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1
Park, Albert, Scott Rozelle, Christine Wong und Changqing Ren. „Distributional Consequences of Reforming Local Public Finance in China“. China Quarterly 147 (September 1996): 751–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100005178x.
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Central-local budgetary arrangements have undergone numerous changes since the 1960s as the Chinese government in its quest for modernization has sought to balance the needs of central control and local autonomy. During the reform period, the falling tax share of GNP and a commitment to greater decentralization of the planning system led to major changes in the public finance system that have devolved expenditure responsibilities and financial authority to local governments. Fiscal decentralization has been credited with hardening budget constraints for local publicly controlled enterprises and government agencies. New budgetary relations have instilled fiscal discipline, allowing local governments to disburse more expenditures only if they generated more revenues. These reforms have helped unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of local bureaucrats, fuelling the rapid growth of rural industry.
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Caulfield, Janice L. „Local government reform in China: a rational actor perspective“. International Review of Administrative Sciences 72, Nr. 2 (Juni 2006): 253–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020852306064613.
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There has been a series of comprehensive reform initiatives in recent Chinese history aimed at improving bureaucratic efficiency, flexibility and innovation through management and fiscal decentralization. The local government sector in China carries major functional responsibilities from economic development to social welfare provision. It is responsible for over 70 percent of total government expenditure. Now, in the new millennium, the Chinese central government seeks to transform local government as part of its market liberalization strategy. This includes ‘privatizing’ local enterprises (a process begun during the 1990s) and a rationalization of local bureaucracy. Although still a highly centralized administration, there has been a significant move away from a uniform approach to local government where now differentiation between regions and localities is actively encouraged. Within a still tightly constrained political structure, however, the reforms have done more than improve China’s economic output. They have created incentives for local officials to engage in rent seeking and utility-maximizing behaviours. The article explores the reform initiatives and critically assesses results against this background.
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Borokh, Olga N. „From Western Knowledge to a National Textbook: The Evolution of Li Quanshi’s Socio-economic Views“. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Asian and African Studies 12, Nr. 3 (2020): 426–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu13.2020.308.
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The article analyzes the scholarly legacy of Li Quanshi as part of the history of intellectual interactions between China and the West in the Republican Period. Having been educated in the United States, in the early 1920s Li Quanshi used Western economic theories to develop a model of administrative and fiscal decentralization in China. He denounced “the communism of revenue” between different levels of government in China, pointed to the failure of a despotic centralized bureaucracy, and called to transfer financial authority to the level of provincial assemblies. Later, Li Quanshi’s views evolved from liberalism to the support of government intervention in the economy. Numerous publications by Li Quanshi impacted the process of the formation of Chinese economics in the Republican Period. He proposed to produce a “national textbook” in economics that took into account the Chinese realities. Li Quanshi set the goal of moving from copying and rendering foreign books to creating China’s own internationally competitive academic writings. The scholar relied upon the division of economics, widely accepted in the West, into production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, but its application to traditional Chinese material generated new results. In the first history of Chinese economic thought written in the Chinese language Li Quanshi interpreted and structured traditional heritage using Western concepts. His determination to introduce Chinese characteristics into economic research has stimulated increased attention to the issues of consumption and the role of the state in the economy. It is concluded that Li Quanshi’s ideas of the 1920s and 1930s have regained relevance in the context of the current official policy of support to “social sciences with Chinese characteristics”.
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Priyatno, Harsasto, und Utomo Susilo. „Democracy, Decentralization and Efficientcy: A Study of Bureaucratic Reforms in Indonesia“. E3S Web of Conferences 73 (2018): 09011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/20187309011.
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This research will investigate how bureaucratic reforms in the context of decentralization impact on state bureaucratic capacity in Indonesia. It argues that bureaucratic reforms in Indonesia has resultin a two-particular political outcomes. Firstly, to strengthen government political control over the bureaucracy by swinging back the decentralization approach toward a prefectoral system as a mean of changing the political arena in their favor, and, secondly, to gain popular support. In this way, bureaucracy reforms have indeed increased efficiency of the public sector, butat the same time decrease its autonomy. Democracy, decentralization, hybrid regime, partial bureaucracy reforms.
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Guo, Shufen, Ludi Wen, Yanrui Wu, Xiaohang Yue und Guilian Fan. „Fiscal Decentralization and Local Environmental Pollution in China“. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, Nr. 22 (21.11.2020): 8661. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17228661.
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Fiscal decentralization is one of the tools for the central government to engage local governments in environment management. However, its effects are inconclusive. This paper aims to examine the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution and the role of government environmental preference in China’s provinces. The results show that fiscal revenue decentralization exacerbates local environmental pollution more seriously than expenditure decentralization. This negative environmental effect of fiscal decentralization could be moderated by government environmental preference. Based on our findings, it is recommended that China’s local governments should improve environmental preference so that fiscal decentralization can create a win–win situation for the economy and environment. Furthermore, the different effects of fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization create a necessity for differentiated management of fiscal decentralization by the central and local governments.
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Joniarta, I. Wayan, I. G. A. AG Dewi Sucitawathi P, Inácio Soares und Wayan Suderana. „STUDI IMPLEMENTASI KEBIJAKAN DESENTRALISASI ADMINISTRATIF DI MUNICIPIO DILI TIMOR-LESTE“. Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 10, Nr. 1 (30.04.2019): 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/politika.10.1.2019.40-56.
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This research aims to empirically elaborate the implementation of administrative decentralization in Municipio Dili Timor-Leste. This research scrutinizes human resource, financial resource, facilities and implementing structure in bureaucracy to identify implementation effectiveness. This research applies qualitative methods using interviews as methods for collecting data, observation and document reviews. This research found that the implementation of administrative decentralization has not yet been effective. There is a need for capacity building to improve government officers' capability to better off the quality of public service.
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Bida, Obed. „Decentralization in Educational Disparity of the Southeast Sulawesi Province“. Policy & Governance Review 2, Nr. 3 (28.02.2019): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.30589/pgr.v2i3.109.
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Educational disparity is a public issue that continues to be an endless subject matter of discourse due to the highly centralistic process of education policy in the government bureaucracy. This research aims to understand the pattern of educational disparity occurring in the islands of Southeast Sulawesi Province, Indonesia. The role of political actors in the success of education policy is a vital element in the policy process, and this is apparent in the significance of the political aspect in the education policy process, which emphasizes more on political approaches rather than actual social, economic, and geographical conditions. This study was conducted using the descriptive qualitative approach with data collection techniques that included observations, in-depth interviews, and document analysis in Buton and South Buton Regencies. Study results indicate that the education policy pattern developing in island regions is inclined to using the spatial approach with a central area priority scale, and the structural elite approach, which is political lobbying employed by structural elites (school principals) targeting education bureaucracy in the region. The education policy pattern developing in the region actually has an impact on educational disparity in the public, both at the district and regency levels. In general, the education decentralization policy has yet to run optimally on account of educational resources in the region being distributed by using the spatial and structural elite approaches which have, consequently, created a pathological behavior in the education bureaucracy that is chockfull of vested interests.
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Yang, Siying, Zheng Li und Jian Li. „Fiscal decentralization, preference for government innovation and city innovation“. Chinese Management Studies 14, Nr. 2 (13.01.2020): 391–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cms-12-2018-0778.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether fiscal decentralization has impacts on city innovation level and to examine the moderating effects of the preference for government innovation in China. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel data of China’s 278 cities from 2003 to 2016, the authors first use fixed-effect model and quantile regression to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level and the variations of impacts conditional on different innovation levels, followed by a mediating effect model to test the moderating effects of the preference for government innovation and its temporal and spatial heterogeneity. Findings The paper finds that fiscal decentralization significantly inhibited city innovation, and with the improvement of city innovation level, the inhibition demonstrated characteristics of “V” type variation. When the degree of fiscal decentralization is between 0.377 and 0.600, the inhibition of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level is the weakest. We further show that fiscal decentralization also inhibits the government's preference for innovation, reduces the proportion of fiscal expenditure on innovation and has a negative impact on city innovation. In addition, the influence of fiscal decentralization on city innovation present clear heterogeneity in space and in time. On one hand, the inhibition of fiscal decentralization on city innovation level in eastern China is significantly weaker than that in central and Western China; on the other hand, after the implementation of China’s innovation-driven development strategy in 2013, the negative impact of fiscal decentralization on city innovation disappeared. Research limitations/implications The research findings have certain policy implications. That is, in the process of decentralization reform, on the one hand, the central government should strengthen the supervision over the fiscal expenditure of local governments and ensure that the central government can play a leading role in the local development strategy, on the other hand, the central government should guard against the distortion of fiscal decentralization on local governments' fiscal expenditure behavior. In addition, the central government should also focus on the heterogeneity of the impacts of fiscal decentralization on cities under different strategic backgrounds and different levels of innovation. Originality/value This paper extends prior research by bringing the decentralization system reform into the study of city innovation system and analyzing its mechanism and its temporal and spatial heterogeneity.
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Widiyahseno, Bambang. „Inovasi Bupati di Ruang Demokrasi: Upaya Membangun Kesadaran Inovasi Birokrasi“. Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik 18, Nr. 3 (22.09.2016): 177. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jsp.13136.
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Decentralization and granting broad autonomy to the local government open the space for the continuity ofpolicy innovation. This study is important because not all regional heads could do it. There are many partiesinvolved and interested in the process. This study explores the behavior of regents to build awareness andmindset (unfreezing) to various parties. The magnitude of opportunities to innovate is largely determinedby regent ability to perform the process of unfreezing. The fi ndings indicate a regent’s eff ort in buildingrelationships with various parties, especially the power of the bureaucracy, parliament and society (thepublic) in the process of unfreezing ie melting of the ice or the awareness of the need for change (innovation). Those are Strategies to encourage and initiate innovation to anticipate the bureaucracy, which is building a coalition with the community to deal with the inert bureaucracy.
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Huang, Yasheng, und Yumin Sheng. „Political Decentralization and Inflation: Sub-National Evidence from China“. British Journal of Political Science 39, Nr. 2 (April 2009): 389–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123408000549.
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One possible political determinant of macroeconomic instability scholars have explored at length is decentralization, but cross-national research measuring political decentralization in terms of constitutional federalism has produced mixed evidence regarding its effects on inflation. Conceptualizing political decentralization in terms of governing political party decentralization but acknowledging the challenges of cross-national data collection, the authors suggest the utility of a sub-national approach by studying one country under single-party rule. Drawing on provincial-level cross-section time-series data, they find that political decentralization measured as the inverse of central government political control, via the ruling party, over the different provincial governments is positively correlated with provincial inflation in China during 1978–97. The finding is robust to alternative specifications, expanded year coverage and Granger causality tests.
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Zhang, Shujian. „Fiscal Decentralization, Budgetary Transparency, and Local Government Size in China“. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 52, Nr. 7 (19.04.2016): 1679–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496x.2016.1142213.
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Tan, Qingshan. „County Government Reform in Urbanizing China“. Lex localis - Journal of Local Self-Government 9, Nr. 4 (19.10.2011): 353–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.4335/9.4.353-371(2011).
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Many rising issues, such as urbanization, migration, social equality, housing, provision of public goods and services, are presenting the greatest challenge to county governments. In order to effectively tackle those social issues, the central government has delegated greater power and responsibility to local governments, particularly county governments. This paper seeks to address the following question: Does empowering county government improve local governance in rapidly urbanizing China? By answering the question, this study evaluates the effects of decentralization of the central policy regarding urbanization and governance at the county level, and addresses the issue of how empowering county government could improve local governance in rapidly urbanizing China.
Keywords: • local politics • self-government • county reform • urbanization
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Hengzhou, X., Y. Hongchun und G. Yuyan. „Fiscal decentralization, local government competition and farmland conversion in China: the co-integration analysis and the GMM estimation based on the inter-provincial panel data“. Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 59, No. 9 (04.10.2013): 420–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/6/2013-agricecon.
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Based on the Chinese provincial panel data from 1995 to 2008, using the panel co-integration method, this paper presents an empirical study on the long-term equilibrium relationship between the fiscal decentralization, the local government competition and the farmland conversion. On this basis, establishing the dynamic panel data model, using the generalized method of moments (GMM) to analyze the dynamic impact of the fiscal decentralization and the local government competition on the farmland conversion from the view of three cross-regional groups and the mainland China. The results show that there is a long-run co-integration relationship between the fiscal decentralization, the farmland conversion and the local government competition, and also there is a positive significant influence of the fiscal decentralization and the local government competition on the farmland conversion, a 1% increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization will increase the area of farmland conversion by 0.3280%. In addition, there is a significant difference of the incentive effect of local government competition on the farmland conversion in different regions. The paper ends with policy suggestions for perfecting the system of the fiscal decentralization, taxation and the division of responsibility and authority, reforming the criterion of the political achievement assessment, strengthening the management of land revenue, reducing the reliance of the local government on land finance; at the same time, the farmers’ land property rights should be perfected.
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Benney, Jonathan. „Decentralization of Political Design in China“. Pacific Affairs 93, Nr. 4 (01.12.2020): 709–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2020934709.
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Political posters, banners, and similar objects are extremely common in China. This article uses political design from contemporary China, particularly emphasizing the government's Chinese Dream campaign, to analyze what at first appears to be a paradox. The subjects of the various campaigns and the language they use are mandated by the central government and promoted through central and local publicity departments. However, the graphic aspects of these campaigns, such as the choice of colours, images, layout, and typeface, are much less strictly controlled, and are decided by local governments or authorities. This makes political design in China decentralized. Decentralized design is inconsistent with the principles of global marketing and with the PRC's reliance on set forms of political discourse, both of which rely on the assumption that uniformity will lead to more effective communication of messages and persuasion of the public. Evidence from local design campaigns indeed shows that Chinese political posters are often designed hastily and without expertise, resulting in strange and unpersuasive images. Despite this, the article shows that decentralized design is not paradoxical. This is largely because the Chinese party-state uses propaganda as a method of "signalling" its overall power, more than as a tool of indoctrination or persuasion about particular topics. The central government's reliance on incentives and metrics to regulate local authorities means that the production of propaganda is also a way in which local governments can signal their loyalty to the Centre.
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Khan, Sajjad Ali. „Decentralization and the Limits to Service Delivery: Evidence From Northern Pakistan“. SAGE Open 11, Nr. 1 (Januar 2021): 215824402199450. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244021994505.
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While the relationship between decentralization and service delivery is underpinned by a set of normative theoretical assumptions, yet not only does the empirical evidence concerning this so-called relationship to date remains inconclusive at best but our understanding of the causes of ineffectiveness of decentralization initiatives with respect to service delivery is also striking. This article attempts to contribute to the debates concerning the relationship between decentralization and service delivery through an analysis of decentralization measures undertaken by the Government of Pakistan during the early 21st Century with the announced aims of improving the efficiency and responsiveness of government as well as the delivery of public services. Notwithstanding a decade of decentralized service delivery, wellbeing outcomes across districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province demonstrated remarkable discrepancy such that while some districts witnessed considerable amelioration in their respective composite indices, others experienced a marked deterioration, thus calling into question the normative assumptions that undergird the relationship between decentralization and service delivery. This article seeks to explain this outcome through a comparative case study of two localities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province viz districts “Swabi” and “Lower Dir,” both of which had witnessed marked deterioration and amelioration in wellbeing outcomes, respectively, in the ex-post of implementation of the Devolution Plan. Data for the study were collected through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The results demonstrate that political dynamics such as the nature of relationship between district governments and the provincial government, extent of political polarization prevalent within or among different levels of the local government system, and the role of bureaucracy turn out to be important factors that ostensibly account for the deterioration of wellbeing outcomes in Swabi district over the course of a decade of implementation of the local government system. The findings suggest that political factors have overshadowed technical considerations in terms of explaining the discrepant outcomes of decentralized service delivery across the two localities.
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Luo, Zhigao, Xinyun Hu, Mingming Li, Jirui Yang und Chuanhao Wen. „Centralization or Decentralization of Environmental Governance—Evidence from China“. Sustainability 11, Nr. 24 (05.12.2019): 6938. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11246938.
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From the perspective of environmental federalism, we extracted the environmental intention words from the work reports of China’s central and provincial governments through data mining, and used the instrumental variable method to conduct empirical experiments concerning the dispute between centralization and decentralization of environmental governance in the Chinese context. The results suggest that a negative correlation exists between the intention of the central government’s environmental governance and the provincial environmental quality, whereas a positive correlation exists between the intention of the provincial government and the provincial environmental quality. Our interpretation is that environmental centralization, coupled with its political, economic, and cultural factors, has converted provincial governments into supporters of environmental pollution, and that the central government’s ongoing environmental protection inspection campaign has forced the provincial government to be somewhat effective. We propose establishing Chinese-style cooperative federalism in environmental authority and not only centralizing or decentralizing in one direction. New transition mechanisms for the central government’s authority should be implemented, such as the environmental protection inspection groups mechanism and the ecological gross domestic product based political tournament.
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Chen, Q., und L. Li. „PHP23 HEALTH DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH OUTCOME IN CHINA“. Value in Health 13, Nr. 7 (November 2010): A536—A537. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1098-3015(11)73231-4.
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Huang, Zhangkai, Lixing Li, Guangrong Ma und Lixin Colin Xu. „Hayek, Local Information, and Commanding Heights: Decentralizing State-Owned Enterprises in China“. American Economic Review 107, Nr. 8 (01.08.2017): 2455–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150592.
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Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support. (JEL D22, D83, L25, L32, L33, O14, P31)
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Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian und Barry R. Weingast. „Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China“. World Politics 48, Nr. 1 (Oktober 1995): 50–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.1995.0003.
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China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. This competition, in turn, encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises, regulation, and economic relationships. Second, it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity. Finally, it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government.
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Zhang, Ping, Haosheng Zheng und Qiang Ren. „The Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization on the Quality of Government in China: A Test of Market-Preserving Federalism at the Provincial Level“. Chinese Public Administration Review 11, Nr. 2 (30.12.2020): 89. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v11i2.281.
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The potential influence of fiscal decentralization on economic growth in China has been extensively studied. This paper examines whether fiscal decentralization has influenced marketization and regional disparity (intra-provincial expenditure inequality) and the tradeoff between them (quality of government, QoG). When local governments have sufficient fiscal autonomy, decentralizing fiscal power to sub-provincial governments is found to have a greater impact on increasing marketization, highlighting the important role of fiscal self-sufficiency in the effect of fiscal decentralization on market efficiency. Measuring the QoG from the marketization versus disparity perspective, we find a reversed U-shape relationship between revenue decentralization and QoG. Comparing the effect of fiscal decentralization on the QoG in different regions, intra-provincial revenue decentralization in the eastern area is above the optimal level, while the fiscal decentralization in the middle and western areas is near the optimal level. This paper combines the perspectives of fiscal decentralization and governance and conducts an empirical test of market-preserving federalism to explain differences among provinces.
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Yang, Yuanhua, Dengli Tang und Peng Zhang. „Effects of fiscal decentralization on carbon emissions in China“. International Journal of Energy Sector Management 14, Nr. 1 (06.01.2020): 213–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijesm-03-2019-0001.
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Purpose Fiscal fund is the key support of carbon emissions control for local governments. This paper aims to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on carbon emissions by spatial Durbin model (SDM), and verify the existence of “free-riding” phenomenon to reveal the behavior of local governments in carbon emissions control. Design/methodology/approach Based on the provincial data of carbon emissions from 2005 to 2016 in China, this paper uses spatial exploratory data analysis technology to analyze the spatial correlation characteristics and constructs SDM to test the impact of fiscal decentralization on carbon emissions. Findings The results show that carbon emissions exhibits significant spatial autocorrelation in China, and the increasing of fiscal decentralization in the region will increase carbon emissions in surrounding areas and on the whole. Then, by comparing the impact of fiscal decentralization on carbon emissions and industrial solid waste, it is found that “free-riding” phenomenon of carbon emissions control exists in China. Practical implications Based on the spatial cluster characteristics of China’s provincial carbon emissions, carbon emissions control regions can be divided into regions and different carbon emission control policies can be formulated for different cluster regions. Carbon emissions indicators should be included in the government performance appraisal policy, and carbon emissions producer survey should be increased in environmental policies to avoid “free-riding” behaviors of local government in carbon emissions control in China. Originality/value This paper contributes to fill this gap and fully considers the spatial spillover characteristics of carbon emissions by introducing spatial exploratory data analysis technology, constructs SDM to test the impact of fiscal decentralization on carbon emissions in the perspective of space econometrics, and tests the existence of “free-riding” phenomenon in carbon emissions control for local governments in China.
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Qian, Cheng, Lyu, Zhu und Li. „Fiscal Decentralization, Local Competitions and Sustainability of Medical Insurance Funds：Evidence from China“. Sustainability 11, Nr. 8 (24.04.2019): 2437. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11082437.
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Local governments are responsible for the management of social medical insurance for urban and rural residents in China. Under the background of fiscal decentralization between the central government and local governments, the strengthening of supervision on medical insurance funds by local governments leads to a reduction in the expenditure of the medical insurance fund, which contributes to its sustainability. By employing the provincial level panel data during 2004–2014, we used a fixed effect model and a spatial autoregression model to investigate whether fiscal decentralization has had a negative influence on the expenditure of China’s new rural cooperative medical system (NCMS) fund. We found that fiscal decentralization has had a significant influence over its per capita expenditure. Our results also indicate that higher fiscal decentralization leads to higher financial aid in the NCMS provided by local governments. Additionally, the expenditure of the NCMS and the local financial aid are influenced by nearby governments. Our results suggest that appropriate fiscal decentralization, which helps to maintain the sustainability of social medical insurance funds, should be encouraged.
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Zhang, Qu, Zhang, Li und Miao. „Effects of FDI on the Efficiency of Government Expenditure on Environmental Protection Under Fiscal Decentralization: A Spatial Econometric Analysis for China“. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, Nr. 14 (12.07.2019): 2496. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16142496.
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Most governments strive for an ecological civilization so the efficiency of government expenditure on environmental protection (EPEE) is an important issue. While it is recognized that foreign direct investment (FDI) enhances environmental protection, this investigation focuses on the effects of FDI on the efficiency of government expenditure on environmental protection under fiscal decentralization. Analysis is conducted using an output-oriented data envelopment analysis (DEA) scale return model to calculate the efficiency of environmental protection spending in China. Then, a spatial model is built to test the linkages among FDI, fiscal decentralization and the efficiency of government expenditure. The results reveal that, firstly, the efficiency of government spending has been enhanced over the last 10 years. Secondly, FDI is positively correlated with the efficiency of government environmental expenditure in terms of both quantity and quality of spending and it has a positive spillover effect. Thirdly, financial decentralization is negatively correlated with the efficiency of environmental spending, but it improves the effect of FDI. Accordingly, policy proposals are that the government should improve the supervision system for environmental spending and local governments should pursue FDI, improve the structure of FDI and use its spillover effect to enhance the efficiency of environmental expenditure.
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Wu, Haitao, Yunwei Li, Yu Hao, Siyu Ren und Pengfei Zhang. „Environmental decentralization, local government competition, and regional green development: Evidence from China“. Science of The Total Environment 708 (März 2020): 135085. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.135085.
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Sátyro, Natália Guimarães Duarte, und Eleonora Schettini Martins Cunha. „The transformative capacity of the Brazilian federal government in building a social welfare bureaucracy in the municipalities“. Revista de Administração Pública 52, Nr. 3 (Juni 2018): 363–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7612151018.
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Abstract The article analyzes the transformative capacity of the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) in shaping structural change in Brazilian municipalities. The study is based on the concepts of organizational and institutional learning, on a combination of analytical categories of the institutional and neo-institutional approaches and on traditional means of government control. As for methodology, this study used process tracing, in-depth interviews, and documentary analysis of regulations, decrees, and resolutions that create direct and indirect incentives to induce agreements and cooperation of municipalities with the Ministry. We identified two important causal mechanisms: a) organizational and institutional learning processes; and b) inter-federative cooperation that, combined, generated significant changes in municipal bureaucratic capacity. The findings show the importance of the Union’s transformative capacity in the process of public policy decentralization in Brazil.
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Susila, Ihwan. „OTONOMI DAERAH: KAJIAN KESIAPAN DUNIA USAHA DAN BIROKRASI“. Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan: Kajian Masalah Ekonomi dan Pembangunan 4, Nr. 1 (02.05.2017): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.23917/jep.v4i1.4013.
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Decentralization is the reflection of economic and politic reformation. The politic change in developing countries in the last decade shows the tendency that local government has the authority to public service in the local society. Due to technology change and integration in the global market, it is a big demand for the government to control the politic and economic system in the country. The regional autonomy has two different effects. The regional autonomy, however gives the opportunity to their districts to grow and develop their own districts. On the contrary, the regional autonomy can be worse. This occurs due to the lack of preparation of the district to apply the policy. The key to minimize or eliminate the problem is by enhancing the quality of human resources. Preparation of business and bureaucracy to face the regional autonomy will be discussed.
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Guo, Gang. „Persistent Inequalities in Funding for Rural Schooling in Contemporary China“. Asian Survey 47, Nr. 2 (März 2007): 213–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2007.47.2.213.
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Decentralization in post-Mao China has widened regional gaps in the provision of basic education. Reforms since 1994 have not reversed that trend. More recently, the government started centralized spending projects on rural education, which have significantly narrowed the urban-rural gap in education spending since 2001. However, interprovincial disparities remain large and growing.
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Zang, Jianing, und Liangliang Liu. „Fiscal decentralization, government environmental preference, and regional environmental governance efficiency: evidence from China“. Annals of Regional Science 65, Nr. 2 (06.03.2020): 439–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00168-020-00989-1.
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Tanner, Murray Scot. „The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China“. China Quarterly 138 (Juni 1994): 381–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000035803.
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This article examines the organizational evolution of Communist Party control over lawmaking processes and institutions in post-Mao China. In particular, it charts the erosion and decentralization of Party control which has accompanied the rise of lawmaking since 1978. The unity of Party control over lawmaking has frayed and dissipated dramatically in these years, as more and more important policy issues are resolved outside the arena of the Party's central decision-making organs (such as the Politburo, the Secretariat, and so on). This decentralization has been matched by a corresponding increase in the institutional power, autonomy and assertiveness of the government (executive) lawmaking offices, and other more open policy-making arenas, most notably the National People's Congress, but also including the Supreme People's Court.
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Zhou, Caihua. „Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization“. Land 10, Nr. 4 (08.04.2021): 389. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/land10040389.
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The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.
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Iskandar, Azwar. „DESENTRALISASI DAN EFISIENSI BELANJA FUNGSI PENDIDIKAN SERTA IMPLIKASINYA TERHADAP KESEJAHTERAAN MASYARAKAT DI PROPINSI SULAWESI SELATAN“. INFO ARTHA 5, Nr. 1 (19.04.2021): 11–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.31092/jia.v5i2.1139.
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This study aims to analyze: (i) the level of efficiency of regional spending of educational functions; (ii) the impact of fiscal decentralization on the spending efficiency; and (iii) the implications of education spending efficiency on the level of welfare in the region. The research used quantitative approach with Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Dinamic Generalized Method of Moment (DGMM) analysis techniques. The results showed that the realization and utilization of education function spending in the aggregate in South Sulawesi Province is quite good, although the spending is still more allocated to government bureaucracy spending. However, the results of efficiency testing by DEA method show that in most districts/cities in South Sulawesi Province, the realization and utilization of such spending is relatively less efficient. From the results of Dynamic Panel Data Testing (DGMM), the findings were obtained that fiscal decentralization in the form of Local Own-Source Revenue had a positive and significant impact on the education spending efficiency, while the fiscal decentralization policy in the form of Balance Fund, negatively influential but insignificant. In terms of good governance, the variable interaction between fiscal decentralization in the form of Local Own-Source Revenue and opinion from BPK on LKPD in districts/cities negatively and significantly affects the efficiency of education spending. While the variable interaction between fiscal decentralization both in the form of Balance Fund and opinion from BPK on LKPD in districts/cities has a positive and significant effect on the efficiency of education spending. The increase in the efficiency of education spending will be significantly followed by the improvement of the welfare of the community. Meanwhile, fiscal decentralization policy in the form of Local Own-Source Revenue has a positive and significant effect.
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Wang, Junmin. „State-Building as Market-Building in China“. European Journal of Sociology 47, Nr. 2 (August 2006): 209–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003975606000075.
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By examining the history of the development of the tobacco industry, a key state industrial sector in China's reform era, this article shows how market-building processes and state-building processes have produced and reproduced each other in economic transitions from planned toward market economies. First, the market competition between state-owned tobacco firms and non-state tobacco firms in the early 1980s resulted in the establishment of a vertical bureaucracy, through a statemonopoly institution. Second, new market dynamics resulted in the transfer of monopoly power from the central government to the local governments. During this process the horizontal bureaucracies governing the tobacco industry in localities were driven into market competitors, while the vertical bureaucracy was greatly undermined. The evidence from the Chinese tobacco industry shows that the project of market-building for postcommunist countries is not a unilateral process. To obtain a complete understanding of transitional economies of postcommunist countries, I suggest that the key is the interaction between state-building and market-building, with a focus on how the specific market dynamics have rebuilt the state structures.
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Chen, Xiaohua, Xinyi Zhang, Yuhua Song, Xueping Liang, Liangjun Wang und Yina Geng. „Fiscal Decentralization, Urban-Rural Income Gap, and Tourism“. Sustainability 12, Nr. 24 (12.12.2020): 10398. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su122410398.
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The reform of China’s tax-sharing system in 1994 has not only had a profound heterogeneous impact on the control level of fiscal resources by local government but also might exert a negative effect on the sustainable development of tourism. Based on this hypothesis, this paper uses 1993–2018 data from 31 Chinese provinces to examine the dynamic relationship between China’s fiscal decentralization, income gap, urbanization, and tourism growth using a panel co-integration model. Our results show that there is a stable co-integration relationship between fiscal decentralization, income gap, and tourism growth. In general, the impact of fiscal decentralization and income gap on tourism development varies across regions. However, in most provinces, urbanization helps the development of tourism. Urbanization and fiscal decentralization also help reduce the income gap. This shows that the inter-regional government competition promotes not only the growth of tourism but also income equality. To achieve the sustainable development of tourism, China should not only take the advantage of local governments’ incentives for economic growth but also handle the income gap problem considering local conditions.
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Zhang, Ping, Chunkui Zhu und Yilin Hou. „Fiscal Decentralization, Flat Administrative Structure, and Local Government Size: Evidence and Lessons from China“. Public Administration and Development 36, Nr. 3 (25.07.2016): 198–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pad.1762.
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ZHENG, YONGNIAN. „Explaining the Sources of de facto Federalism in Reform China: Intergovernmental Decentralization, Globalization, and Central–Local Relations“. Japanese Journal of Political Science 7, Nr. 2 (23.06.2006): 101–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109906002222.
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China does not have a federalist system of government. Nevertheless, with deepening reform and openness, China's political system in terms of central–local relations is functioning more and more like federalism. Federalism as a functioning system in China has been understudied. This paper defines the political system existing in China as de facto federalism, and attempts to explore the sources and dynamics of this de facto federalism. China's de facto federalism was mainly driven by two related factors, i.e. decentralization and globalization. This paper argues that while economic decentralization in the 1980s led to the formation of de facto federalism, globalization since the 1990s has accelerated this process and generated increasingly high pressure on the Chinese leadership to institutionalize existing de facto federalism.
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Wang, Junmin. „Enlightened Localism in Contemporary China: Political Change in Property-Rights Institutions of Township and Village Enterprises“. Comparative Sociology 9, Nr. 5 (2010): 631–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913210x12548913482438.
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AbstractI examine the dynamic and interactive relationships between local governments and local economic elites as they attempted to privatize China’s township and village enterprises (TVEs) in the late 1990s. To pursue financial interests shared with the local economic elite, local governments informally privatized public TVEs and thereby compromised their role as political agents of the central government. This institutional change in property rights demonstrates a Chinese pattern of “enlightened localism” (Gregg 2003) by which the local political and economic actors develop a pragmatic way of coping with ambiguous legal issues. The deployment of enlightened localism in the TVE sector shows that China’s policies of economic decentralization unintentionally have led to a decentralization of political control.
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Luk, Sherriff Ting Kwong, und Ivy Siok Ngoh Chen. „Federal Express: Expansion Strategies for the China Market“. Asian Case Research Journal 10, Nr. 02 (Dezember 2006): 193–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218927506000776.
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China's expanding trade had fuelled the increase in demand for express services. The government was expected to open the industry fully to foreign players by end 2005. Foreign express firms planning to enter or expand in this fast growing market would face a number of challenges — an underdeveloped and disparate transportation infrastructure, complicated and unclear customs procedures, protectionism by local government, and tight business control and bureaucracy. Federal Express initially used a local pick-up and delivery agent to serve the China market. Dissatisfied with its low market share after years of operating in China and convinced that the market would grow rapidly after the country's accession to the WTO, the senior management at FedEx decided to re-examine their long-term marketing strategy in China. The case examines the air express business in China and FedEx's alternatives for expansion.
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Chen, Bin. „Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships in China: A Political Economy Perspective“. Chinese Public Administration Review 2, Nr. 3/4 (04.11.2016): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v2i3/4.45.
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This paper first explores some key principles central to a well-functioning, central/local fiscal relationship from a political economy perspective of federalism. It then applies these principles to an examination of reforming intergovernmental fiscal relationships in China from 1980s to the early 1990s. It is argued that the economic principle central to fiscal federalism is the determination of the optimal structure of the public sector in terms of the assignment of decision-making responsibility for specified functions to representatives of the interests of the proper geographical subsets of society. Fiscal decentralization, as evidenced in China, provides local government with incentives to build a hospitable environment of competition for people and capital and, therefore, prospers local economies. However, China’s experience also suggests that fiscal decentralization without the relevant political institutional foundation will bring about negative effects. The political foundations of fiscal federalism are as essential as its economic principles in preserving and sustaining fiscal federalism.
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Zhou, Xueguang, Yun Ai, Jianhua Ge, Huijun Gu, Ding Li, Lan Li, Qinglian Lu, Wei Zhao und Ling Zhu. „The party–government relationship in the Chinese bureaucracy: Evidence from patterns of personnel flow“. Chinese Journal of Sociology 7, Nr. 3 (Juli 2021): 315–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057150x211031055.
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The party–government relationship is central in the governance of the People’s Republic of China, with its key characteristic being the former’s dominance over the latter. Focusing on personnel management practices and the resulting patterns of personnel flow across positions and offices in the Chinese bureaucracy, we examine the party–government relationship in light of personnel flows across the party and government sectors, and the offices/bureaus and positions therein, in the context of a large, multilayered Chinese bureaucracy. Previous research in this field has evinced two different lines of inquiry. The first focuses on personnel flows in the Chinese bureaucracy, with an emphasis on individual-level career trajectories, mobility patterns, and associated incentive mechanisms, wherein party–government relations are given minimal attention. The second tends to provide descriptive or normative accounts of party–government relations and their historical evolution but has not examined these relations in a quantitative and analytical manner. Our study builds on and goes beyond these existing studies in several ways. First, we propose a perspective that focuses on personnel management and patterns of personnel flow across positions and offices in the party–government relationship. We take the existing party–government structures as our starting point and examine how personnel flow patterns, or the lack thereof, provide information on the degree of personnel mixing between, and the interconnectedness or separateness of, the party and government sectors, areas, and offices. Second, we develop a set of analytical dimensions and measures to capture different aspects of the party–government relationship, such as the degree of stability and specialization in party and government positions and offices. We also propose measures of personnel mixing and interconnectedness between party and government offices. Third, we apply these analytical dimensions and measures to systematically examine the multifaceted patterns of personnel flow and the resulting party–government relations in a large Chinese bureaucracy at the provincial, municipal, and county levels in an entire province, between 1990 and 2008, with over 40,000 key officials and over 300,000 person–year records. Our findings show that there are noticeable variations in patterns of personnel flow among party and government positions and offices, with the former experiencing higher rates of mobility and more generalist characteristics. On the other hand, we also find considerable mixing and interconnectedness among positions and offices between the party and government sectors. These findings suggest that, in the Chinese bureaucracy, party–government positions are organized into an integrated hierarchical order whose boundaries are formal in structure but fluid in terms of personnel flows, especially in those key positions in different administrative jurisdictions.
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Muriany, Telly, und Victor Ruhunlela. „Reformasi Birokrasi Pelayanan Publik di Kecamatan Tanimbar Selatan Kabupaten Kepulauan Tanimbar“. PUBLIC POLICY (Jurnal Aplikasi Kebijakan Publik & Bisnis) 2, Nr. 1 (25.03.2021): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.51135/publicpolicy.v2.i1.p1-20.
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Bureaucratic reform in public services in the Tanimbar Islands District seems very urgent at this time. The facts show that the Tanimbar Islands Regency is still faced with various obstacles in public services, especially those closely related to public service needs in the fields of education, health and licensing, especially at the District level as the spearhead of the Tanimbar Islands Regency government in providing public services. The research method used is descriptive research with a qualitative approach. The use and approach of qualitative research is deemed appropriate because it is in accordance with the qualitative characteristics of the phenomena being studied, to verify the issue of reform has been and can be carried out in accordance with what is expected or in accordance with the character of the archipelago. The results showed that the institutional reform in Tanimbar Selatan District, Southeast Maluku Regency was not effective because of several problems faced related to the efforts of the sub-district government to carry out bureaucratic reform, namely the decentralization of authority was not effective because the decentralization of authority granted was not fully implemented as expected. . From the aspect of organizational structure, it has implemented the principles stipulated in the Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 18 of 2016 concerning Regional Apparatus, but it is hoped that it will prioritize aspects of the interests and needs as well as the availability of Regional Government budgets, the function of authority is often not adjusted to the capacity and competence of the apparatus. it is more dominant based on the likes and dislikes. Supporting facilities are still lacking, especially information and communication technology support, which is still an obstacle to providing effective and efficient services.
Key Word: Bureaucracy, Institutions, Islands, Reform
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Zhou, Caihua, und Xinmin Zhang. „Measuring the Efficiency of Fiscal Policies for Environmental Pollution Control and the Spatial Effect of Fiscal Decentralization in China“. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, Nr. 23 (02.12.2020): 8974. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17238974.
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This paper uses both fiscal expenditure policy and fiscal revenue policy as input indicators and selects environmental pollution control results reflecting different forms and sources of pollution as output indicators. The efficiency of fiscal policies for environmental pollution control (EFPE) of 30 provincial-level administrative divisions in China from 2007 to 2017 is measured by adopting the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method. Then, the spatial effect of fiscal decentralization on EFPE is empirically analyzed by using the spatial lag model (SLM). The results show that EFPE values in China have been greatly improved overall since 2014. The change in technical efficiency (TE) is caused mainly by the change in pure technical efficiency (PTE). EFPE values have regional heterogeneity and convergence. The eastern region has clearly higher EFPE values than other regions. The growth rate of the low efficient region is greater than that of the high efficient region. Fiscal expenditure decentralization has a direct negative effect and spatial spillover effect on EFPE values, while fiscal revenue decentralization has a non-significant effect. Based on these results, this paper proposes the following policy implications: increasing the level of fiscal expenditure of environmental pollution control and improving the central transfer payment system for environmental protection; reforming the government performance assessment system and innovating the conditions of government expenditure on environmental pollution control; and promoting horizontal fiscal cooperation in cross-regional environmental governance.
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Qian, Xiaohong, und Jef C. Verhoeven. „From centralization to decentralization in Chinese higher education“. education policy analysis archives 12 (07.12.2004): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v12n67.2004.
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Since the late 1970’s, the Chinese government has been gradually changing its traditional policy for providing higher education and has begun to emphasize the comprehensiveness of the universities. Interdisciplinary cooperation and the synergization of resources are being promoted, and institutional autonomy is gradually increasing. Schools and faculties have been restored in universities, and new research institutions, research schools, research centers and the like have been established. From a unitary three-level model— university/department/ teaching and research group—before the reform, the organizational structures of the universities have developed a new organizational structure that is more flexible and more open. This more adaptable structure is intended to meet the developmental demands of modern universities with close links being created between their work and regional economic and social development. China has moved from a very centralized educational system in which the main decisions were taken by the central government to a decentralized educational system. This reform is also taking place within the institutions of higher education, and their internal organizational structure has also become more decentralized.
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Morrell, Elizabeth. „What is the News? Criticism, Debate and Community in Indonesia's Local Press“. Asian Journal of Social Science 33, Nr. 1 (2005): 129–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568531053694680.
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AbstractCommunity newspapers are recognized as a potentially effective means of improving participation and equity. In this article, I discuss one local newspaper that has been established since the introduction of media reforms in post-Suharto Indonesia. This newspaper is published in the Luwu region of South Sulawesi, which has undergone significant subdivision within Indonesia's radical decentralization programme. Many of the problems occurring in the country's transition to democracy are evident here. New local government bodies are being established at a number of different levels, and issues including armed conflict, unreliable policing, unemployment, and poverty must also be addressed. Yet, whereas grassroots strengthening is imperative for overcoming all those issues, the local press focuses on the bureaucracy, and does not act sufficiently to develop an informed critical awareness, or the widespread confidence that equitable change can be achieved.
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Rochim, Achluddin Ibnu. „Analisis Implementasi Kebijakan Ketransmigrasian di Dinas Tenagakerja Transmigrasi dan Kependudukan Provinsi Jawa Timur Periode 2009-2014“. DIA: Jurnal Ilmiah Administrasi Publik 15, Nr. 1 (11.11.2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.30996/dia.v15i1.1830.
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Apolicy of democratization and decentralization of development post-Orde Baru in Indonesia. Policies that result in deregulation in all sectors of the Indonesian government is bringing new value changes in the bureaucracy and the public. The potential for conflict of interest, the social and the clash of value systems in recipient community development agents and different backgrounds gave dynamics consequence such as a conflict between migrants with the local population. In practice there is ambivalence policy sector development transmigration, on one side of Pancasila as the ideal basic, the Undang-Undang 1945 contains the values of National unity and togetherness becomes the basis for public policy itself, but on the other hand precisely into contention for the benefit of the Local Government following each value, traditions and culture of different peoples. A discrepancy between the situation of communities and local government conditions sender with the community and the local government transmigration, formulated: 1.How is the Implementation of Transmigration Sector Development Policy in East Java Province, 2.How to model the Implementation of Transmigration Sector Development Policy in East Java Province. Design methods of research used a qualitative descriptive data mining technique documents, interviews, and observations to the location of transmigration.
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Hofem, Andreas, und Sebastian Heilmann. „Bringing the Low-Carbon Agenda to China: A Study in Transnational Policy Diffusion“. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, Nr. 1 (März 2013): 199–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261304200108.
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This study traces the transnational interactions that contributed to introducing the low-carbon economy agenda into Chinese policymaking. A microprocessual two-level analysis (outside-in as well as inside-access) is employed to analyse transnational and domestic exchanges. The study provides evidence that low-carbon agenda-setting – introduced by transnational actors, backed by foreign funding, promoted by policy entrepreneurs from domestic research institutes, propelled by top-level attention, but only gradually and cautiously adopted by the government bureaucracy – can be considered a case of effective transnational diffusion based on converging perceptions of novel policy challenges and options. Opinion leaders and policy-brokers from the government-linked scientific community functioned as effective access points to the Chinese government's policy agenda.
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Muñoz, Fanni. „Una mirada a la gestión educativa local en el marco de la descentralización. El caso de dos municipalidades en Perú“. education policy analysis archives 21 (26.12.2013): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v21n91.2013.
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Through the analysis of two municipalities in northern Peru, this paper examines the operation of local government and the role assigned to education in the context of decentralization. This important State reform process was implemented eleven years ago, and is enabling regional and local governments to encourage decentralized management initiatives in education. This occurs in a global context in which Latin American governments have been promoting various initiatives to improve its quality. It shows how two municipalities from Piura Region (Paita and Morropón) are organized and how they are developing strategies to assume the new competences and responsibilities about education assigned to them by the State reform. With this framework, we analyze the existence of different logics, composition and capabilities in their bureaucracies to take education as a function in specific environments and conditions. The study shows that there are serious difficulties to establish the managerial management model, particularly because there is no qualified bureaucracy. The cases analyzed demonstrate that, although municipalities develop effective actions in education, mainly focused on childhood, education is not a priority of municipal management. These case studies enable us to understand the complexity of the changes in local management in the context of decentralization. The strategies followed provide clues to the implementation of a decentralized educational management.
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LÜ, XIAOBO. „Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform in China“. American Political Science Review 108, Nr. 2 (Mai 2014): 423–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055414000124.
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Elites often use social policies to garner political support and ensure regime survival, but social policies are not a silver bullet. Using two waves of Chinese national surveys, I find that a recent policy of abolishing school fees has significantly increased citizens’ demand for greater government responsibility in financing compulsory education. I argue that policy awareness, rather than policy benefits, drives citizens’ demand. Finally, I show that policy awareness has enhanced citizens’ trust in China's central government, but not in local governments. This asymmetry in regime support has two sources—the decentralization of education provision and biased media reporting—which induce citizens to credit the central government for good policy outcomes. Given that citizens’ responses are primarily influenced by policy awareness that is promoted by the state media, this study casts doubt on the use of social policies to sustain long-term political support.
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Mao, Guirong. „On governmental reform in China: Two suggestions from Japanese experiences“. Chinese Public Administration Review 2, Nr. 1/2 (01.11.2016): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v2i1/2.37.
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This paper explores the, as yet unresolved, crucial question of how best to conduct reforms aimed at controlling government size and improing relations between central and local governments. It suggests two ideas widely promoted and practiced in Japan, the ceiling control system and the fusion system of central-local relations. I argue that China could set up a ceiling control system to fix the total number of governmental departments and commissions and the maximum number of staff, and establish an institutioalized "fusion system" to promote decentralization. The paper demonstrates how these can be implemented to revise current reform practices.
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Sklias, Pantelis, Sifis Plimakis und George Maris. „Governance Innovation and entrepreneurship in Greek local government: Towards the limits of Europeanization?“ KnE Social Sciences 1, Nr. 2 (19.03.2017): 257. http://dx.doi.org/10.18502/kss.v1i2.661.
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<p>The evaluation of the participation of private sector in Greek local government comprises a rather complex task, as it is directly linked to the special configuration parameters of the national model of local governance. Although such model of local governance has gone through significant reforms over the last 20 years, mainly in the promotion of democratization, decentralization of responsibilities and municipalities uniting, however, it remains largely monopolistic and distinctive for its limited efficiency. The monopolistic provision of municipal services still features in the Greek local government, despite its distinctive significant efficiency issues, and also the vast number of regulatory initiatives for the promotion of the alternative provision that have been introduced. Such promotion initiatives of the alternative provision of municipal services have already been promoted since the mid-80s, through actions such as scheduled contracts, inter-municipal co-operation, concessions and PPPs<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Mohamad%20Mostafa/Desktop/Knowledge%20E/In%20Press%20Conferences/EBEEC-2016/Source%20files/Source%20files/KNOWLEDGE%20E_1/EBEEC_2016_paper_95.doc#_ftn1">[1]</a>. However, these have eventually produced limited results, due to the regulatory complexity that characterized their operation, increased bureaucracy in respect of their supervision, limited administrative capacity of local partners and the inability of their integration to the wider development planning of local government.</p>
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Dougherty, Sean M., und Robert H. McGuckin. „The Effects of Federalism on Productivity in Chinese Firms“. Management and Organization Review 4, Nr. 1 (März 2008): 39–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007.00091.x.
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This study offers empirical evidence about how the structure of government and private ownership affected productivity in Chinese firms. It uses the microdata of China's last decennial industrial census, covering all of the 23,000 large and medium-sized industrial firms operating in China during 1995. The results show that government decentralization – ‘federalism’ – played an important role in improving the performance of not just collective firms, but also state-owned and mixed public/private ownership firms. This result is strongly confirmatory of much of the recent theoretical work on transition economies that posits a key role for government in the efficient operation of markets.