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Libri sul tema "Propositional Attitude"

Autore: Grafiati

Pubblicato: 4 giugno 2021

Ultima modifica: 11 febbraio 2022

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1

Dahllöf, Mats. On the semantics of propositional attitude reports. Göteborg University, Dept. of Linguistics, 1995.

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2

Andersen, Gisle, and Thorstein Fretheim, eds. Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pbns.79.

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3

Richard, Mark. Propositional attitudes: An essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

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4

Matthews, Robert J. The measure of mind: Propositional attitudes and their attribution. Oxford University Press, 2007.

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5

Jaszczolt, Katarzyna. Discourse, beliefs, and intentions: Semantic defaults and propositional attitude ascription. Elsevier, 1999.

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6

Matthews, Robert J. The measure of mind: Propositional attitudes and their attribution. Oxford University Press, 2010.

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7

C, Moore Robert. Propositional attitudes and Russellian propositions. CSLI/SRI International, 1988.

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8

Walter, Alex. Evolutionary Psychology and the Propositional-attitudes. Springer Netherlands, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2969-8.

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9

Structured meanings: The semantics of propositional attitudes. MIT Press, 1985.

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10

A, Smirnov V., Karpenko A. S, Bystrov P. I та Institut filosofii (Akademii͡a︡ nauk SSSR), ред. Neklassicheskie logiki i propozit͡s︡ionalʹnye ustanovki: Trudy Nauchno-issledovatelʹskiĭ seminara po logike Instituta filosofii AN SSSR. Akademii͡a︡ nauk SSSR, In-t filosofii, 1987.

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11

Aho, Tuomo. On the philosophy of attitude logic. Societas Philosophica Fennica, 1994.

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12

Walter, Alex. Evolutionary psychology and the propositional-attitudes: Two mechanist manifestos. Springer, 2012.

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13

Empiricism and the foundations of psychology. John Benjamins North America, 2012.

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14

Jospin, Lionel. 1995-2000, propositions pour la France. Stock, 1995.

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15

S, Hoyle B. Urban waterfront redevelopment in Canada: Propositions and perspectives. Department of Geography, University of Southampton, 1993.

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16

Gagné, Francine. Réflexions et propositions d'action: Les jeunes et l'avenir du français au Québec : rapport du Comité du Conseil de la langue française sur les jeunes et l'avenir du français au Québec. Conseil de la langue française, 1985.

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17

Gisle, Andersen, and Fretheim Thorstein, eds. Pragmatic markers and propositional attitude. J. Benjamins Pub., 2000.

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18

Katarzyna, Jaszczolt, ed. The pragmatics of propositional attitude reports. Elsevier, 2000.

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19

Watzl, Sebastian. Is Attention a Non-Propositional Attitude? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0012.

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The first part of this chapter argues that many forms of attention and attention-entailing mental episodes, such as looking at something, watching something, listening to something, or tactually feeling something, are paradigmatic examples of non-propositional intentional episodes. In addition, attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. But is attention a non-propositional attitude? The second part of the chapter argues that it is not. In order to account for attention and its apparently non-propositional character we should reject a certain atomistic model of our mental life and move towards a more holistic conception. I question the assumption that a subject’s mental life should be thought of as a causally connected collection of mental attitudes. This “building-block” model of the mind does not fit the case of attention. Instead, a subject’s mental life can be partitioned along many, equally appropriate dimensions. In a slogan: mentality has priority structure, in addition to attitudinal structure.

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20

The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution. Oxford University Press, USA, 2007.

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21

Richard, Mark. Context and the Attitudes: Meaning in Context, Volume 1. Oxford University Press, 2013.

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22

Richard, Mark. Context and the Attitudes. Oxford University Press, 2015.

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23

Ueda, Tomoo. Telling What She Thinks: Semantics and Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. De Gruyter, Inc., 2015.

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24

Kriegel, Uriah. Belief-That and Belief-In. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0008.

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Let propositionalism be the thesis that all mental attitudes are propositional. Anti-propositionalists have focused on trying to resist reductive analyses of apparently non-propositional attitudes, such as fearing a dog and loving a spouse, into propositional form. This chapter explores the anti-propositionalist’s prospects for going on the offensive, trying to show that some apparently propositional attitudes, notably belief and judgment, can be given a reductive analysis in terms of non-propositional attitudes. Although the notion that belief is a non-propositional attitude may seem ludicrous at first, it has been given an admirable defense by Franz Brentano, a defense which this chapter expounds and deepens.

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25

Anthony, Anderson C., and Owens Joseph 1943-, eds. Propositional attitudes: The role of content in logic, language, and mind. Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1990.

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26

(Editor), C. Anthony Anderson, and Joseph Owens (Editor), eds. Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind (Center for the Study of Language and Information - Lecture Notes). Center for the Study of Language and Inf, 1990.

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27

(Editor), C. Anthony Anderson, and Joseph Owens (Editor), eds. Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind (Center for the Study of Language and Information - Lecture Notes). Center for the Study of Language and Inf, 1990.

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28

Coppock, Elizabeth, and Stephen Wechsler. The proper treatment of egophoricity in Kathmandu Newari. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0003.

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In egophoric (or conjunct/disjunct) verb-marking systems, a conjunct verb form co-occurs with first-person subjects in declaratives and second-person subjects in interrogatives, and also appears in de se attitude and speech reports; a disjunct verb form appears elsewhere. Conjunct marking also interacts with evidentiality: a speaker who abdicates responsibility for the content of an utterance by means of an evidential marker uses the disjunct verb form despite co-occurence with a first-person subject. Focussing on the case of Kathmandu Newari, Coppock and Wechsler propose that conjunct morphology marks the contents of attitudes de se. They develop a formal treatment of egophoricity, including a dynamic discourse model of the way attitudes de se are communicated. The propositional content of an attitude de se, modelled as a set of centered worlds, is effectively uncentered by its agent, to produce an ordinary proposition that is eligible to enter the common ground.

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29

Jaszczolt, Kasia. Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription (Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface). Pergamon, 1999.

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30

Jaszczolt, Kasia. Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription (Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface). Pergamon, 1999.

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31

Perry, John. Frege's Detour. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812821.001.0001.

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I argue that Frege’s treatment of propositional attitudes in “On Sense and Reference” put the philosophy of language on a detour. His doctrine of “indirect reference” reflected and reinforced the view that beliefs, desires, etc. consist in having relations to propositions. According to this doctrine expressions in embedded sentences in indirect discourse and propositional attitude reports do refer as they do when unembedded, but instead refer to their ordinary senses, so sentences refer to Thoughts, Frege’s version of what are now callled general or qualitative propositions. Davidson call this move abandoning “semantic innocence” which is the view that such embedded sentences work as they usually do. I agree with Davidson, that semantic innocence should not be abandonned. I argue that such cognitive states have truth-conditions in virtue of their causal and informational roles, which can be encoded in a variety of ways for different purposes, and provide a better explanation of the considerations that drove Frege to abandon innocence. I trace the problems I see to Frege’s abandonment of the framework of his early work, the Begriffsschrift. I argue that by adding the levels of senses and Thoughts to his Begriffsschriftframework, and retaining “circumstances” as the referents of sentences containing singular terms, Frege could have avoided the doctrine of indirect reference, and philosophy could have taken a different path.

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32

Davis, Wayne A. The property theory and de se attitudes. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0012.

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The property theory of de se belief denies that believing is a propositional attitude, maintaining instead that for Lingens to believe that he himself is lost is for him to self-attribute the property of being lost. For Lingens to believe that Lingens is lost is for him to self-attribute the independent property of being such that Lingens is lost. The chapter argues that this theory postulates differences where we expect uniformity, introduces unnecessary theoretical complexity, is false to a variety of linguistic and phenomenological facts, and fails to explain many psychological and linguistic facts. If “self-attribute a property” means “believing oneself to have the property,” then the theory provides no explanation of de se belief. The author sketches a propositional theory on which the objects of the attitudes are complexes of concepts (thoughts), de se attitudes involving one type of indexical concept.

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33

Rowett, Catherine. Truth and Belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199693658.003.0002.

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The first part of the chapter explores the relations between knowledge and truth and between knowledge and belief. It challenges a number of muddles in the literature concerning propositional attitudes, particularly the idea that while belief is a propositional attitude, knowledge is not. Second, it explores ancient words for ‘truth’, and how truth and being are related in ancient thought, including the so-called veridical sense of the verb einai. It argues that truth is (both for Plato, and in truth) first a property of things, and is then derivatively found in likenesses, such as reflections, pictures, and descriptions, where it comes in degrees according to the representation’s faithfulness to the truth. Finally, it connects this to the iconic method in Plato, whereby he uses such images as a means of accessing the truth that cannot be seen.

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34

Buchak, Lara. Reason and Faith. Edited by William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662241.013.34.

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Faith is a central attitude in Christian religious practice. The problem of faith and reason is the problem of reconciling religious faith with the standards for our belief-forming practices in general (‘ordinary epistemic standards’). In order to see whether and when faith can be reconciled with ordinary epistemic standards, we first need to know what faith is. This chapter examines and catalogues views of propositional faith: faith that p. It is concerned with the epistemology of such faith: what cognitive attitudes such faith requires, what epistemic norms govern these attitudes, and whether Christian faith can ever adhere to them.

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35

Proust, Joëlle. Consensus as an Epistemic Norm for Group Acceptance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0008.

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What are the propositional attitude(s) involved in collective epistemic agency? There are two opposing camps on this question: the ascribers have defended an extended notion of belief, while the rejectionists have claimed that groups form goal-sensitive acceptances. Addressing this question, however, requires providing responses to four preliminary queries. (1) Are group attitudes reducible to the participants’ attitudes? (2) Is epistemic evaluation sensitive to instrumental considerations? (3) Does accepting that p entail believing that p? (4) Is there a unity of epistemic rationality across levels? Both “believing” and “accepting as true”, as applied to plural subjects, fail to provide satisfactory answers to these four queries. An alternative analysis for epistemic group attitude called “accepting under consensus” is proposed. This attitude is shown to reflect actual group agency, and to offer consistent and independently justified answers to the queries. On this analysis, an individualist epistemology cannot simply be transferred to collective agents.

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36

Grzankowski, Alex. A Relational Theory of Non-Propositional Attitudes. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0006.

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According to the “standard theory”, propositional attitudes are two-place relations holding between subjects and propositions. The present chapter considers the prospects of offering an analog for non-propositional attitudes. Many of the same types of motivations and advantages that have made the standard theory of propositional attitudes attractive apply to non-propositional attitudes as well. Of course, in the case of non-propositional attitudes, objects other than propositions are called for and the suggestion to be offered is that non-propositional attitudes are two-place relations holding between subjects and properties. At the end of the chapter, the view is defended against a seemingly obvious objection—namely that subjects don’t typically fear, like, love, and so on, properties.

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37

Kriegel, Uriah. Judgment. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791485.003.0005.

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One aspect of Brentano’s theory of judgment that is crucial for his ontology and metaontology is Brentano’s astonishing claim that judgment is not a propositional attitude, but an objectual attitude. In this chapter, I offer an exposition of this highly heterodox theory, discuss the case for it, and consider some objections. In the following two chapters, the theory’s implications for metaontology and ultimately ontology will be developed.

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38

Hegarty, Michael. Modality and Propositional Attitudes. University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations, 2016.

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39

Hegarty, Michael. Modality and Propositional Attitudes. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

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40

Richard, Mark. Opacity. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0027.

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There seems to be a lot of opacity in our language. Quotation is opaque. The modal idioms are apparently opaque. Propositional attitude ascriptions seem opaque, as do the environments created by verbs such as ‘seeks’ and ‘fears’. Opacity raises a number of issues — first and foremost, whether there is such a thing. This article concentrates on the question of whether there is any opacity to be found in natural language, examining various reasons one might have for denying that apparent opacity is genuine.

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41

1951-, Salmon Nathan U., and Soames Scott, eds. Propositions and attitudes. Oxford University Press, 1988.

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42

Propositions and attitudes. Oxford University Press, 1988.

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43

Mendelovici, Angela. Thought. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0007.

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Thoughts present a challenge for PIT. They seem to represent various contents, including rich descriptive contents, broad contents, and object-involving contents, but it is not clear how PIT can accommodate them. This chapter argues that thoughts have a largely neglected kind of content, immediate content, which is plausibly phenomenally represented and from which rich descriptive, broad, and object-involving contents can be derived. On the proposed view of derived mental representation, self-ascriptivism, thoughts derivatively represent their alleged contents because we ascribe them to our thoughts' immediate contents. This self-ascription is a matter of our dispositions to have certain thoughts that specify that one content cashes out into another. Although on this view, thoughts derivatively represent their alleged contents, this kind of derived representation is not a kind of intentionality. The chapter also briefly suggests that self-ascriptivism can be applied to perceptual states and to the attitude component of propositional attitudes.

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44

Textor, Mark. The Regress and the Duplication Argument. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0005.

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Brentano held that perceiving and awareness of perceiving are not two distinct mental acts, but one. This view is not intuitively plausible. The chapter assesses in detail Brentano’s main argument—the Duplication Argument—for this view. It starts by considering predecessors of Brentano’s version of the argument in Aristotle and Hamilton and then moves on to Brentano’s version. Brentano’s Duplication Argument does not assume that awareness of mental acts is a propositional attitude. Because of this Brentano’s Duplication Argument is more promising than its predecessors. The chapter also makes clear why it is implausible to credit Brentano with the Infinite Regress Argument.

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45

Wolfgang, Künne, Newen Albert, and Anduschus Martin, eds. Direct reference, indexicality, and propositional attitudes. Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1997.

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46

Matthews, Robert J. A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0025.

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47

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Decision. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0009.

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If linguistic vagueness is more fundamental than propositional vagueness, it is natural to think that vague propositions won’t play a substantive role in decision theory. On a linguistic picture, what it is rational for an agent to do is completely determined by their attitudes towards precise propositions. This is vacuously true if all propositions are precise, but it also seems like a natural idea if, like the expressivist discussed in Chapter 8, a distinction is drawn between metaphysically ‘first-rate’ precise propositions and metaphysically ‘second-rate’ vague propositions. This chapter considers how to formulate decision theory in a setting where there are vague propositions, and discusses ways in which vague beliefs, desires, and actions can have concrete impacts on practical deliberation and action.

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48

Zimmerman, Aaron Z. Against Intellectualism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0003.

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The other animals fail to construct sentences, and Descartes inferred from this that they entirely lack beliefs. Contemporary intellectualists—e.g. B. Williams (1973) and D. Velleman (2000)—allow non-human animals beliefs in an “impoverished” sense of the term, while emphasizing the importance of an animal’s “aiming at the truth” when constructing representations of her environment. The pragmatists reject these forms of intellectualism. Humans use sentences to attribute beliefs to themselves and other animals; but there is no further sense in which belief is an essentially “propositional attitude.” Field ethologists report wolves, dolphins, chimpanzees, and scrub jays reflecting and planning, teaching and learning, loving and forgiving. It is a mark in favor of pragmatism that it allows us to understand these behaviors as manifestations of complex bodies of animal belief.

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49

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Uncertainty. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0008.

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Recent forms of expressivism attempt to explain the sense in which certain propositions are ‘non-factual’ in terms of principles about attitudes towards those propositions. Following recent expressivist accounts of conditionals and modals, a version of expressivism about vagueness is explored, which maintains that to have a credence in a vague proposition is just to have your credences in the precise propositions distributed in a certain way. Whilst this form of expressivism is ultimately rejected, a consequence of the view can be exploited to partially capture the intuition that certain subject matters are non-factual. This principle, Rational Supervenience’, effectively states that all disagreements about the vague ultimately boil down to disagreements about the precise: any two rational priors that agree about all precise propositions agree about everything. While the Principle of Plenitude states that there is a proposition occupying every evidential role, Rational Supervenience entails conversely that every proposition occupies some evidential role.

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50

Hirschberg, Julia. Pragmatics and Prosody. Edited by Yan Huang. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697960.013.28.

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Variation in prosody can influence the interpretation of linguistic phenomena in many languages. Type and location of prosodic prominence and prosodic phrase boundaries, differences in overall fundamental frequency (f0) contours, and changes in intensity, duration, and speaking rate can serve to inform hearers about syntactic attachment, disambiguate scope of modifiers and negation, signal information status, indicate type of speech act or propositional attitude, and contribute to the licensing of implicatures and to reference resolution. This chapter discusses aspects of prosodic variation and pragmatic meaning which have been explored in linguistics, computational linguistics, and psycholinguistics. It begins by describing some commonly used frameworks for representing prosody, including the ToBI framework, which is used to identify prosodic variation throughout. The pragmatic influence of prosody on the interpretation of syntactic, semantic, and discourse phenomena is then examined. It concludes by suggesting new avenues for research in the relationship between prosody and pragmatic interpretation.

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