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1
KIM, Sung Chull. „North Korea 2019–2020“. East Asian Policy 12, Nr. 02 (April 2020): 68–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s179393052000015x.
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While the nuclear negotiations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States reached a stalemate in 2019, North Korea has advanced its missile capability and strengthened its alignment with China. In 2020 and beyond, the security of the Korean peninsula will depend on China’s influence on the DPRK–US game amid the US–China rivalry; the modality of Kim Jong-un’s actions, i.e. whether they are provocations or restraints; and the sanctions’ effect on North Korea’s foreign currency reserves.
2
Sabitov, Timur, Irina Zhilko und Artem Gilyov. „Criminal Code of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Recent Trends“. Russian Journal of Criminology 15, Nr. 1 (09.03.2021): 124–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2500-4255.2021.15(1).124-132.
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Criminal law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not stagnant, it is developing under the influence of international community, and this dynamics is of special interest for research that analyzes changes to the Criminal Code of the DPRK with the goal of understanding if there is a trend in North Korea for getting closer to the world community. Naturally, the reclusiveness of the DPRK does not make any speedy changes in its criminal policy likely, and we can only expect an evolutionary transformation of the policy in this sphere. At the same time, there is no denying the fact that the criminal law of the DPRK is converging more and more with the international standards. The examination of the CC of the DPRK included the analysis of the following: norms-principles and norms-declarations within the law; the structure of North Korean criminal law; its specific legal institutes; the system of punishments under the CC of the DPRK; the responsibility for some types of crimes under this Code. The current CC of the DPRK, adopted in 1950 and amended fifteen times since then, fits harmoniously with the policy of the DPRK. A study of key clauses of the CC of the DPRK, which reveal the attitude of North Korean lawmakers to universally recognized legal values, showed that there is a clear indication of the DPRK’s rapproachment with the international community. It is evident that the criminal law of North Korea is improving. At the same time, although some trends observed in North Korean lawmaking can be viewed as positive from the standpoint of universally recognized legal values, some of its criminal law’s features still make it impossible to conclude that the country has radically changed its criminal policy.
3
K. Armstrong, Charles. „Trends in the Study of North Korea“. Journal of Asian Studies 70, Nr. 2 (Mai 2011): 357–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911811000027.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Il can be criticized for many failings, but if one of his goals has been keeping his country in the global media spotlight, he has been wildly successful. Of course, North Korea gets this international attention for all the wrong reasons: military provocations, a clandestine nuclear program, a bankrupt economy, an atrocious record on human rights, and an eccentric if not deranged leadership. Some of the accusations leveled against North Korea in the Western media and popular press may have a basis in fact, others are more questionable. But until recently, substantive knowledge of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was notable mainly for its absence. Before the 1990s, little was written about the DPRK beyond official North Korean propaganda and its opposite, anti-North Korean propaganda from the South. Much of this has changed, both because of new sources of information (including material from North Korea's former communist allies), but more importantly because of the growing interest in the subject after South Korean democratization in the late 1980s and the first US-North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s.
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Wright, Amanda, Lynn Pyun, Eunhee Ha, Jungsun Kim, Hae Soon Kim, Seok Hyang Kim, Insoo Oh und Eun Mee Kim. „Critical Review of North Korean Women and Children's Health, 2000-2019: Physical and Mental Health Challenges with a Focus on Gender“. International Studies Review 20, Nr. 2 (19.10.2019): 95–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-02002005.
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Women account for over eighty percent of recent North Korean defectors arriving in South Korea, yet there is dearth of gender-based research. Given the speed with which the dialogue on denuclearization with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) has progressed since 2017, there is a surprising gap in research on possible health threats. If sanctions are eased, interactions with these previously isolated people will increase leading to potential health problems. This article reviews studies published since 2000 to understand physical and mental health faced in DPRK, among North Korean defectors to South Korea, and to provide policy recommendations. A content analysis of ninety studies found that mental health challenges are severe for North Korean defectors, and that women suffer differently than men during defection and its aftermath. We recommend a more nuanced and gendered approach for future research in order to devise tangible solutions to improve the health of North Koreans in general, and defector women and children in particular.
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Johnson, John A., Wojciech J. Cynarski und Sunjang Lee. „ITF Taekwon-Do pedagogy in North Korea: A case study“. Revista de Artes Marciales Asiáticas 14, Nr. 2s (18.11.2019): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.18002/rama.v14i2s.6017.
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<div><p><em>Background</em>. Despite the style of Taekwon-Do taught by the International Taekwon-Do Federation (ITF) being founded in the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea), it is known predominately as “North Korean Taekwon-Do.” <em>Problem and Aim</em>. Taekwon-Do was introduced to the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea) in 1980, but since then no studies have reported how it is practiced in that country due to the DPRK government’s restricting access to its populace. This research aims to begin establishing if there are differences in pedagogical purpose and praxis in DPRK Taekwon-Do. <em>Methodology</em>. An internet search for individuals who traveled to the DPRK to practice Taekwon-Do specifically was conducted. A systematic literature of ITF pedagogical materials was performed, and a multipurpose, qualitative questionnaire was implemented. Out of the seven individuals who were identified and contacted, two agreed to participate in the current study; however, one of those two were disqualified due to incorrectly completing the questionnaire. A descriptive, non-experimental case study of one subject (Singaporean female aged 36 yr.) was then conducted. A qualitative analysis of the data resulting from the questionnaire and follow-up interviews was performed. <em>Results</em>. All five areas of the ITF’s curriculum (i.e., fundamental techniques, <em>tul </em>[forms], sparring, <em>dallyon</em> [forging or conditioning of the body], and self-defense) and the three levels of Taekwon-do’s pedagogy (i.e., <em>musul</em> [martial technique], <em>muyae</em> [martial artistry], and <em>mudo</em> [martial way]) were found in DPRK Taekwon-Do. <em>Discussion and Conclusions</em>. Despite the severe limitations of being unable to interview DPRK Taekwon-Do practitioners directly and the smallest small sample group possible, it was learned that DPRK instructors most likely teach all aspects of General Choi’s Composition of Taekwon-Do, and the stratified Taekwon-Do pedagogy theory was found in the subject’s practice in the DPRK.</p></div>
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Batchimeg, Migeddorj. „Mongolia's DPRK Policy: Engaging North Korea“. Asian Survey 46, Nr. 2 (März 2006): 275–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.2.275.
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Since the end of the 1990s, in order to improve relations, Mongolia has intensified its engagement policy with North Korea. This article analyzes the overall development and future prospects of bilateral relations and various aspects of this policy.
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Gauthier, Brandon K. „A Tortured Relic“. Journal of American-East Asian Relations 22, Nr. 4 (26.11.2015): 343–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02204002.
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Drawing on national and local news stories, newly declassified documents, u.s. prisoner of war (pow) memoirs, and popular films, this article argues that the legacy of the Korean War in the United States from 1953 to 1962 dramatically shaped how Americans imagined the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk). It specifically examines how media portrayals of North Korean atrocities, the alleged misconduct of u.s. captives, and the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the dprk affected public perceptions of “North Korea” as a subjective construct. The painful legacy of the Korean War, particularly the experience of u.s.pows, encouraged Americans to think of North Korea as an inherently violent foe and as part of a broader “Oriental Communist” enemy in the Cold War. When the experiences of u.s. soldiers contradicted these narratives, media sources often made distinctions between “North Koreans,” a repugnant racial and ideological “other,” and “north Koreans,” potential u.s. friends and allies.
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Clemens, Walter C. „North Korea and the World: A Bibliography of Books and URLs in English, 1997–2007“. Journal of East Asian Studies 8, Nr. 2 (August 2008): 293–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800005336.
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This survey of books in English on North Korea, 1997–2007, identifies nearly 240 titles—mostly by US authors but also by authors in Australia, Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia. The books fall into eleven categories: history and culture; the Korean War revisited; the DPRK regime and its leaders; human rights and humanitarian issues; the economy: Juche, Songun, collapse, or reform; DPRK military assets and programs; relations with the United States; arms control negotiations and outcomes; regional and world security; prospects for North-South unification; and North Korea's future. A final section includes useful websites. This survey points to a wide interest in North Korea and underscores the serious and ongoing efforts of many scholars and policy analysts to understand developments there.
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Grzelczyk, Virginie. „Hard, Soft, Smart? North Korea and Power: It’s All Relative“. International Studies Review 18, Nr. 1 (19.10.2017): 131–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01801007.
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North Korea is notable for its isolation, yet the Korean Central News Agency’s daily editions are filled with articles outlining international admiration for Pyongyang and its leader. Is Pyongyang actively promoting soft power as an integral part of not only its survival, but its development strategy? While scholarship on North Korea tends to focus on Pyongyang’s “high profile” relations with China or Russia (Shambaugh 2003, McCormack 2004, Wu 2005) or with nations seeking to cooperate on weapons of mass destruction (Henriksen 2001), little attention has been paid to how the DPRK engages in seemingly peaceful ways with the world. This article examines the notion of hard, soft, smart and other power declensions, and applies a soft-power framework to investigate DPRK rhetoric and the development of partnerships with both states and non-state actors. It suggests that the DPRK has long pursued a strategy of diplomatic diversification, which includes a more sophisticated understanding of power than previously considered in the literature.
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Lee, Steven Hugh. „Negotiating the Cold War: The United States and the Two Koreas“. Journal of American-East Asian Relations 9, Nr. 1-2 (2000): 85–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187656100793645958.
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AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a “diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.”1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea’s atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P’yo¨ngyang, known as the “sunshine policy.” Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime’s social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.
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Ivanov, A. Yu. „The Problem of Defining the Contemporary Border between the DPRK and China“. Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies 34 (2020): 90–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/2073-3380.2020.34.90.
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When the Communist Party came to power in China and the People's Republic of China was established, the new Chinese leadership began to take steps to improve relations with North Korea. Immediately after the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), China and the DPRK entered into a number of agreements and treaties designed to strengthen the ties between the two states that embarked on the path of socialist development. One of the key agreements between China and North Korea was the conclusion of the “Border Treaty” in 1962, which became the guarantor of stability and security on the shared border; it also resolved previous border disputes between the two states. Making certain territorial concessions in the demarcation of the border the Chinese leadership acquired a reliable ally in conditions when China found itself in international isolation. At the same time, some South Korean politicians and scientists taking an interest in the “Border Treaty” concluded between the China and the DPRK expressed mixed views regarding the Sino-North Korean borders. They believed that the national interests of the Korean people were infringed upon by the demarcation of the border between China and the DPRK.
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Chestnut, Sheena. „Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks“. International Security 32, Nr. 1 (Juli 2007): 80–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.80.
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Since public disclosure by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of its uranium enrichment program in 2002 and the subsequent restarting of its plutonium reactor, policymakers and academics have expressed concern that the DPRK will one day export nuclear material or components. An examination of North Korea's involvement in nonnuclear criminal activities shows that the DPRK has established sophisticated transnational smuggling networks, some of which involve terrorist groups and others that have been able to distribute counterfeit currency and goods on U.S. territory. These networks provide North Korea with a significant amount of much-needed hard currency, but the DPRK regime's control over them has decreased over time. These developments suggest that North Korea has both the means and motivation for exporting nuclear material, and that concerns over nuclear export from the DPRK, authorized or not, are well founded. When placed in the context of the global nuclear black market, the North Korea case suggests that criminal networks are likely to play an increased role in future proliferation. In addition, it raises the concern that proliferation conducted through illicit networks will not always be well controlled by the supplier state. It is therefore imperative to track and curtail illicit networks not only because of the costs they impose, but also because of the deterrent value of countersmuggling efforts. New strategies that integrate law enforcement, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation tools are likely to have the greatest success in addressing the risks posed by illicit proliferation networks.
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Rinna, Anthony V. „Sanctions, Security and Regional Development in Russia's Policies Toward North Korea“. International Studies Review 20, Nr. 1 (19.10.2019): 21–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-02001007.
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In light of North Korean security provocations, the Kremlin has consistently supported the UN's punitive economic measures against Pyongyang; even as economic collaboration with the DPRK is part of a Russian bid to economically invigorate the Russian Far East. This paper argues that Moscow has faced a choice between pursuing its own interests in terms of bilateral relations with the DPRK and participating in a collaborative manner with other states involved in the Korean security debacle, opting for the latter. Even as North Korea is a crucial part of Russia's plans to economically develop its Asiatic territories, the Kremlin perceives that it cannot refuse to join other countries in implementing punitive measures against Pyongyang, even while inconveniencing its own economic interests.
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Steele, Peter. „The Soldiers of Songbun: Militarization, Human Rights Abuse and Childhood Experiences of North Korean Youth“. Allons-y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security 3 (29.03.2020): 8–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.15273/allons-y.v3i0.10063.
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North Korea is an enigma. The United Nations (UN) states that it is “…without parallel in the contemporary world …” in terms of abuse, exploitation and lack of civil rights. No other rogue state commands the attention and mystique as the isolated nation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Despite an increasingly prevalent international front, including warming relations with South Korea and the threat of nuclear weapons, everyday citizens remain hidden. Public displays of Olympic cheerleaders or the admittance of “K-Pop” stars across the Korean Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) distract from the widespread human rights abuses and public indoctrination that is second nature in the country. But this is no surprise; In the DPRK, the leader is above all else. While marginalized groups in other countries may be granted a voice by international organizations, the vulnerable in North Korea are obscured in the shadow of the great leader’s actions.
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Cynarski, Wojciech Jan, und John Arthur Johnson. „North Korea’s emerging martial arts tourism: a Taekwon-Do case study“. International Journal of Culture, Tourism and Hospitality Research 14, Nr. 4 (23.03.2020): 667–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijcthr-07-2019-0133.
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Purpose This descriptive, non-experiment case study addresses the little-studied topic of martial arts tourism within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; i.e., North Korea) to determine if it is a form of non-entertainment tourism. Design/methodology/approach The current research focusses on a single subject (Singaporean female; 36 years of age (at time of interview); Taekwon-Do 4th degree black belt) who travelled to the DPRK three times to practice the Korean martial art Taekwon-Do. After the initial contact, a questionnaire was used and direct interviews via Skype and Facebook were performed. A broad thematic discourse, as well as analysis of the subject’s travel and practice notes and photographs from her stay in the DPRK, were also incorporated into the findings. Findings The subject developed new Taekwon-Do skills, which permitted her to obtain higher Taekwon-Do ranks as well as enriched her personality and changed certain conceptions. Self-realization and self-improvement through martial arts are the dominant motives of martial arts tourism. Therefore, the subject’s motivation confirms martial arts tourism can be a variation of non-entertainment tourism. Research limitations/implications This research is hindered by the standard case study limitations: it is difficult to generalize this study’s results to the wider DPRK population, the interviewee’s and researchers’ subjective feelings may have influenced the findings, and selection bias is definitely a factor because of the study’s population being a single female of non-DPRK origin. Originality/value As one of the first studies on DPRK martial arts tourism and practice, this research examines where research on the DPRK and martial arts tourism intersect. It is thusly unique in providing new insights into the DPRK’s intention for its tourism industry, as well as Taekwon-Do, arguably its most marketable cultural asset.
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Zhang, Chi, Jun He und Guanghui Yuan. „An Empirical Analysis on DPRK: Will Grain Yield Influence Foreign Policy Tendency?“ Sustainability 12, Nr. 7 (30.03.2020): 2711. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12072711.
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the hub of Northeast Asia and its geopolitics is of great significance, whose foreign policy trend is not only related to the peace and stability of the region, but also one of the major variables affecting cooperation in Northeast Asia. According to the data on North Korea’s grain yield collected by the Korea National Statistical Office, supplemented by the data on international food aid to North Korea collected by the World Food Programme, and combined with the judgment of 10 experts from China, South Korea and the United States on the Hawk and Dove Index of North Korea’s foreign policy from 1990 to 2018, we use empirical mode decomposition wavelet transform data analysis and feature extraction methods to study the impact relationship, and OLS regression analysis to study the actual cycle of transformation. We found that: (1) North Korea’s grain output is an important indicator that affects its foreign policy tendency (hawks or doves). The hawk refers to those who take a tough attitude in policy and prefer rigid means such as containment, intimidation and conflicts; the dove refers to those who take mild attitude in policy, and prefer to adopt flexible means such as negotiation, cooperation, and coordination. When it comes to grain yield increase, North Korea’s foreign policy tends to be hawkish; when it comes to grain reduction, its dovish tendency will be on the rise. This is because food increase can alleviate grain shortage in North Korea and enhance its ability to adopt tough policies in its foreign policy. However, decreases in grain production will lead to adopt a more moderate policy and seek international cooperation and assistance to ease the internal pressure caused by grain shortage. (2) North Korea’s grain yield influencing its foreign policy (hawks or doves) has a lag phase of about 3 years. Such being the case, the accumulated grain during the production increase period has enhanced North Korea’s ability to cope with grain reduction in the short term. Secondly, the North Korean government blames the reduction on foreign sanctions, which will instead make the North Korean people more determined to resist external pressure. Therefore, we can use the changes in North Korea’s grain output to predict the direction of its foreign policy so as to more accurately judge the development of the Korean Peninsula and more effectively promote the process of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. We concluded that grain production will affect its policy sustainability in North Korea.
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YUAN, Jingdong. „China’s Core Interests and Critical Role in North Korea’s Denuclearisation“. East Asian Policy 11, Nr. 03 (Juli 2019): 25–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930519000242.
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China remains an indispensable player in the peninsular denuclearisation process. Beijing seeks to foster peace and stability in the region, maintain a balanced two-Korea policy, and manage the North Korean nuclear challenge in the broader contexts of growing strategic rivalry with the United States, including disputes over trade, Taiwan and the South China Sea. Recent developments in China-DPRK relations indicate that Beijing continues to view North Korea as a strategic asset.
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Zakharova, L. V. „Implications of UN Security Council Sanctions for Russia – North Korea Economic Relations“. Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies 34 (2020): 67–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/2073-3380.2020.34.67.
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The UN Security Council imposed tough economic sanctions against the DPRK in response to Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests in 2016-2017. They placed considerable strain on economic relations with North Korea. Prior to the introduction of the new international restrictions, economic relations between the Russian Federation and the DPRK had been mainly represented by trade, the Hasan-Rajin joint transport and logistics project, temporary labor migration of North Korean citizens to work in Russia, and humanitarian assistance from the Russian Federation. New investment cooperation projects had also been discussed (for example, in infrastructure and energy spheres), as well as the construction of an motor-way bridge between the two countries. The article evaluates the consequences of the UN Security Council sanctions against the DPRK for the main areas of Russian-North Korean economic relations. Moscow managed to exclude the Khasan-Rajin railway project from the UN Security Council resolutions as the Russian side had invested more than $ 250 million in it. Since 2018 the joint venture, however, has faced serious problems in ensuring the necessary volume of freight to handle. Due to the UNSC sanctions, mutually beneficial cooperation in attracting workers from the DPRK to Russia had to be terminated by the end of 2019. At the same time, bilateral trade, which cut in half in 2018, showed a yoy growth of more than 40 % in 2019, primarily due to an increase in Russian exports. The supply of the Russian humanitarian aid also continued.
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Agov, Avram. „“The East Asian Frontier of the Socialist World: North Korea in the 1950s”“. Journal of American-East Asian Relations 24, Nr. 2-3 (12.09.2017): 160–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02402001.
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The decade of the 1950s was a formative period for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk), one that shaped its integration into the international socialist system. This article examines the interaction between North Korea’s internal (institutional) and external (international) integration into the socialist system that, at this time, the Soviet Union and its East European bloc allies dominated. It argues that North Korea was more integrated into the socialist world than its nationalist ideology implied. The 1950s marked the culmination of the dprk’s connectivity to the international socialist world. The narrative begins in the second half of the 1940s with the building of North Korea’s socialist system. It then focuses on East European bloc aid to North Korea during and after the Korean War, as well as the dprk’s reactions to this fraternal assistance. By the second half of the 1950s, North Korea came to associate integration with dependency, generating nationalist impulses in dprk policy and laying the foundation for the juche (self-reliance) paradigm. North Korea’s nationalist ideology was part of a broader post-colonial nation building drive, but socialist interdependency also played a role in the dprk’s divergence, after the early 1960s, from the Soviet bloc and the People’s Republic of China.
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Gainullina, Liailia Aidarovna, Rustem Ravilevich Muhametzyanov, Bulat Aidarovich Gainullin und Nadiia Almazovna Galiautdinova. „DPRK'S nuclear program“. Laplage em Revista 6, Extra-A (14.12.2020): 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.24115/s2446-622020206extra-a550p.15-22.
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Historically, in the eyes of the Korean people, Japan is an antagonistic state that has brought them many troubles in the past century. Relations between Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are fundamental in terms of security in the Northeast Asia (NEA) region, since the decision on the DPRK nuclear missile program and on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is one of the pillars of achieving that very security throughout the region. The period, we consider in this study, from 1996 to 2006, is of significant importance, since a thorough analysis of the events of those years is important for understanding the root of existing problems in bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea. The present analysis on the behavioral lines in the solution of the North Korean nuclear missile program may contribute to the choice the best way to normalize relations between the two countries.
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Danielewski, Mateusz. „Polityka zagraniczna Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich i Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec Koreańskiej Republiki Ludowo-Demokratycznej (1948–2016)“. Poliarchia 5, Nr. 9 (25.01.2019): 5–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/poliarchia.05.2017.09.01.
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Foreign Policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Russian Federation toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1948–2016) Foreign relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the Cold War were based on support of the North Korean regime and a distrustful attitude toward Kim Il‑sung, who remained neutral in the Soviet‑Chinese split. After the political transformation, the Russian Federation is pursuing pragmatic policy toward the DPRK. Moscow seeks to deepen economic cooperation in order to maintain security in Northeast Asia. The aim of this article is to analyse the USSR’s and Russia’s relations with the DPRK. The author describes events before, during and after the Cold War. The article draws attention to the extent to which national interests and the foreign policy of the Russian Federation coincide and differ from those pursued by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
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Choi, Jina, und Brendan Howe. „United Nations Contributions to Promoting Human Rights in the DPRK: Impetus for Change“. International Studies Review 19, Nr. 2 (19.10.2018): 115–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01902006.
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The United Nations (UN) has been the key contributor to the diffusion of human rights norms and practices in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The process of promoting human rights in the DPRK has been beset with challenges. The UN has had to steer its way through a complex web of international politics in order consistently to apply pressure on Pyongyang to amend its human rights norm-violating behavior. While achievements to date have been limited, this paper identifies the processes of socialization rather than coercion or inducements, as constituting the most promising avenue for the UN to impact North Korean governance. The paper will examine the evolution of UN socialization efforts in the DPRK to date, including how and under what mechanisms or conditions, socialization occurred, and what progress has been made by UN socialization dynamics. Although the progress so far may have been limited at best, what has been achieved merits greater scholarly attention, in order to derive implications for future policy prescription with regard to promoting human rights in North Korea and beyond.
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DYACHKOV, Ilya Vladimirovich. „UN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DPRK: AN ASSESSMENT OF EFFICIENCY“. Tambov University Review. Series: Humanities, Nr. 177 (2018): 173–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/1810-0201-2018-23-177-173-179.
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The last decade and a half we saw the gradual forming of a sanctions regime against the DPRK in connection with Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. United Nations Security Council resolutions have disconnected North Korea from the global financial system, cut all foreign military ties with the country, introduced considerable sectoral sanctions on imports and exports, blocked major channels Pyongyang used to acquire foreign currency. Besides, the United States, South Korea and Japan have simultaneously enforced unilateral restrictions. Early 2018 offers an opportunity to solve the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem, and now is the time to assess the sanctions’ efficiency. We analyze the problems with their implementation and describe the means North Korea employs to circumvent the regime. Such measures include building an autarkic economy, ignoring the directives of the United Nations Security Council, deceiving international partners, exploiting the global market and engaging in espionage and diplomacy. These strategies allow the DPRK to support and develop the economy, as well as missile and nuclear programs. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations may be, it is already evident that sanctions cannot efficiently solve the nuclear issue and must give way to dialogue.
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Jordan, Klara Tothova. „United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 on Nuclear Nonproliferation in North Korea“. International Legal Materials 52, Nr. 5 (Oktober 2013): 1196–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/intelegamate.52.5.1196.
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On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094 (2013), bolstering the scope of United Nations (UN) sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Resolution represents the international community’s latest attempt at applying diplomatic and economic pressure to the DPRK so as to curb its nuclear weapons program. The resolution is also a response to the DPRK’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013 and its subsequent threat to carry out preemptive nuclear strikes against the United States and South Korea. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council responded to these grave violations of its existing Resolutions—seen as clear threats to international peace and security—by building upon, strengthening, and expanding the scope of the sanctions regime against the DPRK.
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Shen, Zhihua, und Yafeng Xia. „Chinese–North Korean Relations and China's Policy toward Korean Cross-Border Migration, 1950–1962“. Journal of Cold War Studies 16, Nr. 4 (Oktober 2014): 133–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00518.
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Making use of Chinese Foreign Ministry archives and provincial and municipal archives, this article traces the history of cross-border migration of ethnic Koreans from 1950 to 1962, especially the illegal migration of ethnic Koreans to North Korea (DPRK) in 1961. A historical examination of Koreans in northeast China demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party attempted to achieve a workable policy toward Korean border crossers as well as a disposition to accommodate the DPRK's concerns and imperatives in defining nationality, handling cases of Sino-Korean marriages and exit procedures for ethnic Koreans, receiving Korean nationals to visit China, and dealing with cases of illegal border crossings. To this end, the Chinese authorities were pursuing larger Cold War interests, specifically the desire to keep the DPRK aligned with China during the Sino-Soviet split.
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Cohen, Roberta. „An r2p Framework for North Korea“. Global Responsibility to Protect 8, Nr. 4 (26.10.2016): 410–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875984x-00804006.
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North Korea has long been considered a country where r2p’s application would not be a practical option. Its major abuses are largely hidden from view and its reclusive nature has made it appear impervious to outside influence. But with the publication of the un Commission of Inquiry report and the response of the dprk, opportunities have arisen. Building on these, this article proposes an r2p framework for North Korea with the strong involvement of the Secretary-General and the entire un system. It argues that despite the challenges, there are persuasive reasons for the new Secretary-General to promote r2p for North Korea.
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Hymans, Jacques E. C. „Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions and Capacities: A New Approach“. Journal of East Asian Studies 8, Nr. 2 (August 2008): 259–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800005324.
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This article develops a novel assessment of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Using a theory-driven approach rooted in comparative foreign policy analysis, the article undermines two common assumptions about the DPRK nuclear threat: first, that the North Korean leadership's nuclear intentions are a measured response to the external environment and, second, that the DPRK has developed enough technical capacity to go nuclear whenever it pleases. In place of these assumptions, the article puts forth the general theoretical hypotheses that (1) the decision to go nuclear is rarely if ever based on typical cost-benefit analysis, and instead reflects deep-seated national identity conceptions, and (2) the capacity to go nuclear depends not only on raw levels of industrialization and nuclear technology, but also on the state's organizational acumen. Applied to the case of the DPRK, these hypotheses suggest that it has long been strongly committed to the goal of acquiring an operational nuclear deterrent, but also that it has been finding it very difficult to successfully implement that wish. The article also demonstrates that these hypotheses are supported by the meager evidence available on this case.
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Emery, Clifton R., Jieun Yoo, Amia Lieblich und Randall Hansen. „After the Escape: Physical Abuse of Offspring, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and the Legacy of Political Violence in the DPRK“. Violence Against Women 24, Nr. 9 (30.10.2017): 999–1022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801217731540.
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What is the relationship between victimization by political violence against women in North Korea and later physical abuse of offspring? This article examines the relationships between victimization by political violence, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), alcohol abuse/dependence, and abuse of offspring after arrival in South Korea. A random sample of 204 female North Korean defectors was used to test hypotheses. An oral history conducted with a survivor of North Korean political violence is provided in an appendix to contextualize the results. Analyses established a significant link between previous victimization by political violence and abuse of offspring but not mediation by either PTSD or alcohol abuse/dependence.
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Chen, Cheng, und Ji-Yong Lee. „Making sense of North Korea: “National Stalinism” in comparative-historical perspective“. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40, Nr. 4 (01.12.2007): 459–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2007.10.003.
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This paper examines the striking institutional parallels between the seemingly inexplicable DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and Ceausescu’s Romania. It argues that in both cases, the role of strong anti-liberal ideology that combined both far left and far right nationalist elements was highly significant in sustaining the regime and therefore should not be underestimated. While developments elsewhere in the Soviet bloc deprived the Ceausescu regime of potential nationalist cards it could play and thus precipitated regime change, the DPRK regime was able to hold on to power by using imagined and real external threats to justify its ongoing domestic repression and reinforce its nationalist claims.
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Zadeh-Cummings, Nazanin, und Lauren Harris. „The Impact of Sanctions against North Korea on Humanitarian Aid“. Journal of Humanitarian Affairs 2, Nr. 1 (01.01.2020): 44–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.7227/jha.033.
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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has been a recipient of international humanitarian aid from international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) since 1995. In recent years, multilateral and unilateral sanctions in response to the DPRK’s nuclear programme have created a new layer of difficulty for humanitarians looking to engage with the authoritarian state. This paper explores how sanctions are affecting humanitarian work in practice, utilising interviews with practitioners. The research first surveys documentation, particularly from IOs, to establish how humanitarians understand contemporary need inside the country. Next, this paper examines the impacts of sanctions on aid efforts, with a particular focus on multilateral United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and unilateral American measures. Unpacking humanitarian challenges and potential ways to navigate the sanctions regime provides a foundation for academics and humanitarian practitioners to better understand both the DPRK and possible avenues for principled, effective aid.
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Samuels, Richard J. „Kidnapping Politics in East Asia“. Journal of East Asian Studies 10, Nr. 3 (Dezember 2010): 363–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800003660.
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In this article, I examine two contemporary cases in which the same foreign adversary, North Korea (DPRK), violated the sovereignty of neighboring states. I use a comparison of South Korean and Japanese reactions to political captivity to assess institutional performance in democratic states and ways in which these dynamics are connected to international politics. We see how “captivity narratives” can be differentially constructed and deployed and howpolicycapture can be achieved by determined political actors. Civic groups in both countries worked to mobilize political support, frame the issue for the media, and force policy change. In Japan, politicians were more willing to use the abduction issue for domestic political gain than in Korea, where the political class was determined to prevent human rights issues (including abductions) from interfering with their larger political agenda, including improved relations with the DPRK.
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Husenicova, Lucia. „U.S. Foreign Policy Towards North Korea“. International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal 22, Nr. 1 (09.11.2018): 65–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1641-4233.22.05.
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The U.S. relations to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are since the end of the Cold War revolving around achieving a state of nuclear free Korean peninsula. As non-proliferation is a long term of American foreign policy, relations to North Korea could be categorized primarily under this umbrella. However, the issue of North Korean political system also plays role as it belongs to the other important, more normative category of U.S. foreign policy which is the protection of human rights and spreading of democracy and liberal values. In addition, the North Korean issue influences U.S. relations and interests in broader region of Northeast Asia, its bilateral alliances with South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) and Japan as well as sensitive and complex relations to People’s Republic of China. As the current administration of president Donald J. Trump published its National security strategy and was fully occupied with the situation on Korean peninsula in its first year, the aim of the paper is to analyse the changes in evolution of U.S. North Korean policy under last three administrations, look at the different strategies adopted in order to achieve the same aim, the denuclearization. The paper does not provide a thorough analysis, neither looks at all documents adopted and presented in the U.S. or within the U.N. It more focuses on the general principles of particular strategies, most significant events in mutual relations as recorded by involved governmental officials and also weaknesses of these strategies as none has achieved desirable result. In conclusion, several options for current administration are drawn, however all of them require significant compromises and could be accompanied with series of setbacks dangerous for regional stability and U.S. position in the region.
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Pugacheva, O. S. „Inter-Korean Relations: Factors and Prospects“. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 14, Nr. 1 (28.01.2021): 151–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2021-14-1-8.
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The relations between South Korea and North Korea were improved in 2018 on the basis of the Sunshine policy ideational platform and the inter-Korean agreements reached between the two countries under the progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung in 2000 and Roh Moohyun in 2007. However, inter-Korean relations had been at a lull since the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi in February 2019 despite the intentions of the parties to develop diverse forms of cooperation. After that, the month of June saw a severe deterioration in the Inter-Korean relations. The aim of this article is to analyze the inter-Korean relations and the North Korean policies of the South Korean governments from 1998 to 2020 as well as explain the reasons behind Seoul’s inability to make progress in dialogue with Pyongyang. South Korea’s prioritizing of its ties with the United States as well as its increased dependence on the United States were the main reason behind the stagnation of inter-Korean relations. Under the international regime of sanctions against the DPRK, Moon Jae-In has failed to put the Sunshine policy into practice, for instance, re-open Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism zone. The fact that inter-Korean economic cooperation was actually still linked to the denuclearization of the DPRK also had a negative impact on the prospects for maintaining the positive dynamics of inter-Korean relations. The exacerbation of inter-Korean relations in June 2020 showed that in the absence of practical inter-Korean cooperation and with the continuing deadlock in the US-North Korean negotiations on the nuclear issue, Pyongyang is not interested in normalizing relations with Seoul and it can concentrate on relations with the United States. At the same time, the intensifying confrontation between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region is not conducive to a political settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and it can potentially lead to an aggravation of inter-Korean relations.
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Jin, Jinxiu. „Political News Discourse Analysis Based on an Attitudinal Perspective of the Appraisal Theory—Taking the New York Times’ Report China-DPRK Relations as an Example“. Theory and Practice in Language Studies 9, Nr. 10 (01.10.2019): 1357. http://dx.doi.org/10.17507/tpls.0910.15.
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The relationship among China, the United States and North Korea has already been a focus of international politics. From June 19 to 20, North Korea leader Kim Jong-un ended his third visit to China within 100 days. This is also his three consecutive visits to China since he took office in December 2011. The high density and frequency are not only rare in the history of China-DPRK relations, but also seem to be unique in the history of international relations, indicating that China-DPRK relations are welcoming new era. This paper selects the New York Times’ report on China-DPRK relations as an example, which is based on an attitudinal perspective of the appraisal theory to analyze American attitudes toward China. Attitudes are positive and negative, explicit and implicit. Whether the attitude is good or not depends on the linguistic meaning of expressing attitude. The meaning of language is positive, and the attitude of expression is positive; the meaning of language is negative, and the attitude of expression is negative. The study found that most of the attitude resources are affect (which are always negative affect), which are mainly realized through such means as lexical, syntactical and rhetorical strategies implicitly or explicitly. All these negative evaluations not only help construct a discourse mode for building the bad image of China but also are not good to China-DPRK relations. The United States wants to tarnish image of China and destroy the relationship between China and North Korea by its political news discourse.
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Oppenheim, Robert. „Introduction to the JAS Mini-Forum “Regarding North Korea”“. Journal of Asian Studies 70, Nr. 2 (Mai 2011): 333–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911811000052.
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As Charles Armstrong notes in beginning his review essay that follows, deliberately or not North Korea has been in the headlines. Over the past two decades, and notwithstanding the publication timelines that affect our business, it has rarely been a risk for an academic author to start any piece by stating just that. While the articles that comprise this Journal of Asian Studies “mini-forum” on North Korea had already been commissioned, it will surprise no reader to learn that their framing and urgency shifted in response to recent events. As this issue goes to press, such events have included the November 2010 artillery skirmish centered on Yŏnp'yŏng Island, the choreographed revelation in the same month of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) uranium enrichment facilities to visiting nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker, and the March 2010 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan. All of these incidents—in combination with actions and inactions by South Korea, the United States, and other regional powers—arguably moved the peninsula closer to “the brink” at the end of 2010 than it had been for some time.
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Fedorovsky, A., und V. Shvydko. „Inter-Korean Relations: Political Role of Regional Powers“. World Economy and International Relations, Nr. 2 (2014): 83–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-2-83-91.
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Missile launches and nuclear tests by DPRK in 2013 undermined inter-Korean cooperation and regional stability. The primary purpose of these activities was to strengthen legitimacy of Kim Jong Un’s administration. South Korean president Park Geun-Hye’s trustpolitik policy focused on improving mutual understanding and developing step-by-step inter-Korean cooperation. Regional powers jointly opposed North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, but failed to elaborate common understanding on policies to promote security in the Korean peninsula as well as on prospects for the unification of Korea.
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Denisov, V. I., und A. S. Pyatachkova. „The Future of the Korean Peninsula: Topical Issues and Possible Solutions“. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 12, Nr. 1 (01.04.2019): 86–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-1-86-101.
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The DPRK has become one of the most striking news-maker of 2018. Kim Jong-un took decisive steps to establish cooperation with the ROK – the parties had quite coordinated interaction during the Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, and hold three Inter-Korean summits in April, May and September 2018. Kim Jong-un have hold three meetings with Xi Jinping. The summit of Kim Jong-un and Trump in Singapore was equally resonant. The President of the Russian Federation during the WEF invited Kim Jongun to Russia, earlier the leader of North Korea had a meeting with S.V. Lavrov and V.I. Matvienko. These steps look particularly important against the previous period, when the DPRK was mainly presented by the United States and other states as a security threat. However, despite the changes that took place and the fact that Kim Jong-un is attempting to build a dialogue in different areas, the position remains about the real interests and intentions of the DPRK and the future of the North Korean regime remains ambiguous. The article analyzes existing points of view on the issue and identifies and the prospects’ of the problem development. At the beginning of the study, a comprehensive analysis of the problem of the Korean Peninsula is presented. It examines the features of the interaction of the DPRK with key international players, the question of sanctions against the country, and the peculiarities of the internal political line of the DPRK. Further analysis focuses on the current foreign policy line of Kim Jong Yin, assesses the results of major international meetings, including the opinion of experts and the analysis of the significance of specific agreements for understanding possible scenarios. Specific attention is payed to the Russian policy towards the inter-Korean settlement and Russian potential role in this process.
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Husarski, Roman. „Towards a Supernatural Propaganda. The DPRK Myth in the Movie The Big-Game Hunter“. Studia Religiologica 53, Nr. 2 (2020): 149–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20844077sr.20.011.12514.
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For a long time, the world thought that the collapse of the USSR in 1991 would lead to a similar outcome in North Korea. Although the Kim regime suffered harsh economic troubles, it was able to distance itself from communism without facing an ideological crisis and losing mass support. The same core political myths are still in use today. However, after the DPRK left the ideas of socialist realism behind, it has become clearer that the ideology of the country is a political religion. Now, its propaganda is using more supernatural elements than ever before. A good example is the movie The Big-Game Hunter (Maengsu sanyangkkun) in which the Japanese are trying to desacralize Paektu Mountain, but instead experience the fury of the holy mountain in the form of thunderbolts. The movie was produced in 2011 by P’yo Kwang, one of the most successful North Korean directors. It was filmed in the same year Kim Chŏng-ŭn came to power. The aim of the paper is to show the evolution of the DPRK political myth in North Korean cinema, in which The Big-Game Hunter seems to be another step in the process of mythologization. It is crucial to understand how the propaganda works, as it is still largely the cinema that shapes the attitudes and imagination of the people of the DPRK.
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Husarski, Roman. „Towards a Supernatural Propaganda. The DPRK Myth in the Movie The Big-Game Hunter“. Studia Religiologica 53, Nr. 2 (2020): 149–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20844077sr.20.011.12514.
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For a long time, the world thought that the collapse of the USSR in 1991 would lead to a similar outcome in North Korea. Although the Kim regime suffered harsh economic troubles, it was able to distance itself from communism without facing an ideological crisis and losing mass support. The same core political myths are still in use today. However, after the DPRK left the ideas of socialist realism behind, it has become clearer that the ideology of the country is a political religion. Now, its propaganda is using more supernatural elements than ever before. A good example is the movie The Big-Game Hunter (Maengsu sanyangkkun) in which the Japanese are trying to desacralize Paektu Mountain, but instead experience the fury of the holy mountain in the form of thunderbolts. The movie was produced in 2011 by P’yo Kwang, one of the most successful North Korean directors. It was filmed in the same year Kim Chŏng-ŭn came to power. The aim of the paper is to show the evolution of the DPRK political myth in North Korean cinema, in which The Big-Game Hunter seems to be another step in the process of mythologization. It is crucial to understand how the propaganda works, as it is still largely the cinema that shapes the attitudes and imagination of the people of the DPRK.
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Leading Korean scholars, no name. „North Korea Facing Collapse: Domestic Political and Social and Economic Situation“. World Economy and International Relations, Nr. 1 (2012): 89–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2012-1-89-102.
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The paper deals with various aspects of economic and social crisis in the DPRK on the eve of 2010’s. Basically, there is an evident functional paralysis of the command economy that leads to its complete decay and breakdown. The result is emergence of a set of isolated sectors and segments living by different rules. Also, it triggers major social processes which undermine the stability of North Korean political system and its ideology. Different options of future developments are considered in the light of possible similarities with processes characteristic of the Soviet Union, East European countries and China in the past. Special attention is paid to actual and potential role of external factors, primarily to the influence of Chinese policy towards North Korea and the recent contacts with South Korea.
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Ullah, Aman, Waseem Ishaque und Muhammad Usman Ullah. „UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA RAPPROCHEMENT: AVERTING A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST“. Global Political Review 2, Nr. 1 (30.12.2017): 81–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2017(ii-i).09.
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The situation in the Korean Peninsula has generally remained uncertain since the time of the Korean war. President Trumps proverbs of fire and fury, Rocket Man and now a valuable partner are gradual transformations, which have been appreciated by the world at large, yet fragility and lack of trust among the key contenders North Korea (DPRK), USA and South Kora may lead to strategic miscalculation and undo the process of confidence-building. The efforts of Russia and China are commendable as these are contributing to a stable environment; however, the world is witnessing these developments with cautious optimism due to the impulsive nature of opposing leaders. On an optimistic note, Chairman Kim and President Trump want to move forward for a reasonable settlement. The leadership on both sides, the global players and regional organizations will have to work for hand in gloves for sustainable peace as failure is the worst option.
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DiFilippo, Anthony. „History, Ideology, and Human Rights“. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 53, Nr. 2 (01.06.2020): 153–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2020.53.2.153.
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This article will analyze the connection between history, countervailing ideologies, that is, the legacy of the Cold War, and the perceived identification of human rights violations as they pertain to countries with major security interests in Northeast Asia. This article will further show that the enduring nuclear-weapons problem in North Korea has been inextricably linked to human rights issues there, specifically because Washington wants to change the behavior of officials in Pyongyang so that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) becomes a state that at least remotely resembles a liberal democracy. Although supported by much of the international community, including the United States' South Korean and Japanese allies in Northeast Asia, Washington's North Korean policy has remained ineffective, as Pyongyang has continued to perform missile testing and still possesses nuclear weapons.
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Hong, Suk-Hoon, und Yun-Young Cho. „Consistent pattern of DRPK’s policy on ROK: What shapes North Korea’s foreign policy?“ International Area Studies Review 20, Nr. 1 (21.12.2016): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2233865916683602.
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Identity is the basis of North Korea’s regime legitimacy. As a divided country, North Korea’s legitimacy is forged in the inter-Korean comparison. This paper starts with the question of what factors influence whether North Korea chooses to implement risky or cooperative policies toward South Korea, as well as what role domestic politics and ideology play in The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) formation and enactment of foreign policy. This paper confirmed that the Pyongyang leadership’s policy priority has mostly depended on identity need. Also, we infer that Pyongyang tends to take a hostile stance whenever the South government is willing to infringe Pyongyang’s legitimacy and dignity regardless of the South’s economic assistance. This research attempts to explain how historical and cultural contexts play in the DPRK’s formation of its policy toward the Republic of Korea, and also examines Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Pyongyang regime, through the lens of content analysis in order to determine the DPRK’s perception and policy preferences toward the The Republic of Korea (ROK).
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Hughes, Christopher W. „"Super-Sizing" the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea“. Asian Survey 49, Nr. 2 (01.03.2009): 291–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.2.291.
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Japan's reemergence as a "normal" military power has been accelerated by the "super-sizing" of North Korea: a product of the North's extant military threat, multiplied exponentially by its undermining of U.S.-Japan alliance solidarity, views of the North as a domestic "peril," and the North's utilization as a catch-all proxy for remilitarization.
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Johnson, John Arthur, und Udo Moenig. „Furthering taekwondo as an academic discipline: A report on Youngsan University’s 1st International Academic Taekwondo Conference“. Revista de Artes Marciales Asiáticas 14, Nr. 2 (18.12.2019): 86. http://dx.doi.org/10.18002/rama.v14i2.6035.
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<p>The 1<sup>st</sup> International Academic Taekwondo Conference Youngsan University was held on October 4, 2019 in Yangsan, Republic of Korea (ROK; i.e., South Korea). In an effort to bring together international researchers of taekwondo, three non-Korean presenters were invited and three accomplished academics, two non-Korean, made up the conference’s invited panelists. The topics presented were: 1) the shift in taekwondo’s peace promotion duties, 2) a discussion of <em>mudo</em> (“martial way” of life) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; i.e., North Korea), and 3) the decline of taekwondo as a combat sport. Although small in scale, the conference built upon previous taekwondo academic endeavors in- and outside of Korea. Most importantly, the conference highlighted the fact that non-Korean academics are furthering the research field beyond the nationalistic concepts still held in the Korean taekwondo community. The event immediately garnered interest in an expanded conference for 2020.</p>
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Park, John J., Ah-Young Lim, Hyung-Soon Ahn, Andrew I. Kim, Soyoung Choi, David HW Oh, Owen Lee-Park et al. „Systematic review of evidence on public health in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea“. BMJ Global Health 4, Nr. 2 (März 2019): e001133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001133.
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BackgroundEngaging in public health activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea) offers a means to improve population health for its citizens and the wider region. Such an engagement requires an understanding of current and future needs.MethodsWe conducted a systematic search of five English and eight Korean language databases to identify available literature published between 1988 and 2017. A narrative review of evidence was conducted for five major categories (health systems, communicable diseases (CDs), non-communicable diseases (NCDs), injuries, and reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH) and nutrition).FindingsWe found 465 publications on the DPRK and public health. Of the 253 articles that addressed major disease categories, we found under-representation of publications relative to proportion of disease burden for the two most significant causes: NCDs (54.5% publications vs 72.6% disability adjusted life years (DALYs)) and injuries (0.4% publications vs 12.1% DALYs), in comparison to publications on the third and fourth largest disease burdens, RMNCH and nutrition (30.4% publications vs 8.6% DALYs) and CDs (14.6% publications vs 6.7% DALYs) which were over-represented. Although most disease category articles were on NCDs, the majority of NCD articles addressed mental health of refugees. Only 165 articles addressed populations within the DPRK and among these, we found publication gaps on social and environmental determinants of health, CDs, and NCDs.ConclusionThere are gaps in the public health literature on the DPRK. Future research should focus on under-studied, significant burdens of disease. Moreover, establishing more precise estimates of disease burden and their distribution, as well as analysis on health systems responses aimed at addressing them, can result in improvements in population health.
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Song, Jiyoung. „The Right to Survival in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea“. European Journal of East Asian Studies 9, Nr. 1 (2010): 87–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156805810x517689.
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AbstractFor the past decade, the author has examined North Korean primary public documents and concludes that there have been changes of identities and ideas in the public discourse of human rights in the DPRK: from strong post-colonialism to Marxism-Leninism, from there to the creation of Juche as the state ideology and finally 'our style' socialism. This paper explains the background to Kim Jong Il's 'our style' human rights in North Korea: his broader framework, 'our style' socialism, with its two supporting ideational mechanisms, named 'virtuous politics' and 'military-first politics'. It analyses how some of these characteristics have disappeared while others have been reinforced over time. Marxism has significantly withered away since the end of the Cold War, and communism was finally deleted from the latest 2009 amended Socialist Constitution, whereas the concept of sovereignty has been strengthened and the language of duties has been actively employed by the authority almost as a relapse to the feudal Confucian tradition. The paper also includes some first-hand accounts from North Korean defectors interviewed in South Korea in October–December 2008. They show the perception of ordinary North Koreans on the ideas of human rights.
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Asmolov, Konstantin. „Problems and Prospects for the DPRK’s Development: Forecasting Model-2021“. Problemy dalnego vostoka, Nr. 4 (2021): 134. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013128120016161-8.
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Since the 1990s, there have been many publications predicting an imminent "collapse of the North Korean regime" or a shift of the country’s political vector. However, this has not happened so far, and the DPRK’s political regime continues to exist. What leads to such chronically unrealistic forecasts for North Korea, and what are alternative options for the future of this country in the short and medium term? Revising a number of unfulfilled predictions, the authors try to explain the reason for these failures. They are usually closely related to an ideological framework, lack of information and dependence on certain sources, which leads to an underestimation of the DPRK's capabilities and misinterpretation of data, when any event is seen as a sign of the regime’s imminent collapse. Using the theoretical approaches of G. Tallok and V.I. Lenin, the article identifies the main types of threats to the current political regime (external invasion, a coup within the elite, economic collapse, mass protests), as well as the likelihood of their implementation under the current policies of the DPRK leadership. The authors describe several development scenarios based on an analysis of factors that can affect the situation in North Korea in the short and medium term. Maintaining the status quo stands out in the first place in terms of probability. Less likely scenarios include “sinofication” due to Beijing's growing influence on Pyongyang, military escalation leading to an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, political and economic crisis.
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Trigubenko, Marina E., und Tatiana V. Lezhenina. „INNOVATIONS IN THE DPRK ECONOMY IN THE ERA OF KIM JONG-UN: RESULTS, THREATS AND RISKS“. SCIENTIFIC REVIEW. SERIES 1. ECONOMICS AND LAW, Nr. 1-2 (2020): 96–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.26653/2076-4650-2020-1-2-08.
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During the 8 years of the DPRK leadership, Kim Jong-un has been trying to position himself as a major reformer of the economy and the main military strategist in the development of the production of the latest intercontinental missiles directed towards the United States. Kim Jong-un presented the economic program for the first time at the VII Congress of the Labor Party of Korea in 2016 in the format of the three main tasks of the first five-year plan for 2016-2020. Tasks. To summarize Kim Jong-un's innovations in economic development and prove that they will be effective in the context of expanding trade and economic cooperation between the DPRK and China, Russia, as well as reducing the US sanctions policy against the DPRK. Methodology. The use of methods of scientific knowledge of the reformation of the economy of less developed countries. Results. The scale of economic innovations of Kim Jong-un and the influence of the legacy left by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il from the position of national ideology are proved to be self-reliant (Juche), which complicates and slows down the transition of North Korea to the number of democratically developed countries of the world, political and trade-economic DPRK cooperation with the Republic of Korea. Findings. Today, China has always been and remains the main military-political ally and economic partner of the DPRK. Sino-US relations have become much more complicated as a result of the trade war and US accusations of concealing by China the real reasons for the appearance and spread of COVID-19 all over the world. The DPRK's economic relations with the United States do not develop after direct contact in 2019 of Donald Trump with Kim Jong-un. External and internal threats and risks in the use of innovations remain.
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Ishiyama, John. „Assessing the leadership transition in North Korea: Using network analysis of field inspections, 1997–2012“. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, Nr. 2 (27.04.2014): 137–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.04.003.
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This paper examines changes in the in the composition of the North Korean elite from 1997 to 2012, a particularly tumultuous period in the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Specifically, the paper assesses the changing composition of the leadership networks around both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, using data from the entourages that accompanied the great leaders on their “on the spot guidance” inspection tours. The paper finds that there have been significant changes in the leadership elite since the succession of Kim Jong Un. The paper offers some observations regarding the implications these changes have on the receptivity of the regime to a normalization of relations with the West and future economic and political reform.