leads us to discard the first of our three equilibrium concepts as unacceptable. In chapter 4, our remaining two equilibrium concepts are compared empirically, using average-level data originally aggregated from a number of studies by Camerer and Selten and Chmura; the results suggest that PT preferences may improve on the descriptive validity of NE, and pose some interesting questions about the nature of the PT weighting function (2003, Ch. 3). Chapter 5 concludes, systematically summarizes theoretical and empirical differences and similarities between the three equilibrium concepts, and offers some thoughts on future work.
8
Ramström, Ola. "Visual attention using game theory." Licentiate thesis, KTH, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-349.
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9
Jiang, Ge. "Essays in evolutionary game theory." Thesis, University of Essex, 2016. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/16917/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis contains three essays in evolutionary game theory. In the first chapter, we study the impact of switching costs on the long run outcome in 2X2 coordination games played in the circular city model of local interactions. We find that for low levels of switching costs, the risk dominant convention is the unique long run equilibrium. For intermediate levels of switching costs the set of long run equilibria contains the risk dominant convention but may also contain conventions that are not risk dominant. For high levels of switching costs also nonmonomorphic states will be included in the set of LRE. We study the impact of location heterogeneity on neighborhood segregation in the one-dimensional Schelling residential model in the second chapter. We model location heterogeneity by introducing an advantageous node, in which a player’s utility is impartial to the composition of her neighborhood. We find that when every player interacts with two neighbors, one advantageous node in the circular city will lead to a result that segregation is no longer the unique LRE. When players interact with more neighbors, more advantageous nodes are necessary to obtain the same result. In the third chapter, we consider a model of social coordination and network formation, where players of two groups play a 2X2 coordination game when connected. Players in one group actively decide on whom they play with and on the action in the game, while players in the other group decide on the action in the game only. We find that if either group’s population size is small in comparison to the linking restriction, all players will choose the risk dominant equilibrium, while when both groups are sufficiently large in population, the players of two groups will coordinate on the payoff dominant action.
10
Dal, Borgo Maria Manuela Wagner. "Thucydides : father of game theory." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2016. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1507820/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In this thesis, I interpret Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War utilizing models of game theory to distil the abstract strategic structures that Thucydides illuminates. It is possible by close analysis of the narrative to extract an implicit descriptive theory embedded in the narrative, never made explicit but a consistent presence wherever characters, groups and nations interact. Game theory in its informal structure (i.e. without deploying the full formal apparatus of mathematics) offers a valuable extension to narratology, a narrative theory already successfully introduced into Classical studies. The thesis studies Thucydides’ conception of the agon (contest/competition) in its basic framework from simple strategic and dynamic games to games with boundedly rational players. I argue that Thucydides describes a tropology of interaction by inferring motivations from observed actions. Chapter 1 and 2 discuss Thucydides’ method of reading the minds of historical agents to explore historical causation in simultaneous move and sequential move environments, respectively. Chapter 3 discusses agents with incomplete information and also agents who take irrational decisions. Thucydides allows room in his narrative for players to miscalculate or make conjectures when faced with an interactive environment. He writes history as a description of similar types of potentially recurrent events and sequences linked by a causal chain, whose outcomes are only probabilistically predictable. Whilst analysing different types of interactions, the study aims to explore different game theoretic models based on Thucydides’ tropology of interaction, in order to identify in the final chapter new research directions for rational actor models as well as stochastic environments for the benefit of political science.
11
Ghachem, Montasser. "Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-132433.
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Evolutionary game theory tries to explain the emergence of stable behaviors observed in human and animal societies. Prominent examples of such behaviors are cooperative and conformist behaviors. In the first part of the thesis, we develop a model of indirect reciprocity with institutional screening to study how institutions may promote cooperative behavior. We show that cooperation can emerge if screening institutions are sufficiently reliable at identifying cooperators. The second part presents a large-population learning model in which individuals update their beliefs through time. In the model, only one individual updates his beliefs each period. We show that a population, playing a game with two strategies, eventually learns to play a Nash equilibrium. We focus on coordination games and prove that a unique behavior arises both when players use myopic and perturbed best replies. The third part studies the payoff calculation in an evolutionary setting. By introducing mutual consent as a requirement for game play, we provide a more realistic alternative way to compute payoffs.<br><p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript. Paper 3: Manuscript.</p>
12
Malaspina, Jurado Uldarico. "Elements for teaching game theory." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/96892.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This article is a lecture accepted for presentation and publication in the proceedings of the 2nd International Conference .on the Teaching of Mathematics, held in Crete on July 2002. Some elements to have in mind for the teaching of Game Theory are given, using the author's teaching experience that relies on the viewpoint that encourages the formal development of mathematical concepts after proposing students problems related with these concepts and after stimulating and analyzing their intuitive approaches to the solution of these problems.
13
Cox, Caleb A. "Essays in Behavioral Game Theory." The Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1365163152.
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Kozlovskaya, Maria. "Three essays in game theory." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/37957.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis applies game theoretic methods to problems of individual choice and business strategy. It consists of three self-contained chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 explore strategic interaction between agents who are concerned about the social consequences of their actions, while Chapter 4 considers information use by firms who can spy on their competitors. By investigating these diverse topics, the thesis shows how Game Theory can be used to explain and predict outcomes in a variety of real-life scenarios of economic interest. Chapter 2 explores the effect of “other-regarding” preferences on the outcomes of repeated social interactions, modelled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The models of inequality aversion and guilt aversion are identified as compatible with the existing laboratory evidence on the game, and a novel experiment is run to test them against each other. The experiment provided support for the inequality aversion model, which shows that fairness is an important consideration in repeated social interaction. Chapter 3 develops a formal theory of moral choice by proving a representation theorem for guilt-averse preferences. In the chapter, an axiomatic approach is used to deduce a utility function which explains how people trade off material and moral incentives. A novel logarithmic utility is proposed, which is grounded in realistic psychological assumptions and accounts well for the existing body of laboratory evidence. Chapter 4 investigates the welfare consequences of industrial espionage by modelling it as an information acquisition game played by duopolists. In the model, firms can acquire information about unobservable demand either by conducting market research, or by spying on their competitors. The chapter shows how the two information sources affect price and quantity decisions taken by firms. It also shows that aggregate profit and social welfare grow with the precision of the intelligence technology in most environments.
15
Harper, Stephen Bryce. "Investigations into Social Game Theory." VCU Scholars Compass, 2006. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/812.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Investigations into Social Game Theory is a document that describes my two-year exploration of the ritual encapsulated in our societal framework. It discusses the thoughts and processes that accompanied the three bodies of work that led to the creation of my final thesis exhibition.
16
Symonds, Adam James. "Graphical game theory with mobility." Thesis, Durham University, 2015. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11311/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This study aimed to resolve disparities between the human behaviour predicted by game theoretic models and the behaviours observed in the real world. The existing model of graphical games was analysed and expanded to create a new model in which agents can move themselves around the graph over time. By adopting different configurations of variables, this model can simulate a very wide range of different scenarios. The concept of meta-games was applied to expand this range yet further and introduce more real-world applications. The interactions between different elements of the configuration were investigated to develop an understanding of the model's emergent properties. The study found that this new model is more accurate and more widely applicable than all other pre-existing candidate models. This suggests that human irrationality can generally be accounted for with a better understanding of the environment within which interaction is occurring.
17
Palafox, Damian. "THINKING POKER THROUGH GAME THEORY." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2016. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/314.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Poker is a complex game to analyze. In this project we will use the mathematics of game theory to solve some simplified variations of the game. Probability is the building block behind game theory. We must understand a few concepts from probability such as distributions, expected value, variance, and enumeration methods to aid us in studying game theory. We will solve and analyze games through game theory by using different decision methods, decision trees, and the process of domination and simplification. Poker models, with and without cards, will be provided to illustrate optimal strategies. Extensions to those models will be presented, and we will show that optimal strategies still exist. Finally, we will close this paper with an original work to an extension that can be used as a medium to creating more extensions and, or, different games to explore.
18
Héliou, Amélie. "Molecular conformations and game theory." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017SACLX033/document.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Les protéines et acides ribonucléiques sont les principaux acteurs de nombreux processus cellulaires.Comprendre leurs fonctions, structures et interactions est un challenge important.Les méthodes expérimentales fournissent des informations sur la structure et la dynamique des molécules.Cependant les méthodes expérimentales sont limitées par le nombre de molécules qu'elles peuvent observer et les moyens qu'elles requièrent.Les méthodes de prédiction permettent d'obtenir des informations structurelles de façon quasi-automatique.Pour s'assurer de leur fiabilité, elles sont testées sur des données expérimentales.Nous présentons une procédure basée sur la cinétique inverse pour trouver une transition entre deux conformations d'un ARN tout en conservant sa structure secondaire.Nous obtenons des résultats comparables à l'état de l'art, ce qui montre que notre sélection des degrés de liberté est pertinente.De plus, nous utilisons des données partielles, ce qui permet d'utiliser différents types de résultats expérimentaux.Nous abordons aussi le problème du repliement protéique par une approche de théorie des jeux.Nous représentons une protéine par un jeu où les joueurs sont les acides aminés et les stratégies, les angles dièdres.La prédiction de structure peut alors être vue comme la recherche d'un équilibre dans un jeu multi-joueur où les fonctions d'utilité correspondent à la qualité du repliement.Nous montrons que l'algorithme de non-regret, appelé Hedge, garantit l'élimination des stratégies dominées et la convergence locale vers un équilibre de Nash.Puis, en limitant notre analyse aux jeux de potentiel, nous montrons qu'une classe plus large d'algorithmes, les algorithmes de régularisation, convergent vers un équilibre de Nash presque surement<br>Proteins and Ribonucleic Acids are the workhorses of many cellular processes.Understanding their functions, structures and interactions is an important challenge.Experimental methods provide actual information on structure and dynamics of molecules.However they have limitations : they cannot be applied to all molecules, and they need a lot of resources.Prediction methods are almost automatic ways of obtaining structural information.They are tested on experimental data to attest their reliability.We present, here, approaches tackling different problems.We develop a kinematics-based procedure to morph a RNA molecule between conformations while preserving its secondary structure.We obtain results comparable to state of the art methods showing that our selection of degrees of freedom is efficient.Furthermore we only use sparse information allowing for various kinds of experimental inputs.We also look at the protein structure prediction problem from a game theory angle.We represent the protein dynamics as a game, in which players are amino acids and strategies are dihedrals angles.The structure prediction can thus be seen as finding equilibrium in a multi-players game where all players have utility functions corresponding to the quality of the protein structure.We showed that a well-known no-regret algorithm, called Hedge, guarantees dominated strategies to vanish and a local convergence toward Nash equilibria.Furthermore restricting our analysis to potential games we showed that dual-averaging regularized learning algorithms converge toward a Nash equilibrium almost surely
19
Di, Gaetano Luigi. "Essays in Applied Game Theory." Doctoral thesis, Università di Catania, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10761/1358.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This Thesis is a collection of three essays on applications of game theory to contexts such as licence and patents and, in general, to cultural products and cultural industries.
The first paper develops a model which tries to analyse incentives of corporate donations to open source. Opens source software (OSS) is developed by firms and individuals, and distributed for free. However, these contributions can hardly be explained by the usual considerations, such as the well known warm glow.
In the paper we develop the idea that companies, instead, may use open source software (OSS) as a strategic variable, in a market in which hardware and software are complements.
Hardware firms may be willing to develop OSS in order to decrease the market power of the software producer, in order to charge a greater mark--up.
Moreover, due to the characteristics of information and public good of OSS, it is very interesting to study the welfare effects of strategic interactions and public intervention to support OSS.
Results are several, positive (private) contributions are possible; although, they are not socially optimal. OSS availability has a positive impact on hardware firms' profits and prices, and on social welfare. Software monopolist's profits and price decrease when OSS is available. The effect on the price of the hardware-closed source bundle depends on model parameters: when demand own-price elasticity is relatively high, it increases with respect to the case in which OSS is not developed.
In the second paper, we develop a similar topic by further consider the field of intellectual property. In our vision we think that incomplete information may affect strategic interactions in a system in which patent assessment is not perfectly reliable.
In this model we try to define patent complexity as the degree of difficulty in properly understanding the boundaries (breath) of a patent. Patent complexity determines the degree of spillovers of information released to the potential entrant.
We build a Bayesian game and try to understand if firms can exploit asymmetric information and patent complexity to avoid entry and for other competitive behaviours.
Results are several. Entry deterrence is possible for certain values of parameters. There is an incentive in increasing the complexity, although, there exists an upper-bound which is inefficient, for the incumbent, to cross; this upper--bound is determined by the credibility of the strategic threat.
In the last paper we continue using a Bayesian approach to derive a game theoretic model. We investigate the selection of artists by a gallery with adverse selection and moral hazard and derive an optimal mechanism for cultural industries.
The model accounts for the possibility that artists' output is not homogeneous. Moreover, we think that being recognised as innovative by a system of gate-keepers could affect the price as well. These two characteristics create a market power, which can be exploited by galleries.
We study the relationship between innovation and productivity/creativity in the artist job market, as well as for the effect of gate--keepers in the art market. In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, the choice of the Gallery will depend on the artists' characteristics, as well on the gallery's market power. Furthermore, we find that a segmented market with gate-keeping, where some artists have no opportunity to bid to join a top gallery, has a negative impact on innovation.
20
Sandi, Giulia <1982>. "Matching hypergraphs with game theory." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/13344.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The problem of finding isomorphisms, or matching partitions, in hypergraphs has gained increasing interest from the scientific community in the last years, particularly in the Computer Vision field. This is due to the advantages that arises from overcoming the limitations provided by pairwise relationship, thus encoding a bigger pool of information. Association graph techniques represent a classical approach to tackle the graph matching problem and recently the idea has been generalized to the case of uniform hypergraphs. In this thesis, the potential of this approach, employed together with elements from the Evolutionary Game Theory, is explored. Indeed, the proposed framework uses a class of dynamical systems derived from the Baum-Eagon inequality in order to find the maximum (maximal) clique in the association hypergraph, that corresponds to the maximum (maximal) isomorphism between the hypergraphs to be matched. The proposed approach has extensively been tested with experiments on a large synthetic dataset. In particular both the pure isomorphism and the subgraph isomorphism problems have been analysed. The obtained results reflect the different complexity classes these problems belong to, thus showing that despite its simplicity the Baum-Eagon dynamics does an excellent job at finding globally optimal solutions in the pure isomorphism case, while in the subgraph case the use of more complex dynamics might be more suitable.
21
Paiva, Jonas Alves de. "Application of decision theory to solve game theory problems." Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 2012. https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/10817.
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Submitted by João Arthur Martins (joao.arthur@ufpe.br) on 2015-03-05T17:29:44Z
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Previous issue date: 2012<br>Os problemas de decisão enfrentados atualmente são bastante complexos devido ao grande número de variáveis que devem consideradas na construção dos modelos. Atualmente os tomadores de decisão se utilizam de duas teorias diretamente interligadas conceitualmente, a Teoria da Decisão e a Teoria dos Jogos que o ajudam a escolher uma ação ou conjunto de ações disponíveis, no intuito de maximizar sua utilidade esperada. A primeira teoria usa uma caraterização profunda dos elementos estatísticos os que atuam em um problema de decisão, enquanto que a Teoria dos Jogos analisa as interações entre os agentes, quando a ação de um afeta diretamente o resultado dos demais. Analisar a metodologia de tomada de decisão na Teoria dos Jogos como uma aplicação da Teoria da Decisão foi o principal propósito deste trabalho. Este propósito foi alcançado pelo estabelecimento das relações entre os elementos que
compõem a estrutura das duas teorias e da definição de um algoritmo de resolução sando Teoria da Decisão para resolver problemas de Teoria dos Jogos. Depois partiu-se para a aplicação deste algoritmo para resolução de problemas de jogos simultâneos e sequenciais de dois jogadores, om estratégias puras, mistas e jogos de informação in completa. P de-se constatar que a metodologia da Teoria da De são alcançados mesmos resultados da análise feita pela Teoria dos Jogos. Este resultado reforça o fato de que estas duas teorias trabalham sobre os mesmos princípios e que a relação entre estas é mais imbricada do que se imagina. No aso usando Teoria da Decisão deve-se fazer ajustes na forma de analise para considerar a racionalidade e a interação entre os agentes.
22
Rai, Birendra Kumar. "Essays in game theory and institutions." [College Station, Tex. : Texas A&M University, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1772.
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Kuipers, Jeroen. "Combinatorial methods in cooperative game theory." Maastricht : Maastricht : Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht ; University Library, Maastricht University [Host], 1994. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=6950.
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Wishnietsky, Anida G. Grafton Carl. "Applying game theory to presidential mistakes." Auburn, Ala., 2007. http://repo.lib.auburn.edu/2007%20Fall%20Dissertations/Wishnietsky_Anida_27.pdf.
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Xu, Genjiu. "Matrix approach to cooperative game theory." Enschede : University of Twente [Host], 2008. http://doc.utwente.nl/59410.
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Terry, Elaine Audrey. "Problem solving methods in game theory." DigitalCommons@Robert W. Woodruff Library, Atlanta University Center, 1988. http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/dissertations/1796.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Game theory is the mathematical theory associated with winning strategic and non-strategic games. In order to win a game, a player must find an optimal strategy to play. Strategies may be either pure or mixed. The latter is used when there are no pure strategies available . Games that require mixed strategies may be solved by various methods.
This study is concerned with the basic theory of games. Definitions and methods for solving games are discussed. The methods for solving involve both pure and mixed strategies. The simplex method for solving linear programming problems is reviewed. The numerical examples were solved using the IBM Macintosh with the MacSimplex package.
27
Gilli, Mario. "Equilibrium and learning in game theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.389813.
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Mei, Jie S. M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Applications of game theory in microgrids." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118055.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2018.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 57-62).<br>A microgrid, which can be defined as a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid, has been studied extensively in recent years. This paper will explore the application of non-cooperative game and cooperative game in microgrids. For an individual microgrid that is connected with renewable energy sources through DC-DC converters, a non-cooperative game theory based PI controller tuning method is proposed to help make more stable output voltage. For microgrids that are connected in network, a cooperative game theory based local energy exchange scheme is proposed to help them meet their energy requirements while achieving higher individual utility.<br>by Jie Mei.<br>S.M.
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Aslan, Ercan. "Essays in game theory and bankruptcy." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/21708.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In Chapter 1 I study the iterative strategy elimination mechanisms for normal form games. The literature is mostly clustered around the order of elimination. The conventional elimination also requires more strict knowledge assumptions if the elimination is iterative. I define an elimination process which requires weaker rationality. I establish some preliminary results suggesting that my mechanism is order independent whenever iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) is so. I also specify conditions under which the \undercutting problem" occurs. Comparison of other elimination mechanisms in the literature (Iterated Weak Strategy Elimination, Iterated Strict Strategy Elimination, Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion, RBEU, Dekel-Fudenberg Procedure, Asheim- Dufwenberg Procedure) and mine is also studied to some extent. In Chapter 2 I study the axiomatic characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule: Proportional Division (PROP). The rule allocates shares proportional to agents' claims and hence, is intuitive according to many authors. I give supporting evidence to this opinion by first defining a new type of consistency requirement, i.e. union-consistency and showing that PROP is the only rule that satisfies anonymity, continuity and union-consistency. Note that anonymity and continuity are very general requirements and satisfied by almost all the rules that have been studied in this literature. Thus, I prove that we can choose a unique rule among them by only requiring union-consistency. Then, I define a bankruptcy operator and give some intuition on it. A bankruptcy operator is a mapping from the set of bankruptcy operators to itself. I prove that any rule will converge to PROP under this operator as the claims increase. I show nice characteristics of the operator some of which are related to PROP. I also give a definition for continuity of an operator. In Chapter 3 investigate risk-averse investors' behaviour towards a risky firm. In order to find Pareto Optimal allocations regarding a joint venture, I employ a 2-stage game, first stage of which involves a social-planner committing to an ex-post bankruptcy rule. A bankruptcy rule is a set of suggestions for solving each possible bankruptcy problem. A bankruptcy problem occurs when there is not enough endowment to allocate to the agents each of whom has a claim on it. I devise the game-theoretic approach posed in K1br1s and K1br1s (2013) and extend it further. In fact, that paper considers a comparison among 4 renowned bankruptcy rules whereas mine do not restrict attention to any particular rule but rather aim to find a Pareto Optimal(PO) one. I start with 2 agent case in order to give some insight to the reader and then, generalise the results to an arbitrary number of investors. I find socially desirable (PO) allocations and show that the same can be achieved through financial markets by the help of some well-known results.
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Le, Roux Stéphane. "Generalisation and formalisation in game theory." Lyon, École normale supérieure (sciences), 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008ENSL0449.
Testo completo
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Benešová, Anita. "Job Information Networks and Game Theory." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2010. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-81886.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The use of personal contacts and the role of education as a signal of the Worker's productivity are two important aspects of the job search process. The aim of this thesis is to develop a model that combines both approaches. We distinguish between random and strategic models of job information networks. In the former case the structure of the network is given, while in the latter it depends on the strategic decision of the Workers. We present a strategic model of network formation with two types of Workers who are able to signal their productivity by the level of their education. When applying for a job they have two possibilities of contacting the Employer: a direct application and an indirect application through a friend who currently works for the Employer.
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Chakeri, Alireza. "Scalable Unsupervised Learning with Game Theory." Scholar Commons, 2017. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6616.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Recently dominant sets, a generalization of the notion of the maximal clique to edge-weighted graphs, have proven to be an effective tool for unsupervised learning and have found applications in different domains. Although, they were initially established using optimization and graph theory concepts, recent work has shown fascinating connections with evolutionary game theory, that leads to the clustering game framework. However, considering size of today's data sets, existing methods need to be modified in order to handle massive data. Hence, in this research work, first we address the limitations of the clustering game framework for large data sets theoretically. We propose a new important question for the clustering community ``How can a cluster of a subset of a dataset be a cluster of the entire dataset?''. We show that, this problem is a coNP-hard problem in a clustering game framework. Thus, we modify the definition of a cluster from a stable concept to a non-stable but optimal one (Nash equilibrium). By experiments we show that this relaxation does not change the qualities of the clusters practically.
Following this alteration and the fact that equilibriums are generally compact subsets of vertices, we design an effective strategy to find equilibriums representing well distributed clusters. After finding such equilibriums, a linear game theoretic relation is proposed to assign vertices to the clusters and partition the graph. However, the method inherits a space complexity issue, that is the similarities between every pair of objects are required which proves practically intractable for large data sets. To overcome this limitation, after establishing necessary theoretical tools for a special type of graphs that we call vertex-repeated graphs, we propose the scalable clustering game framework. This approach divides a data set into disjoint tractable size chunks. Then, the exact clusters of the entire data are approximated by the clusters of the chunks. In fact, the exact equilibriums of the entire graph is approximated by the equilibriums of the subsets of the graph. We show theorems that enable significantly improved time complexity for the model. The applications include, but are not limited to, the maximum weight clique problem, large data clustering and image segmentation. Experiments have been done on random graphs and the DIMACS benchmark for the maximum weight clique problem and on magnetic resonance images (MRI) of the human brain consisting of about 4 million examples for large data clustering. Also, on the Berkeley Segmentation Dataset, the proposed method achieves results comparable to the state of the art, providing a parallel framework for image segmentation and without any training phase. The results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.
In another part of this research work, we generalize the clustering game method to cluster uncertain data where the similarities between the data points are not exactly known, that leads to the uncertain clustering game framework. Here, contrary to the ensemble clustering approaches, where the results of different similarity matrices are combined, we focus on the average utilities of an uncertain game. We show that the game theoretical solutions provide stable clusters even in the presence of severe uncertainties. In addition, based on this framework, we propose a novel concept in uncertain data clustering so that every subset of objects can have a ''cluster degree''. Extensive experiments on real world data sets, as well as on the Berkeley image segmentation dataset, confirm the performance of the proposed method.
And finally, instead of dividing a graph into chunks to make the clustering scalable, we study the effect of the spectral sparsification method based on sampling by effective resistance on the clustering outputs. Through experimental and theoretical observations, we show that the clustering results obtained from sparsified graphs are very similar to the results of the original non-sparsified graphs. The rand index is always at about 0.9 to 0.99 in our experiments even when lots of sparsification is done.
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Cobanli, Onur. "An application of cooperative game theory." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17103.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Die Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Essays zur Anwendung der kooperativen Spieltheorie auf den internationalen Erdgashandel. Das internationale Erdgasnetz wird von einem stilisierten quantitativen Modell dargestellt, welches aus den wichtigsten Produzenten, Verbrauchern, Pipelines und LNG-Terminals besteht. Die Koalitionsfunktion berücksichtigt wesentliche Merkmale des internationalen Gashandels und schildert die Abhängigkeiten zwischen den Akteuren. Das Spiel wird mit dem Shapley-Wert und dem Nukleolus gelöst, welche alternative Indizes für die Darstellung der Machtstruktur sind. Kapitel 1 versucht die Interessen der Spieler in drei Pipeline-Projekte, d.h. Nord Stream, South Stream und Nabucco, zu rationalisieren. Das Kapitel ordnet die Investitionen in die neuen Pipelines ihren Auswirkungen auf die Verhandlungsmacht der Akteure zu und zieht dabei Rückschlüsse auf die Aussagekraft der Lösungskonzepte. Der Shapley-Wert rechtfertigt die jüngsten Investitionen in die Pipelines als rationale Versuche, die Machtstruktur zu verändern. Im Gegensatz zum Shapley-Wert kann der Nukleolus die empirischen Beobachtungen nicht nachbilden. Kapitel 2 studiert Pipeline-Projekte im zentralasiatischen Raum. Die Ergebnisse erklären die Unterstützung der zentralasiatischen Länder für eine nach China verlaufende Pipeline statt einem nach Europa führenden Projekt, und zeigen, dass die Konkurrenz zwischen China und Europa für das zentralasiatische Erdgas vernachlässigbar ist. Kapitel 3 untersucht die bedeutendsten Entwicklungen in Angebot und Nachfrage im globalen LNG-Markt sowie deren Einfluss auf die Machtstruktur im eurasischen Erdgashandel. Die Entwicklungen kommen den europäischen Verbrauchern deutlich zugute, aber scheitern dabei, die Macht der etablierten Anbieter um Europa, beispielsweise Russlands, einzudämmen.<br>The dissertation contains three independent essays on the application of cooperative game theory on the international natural gas trade. The international natural gas network is represented by a stylized disaggregated quantitative model consisting of its major producers, customers, trunk-pipelines and LNG terminals. The value function considers essential characteristics of the international gas trade and characterizes the interdependencies between the major actors. The game is solved with the Shapley value and the nucleolus as alternative indexes for capturing the power of different players. Chapter 1 aims to rationalize players'' interest in the three pipeline projects, i.e., Nord Stream, South Stream, and Nabucco. The chapter relates the investments into the new pipelines to their impact on the power structure and thereby makes conclusions about the explanatory power of the solution concepts. While the Shapley value can explain the recent investments in the new pipelines as a rational attempt to alter the power structure in the network, the nucleolus, in contrast, fails to replicate the empirical evidence. Chapter 2 studies pipeline options of the Central Asian countries aimed at diversifying their transit routes and export markets. The results explain the Central Asian countries'' endorsement for an eastbound pipeline to China rather than a Europe-bound option, and show negligible demand competition between China and Europe for Central Asian supplies. Chapter 3 investigates major supply and demand developments in the global LNG market as well as their impact on the power structure in the Eurasian natural gas trade. The developments benefit European consumers significantly, but barely curtail the power of the established suppliers in close proximity to Europe, such as Russia.
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Sekli, Guillaume. "Three applications of cooperative game theory." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023UBFCB006.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
La théorie des jeux coopératifs est un ensemble d'outils pertinents pour appréhender des situations conflictuelles dans lesquels des agents économiques coopèrent pour ensuite récupérer une part du fruit de la coopération. Le projet s'articule autour de trois différentes applications originales ; dans le domaine de l'économie de la santé avec la mise en place de soins intégrés pour le traitement des maladies chroniques entrainant une coopération des prestataires de soins ; dans le domaine de la taxation internationale avec l'étude de la mise en place d'un taux commun harmonisé pour taxer les profits des firmes multinationales dans les pays du G7/G20; et dans le domaine de la finance avec l'études des signaux apportés par les donateurs dans des projets utilisant les plateformes de crowdfunding comme source de financement<br>Cooperative game theory is a set of relevant tools for understanding conflict situations in which economic agents cooperate in order to recover a share of the fruit of the cooperation. The project is articulated around three different original applications; in the field of health economics with the implementation of integrated care for the treatment of chronic diseases leading to a cooperation of care providers; in the field of international taxation with the study of the implementation of a common harmonized rate to tax the profits of multinational firms in the G7/G20 countries; and in the field of finance with the study of the signals brought by contributors in projects using crowdfunding platforms as a source of financing
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Mroué, Bouchra. "Decarbonization strategies : a game theory perspective." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lorraine, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024LORR0027.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Cette thèse étudie l’impact socio-économique du changement climatique à l’aide de la théorie des jeux et a pour but de déterminer des stratégies de réduction d’émission au niveau des gouvernements. La thèse commence par une introduction informelle, offrant des perspectives sur la modélisation des problèmes liés au changement climatique à l’aide de la théorie des jeux et de l’optimisation, les deux piliers méthodologiques de la thèse. Le Chapitre 2 propose un traitement formel, présentant des préliminaires essentiels pour les chapitres suivants. Les définitions de la théorie des graphes et les concepts clés de la théorie des jeux, cruciaux pour la thèse, sont présentés dans ce chapitre fondamental. Le Chapitre 3 présente la motivation du sujet de recherche abordé dans cette thèse et résume les contributions proposées. Il examine de manière critique les limites des stratégies actuelles de réduction des émissions, principalement motivées par des considérations économiques à court terme, empêchant les efforts mondiaux. Ensuite, nous présentons une synthèse approfondie sur les modèles de changement climatique et les cadres théoriques utilisés pour leur analyse. Les modèles climatiques, inspirés des projections du GIEC, font l’objet d’une analyse afin de mettre en lumière les circonstances qui influencent le comportement des nations en matière de réduction des émissions. Dans le Chapitre 4, nous formulons un jeu statique sous forme stratégique, nous permettant d’étudier le processus de prise de décision et de mettre en évidence un comportement écologiquement responsable. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous effectuons une analyse complète des équilibres de Nash du jeu. Nous fournissons des conditions sous lesquelles l’équilibre est unique et analysons numériquement l’impact de différents choix de modélisation. Le chapitre se termine par une brève discussion résumant les messages clés de cette partie. L’étude se poursuit dans le Chapitre 5, où le problème du changement climatique est présenté sous la forme d’un jeu d’imitation. Dans cette configuration, les joueurs minimisent une fonction d’utilité comprenant des avantages socio-économiques, des dommages liés au changement climatique globale et un terme d’imitation capturant l’influence des autres joueurs. L’analyse de l’équilibre de Nash révèle une variété de comportements des joueurs face à la prise de conscience du changement climatique et à l’influence mutuelle. Des paramètres clés, tels que le poids de l’imitation, sont analysés numériquement, soulignant l’importance de la coordination et de la coopération dans l’atténuation du changement climatique. Cette thèse étudie l’interaction complexe entre les considérations climatiques et la théorie des jeux, offrant une compréhension nuancée des stratégies mondiales de réduction des émissions. Les perspectives fournies contribuent au domaine de la recherche de solutions durables pour faire face au réchauffement climatique<br>This thesis delves into the study of climate change by the tools of game theory, investigating strategies for global emissions reduction. The journey begins with an informal introduction, providing insights into the modeling of climate change problems using game theory and optimization—the twin pillars of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a formal treatment, presenting preliminaries which are instrumental for the subsequent chapters. Graph theory definitions and key concepts in game theory, pivotal to the thesis, are revisited in this foundational chapter. Chapter 3 outlines the motivation for the research subject addressed in this thesis and summarizes the proposed contributions. It critically examines the limitations of the current emission reduction strategies, primarily driven by short-term economic considerations, blocking global efforts. Next, we present a thorough survey of the climate change models and the theoretical frameworks employed for their analysis. Climate models, inspired by IPCC projections, are examined to unravel the circumstances influencing nations’ behavior in emissions reduction. In Chapter 4, we formulate a static game model in the strategic form, allowing us to study the decision-making process and exhibit environmentally conscious behavior. To reach this goal, we conduct a complete analysis of the Nash equilibria of the game. We provide conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and numerically analyze the impact of different modeling choices. The Chapter ends with a brief discussion summarizing the takeaway messages of this part. The study continues in Chapter 5, where the climate change problem is cast as an imitation game. In this setup, the players are minimizing a utility function including socio-economic benefits, global climate change damage, and an imitation term capturing the influence of the other players. The Nash equilibrium analysis unveils a variety of players’ behaviors under climate change awareness and mutual influence. Key parameters, such as the weight of imitation, are numerically analyzed, emphasizing the importance of coordination and cooperation in mitigating climate change. This thesis explores the complex interplay between climate considerations and game theory, providing a nuanced understanding of global emissions reduction strategies. The provided insights contribute to the broad subject of finding sustainable solutions for addressing the urgent issue of global warming
36
Marston, Matthew C. "Game based design : a game theory based approach to engineering design." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/15877.
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CONSTANTINO, DA SILVA RUI MIGUEL. "ESSAYS ON EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION AND GAME THEORY." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/636885.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The problem of equilibrium selection has been a relevant and fundamental topic in game theory since the own definition of the Nash equilibrium concept. However, despite its importance, this topic does not appear any longer as a top priority in the game-theoretic research agenda; at least, considering the absence of relevant contributions in the last two decades. In its present state, the existent literature consists of an eclectic collection of methods, each one dependent on a particular methodology, or tailored merely to a specific class of problems. Hence, it becomes almost impossible to organize those approaches under the umbrella of one or two research programs.
The current state is partially the product of the initial approach to the equilibrium multiplicity issue; that was the equilibrium refinement research program. Its purpose was the refinement of the equilibrium concept, seeking in the process to produce more reasonable predictions, and to reduce the number of possible solutions in a game. However, the result was a sequence of competing refinements and the absence of a consensual and unanimous concept. Even in extensive-form games, where the sequential equilibrium concept is possibly the most sensible candidate, we can find several variations that depend on the conditions for the consistency of beliefs, none of which being entirely satisfactory. The first approach aiming at the development of rational criteria for the selection of an equilibrium as the solution of a game emerges in the late 1980s, seen as the culmination of the refinement program and led by two of its main contributors, John Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. The subsequent interest resulted in some new methods and theories; however, none became utterly dominant. The slowdown that followed was also the product of an emerging paradigm, under which the information provided by the multiplicity of solutions is perhaps more useful than the prediction/prescription of a single one.
However, in my opinion, game theory has reached a stage that justifies renewed attention over this topic. In the one hand, the information provided by the multiplicity of solutions does not prevent the selection of a single solution. On the other hand, the dissemination of game theoretical tools in applied research raises the necessity for sensible predictions. Those predictions do not have to correspond to an exact behavior code; instead, they may just have a prescriptive orientation, matching the limitations that real agents face. The absence of such criteria limits the impact of game-theoretical tools and raises questions as to the usefulness of the theory itself. The product of behavioral and experimental economics research also has increased the criticism on game theory, based on the argument that a theory that does not make consistent and recurrent predictions cannot be effectively useful in social sciences.
In this dissertation, I treat the selection issue with a prescriptive orientation. Therefore, I propose an equilibrium selection method to static games with complete information and an extension of it to dynamic games with asymmetric information.
In the first paper - equilibrium selection in static games - I define criteria of risk and payoff dominance, which I combine into a single measure. That measure - the premium of an equilibrium - represents the risk of an equilibrium to a player, given his perception about risk, and the expected payoff. Such measure helps to rationalize the available experimental evidence by adjusting the importance of each dominance criterion to the selection of an equilibrium according to the characteristics of the game, namely, the distribution of the payoffs across the game outcomes. The solution of a game is an equilibrium that minimizes the premium to the player, that is, which minimizes the risk to a player given their perception of risk and their expected payoff, conditional on the same being true for every opponent. I provide a brief axiomatic characterization of that measure, and show that the solution set is nonempty and that almost all games have a unique solution; therefore, the set of games with multiple solutions have null Lebesgue measure.
In the second paper, I extend the method to dynamic games with asymmetric information. Considering the sequential nature of decision making, I show that a solution of an extensive-form game does not necessarily coincide with the solution of its reduced normal-form. I apply the method to the most basic version of Spence signaling game with just two types of worker. I obtain that the solution of such a game depends on the firms’ prior concerning the players’ types. In both dynamic and static games, I show that the method’s solutions respect certain invariance properties.
I am then able to identify several directions of research. In one direction, we have the application of the selection method to specific problems in which the multiplicity of solutions play a critical role. Among such problems, I highlight bank-runs, and climate change negotiations. Additionally, I am interested in expanding the selection analysis of Spence game through the inclusion of additional types of worker. Another direction follows a different path, and focus on the identification and further characterization of the epistemic conditions of this selection method, and the comparison with the conditions in other selection methods and/or equilibrium refinement concepts.
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Beale, Matthew Carson. "Playing the Writing Game: Gaming the Writing Play." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/32006.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
My studies consider the application of digital game theory to the instruction of writing in the first year composition classroom. I frame my argument through dialectic of representation and simulation and the cultural shift now in progress from the latter to the former. I first address the history of multimodal composition in the writing classroom, specifically noting the movement from analysis to design. In the third chapter, I examine several primary tenants of video game theory in relation to traditional academic writing, such as the concept of authorship and the importance of a rule system. My final chapter combines the multimodal and digital game theory to create what I term â digital game composition pedagogy.â The last chapter offers new ways to discuss writing and composing through the theories of video games, and shows how video games extend the theories associated with writing to discussions that coincide with an interest that many of our students have outside of the classroom.<br>Master of Arts
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Pálffy, Miklós-Paul. "Game Theory and M&A Transactions." St. Gallen, 2007. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/03606407001/$FILE/03606407001.pdf.
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Markakis, Evangelos. "Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Microeconomics." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/7173.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The purpose of this thesis is to study algorithmic questions that arise in the context of game theory and microeconomics. In particular, we investigate the computational complexity of various economic solution concepts by
using and advancing methodologies from the fields of combinatorial optimization and approximation algorithms.
We first study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents, who express preferences over combinations of items through their utility functions. Several objectives have been considered in the economic literature in different contexts. In fair division theory, a desirable outcome is to minimize the envy or the envy-ratio between any pair of players. We use tools from the theory of linear and integer programming as well as combinatorics to derive new approximation algorithms and hardness results for various types of utility functions. A different objective that has been considered in the context of auctions, is to find an allocation that maximizes the social welfare, i.e., the total utility derived by the agents. We construct
reductions from multi-prover proof systems to obtain inapproximability results, given standard assumptions for the utility functions of the agents.
We then consider equilibrium concepts in games. We derive the first subexponential algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in $2$-player noncooperative games and extend our result to multi-player games. We further propose a second algorithm based on solving polynomial equations over the reals. Both algorithms improve the previously known upper bounds on the complexity of the problem.
Finally, we study game theoretic models that have been introduced recently to address incentive issues in Internet routing. A polynomial time algorithm is obtained for computing equilibria in such games, i.e., routing schemes and payoff allocations from which no subset of agents has an incentive to deviate. Our algorithm is based on linear programming duality theory. We also obtain generalizations when the agents have nonlinear utility functions.
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McAvoy, Alexander Patrick. "Essays on game theory and stochastic evolution." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/58514.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Evolutionary game theory is a popular framework for modeling the evolution of populations via natural selection. The fitness of a genetic or cultural trait often depends on the composition of the population as a whole and cannot be determined by looking at just the individual ("player") possessing the trait. This frequency-dependent fitness is quite naturally modeled using game theory since a player's trait can be encoded by a strategy and their fitness can be computed using the payoffs from a sequence of interactions with other players. However, there is often a distinct trade-off between the biological relevance of a game and the ease with which one can analyze an evolutionary process defined by a game. The goal of this thesis is to broaden the scope of some evolutionary games by removing restrictive assumptions in several cases. Specifically, we consider multiplayer games; asymmetric games; games with a continuous range of strategies (rather than just finitely many); and alternating games. Moreover, we study the symmetries of an evolutionary process and how they are influenced by the environment and individual-level interactions. Finally, we present a mathematical framework that encompasses many of the standard stochastic evolutionary processes and provides a setting in which to study further extensions of stochastic models based on natural selection.<br>Science, Faculty of<br>Mathematics, Department of<br>Graduate
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Tsakas, Elias. "Essays on epistemology and evolutionary game theory." Göteborg : Dept. of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, 2008. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016654920&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Wallace, Christopher Conor. "Evolutionary game theory in the social sciences." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.322749.
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Kim, Ngan M. "U.S.-Vietnam Military Relations: Game Theory Perspective." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7367.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In recent years, China has been flexing its military power and strengthening its claim to the resource-rich Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. These islands are also being claimed by five other countries Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Currently China claims the entire South China Sea as its territorial waters. The U.S. has great interest in this issue because its trade routes with the Asia-Pacific region go through the South China Sea. Throughout history, Vietnam and China have had a contentious relationship. Like China, Vietnam is currently modernizing its military and strengthening its claims to the South China Sea. Of the claimants to the South China Sea, Vietnam seems to be the only country that is willing to challenge Chinese assertiveness in the region. Since the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam, the two former enemies have become important trading partners. The United States and Vietnam are conducting yearly high-level military visits, however, the U.S. wants to take this relationship to the next level. This thesis will apply game theory and analyze whether the U.S. can influence Vietnam to open a more formal military relationship to counterbalance the assertiveness of China in the South China Sea. This thesis concludes that, from a game theoretic Strategic Moves perspective, the U.S. currently cannot apply threats, promises, or a combination thereof to compel or coerce Vietnam toward a more formal military alliance to counterbalance the assertiveness of China in the South China Sea.
45
Lockwood, Ben. "Dynamic equilibrium : game theory, contracts, and search." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1986. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56207/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis comprises three chapters centered on two common themes. The first theme is the application of non-cooperative game theory to economic questions; the second is the study of the kind of arrangements that can arise in the labour market as a response to asymmetric information. The first chapter surveys recent developments in non-cooperative game theory, and then attempts an extension of the recent results characterising perfect equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without discounting to more general games. We choose the dynamic game framework for the generalisation, and shows that there are two jointly, but not indi vidually sufficient condi tions for the generalisation to go through. We then turn to an application of these ideas to the theory of longterm contracts. The main motivation for this is that the view that wages and employment are determined by risk-sharing implicit contracts is now a well established alternative to fixed-price and marketclearing theories. In general, long-term arrangements may mitigate inefficiencies in the short-term contract that arise from various sorts of asymmetric information which are likely to be prevalent in worker-firm relationships. In this chapter two things are attempted; first, we try to integrate the game-theoretic approach to contractinq of Radner with the work of Townshend, Rogerson, Roberts and Manning among others, and second, we characterise the optimal contract, and obtain some new results. The labour market is also the topic of the third chapter. Here, we attempt to extend a well-known model of "frictional" labour market equilibrium to the case where onr or both sides of the market differ in inherent characteristics (e.g. skills) which may be observable or unobservable. We show first that the equilibrium may be inefficient even in the absence of externalities which work through the matching technology. Also, the model with unobservable characteristics provides a framework for a theoretical anal;Tsis of the practice of firms of screening workers by unemployment duration. We show that in our model, there are screening equilibria, and also investigate in some detail the impact of exogenous variables on the equilibrium.
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Moore, David John. "Dialogue game theory for intelligent tutoring systems." Thesis, Leeds Beckett University, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.333697.
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Burton, A. C. "Considerations towards a non-rationalistic game theory." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.267317.
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COUTINHO, FELIPE DE OLIVEIRA. "GAME THEORY AND JUDICIAL RECOVERY OF COMPANIES." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2017. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=32454@1.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO<br>COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR<br>O principal objetivo deste trabalho é utilizar a teoria dos jogos para
analisar as estratégias de um plano de recuperação judicial proposto por uma
empresa. O princípio que envolve a recuperação está ligado à função social da
empresa, que nada mais é do que toda função que ela possui para a sociedade do
local onde se encontra. A teoria dos jogos é um ramo da matemática que também
é conhecida como ciência da estratégia e, como o próprio nome diz, estuda as
situações estratégicas onde os jogadores escolhem diferentes ações na tentativa de
obter o melhor retorno possível nas suas escolhas. Para fazer essa análise
tomamos o plano de recuperação judicial da empresa Oi S/A e detalhamos as
estratégias de pagamento oferecidas por ela. Avaliando assim a melhor estratégia
para a empresa e por consequência a melhor estratégia também para os credores
envolvidos. Um jogo onde existe uma situação que é considerada ideal para
ambas as partes é considerado um jogo que cada pessoa envolvida toma suas
decisões para benefício próprio, mas em nossas análises podemos observar que
nem sempre na recuperação judicial poderemos avaliar o jogo desta maneira,
afinal se um credor optar por este tipo de jogo em um cenário mais racional, o
prejuízo financeiro e social acabará sendo maior do que se optar por um jogo onde
exista uma cooperação entre os jogadores e que trará um retorno positivo e onde a
empresa obterá maiores prazos e condições de pagamento.<br>The main objective of this work is to use game theory to analyze the strategies of a judicial recovery plan proposed by a company. The principle that involves recovery is linked to the social function of the company, which is nothing more than any function it has for society in the place where it is. Game
theory is a branch of mathematics that is also known as the science of strategy and, as the name implies, studies the strategic situations in which players choose different actions in an attempt to obtain the best possible return on their choices. To do this analysis we take the legal recovery plan of the company Oi S / A and detail the payment strategies offered by it. Evaluating the best strategy for the company and consequently the best strategy also for the creditors involved. A game where there is a situation that is considered ideal for both parties is considered a game that each person involved makes their decisions for their own benefit, but in our analyzes we can observe that not always in judicial recovery we can evaluate the game in this way, a lender opts for this type of game in a more rational scenario, the financial and social loss will be greater than if you opt for a game where there is a cooperation between the players and that will bring a positive return and where the company will obtain longer deadlines and payment conditions.
49
Wei, Mengxing. "Essays on psychological game theory and ambiguity." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/40696.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis mainly focuses on two themes, psychological game theory and quantum decision theory. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 study how emotions and other-regarding preferences affect classical results in game theory. Chapter 4 tests the quantum decision theory model of the Ellsberg paradox that has been developed by al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2017). Chapter 2 models guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions in a one-shot public goods game. Using the induced beliefs method in both within-subjects design (strategy method) and between-subjects design, the experimental results show that guilt-aversion is predominant relative to surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions are important. Chapter 3 compares three main competing explanations for the choice of effort by workers in a gift exchange game - classical reciprocity (Akerlofs action-based formulation, Malmendier and Schmidt (2017) formulation) and belief-based reciprocity (psychological game theory). Experimental results show that all models explain well about the workers choices of efforts, and psychological game theory can predict their emotions of guilt. However, Akerlofs model is the best in terms of parsimony and fit. Chapter 4 experimentally tests the matching probabilities for the Ellsberg paradox, which is based on a parameter-free theoretical derivation using quantum probabilities rather than Kolmogorov probabilities (al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2017). The experimental results are consistent with the quantum model, and subjects are ambiguity seeking for the low probabilities but ambiguity averse for the medium and high probabilities.
50
Aghassi, Michele Leslie. "Robust optimization, game theory, and variational inequalities." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33670.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2005.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-109).<br>We propose a robust optimization approach to analyzing three distinct classes of problems related to the notion of equilibrium: the nominal variational inequality (VI) problem over a polyhedron, the finite game under payoff uncertainty, and the network design problem under demand uncertainty. In the first part of the thesis, we demonstrate that the nominal VI problem is in fact a special instance of a robust constraint. Using this insight and duality-based proof techniques from robust optimization, we reformulate the VI problem over a polyhedron as a single- level (and many-times continuously differentiable) optimization problem. This reformulation applies even if the associated cost function has an asymmetric Jacobian matrix. We give sufficient conditions for the convexity of this reformulation and thereby identify a class of VIs, of which monotone affine (and possibly asymmetric) VIs are a special case, which may be solved using widely-available and commercial-grade convex optimization software. In the second part of the thesis, we propose a distribution-free model of incomplete- information games, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty.<br>(cont.) Our "robust game" model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi's Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative, distribution-free equilibrium concept, for which, in contrast to ex post equilibria, existence is guaranteed. We show that computation of "robust-optimization equilibria" is analogous to that of Nash equilibria of complete- information games. Our results cover incomplete-information games either involving or not involving private information. In the third part of the thesis, we consider uncertainty on the part of a mechanism designer. Specifically, we present a novel, robust optimization model of the network design problem (NDP) under demand uncertainty and congestion effects, and under either system- optimal or user-optimal routing. We propose a corresponding branch and bound algorithm which comprises the first constructive use of the price of anarchy concept. In addition, we characterize conditions under which the robust NDP reduces to a less computationally demanding problem, either a nominal counterpart or a single-level quadratic optimization problem. Finally, we present a novel traffic "paradox," illustrating counterintuitive behavior of changes in cost relative to changes in demand.<br>by Michele Leslie Aghassi.<br>Ph.D.