Zeitschriftenartikel: „PRIME MINISTERIAL“

1

West, Nigel. „Prime Ministerial Secrets“. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, Nr. 4 (07.09.2017): 818–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1337450.

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2

Edwards, Owen Dudley. „The Prime Ministerial Debates 2010“. Scottish Affairs 72 (First Serie, Nr. 1 (August 2010): 9–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/scot.2010.0037.

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3

Clayton, Peter. „Editorial: Why Prime Ministerial Libraries?“ Australian Academic & Research Libraries 36, Nr. 1 (Januar 2005): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048623.2005.10755286.

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4

Hawes, Derek. „Understanding Prime Ministerial Performance: Comparative Perspectives“. Journal of Contemporary European Studies 22, Nr. 1 (02.01.2014): 90–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.884800.

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5

McKnight, Sue. „The Alfred Deakin Prime Ministerial Library“. Australian Academic & Research Libraries 36, Nr. 1 (Januar 2005): 25–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048623.2005.10755289.

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6

Kamijo, Akitaka. „Cabinet Reshuffles and Prime-ministerial Survival“. Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association 70, Nr. 2 (2019): 2_264–2_288. http://dx.doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.70.2_264.

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7

Elgie, Robert. „Understanding Prime-Ministerial Performance: Comparative Perspectives“. West European Politics 37, Nr. 5 (31.07.2014): 1187–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.924717.

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8

Heppell, Timothy, und Michael Hill. „Prime Ministerial Powers of Patronage: Ministerial Appointments and Dismissals Under Edward Heath“. Contemporary British History 29, Nr. 4 (09.02.2015): 464–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2014.997715.

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9

INDRIDASON, INDRIDI H., und CHRISTOPHER KAM. „Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift“. British Journal of Political Science 38, Nr. 4 (14.07.2008): 621–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123408000318.

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A model of policy implementation in a parliamentary democracy as delegation between the prime minister and her cabinet ministers is introduced. Cabinet reshuffles can be pursued as a strategy to reduce the agency loss which occurs due to the different preferences of the actors. This work thus explains why prime ministers resort to reshuffles: cabinet reshuffles reduce the moral hazard facing ministers. This answer both augments and distinguishes this work from traditional perspectives on reshuffles that have emphasized the deleterious effects of reshuffles on ministerial capacity, and also from recent work that casts reshuffles as solutions to the adverse-selection problems inherent in cabinet government. The conclusion offers a preliminary test of some of the hypotheses generated by this theory.

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10

Diskin, A., und R. Y. Hazan. „The 2001 Prime Ministerial election in Israel“. Electoral Studies 21, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2002): 659–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0261-3794(02)00003-3.

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11

Piggott, Michael. „Australian Prime Ministerial Libraries—Comments and Reflections“. Australian Academic & Research Libraries 36, Nr. 1 (Januar 2005): 74–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048623.2005.10755294.

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12

Baylis, Thomas A. „Embattled executives: Prime ministerial weakness in East Central Europe“. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40, Nr. 1 (05.02.2007): 81–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.12.007.

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In a period in which ‘‘strong’’ and even ‘‘presidential’’ prime ministers have arguably become more the rule than the exception in the major states of Western Europe, most prime ministers in the new democracies of East Central Europe appear to have been relatively weak figures. This article investigates the reasons for that relative weakness in the ten East Central European countries, which together have had 87 prime ministers in the 16 years since the fall of Communism. It evaluates several possible explanations: party system weakness, the institutional structure, elite recruitment patterns, and policy constraints. It then seeks to explain several notable exceptions to the prime ministerial weakness rule.

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13

Kerby, Matthew. „Combining the Hazards of Ministerial Appointment AND Ministerial Exit in the Canadian Federal Cabinet“. Canadian Journal of Political Science 44, Nr. 3 (September 2011): 595–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423911000485.

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Abstract. The Canadian federal cabinet stands out among Westminster parliamentary democracies because of the large number of first-time ministers who are appointed to cabinet without any previous parliamentary or political experience. Several explanations have been put forward to account for this peculiarity but no attempt has been made to examine how Canadian prime ministers overcome the information deficit associated with appointing ministers with no experience. How can prime ministers be confident that they are making the right choice? This paper explores the subject by estimating the survival functions of ministerial turnover for potential, but not yet appointed, cabinet ministers were they to survive to a defined political benchmark; these survival rates are included in a logit model of Canadian ministerial appointment following four general elections (1957, 1979, 1984 and 2006) in which the prime minister was tasked with appointing a cabinet with ministerial neophytes.Résumé. Le Conseil des ministres fédéral du Canada se démarque dans l'ensemble des démocraties parlementaires britanniques en raison du grand nombre de ministres novices qui sont nommés au Conseil alors qu'ils ne possèdent aucune expérience parlementaire ou politique antérieure. Plusieurs explications de cette anomalie ont été proposées, mais aucune démarche d'analyse ne s'est encore penchée sur la manière dont les premiers ministres du Canada arrivent à surmonter le manque d'information associé à la nomination de ministres sans expérience. Comment les premiers ministres peuvent-ils être certains d'avoir fait le bon choix? Cette étude scrute le sujet en évaluant le coefficient de survie, en cas de remaniement ministériel, pour les ministres du Conseil potentiels, mais pas encore mandatés, advenant que ces derniers survivent à certains jalons politiques précis. Ces taux de survie font partie intégrante d'un modèle de répartition des nominations ministérielles qui sont survenues à la suite de quatre élections générales (1957, 1979, 1984 et 2006) où le premier ministre a dû constituer un Conseil des ministres composé de néophytes.

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Pukelis, Lukas, und Mažvydas Jastramskis. „Prime ministers, presidents and ministerial selection in Lithuania“. East European Politics 37, Nr. 3 (11.03.2021): 466–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2021.1873776.

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15

Takayasu, Kensuke. „Prime-ministerial power in Japan: a re-examination“. Japan Forum 17, Nr. 2 (September 2005): 163–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0955580052000337503.

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16

Carman-Brown, Lesley, Kandy-Jane Henderson und Lesley Wallace. „Australia's First Prime Ministerial Library: Past and Future“. Australian Academic & Research Libraries 36, Nr. 1 (Januar 2005): 2–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048623.2005.10755287.

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17

O'Malley, Eoin. „Investigating the Effects of Directly Electing the Prime Minister“. Government and Opposition 41, Nr. 2 (2006): 137–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2006.00174.x.

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AbstractThere are good prima facie reasons to believe that directly electing a prime minister may provide the holder of that office with a tremendous power resource. Indeed some countries with weak prime ministers have debated this possible change, and one, Israel, carried it through. Using a theoretical argument based on the number of veto points in a political system, this article proposes that a directly elected prime minister will not increase the power of a prime minister. It studies what actually happened in Israel, and offers alternative explanations for the weakness of and lack of cohesion in its executive. Similarly, other factors are identified as causes of prime ministerial weakness in Italy and Japan.

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18

Dunleavy, Patrick, G. W. Jones, Jane Burnham, Robert Elgie und Peter Fysh. „Leaders, Politics and Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868–1990“. British Journal of Political Science 23, Nr. 3 (Juli 1993): 267–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400006621.

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In the Westminster system the prime minister's active participation in parliamentary proceedings is a key mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the executive. We survey the evolution of the four main prime ministerial activities across the period 1868–1990. There has been a long-term decline in prime ministers' speeches in the Commons, a stepped decline in debating interventions and a significant decrease in question-answering from the late nineteenth century to the 1950s. But prime ministerial statement-making increased after 1940, ebbing away again in the 1980s. And the downward drift in question-answering was halted by procedural innovations since the 1960s, which standardized the frequency of prime ministers' appearances and lead to the dominance of ‘open’ questions. We trace the varied impacts of institutional changes and shorter-term political or personal influences. The direct accountability of the prime minister to Parliament has undoubtedly declined, a trend probably paralleled by decreasing indirect accountability. These findings raise fundamental questions about executive-legislature relations in the United Kingdom

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19

Heffernan, R. „There's No Need for the '-isation': The Prime Minister Is Merely Prime Ministerial“. Parliamentary Affairs 66, Nr. 3 (14.11.2012): 636–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gss058.

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20

Hazan, Reuven Y., und Abraham Diskin. „The 1999 Knesset and prime ministerial elections in Israel“. Electoral Studies 19, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2000): 628–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0261-3794(00)00006-8.

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21

Heffernan, Richard. „Prime Ministerial Predominance? Core Executive Politics in the UK“. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5, Nr. 3 (August 2003): 347–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-856x.00110.

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22

McCaffrie, Brendan. „A contextual framework for assessing reconstructive prime ministerial success“. Policy Studies 34, Nr. 5-6 (November 2013): 618–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2013.804300.

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23

Byrne, Chris, Nick Randall und Kevin Theakston. „Evaluating British prime ministerial performance: David Cameron’s premiership in political time“. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, Nr. 1 (29.12.2016): 202–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148116685260.

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This article contributes to the developing literature on prime ministerial performance in the United Kingdom by applying a critical reading of Stephen Skowronek’s account of leadership in ‘political time’ to evaluate David Cameron’s premiership. This, we propose, better understands the inter-relationship of structure and agency in prime ministerial performance than existing frameworks, particularly those based on Greenstein’s and Bulpitt’s approaches. We identify Cameron as a disjunctive prime minister, but find it necessary significantly to develop the model of disjunctive leadership beyond that offered by Skowronek. We identify the warrants to authority, strategies and dilemmas associated with disjunctive leadership in the United Kingdom. We argue that Cameron was relatively skilful in meeting many of the challenges confronting an affiliated leader of a vulnerable regime. However, his second term exposed deep fractures in the regime, which proved beyond Cameron’s skills as a disjunctive leader.

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24

Patterson, Dennis, und Ko Maeda. „Prime Ministerial Popularity and the Changing Electoral Fortunes of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party“. Asian Survey 47, Nr. 3 (Mai 2007): 415–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2007.47.3.415.

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This article explores the impact of prime ministerial popularity on the changing electoral fortunes of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). We show that the popularity of the Japanese prime minister exerted a modest but definite impact on aggregate vote shares captured by the LDP throughout the postwar period.

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25

Helms, Ludger. „Heir Apparent Prime Ministers in Westminster Democracies: Promise and Performance“. Government and Opposition 55, Nr. 2 (13.09.2018): 260–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.22.

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AbstractWhile the grand narratives of political leaders and leadership in parliamentary democracies tend to centre on victorious campaigners, prime ministers ‘inheriting’ the office from their predecessor between two parliamentary elections are a widespread occurrence in constitutional practice. Focusing on four Westminster democracies (Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), this article inquires how such heirs apparent have fared in terms of prime ministerial performance. Although in light of their experience, expertise and public recognition, heir apparent prime ministers can be, and have been, considered to be particularly well placed to succeed, when eventually securing the most powerful political office, most of them have actually been conspicuous under-performers. The single most important and strongly counter-intuitive finding of an empirical investigation of different prime ministers is that extensive experience in government, both in terms of duration and diversity of ministerial offices held, seems to correlate more with failed rather than particularly successful premierships.

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26

Shastri, Sandeep. „The Modi Factor in the 2019 Lok Sabha Election: How Critical Was It to the BJP Victory?“ Studies in Indian Politics 7, Nr. 2 (Dezember 2019): 206–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321023019874910.

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The BJP victory in the 2019 elections is attributed to a range of factors. This article examines the role of the leadership factor in propelling the BJP to victory in this election. While the Prime Ministerial candidate of the BJP/NDA was clearly the preferred choice, the National Election Study 2019, undertaken by Lokniti–CSDS, indicates that one-thirds of those who supported the BJP would have altered their voting preference if Modi were not to be the Prime Ministerial candidate of the party. The article explores the leadership factor in the 2019 election and concludes that it was a major factor that influenced voter choice.

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Hennessy, Peter. „The Blair Style of Government: An Historical Perspective and an Interim Audit“. Government and Opposition 33, Nr. 1 (Januar 1998): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1998.tb00780.x.

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MAY I BEGIN WITH A DASH OF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE? I DO SO AS A health warning, to myself as much as to anyone else. Just as the great Lord Salisbury once said that too much poring over maps tended to drive nineteenth-century ministers and military chiefs mad, an excessive concentration on prime-ministerial styles can propel scholars and commentators smack bang into the Tommy Cooper school of analysis – here you have collective cabinet government then, just like that, when the premiership changes hands, you switch to overbearing prime-ministerial government. There has been a good deal of this since Tony Blair entered No. 10 exactly 214 days ago.

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Regan, Aidan. „Rethinking social pacts in Europe: Prime ministerial power in Ireland and Italy“. European Journal of Industrial Relations 23, Nr. 2 (12.09.2016): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959680116669032.

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In Ireland and Southern European countries, social pacts were widely seen as a mechanism to mobilize broad support for weak governments to legitimate difficult reforms in the context of monetary integration. I retrace the politics of these pacts in Ireland and Italy to argue that it was less the condition of ‘weak government’ that enabled the negotiation of tripartite pacts, than the intervention of a ‘strong executive’: the prime minister’s office. Social pacts were pursued as a political strategy to enhance prime ministerial executive autonomy. In the aftermath of the euro crisis, this means of enhancing executive autonomy has been replaced by the negotiation of grand coalition governments, with the exclusion of unions; but this continues the trend towards the prime ministerialization of politics.

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Yan, Huang-Ting. „Prime ministerial autonomy and intra-executive conflict under semi-presidentialism“. European Political Science Review 13, Nr. 3 (09.03.2021): 285–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773921000072.

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AbstractThis article answers why intra-executive conflict varies across semi-presidential democracies. The literature verifies that intra-executive competition tends to be higher when the president holds less power to dismiss the cabinet, coexists with a minority government, or the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. This paper, therefore, integrates these factors to construct an index of prime ministerial autonomy, proposing that its relationship with the probability of intra-executive conflict is represented by an inverted U-shaped curve. That is, when the prime minister is subordinated to an elected president, or conversely, enjoys greater room to manoeuvre in the executive affairs of the government, the likelihood of conflict is low. In contrast, significant confrontation emerges when the president claims constitutional legitimacy to rein in the cabinet, and controls the executive to a certain degree. This study verifies hypotheses using data on seventeen semi-presidential democracies in Europe between 1990 and 2015.

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LEE, Jukyung. „Political Control over Bureaucrats and Prime Ministerial Executive-Led Politics“. Korean Journal of Japanese Dtudies 25 (15.08.2021): 66–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.29154/ilbi.2021.25.66.

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31

Bromfield, Nicholas. „The Genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses, 1973-2016“. Australian Journal of Politics & History 64, Nr. 1 (März 2018): 81–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12426.

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32

Theakston, Kevin. „Political Skills and Context in Prime Ministerial Leadership in Britain“. Politics & Policy 30, Nr. 2 (Juni 2002): 283–323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2002.tb00124.x.

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33

Sealey, Alison, und Stephen Bates. „Prime ministerial self-reported actions in Prime Minister's Questions 1979–2010: A corpus-assisted analysis“. Journal of Pragmatics 104 (Oktober 2016): 18–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2016.07.010.

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34

Semenova, Elena, und Keith Dowding. „Presidential power effects on government and ministerial durability: evidence from Central and Eastern Europe“. European Political Science Review 13, Nr. 2 (09.03.2021): 227–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773921000059.

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AbstractIn this article, we examine the variation in the institutional powers granted to president to terminate cabinets (by dismissing prime ministers), and appointing ministers to show how variations affect both cabinet durability (and the mode of cabinet termination) and ministerial durability (i.e., the overall time a minister remains in cabinet). Using the most extensive survival data set on ministers in 14 Central and Eastern European countries available to date alongside data on government survival, our Cox regression models demonstrate that the institutional rules granting extensive powers to the presidents are powerful determinants of ministerial durability. We show that the effect of presidential powers reduces cabinet durability but increases ministerial durability. These results demonstrate that the specific powers given to chief executives are essential for issues surrounding implications for ministerial and cabinet durability, institutional choice, policy stability, and governmental accountability.

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IIO, Jun. „The Abe Administration and the Rise of the Prime Ministerial Executive“. Social Science Japan Journal 22, Nr. 1 (09.12.2018): 154–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ssjj/jyy050.

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36

't Hart, Paul, und David Schelfhout. „Assessing prime-ministerial performance in a multiparty democracy: The Dutch case“. Acta Politica 51, Nr. 2 (13.02.2015): 153–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ap.2015.2.

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37

Mitchell, David. „Determining Indian Foreign Policy: An Examination of Prime Ministerial Leadership Styles“. India Review 6, Nr. 4 (19.11.2007): 251–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736480701677995.

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38

Clarke, Harold D., und Marianne C. Stewart. „Economic Evaluations, Prime Ministerial Approval and Governing Party Support: Rival Models Reconsidered“. British Journal of Political Science 25, Nr. 2 (April 1995): 145–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007134.

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The argument that personal economic expectations drive support for British governing parties has received wide attention. This article employs aggregate data for the 1979–92 period to assess the effects of personal expectations, other subjective economic variables and evaluations of prime ministerial performance in rival party-support models. Analyses of competing models, including error correction specifications that take into account nonstationarity in the time series of interest, indicate that the personal expectations variants generally do very well, although they do not outperform one or more alternatives incorporating other types of economic evaluations. The error correction models show that the prime minister's approval ratings have significant short-term and long-term effects on governing party popularity.

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Kretzmer, David. „Presidential Elements in Government Experimenting with Constitutional Change: Direct Election of the Prime Minister in Israel“. European Constitutional Law Review 2, Nr. 1 (Februar 2006): 60–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019606000605.

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A constitutional experiment in which a parliamentary system of government under proportional representation was combined with the direct election of a prime minister — the system prior to 1992 — the political context of the 1992 reform — the unintended consequences of the reform in practice — the return to a pure parliamentary form of government, combined with a constructive vote of no-confidence and a prime-ministerial power to dissolve parliament.

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Byrne, Christopher, und Kevin Theakston. „Understanding the power of the prime minister: structure and agency in models of prime ministerial power“. British Politics 14, Nr. 4 (26.03.2018): 329–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41293-018-0087-7.

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41

Allen, Nicholas, und Hugh Ward. „‘Moves on a Chess Board’: A Spatial Model of British Prime Ministers' Powers over Cabinet Formation“. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11, Nr. 2 (Mai 2009): 238–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2009.00364.x.

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We use an institutional rational choice approach to help us understand how prime ministers in the UK make cabinet appointments and the implications for prime ministerial power. Assuming that prime ministers attempt to form a cabinet so as to get an overall package of policies as close as possible to their ideal, we show why the trade-offs they face are so complex, why apparently common-sense rules for making appointments might not always work well and why apparently strange choices made by prime ministers might actually be rational. Acknowledging the power prime ministers derive from their ability to appoint, we argue that the literature commonly fails to distinguish between power and luck, where lucky prime ministers get their way because they happen to agree with colleagues.

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Jäckle, Sebastian. „Voluntary Withdrawals, Forced Resignations, Collective Retirements or Just Bad Fortune? A Competing Risks Analysis of Ministerial Turnover in the German Länder (1990-2010)“. German Politics and Society 34, Nr. 1 (01.03.2016): 54–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2016.340103.

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This paper explores the determinants of ministerial duration within the German Länder between 1990 and 2010. In arguing that different terminal events ceasing ministerial tenures should be analyzed separately, it distinguishes four exit types: voluntary, forced, collective (ministers leaving office because their whole party does so) and exits that are neither volitional acts of the minister nor politically induced. Depending on the exit type, competing-risks Cox-models show different effects for one and the same variable on the hazard for ministerial turnover. Seniority in high-level politics for example helps not to be forced out of office while it has no effect on voluntary or collective exits. Heading an important ministry on the other hand increases the chances to rise to other positions in high politics or private business, but does not impact the other two hazards. The analysis furthermore shows that the principal-agent-logic known from Westminster systems with the prime minister being largely sovereign in hiring and firing cabinet members must be adapted to the German context of frequent coalition governments. In coalition governments, only ministers from the same party as the prime minister exhibit higher hazards for forced exits, while ministers from other coalition partners are much safer in that regard.

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Wilson, R. Paul. „Research Note: A Profile of Ministerial Policy Staff in the Government of Canada“. Canadian Journal of Political Science 48, Nr. 2 (Juni 2015): 455–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423915000293.

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AbstractAlthough ministerial political advisors are prominent and influential actors within the core executive in Canada and elsewhere, information is scarce with respect to their personal and professional backgrounds and career trajectory. This article uses recent survey data and publicly available biographical information to analyse the demographic composition of senior ministerial policy advisors within the Government of Canada. It finds that, while ministerial policy staffers are young and politically committed, they are not so young nor so professionally inexperienced as sometimes thought. Nor are they always personally and tightly bound to their current ministers but often work for different ministers in different departments. This suggests that advisors are agents of the whole government as much as agents of their individual ministers and raises questions about the degree to which they are responsive to the Prime Minister's Office, thereby increasing centralization.

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Burnham, June, G. W. Jones und Robert Elgie. „The Parliamentary Activity of John Major, 1990–94“. British Journal of Political Science 25, Nr. 4 (Oktober 1995): 551–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007341.

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A recent article in thisJournal(Patrick Dunleavy and G. W. Jones with others, ‘Leaders, Politics and Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868–1990’, 23 (1993), 267–98) demonstrated a clear secular decline in prime ministers' accountability to Parliament. It examined the frequency with which prime ministers from W. E. Gladstone to Margaret Thatcher accounted directly to MPs by answering oral questions and making statements, major speeches and minor interventions in debates. The decline in each of these activities had followed a different pattern. There was a steep fall in prime ministers' participation inoral questionsuntil the late 1950s, but after parliament and Harold Macmillan had agreed that prime ministers would answer questions for 15 minutes on Tuesdays and Thursdays, the fall seemed to have been arrested. The evidence from John Major's premiership, which is presented below, shows that, even within this apparently rigid timetable, there has been further decline. The making ofstatements, after a period of near absence, had revived in the 1940s, but declined noticeably again in the 1980s. Dunleavy and Jones concluded that increases in the number of prime-ministerial statements were associated with international and domestic crises, summits and the relaxation of procedural rules. Evidence from Major's performance reinforces these findings. The long-term trend towards fewer substantialspeecheswas found to have accelerated in the 1980s, a development which was mirrored in a fall in the number ofdebating interventionsduring the Thatcher years. The evidence on these two activities, presented below, indicates a partial return under Major to pre-Thatcher norms – though this revival may be only a temporary phenomenon.

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45

Wear, Rae. „The Manner of Their Going Prime Ministerial Exits from Lyne to Abbott“. Australian Journal of Politics & History 63, Nr. 3 (September 2017): 467–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12379.

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Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, und Michelangelo Vercesi. „Prime ministerial careers in the European Union: does gender make a difference?“ European Politics and Society 18, Nr. 2 (02.09.2016): 245–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1225655.

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MASTERS, ADAM, und PAUL ‘THART. „PRIME MINISTERIAL RHETORIC AND RECESSION POLITICS: MEANING MAKING IN ECONOMIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT“. Public Administration 90, Nr. 3 (31.01.2012): 759–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01966.x.

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Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, Matthew Diamond, Abraham Diskin, Renan Levine und Thomas J. Scotto. „Strategic Abandonment or Sincerely Second Best? The 1999 Israeli Prime Ministerial Election“. Journal of Politics 66, Nr. 3 (August 2004): 706–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00273.x.

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Ie, Kenny William. „Cabinet committees as strategies of prime ministerial leadership in Canada, 2003–2019“. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 57, Nr. 4 (27.09.2019): 466–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2019.1668618.

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Allen, Nicholas, Judith Bara und John Bartle. „Rules, Strategies and Words: The Content of the 2010 Prime Ministerial Debates“. Political Studies 61, Nr. 1_suppl (April 2013): 92–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12012.

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