Thematische Bibliographien / Bureaucracy Decentralization in government China

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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Bureaucracy Decentralization in government China“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 10. Februar 2022

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Bureaucracy Decentralization in government China"

Park, Albert, Scott Rozelle, Christine Wong und Changqing Ren. „Distributional Consequences of Reforming Local Public Finance in China“. China Quarterly 147 (September 1996): 751–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100005178x.

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Central-local budgetary arrangements have undergone numerous changes since the 1960s as the Chinese government in its quest for modernization has sought to balance the needs of central control and local autonomy. During the reform period, the falling tax share of GNP and a commitment to greater decentralization of the planning system led to major changes in the public finance system that have devolved expenditure responsibilities and financial authority to local governments. Fiscal decentralization has been credited with hardening budget constraints for local publicly controlled enterprises and government agencies. New budgetary relations have instilled fiscal discipline, allowing local governments to disburse more expenditures only if they generated more revenues. These reforms have helped unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of local bureaucrats, fuelling the rapid growth of rural industry.

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Caulfield, Janice L. „Local government reform in China: a rational actor perspective“. International Review of Administrative Sciences 72, Nr. 2 (Juni 2006): 253–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020852306064613.

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There has been a series of comprehensive reform initiatives in recent Chinese history aimed at improving bureaucratic efficiency, flexibility and innovation through management and fiscal decentralization. The local government sector in China carries major functional responsibilities from economic development to social welfare provision. It is responsible for over 70 percent of total government expenditure. Now, in the new millennium, the Chinese central government seeks to transform local government as part of its market liberalization strategy. This includes ‘privatizing’ local enterprises (a process begun during the 1990s) and a rationalization of local bureaucracy. Although still a highly centralized administration, there has been a significant move away from a uniform approach to local government where now differentiation between regions and localities is actively encouraged. Within a still tightly constrained political structure, however, the reforms have done more than improve China’s economic output. They have created incentives for local officials to engage in rent seeking and utility-maximizing behaviours. The article explores the reform initiatives and critically assesses results against this background.

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Borokh, Olga N. „From Western Knowledge to a National Textbook: The Evolution of Li Quanshi’s Socio-economic Views“. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Asian and African Studies 12, Nr. 3 (2020): 426–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu13.2020.308.

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The article analyzes the scholarly legacy of Li Quanshi as part of the history of intellectual interactions between China and the West in the Republican Period. Having been educated in the United States, in the early 1920s Li Quanshi used Western economic theories to develop a model of administrative and fiscal decentralization in China. He denounced “the communism of revenue” between different levels of government in China, pointed to the failure of a despotic centralized bureaucracy, and called to transfer financial authority to the level of provincial assemblies. Later, Li Quanshi’s views evolved from liberalism to the support of government intervention in the economy. Numerous publications by Li Quanshi impacted the process of the formation of Chinese economics in the Republican Period. He proposed to produce a “national textbook” in economics that took into account the Chinese realities. Li Quanshi set the goal of moving from copying and rendering foreign books to creating China’s own internationally competitive academic writings. The scholar relied upon the division of economics, widely accepted in the West, into production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, but its application to traditional Chinese material generated new results. In the first history of Chinese economic thought written in the Chinese language Li Quanshi interpreted and structured traditional heritage using Western concepts. His determination to introduce Chinese characteristics into economic research has stimulated increased attention to the issues of consumption and the role of the state in the economy. It is concluded that Li Quanshi’s ideas of the 1920s and 1930s have regained relevance in the context of the current official policy of support to “social sciences with Chinese characteristics”.

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Priyatno, Harsasto, und Utomo Susilo. „Democracy, Decentralization and Efficientcy: A Study of Bureaucratic Reforms in Indonesia“. E3S Web of Conferences 73 (2018): 09011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/20187309011.

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This research will investigate how bureaucratic reforms in the context of decentralization impact on state bureaucratic capacity in Indonesia. It argues that bureaucratic reforms in Indonesia has resultin a two-particular political outcomes. Firstly, to strengthen government political control over the bureaucracy by swinging back the decentralization approach toward a prefectoral system as a mean of changing the political arena in their favor, and, secondly, to gain popular support. In this way, bureaucracy reforms have indeed increased efficiency of the public sector, butat the same time decrease its autonomy. Democracy, decentralization, hybrid regime, partial bureaucracy reforms.

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Guo, Shufen, Ludi Wen, Yanrui Wu, Xiaohang Yue und Guilian Fan. „Fiscal Decentralization and Local Environmental Pollution in China“. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, Nr. 22 (21.11.2020): 8661. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17228661.

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Fiscal decentralization is one of the tools for the central government to engage local governments in environment management. However, its effects are inconclusive. This paper aims to examine the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution and the role of government environmental preference in China’s provinces. The results show that fiscal revenue decentralization exacerbates local environmental pollution more seriously than expenditure decentralization. This negative environmental effect of fiscal decentralization could be moderated by government environmental preference. Based on our findings, it is recommended that China’s local governments should improve environmental preference so that fiscal decentralization can create a win–win situation for the economy and environment. Furthermore, the different effects of fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization create a necessity for differentiated management of fiscal decentralization by the central and local governments.

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Joniarta, I. Wayan, I. G. A. AG Dewi Sucitawathi P, Inácio Soares und Wayan Suderana. „STUDI IMPLEMENTASI KEBIJAKAN DESENTRALISASI ADMINISTRATIF DI MUNICIPIO DILI TIMOR-LESTE“. Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 10, Nr. 1 (30.04.2019): 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/politika.10.1.2019.40-56.

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This research aims to empirically elaborate the implementation of administrative decentralization in Municipio Dili Timor-Leste. This research scrutinizes human resource, financial resource, facilities and implementing structure in bureaucracy to identify implementation effectiveness. This research applies qualitative methods using interviews as methods for collecting data, observation and document reviews. This research found that the implementation of administrative decentralization has not yet been effective. There is a need for capacity building to improve government officers' capability to better off the quality of public service.

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Bida, Obed. „Decentralization in Educational Disparity of the Southeast Sulawesi Province“. Policy & Governance Review 2, Nr. 3 (28.02.2019): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.30589/pgr.v2i3.109.

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Educational disparity is a public issue that continues to be an endless subject matter of discourse due to the highly centralistic process of education policy in the government bureaucracy. This research aims to understand the pattern of educational disparity occurring in the islands of Southeast Sulawesi Province, Indonesia. The role of political actors in the success of education policy is a vital element in the policy process, and this is apparent in the significance of the political aspect in the education policy process, which emphasizes more on political approaches rather than actual social, economic, and geographical conditions. This study was conducted using the descriptive qualitative approach with data collection techniques that included observations, in-depth interviews, and document analysis in Buton and South Buton Regencies. Study results indicate that the education policy pattern developing in island regions is inclined to using the spatial approach with a central area priority scale, and the structural elite approach, which is political lobbying employed by structural elites (school principals) targeting education bureaucracy in the region. The education policy pattern developing in the region actually has an impact on educational disparity in the public, both at the district and regency levels. In general, the education decentralization policy has yet to run optimally on account of educational resources in the region being distributed by using the spatial and structural elite approaches which have, consequently, created a pathological behavior in the education bureaucracy that is chockfull of vested interests.

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Yang, Siying, Zheng Li und Jian Li. „Fiscal decentralization, preference for government innovation and city innovation“. Chinese Management Studies 14, Nr. 2 (13.01.2020): 391–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cms-12-2018-0778.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether fiscal decentralization has impacts on city innovation level and to examine the moderating effects of the preference for government innovation in China. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel data of China’s 278 cities from 2003 to 2016, the authors first use fixed-effect model and quantile regression to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level and the variations of impacts conditional on different innovation levels, followed by a mediating effect model to test the moderating effects of the preference for government innovation and its temporal and spatial heterogeneity. Findings The paper finds that fiscal decentralization significantly inhibited city innovation, and with the improvement of city innovation level, the inhibition demonstrated characteristics of “V” type variation. When the degree of fiscal decentralization is between 0.377 and 0.600, the inhibition of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level is the weakest. We further show that fiscal decentralization also inhibits the government's preference for innovation, reduces the proportion of fiscal expenditure on innovation and has a negative impact on city innovation. In addition, the influence of fiscal decentralization on city innovation present clear heterogeneity in space and in time. On one hand, the inhibition of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level in eastern China is significantly weaker than that in central and Western China; on the other hand, after the implementation of China’s innovation-driven development strategy in 2013, the negative impact of fiscal decentralization on city innovation disappeared. Research limitations/implications The research findings have certain policy implications. That is, in the process of decentralization reform, on the one hand, the central government should strengthen the supervision over the fiscal expenditure of local governments and ensure that the central government can play a leading role in the local development strategy, on the other hand, the central government should guard against the distortion of fiscal decentralization on local governments' fiscal expenditure behavior. In addition, the central government should also focus on the heterogeneity of the impacts of fiscal decentralization on cities under different strategic backgrounds and different levels of innovation. Originality/value This paper extends prior research by bringing the decentralization system reform into the study of city innovation system and analyzing its mechanism and its temporal and spatial heterogeneity.

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Widiyahseno, Bambang. „Inovasi Bupati di Ruang Demokrasi: Upaya Membangun Kesadaran Inovasi Birokrasi“. Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik 18, Nr. 3 (22.09.2016): 177. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jsp.13136.

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Decentralization and granting broad autonomy to the local government open the space for the continuity ofpolicy innovation. This study is important because not all regional heads could do it. There are many partiesinvolved and interested in the process. This study explores the behavior of regents to build awareness andmindset (unfreezing) to various parties. The magnitude of opportunities to innovate is largely determinedby regent ability to perform the process of unfreezing. The ﬁ ndings indicate a regent’s eﬀ ort in buildingrelationships with various parties, especially the power of the bureaucracy, parliament and society (thepublic) in the process of unfreezing ie melting of the ice or the awareness of the need for change (innovation). Those are Strategies to encourage and initiate innovation to anticipate the bureaucracy, which is building a coalition with the community to deal with the inert bureaucracy.

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Huang, Yasheng, und Yumin Sheng. „Political Decentralization and Inflation: Sub-National Evidence from China“. British Journal of Political Science 39, Nr. 2 (April 2009): 389–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123408000549.

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One possible political determinant of macroeconomic instability scholars have explored at length is decentralization, but cross-national research measuring political decentralization in terms of constitutional federalism has produced mixed evidence regarding its effects on inflation. Conceptualizing political decentralization in terms of governing political party decentralization but acknowledging the challenges of cross-national data collection, the authors suggest the utility of a sub-national approach by studying one country under single-party rule. Drawing on provincial-level cross-section time-series data, they find that political decentralization measured as the inverse of central government political control, via the ruling party, over the different provincial governments is positively correlated with provincial inflation in China during 1978–97. The finding is robust to alternative specifications, expanded year coverage and Granger causality tests.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Bureaucracy Decentralization in government China"

朱慧嫻 und Wai-hang Flora Chu. „Bureaucratic reform and decentralization: a study of China's State Council in the post Mao era“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1985. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31974387.

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Chu, Wai-hang Flora. „Bureaucratic reform and decentralization : a study of China's State Council in the post Mao era /“. [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1985. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B12316088.

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GERA, Weena J. S. „Central Bureaucratic Supervision and Capacity Development in Decentralization: Rethinking the Relevance of the Depertment of Interior and Local Government of the Philippines“. 名古屋大学大学院国際開発研究科, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/10585.

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陳淑英 und Suk-ying Glenda Chan. „Adaptability of the government bureaucracy to economic reform in dongguan county“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1993. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31964230.

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Ouyang, Hongwu. „Political economy of unbalanced development in China“. online access from Digital dissertation consortium, 2002. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3068329.

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Leung, Pik-yee Emily, und 梁璧儀. „Hiving-off: the case of the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1989. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31975999.

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Chai, Man-hon, und 柴文瀚. „Neither recentralization nor decentralization: a review of district administrative scheme since 2008“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46760350.

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Hu, Jingfei, und 胡竞菲. „School-government relationships in the setting of decentralisation: two school voucher schemes in China“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B44548825.

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蘇偉業 und Wai-yip Bennis So. „Elites, bureaucracy, and the policy process in China: a study of the Socialist Transformation of capitalistindustry and commerce, 1949-56“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1996. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31214629.

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Yau, Wai-keung, und 邱偉強. „A study on fire protection policy in Hong Kong: devolution from bureaucracy“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2006. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B36443311.

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Bücher zum Thema "Bureaucracy Decentralization in government China"

Ura, Karma. Bureaucracy and peasantry in decentralization in Bhutan. Chiba-shi, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, 2005.

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Vuorela, Terho. Desentralisointi debyrokratisoinnin keinona: Tutkimus mahdollisuuksista edistää debyrokratisointia desentralisoinnin avulla. [Tampere]: Tampereen yliopisto, Hallintotieteiden laitos, 1986.

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Lungu, Gatian F. Administrative decentralization in the Zambian bureaucracy: An analysis of environmental constraints. Gweru, Zimbabwe: published on behalf of the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, Lusaka, by Mambo Press, 1985.

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Golola, Moses L. Decentralization, local bureaucracies and service delivery in Uganda. Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2001.

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Jaques, Elliott. A generaltheory of bureaucracy. Aldershot: Gower, 1986.

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Bounded bureaucracy and the budgetary process in the United States. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2011.

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Lungu, Gatian. Administrative decentralisation in the Zambian bureaucracy: An analysis of environmental constraints. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Published on behalf of the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, by Mambo Press, 1985.

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Tadashi, Miyamoto. Gendai kanryōsei to chihō bunken. Tōkyō: Kōbundō Shuppansha, 2004.

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Zhang, Tao. Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China. Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy Research Dept., Public Economics Division, 1996.

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Traité de balayage. Paris: A. Figueras, 1985.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Bureaucracy Decentralization in government China"

Lu, Zi, Jing Zhang, Bing Han, Zhuopeng Deng und Ji Lu. „The Development of Urban E-Governement in China“. In Global E-Government, 214–37. IGI Global, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-027-1.ch013.

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The chapter assesses and cognizes the development of urban e-government in China from two main aspects: functionality and complexity. To functionality, nine websites of urban governments in China at three levels were selected for this assessment. Data needed for the study was tracked and recorded continuously for six weeks from these websites. To complexity, the influence of e-government to urban modality and evolution are explored, which shows that e-government has a leading role to the gathering and decentralization of urban space, the organization of material (people) flows and the informal exchange in internal cities.

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Grant, Bligh, Ronald Woods und Su Fei Tan. „Subnational Finance in Australia and China“. In Advances in Electronic Government, Digital Divide, and Regional Development, 150–66. IGI Global, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-1645-3.ch007.

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The political and economic benefits of decentralization have been cogently represented, to the extent that decentralization and devolution comprise identifiable programs of reform across a range of polities. However, the public policy question of finance following function – and the oversight of this process – is less resolved. Further, concerns over the financial sustainability of sub-national governments continue across a range of polities. Against the backdrop of reforms to municipal finance in both Australia and China, this chapter provides an account of the formation and functioning of two successful sub-national financial institutions, the Local Government Finance Authority of South Australia (LGFA) and the Municipal Finance Authority of British Colombia. The case studies suggest that sub-national finance may not be the thorn in the side of decentralization it sometimes appears to be. The broader introduction of such financial instruments is considered.

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Schlæger, Jesper. „The Role of M-Government in Western China Development“. In Regional Development, 364–80. IGI Global, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-0882-5.ch211.

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This chapter explores the role of m-government in Western China development. Bureaucracy has been identified as a barrier for economic development in Western China. It is discussed how applications of m-government embedded in a larger reform agenda has reduced some of the growth stifling effects of bureaucracy. This chapter describes the content of ideas, institutions, and technologies of m-government to understand how fitting these levels has led to such an improvement in governance. Recommendations are made concerning continued emphasis on simple applications, rethinking government organisation, and increased discussion of the role of private service providers.

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Schlæger, Jesper. „The Role of M-Government in Western China Development“. In Mobile Information Communication Technologies Adoption in Developing Countries, 117–33. IGI Global, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-61692-818-6.ch009.

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Qian, Yingyi. „Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style“. In How Reform Worked in China. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262534246.003.0010.

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Aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies. Using a panel data set from China, we investigate the relationship between provincial government’s fiscal incentives and provincial market development. We report three empirical findings. First, we find that during the period of “fiscal contracting system” the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small, suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible. Second, we find a much higher correlation, about four times, between the provincial government’s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s, demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform. Third, we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives, measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue, are associated with faster development of the non-state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy. This holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization. Finally, we compare federalism, Chinese style, to federalism, Russian style.

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So, Bennis Wai Yip. „How far does bureaucracy control the agenda of government personnel administrative policy in Taiwan?“ In The Changing Policy-Making Process in Greater China, 190–207. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315884608-11.

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Dean, Laura A. „Uneven implementation of human trafficking policies“. In Diffusing Human Trafficking Policy in Eurasia, 121–48. Policy Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447352839.003.0006.

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This chapter discusses how anti-trafficking institutions and networks combine to diffuse policy implementation from the top-down and bottom-up. It shows that when no one in the government is held accountable for the implementation of the policies uneven policy implementation occurs as some countries (i.e. Latvia) are more effective at implementing policy than others (i.e. Ukraine and Russia). The results demonstrate that top-down implementation (from the national government) was apparent in all three countries as the government entities attempted to guide implementation. Only Latvia was able to balance this top-down approach with a grass roots bottom-up implementation processes facilitated by their working group and the strength of the interest groups in that country. This could also demonstrate that country size and/or decentralization reforms from the federal level help facilitate human trafficking policy implementation. The influence of internal factors including law enforcement measures to combat trafficking and interest group strength are the most significant facilitators of policy implementation. While state capacity and commitment, bureaucracy, and corruption were the biggest impediments to successful policy implementation. Interest groups also provide feedback loops, policy evaluations, and guide implementation when the government fell short.

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Goebel, Zane. „Globalization and Good Governance“. In Global Leadership Talk, 15–28. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190845049.003.0002.

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This chapter synthesizes sociolinguistic scholarship on enregisterment, regimes of language, chronotopes, and scale to offer the concept of “mass-mediated chronotopic identity.” It starts with an examination of a 1998 speech on good governance made by the director of the International Monetary Fund, and the subsequent uptake of these ideas in policy documents sponsored by an Indonesian president and a government ministry. The chapter traces the imitation of ideas of good governance across these contexts through reference to words, such as “efficiency,” “effectiveness,” “corruption,” and “bureaucracy.” In doing so, it points to the utility of connecting the discursive work that occurs within one chronotopic moment with another quite different one. I argue that a reduction in media censorship, along with the move from a highly centralized authoritarian regime to a democratic one tasked with the large-scale fiscal and political decentralization of Indonesia, facilitated this imitation and the creation of what I refer to as “chronotopes of good governance.”

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Dean, Austin. „Provincial Silver Coins and the Fragmenting Chinese Monetary System, 1887–1900“. In China and the End of Global Silver, 1873-1937, 43–62. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752407.003.0004.

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This chapter mentions Qing officials in the 1880s who believed the influx of foreign silver coins was a negative development that had to be opposed as it represented a violation of the dynasty's economic rights. It argues that strengthening the dynasty with more revenue was not the same as creating a unified national monetary system, which was an emerging goal for figures in the late Qing. It also introduces and analyzes disagreements within China about how to reform the coinage and monetary system in the context of political decentralization, including the role of silver. The chapter focuses on the intellectual and economic impetus to mint coins, as well as the problems of mint administration. It examines the tension between the power of provincial officials and the Qing central government, which acted as a constraint on the currency reform and state-building activities of the dynasty.

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Moore, Scott M. „Central Control, Localized Interests, and Interprovincial Conflict in the People’s Republic of China“. In Subnational Hydropolitics. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190864101.003.0010.

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From a comparative perspective, the People’s Republic of China represents perhaps the world’s most distinctive combination of political centralization and fiscal and administrative decentralization. The basic unity of the state, referred to as Dayitong (大一统), has long been seen as the organizing principle of governance in mainland China and underpins the modern system whereby decision- making is tightly concentrated at the central government level (Wang 2009). At the same time, however, the practical challenges of governing a large and diverse territory have historically led Chinese officials to delegate substantial administrative powers to subnational levels of government. Moreover, in economic terms China is one of the most decentralized countries in the world, with revenue and expenditure powers largely in the hands of local officials (Dziobek, Mangas, and Kufa 2011). Chinese officials are thus caught in an institutional matrix known as tiao-kuai (条- 块), in which they are responsible both to line control by functional bureaucracies, such as the various central government ministries, as well as to territorial government leaders, including mayors and provincial governors, and to equivalent officials within the parallel Chinese Communist Party (CCP) structure. The CCP effectively controls all important political appointments, creating a potent mechanism to ensure the coherence of central and local policy objectives (Mertha 2008). This matrix is intended to ensure that subnational officials pursue priorities set by the central government but also to provide them with the flexibility to implement these policies according to individual local circumstances. In practical terms, this flexibility also translates into autonomy in a wide range of policy areas, including water resource management. Like their counterparts in more politically decentralized countries, China’s subnational officials therefore also confront the dilemma of autonomy, and they sometimes attempt to resolve it through conflict with neighboring jurisdictions (Moore 2014a).

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Bureaucracy Decentralization in government China"

Jiang, Yanfeng. „Decentralization and Vertical Control in China�s Government Controlled Firms“. In 2nd International Conference on Education, Management and Social Science (ICEMSS 2014). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icemss-14.2014.3.

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Cai, Dongdong, und Qian Li. „Research on the relevance of the provision of local public goods and fiscal decentralization in China“. In 2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icebeg.2011.5882668.

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