Einloggen

Thematische Bibliographien / Objectivism / Zeitschriftenartikel

Um die anderen Arten von Veröffentlichungen zu diesem Thema anzuzeigen, folgen Sie diesem Link: Objectivism.

Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Objectivism“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 9. Juni 2025

Geben Sie eine Quelle nach APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard und anderen Zitierweisen an

Wählen Sie eine Art der Quelle aus:

Machen Sie sich mit Top-50 Zeitschriftenartikel für die Forschung zum Thema "Objectivism" bekannt.

Neben jedem Werk im Literaturverzeichnis ist die Option "Zur Bibliographie hinzufügen" verfügbar. Nutzen Sie sie, wird Ihre bibliographische Angabe des gewählten Werkes nach der nötigen Zitierweise (APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver usw.) automatisch gestaltet.

Sie können auch den vollen Text der wissenschaftlichen Publikation im PDF-Format herunterladen und eine Online-Annotation der Arbeit lesen, wenn die relevanten Parameter in den Metadaten verfügbar sind.

Sehen Sie die Zeitschriftenartikel für verschiedene Spezialgebieten durch und erstellen Sie Ihre Bibliographie auf korrekte Weise.

1

Parrish, Stephen E. "God and Objectivism: A Critique of Objectivist Philosophy of Religion." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8, no. 2 (2007): 169–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41551399.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Abstract Objectivism is committed to atheism. However, Objectivists have done little work in Philosophy of Religion. This article argues that much of the work that they have done is fallacious. In particular, the critique of God that Peikoff gives in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand is deeply flawed. If they want to justify their atheism, Objectivists need to rework and revise their arguments; in the final analysis, however, it is doubtful that their efforts will succeed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

2

Parrish, Stephen E. "God and Objectivism: A Critique of Objectivist Philosophy of Religion." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8, no. 2 (2007): 169–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.8.2.0169.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Abstract Objectivism is committed to atheism. However, Objectivists have done little work in Philosophy of Religion. This article argues that much of the work that they have done is fallacious. In particular, the critique of God that Peikoff gives in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand is deeply flawed. If they want to justify their atheism, Objectivists need to rework and revise their arguments; in the final analysis, however, it is doubtful that their efforts will succeed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

3

Cotera, María. "Unveiling Objectivism." Aztlán: A Journal of Chicano Studies 37, no. 1 (2012): 145–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/azt.2012.37.1.145.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

4

Dent, Eric B. "Objectivism and Christianity." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 189–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41560411.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Abstract The two primary philosophies upholding reason today are Objectivism and Christianity. They may seem like strange bedfellows, but many of the large perceived gaps between them disappear upon close inspection. This paper analyzes five areas (creation; tabula rasa; life as the ultimate standard; romantic love, sex and marriage; and altruism and the trader principle) in which Objectivist philosophy can be enhanced by assuming Christian philosophical axioms. The argument focuses on Christianity as a philosophy and intentionally does not assume a transcendent God. In each case, the Christian philosophical axioms are more realistic and better supported empirically than the Objectivist axioms.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

5

Dent, Eric B. "Objectivism and Christianity." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 189–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.11.2.0189.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Abstract The two primary philosophies upholding reason today are Objectivism and Christianity. They may seem like strange bedfellows, but many of the large perceived gaps between them disappear upon close inspection. This paper analyzes five areas (creation; tabula rasa; life as the ultimate standard; romantic love, sex and marriage; and altruism and the trader principle) in which Objectivist philosophy can be enhanced by assuming Christian philosophical axioms. The argument focuses on Christianity as a philosophy and intentionally does not assume a transcendent God. In each case, the Christian philosophical axioms are more realistic and better supported empirically than the Objectivist axioms.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

6

Goldman, Michael. "Capitalism, Socialism, Objectivism." Philosophy Research Archives 12 (1986): 143–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pra1986/19871221.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

7

Venturinha, Nuno. "Context-Sensitive Objectivism." Logos & Episteme 11, no. 4 (2020): 481–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011436.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This paper outlines the major topics addressed in my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018), anticipates some possible misunderstandings and discusses issues that warrant further investigation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

8

PENDLEBURY, MICHAEL. "OBJECTIVISM VERSUS REALISM." Philosophical Forum 42, no. 1 (February 7, 2011): 79–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2010.00379.x.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

9

Harrington, Austin. "Objectivism in Hermeneutics?" Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30, no. 4 (December 2000): 491–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839310003000401.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

10

Edelman, Christopher. "Montaigne's Moral Objectivism." Philosophy and Literature 35, no. 1 (2011): 32–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.2011.0001.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

11

Yarusso, Lowell. "Constructivism vs. objectivism." Performance + Instruction 31, no. 4 (April 1992): 7–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pfi.4170310404.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

12

Björnsson, Gunnar. "Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?" Journal of Ethics 16, no. 4 (June 12, 2012): 367–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9131-9.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

13

Ommen, Thomas B. "Relativism, Objectivism, and Theology." Horizons 13, no. 2 (1986): 291–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0360966900036343.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

AbstractRelativism is a central issue in anthropology, philosophy of science, and a number of other disciplines. It is usually contrasted with objectivism or foundationalism, the quest for universal and absolute norms. Richard Bernstein has recently written an illuminating overview of the relativist-objectivist tension and has sketched out a notion of rationality “beyond objectivism and relativism.” This paper is an effort to follow Bernstein's lead and consider the theological implications of objectivism and relativism and the attempt to move beyond them. The first two parts of the paper take up objectivism and relativism in their philosophical and theological forms. The third section briefly explores some aspects of a non-relativist and non-objectivist model of rationality.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

14

Warren C. Gibson. "Modern Physics versus Objectivism." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 140. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.13.2.0140.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

15

Kang, In ae. "Objectivism' Challenges to Constructivism." Journal of Educational Technology 13, no. 1 (October 30, 1997): 3–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.17232/kset.13.1.3.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

16

Gowans, Christopher W. "Beyond Objectivism and Relativism." International Philosophical Quarterly 25, no. 2 (1985): 207–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq19852528.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

17

Lambek, Michael. "Introduction: Treading Beyond Objectivism." Culture 11, no. 1-2 (December 15, 2021): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1084470ar.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

18

Laurier, Daniel. "Between Phenomenalism and Objectivism." Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (2005): 189–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20053034.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

19

McLaughlin, Andrew. "Beyond Objectivism and Relativism." Philosophical Inquiry 7, no. 1 (1985): 60–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry19857117.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

20

McKinney, Ronald H. "Beyond Objectivism and Relativism." Modern Schoolman 64, no. 2 (1987): 97–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198764218.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

21

Margolis, Joseph. "X—Objectivism and Relativism." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85, no. 1 (June 1, 1985): 171–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/85.1.171.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

22

Fuller, Steve. "Towards objectivism and relativism∗." Social Epistemology 1, no. 4 (October 1987): 351–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728708578452.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

23

Stige, Brynjulf. "Beyond Objectivism and Relativism?" Nordic Journal of Music Therapy 10, no. 1 (January 2001): 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08098130109478011.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

24

WEINTRAUB, RUTH. "Objectivism without objective probabilities." Theoria 56, no. 1-2 (February 11, 2008): 23–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1990.tb00216.x.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

25

Dallmayr, Fred R. "Beyond Objectivism and Relativism." New Vico Studies 3 (1985): 215–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/newvico1985339.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

26

Cairns, Dorion, Lester Embree, Fred Kersten, and Richard M. Zaner. "Husserlian Phenomenology and Objectivism." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 38, no. 2 (January 2007): 116–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2007.11006607.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

27

Rosati, Connie S. "OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIONAL GOOD." Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (December 20, 2007): 314–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052508080126.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be “good for” someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alternatives so that we may better decide what to admit into our moral ontology and better assess what may be at stake in whether objectivists treat good or good for (or neither) as fundamental. I compare the Moorean and welfarist pictures of value, providing an account of the form and function of good for. According to this account “good for” expresses a distinct relational value that has its source in the value of persons. Good for value is thus a form of extrinsic value that provides agent-neutral reasons for action, and it plays a pervasive normative role in regulating child rearing, guiding individual life choices, and shaping social policy formation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

28

Averill, Edward Wilson. "A limited objectivism defended." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 27–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00067261.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

29

HAMATI-ATAYA, INANNA. "Transcending objectivism, subjectivism, and the knowledge in-between: the subject in/of ‘strong reflexivity’." Review of International Studies 40, no. 1 (April 23, 2013): 153–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000041.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

AbstractThis article addresses theproblématiqueof the subject and the subject-object dichotomy from a post-objectivist, reflexivist perspective informed by a ‘strong’ version of reflexivity. It clarifies the rationale and epistemic-ontological requirements of strong reflexivity comparatively, through a discussion of autoethnography and autobiography, taken as representatives of other variants of reflexive scholarship. By deconstructing the ontological, epistemic, and reflexive statuses of the subject in the auto-ethnographic and auto-biographical variants, the article shows that the move from objectivism to post-objectivism can entail different reconfigurations of the subject-object relation, some of which can lead to subjectivism or an implicit positivist view of the subject. Strong reflexivity provides a coherent and empowering critique of objectivism because it consistently turns the ontological fact of the social situatedness of knowledge into an epistemic principle of social-scientific research, thereby providing reflexivist scholars with a critique of objectivism from within that allows them to reclaim the philosophical, social, and ethical dimensions of objectivity rather than surrender them to the dominant neopositivist tradition.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

30

Vrhovski, Jan. "Shadowlands of Objectivism and Comprehensiveness." Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (January 8, 2021): 227–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2021.9.1.227-262.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

The article aims at presenting an overview of the main concepts in the philosophical thought of Zhang Shenfu, one of the leading intellectuals from Republican China (1912–1949). The study sets out from a brief summary of Zhang’s intellectual achievements, and proceeds by offering a more concise picture of the main influences, developmental stages and finally also central ideas of Zhang’s thought. By offering a general view on the concrete confluences and dissonances between the keystones of Zhang’s philosophy on one side, and its alleged sources in Western and Chinese philosophy on the other, this study further aims at presenting a new insight into the unique characteristics of Zhang’s philosophy. At the same time, by setting the discussion on Zhang’s philosophy in a broader context of contemporary intellectual discourse, the article also endeavours to establish a tentative basis for the future critical analyses and potential revaluations of Zhang Shenfu’s role in intellectual history of modern China.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

31

Vrhovski, Jan. "Shadowlands of Objectivism and Comprehensiveness." Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (January 8, 2021): 227–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2021.9.1.227-262.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

The article aims at presenting an overview of the main concepts in the philosophical thought of Zhang Shenfu, one of the leading intellectuals from Republican China (1912–1949). The study sets out from a brief summary of Zhang’s intellectual achievements, and proceeds by offering a more concise picture of the main influences, developmental stages and finally also central ideas of Zhang’s thought. By offering a general view on the concrete confluences and dissonances between the keystones of Zhang’s philosophy on one side, and its alleged sources in Western and Chinese philosophy on the other, this study further aims at presenting a new insight into the unique characteristics of Zhang’s philosophy. At the same time, by setting the discussion on Zhang’s philosophy in a broader context of contemporary intellectual discourse, the article also endeavours to establish a tentative basis for the future critical analyses and potential revaluations of Zhang Shenfu’s role in intellectual history of modern China.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

32

Margolis, Joseph. "Relativism vs. Pluralism and Objectivism." Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (1996): 95–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1996_18.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

33

Eggerman, Richard. "TWO KINDS OF VALUATIONAL OBJECTIVISM." Southwest Philosophy Review 10, no. 2 (1994): 167–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview199410234.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

34

Mason, Elinor. "Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7, no. 2 (June 5, 2017): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v7i2.72.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

In this paper I present a new argument for prospectivism: the view that, for a consequentialist, rightness depends on what is prospectively best rather than what would actually be best. Prospective bestness depends on the agent’s epistemic position, though exactly how that works is not straightforward. I clarify various possible versions of prospectivism, which differ in how far they go in relativizing to the agent’s limitations. My argument for prospectivism is an argument for moderately objective prospectivism, according to which the right thing to do is what would make sense given reasonable beliefs, reasonable probability estimates and a reasonable understanding of value. My argument is an argument for this form of prospectivism over objectivism. Arguments about prospectivism and objectivism usually use an example with the following form: an agent has a choice between options – one she knows would be acceptable, while the other could either be catastrophic or very good. Objectivists argue that the right thing to do is what would in fact be best (though the agent cannot know which option that is) while prospectivists argue that the agent’s ignorance is relevant, and the right thing to do is to compromise. The question is how we should understand the underlying argument. It is not about action guidance. Moderately objective prospectivism is not action guiding, because an actual agent may not have access to reasonable beliefs, probability estimates and so on. Another common argument is that the objective notion is the primary one. I show that there are no good grounds for this claim. My argument uses the distinction between rightness and goodness to show that a consequentialist theory, that bases rightness on goodness, should take into account how much goodness is at stake. Crucially, potential losses as well as gains are relevant. So long as goodness, rather than rightness, is in the driving seat, we should not be “bestness fetishists.” As the name suggest, this would be an irrational privileging of the best option. This argument does not apply to pure deontology: a pure deontology does not use the notion of goodness at all, and so there is nothing to compromise with. If the agent does not know what is right, there is nothing further to say. I end by arguing against a recent strategy that aims to show that although objectivism is true (the right option is the best one), we should sometimes do what is wrong (i.e. what is prospectively best). I argue that insofar as this is correct, it is simply prospectivism with awkward terminology.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

35

Mizrahi, Vivian. "Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism." dialectica 60, no. 3 (September 2006): 283–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01070.x.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

36

Nees, Dan, Valerie E. Green, and Kim Treadway. "Activism, Objectivism, and Environmental Politics." Environmental Ethics 25, no. 3 (2003): 295–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics200325320.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

37

Elkind, David. "Response to Objectivism and Education." Educational Forum 69, no. 4 (December 31, 2005): 328–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131720508984706.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

38

Dorfman, Eran. "Naturalism, Objectivism and Everyday Life." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (April 3, 2013): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246113000088.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

AbstractIn this paper I analyse the role of naturalism and objectivism in everyday life according to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Whereas Husserl attributes the naturalistic attitude mainly to science, he defines the objectivist attitude as a naiveté which equally applies to the natural attitude of everyday life. I analyse the relationship between the natural attitude and lived experience and show Husserl's hesitation regarding the task of phenomenology in describing the lived experience of everyday life, since he considers this experience to be too objectivistic. I use Merleau-Ponty's work to argue that objectivism is an essential characteristic of lived experience and that phenomenology should therefore find ways to integrate it into its descriptions while simultaneously suggesting ways to overcome its rigidity in order to renew perception. I finally propose that the project of the naturalisation of phenomenology could be one of the ways to connect lived experience to the objectivism of everyday life.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

39

Levine, Joseph. "Objectivism-subjectivim: A false dilemma?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 42–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00067431.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

40

Averill, Edward Wilson, and Allan Hazlett. "Color objectivism and color projectivism." Philosophical Psychology 24, no. 6 (June 6, 2011): 751–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.562645.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

41

Beebe, James R., and David Sackris. "Moral objectivism across the lifespan." Philosophical Psychology 29, no. 6 (April 22, 2016): 912–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1174843.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

42

Majka, Wojciech. "A critique of scientific objectivism." International Journal of Academic Research 5, no. 3 (May 23, 2013): 167–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.7813/2075-4124.2013/5-3/b.26.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

43

Shi, Xuanze. "Moral Objectivism and Moral Utilitarianism." Communications in Humanities Research 4, no. 1 (May 17, 2023): 204–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/4/20220439.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Morality is the standard that can guide and restrict the behaviors of people, and it has played an important role during the past centuries. Two questions remain unsolved by philosophers. The first problem is the existence of objective morality and if there is such an objective morality, the other problem is the content of morality. It is important to discuss these problems because they can play a significant role in helping people understand and develop the right morality. For these two problems, the author aims to argue that moral objectivism and moral utilitarianism are true. For objectivism, the author will argue the problem of lacking such an objective morality. For utilitarianism, the author will explain its meaning, argue against several objections, and present its application in his personal life. This paper argues that moral objectivism and utilitarianism are true.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

44

Dedrick, Don. "Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Colour Vision." Dialogue 34, no. 1 (1995): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300049283.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

In Color for Philosophers, C. L. Hardin argues that chromatic objectivism—a view that identifies colour with some or other property of objects—must be false. The upshot of Hardin's argument is this: there is, in fact, no principled correlation between physical properties and perceived colours. Since that correlation is a minimal condition for objectivism, objectivism is false. Mohan Matthen, who accepts Hardin's conclusion for what can be called “simple objectivism,” takes it that an adaptationist theory of biological function applied to colour is able to surmount the problems Hardin describes. It is Matthen's view that I am primarily concerned with in this paper. I will argue that it entails an overly simple view of adaptive value—as, perhaps, do all objectivist views.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

45

Hedden, Brian. "A defense of objectivism about evidential support." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, no. 5-6 (December 2015): 716–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1123038.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Objectivism about evidential support is the thesis that facts about the degree to which a body of evidence supports a hypothesis are objective rather than depending on subjective factors like one’s own language or epistemic values. Objectivism about evidential support is key to defending a synchronic, time-slice-centric conception of epistemic rationality, on which what you ought to believe at a time depends only on what evidence you have at that time, and not on how you were at previous times. Here, I defend a version of objectivism about evidential support on which facts about evidential support are grounded in facts about explanatoriness.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

46

Machado, Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina. "Explanatory Phenomenal naïve realism must be non-objectivist." Griot : Revista de Filosofia 24, no. 1 (February 29, 2024): 29–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v24i1.3572.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This study focuses on a particular type of Naïve Realism known as objectivism, which suggests that the explanation of perceptual phenomenology is based on environmental things that the subject becomes acquainted with. Section 2 introduces a subtype of objectivism, “selectivism”, which aims to overcome a traditional kind of objection. However, this section highlights that the cases these objections invoke may still posit challenges (demands for explanations) to selectivism. Section 3 discusses a recent objection to objectivism and demonstrates how it can be addressed by selectivism so becomes only a challenge of this kind. However, it is important to note that, despite not providing positive refutations, these challenges are still significant. Sections 4 and 5 present the main contribution of this study, as they provide novel arguments that conclusively refute objectivism. Section 4 presents an argument that shows the falsity of objectivism as it has been presented in the literature. Nevertheless, a modified version of objectivism is proposed that could address it, although it still faces some non-definitive challenges. This reformulated theory is a novel type within the realm of Naïve Realism as a whole, as it posits that perceptions involve acquaintance with facts relative to sense organs. In contrast, Section 5 proposes an argument that positively refutes objectivism, which cannot be salvaged by any modification. Section 6 raises objections to an alternative option of Naïve Realism and, also based on the issues raised earlier in the article regarding objectivism, concludes that Naïve Realism must be subjectivist.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

47

Smith, Holly M. "The Zimmerman-Graham Debate on Objectivism versus Prospectivism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, no. 4 (August 11, 2018): 401–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20180006.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

In Living with Uncertainty Michael Zimmerman argues against the Objective view and for the Prospective view of morality. He claims that the conscientious agent would always choose the act that maximizes projected value, and that this is incompatible with Objectivism. Peter Graham defends Objectivism against Zimmerman’s attack. He argues that a conscientious agent must balance fulfilling obligations against avoiding the worst wrong-doings, and that this stance is consistent with Objectivism and with the agent’s choosing an act she believes to be Objectively wrong. In Ignorance and Moral Obligation Zimmerman argues that Graham’s “Objectivism” is only terminologically distinct from his Prospectivism. I argue that Graham faces a dilemma: if his theory delivers different prescriptions from Zimmerman’s, those prescriptions are implausible. On the other hand, if his theory avoids such implausible recommendations, it now generates exactly the same recommendations as Zimmerman’s theory, and so does not constitute a serious challenge to it.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

48

Raskin, Jonathan D. "Objecting, subjecting, and epistemic diversity." Theory & Psychology 30, no. 3 (June 2020): 394–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354320914392.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Held (2020) portrays critical and Indigenous psychologists as subscribing to an epistemological “anti-objectivism” that inhibits their ability to combat oppression. She believes that their anti-objectivism yields a troublesome relativism in which truth is overly context-dependent; what counts as true knowledge for one Indigenous group may not count for another. This commentary explores whether critical and Indigenous psychologists are strict “anti-objectivists,” as Held contends. It also challenges the need for epistemological consistency, while encouraging a shift from “objectivism” and “subjectivism” as essentialized states to “objecting” and “subjecting” as complementary ways to explore and study the world.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

49

Dent, Parnell, and Carraher. "Developing an Instrument to Measure Objectivism." Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 18, no. 1 (2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.18.1.0001.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

50

Zhang, Long, John A. Parnell, and Eric B. Dent. "Objectivism In China: A Management Perspective." Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, no. 1 (January 2016): 10313. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.10313abstract.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Wir bieten Rabatte auf alle Premium-Pläne für Autoren, deren Werke in thematische Literatursammlungen aufgenommen wurden. Kontaktieren Sie uns, um einen einzigartigen Promo-Code zu erhalten!