Articoli di riviste sul tema "North Atlantic Treaty Organization. European Union. National security European Union countries"

AbstractScholars and practitioners continue to debate transatlantic burden sharing, which has implications for broader questions of collective action and international organizations. Little research, however, has analyzed domestic and institutional drivers of burden-sharing behavior; even less has disaggregated defense spending to measure burden sharing more precisely. This paper enhances understanding of the relationship between national political economies and burden shifting, operationalizing burden shifting as the extent to which a country limits or decreases defense expenditures, while at the same time favoring personnel over equipment modernization and readiness in the composition of defense budgets. Why do countries choose to allocate defense resources to personnel, rather than equipment modernization? I find that governments slightly decrease top-line defense spending in response to unemployment while shifting much more substantial amounts within defense budgets from equipment expenditures into personnel. This research highlights the intimate connection between Europe’s economic fortunes, transatlantic security, and burden sharing in North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union – of particular interest as a pandemic buffets the transatlantic economy. It also points policy analysts toward factors more amenable to political decisions than the structural variables generally associated with burden sharing, bridging significant gaps between defense economics, security studies, and comparative political economy.

Security (in a broad sense, see infra, II.B) in Europe is the realm of several regional international organisations, mainly the European Union (“EU”), Western European Union (“WEU”), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Europe, creating a patchwork of regional security institutions that is unique in the world. These organisations interact in many ways and claim to be mutually reinforcing. Is that the case? Is there room for improvement?

This paper aims to discuss the efforts of the European Union in enhancing integration and defense-security cooperation through the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation. This paper seeks to answer how the formation of PESCO can increase the integration and independence of military cooperation between EU member states. Whereas before there has been a North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a security pillar that has long been recognized in the European region. The author uses the theory of regional security complex and the concept of collective security in analyzing related phenomena. This research uses descriptive method with qualitative approach. The data collection technique is literature study consisting of books, journals, and including data from reliable websites to support the explanation of this paper. The results of this research indicate the establishment of PESCO as a form of implementation of Article 42 paragraph 6 of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 concerning the efforts of member countries in establishing defense-security cooperation within the European Union framework. The establishment of the PESCO was also based on doubts by the European Union on the role of the US in NATO, but PESCO did not directly replace NATO but rather as a complement to autonomous and effective crisis resolution.

The world is going through a crisis of the international liberal order, exemplified by a host of recent shocks: the invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia; the transnational dimensions of conflicts such as in Syria; the United Kingdom's decision to exit the European Union; the attempted coup d’état in Turkey and its reversal toward autocracy; and the election and rise of non-universalist and illiberal governments as well as politicians who operate under the populist rubric in countries that are viewed as beacons of democracy and stability. These shocks have catalyzed two outcomes. First, the prevailing global norms that serve as the custodians of peace and security have been the subject of revived debate. Second, and relatedly, these shocks have prompted deep reflection on the role of institutions such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the roles of the supposedly democratic members within those institutions.

The place and role of state intelligence bodies in the mechanism of ensuring constitutional rights and freedoms of man and citizen according to international standards and in the light of the newly adopted Laws of Ukraine «On the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine» and «On Intelligence» are studied. It is proved that in Ukraine, as in other post-Soviet states that did not have intelligence legislation, but began to create it after the declaration of independence, the process of constitutional and legal regulation of intelligence agencies consisted of four stages (transitional, initial, basic and modern). Describing each stage, the authors stressed that the Ukrainian legislator is now in the fourth stage, which is characterized by the improvement of already adopted legislation on intelligence activities or the adoption of completely new laws based on new versions or amendments to constitutions (basic laws). It is emphasized that Ukraine has been one of the first states in the territory of the former USSR to adopt the fourth (modern) stage since the adoption of new legislative acts on the activities of intelligence agencies. Undoubtedly, the impetus for this was the amendment of the Constitution of Ukraine on the strategic course of the state to become a full member of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which radically changed the direction and direction of intelligence use of available forces and means. It is noted that the newly adopted legislation was developed not out of thin air, but based on a set of already adopted regulations that fully reflect the complex threatening situation around Ukraine and clearly indicate the place of intelligence agencies in a single system of national security. It was necessary to summarize all the adopted preliminary normative material and summarize it in new legislative acts, which would in a new way regulate all issues of intelligence functioning in modern difficult conditions. The main positive points in the newly adopted laws are identified, namely: 1) granting categories that were previously used only in the theory of intelligence, the status of legal categories, which indicates the beginning of the process of forming a completely new set of special legal terms; 2) inclusion in the text of a separate article on the observance of human rights and freedoms in the conduct of intelligence activities; 3) inclusion in the Law of Ukraine «On Intelligence» of a separate section on the peculiarities of democratic civilian control over intelligence; 4) granting the right to intelligence agencies to conduct intelligence affairs. It is proposed to consider in the Ukrainian legislation some legal provisions of the legislation of European countries regarding parliamentary control, which, according to the authors, will significantly increase the effectiveness of control. It is substantiated that the Law of Ukraine «On Intelligence» should contain: - a list of principles of intelligence activities must be defined; - the obligation of the authorized judge of the court to draw up a decision on the refusal to grant permission to conduct an intelligence event is more correctly formulated; - the right of intelligence agencies to provide training, retraining and advanced training of persons involved in confidential cooperation, in the manner prescribed by law for intelligence officers, is more clearly defined. It is concluded that the newly adopted laws provide comprehensive guarantees of compliance with the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and fully reflect the needs of intelligence agencies in the legal regulation of their activities in modern conditions.

After the end of World War II leaders of the West European countries had realised the necessity to create new security frameworks, thus making the security of the continent the concern of the Europeans themselves. However, immediately after it had been formed the North Atlantic Alliance, as a trans-Atlantic defence shield against the danger from the "communist East", became the central security component in Europe. Just after the end of the Cold War and disappearance of the "danger from the East" the European leaders initiated the process of creation of the new European defence system. The system would be designed in such a way not to jeopardise the position of the NATO, improving at the same time the security and stability in the continent. In the first part of the article the author considers the course of European integration in the second half of the last century that proceeded through creation of institutions preceding the establishment of the European Union. During the period of creation of this specific form of action performed by the European states at the internal and international levels, the deficiency of integration in the military field was notable. In that regard, the author stresses the role of the Western European Union as an alliance for collective defence of West European countries. The second part of the paper discusses the shaping of the EU security component through the provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which are included in the EU agreements. The Maastricht Treaty defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an instrument to reach agreement by member states in the defence field. The Amsterdam Treaty confirmed the role of this mechanism expanding the authorities resulting from it. The Treaty of Nice supplements the existing mechanism by a new military and political structure that should help implement the decisions made by the European Union institutions in the military field. In the third part of the article, the author presents the facts concerning the establishment and internal organisation of the Eurocorps. The creation of this military formation took place in early 1990s and was initiated by the two states of "the old Europe" - Germany and France. The authors also emphasises that the establishment of this formation is the first step towards creation of the armed forces in Europe. The fourth part of the paper treats the Rapid Reaction Force that was established by the Helsinki Agreement (1999). It became operative in early 2003 and its basic aim is to prevent the outbreak of crises in the region and to improve stability in Europe. In spite of the opinions that the establishment of such a force is the skeleton for creation of the European armed forces, the author thinks that, at least in the near future, they will not be a rival to the NATO. In his opinion, their possible military missions will be carried out only when the alliance takes no interest in being engaged in them.

Problem setting. In spite of the presence of numerous conventions, treaties and organizations in the world today, the issue of security is still a very acute issue for the world community. There are many reasons for this: the presence of nuclear powers, serious disputes between countries that are justly considered world leaders, the existence of numerous local conflicts and wars of a more global nature across the globe. These and other factors are pushing states around the world to allocate budget funds to ensure effective security policies. Given today’s realities, one can trace the tendency of several countries to pool their own efforts and resources to pursue a common security policy. The European Union is one of the clearest examples of this behavior. This intergovernmental organization is committed to maintaining peace, diplomacy, trade and development around the world. The EU also promotes cooperation with neighboring countries through the European Neighborhood Policy. Target research. The aim of the research is to study the role of the European Union’s institutional mechanism in the exercise of its powers to ensure the defense and foreign policy cooperation of the Member States. Analysis of recent research and publication. Many domestic and foreign scholars, including B. Tonro, T. Christiansen, S. Morsch, G. Mackenstein, and others. The institutional basis of foreign and security policy is analyzed in detail by J. Peterson, questions related to the European Union’s security policy. M. Shackleton. K. Gill, M. Smith and others study the general features of the development of a common EU security policy. Some contribution to the study of various problems related to European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been made by such national scientists as V. Govorukh, I. Gritsyak, G. Nemyrya, L. Prokopenko, O. Rudik, V. Streltsov, O. Tragniuk, I. Shumlyaeva, I. Yakovyuk and others. Article’s main body. The article examines the emergence and development of the European Union’s security policy from the date of the Brussels Covenant to the present. Particular attention is paid to the role of the European Union’s institutional mechanism in the exercise of its powers to ensure the defense and foreign policy cooperation of the Member States. A study of the officially adopted five-year global foreign and security policy of the EU is being done to improve stability in Europe and beyond, analyzing EU conflict resolution and crisis management activities. Conclusions and prospect of development. In view of the above, it can be concluded that the EU’s foreign and security policy institutional framework is an extensive system in which all the constituencies are endowed with a certain range of general and specific powers and are called upon to cooperate with one another to achieve a common goal. It cannot be said that such close cooperation puts pressure on Member States. Yes, a Member State has the right to refrain from voting for any decision that requires unanimity and such abstention will not prevent the above decision being taken. In this case, the mechanism of so-called “constructive retention” is triggered: the abstaining country is not obliged to comply with the decision, however, accepts the fact that it is binding on other Member States and takes this into account when concluding treaties, which should not contradict the said decision.

The article presents the directions and causes of changes in the command system and organization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. It presents issues related to the changes that took place in the Polish Armed Forces after 1989 resulting from changes in the international security environment and resulting from Polish accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

By 1955, the formation of a Cold War bloc in Western Europe was complete. The Western European Union (WEU), a redesigned Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with West Germany and Italy as members, was created. The 1954 Paris Agreements that established WEU also enabled West Germany to become a virtually sovereign actor, and a member of NATO. The Agreements were effected on the rubble of an acrimonious four-year international debate over a proposed European Defence Community (EDC). This would have created a European army for France, the Benelux countries, Italy and West Germany on the model of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and a parallel political community for the Six.

Povzetek Namen članka je spodbuditi razmislek o tem, ali so ovire za skladno delovanje Evropske unije in Organizacije severnoatlantske pogodbe na področju skupne varnosti in obrambe le tehnične narave ali gre za razlike na nekaterih drugih ravneh v politiki, dvostranskih odnosih in nacionalnih ambicijah nekaterih držav, ki so članice ene ali druge organizacije. V obeh primerih se postavlja vprašanje, ali lahko Slovenija kot država, ki 1. julija 2021 prevzame predsedovanje Svetu Evropske unije, v šestih mesecih predsedovanja prispeva k premostitvi kakšne izmed teh ovir. Ključne besede EU, Nato, Slovenija, predsedovanje Svetu EU. Abstract The aim of this article is to entice the reader to consider whether the obstacles in the way of cohesion between the European Union’s common security and defence efforts and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organization are truly of a technical nature, or whether there are differences on other levels, in the politics, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain members of the same organization? Whatever the case may be, the question before us is whether Slovenia can contribute to surmounting any of these obstacles during its six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union, starting on 1st July. Key words EU, NATO, Slovenia, Presidency of the Council of the EU.

The 2011 Libya campaign highlighted the divergence of interests between France and Germany within the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in matters of Middle East and global security. This divergence calls for a reassessment of the meaning of their bilateral cooperation, as defined in the Treaty of Friendship between France and Germany, otherwise known as the Élysée Treaty, signed on 22 January 1963 by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle. This article focuses on France, which engaged militarily in Libya cooperating with the United Kingdom as its principal European partner. Germany, for reasons explained by its history, political culture, and the nature of its federal system, chose to abstain in the United Nations vote to authorize the campaign. These differences between France and Germany suggest a contrast in their respective security and, particularly defense, policy objectives on the fiftieth anniversary of the Élysée Treaty.

The processes of ensuring Poland’s security require the constant analysis of many factors that significantly affect the possibility of the emergence of threats to external and internal security. From the point of view of this criterion of understanding security, the political, military, economic, and social factors are crucial. Along with Poland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, membership in these organizations has become the basis for building the national security system and is positively perceived by most of the society. However, it should be remembered that the volatility of the security environment and the immediate environment of Poland brings about new challenges (migration processes, energy supply issues, the power policy of the Russian Federation) that may give rise to anxiety and a sense of threat. The article aims to present selected conditions of the process of ensuring the security of Poland.

The worsening of technical and safety condition of the pipeline infrastructure in Ukraine due to economic crisis following the end of the Cold War had driven Russia to provide compensation to Ukraine through applying subsidy on its gas price and paying the Ukrainian gas imports as long as Ukraine keep its promise to pay back the country’s debt until 2005. However, since Ukraine’s integration with the United States and its Western Allies by asking to become part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union state members, it refused to pay its high gas debts to Russia. This situation made Russia feels threatened towards its national security where there will be a possibility to the fall of Russian political influence in Ukraine. In 2006, Russia decided to implement its coercive diplomacy actions towards Ukraine through politicizing its gas sector.

Among various geopolitical repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic are redefinitions of the short-term priorities of many international organizations. Among others, the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are becoming absorbed by new internal challenges, and are thus even less interested in further enlargement than before. Against this background, Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau, as well as their Western friends, need to seek new paths to increase the three countries’ security, resilience, and growth before their accession to the West’s major organizations. Above all, an alternative way to decrease Ukraine’s current institutional isolation is to develop more intense bilateral relations with friendly states across the globe, including Germany and the United States. In Eastern Europe, moreover, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova should attempt to create new multilateral networks with post-communist member countries of NATO as well as the EU, and try to become part of such structures as the Three Seas Initiative or Bucharest Nine group.

Through this scientific research it is analyzed the legislation and the impact of Macedonian Parliament in establishing of Foreign and Security Politics. it is done the analyze about essential sources of the definition of position in the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia, beginning from the Constitution, Regulation and Foreign Law of Parliamentary Work, about the law of Foreign Affairs and Law Framework of Security Politics. As well it is explained the role and the work of Parliamentary Commission in the establishing of Security and Foreign Politics such as: the Commission of Foreign Affairs, Commission of Defense and Security, Commission of Secret Services and the Commission of the European Issues, so far is elaborated Cooperation Board with Other Parliamentary Commissions. At the end of the first part, Work Groups of the Parliament of Republic of Macedonia with parliaments of other Countries.At the first research to International Relationship – Foreign Politics and Security, especially is explored the Relationship and Cooperation with neighboring Countries and with some European South - Eastern, Countries. The role of Parliament of Republic of Macedonia it is analyzed and explained as well and the cooperation with Parliamentarian Assembly of Organization of United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), The Parliament of European Union, Organization of North Atlantic Alliance (OTAN) and European Council.

The anticipation of security threats is one of the key elements in the determination of objectives and the main direction for the functioning of states or organizations. It constitutes a fundamental basis for building capacity, aimed at counteracting the identified threats or limiting the emergence of new ones. This is also applicable to the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in their security documents identify threats that may have an impact on their existence and future development. The purpose of this article is to identify common threats to EU and NATO security, as well as to demonstrate their impact on the security of the countries of the Eastern flank. The analyses, comparisons and generalizations are based on strategic documents concerning the sphere of EU and NATO security (the EU security strategies and the NATO strategic concepts). The analyzed timeline covered the period from the end of the Cold War until the publication of the strategic documents in question. The perception of threats to the external security of the EU and NATO was contrasted with the results of public opinion polls from the member states of both organizations. The general result leads to the conclusion that the perception of security threats, contained in the strategic documents of the above-mentioned entities, is essentially identical; however, the priorities in the scope of reducing the risks associated with the occurrence of specific threats are perceived differently, including the Eastern flank countries.

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.

After the end of the Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) enlargement were two main political processes in the European continent. Both organizations since their inception, promoted the idea of integrated Europe without borders, which meant creating a Europe without divisions and bringing back all Central Eastern European (CEE) countries into the European family where they belong. However, after half a century of isolation in the totalitarian communist system the CEE countries (CEEC) had to undertake fundamental institutional, political, economic, military and other reforms in order to join NATO and the EU. In order to ease the process of accession, both organizations set certain criteria for membership for the CEECs. While NATO’s requirements for membership were more general and flexible, the EU’s requirements, on the other hand, were non-negotiable and closely enforced.Therefore, this article will explore NATO’s and the EU’s enlargement process eastwards, its similarities and differences. In addition, it will analyse the difficulties and challenges with special focus on Russia’s opposition to this process.The author will identify the similarities and differences between NATO and the EU’s enlargement and will argue that the eastern enlargement marked the final end to the Cold War antagonism and it created conducive preconditions for more secure and prosperous Europe.

The State Program for NATO – Ukraine Cooperation 2001-2004 is analyzed, its priorities and features in the context of the development of bilateral relations are determined. It has been established that the content of the program has become a logical continuation of the previous one and should, in the short term, ensure the fullest / best possible implementation of terms of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership (1997). It is shown that the President of Ukraine, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) and on its behalf, the State Interagency Commission for NATO – Ukraine Cooperation, have overseen the implementation of the program. The author notes that its adoption took place during the intensification of Ukraine's foreign policy activities aimed at deepening constructive cooperation with the European Union (EU), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. The program played an important role in the path to the state's declared accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. During this period, it became one of the main directions of the state policy on national security in the context of the formation of the new architectonics of European security of the 21st century. It is claimed that in the political area the program was meant to ensure the implementation of national policy on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, to increase the level of independence guarantees, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukrainian borders, its national security, as well as to promote the principles of democracy, respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, the rule of law in Ukraine. Keywords Ukraine, NATO, Euro-Atlantic Integration, national security, Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU).

Abstract: Nowadays, the modern security environment has it foundation based on some vital pilons, that are also important for the normal functionality of the modern society. This paper will offer a new perspective on critical infrastructure protection, defining the relationships that take place freely in a modern society. The international security could be analyzed from functional (systemic) and structural points of view. From the systemic point of view, the global security is characterized by five major systems: political, economic, social (socio-demographic), cultural and ecological. From the structural point of view, besides the above systems there are other ones: military, intelligence, communications and infrastructure (the critical infrastructure, health, financial, culture, education and research). There are certain infrastructures such as: telecommunications, transports, systems of power or water supply, IT systems, diverse systems and emergency services, that are actually fundamental to a prosperous economy and therefore critical to the development of human society. Telecommunications, power systems and transport infrastructures are essential infrastructures that ensure not only the mobility, but also the adequate performance of the armed forces, which is one more reason for which these infrastructures are critical. The degree of development and resilience of national and European critical infrastructures is essential for the economic growth and for ensuring the security and welfare of society on the whole. Therefore, the modern national security, seen as a system or a structure, has been passing through a reform and modernization process in order to adapt to the challenges of the 21st Century and the requirements triggered by North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union memberships, and not only. In this context there is a need for some security politics and strategy which could increase the national security condition.

The newest policy of Ukraine should be to develop such state concepts, strategies and programs that would contribute to the European integration of the country, taking into account the current challenges of today. The purpose of the article is to define the conceptual foundations of the strategy of formation and implementation of state policy in the sphere of European integration of Ukraine in modern conditions. The conceptual framework of the national strategy for the European integration of Ukraine is a general concept of the country’s long-term actions, a certain model of the mission realization and achievement of long-term goals, which defines its development prospects, main directions and priorities of activity in the European integration sphere. Such a generalized European integration concept of Ukraine is reflected in the relevant state documents, laws and by-laws, and within the framework of the state strategy, strategies for development of various spheres, sectors and sectors of economy and public life are developed and implemented in accordance with the existing requirements, rules and regulations of the euro framework documents.A significant event in the European integration of Ukraine into the EU was the introduction of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (concerning the strategic course of the state for the acquisition of full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and in the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty). In addition to the issues related to the implementation of the Association Agreement, further progress on the European integration of Ukraine should also take place in the following areas: associations with the Schengen area; accession to the EU customs union; accession to the EU Energy Union; the entry into force of the common aviation space; joining the digital market, etc.Integration with the EU is an important component of Ukraine’s foreign policy. However, conceptually, European integration should be seen first and foremost as a comprehensive domestic state policy aimed at introducing reforms and transformations that are necessary and important for Ukrainian society, and only then, as a component of foreign state policy, which depends largely on the political will of the EU on the pace and full integration with our country. Thus, the strategy of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union should ensure the country’s accession to the European political, legal, economic, informational and security space. Obtaining full EU membership in the medium term on this basis should become a major foreign policy priority of Ukraine’s policy formulation and implementation policy in the face of contemporary challenges of today.

Abstract Numerous representatives of theories of international relations, security theories or alliance theories have examined the new role of the North Atlantic Alliance or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post-bipolar world. Parallel with the theoretical examination of goals and tasks, NATO has transformed itself in practice, following the realities of the contemporary global era. In trying to achieve and keep the primacy of the strongest military- political organization, the Alliance has - especially in the Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon in 2010-set the normative and institutional foundations of its global engagement, fulfilling the military (hard) and a wide array of non-military (soft) security challenges. This strategy has given rise to "Euro-Atlanticism", as a subsystem of international relations based on strong American-European relations, to fit with the process of regionalization of global politics. However, the 2013-2014 crisis in Ukraine has turned the focus of interest and activities of NATO once again primarily to Europe and it has stressed the importance and necessity of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security and defence ties. The most powerful member of the Alliance, the United States, is again strongly engaged in Europe and Russia, as a kind of successor to the Soviet Union, is once more detected as a major threat to European security. There have been many aspects of theories of international relations that have tried to explain the dynamic of the post-Cold War international community. However, the approach based on neo-realistic assumptions of the role of a security community, collective defence and the use of military force has proved to be dominant. NATO will continue to work on its political dimension as an alliance of the democratic world and the September 2014 Wales Summit will certainly mark the return of NATO to its roots, strengthening its security and military dimensions in the collective defence of Europe from Russia.

Controversy arose in the mid-1990s when Russian officials accused Western governments of reneging on binding pledges made to Moscow in 1990 during German unification diplomacy. According to the allegations, Western leaders had solemnly promised that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would never expand beyond Germany into Central and Eastern Europe. Were such pledges ever made? Was the Soviet Union betrayed, and if so, by whom, how, and when? Or have various tactical comments been misinterpreted in hindsight? This article seeks to offer new answers to these questions by exploring not simply U.S.-Soviet-West German triangular diplomacy in 1990 but also the evolution of different approaches, ideas, and visions regarding Germany's security arrangements and the wider European security architecture. These ideas were floated publicly and privately, at home and abroad, by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and other senior West German officials. In showing how ultimately a “unified Germany in NATO” came about after months of intense diplomacy in 1990 to resolve the “German question,” this article refutes the recently made claim that the extension of full membership to the whole of Germany was a precedent-setting expansion of NATO.

The ethno-territorial conflicts precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union and dissolution of Yugoslavia had major implications for European security and substantially altered the strategic priorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post-Cold War period. In order to preserve regional stability, NATO expanded beyond collective defense into crisis management and peacekeeping to address destabilizing ethnic conflicts, particularly in the Balkans region. This paper proposes that the NATO peacekeeping operation succeeded as a whole in stabilizing the Kosovo crisis and enabled the creation of a functioning, multiethnic state in Kosovo, which became independent in 2008. Using Kosovo as a case study, this paper outlines a conceptual framework for use in examining the success of the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, known as KFOR, in stabilizing the Kosovo crisis and enhancing regional stability. This framework consists of five core security tasks – diffusing the crisis; ensuring security; enabling humanitarian relief operations; facilitating a political solution; and fostering long-term regional stability – organized around an end state of establishing a stable, independent Kosovo. The paper concludes with comments on the usefulness of KFOR as a model for peacekeeping and the long-term use of NATO forces in such peacekeeping operations going forward.

The field of international relations has been assessed through diverse theoretical framework including realism. Classical realism has been reformed by neorealists for analyzing current actors and interactions in international relations. For neorealists, the most essential characteristic of the international arena is anarchy, which they argue exists because the international system lacks a world government with the capability of making and imposing international law, which in turn makes cooperating among states difficult. Then, competition and conflict can never be avoided in such situation. Thus, states must eventually guarantee their own survival and security. Neorealists describe states as the main actors in international relations and they have a negative view about non-state actors, in particular international and regional organizations; they state that organizations have no capacity to control a states' attitude or to prevent war or at least minimize anarchy in the international politics. Moreover, neorealists emphasize that organizations are ineffective because the agendas they set tend to be controlled by the superpower states, and they are in fact tools for increasing superpower influence. Neorealists support their argument by highlighting many case studies such as the United Nations, the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and World Trade Organization.

This research is based on the hypothesis that the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean are lagging behind in the construction of cyber defense capabilities to face the international context of cyber threats, with respect to the member countries of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both in the organizational plan, as in the individual. To prove this statement, the text is divided into six sections. The first part presents the global environment of cyber threats, the economic losses suffered by governments and companies according to reports from information security firms such as Kaspersky, Microsoft, Verizon and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). The second part presents the internet securitization process, the immersion of cybersecurity in national security studies, and the definition of cyber capabilities and the delimitation of threats to the Nation-State from cyberspace are addressed. The third part shows the trajectory of NATO as an organization in the development of cyber capabilities in the last twenty years. In the fourth part, a set of National Cybersecurity Strategies (ENCS) of NATO countries and allies is analyzed from the individual level, from which their main elements are extracted and their general anatomy is outlined. In the sixth part, an approach to different regional or global cybersecurity environments is presented based on measurements of the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI), of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the National Cyber Security Index (NSCI) of the Estonian E-Governance Academy. The fifth section presents the context of cybersecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to studies made by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as private cybersecurity firms. In the sixth, two case studies of Mexico, from the 2019-2020, are briefly presented, which represent the lack of maturity of its ENCS and development of cyber capabilities, an aspect that it shares with most of the countries of Latin America and Caribbean. Finally, brief conclusions are presented on the aspects to be strengthened by the region.

Hybrid threats use conventional and unconventional means to achieve their goals. This paper explores the cyber threat as one possible aspect of hybrid threats. It also discusses the background of the term hybrid warfare, how it emerged and travelled as the empirical situations evolved and needed new definitions. Russia aims at attaining this by applying a holistic mix of military, political and economic means to weaken the West and to strengthen its own role as a global player (with the “West” I for simplicity mean the states which constitute EU and NATO, but it is really more a cultural approach than an organizational). The Russian approach builds on a strategy of reflexive control which as such is an old method, but the outcome of the application of this approach results in hybrid warfare which as such is a new emerging concept of warfighting. This short article looks at one particular aspect of this Russian strategy, namely using Hybrid, or non-linear, Warfare against its Western direct neighbors in particular and the West in general. The cyber arena is very important in this practice. The attack of this weaponized situation is that the trust in the West. Primarily the EU (European Union) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), is eroded for every day which these countries challenges the international system which the western democracies say that they present and defend. This is part of what can be described as an example of reflexive control, exercised by Russia.

The article analyses the complex influence of dangerous changes, which took place after 2014 in the international political environment in Europe, on the ongoing transformations, suggests essential revision of national policies of the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland) in the field of their security and defenсe. The degree of military and political tension in the North of Europe has increased significantly after 2014. The conflict is escalating due to additional deployment within the so-called reinforcement of the “eastern flank” of the Alliance with three allied battalions, and NATO weapons in the Baltic States and Poland. However, great strategic stability in the zone of direct contact between NATO and Russia is still possible to maintain. The international political situation in the subregion has also deteriorated markedly as a result of the U.S., NATO and EU sanctions policy against Russia, strengthening of transatlantic relations of the Nordic countries, and reinforcement of allied ties within the framework of the Western bloc policy as a whole. It noted signified not only a revision in favor of further strengthening of transatlantic ties in the policy of bloc allegiance of the Nordic countries – members of NATO (Denmark, Norway, Iceland), but also an obvious intensification of practical cooperation between formally non-aligned states (Sweden and Finland) with the Alliance structures. The Nordic Defenсe Cooperation (NORDEFCO) has also started to acquire a risky pro-Atlantic style, losing its previous autonomous subregional nature. Apparently, in the present complex situation, the Nordic Five is disposed to solve security and defence problems by: 1) having a greater many-sided cooperation with NATO; 2) giving a real, limited meaning to the European Union in the military-political sphere; 3) continuing to bear pressure upon Russia for the purpose of limiting Russian influence in the subregion, especially in the Baltic region. In the near future, the problem of NATO accession for Sweden and Finland may remain in the same precarious condition unless some dangerous force majeure circumstances occur in the Baltic region.

Ukraine's accession to NATO has been and remains one of the priorities of our country's foreign policy, its strategic goal. Since independence, Ukraine has been moving towards joining NATO, but this movement has been slow and sometimes declarative compared to other neighboring countries. At present, the transformation of NATO's views in Ukrainian society is rapidly turning into a positive side, and membership in this organization is regarded as a pledge to realize the national interests of the country. The great positive is that on February 7, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on the constitution of Ukraine's strategic course for membership in the European Union and NATO. The recent visit of the North Atlantic Council to Ukraine, as well as the 2019 London Summit, have been of particular interest, primarily because of the prospect of NATO enlargement in the coming years. There is every reason to believe that the transition to enhanced partnership programs will take place in the near future. And, of course, we should take the most serious steps to improve Ukraine's political system, de-oligarchization, fight against corruption and other urgent tasks of building a civil society and a full-fledged democratic order that will fulfill the political criteria of membership in the Alliance. And, ultimately, it will create the right conditions for security in the face of the challenges of the modern world. The next Alliance Summit will be held on December 3-4, 2019 in London to commemorate NATO's 70th anniversary. For Ukraine, an event such as the NATO Summit should theoretically be an opportunity to declare its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, with the likelihood of making any statements and making demarches in this regard. At the moment, it is important for Ukraine, prior to the start of the dialogue on the submission of the NATO Membership Action Plan, to demonstrate to NATO member countries progress in meeting the criteria for NATO membership and to understand the prospects of NATO enlargement in the coming years.

euenergy policy objectives are directed at three highly interdependent areas: energy supply security, competitiveness and decarbonization to prevent climate change. In this paper, we focus on the issue of energy supply security. Security of energy supply for the immediate and medium-term future is a necessary condition in the current context of the global political economy for the survival of the Union and its component member states. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, energy policy no longer comes onto the agenda of the European Commission through the backdoor of the common market, environment and competitiveness. The Treaty created a new legal basis for the internal energy market. However, securing external supplies as well as deciding the energy mix, remain matters of national prerogative, though within the constraints of other parts of eu’s legislation in force. Without a common defense policy, the highly import dependent Union and its members face external instability in the energy rich Arab Middle East and North Africa.Concern about energy security has been triggered by declining European energy production as well as the strain on global demand exerted by newly industrializing economies such as China and India and the Middle East, as well as the political instability in this reserve-rich part of the world. This paper explores the following two topics [1] the current situation and past trends in production, supply, demand and trade in energy in the eu, against the background of major changes in the last half decade and [2] threats to the security of the supply of oil and natural gas from import regions.Fossil fuel import dependence in the eu is expected to continue to increase in the coming two decades. As global trends show, and despite new fields in the Caspian region and the Eastern Mediterranean, conventional fossil oil and gas resources remain concentrated in fewer geopolitically unstable regions and countries (i.e. the Middle East and North Africa (mena) and the Caspian Region (cr) including Russia), while global demand for fossil energy is expected to substantially increase also within the energy rich Gulf countries. This combination directly impacts eu energy supply security. It should be noted that the trend towards higher levels of import dependence was not interrupted when the era of low energy prices, between 1980 and 2003, came to an end.Within the eu itself, domestic resistance to the development of unconventional resources is an obstacle to investment in unconventional sources in this part of the high-income world. This should therefore not put at risk investments in either renewables or alternative sources at home or conventional resources mainly in the Arab-Middle East.The situation is exacerbated by the spread of instability in the Arab-Middle Eastern countries. There are three domestic and geopolitical concerns to be taken into consideration:(1) In the Arab-Middle East, threats to eu energy supply security originate in the domestic regime of these countries. Almost all Arab resource-rich countries belong to a type ofpatrimonial, rentier-type of state-society relation. These regimes rely on rents from the exploitation of energy resources and the way in which rents are distributed.Regimes of this type are being challenged. Their economies show uneven economic development, centralized power structures, corruption and poverty at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The discrimination of females is a major obstacle to the development of the service sector. At present, even the monarchies fear the spread of violent conflict.Offshoots of these consequences have proven to cause civil unrest, exemplified by what optimists have called the ‘Arab Spring.’(2) The second concern is the domestic and global impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds (swfs) managed by Arab patrimonial rentier states. swfs have proven to be an asset in both developing and developed economies due to their ability to buffer the ‘Dutch Disease,’ and to encourage industrialization, economic diversification and eventually the development of civil society. In patrimonial states, however, swfs are affected by corruption and the diversion of funds away from long-term socioeconomic development to luxury consumption by political elites. In fact, Arab swfs underpin the persistence of the Arab patrimonial rentier state system.(3) Finally, the post-Cold War, me and cea geopolitical landscape is shifting. The emergence of China and other Asian economies has increased their presence in the Middle East due to a growing need for energy and the expansion of Asian markets. The recent discovery of energy resources in the us has led to speculation that there will be less us presence in the region. There would be a serious risk to eu energy security if emerging Asian economies were to increase their presence in the Middle East as us interests recede.

INTRODUCTION. This year is the 75-th anniversary of the Great Victory of the Allies – Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA – over Nazi Germany. The most important legal result of this victory has become the Charter of the United Nations – the universal treaty initiated by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA (and later – by China and France) aiming to save succeeding generations from the new world war by establishing United Nations mechanisms to maintain international peace and global security. The UN Charter has since become the foundation of modern international law, respected by States across continents and generations. That seems, however, to begin changing after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, when its former-members «socialist» European countries (including Bulgaria and Poland) became a part of the Western military bloc – North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO seems to demonstrate now a new attitude to fundamental principles of the UN Charter, first of all, to the principle relating to the use of armed force only according to the UN Charter. NATO States-members launched in 1999 an air campaign against Serbia without authorization by the Security Council; then an ad hoc western coalition, led by the United States, resorted to armed force in 2003 against Iraq and organized in the occupied territory of Iraq the death penalty of the President Saddam Hussein. Even some western European States, France and Germany, first of all opposed such military action of the USA for ignoring the UN Charter. The apparent involvement of the USA in the unconstitutional removal of the Ukrainian President Yanukovich from power in Kiev in 2014 and the subsequent local war between those who recognize such a discharge as legitimate and those who do not (both referring to the right of self-defense) – these facts make the problem of international peace especially urgent. In this political environment, the risks of World War III seem to be increasing. This paper addresses such challenges to modern international law.MATERIALS AND METHODS. Th background of this research is represented by the teachings of distinguished scholars and other specialists in international law, as well as international materials including documents of the international conferences relevant to the topic. Some of such materials are alarming, noting that the international legal system is in danger of collapse and it is doubtful whether an international legal order will be possible in the coming decades at all. Others are not so pessimistic. The analytical framework includes also suggested interpretations of the UN Charter and other international treaties regulating interstate relations in the area of global security. The research is based on a number of methods such as comparative law and history of international law, formal logic, including synthesis of relevant facts and analogy.RESEARCH RESULTS. It is acknowledged that there is a need for a more coherent international legal order, with the system of international law being at its heart. Within the context of applicable principles and norms of international law, this article specifically provides the results of analysis of the following issues:1) centrifugal interpretations of international law as they are reflected in its sources; 2) the need for increasing the role of the UN Charter in the global international legal framework; 3) modern values of the UN Charter as an anti-confusion instrument; 4) the contemporary meaning of the Principles embedded in the UN Charter; 5) comparison of the main principles of international law and general principles of law; 6) jus cogens and the UN Charter.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. After discussing the issues noted above, this paper concludes that it is in the interest of the community of states as a whole to clarify the normative structure and hierarchy of modern international law. Greater discipline will need to be demonstrated in the use and classification of principles of international law and general principles of law in the meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. The content of jus cogens norms most probably will be gradually identified, after diffi lt discussions across the international community, both at interstate level and among academics. At the heart of such discussions may be the conclusion suggested in this paper on the peremptoriness of the principles of the United Nations Charter – Articles 1 and 2. Such an approach will further promote international law at the advanced quality of regulation of international relations and, for the good of all mankind, assist in the establishment of an international environment much more dependent on the rule of law.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

In my postgraduate formation during the last years of the 80’s, we had close to thirty hospital beds in a pavilion called “sépticas” (1). In Colombia, where abortion was completely penalized, the pavilion was mostly filled with women with insecure, complicated abortions. The focus we received was technical: management of intensive care; performance of hysterectomies, colostomies, bowel resection, etc. In those times, some nurses were nuns and limited themselves to interrogating the patients to get them to “confess” what they had done to themselves in order to abort. It always disturbed me that the women who left alive, left without any advice or contraceptive method. Having asked a professor of mine, he responded with disdain: “This is a third level hospital, those things are done by nurses of the first level”. Seeing so much pain and death, I decided to talk to patients, and I began to understand their decision. I still remember so many deaths with sadness, but one case in particular pains me: it was a woman close to being fifty who arrived with a uterine perforation in a state of advanced sepsis. Despite the surgery and the intensive care, she passed away. I had talked to her, and she told me she was a widow, had two adult kids and had aborted because of “embarrassment towards them” because they were going to find out that she had an active sexual life. A few days after her passing, the pathology professor called me, surprised, to tell me that the uterus we had sent for pathological examination showed no pregnancy. She was a woman in a perimenopausal state with a pregnancy exam that gave a false positive due to the high levels of FSH/LH typical of her age. SHE WAS NOT PREGNANT!!! She didn’t have menstruation because she was premenopausal and a false positive led her to an unsafe abortion. Of course, the injuries caused in the attempted abortion caused the fatal conclusion, but the real underlying cause was the social taboo in respect to sexuality. I had to watch many adolescents and young women leave the hospital alive, but without a uterus, sometime without ovaries and with colostomies, to be looked down on by a society that blamed them for deciding to not be mothers. I had to see situation of women that arrived with their intestines protruding from their vaginas because of unsafe abortions. I saw women, who in their despair, self-inflicted injuries attempting to abort with elements such as stick, branches, onion wedges, alum bars and clothing hooks among others. Among so many deaths, it was hard not having at least one woman per day in the morgue due to an unsafe abortion. During those time, healthcare was not handled from the biopsychosocial, but only from the technical (2); nonetheless, in the academic evaluations that were performed, when asked about the definition of health, we had to recite the text from the International Organization of Health that included these three aspects. How contradictory! To give response to the health need of women and guarantee their right when I was already a professor, I began an obstetric contraceptive service in that third level hospital. There was resistance from the directors, but fortunately I was able to acquire international donations for the institution, which facilitated its acceptance. I decided to undertake a teaching career with the hope of being able to sensitize health professionals towards an integral focus of health and illness. When the International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) was held in Cairo in 1994, I had already spent various years in teaching, and when I read their Action Program, I found a name for what I was working on: Sexual and Reproductive Rights. I began to incorporate the tools given by this document into my professional and teaching life. I was able to sensitize people at my countries Health Ministry, and we worked together moving it to an approach of human rights in areas of sexual and reproductive health (SRH). This new viewpoint, in addition to being integral, sought to give answers to old problems like maternal mortality, adolescent pregnancy, low contraceptive prevalence, unplanned or unwanted pregnancy or violence against women. With other sensitized people, we began with these SRH issues to permeate the Colombian Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, some universities, and university hospitals. We are still fighting in a country that despite many difficulties has improved its indicators of SRH. With the experience of having labored in all sphere of these topics, we manage to create, with a handful of colleagues and friend at the Universidad El Bosque, a Master’s Program in Sexual and Reproductive Health, open to all professions, in which we broke several paradigms. A program was initiated in which the qualitative and quantitative investigation had the same weight, and some alumni of the program are now in positions of leadership in governmental and international institutions, replicating integral models. In the Latin American Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecology (FLASOG, English acronym) and in the International Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecology (FIGO), I was able to apply my experience for many years in the SRH committees of these association to benefit women and girls in the regional and global environments. When I think of who has inspired me in these fights, I should highlight the great feminist who have taught me and been with me in so many fights. I cannot mention them all, but I have admired the story of the life of Margaret Sanger with her persistence and visionary outlook. She fought throughout her whole life to help the women of the 20th century to be able to obtain the right to decide when and whether or not they wanted to have children (3). Of current feminist, I have had the privilege of sharing experiences with Carmen Barroso, Giselle Carino, Debora Diniz and Alejandra Meglioli, leaders of the International Planned Parenthood Federation – Western Hemisphere Region (IPPF-RHO). From my country, I want to mention my countrywoman Florence Thomas, psychologist, columnist, writer and Colombo-French feminist. She is one of the most influential and important voices in the movement for women rights in Colombia and the region. She arrived from France in the 1960’s, in the years of counterculture, the Beatles, hippies, Simone de Beauvoir, and Jean-Paul Sartre, a time in which capitalism and consumer culture began to be criticized (4). It was then when they began to talk about the female body, female sexuality and when the contraceptive pill arrived like a total revolution for women. Upon its arrival in 1967, she experimented a shock because she had just assisted in a revolution and only found a country of mothers, not women (5). That was the only destiny for a woman, to be quiet and submissive. Then she realized that this could not continue, speaking of “revolutionary vanguards” in such a patriarchal environment. In 1986 with the North American and European feminism waves and with her academic team, they created the group “Mujer y Sociedad de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia”, incubator of great initiatives and achievements for the country (6). She has led great changes with her courage, the strength of her arguments, and a simultaneously passionate and agreeable discourse. Among her multiple books, I highlight “Conversaciones con Violeta” (7), motivated by the disdain towards feminism of some young women. She writes it as a dialogue with an imaginary daughter in which, in an intimate manner, she reconstructs the history of women throughout the centuries and gives new light of the fundamental role of feminism in the life of modern women. Another book that shows her bravery is “Había que decirlo” (8), in which she narrates the experience of her own abortion at age twenty-two in sixty’s France. My work experience in the IPPF-RHO has allowed me to meet leaders of all ages in diverse countries of the region, who with great mysticism and dedication, voluntarily, work to achieve a more equal and just society. I have been particularly impressed by the appropriation of the concept of sexual and reproductive rights by young people, and this has given me great hope for the future of the planet. We continue to have an incomplete agenda of the action plan of the ICPD of Cairo but seeing how the youth bravely confront the challenges motivates me to continue ahead and give my years of experience in an intergenerational work. In their policies and programs, the IPPF-RHO evidences great commitment for the rights and the SRH of adolescent, that are consistent with what the organization promotes, for example, 20% of the places for decision making are in hands of the young. Member organizations, that base their labor on volunteers, are true incubators of youth that will make that unassailable and necessary change of generations. In contrast to what many of us experienced, working in this complicated agenda of sexual and reproductive health without theoretical bases, today we see committed people with a solid formation to replace us. In the college of medicine at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the College of Nursing at the Universidad El Bosque, the new generations are more motivated and empowered, with great desire to change the strict underlying structures. Our great worry is the onslaught of the ultra-right, a lot of times better organized than us who do support rights, that supports anti-rights group and are truly pro-life (9). Faced with this scenario, we should organize ourselves better, giving battle to guarantee the rights of women in the local, regional, and global level, aggregating the efforts of all pro-right organizations. We are now committed to the Objectives of Sustainable Development (10), understood as those that satisfy the necessities of the current generation without jeopardizing the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own necessities. This new agenda is based on: - The unfinished work of the Millennium Development Goals - Pending commitments (international environmental conventions) - The emergent topics of the three dimensions of sustainable development: social, economic, and environmental. We now have 17 objectives of sustainable development and 169 goals (11). These goals mention “universal access to reproductive health” many times. In objective 3 of this list is included guaranteeing, before the year 2030, “universal access to sexual and reproductive health services, including those of family planning, information, and education.” Likewise, objective 5, “obtain gender equality and empower all women and girls”, establishes the goal of “assuring the universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in conformity with the action program of the International Conference on Population and Development, the Action Platform of Beijing”. It cannot be forgotten that the term universal access to sexual and reproductive health includes universal access to abortion and contraception. Currently, 830 women die every day through preventable maternal causes; of these deaths, 99% occur in developing countries, more than half in fragile environments and in humanitarian contexts (12). 216 million women cannot access modern contraception methods and the majority live in the nine poorest countries in the world and in a cultural environment proper to the decades of the seventies (13). This number only includes women from 15 to 49 years in any marital state, that is to say, the number that takes all women into account is much greater. Achieving the proposed objectives would entail preventing 67 million unwanted pregnancies and reducing maternal deaths by two thirds. We currently have a high, unsatisfied demand for modern contraceptives, with extremely low use of reversible, long term methods (intrauterine devices and subdermal implants) which are the most effect ones with best adherence (14). There is not a single objective among the 17 Objectives of Sustainable Development where contraception does not have a prominent role: from the first one that refers to ending poverty, going through the fifth one about gender equality, the tenth of inequality reduction among countries and within the same country, until the sixteenth related with peace and justice. If we want to change the world, we should procure universal access to contraception without myths or barriers. We have the moral obligation of achieving the irradiation of extreme poverty and advancing the construction of more equal, just, and happy societies. In emergency contraception (EC), we are very far from reaching expectations. If in reversible, long-term methods we have low prevalence, in EC the situation gets worse. Not all faculties in the region look at this topic, and where it is looked at, there is no homogeneity in content, not even within the same country. There are still myths about their real action mechanisms. There are countries, like Honduras, where it is prohibited and there is no specific medicine, the same case as in Haiti. Where it is available, access is dismal, particularly among girls, adolescents, youth, migrants, afro-descendent, and indigenous. The multiple barriers for the effective use of emergency contraceptives must be knocked down, and to work toward that we have to destroy myths and erroneous perceptions, taboos and cultural norms; achieve changes in laws and restrictive rules within countries, achieve access without barriers to the EC; work in union with other sectors; train health personnel and the community. It is necessary to transform the attitude of health personal to a service above personal opinion. Reflecting on what has occurred after the ICPD in Cairo, their Action Program changed how we look at the dynamics of population from an emphasis on demographics to a focus on the people and human rights. The governments agreed that, in this new focus, success was the empowerment of women and the possibility of choice through expanded access to education, health, services, and employment among others. Nonetheless, there have been unequal advances and inequality persists in our region, all the goals were not met, the sexual and reproductive goals continue beyond the reach of many women (15). There is a long road ahead until women and girls of the world can claim their rights and liberty of deciding. Globally, maternal deaths have been reduced, there is more qualified assistance of births, more contraception prevalence, integral sexuality education, and access to SRH services for adolescents are now recognized rights with great advances, and additionally there have been concrete gains in terms of more favorable legal frameworks, particularly in our region; nonetheless, although it’s true that the access condition have improved, the restrictive laws of the region expose the most vulnerable women to insecure abortions. There are great challenges for governments to recognize SRH and the DSR as integral parts of health systems, there is an ample agenda against women. In that sense, access to SRH is threatened and oppressed, it requires multi-sector mobilization and litigation strategies, investigation and support for the support of women’s rights as a multi-sector agenda. Looking forward, we must make an effort to work more with youth to advance not only the Action Program of the ICPD, but also all social movements. They are one of the most vulnerable groups, and the biggest catalyzers for change. The young population still faces many challenges, especially women and girls; young girls are in particularly high risk due to lack of friendly and confidential services related with sexual and reproductive health, gender violence, and lack of access to services. In addition, access to abortion must be improved; it is the responsibility of states to guarantee the quality and security of this access. In our region there still exist countries with completely restrictive frameworks. New technologies facilitate self-care (16), which will allow expansion of universal access, but governments cannot detach themselves from their responsibility. Self-care is expanding in the world and can be strategic for reaching the most vulnerable populations. There are new challenges for the same problems, that require a re-interpretation of the measures necessary to guaranty the DSR of all people, in particular women, girls, and in general, marginalized and vulnerable populations. It is necessary to take into account migrations, climate change, the impact of digital media, the resurgence of hate discourse, oppression, violence, xenophobia, homo/transphobia, and other emergent problems, as SRH should be seen within a framework of justice, not isolated. We should demand accountability of the 179 governments that participate in the ICPD 25 years ago and the 193 countries that signed the Sustainable Development Objectives. They should reaffirm their commitments and expand their agenda to topics not considered at that time. Our region has given the world an example with the Agreement of Montevideo, that becomes a blueprint for achieving the action plan of the CIPD and we should not allow retreat. This agreement puts people at the center, especially women, and includes the topic of abortion, inviting the state to consider the possibility of legalizing it, which opens the doors for all governments of the world to recognize that women have the right to choose on maternity. This agreement is much more inclusive: Considering that the gaps in health continue to abound in the region and the average statistics hide the high levels of maternal mortality, of sexually transmitted diseases, of infection by HIV/AIDS, and the unsatisfied demand for contraception in the population that lives in poverty and rural areas, among indigenous communities, and afro-descendants and groups in conditions of vulnerability like women, adolescents and incapacitated people, it is agreed: 33- To promote, protect, and guarantee the health and the sexual and reproductive rights that contribute to the complete fulfillment of people and social justice in a society free of any form of discrimination and violence. 37- Guarantee universal access to quality sexual and reproductive health services, taking into consideration the specific needs of men and women, adolescents and young, LGBT people, older people and people with incapacity, paying particular attention to people in a condition of vulnerability and people who live in rural and remote zone, promoting citizen participation in the completing of these commitments. 42- To guarantee, in cases in which abortion is legal or decriminalized in the national legislation, the existence of safe and quality abortion for non-desired or non-accepted pregnancies and instigate the other States to consider the possibility of modifying public laws, norms, strategies, and public policy on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to save the life and health of pregnant adolescent women, improving their quality of life and decreasing the number of abortions (17).

The article reveals the conceptual foundations of the policy and system for ensuring information security in the countries of Central Europe, in particular in Germany, Poland, Hungary and Croatia. It was found that Germany, Poland, Hungary and Croatia are member countries of the European Union and NATO, therefore they are subject to the rules and standards of these international organizations. It was established that the main documents and programs for ensuring information security and cybersecurity in the EU and NATO member states are: Document C-M (2002) 49 “Security in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)”, the Cybersecurity Concept, formulated based on the results of the Lisbon Summit, the Concept cybersecurity, formulated as a result of the Warsaw Summit, “European Criteria for Information Technology Security”, “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security”, “Network and Information Security: a European Political Approach”, “Safe Internet”, “Towards a Common Policy in the Field of Combating cybercrime”,“Protecting Europe from large-scale cyber attacks and disruption: strengthening preparedness, security and resilience”, Directive 95/46 / EU “On the protection of individuals in the context of the processing of personal data and the free circulation of such data ”. It was determined that in Germany the policy and system for ensuring information security and cybersecurity is based on the Law “On Security Inspection”, the “Act for the Protection of Information in Telecommunications”, the “Act on Freedom of Information”, and the Law “On Strengthening the Security of Information Systems”. It was established that in Poland the policy and system for ensuring information security and cybersecurity is based on the Law “On Mail”, the Law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, the Law “On State Relations with the Roman Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland”, the Cybersecurity Strategy of Poland, the Doctrine of Cybersecurity Poland, Poland's Information Security Doctrine. It has been established that in Hungary the policy and system for ensuring information security and cybersecurity is based on the Law “On the Protection of Information about a Person and Access to Information of Public Interest”, the Law “On the Right to Information Self-Determination and Freedom of Information”, the Law “On Processing and Protection medical information and related personal data”, “Act on Electronic Information Security of State and Municipal Bodies”, Hungarian National Security Strategy, Hungarian National Cybersecurity Strategy. It was determined that in Croatia the policy and system for ensuring information security and cyber security is based on the “Information Security Act” and the National Cyber Security Strategy. It has been proved that Ukraine, which has chosen the course of European integration, should be guided by a number of information security strategies identified in the member states of the European Union, in particular in Germany, Poland, Hungary and Croatia.

In this issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we focus on the relations between the European Union and NATO in the field of security. On 1 June 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss the details of the NATO Summit to be held on 14 June 2021 in Brussels, Belgium; the period, which coincides with the publication of this thematic issue. Twenty foreign ministers represented NATO member states, which are also EU members, making an event such as the NATO summit all the more important for the future of European security. Many topics were mentioned at the ministerial, such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Russia and China. In general, however, the emphasis was put on the fact that NATO should adapt to new challenges, security settings in a highly competitive environment. As mentioned by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, we are presented with a number of challenges to our security that we need to tackle together, because no country and no continent can deal with them alone. This includes strengthening the existing partnerships and building new ones, including in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. The participants also discussed the stepping up of training and capability building for partners, as well as work to address the security impact of climate change. In the conclusion, the ministers broadly agreed that it was important to start work on NATO's next Strategic Concept, because our strategic environment has significantly changed since 2010. Secretary General underlined that NATO’s future adaptation would require Allies to continue investing in defence, and to invest more together, as a force multiplier and a strong message of unity and resolve. During Donald Trump’s mandate as President of the United States, the fact that the European Union or its Member States pay too little attention and thus resources for their own defence has often been a hot topic of political debate. In 2016, a year before the US President Trump took office, the European Union adopted a Global Strategy which envisaged several options to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy, which we will discuss in further detail in the next issue of the Contemporary Security Challenges. The Global Strategy provided that the European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and other existing and new mechanisms would operate in such a way that activities, resources and capabilities would not duplicate with NATO’s, but would complement each other. True enough that, within the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union has already foreseen many activities at its meetings and in the adopted documents in terms of strengthening this policy, but later implemented little. Has anything changed in this area in the past four years, or will perhaps something change at the time of the conference on the European future? Just as the Alliance is planning a new strategic concept, the European Union is announcing a Strategic Compass, which will set new directions for future cooperation, also in the field of security. In this issue, the authors present how the cooperation between the European Union and NATO is taking place in 2021 in some areas of security. The article titled EU-NATO cooperation and the Slovenian presidency of the Council of the European Union by Marko Mahnič presents an interesting thesis on whether obstacles to the coherent functioning of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the field of common security and defence are of a purely technical nature, or are there maybe differences in the policies, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain countries. Damjan Štrucl writes about the EU-NATO partnership and ensuring information security and cybersecurity: theory and practice. According to him, the development of information and communication technology and new challenges of the modern security environment have led to the signing of the Joint Declaration on deepening the strategic partnership between both organizations in 2016. The author provides an analysis of the EU-NATO strategic partnership in ensuring security and defence in the modern security environment. Defence initiatives to strengthen the security of the European Union motivated Gregor Garb to write an article presenting what the 2016 European Union Global Strategy contributed to the EU’s strategic defence autonomy. Initially, in a theoretical sense, and after five years in a practical sense. All of course, given the fact that the European Union will continue to maintain strong relations and cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. David Humar and Nina Raduha present the process of creating the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in the Slovenian Armed Forces. Changes in the international environment have initiated security-related strategic considerations of NATO and the European Union. Slovenia as a member of both organizations also needs a strategic consideration in both military and security fields. Their article provides more details about the The process of devising the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia. Tackling irregular migration in Europe is a topic addressed by Miklós Böröcz. Ever since 2015, the then mass illegal migration has posed a major problem for Europe and the European Union. The mass refugee crisis has gradually transformed into illegal migrations of individuals and small groups, who have maintained and strengthened contact with everybody along the way, who take part in this and ensure that the migration flow with of illegal character does not subside. The author provides some solutions to this problem.

Since its accession to the European Union, the United Kingdom has played an important role in the design and development of the European Union’s foreign, security and defence policy. While it is among the founding members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is also one of the main contributors to European security and played an active part in developing the relationship between both organisations. With the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, questions concerning the implications of Brexit on European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization cooperation arise. As the transatlantic bridge between the two organisations, Britain also faces an uncertain position within the European security architecture. It therefore needs to redefine its relations with the European Union and its own position among other member states. Taking into account the development of national security interests and recent political events, this article develops three possible scenarios that may occur for the European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization relationship depending on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations.

This article analyzes the role of the European Union (EU) and Canada in the promotion of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) activities in two regional organizations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The concept of SSR seeks to address the effective governance of security in post-conflict environment by transforming the security institutions within a country in order for them to have more efficient, legitimate and democratic role in implementing security. Recent debates within the EU have led to the adoption of an SSR concept from the Council and a new strategy from the European Commission on the SSR activities. Within the framework of the ESDP, the EU has positioned itself as a leading actor, in this domain, including in its crisis management operations. On the other hand, Canada, through its whole-of government and human security programs has also been an important actor in the promotion of SSR activities. Yet, even though several international organizations (including the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO) are effectively doing SSR activities on the ground, there does not exist a common framework within any of these organizations despite the role of the EU and Canada. As such, it is surprising to found no global common policy for SSR while this approach is precisely holistic in its foundations. Taking these elements into consideration, this paper analyzes two specific aspects : a) the absence of a common policy framework within international organizations and b) the major differences between the approaches of the OSCE and NATO in the domain of SSR and the implications for the EU and Canada’ roles.

This article analyzes the role of the European Union (EU) and Canada in the promotion of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) activities in two regional organizations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The concept of SSR seeks to address the effective governance of security in post-conflict environment by transforming the security institutions within a country in order for them to have more efficient, legitimate and democratic role in implementing security. Recent debates within the EU have led to the adoption of an SSR concept from the Council and a new strategy from the European Commission on the SSR activities. Within the framework of the ESDP, the EU has positioned itself as a leading actor, in this domain, including in its crisis management operations. On the other hand, Canada, through its whole-of government and human security programs has also been an important actor in the promotion of SSR activities. Yet, even though several international organizations (including the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO) are effectively doing SSR activities on the ground, there does not exist a common framework within any of these organizations despite the role of the EU and Canada. As such, it is surprising to found no global common policy for SSR while this approach is precisely holistic in its foundations. Taking these elements into consideration, this paper analyzes two specific aspects : a) the absence of a common policy framework within international organizations and b) the major differences between the approaches of the OSCE and NATO in the domain of SSR and the implications for the EU and Canada’ roles. Full extt available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v3i2.186

The cyclic emergence of various concepts related to communication in the security, defence and military fields continues. The newest one is Strategic Communication that follows Psychological Operations, Information Operations, Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Psychological Warfare, Political Warfare and Propaganda. There have been broader concepts developed in the past that involve different communication-related activities to realize interests and fulfil objectives of countries, international organizations as well as other actors. Listed chronologically as they appeared, the Strategy of Indirect Approach, Low Intensity Conflict, Operations Other Than War, Information Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Smart Power and Hybrid Warfare are among the most prominent ones. We are not in a position to define and compare all of the above concepts in order to identify the patterns of (dis)continuity or to explore how the concepts duplicate, overlap, and complement each other. The Strategic Communication concept is here, theoretically and in the practical application of various actors. Therefore, this introduction to the special issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, will dwell upon conceptual issues related to Strategic Communication, and will try to identify the understanding and applying of the concept in the United States of America (USA), the Russian Federation, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The year 2019 marks three anniversaries of great significance to the Republic of Slovenia, its citizens, its security and defence system, and the members of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The first anniversary commemorates 70 years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the other two relate to the 15 years of Slovenia's membership of the European Union and NATO. Celebrating 70 years of NATO is of central importance because of the Alliance's symbolic meaning. Although it was officially established on 4 April 1949, it is true to say that North Atlantic cooperation is far older. It began during the mass immigration of members of numerous nations from the territories of today’s European Union and other parts of the world into North America. So far, several generations have been connected through family ties on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean; yet, these ties are not the only ones. These relationships overcame terrible ordeals in both World Wars, and resulted in cooperation, later officially named the Alliance, in the aftermath of World War II for one reason only – for it to never happen again. On the celebration of the 70th anniversary of NATO in Washington, D.C., the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said that “[the Treaty's] reach is vast, and it has stood the test of time – because we have united around our core commitment to protect and defend one another”. In a wider sense, however, this long lasting Alliance is probably all about striving to safeguard, preserve and develop the Western European cultural, historical, political, sociological, security, defence, military (and so on) identity. Recently, the geopolitical aspect and the importance of the Alliance in relation to other emerging political actors, mainly from the East, have become increasingly important. Nevertheless, despite the major changes it has undergone in the past 70 years, the Alliance, having seemed obsolete to other security organizations, is now as vital as ever. The fact that the Republic of Slovenia has already been a member of the European Union and NATO for 15 years appears logical, particularly from the historical perspective. The territory of what is now Slovenia, where our ancestors have lived for centuries, was part of the Holy Roman Empire for over a thousand years, the Austrian Empire for 63 years, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire for 51 years. The 20th century saw several different organizational structures, with us as part of them, together with those countries which are now collectively referred to as the Western Balkans. However, the 21st century brought us membership of the European Union and NATO, i.e. a “place” where we can finally belong. On 23 March 2003, a referendum on Slovenia’s membership of the EU and NATO was held, asking the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia if they were in favour of joining the two organizations. Almost 90% of voters favoured Slovenia joining the EU, while 66% voted to join NATO. The current edition of Contemporary Military Challenges is dedicated to the 15th anniversary of Slovenia's membership of the Alliance. In 2009 and 2014, two special thematic issues were published, marking the 5th and 10th anniversaries respectively, highlighting the experience gained, and describing the best and also the less successful practices. We wanted to write them down, to remember them and leave them for generations yet to come. What is more, we wanted to share our experience with other countries aiming to join the Alliance. Our purpose here was to help those countries to not repeat our mistakes, and to assist them in avoiding mistakes altogether. For this issue, authors from other countries were invited to share their experiences and views of their countries’ and Slovenia’s membership of the Alliance. Special thanks go to David Humar and Primož Šavc for their invaluable assistance in creating the current edition.

The task of building an effective security architecture facing the European Union is extremely important in that the approach to its solution will determine the nature of the relations between the countries in the region in the future. An analysis of the processes of building a common security and defense policy (EUSR) of the EU is impossible without addressing the interrelated problems: security in the EU with the European Union's place in the Euro-Atlantic processes and in the world at large. The development of the SPBO has a significant impact on all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, which explains the relevance of its further study by national science. Until the scientific and legal literature has addressed the issue of forming and developing a common security and defense policy in the EU. In many ways, this is explained by the relatively short period of existence of the ESDC as a phenomenon, with the result that, in most cases, the study focused on considering the formation, rather than the functioning, of the ESDC mechanisms designed to prepare the EU component for further work. First of all, we are referring to studies on various aspects of the history and current activities of the European Union. In addition, the authors analyze the common issues of European security: from the problems of building security models for Europe to issues related to the activities of European regional military-political organizations on the security and interaction of European and US countries in the field of the common security and defense policy of the EU. Other authors have considered some aspects in the process of becoming an EU Security Council. However, the existing work does not allow for a holistic picture of the process of forming and developing a common foreign and security policy of the EU, in turn, the continued development of a common foreign and security policy of the EU necessitates the development of new aspects of identified issues and generalizations. In this article, the author focuses on highlighting the main stages of the EUSF formation and its importance for the effective functioning of the EU as a whole. There are four main stages in the development of the common security and defense policy: the first stage (1992-1997) is the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties; the second stage (1998-2002), when the EU declared its intention to form an ESDP in Saint-Malo (1998), as well as the decisions taken at the Cologne, Helsinki, Nice, Lachen summits; the third stage (since 2003), the Berlin Plus agreement was reached (March 2003). The Council of Europe adopted the first European Security Strategy (December 2003); and the final stage began with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Within this framework, the European Union is trying to adequately respond to some of the new challenges that emerge in the process of globalization, shaping European identity.

At the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, large-scale interna-tional conflicts and wars between groups of individuals, unrecognized international actors and countries continue to unfold. In the context of globalization, the issue of forming and strengthening the military potential of the country largely depends on its international integration policy and participation in regional alliances. Relations between the members of regional organizations are formed in the spheres of trade, finance, technical and political cooperation, among which the most important issue is military cooperation, which strengthens their military potential on the world stage. The study found that in existing regional organizations, the degree of military interaction between countries differs significantly. The authors grouped regional organizations according to the power of military cooperation into three groups. The first group is regional integration organizations that do not have joint military forces, military programs and coordination structures. This group includes the vast majority of regional organizations. The second group is regional integration organizations, which have a small amount of military cooperation, conduct joint military exercises, carry out force programs and are able to solve problems with a consolidated military force. This group includes and studied: Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU). The third group is regional alliances, which have a strong military potential. These integration organizations have: an extensive system of international agreements; unified standards; joint military units; joint development programs; coordinating structures; carry out joint exercises and military operations. This group includes: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), European Union (EU). Based on the author's analysis of the military potential of regional organizations, recommendations for countries have been developed. For the countries of the first group it is necessary to determine the expediency of strengthening the military potential of the country by strengthening the integration process: within the membership of existing integration organizations; joining other integration organizations; creation of new integration organizations. For the countries of the second group, it is advisable to continue to support military formations, increase spending on the protection and defense of life and health of their citizens from terrorist groups and other illegal actions that may endanger the government and civilians. For the countries of the third group it is recommended to maintain cooperation in the military sphere, to increase the costs of improving military equipment and weapons. Conduct more joint exercises to gain new experience and skills in different conditions of use of military resources in civilian and military spheres. These most powerful regional alliances have an advantage in the military field precisely because of the number of troops, the number of weapons, military equipment, and joint military bases. And the main goal of these regional organizations is to create security for their citizens and the world as a whole, through the development of new effective mechanisms for global interaction.

This volume is based on NRF-funded research cooperation between the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History in Bucharest and the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University, dealing with the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. It discusses the transition to multi-party democracy, the consequent changes in the security environment and the current role and defensive posture of these countries in their respective regions. All contributions are abstracted separately in the introductory chapter (pp 1-11). The specific chapters discuss the joint experiences and challenges in facing the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (1. Liebenberg, I: "Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy": 13-36; 2. Sasz, P V: "Transition to Democracy in Romania": 37-57; 4. Mangayani, C: "The Role of Youth in South Africa's Transition": 87-121), the reform of the armies (3. Ionesco, M: "Transition, Alliances and Military Reform in Romania in the post-Cold War Period": 59-86; 5. Ferreira, R: "South Africa: From Apartheid Army to a Post-Apartheid Defence Force": 123-135; 7. Mangayani, C: "Structures for Political Oversight of the Military": 171-204; 8. Otu, P: "Military Reform in Romania": 205-231) as well as the repositioning of Romania's security strategy (6. Cioculescu, S: "Romania's National Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Period": 137-170). South Africa's change in strategy concerning its interests in the Indian Ocean is the main focus of T Potgieter in chapter 10 (pp 267-305)and Romania's status within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has been dealt with by Carmen Rijnoveanu in chapter 11 (pp307-340). Worthy of special attention is chapter 9 (Liebenberg, I: "The Arms Industry, Reform and Civil-Military Relations in South Africa": 233-266), bridging the purchase of arms and ammunition during the inter-war years (1919-1939) to the period of World War II (1939-1945) and even further to the establishment of South Africa's own defence industry under apartheid rule (1948-1989), emphasising the enormous cost of maintaining a military superiority in southern Africa paving the way for South Africa's economic decline by the end of the 1980s and leading to the political demise of apartheid in the 1994 elections. In chapter 12 ("Waves of Change, Military-Political Reorientation, Economic Alliances and Uncertain Futures": 341-357), the editors make a comparison Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 38, No 2 Book Reviews 181 of the different starting positions of both countries and the national security strategies that emerged from it.

Problem setting. The issue of Ukrainian relations with the four state members of the Visegrad Group is important from the very beginning of the establishment of the Visegrad Group as Ukraine is interested in raising the question of its support in the integration into the NATO and EU. The Visegrad Group has the experience of supporting its members in such integration. In addition, Ukraine is concerned about the resolution of its defence problems. Takin into consideration the war conflict of Ukraine with the Russian Federation that started in 2014, issues of cooperation in the military field turned out to be of top priority in relations with the state members of the Visegrad Group. Recent research and publications analysis. Issues of cooperation of Ukraine with the four state members of the Visegrad Group, in particular as a means for the European integration, have been studied by O. Andriychuk, Ye. Kish, M. Lendiel, A. Kudriachenko, S. Mitriaeva and H. Perepelytsia. Challenges and opportunities in collaboration of the Visegrad Group countries with Ukraine in the field of defence and security have been analysed in research works of V. Andreiko, H. Mysak and O. Kaplynskyi. Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. In spite of numerous studies of the above-mentioned authors, military cooperation between Ukraine and the state members of the Visegrad Group is understudied. Issues of working together with individual state members of the Visegrad Group in the military field need to be addressed deeper. Especially, it is important to outline military cooperation with the Republic of Poland in light of understanding the threats posed by the Russian Federation to Eastern-European countries. Paper main body. The Visegrad Group (Visegrad Four or V4) is a union of the four countries – Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia, founded 25 years ago on 15 February 1991, composed at that time of the three states: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The union was formed as a result of the reaction of countries of the former Communist Bloc to the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance that created economic and security problems for the states, which they tried to solve partially by the enforcement of regional cooperation. According to the instruments of incorporation, the V4 Group is headed by one of the state members based on annual rotation, with a Summit of Heads of Governments held at the end. The countries head the organization for one year by turn. The main priorities of heading include expansion of the EU to the Western Balkans and eastern policy of the EU, cooperation in the field of defence, etc. Ukraine is one of the key partners of the V4 Group, aiming primarily at establishing a comprehensive dialogue and elaborating a joint position on the whole range of topical issues of international partnership and political situation, including in the region of the East Central Europe. In the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, the V4 Group was headed by the Czech Republic. Taking into consideration significant changes in the security environment, the program of Czech heading was targeted at the expansion of cooperation in the following areas: – internal unity (joint political approach and solutions: there were more than 10 statements approved by the V4 Group at the level of Heads of Governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs since the escalation of the situation in Ukraine regarding the support of Ukraine and preservation of its territorial integrity); – defence and security cooperation (implementation of common projects both within the V4 Group and the European Union), and others. Polish heading provided for coordination of the position of the state members of the V4 Group concerning Ukraine and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and evaluation of the previous activities of the V4 Group towards the support of Ukraine. The Republic of Poland makes every effort to strengthen relations with Ukraine aimed at minimizing political threats and enforcing Polish defence. In the area of military cooperation, Ukraine and the Republic of Poland achieved substantial success in formation of the regulatory and legal framework of cooperation and initiation of primary directions of collaboration – from participation in the Partnership for Peace Program, joint military trainings, sharing experiences, improvement of professional skills of officers, education of mobile and tank forces to formation of a Polish-Ukrainian unit. Support of the idea of creation of a common security (defence) space from the Baltic States to the Back Sea must become a prioritized direction in cooperation between Ukraine and the Visegrad Group. Intensification of mutual efforts in the mentioned area will contribute to restraining the unhidden full-scale military aggression of Russia and serve as a factor of holding the Russian Federation from new re-division of the spheres of influence and territories. Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Therefore, Ukraine has a great potential for the expansion of cooperation with the countries of the V4 Group in the military field, in particular with Poland and Czech Republic. Planning of and participation in the activities within the regional military collaboration of the Visegrad Group with Ukraine gradually turn into an efficient ground for the achievement of the main strategic objective of our country – full integration into the European Atlantic security space and joining the political and military alliance NATO. Further studies will provide an insight into the possibilities for enhancement of cooperation of Ukraine with the individual state members of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) in the military field and development of comprehensive measures to mitigate the destructive policy of Hungary towards Ukraine.