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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Reverse auction“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 31. Mai 2022

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1

Xiang, Jie, Juliang Zhang, T. C. E. Cheng, Jose Maria Sallan und Guowei Hua. „Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption“. Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 36, Nr. 03 (Juni 2019): 1950013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595919500131.

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Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters, many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disruption probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and “truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA. We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.

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Arnold, Ulli, Wolfgang Schnellbächer und Philipp Glaser-Gallion. „How to do a reverse auction“. Der Betriebswirt 53, Nr. 1 (28.02.2012): 26–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/dbw.53.1.26.

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Elektronische Beschaffungsauktionen sind das wohl am intensivsten diskutierte Einkaufsinstrument des vergangenen Jahrzehnts. Befürworter sehen den Grund dafür primär in den zu erzielenden Preisreduktionen im Vergleich zu Face-to-Face-Verhandlungen oder Ausschreibungen. Bei Durchführung einer so genannten electronic reverse auction ist eine Vielzahl an Parametern wie der Auktionstyp, die Dauer des Verfahrens oder der Transparenzgrad zu bestimmen. Dieser Artikel stellt die zur Verfügung stehenden Parameter bei einer Einkaufsauktion vor und zeigt auf, in welcher Beschaffungssituation welches Verfahren zu wählen ist. Electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) are one of the central tools in e-procurement. They enable significant price reductions in comparison to former negotiation methods. When conducting an eRA purchasers have to decide on a variety of parameters such as the auction type, the time limit or the transparency degree. This article introduces these parameters and connects them to specific purchasing situations. Keywords: reversed auction

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Ma, Benjiang, Zhongmin Zhou, Muhammad Farhan Bashir und Yuanji Huang. „A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding“. Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 37, Nr. 06 (15.09.2020): 2050032. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595920500323.

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Multi-attribute reverse auction has many advantages for the buyer with the multi-dimensional attribute requirements. However, it is hard to design an optimal auction mechanism for the scenario in practice. Therefore, this paper presents a method transforming multi-attribute auction into single-attribute auction by bidding in deposit. The analysis indicates that our method can reduce not only the transaction risk caused by the supplier’s bid abandonment but also the operating cost and complexity of the multi-attribute auction. Besides, our method meets the incentive compatibility and participation constraint conditions by promising that the highest bidding supplier is the winner in the Auction and can obtain higher expected profits than traditional auctions for the buyer.

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Mora Cortez, Roberto, und Wesley J. Johnston. „How to recover B2B relationships after a failed online reverse auction“. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 35, Nr. 3 (03.06.2019): 551–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jbim-02-2019-0095.

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Purpose This paper aims to explore the possible scenarios after a failed reverse auction to continue a current buyer–seller relationship. Design/methodology/approach The authors developed a further understanding of reverse auctions through the examination of a longitudinal case study in the mining industry based on grounded theory. Findings The study indicates that losing a reverse auction is not a death sentence for the current supplier. Four factors influence the potential scenarios: buyer factors, supplier factors, buyer–seller factors and contextual factors. If the overall evaluation favors the current buyer–seller relationship, the supplier can continue the business interaction by full renegotiation or discrete step-by-step reconsideration. Conversely, the buyer–seller relationship would reach a state of dissolution. Originality/value This manuscript contributes to the understanding of reverse auction, an under-researched theme in organizational buying behavior theory. This paper is the first attempt to link buyer–seller relationship dissolution and reverse auctions. The authors suggest that more academic endeavors are needed to study online reverse auctions.

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Jap, Sandy D., und Ernan Haruvy. „Interorganizational Relationships and Bidding Behavior in Industrial Online Reverse Auctions“. Journal of Marketing Research 45, Nr. 5 (Oktober 2008): 550–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.5.550.

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The authors model (1) the impact of the supplier's relationship propensity before the auction on the supplier's bidding aggressiveness in the auction (in terms of the number of bids it submits, the rate at which the bids are submitted, and the price concessions offered) and (2) the impact of bidding behaviors in the auction on the buyer–supplier relationship after auction through longitudinal survey data from 12 online reverse auctions across various product categories. The results suggest that incumbency, many bidders, and a willingness to make specific investments lead to less aggressive bidding, whereas the total number of bids from competing suppliers increases aggressiveness. In turn, aggressive bidding behavior reduces suppliers' disposition toward developing a relationship with the buyer and sours incumbent satisfaction with the relationship. Finally, auctions that are longer in duration can improve the relationship but may risk bidding competition. Collectively, the results suggest that pricing and relationships are intertwined and traded off against each other in complex ways and that the auction does not operate in isolation of key organizational variables.

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Man Chan, Mandel Wai, Dickson K. W. Chiu und Ada Chi Wai Chung. „Developing Forward and Reverse e-Auction with Alert Support in a Web Service Environment“. International Journal of Systems and Service-Oriented Engineering 5, Nr. 2 (April 2015): 73–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijssoe.2015040105.

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Auction is a common competitive business-to-business (B2B) procurement procedure for supplying products and services, which are solicited, received, and evaluated. Currently, most auction portals support only forward auctions with interactive Web portals, while large companies usually construct their own reverse auction Websites. To provide a unified and more comprehensive solution, the authors develop an E-Auction System (EAS) to provide both forward and reverse auction support in a Web services environment. Buyer and sellers can post their requests via automated Web services for better Enterprise Information System (EIS) integration. Alternatively, they can manually browse the portal with a browser to post requests or submit their bid prices. Their EAS also provides an auction-matching function that automatically matches forward and reverse auction records to help completing business processes effectively. Further, their EAS's CRM system can capture and analyze user bidding behavior and posting to provide personalized Webpages. Besides, alert services provide notification of auction and bid statuses to customers for efficiency.

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Emiliani, M. L., und D. J. Stec. „Wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions“. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 10, Nr. 4 (01.09.2005): 278–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598540510612758.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to quantitatively assess wood pallet suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions and its impact on their business policies and practices.Design/methodology/approachSurvey method was used to determine how pallet suppliers react to online reverse auctions.FindingsDetermines that pallet suppliers do not realize the benefits claimed by online reverse auction service providers. Identifies new sources of costs which accrue to buyers and are not accounted for in so‐called “total cost” request for quotes including: retaliatory pricing practices, less cooperative relationships, and sourcing work back to the original supplier. The qualitative benefits identified for suppliers by third‐party online reverse auction service providers are overstated or false.Research limitations/implicationsThe present work can be extended to other commodity categories to identify similarities and differences in how suppliers react to online reverse auctions, understand the domain of successful and unsuccessful application of the online reverse auction tool, and provide further insight into the evolution of buyer‐seller relationships, including embedded organizational routines such as power‐based bargaining.Practical implicationsFindings mirror the results found in a previous study that examined aerospace parts suppliers' reaction to online reverse auctions, and indicates that market makers have consistently overstated the benefits of online reverse auctions to both sellers and buyers, and the use of this tool will typically result in unfavorable outcomes for both buyers and sellers.Originality/valueThis paper will be of interest to buyers, sellers, and market makers, as it identifies important problems with online reverse auctions, and suggests questions that buyers should ask market makers to ensure better sourcing decisions.

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S. Wu, Irene. „Maximum impact for minimum subsidy: reverse auctions for universal access in Chile and India“. info 16, Nr. 5 (05.08.2014): 46–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/info-06-2013-0037.

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Purpose – The purpose of this article is to discuss how minimum subsidy auctions have been implemented in Chile and India for Internet and mobile phone infrastructure to and identify lessons for governments considering reverse auctions as a tool. In a minimum subsidy auction (also known as a reverse auction), the government starts by offering the maximum funds available for a given public project; the company requiring smallest subsidy wins. Design/methodology/approach – The article investigates several case studies of subsidy auctions in both Chile and India. Findings – When firms compete for subsidies in reverse auctions, they have incentives to get the most result for the least funds. This furthers the government’s goal to achieve maximum public policy impact with minimum budget. Originality/value – For developing countries, very little research has been done on implementation of auctions in the communications sector.

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Trifunovic, Dejan, und Bojan Ristic. „Multi-unit auctions in the procurement of electricity“. Ekonomski anali 58, Nr. 197 (2013): 47–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1397047t.

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This paper reviews some multi-unit auction mechanisms that are used in the procurement of electricity. In ordinary multi-unit auctions bidders compete to buy several units of the same object from the seller, while in procurement or reverse auctions suppliers of electricity compete to sell a certain number of units. Reverse electricity auctions are used in numerous countries and they create a competitive market for electricity, instead of state-owned monopolies providing electricity at administratively set prices. In this paper we will present the most commonly used multi-unit auction forms in electricity markets. Auctions for electricity from renewable energy sources deserve special attention, since these suppliers cannot compete with large-scale producers at the present state of technology.

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Zheng, Xinyue. „Analysis of Buyer and Seller's Decision under New Online Auction“. BCP Business & Management 16 (26.12.2021): 334–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v16i.319.

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Online transactions have become increasingly crucial in worldwide social and commercial activities as the Internet has risen in popularity. The online auction has gradually developed into a major trade mode as an effective technique of online trading. This paper mainly studies the factors that influence the decision of buyers and sellers in the new online auction of the group-buying auction, reverse auction, and buy-it-now auction. It is found that psychological factors often affect consumers' entry time in online group-buying auctions, and sellers' use of static public reserve prices or secret reserve prices will lead to different results. In an online reverse auction, buyers can improve their own interests by colluding, while sellers' expectations of buyers and information processing ability have certain effects on the present and future decision-making. In an online buy-it-now auction, consumers' risk sensitivity will affect buyers' strategy, while sellers' price-setting strategy will affect their own earnings. This paper aims to comprehensively analyze and summarize the strategies of buyers and sellers in each online auction, hoping to provide useful information for participants in the online auction.

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Tayaran, Hojat, und Mehdi Ghazanfari. „A Framework for Online Reverse Auction Based on Market Maker Learning with a Risk-Averse Buyer“. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020 (06.10.2020): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5604246.

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The online reverse auction is considered as a new e-commerce approach to purchasing and procuring goods and materials in the supply chain. With the rapid and ever-expanding development of information technology as well as the increasing usage of the Internet around the world, the use of an online reverse auction method to provide the required items by organizations has increased. Accordingly, in this paper, a new framework for the online reverse auction process is provided that takes both sides of the procurement process, namely, buyer and seller. The proposed process is a multiattribute semisealed multiround online reverse auction. The main feature of the proposed process is that an online market maker facilitates the seller’s bidding process by the estimation of the buyer’s scoring function. For this purpose, a multilayer perceptron neural network was used to estimate the scoring function. In this case, in addition to hiding the buyer’s scoring function, sellers can improve their bids using the estimated scoring function and a nonlinear multiobjective optimization model. The NSGA II algorithm has been used to solve the seller model. To evaluate the proposed model, the auction process is simulated by considering three scoring functions (additive, multiplicative, and risk-aversion) and two types of open and semisealed auctions. The simulation results show that the efficiency of the proposed model is not significantly different from the open auction, and in addition, unlike the open auction, the buyer information was not disclosed.

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Schellhorn, Henry. „A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming“. Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences 2005, Nr. 1 (01.01.2005): 19–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/jamds.2005.19.

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In combinatorial auctions, buyers and sellers bid not only for single items but also for combinations (or “bundles”, or “baskets”) of items. Clearing the auction is in general an NP-hard problem; it is usually solved with integer linear programming. We proposed in an earlier paper a continuous approximation of this problem, where orders are aggregated and integrality constraints are relaxed. It was proved that this problem could be solved efficiently in two steps by calculating two fixed points, first the fixed point of a contraction mapping, and then of a set-valued function. In this paper, we generalize the problem to incorporate constraints on maximum price changes between two auction rounds. This generalized problem cannot be solved by the aforementioned methods and necessitates reverse convex programming techniques.

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A. Majid, Kashef, Andrew Bryant und Pradeep A. Rau. „“Name your price” – online auctions and reference prices“. Journal of Product & Brand Management 23, Nr. 6 (09.09.2014): 420–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpbm-06-2014-0626.

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Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the presence of varying price points on the impact of product valuations in both English and reverse auctions on potential bidders, that is, those not yet engaged in the auction. Internet auctions, both English style and reverse, constitute one of the success stories of digital commerce. Design/methodology/approach – As its method of research, this paper uses an experimental approach to explore the effects of multiple reference prices. Findings – While previous research has done well to show that a lower initial price decreases barriers to entry and can lead to a higher final price in English-style auctions, this research shows that such a strategy may harm potential bidders’ product perceptions due to multiple reference prices. The authors explore situations of multiple reference prices in the context of reverse auctions, where both higher and lower reference prices are shown to be able to increase product valuations. Research limitations/implications – Additional research of a variety of products and using a representative sample would enhance the findings of this paper. Practical implications – The findings show that reference prices have differing impacts, which are dependent upon the goal of either maximizing or minimizing the distance between the initial price and the price consumers are willing to pay in an online auction. Originality/value – The investigation links differing goals created by the type of auction to the potential impact of the reference price. In addition, we explore the effects of multiple reference prices on consumer valuations.

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Emiliani, M. L., und D. J. Stec. „Online reverse auction purchasing contracts“. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 6, Nr. 3 (August 2001): 101–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598540110399066.

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Hanák, Tomáš, Ivan Marović und Nikša Jajac. „Challenges of Electronic Reverse Auctions in Construction Industry—A Review“. Economies 8, Nr. 1 (14.02.2020): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies8010013.

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The innovation of construction procurement by means of electronic reverse auctions is a controversial subject of discussion among both researchers and practitioners. This paper consolidates and critically discusses current knowledge concerning the adoption and use of electronic reverse auctions in the light of specific features of the construction industry. A systematic literature review has been employed to select papers indexed in Scopus and Web of Science databases. The findings of the study indicate that studies are addressing especially five main areas, i.e., suitability of electronic reverse auction (eRA) for construction tenders, related drivers and barriers, ethical considerations, savings potential and bidding behavior, and bid distribution. Accordingly, the authors are suggesting three directions in which future research should focus on mutual interaction of electronic reverse auctions and long-term effects on construction project outcomes.

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Lin, Chia-Chen, Ya-Fen Chang, Chin-Chen Chang und Yao-Zhu Zheng. „A Fair and Secure Reverse Auction for Government Procurement“. Sustainability 12, Nr. 20 (16.10.2020): 8567. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12208567.

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With the development of e-commerce, the electronic auction is attracting the attention of many people. Many Internet companies, such as eBay and Yahoo!, have launched online auction systems. Many researchers have studied the security problems of electronic auction systems, but few of them are multi-attribute-based. In 2014, Shi proposed a provable secure, sealed-bid, and multi-attribute auction protocol based on the semi-honest model. We evaluated this protocol and found that it has some design weaknesses and is vulnerable to the illegal operations of buyers, which results in unfairness. In this paper, we improved this protocol by replacing the Paillier’s cryptosystem with the elliptic curve discrete (ECC), and we designed a novel, online, and multi-attribute reverse-auction system using the semi-honest model. In our system, sellers’ identities are not revealed to the buyers, and the buyers cannot conduct illegal operations that may compromise the fairness of the auction.

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ZENG, QI, BRUCE R. DAVIS und DEREK ABBOTT. „REVERSE AUCTION: THE LOWEST UNIQUE POSITIVE INTEGER GAME“. Fluctuation and Noise Letters 07, Nr. 04 (Dezember 2007): L439—L447. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219477507004069.

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A reverse auction can be likened to a tendering process where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This is in contrast to a conventional forward auction where the highest bidder wins. In this paper we analyze a minority game version of the reverse auction where an extra condition is imposed that, namely, the bid must be unique. In other words, the bidder with the lowest positive unique integer (LUPI) wins. We examine and compare two extrema, namely, the case when all players are rational and the case when all players make random selections.

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Delina, Radoslav, und Anton Lavrin. „Reverse Auction Impact on Mining Company“. International Journal of Cases on Electronic Commerce 2, Nr. 1 (Januar 2006): 61–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jcec.2006010104.

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Nichols, John. „Reverse Auction Bidding: Studying Player Behavior“. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 144, Nr. 1 (Januar 2018): 04017095. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001409.

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Almeida, Clever Divino Inácio De, und Ricardo Luis Machado. „Reverse auction principles in supply chain“. International Journal of Procurement Management 1, Nr. 1 (2021): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijpm.2021.10037645.

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Zhang, Hongkun, und Xinmin Liu. „Reverse Auction-Based Services Optimization in Cloud Computing Environments“. Security and Communication Networks 2021 (17.03.2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6666628.

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Cloud-based services have been increasingly used to provide on-demand access to a large amount of computing requests, such as data, computing, resources, and so on, in which it is vitally important to correctly select and assign the right resources to a workload or application. This paper presents a novel online reverse auction scheme based on online algorithm for allocating the cloud computing services, which can help the cloud users and providers to build workflow applications in a cloud computing environment. The online reverse auction scheme consists of three parts: online algorithm design, competitive ratio calculation, and performance valuation. The online reverse auction-based algorithm is proposed for the cloud user agent to choose the final winners based on Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism and online algorithm (OA). The competitive analysis is applied to calculate the competitive ratio of the proposed algorithm compared with the offline algorithm. This analysis method is significant to measure the performance of proposed algorithm, without the assumption of the distribution of cloud providers’ bids. The results prove that the proposed online reverse auction-based algorithm is the appropriate mechanism because it allows the cloud user agent to make purchase decisions without knowing the future bids. The difference of auction rounds and transaction cost can impressively influence and improve the performance of the proposed reverse auction algorithm.

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Zhao, Yinan, Qinghua Chen und Yougui Wang. „Bid distribution derived from consistent mixed strategy in lowest unique bid auction“. International Journal of Modern Physics C 25, Nr. 05 (11.03.2014): 1440002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183114400026.

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The Lowest Unique Bid Auction (LUBA) booms recently through the Internet. A typical distribution pattern of bid price in this reverse auction has been found and needs to be interpreted. The distribution curve is a decreasing one whose slope has a close relationship with the number of agents participating in the auction. To explain this stylized fact, we develop a model assuming that agents prefer to bid on the price at which the probability of winning is higher. The bid distributions of actual auctions with the number of agents less than 200 can be fitted very well using the parameters for the value of items and the number of bids. When this number becomes larger, however, a deviation occurs between prediction and empirical data, which can be adjusted by introducing cognitive illusion of the bid number.

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Kang, Wang Lin, Xin Min Liu und Kai Wang. „A Multi-Agent Management System for Grid Resource Allocation“. Advanced Materials Research 760-762 (September 2013): 973–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.760-762.973.

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This paper designs a decentralized resource multi-agent system based on a novel reverse auction protocol. In the implementation of this multi-agent system, first the multi-attribute bids offered by the provider agents are calculated based on the users preference value function. Furthermore, an on-line reverse auction mechanism is provided to describe the on-line situation. I.e., the different grid resource provider agents arrive at different times and this mechanism is required to make an immediate decision about each bid as it is received. Numerous simulating experiments show that the proposed reverse auction method is effective in resource utilization and has better performance in user utility.

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Zaidi, Bizzat Hussain, Ihsan Ullah, Musharraf Alam, Bamidele Adebisi, Atif Azad, Ali Raza Ansari und Raheel Nawaz. „Incentive Based Load Shedding Management in a Microgrid Using Combinatorial Auction with IoT Infrastructure“. Sensors 21, Nr. 6 (10.03.2021): 1935. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s21061935.

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This paper presents a novel incentive-based load shedding management scheme within a microgrid environment equipped with the required IoT infrastructure. The proposed mechanism works on the principles of reverse combinatorial auction. We consider a region of multiple consumers who are willing to curtail their load in the peak hours in order to gain some incentives later. Using the properties of combinatorial auctions, the participants can bid in packages or combinations in order to maximize their and overall social welfare of the system. The winner determination problem of the proposed combinatorial auction, determined using particle swarm optimization algorithm and hybrid genetic algorithm, is also presented in this paper. The performance evaluation and stability test of the proposed scheme are simulated using MATLAB and presented in this paper. The results indicate that combinatorial auctions are an excellent choice for load shedding management where a maximum of 50 users participate.

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Zhou, Yan Yue, Chen Li und Ge Zhu. „Online Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Mechanism Design Based on Utility“. Advanced Engineering Forum 1 (September 2011): 405–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/aef.1.405.

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A good auction mechanism is able to release the information who owns to the other side who lacks of. In order to ensure a positive flow of information and to improve the active participation of suppliers, negotiation mechanism is introduced, and suppliers can participate in the design of auction mechanism. Several rounds of English auction is applied to determining the final winner. Taking into account that the buyer has a preference on the property, we use AHP to calculate final weights, and use multi-attribute utility function to calculate the greatest utility as the winner.

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Aloini, Davide, Riccardo Dulmin und Valeria Mininno. „E‐reverse auction design: critical variables in a B2B context“. Business Process Management Journal 18, Nr. 2 (13.04.2012): 219–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14637151211225180.

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PurposeThis paper attempts to provide an empirical cross‐industrial study on critical success factors impacting on “price” and “process” performance in business‐to‐business (B2B) e‐reverse auction design.Design/methodology/approachBased on an online survey to a panel of academic experts and practitioners, the paper presents the empirical validation of a previous conceptual model using a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) approach.FindingsResults demonstrate that a multi facet construct consisting of six main dimensions impacts on e‐auction performance. Moreover, these dimensions differently impact on price and process performance.Research limitations/implicationsBecause of the complexity of the framework, the sample size and the qualitative nature of experts' observations, results should be seen as more indicative than conclusive and therefore generalization should be additionally tested.Practical implicationsFindings provide useful information for the formulation of managerial decisions in designing the auction event/process and supporting the definition of different negotiation strategies.Originality/valueThis article is a first attempt to test a conceptual framework on critical factors impacting on e‐reverse auction performance in a B2B context. A lot of conceptual papers try to systematize the numerous variables affecting e‐auction success and their complex relationships into a single comprehensive framework; nevertheless there is a lack of empirical evidence supporting these models especially in the B2B context.

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Srinath, T. R., Mahendra Pratap Singh und Alwyn Roshan Pais. „Anonymity And Verifiability In Multiattribute Reverse Auction“. International Journal of Information Technology Convergence and Services 1, Nr. 4 (30.08.2011): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/ijitcs.2011.1401.

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Ray, Arun Kumar, Mamata Jenamani und Pratap K. J. Mohapatra. „Bidding decision in multi-attribute reverse auction“. International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences 3, Nr. 3 (2010): 280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijads.2010.036103.

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Shih, Dong-Her, Shin-Yi Huang und Binshan Lin. „Linking secure reverse auction with web service“. International Journal of Services and Standards 2, Nr. 1 (2006): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijss.2006.008157.

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Tarazona_Bermudez, Giovanny_Mauricio, B. Cristina Pelayo G-Bustelo, Oscar Sanjuán Martínez, Benjamin Torres Alvarez und Luz Andrea Rodriguez Rojas. „Reverse electronic auction web tool for B2B“. Computers in Industry 65, Nr. 5 (Juni 2014): 841–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compind.2013.12.008.

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Ahmad, Maqbool, Muhammad Shafiq, Azeem Irshad, Muhammad Khalil Afzal, Dae Kim und Jin-Ghoo Choi. „Adaptive and Economically-Robust Group Selling of Spectrum Slots for Cognitive Radio-Based Networks“. Sensors 18, Nr. 8 (01.08.2018): 2490. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18082490.

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Auction theory has found vital application in cognitive radio to relieve spectrum scarcity by redistributing idle channels to those who value them most. However, countries have been slow to introduce spectrum auctions in the secondary market. This could be in part because a number of substantial conflicts could emerge for leasing the spectrum at the micro level. These representative conflicts include the lack of legislation, interference management, setting a reasonable price, etc. In addition, the heterogeneous nature of the spectrum precludes the true evaluation of non-identical channels. The information abstracted from the initial activity in terms of price paid for specific channels may not be a useful indicator for the valuation of another channel. Therefore, auction mechanisms to efficiently redistribute idle channels in the secondary market are of vital interest. In this paper, we first investigate such leading conflicts and then propose a novel Adaptive and Economically-Robust spectrum slot Group-selling scheme (AERG), for cognitive radio-based networks such as IoT, 5G and LTE-Advanced. This scheme enables group-selling behavior among the primary users to collectively sell their uplink slots that are individually not attractive to the buyers due to the auction overhead. AERG is based on two single-round sealed-bid reverse-auction mechanisms accomplished in three phases. In the first phase, participants adapt asks and bids to fairly evaluate uplink slots considering the dynamics of spectrum trading such as space and time. In the second phase, an inner-auction in each primary network is conducted to collect asks on group slots, and then, an outer-auction is held between primary and secondary networks. In the third phase, the winning primary network declares the winners of the inner-auction that can evenly share the revenue of the slots. Simulation results and logical proofs verify that AERG satisfies economic properties such as budget balance, truthfulness and individual rationality and improves the utilities of the participants.

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Xu, Xiaodong, Chunjing Yuan, Jianhui Li, Huixin Zhang und Xiaofeng Tao. „Reverse Auction Based Green Offloading Scheme for Small Cell Heterogeneous Networks“. Mobile Information Systems 2016 (2016): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/5087525.

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The small cell is treated as a promising proposition to provide hot spot capacity and higher data rates. However, even with dense small cell deployment scenario, the heavy traffic load pressure and low energy efficiency in the small cell heterogeneous network (HetNet) still exist. Therefore, how to make the best use of densely deployed small cells under HetNet environments becomes the focus of researches. Offloading provides a feasible solution to promote cooperation between macrocells and small cells for user traffic supporting. In this paper, we propose the reverse auction based Green Offloading (GO) scheme for energy efficiency improvements. The proposed GO scheme employs the reverse auction theory to handle the offloading decision process, aiming at maximizing the system energy efficiency under the constraints of user Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, bandwidth, and transmission power limitations. Moreover, the reverse auction model gives the facility of multicell coordination transmissions with multiple winners situation. The energy efficiency optimization problem with constraints is solved by Dynamic Programming method with Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The Individual Rationality and Truthfulness of the reverse auction model are also proved. By comparing the energy efficiency performances of the proposed GO scheme with current works within the Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A) system downlink scenario, simulation results show the improvements of the proposed GO scheme.

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KURACH, RADOSŁAW, PAWEŁ KUŚMIERCZYK und DANIEL PAPLA. „Can auctions help reduce mandatory pension fund fees?“ Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 18, Nr. 2 (12.12.2017): 190–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474747217000440.

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AbstractCompanies that manage mandatory pension funds are frequently accused of excessive fee taking. International analyses have found that in countries with legal caps, commissions remain within these caps; hence, market competition does not function. Surprisingly, there are few international cases where local regulators implement mechanisms to facilitate competition. The variety of auction mechanisms available raises the question of whether an optimal solution exists for this purpose. Therefore, in this study, we present evidence, based on a controlled regulatory experiment, on the fee-reduction potential of reverse auctions.

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Ding, Li Li, Zheng Wei Wang und Xiao Ling Wang. „Auction-Based Resource Allocation in Computational Grids“. Advanced Materials Research 816-817 (September 2013): 847–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.816-817.847.

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Auction techniques have been becoming the key methods in grid resource allocation. In this paper, we propose the multi-attribute reverse auction models for computational grid resource based on the designed satisfaction degree function. The fairness is also introduced into the models and protocols to match the reality. Two auction-based protocols are presented, i.e., the offline multi-attribute auction-based protocol and the on-line multi-attribute auction-based protocol. The goal is to help the resource user make multi-attribute decisions with complete information or incomplete information. Results from simulation experiments show that these two protocols can achieve market efficiency and fairness in most instances.

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Thurston, Hale W., Michael A. Taylor, Allison Roy, Matthew Morrison, William D. Shuster, Joshua Templeton, Matthew Clagett und Heriberto Cabezas. „Applying a Reverse Auction to Reduce Stormwater Runoff“. AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment 37, Nr. 4 (Juni 2008): 326–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1579/0044-7447(2008)37[326:aaratr]2.0.co;2.

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36

Foroughi, Abbas, Mehmet Kocakulah und Jennifer Williams. „A Framework for Electronic Reverse Auction (eRA) Research“. Journal of Internet Commerce 6, Nr. 3 (08.10.2007): 45–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j179v06n03_03.

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Zhou, Sean X., Zhijie Tao, Nianbing Zhang und Gangshu George Cai. „Procurement with Reverse Auction and Flexible Noncompetitive Contracts“. Decision Sciences 47, Nr. 3 (12.01.2016): 554–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/deci.12207.

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Hawkins, Timothy G., und Michael J. Gravier. „Individual manager experience influences on reverse auction use“. International Journal of Procurement Management 7, Nr. 6 (2014): 719. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijpm.2014.064985.

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Jones, Steve, Ray Hackney und Zahir Irani. „E-government: an e-reverse auction case study“. Electronic Government, an International Journal 4, Nr. 4 (2007): 412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/eg.2007.015035.

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Chang, Shi-Chung, Ming-Ming Hsieh und Chia-Wei Chen. „Reverse auction-based job assignment among foundry fabs“. International Journal of Production Research 45, Nr. 3 (Februar 2007): 653–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207540600792176.

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41

Tung, Dang Thanh, Baltazár Frankoviĉ, Con Sheahan und Ivana Budinská. „NEW ALGORITHMS FOR SOLVING SINGLE-ITEM REVERSE AUCTION“. IFAC Proceedings Volumes 38, Nr. 1 (2005): 128–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3182/20050703-6-cz-1902.02257.

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42

Hawkins, Timothy G., Michael J. Gravier und C. Michael Wittmann. „Enhancing reverse auction use theory: an exploratory study“. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 15, Nr. 1 (26.01.2010): 21–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13598541011018102.

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43

Tang, Hai, Mingjun Xiao, Guoju Gao und Hui Zhao. „Reverse-auction-based crowdsourced labeling for active learning“. World Wide Web 23, Nr. 1 (27.11.2019): 671–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11280-019-00744-3.

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Zhao, Feng, Xiaofei Xu und Hongbin Chen. „Reverse spectrum auction algorithm for cellular network offloading“. Ad Hoc Networks 58 (April 2017): 278–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2016.03.003.

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Aghajani, Mojtaba, und S. Ali Torabi. „A mixed procurement model for humanitarian relief chains“. Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management 10, Nr. 1 (16.10.2019): 45–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jhlscm-10-2018-0067.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to improve the relief procurement process as one of the most important elements of humanitarian logistics. For doing so, a novel two-round decision model is developed to capture the dynamic nature of the relief procurement process by allowing demand updating. The model accounts for the supply priority of items at response phase as well. Design/methodology/approach A mixed procurement/supply policy is developed through a mathematical model, which includes spot market procurement and a novel procurement auction mechanism combining the concepts of multi-attribute and combinatorial reverse auctions. The model is of bi-objective mixed-integer non-linear programming type, which is solved through the weighted augmented e-constraint method. A case study is also provided to illustrate the applicability of the model. Findings This study demonstrates the ability of proposed approach to model post-disaster procurement which considers the dynamic environment of the relief logistics. The sensitivity analyses provide useful managerial insights for decision makers by studying the impacts of critical parameters on the solutions. Originality/value This paper proposes a novel reverse auction framework for relief procurement in the form of a multi-attribute combinatorial auction. Also, to deal with dynamic environment in the post-disaster procurement, a novel two-period programming model with demand updating is proposed. Finally, by considering the priority of relief items and model’s applicability in the setting of relief logistics, post-disaster horizon is divided into three periods and a mixed procurement strategy is developed to determine an appropriate supply policy for each period.

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Li, Xuejun, Ruimiao Ding, Xiao Liu, Xiangjun Liu, Erzhou Zhu und Yunxiang Zhong. „A Dynamic Pricing Reverse Auction-Based Resource Allocation Mechanism in Cloud Workflow Systems“. Scientific Programming 2016 (2016): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/7609460.

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Market-oriented reverse auction is an efficient and cost-effective method for resource allocation in cloud workflow systems since it can dynamically allocate resources depending on the supply-demand relationship of the cloud market. However, during the auction the price of cloud resource is usually fixed, and the current resource allocation mechanisms cannot adapt to the changeable market properly which results in the low efficiency of resource utilization. To address such a problem, a dynamic pricing reverse auction-based resource allocation mechanism is proposed. During the auction, resource providers can change prices according to the trading situation so that our novel mechanism can increase the chances of making a deal and improve efficiency of resource utilization. In addition, resource providers can improve their competitiveness in the market by lowering prices, and thus users can obtain cheaper resources in shorter time which would decrease monetary cost and completion time for workflow execution. Experiments with different situations and problem sizes are conducted for dynamic pricing-based allocation mechanism (DPAM) on resource utilization and the measurement of Time⁎Cost (TC). The results show that our DPAM can outperform its representative in resource utilization, monetary cost, and completion time and also obtain the optimal price reduction rates.

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Morales-Camargo, Emmanuel, Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein und Jaime F. Zender. „Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination“. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, Nr. 4 (August 2013): 1271–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000409.

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AbstractAn experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

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Hu, Ying, Yingjie Wang, Yingshu Li und Xiangrong Tong. „An Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsourcing Based on Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions“. Sensors 18, Nr. 10 (14.10.2018): 3453. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18103453.

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In order to avoid malicious competition and select high quality crowd workers to improve the utility of crowdsourcing system, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism based on the combination of reverse auction and multi-attribute auction in mobile crowdsourcing. The proposed online incentive mechanism includes two algorithms. One is the crowd worker selection algorithm based on multi-attribute reverse auction that adopts dynamic threshold to make an online decision for whether accept a crowd worker according to its attributes. Another is the payment determination algorithm which determines payment for a crowd worker based on its reputation and quality of sensing data, that is, a crowd worker can get payment equal to the bidding price before performing task only if his reputation reaches good reputation threshold, otherwise he will get payment based on his data sensing quality. We prove that our proposed online incentive mechanism has the properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget-balance, truthfulness and honesty. Through simulations, the efficiency of our proposed online incentive mechanism is verified which can improve the efficiency, adaptability and trust degree of the mobile crowdsourcing system.

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Delina, Radoslav, und Marek Grof. „Empirical Problems of Savings Calculation in Electronic Reverse Auction“. Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research 14, Nr. 2 (Mai 2019): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/s0718-18762019000200111.

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Jeong, Woo Seok, Sun Gwan Han und Geun Sik Jo. „Intelligent Cyber Logistics Using Reverse Auction in Electronic Commerce“. Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce 13, Nr. 3 (01.02.2003): 191–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327744joce133&4_03.

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