Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Moral ignorance"
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Articoli di riviste sul tema "Moral ignorance":
Harman, Elizabeth. "DOES MORAL IGNORANCE EXCULPATE?" Ratio 24, n. 4 (9 novembre 2011): 443–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x.
Zimmerman, Michael J. "Moral Responsibility and Ignorance". Ethics 107, n. 3 (aprile 1997): 410–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/233742.
Mason, Elinor. "Moral ignorance and blameworthiness". Philosophical Studies 172, n. 11 (31 gennaio 2015): 3037–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0456-7.
Guerrero, Alexander A. "UNEXCUSED REASONABLE MISTAKES: CAN THE CASE FOR NOT EXCUSING MISTAKES OF LAW BE SUPPORTED BY THE CASE FOR NOT EXCUSING MISTAKES OF MORALITY?" Legal Theory 21, n. 2 (giugno 2015): 86–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135232521600001x.
Heikes, Deborah K. "Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility". Southwest Philosophy Review 36, n. 1 (2020): 93–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036111.
Wieland, Jan Willem. "What's Special about Moral Ignorance?" Ratio 30, n. 2 (14 dicembre 2015): 149–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12127.
Fields, Lloyd. "Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness". Philosophy 69, n. 270 (ottobre 1994): 397–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100047239.
Shapira, Reuven. "Prevalent concealed ignorance of low-moral careerist managers". Management Decision 53, n. 7 (17 agosto 2015): 1504–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-10-2014-0620.
Hartman, Robert J. "Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility". Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10, n. 1 (25 gennaio 2021): 58–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.481.
Harbour, Michael. "Ignorance of the Law and Moral Desert". Southwest Philosophy Review 28, n. 1 (2012): 209–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201228121.
Tesi sul tema "Moral ignorance":
Nanni, Milo. "Moral responsibility and ignorance". Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/49072/.
Markey, Bren April. "Feminist methodologies in moral philosophy". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9107.
Cox, Patrick A. "The Effects of Learning on Moral Education for Rousseau". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/121.
Sjölander, Johansson Jakob Andreas. "Provisional Values". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-184983.
Denna uppsats handlar om problemet med vår brist på kunskap om värde och hur manbäst hanterar det. Jag försöker ta reda på vad vi borde göra i situationer där vi ärokunniga om vilka mål som är värdefulla att uppnå. Den lösning som föreslås är ettindirekt system av ”provisoriskt värde”. Detta system är uppbyggt kring tre mål somsannolikt kommer att öka våra chanser att uppnå direkta eller verkliga värden, om ensådan sak skulle vara möjlig. Dessa tre provisoriska mål som systemet ger oss ärföljande: kunskap, optionalitet och mångfald.Kunskap är det traditionella sättet att försöka lindra vår okunnighet, och harvarit fokus för det mesta filosoferandet om värde.Optionalitet innebär att ha alternativ eller makten att agera annorlunda. Dettakommer sannolikt att bli viktigt om vi någonsin upptäcker vad det är värdefullt attgöra.Slutligen är mångfald helt enkelt tanken att om vi inte vet vad som verkligen ärvärdefullt så bör vi göra så mycket som möjligt av allt i hopp om att något av det kanvisa sig värdefullt.
Thomas, Joaquin Teruji. "Topics in population ethics". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:fa2a09aa-e784-4126-bd4a-0487d3653add.
Fishman, Christine A. "Making Way for Equity: Elementary Principals' Interpretations of Equity". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1269042026.
Lappalainen, Isa. "The Secret Ingredients to Moral Philosophy: Blood, Sweat, and Tears : On bad enough worst-case scenarios in experimental approximations of John Rawls' Original Position". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-374308.
Petipermon, Frédérick. "Le discernement en droit pénal". Thesis, Paris 2, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA020080.
Discernment is traditionally attached to the study of the « moral element » of the offense. Under the influence of the Penal Code of 1810, the foundations of natural law are at work, so that the discernment was defined by canon law as the ability to distinguish good from evil. But this understanding does not reveal the content of the original criterion of free will: it used to correspond to the knowledge of the divine law which secular law was only the reflection. The analysis of positive law secularized invites you to discover the existence of a presumption of knowledge of the law as imperative as it was in the systems of ancient penalty. Discernment can then be defined as a reflexive consciousness: the awareness of rights and obligations identified to each person within legal statutes that the proliferation of standards helps to clarify. Also, guilt is not a knowledge of the wrongfulness of an outcome; it proceeds fromignorance of the legal requirements in the person who is presumed to know of its existence. In criminal proceedings, this presumption becomes protective of the rights of the suspect. No coercive act can be exercised against him if he has not been notified of the status to which he belongs. This information ensures the retributive purpose of punishment, for the one who can’t ignore the reasons for his conviction. In any event, the submission of individuals to the established rules is the only objective of the criminal law, which might imply that it accepts the presence of victims in criminal proceedings, for the sole purpose of preserving their faith in his imperativity
Robichaud, Philip. "Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Quality of Will Approach". Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/64675.
Ehrich, Kristine Renee. "Willful ignorance: the avoidance of ethical attribute information". Thesis, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/1955.
Libri sul tema "Moral ignorance":
Zimmerman, Michael J. Living with uncertainty: The moral significance of ignorance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Peels, Rik. Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy. 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge: Routledge, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315671246.
Twesigye, Emmanuel K. The global human problem: Ignorance, hate, injustice, and violence. New York: P. Lang, 1988.
Tamine, Jacques. Nouvel éloge de l'ignorance. Fernelmont: E.M.E., 2010.
Tamine, Jacques. Nouvel éloge de l'ignorance. Fernelmont: E.M.E., 2010.
Sher, George. Blame and Moral Ignorance. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190660413.003.0010.
Sher, George, a cura di. Blame and Moral Ignorance. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0005.
Ignorance And Moral Obligation. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Blaauw, Martijn, e Rik Peels. Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy. Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.
Zimmerman, Michael J. Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Capitoli di libri sul tema "Moral ignorance":
Harman, Elizabeth. "Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?" In Developing Deontology, 95–120. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118368794.ch6.
Bisel, Ryan S. "Stories of Organizational Moral Learning and Ignorance". In Organizational Moral Learning, 204–33. New York, NY : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315652252-13.
Bisel, Ryan S. "Pluralistic Moral Ignorance and Spirals of Silent Misdirection". In Organizational Moral Learning, 82–98. New York, NY : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315652252-6.
Midgley, Mary. "Can We Base Freedom on Ignorance?" In Can’t We Make Moral Judgements?, 3–11. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-09446-9_1.
Matthyssen, Mieke. "The Moral Code of Playing Dumb". In Ignorance is Bliss: The Chinese Art of Not Knowing, 279–333. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73902-7_7.
Weatherson, Brian. "Blame and Moral Ignorance". In Normative Externalism, 84–108. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0005.
Zimmerman, Michael J. "Moral Rights". In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, 113–40. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688852.003.0005.
Prichard, H. A. "Duty and Ignorance of Fact". In Moral Writings, 84–101. Oxford University Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199250197.003.0006.
Zimmerman, Michael J. "Three Views of Moral Obligation". In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, 1–24. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688852.003.0001.
Zimmerman, Michael J. "In Defense of the Prospective View". In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, 25–57. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688852.003.0002.