Dissertationen zum Thema „Robert Nozick“

A dissertação propõe o exame da teoria da justiça e do Estado apresentadas pelo filósofo americano Robert Nozick em sua obra Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). Na primeira parte do trabalho, três conceitos fundamentais da tradição liberal clássica são examinados: estado de natureza, justiça e direitos, e Estado Liberal. Os paradigmas adotados são John Locke e Immanuel Kant. O primeiro, porque Nozick parte de pressupostos lockeanos para desenvolver sua teoria do Estado. O segundo, pelo paralelismo entre a concepção de justiça de Nozick e a do filósofo alemão. Na segunda parte da dissertação, procede-se ao exame do modo como Nozick abordou os conceitos a que alude a parte inicial do trabalho. A conclusão propõe identificar as aproximações e divergências de Nozick com a sua própria tradição.
This work proposes the examination of Robert Nozick‟s Theory of justice and state in his book Anarchy, state and Utopia (1974). In the first part, three main concepts of the classical liberal tradition are sutied: state of nature, justice and rights, and the Liberal State. The thought of John Locke and Immanuel Kant are the adopted paradigms. The former, because Nozick assumes lockean concepts to develop his theory of the state. The later, because of the approximation between Nozick‟s concepts of justice and the one of the philosofy born in Könisberg. In the second part, the object is to undercover how Nozick described the same main concepts of the classical liberal tradition. Conclusively, this work proposes to identify the convergences and divergences between nozick and his own tradition.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magister en Filosofía mención Axiología y Filosofía Política
Años atrás la opinión pública vio como un grupo de jóvenes arrojaba un arma incendiaria contra el palacio La Moneda (símbolo del Estado en Chile). Dicho grupo se auto identificaba como “Movimiento Anarquista” y predicaban más o menos lo mismo que el movimiento anarquista español (o CNT) que luchó en contra de la dictadura franquista; me refiero a un rechazo a la autoridad del Estado. También, desde hace algunos años, vemos como otro grupo le exige al Estado lo mismo que aquel grupo de jóvenes. Ahora, eso sí, no se trata de jóvenes protestando; se trata de gente algo mayor identificados con los altos poderes económicos del país que, con corbatas y ternos exigen algo similar: un Estado que no se entrometa es sus acciones. Pero ¿Qué tienen en común estos grupos tan disímiles? ¿Por qué culpan al Estado de sus males? ¿Qué hace el Estado en su contra? ¿Será que al menos, en esencia, comparten ideas similares? La primera respuesta que a cualquiera que se le viene a la cabeza sobre estos cuestionamientos es que claramente este rechazo de la autoridad del Estado tiene algo que ver con nuestra Libertad. Pareciese, según lo creen algunos, que el gran problema que ven en el Estado es que éste intefiere con nuestra Libertad y con nuestras decisiones; pareciese que el Estado les ata las manos y no les deja actuar a sus anchas. De este modo, si es que aceptásemos que estas respuestas instintivas tienen algo de verdad, deberíamos aceptar también que, por lo menos en apariciencia, estos grupos sostienen que el Estado necesariamente viola Libertades. ¿No sería más sensato ver al Estado como institución política que trata de promover nuestra Libertad? En esta tesis trataremos de mostrar las soluciones teóricas que estas posiciones han dado a estas interrogantes junto con tratar de resolver la cuestión de si estas posturas sotienen una semejanza significativa. Para esto, nuestra primera labor será posicionar filosóficamente lo que representan estas posturas. Respecto a las posiciones Anarquistas, no hay ningún problema ya que dicha postura tiene una vasta defensa teórica representada por un largo historial de pensadores. Respecto a los grupos que exigen más libertad al Estado y que representan a altos poderes económicos del país es algo más complejo, filosóficamente hablando. Es fácil encontrar un correlato teórico en términos económicos (se les suele llamar capitalistas, libre cambistas, liberales, etc.), no obstante en términos filosóficos no es tan claro a quién representan. Descartamos a los liberales (principalmente a los de corte ralwsiano) ya que sus posiciones no representan una confrontación directa entre las Libertades y el Estado. Creemos que la posición filosófica que más se ajusta a dicha descripción son los Libertarios ya que estos serían quienes extreman el rasgo de la libertad en su argumentación que incluso se acentúa cuando hablamos sobre derechos de propiedad.

Esta tesis doctoral tiene como objetivo estudiar el pensamiento moral y político de Robert Nozick para demostrar que Nozick, en su obra “Anarquía, Estado y utopía”, no forma un Estado mínimo ni el equivalente al Estado gendarme de la teoría liberal clásica. Lo que forma Nozick son unas mutuas aseguradoras de carácter privado que podrían servir para administrar a la sociedad. Para efectuar su despliegue argumentativo desde el estado de naturaleza de John Locke, Nozick, a diferencia de otros pensadores, no privatiza el Estado sino que construye desde un principio una sociedad utópica en la que no existe el Estado. Las agencias de protección sirven para administrar la sociedad donde viven los clientes de la misma que contratan con sus agencias de forma libre y voluntaria. Aquellos individuos que no quieren contratar con las agencias de protección privadas que actúan en un territorio determinado no tienen por qué hacerlo y nadie puede obligarles a ello a diferencia de nuestros Estados que nos afilian a ellos sin nuestro consentimiento explícito y de forma obligatoria. El pensamiento racional es utilizado en la obra política de Nozick de forma instrumental para formar una utopía en la que el individuo de una sociedad pasa de ser ciudadano a “cliente “de una institución privada que administra la sociedad. Mientras que entre las relaciones contractuales entre individuos, todos los neocontractualistas (como Hayek, Rothbard, Buchanan, Apel o Habermas) parecen buscar explícitamente la justicia y la equidad, Nozick parece buscar la permisibilidad moral de las relaciones entre individuos más allá de las relaciones propias del noecontractualismo político al defender la vida ética y las virtudes morales (como la no instrumentalización de un individuo por otro o valorar a un individuo como un fin y no utilizarlo como un medio forjando una organización de la sociedad que permita a los individuos, tal como dice Nozick en Anarchy, State and utopia, pg. 334, “ser inviolables en el uso de sus derechos y libertades individuales, no ser tratados como instrumentos o recursos con la dignidad que esto supone permitiendo a cada individuo, individualmente o con quien él decida, decidir sobre su vida y alcanzar sus fines personales y profesionales ayudados por otros individuos a través de la cooperación y no de la competición ni confrontación, que posean la misma dignidad”) e incluyendo las relaciones contractuales dentro de la necesidad de obedecer a esa eticidad. De esta manera es como Nozick desea que se relacionen los individuos que podrían convivir en la sociedad utópica creada por él en Anarquía, Estado y utopía.” También ha sido la intención de esta tesis colocar el pensamiento de Nozick dentro de la Historia para ver que su utopía es una obra atractiva y sugestiva en sintonía con los padres fundadores de los Estados Unidos de América, con el espíritu de la declaración de independencia, con la ideología de los pensadores liberales libertarios y anarcoindividualistas estadounidenses, con los fundadores de sociedades utópicas en los Estados Unidos en el siglo XlX e incluso con pensadores anarquistas europeos como Bakunin y Kropotkin.
This doctoral tesis has the paramount goal to study the political and moral thought of Robert Nozick developed in “Anarchy, State and utopia”. We say that the mutual protection associations of Nozick are a Scheme of private associations and, therefore, a very different institution of the minimal State (night-watchman State). Nozick starts his Framework from de John Locke’s state of nature. Nozick doesn’t destroy the State or privatize it. Robert Nozick creates a society without State. The Mutual protection associations are private institutions and maintain the under control of the society. The liberal contractualism is developed from the ethical thought and rational mind. The men and woman who don’t want to join with the agency are free to do it. This question is an important difference about the organization of under control of our societies because, for all of us, the affiliation to the State is compulsory. The change is very important. With the mutual protection associations of Nozick, the citizen become a customer. Several questions about the moral thought of Robert Nozick are studied. The goal is to see that Nozick doesn’t a selfish-man; his philosophy of individualism is an instrument to protect the individual freedom of all men and woman. The framework of Nozick “treats the individuals, who may not be used in certain ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treat us as persons having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes. Treating the individuals with respect by respecting their rights, it allows to the individuals, individually or with whom they choose, to choose their life and to realize their ends and their life with liberty, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity.” This is the goal of the framework of Robert Nozick developed in “Anarchy, State and utopia.”

No presente trabalho, é realizado um experimento para investigar as escolhas entre distintas distribuições de renda, sob diferentes conjuntos informacionais. Os indivíduos são defrontados com distribuições baseadas nas teorias de John Rawls (2002), Robert Nozick (1991) e duas distribuições mistas, sob dois tratamentos distintos: o primeiro com o véu de ignorância da teoria rawlsiana e, o segundo, sem o véu de ignorância. Os resultados revelaram um maior número de escolhas do modelo rawlsiano sob o véu de ignorância, enquanto no tratamento sem véu a maioria dos participantes escolheu o modelo de Nozick, ainda que sob esse tratamento o padrão de escolhas tenha sido mais homogêneo. Esses resultados indicam a instabilidade de princípios escolhidos sob o véu de ignorância.
This work provides a synthesis of three theories of justice: from Rawls, Nozick and the utilitarian theory. Then an experiment is proposed, aimed to investigate choices of distributive justice based on these theories. The individuals are confronted with different income distributions, under two distinct informational treatments: the first with a veil of ignorance and, the second, with no veil of ignorance. The results point to a majority of choices of the rawlsian principle under the veil of ignorance treatment, while under the non veil of ignorance treatment there is a majority of choices of Nozick’s model of distribution of income. These results indicate the instability of principles of justice chosen under the veil of ignorance.

O libertarismo assume-se como uma teoria política baseada nos direitos de autopropriedade e de propriedade dos recursos externos e da sua legitimidade ao longo da história das posses num mercado livre. Na senda de John Locke, Robert Nozick e Peter Vallentyne estabelecem restrições (proviso) e princípios de justiça que impõem os critérios e limites das aquisições e transferências justas, constituindo a rectificação o mecanismo de correcção histórica das violações dos direitos de propriedade ocorridas ao longo das transacções efectuadas. A justiça intergeracional, as questões de redistribuição das posses, a importância atribuída à igualdade material, bem como o papel e funções do estado no restabelecimento da justiça surgem imediatamente como pano de fundo da rectificação. Argumenta-se neste trabalho que nenhum dos autores responde com eficácia aos problemas de rectificação. Estes acabam assim por debilitar os seus pressupostos, indicando no entanto, ao mesmo tempo, rumos e temas da reflexão incontornáveis na discussão político-filosófica actual.

O libertarismo assume-se como uma teoria política baseada nos direitos de autopropriedade e de propriedade dos recursos externos e da sua legitimidade ao longo da história das posses num mercado livre. Na senda de John Locke, Robert Nozick e Peter Vallentyne estabelecem restrições (proviso) e princípios de justiça que impõem os critérios e limites das aquisições e transferências justas, constituindo a rectificação o mecanismo de correcção histórica das violações dos direitos de propriedade ocorridas ao longo das transacções efectuadas. A justiça intergeracional, as questões de redistribuição das posses, a importância atribuída à igualdade material, bem como o papel e funções do estado no restabelecimento da justiça surgem imediatamente como pano de fundo da rectificação. Argumenta-se neste trabalho que nenhum dos autores responde com eficácia aos problemas de rectificação. Estes acabam assim por debilitar os seus pressupostos, indicando no entanto, ao mesmo tempo, rumos e temas da reflexão incontornáveis na discussão político-filosófica actual.

La esencia del libertarismo es la creencia en los derechos básicos del individuo y una particular desconfianza a la intervención del Gobierno en la economía. Para los pensadores libertarios, con frecuencia tal intervención en la economía, particularmente si se trata de una intervención directa, no solo es inefectiva, sino que además amenaza la autonomía, dignidad e ingenio humanos, que son los valores requeridos para la prosperidad y el avance de los seres humanos. Este artículo se enfoca en los aspectos filosófico-legales del trabajo de dos eminentes eruditos libertarios del siglo XX: Friedrich Hayek y Robert Nozick.

Justice, and what is just, have been discussed by many with no true definition to go by and both political and moral theories alike have tried to find the right definition of what justice is supposed to be. This study will use three political theories to tackle the question if the american election system can be considered just or unjust. The three theories are John Rawls’s Justice as fairness, Thomas Hobbes and the social contract and lastly Robert Nozick’s libertarianism. To analyse the framing of question a normative ‘givet-att’ analyse method will be used, to form arguments from the values presented in the three different theories of justice. The conclusions drawn from the analysis are in the cases of Rawls and Hobbes theories quite similar, on how the election system should be interpreted. Nozick’s theory on the other hand gives a different conclusion compared to the other two. However, the goal of this study is not to find one true answer to whether the election system can be called just or not, but rather to show it from different perspectives of justice and how that can affect the view of the election system.

Une nouvelle tentative pour faire face au défi sceptique est menée depuis une quarantaine d’années. Cette tentative repose sur une théorie de la connaissance centrée sur la notion d’alternatives pertinentes. La thèse se propose de montrer les faiblesses de cette théorie, même lorsqu’elle s’appuie sur l’appareillage des mondes possibles, et suggère que le scepticisme demeure la meilleure position épistémologique. Dans le premier chapitre on passe en revue une série de difficultés liées au sujet des alternatives pertinentes et l'on essaye d'argumenter en faveur de l'idée qu'il n'y a peut-être pas, finalement, de moyens en quelque sorte objectifs pour établir quelles sont les alternatives pertinentes relativement à une situation quelconque. À partir du deuxième chapitre, il est procédé à une analyse critique des tentatives de certains auteurs qui se sont servis, pour élaborer leurs propres conceptions bien précises, du langage des mondes possibles. Dans le deuxième chapitre, l'on se concentre surtout sur la question du degré de proximité qu'un monde possible donné doit exhiber pour être considéré comme suffisamment proche du monde actuel et l'on essaye de montrer qu'il n’est probablement pas possible de tracer d'une manière non arbitraire une ligne de démarcation entre ces mondes possibles qu’on peut ignorer et ceux qu’on ne peut ignorer dans nos attributions de connaissance. Dans le troisième chapitre, l'on se concentre surtout sur la question des critères qui devraient guider nos évaluations de proximité et l'on essaye de montrer le caractère discutable de n'importe quelle règle visant à établir quels seraient ces critères-là
Over the last forty years, a new attempt to answer to the skeptic challenge has been proposed. This attempt is based on a theory of knowledge, which is grounded on the notion of relevant alternative. My dissertation aims to show the problems of such a theory, even when formulated in terms of possible worlds, and suggests that in the end skepticism remains the best epistemological option. In the first chapter, I will offer a discussion of the issue of relevant alternatives, and I will argue in favor of the idea that perhaps there are no objective criteria to establish which are the relevant alternatives with respect to a certain given situation. In the second chapter, I will propose a critical analysis of the attempts of some philosophers to formulate their own proposals in the language of possible worlds. In particular, I will focus on the issue of the proximity degree that a certain possible world must have in order to be considered as sufficiently closed to the real world, and I will try to show that perhaps it is not possible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between those possible worlds that we can ignore and those that we must take into account in our attribution of knowledge. In the third chapter, I will critically discuss the criteria that should guide our evaluations about proximity, and I will show the problematic aspects of any rule aimed to establish which these criteria in effect should be

In this thesis, many topics will be discussed and a variety of philosophers will be mentioned. The main goal of this thesis is to determine a health care plan that fits with the theories of Robert Nozick, Arthur Ripstein, Norman Daniels, and Amartya Sen. I conclude that Ezekiel Emanuel’s health care plan, The Guaranteed Healthcare Access Plan, can be used as a compromise between the views of each of these philosophers. In reaching such a conclusion, I take many steps. I begin with the explanation of theories of justice and their focus. I then turn to the important distinction between rights and ethics. Next, I explain that often closely held values come into conflict with one another. Then, I turn to the specific philosophers and their theories. Beginning with Nozick, I explain the justification for a state and how this justification is important for all four of the philosophers. Afterwards, in turn, I lay out what each philosopher claims in regards to a just society and the role of a state, his justification for such claims, and the results of such claims specifically in regards to health care. Subsequently, I examine the connections between philosophers, which help me understand the ways a health care system could be instituted to appeal to all four of them. After questioning if a just society can really exist in a limited world, I decide what type of health care system such a just society should implement. Finally, I rest on Ezekiel Emanuel’s plan, which I believe should be implemented in a just society and which best demonstrates the common ground between the four philosophers I discuss.

The present work approaches the matter of the Law of Property and its social function according to John Rawls theory of justice, having the intention to understand what the role of the property is to the author, the ways of property which are considered fair by him and, if it answers to the principles of justice and property which fitted with its social purpose. For such, it deals with, firstly, in chapter 1, the conteporary conception of law of property, which is inserted within a more humanitary, cooperative pespective of society and reciprocity, longing to a socialeconomical harmony and the effectiviness of certain human necesseties to improve the pespective of the citizens lives. Carrying on in this chapter, it is studied Locke s concept of private property to demonstrate the points where his theory disagree with John Rawls theory, thus it brings more individual view of property and it adopts a restricted conception of this right. Locke defends the unlimited accumulation of wealth, being the property turned, only, to the individual growth of the owner and to benefit the business, and then not existing a distributive and cooperative justice. Macpherson criticizes Locke s theory since it is extremely individualist. Chapter 2 aims to analyse the main ideas of Rawls theory of justice, seaching for the main and fundamental concepts so that chapter 3 is well-understood. Rawls supports the distributive justice and encourages the social cooperation. For this author, the basic liberties are inegotiable and the object of his theory is the basic structure of the society as an equitative system of social cooperation among free and iqual citizens. In order to reach this, the individuals make an agreement under the veil of ignorance to formulate the principles of justice which will run the institutions of a democratic constitutional fair society. Chapter 3 fights against the matter of the law of property for this author, a big suppoter of the distributive justice and of the social cooperation, which understands the law of property as basic good, because it helps to accomplish the expectations of the citizens lives, and it must also be capatible to the other rights and liberties which belong to a social system to provide a honored life. Rawls thought was a target for criticism by Robert Nozick, whom rescued Locke s theory of appropriation, not agreeing with the notion of distributive justice and of social cooperation, counteracting in several points to the Rawls theory of justice. However, according to the philosophers Álvaro de Vita, Will Kimlicka and Van Parijs, the defense of John Rawls theory was made, because they support the thought of this author, abova all objections shown by Nozick. Thus, the right of property must have a social mean to promote certain basic needs of the individuals, and this is clear in Rawls work so that he believes in social cooperation, in the effectiviness of human dignity, of self-respect, of self-steem and of their own citizenship, through a distributive justice.
O presente trabalho aborda a questão do direito de propriedade e sua função social a partir da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, com a intenção de compreender qual o papel da propriedade para o autor, as formas de propriedade consideradas justas para ele e, se atende aos princípios da justiça a propriedade que cumpre com uma finalidade social. Para tanto, trata-se, primeiramente, no capítulo 1, a concepção contemporânea de direito de propriedade, o qual está inserido numa perspectiva mais humanitária, cooperativa, de sociabilidade e reciprocidade, buscando a harmonia econômico-social e a efetivação de certas necessidades humanas para melhorar as perspectivas de vida dos cidadãos. Dando continuidade a este capítulo, é estudado o conceito de propriedade privada de Locke, com a finalidade de demonstrar os pontos em que sua teoria contrapõe-se à teoria de John Rawls, pois traz uma visão mais individualista de propriedade e adota uma concepção restrita deste direito. Locke defende a acumulação ilimitada de riquezas, estando a propriedade voltada, unicamente, para o crescimento individual do proprietário e para beneficiar o comércio, inexistindo uma justiça distributiva e cooperativa. Macpherson critica a teoria de Locke por ser extremamente individualista. O capítulo 2 intenciona analisar as principais idéias da teoria da justiça de Rawls, buscando-se os conceitos principais e fundamentais para que o capítulo 3 seja mais bem compreendido. Rawls defende a justiça distributiva e incentiva a cooperação social. Para este autor, as liberdades básicas são inegociáveis e o objeto de sua teoria é a estrutura básica da sociedade como um sistema equitativo de cooperação social entre cidadãos livres e iguais. Para que isso seja alcançado, os indivíduos realizam um acordo, sob o véu da ignorância , para formular os princípios da justiça que regerão as instituições de uma sociedade constitucional democrática justa. O capítulo 3 enfrenta a questão do direito de propriedade para o autor, grande defensor da justiça distributiva e da cooperação social, que entende o direito de propriedade como um bem básico, pois auxilia nas realizações das expectativas de vida dos cidadãos, devendo ser compatível com os demais direitos e liberdades pertencentes a um sistema social para proporcionar uma vida digna. O pensamento de Rawls foi alvo de crítica de Robert Nozick, o qual resgatou a teoria da apropriação de Locke, não concordando com a noção de justiça distributiva e de cooperação social, contrapondo-se em inúmeros pontos à teoria da justiça ralwsiana. Mas, com base nos filósofos Álvaro de Vita, Will Kymlicka e Van Parijs foi realizada a defesa da teoria de John Rawls, pois defendem o pensamento deste autor, acima das objeções apresentadas por Nozick. Asim, o direito de propriedade deve ter uma finalidade social para promover certas necessidades básicas dos indivíduos, e isso, percebe-se na obra de Rawls, pois ele acredita na cooperação social, na efetivação da dignidade humana, do auto-respeito, da auto-estima e da própria cidadania, por meio de uma justiça distributiva.

This essay compares the theory of human rights and human responsibility to the reality in the Swedish government. The aim is to understand what the            philosophers in this case study are saying about human rights and responsibility. The essay also asks how the philosopher’s theories compare to the reality in the Swedish State.  When comparing the theory of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Robert Nozick to the Swedish government and laws we understand that Rousseau is the most conservative and yet the one out of the three philosophers that are closest to  Swedish State reality. Locke is not very different from Rousseau and a lot of how the Swedish State works is compatible whit his thoughts. Nozick, being the one that is most liberal, is then the one that has ideas that are most different from the Swedish State 2021 even though Sweden is known to be one of the most liberal and equal states in the world.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: On The io" of May 1994 Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected black president of South Africa. The occasion was regarded, both nationally and internationally, as a triumph for humanity and perfused with a widespread optimism for the future of South Africa. Mandela proclaimed in his inaugural speech that "Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will experience oppression of one by another .... The sun shall never set on so glorious an achievement." However, now, less than 10 years later the rapidly accelerating and devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic is again 'obscuring the sun'. Those people affected so negatively by the racial, economic and gender injustices of the apartheid past, seem again to be suffering a possible injustice, because of a health and welfare system that is struggling to meet the needs of the HIV affected population. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the concept of distributive justice in South Africa, within the context of this devastating epidemic. I begin by discussing the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. I argue that an acceptable framework for a theory of justice for health care in South Africa, must be worked out against the background of this egalitarian Bill of Rights. I then consider the extent of the HIV epidemic, the effect it is having on the people of South Africa and the consequent implications for health care needs. It is within this context that I examine and compare three theories of distributive justice, namely utilitarianism, John Rawls' theory of "Justice as Fairness" and a libertarian concept of justice, as proposed by Robert Nozick. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory that focuses on producing the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'. I argue that many health policy decisions in South Africa are in fact guided by this principle. However utilitarianism has both strengths and weaknesses which are critically examined. Within the framework of health care policy making, utilitarian justice dictates that rights are derivative and that the welfare of the majority usually takes precedence over the pressing needs of a minority. This issue in particular is discussed. Rawls' theory of "Justice as fairness" is critically discussed next. This theory has been adapted to health care by Norman Daniels, who argues that the Rawlsian principle of "fair equality of opportunity" is a suitable founding principle for health care institutions. Apartheid entrenched a system of 'inequality of opportunity'. Consequently, a theory that focuses on equality of opportunity, has many advantages within the South African context. I examine this theory in detail and provide justification for my assertion that it could be usefully adapted to South African healthcare and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Finally, I discuss a Libertarian (Nozickian) theory of justice and examine both the strengths and weaknesses of this theory. I attempt to demonstrate why a libertarian system, with it vigorous commitment to moral and economic individualism and belief that one is only entitled to that share of healthcare that can be paid for, would be unjust, if rigorously applied within the post-apartheid South African context. I conclude my dissertation by reiterating my assertion that "Justice as Fair Equality of Opportunity" could be used as a just foundation for a theory of justice for health care in current day, HIV/AIDS affected South Africa.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Teorieë van geregtigheid en 'n gesondheidsbeleid vir die VIGS epidemie in Suid Afrika: 'n vergelykende ontleding. Op die 10de Mei 1994 is Nelson Mandela ingehuldig as die eerste demokraties verkose swart president van Suid- Afrika. Die geleentheid is in beide Suid-Afrika en in die buiteland beskou as 'n oorwinning vir humaniteit. Optimisme oor Suid-Afrika se toekoms was oral tasbaar. Mandela het in sy inhuldigingstoespraak verkondig dat dit nooit weer sal gebeur dat hierdie pragtige land sal lyonder die onderdrukking van een oor die ander nie. Hy het gesê dat die son nooit salondergaan op so 'n wonderlike prestasie nie. Nou, minder as tien jaar later, is die verwoestende VIGS epidemie besig om weer die 'son te laat ondergaan'. Dieselffde mense wat alreeds onder apartheid se rasisme en ekonomiese en geslagsongeregtighede gely het, blyk nou weer verontreg te word; hierde keer omdat die gesondheids- en welsynsisteem sukkel om in die behoeftes van die VIGS-geaffekteerde populasie te voorsien. Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om die konsep van distributiewe geregtigheid in die konteks van die dreigende VIGS epidemie te bespreek. Ek begin met 'n bespreking van die Verklaring van Regte soos vervat in die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet. Ek voer aan dat enige aanvaarbare teorie oor geregtigheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse gesondheidsisteem gegrond moet word op hierdie egalitêre Verklaring van Regte. Tweedens kyk ek na die omvang van die VIGS epidemie, die effek wat dit op die HIV-positiewe populasie en hulle familielede het, en die gevolglike implikasies vir gesondheidsbehoeftes. Dit is binne hierdie konteks dat ek drie teorieë van distributiewe geregtigheid ondersoek en vergelyk; naamlik utilitarisme, John Rawls se teorie van "Justice as Fairness", en 'n libertynse konsep van geregtigheid soos voorgestel deur Robert Nozick. Utilitarisme is 'n konsekwensialistise teorie wat beteken dat die regte daad die een is wat in enige situasie die grootste geluk vir die meeste persone sal meebring. Ek voer aan dat baie van die beleidsrigtings wat 'n gesondheidsorg in Suid-Afrika gevolg is, deur hierdie teorie beïnvloed is. Utilitarisme het uiteraard sterk en swak punte en beide kante word krities ondersoek. In 'n gesondheidsorg konteks beteken utilitarisme dat regte altyd afgelei is en dat die welsyn van die meerderheid gewoonlik belangriker is as die van 'n minderheid, selfs wanneer die probleme van die minderheid ernstig en dringend is. Rawls se teorie van geregtigheid word vervolgens krities bespreek. Hierdie teorie is deur Norman Daniels aangepas vir gesondheidsorg. Hy stel voor dat Rawls se beginsel van 'regverdige gelykheid van geleentheid' baie effektief aangepas kan word vir gesondheidsorginstellings. Apartheid het 'n sisteem van ongelyke geleentheids verskans; gevolglik hou 'n teorie wat gelykheid van geleentheid verseker baie voordele vir die Suid- Afrikanse situasie in. Ek bespreek hierdie teorie in detail en poog om my standpunt dat die teorie besonder geskik is vir Suid-Afrikaanse gesondheidsisteem - veral in die konteks van die VIGS epidemie - te regverdig. Laastens bespreek ek die libertynse teorie van geregtigheid soos voorgestel deur Robert Nozick. Ek probeer aantoon waarom hierdie teorie, wat gebaseer is op morele en ekonomiese individualisme en gevolglik aanvoer dat mense geregtig is op gesondheidsorg alleenlik as hulle daarvoor kan betaal, onregverdig is in die Suid-Afrikaanse post-apartheid konteks. Ek sluit hierdie. verhandeling af deur weer te argumenteerdat Rawls se teorie en die beginsel van 'geregtigheid as gelyke geleentheide' uiters geskik is as 'n grondslag vir gesondheidsorg in Suid-Afrika vandag.

A presente dissertação propôs-se analisar a importância da construção do Estado na Filosofia Política. Num grande número de nações, a vida em sociedade encontra-se, actualmente, organizada em torno do padrão ocidental do Estado democrático e de Direito. Com ele, a política na sua dimensão de poder englobante tornou-se fundamental. Os teóricos desta área do saber têm procurado compreender a génese do Estado e as suas competências político-sociais, bem como a relação entre o Estado e o indivíduo na óptica dos direitos individuais e da Justiça. No contexto da recente produção filosófico-política, elegemos como objectivo analisar a perspectiva do Estado delineada por Robert Nozick. Para tal, procurámos situar este autor e o seu libertarismo no contexto das teorizações modernas e contemporâneas da Filosofia Política. Prosseguimos a tarefa com a abordagem das relações entre o Estado mínimo nozickiano e as diversas vertentes da Justiça, cuja pedra basilar são os direitos individuais. Concomitantemente, aflorámos a preocupação com os direitos democráticos e o papel da moral na fundamentação da Justiça. De um modo geral, não nos furtámos a tecer as nossas próprias considerações sobre a pertinência da abordagem de Robert Nozick, nem a propor uma perspectiva crítico-avaliativa do nozickismo relativamente ao paradigma actual.
The present work aims at analysing the central issue of the political construction of the State in political philosophy. In a great number of nations, life in society is currently organised around the Western pattern of the democratic law-governed State, within whose scope politics in its dimension of all-encompassing power earned a crucial role. Thinkers in this field of knowledge have tried to elucidate the origins of the State and the rise of its political and social responsibilities, as well as the relation between the State and the individual from the standpoint of Justice and individual rights. In the context of recent philosophical and political thinking, we endeavoured to study the conception of State outlined by Robert Nozick. To that end, we have undertaken to situate the author, as well as his libertarianism, in the framework of modern and contemporary theories of political philosophy. We then proceeded to approach the relations between the minimal State of Nozick and the different strands of Justice, whose cornerstone are individual rights. We have concurrently touched upon the issue of democratic rights and the role of morals as the foundation of Justice. By and large, we did not back away from weaving our own considerations on the relevance of Robert Nozick's approach and from putting Nozickian thought into critical perspective as regards the current paradigm.

This work deals with the different concepts of justice that are presented by works of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Seeing that they are liberal authors, the first chapter is devoted to liberalism and its forms. Rawls is presented as a supporter of modern liberalism and Nozick is presented as a representative of classical liberalism, concretely libertarianism. The second chapter discusses how both authors describe natural state. The third chapter is devoted to it how Rawls and Nozick talk about conception of liberty. The following chapter describes and compares their theories of justice: justice as fairness and justice as entitlement. The fifth chapter deals with the final reflection on the theories of both authors. There are presented various reactions and interpretations of the mentioned theories. At the same time, there is shown considerable asset of Rawls?s Theory of Justice and Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia which both influenced political-philosophical discussion.

Praca szkicuje zasadnicze elementy filozofii politycznej Roberta Nozicka: koncepcję państwa minimalnego, doktrynę indywidualnych praw, teorię sprawiedliwości odnoszącą się do własności. Wokół tych zagadnień wyłaniają się kwestie zaistnienia obowiązku politycznego, zobowiązania do społecznej partycypacji, sprawiedliwego podziału dóbr w państwie, zawłaszczania dającego trwały i przenośny tytuł własności do rzeczy, wykluczający roszczenia innych. Nozick stawia sobie za cel etyczne uzasadnienie państwa minimalnego i wykazanie, iż żadne państwo bardziej rozbudowane niż to minimalne nie posiada moralnej legitymizacji, bowiem, urzeczywistniając ideał sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej, narusza ludzkie prawa. Intelektualni przeciwnicy Nozicka to stanowisko anarchicznego indywidualizmu, wielki rywal John Rawls i teoria utylitarystyczna, specyficznie konsekwencjalizm. Nozick opisuje proces powstania państwa ze stanu anarchii (posługuje się kontrfaktyczną hipotezą stanu natury) i argumentuje, iż w trakcie przejścia od dominującej agencji ochrony do państwa minimalnego, a następnie do struktury państwa minimalnego, nie doszło do działań moralnie nagannych, nie naruszono niczyich praw, a zatem państwo jest etycznie usprawiedliwione. Nozick dokonuje drobiazgowej krytyki modelu sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej Rawlsa; krytykuje wzorcowe, schematyczne zasady dystrybucji dóbr oraz zasady oparte o pewien założony końcowy stan. Obie formy dystrybucji, przyjmując założenie "bieżącego przekroju czasu" i traktując własność jak "społeczny wspólny garnek", naruszają indywidualne, szczególne uprawnienia konkretnych jednostek do konkretnych rzeczy. Nozick kontrastuje zasady sprawiedliwości Rawlsa i sposób organizacji państwa socjalistycznego z własną teorią uprawnień. Teoria jest trójdzielna i ma charakter historyczny; reguluje kwestie sprawiedliwego pierwszego zawłaszczenia, transferu dóbr i naprawienia powstałych w ramach dwu poprzednich zasad krzywd i niesprawiedliwości. Jej idea mieści się w maksymie: wszystko, co powstaje ze sprawiedliwej sytuacji w wyniku sprawiedliwych kroków, samo jest sprawiedliwe. Praca jest podzielona na osiem rozdziałów podejmujących kolejno zagadnienia: założeń antropologicznych, teorii praw, własności, teorii uprawnień, powstania państwa minimalnego, modelu utopii, oceny typu sprawiedliwości i racjonalności, i późniejszych poglądów Nozicka na kwestie polityczne i moralne. Każdy z rozdziałów prezentuje dyskusję i krytykę poglądów Nozicka. Praca eksponuje wątki obecne w filozoficznej twórczości Nozicka: fascynację filozofią nauk, niechęć wobec przymusu, refleksję nad pojęciem sensownego życia. Nozick opiera się na metodologicznym indywidualizmie oraz wykorzystuje, jako zasadę metodologiczną, wyjaśnienie typu "niewidzialna ręka". Teoria należy do typu teorii racjonalistycznych, modeli teoretycznych pozbawionych w zasadzie odniesień do rzeczywistości empirycznej. Filozofia Nozicka ma charakter skrajnie indywidualistyczny - libertariański - nawiązuje do tradycji klasycznego liberalizmu, dla którego dwoma zasadniczymi postulatami są: nienaruszalność własności prywatnej i wolność - swoboda działania jednostki. Swoboda działania umożliwia realizację dalekosiężnej wizji życia jednostki i działanie w kategorii jej dopełniania (realizację celów). Elementem kluczowym jest zasada samoposiadania pojmowana, jako zestaw uprawnień jednostki wobec państwa (katalog, zespól praw można ustalić a priori). Prawa jednostek, postulaty teoretyczne umożliwiające swobodę działania są nienaruszalne, obowiązują powszechnie. Zobowiązania wobec społeczeństwa - ich brak - wyraża formuła: od każdego według tego, jak wybiera, każdemu według tego, jak jego wybierają. Teoria Nozicka i preferowany model racjonalności ekonomicznej jest zestawiony z teorią szkoły publicznego wyboru, z ekonomią filozoficzną J.M. Buchanana prezentującą oryginalne podejście w filozofii politycznej uwzględniające wybory zbiorowe (kolektywne). Teoretycy szkoły publicznego wyboru badają mechanizmy składania bądź rozkładania decyzji zbiorowych na wybory indywidualne. W perspektywie tych badań teoria Nozicka, choć spójna i oryginalna, wydaje się być, mimo wszystko anachroniczna, głównie ze względu na przyjęcie założenia, że państwo ma jedynie zapewniać bezpieczeństwo i dotrzymywanie indywidualnych umów.
This work is a concise presentation of Robert Nozick's political philosophy as presented in his highly acclaimed Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The moral foundation of Nozick's system, the system of individuals, rests on the notion of absolute individual rights. Individuals are separate (separate existences) and each have their own lives to lead. This gives morality its form: as moral side constraints. The content of morality is the libertarian constraint prohibiting aggression (paternalistic aggression included). Guided by the notion of individual rights Nozick takes on the task of justifying a minimal state against the anarchist claim, that in the course of maintaining a monopoly on the use of force and protecting everyone within its territory, the state must violate individuals' rights, and is therefore immoral. Nozick adapts the invisible hand mechanism to demonstrate that a minimal state would arise from a state of nature by a process which need not violate anyone's rights. The work presents Nozick's account of the development of a minimal state. He further argues against an extensive state, or a welfare state, claiming that in the course of fulfilling the demands of distributive justice the more extensive state does violate peoples' rights. The present work has been divided into 8 chapters, each of them dealing with a separate matter. They cover respectively the matter of Nozick's various philosophical interests; the issue of rights; their status and character; the moral basis of his system; and the issues of property and ownership. There is an extensive presentation of Nozick's theory of justice, known as the entitlement theory; an account of his debate with John Rawls; and a presentation of the development of a minimal state. Finally, there is a brief chapter devoted to his political and moral ideas developed over a decade after the publication of his acclaimed book. The most important set of rights for Nozick are ownership rights and property rights. He thinks of them as absolute. The idea of self-ownership, designed to safeguard an individual's moral autonomy and to justify his or her moral right to own private property, justifies the appropriation of resources. A fulfillment of the concept's demands requires a specific type of the state: the minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud and enforcement of contracts; any state more extensive violates people's rights. Nozick claims that distributive justice, a tool used by the welfare state to achieve egalitarian goals (social and economic equality), implies redistribution practices (taxation). Those almost always infringe upon the individuals' rights. A patterned distribution not only ignores the fact that individuals are entitled to certain holdings, but is also remarkably blind to the fact that particular things come to the world already attached to particular people who have entitlements over them. The state may not use its coercive powers to improve the situation of less well-favored citizens. The concept of self-ownership conveys Nozick's powerful conviction that individuals' rights leave almost no room for the state and its officials. There is also a presentation of Nozick' concept of utopia, which differs from the traditional theories of a perfect society. The structure he proposes consists of two elements: the framework of a utopian common ground, and the particular, individual communities established within that framework. The framework, (libertarian, voluntary and laisses-faire), is equivalent to the minimal state. A vast range of communities cover different aspects of life and give individuals the opportunity to lead different kinds of lives under different institutions. The utopia proposed by Nozick will consist of different utopias; there will be no one single kind of utopian community or one single one kind of life led in that utopia. No one will impose his or her vision of utopia upon others. Nozick presents various theoretical routes leading to his model. All of them take seriously the fact that people are different and complex, that one system, one unique community or society will never obtain universal assent. The dual structure of his utopia leaves liberty for experimentation and makes room for people's individual decisions whether to live in or to leave particular communities. The model rejects the outrageous idea of many other concepts of a perfect society, the idea of molding and transforming people to fit a utopian project. Nozick concludes that the minimal state, the utopian common ground, is not pale and feeble as it may seem in comparison to other types of states. The minimal state is, as Nozick puts it, the one that best realizes the utopian dreams and aspirations of various visionaries. Nozick's defense of libertarianism remains his most notable intellectual mark on philosophical inquiry.

Le présent mémoire cherche à préciser les contours d'une fiscalité équitable dans le cadre du système économique et politique actuel au Québec et au Canada. Pour ce faire, il commence (chapitre 1) par présenter les objectifs des régimes d'imposition et les moyens dont dispose ici l'État pour les atteindre. Par la suite (chapitre Il), nous exposons quatre théories libérales influentes de la justice reconnaissant toutes d'une part une place centrale à un idéal de la promotion de la liberté individuelle, d'autre part un certain rôle au libre-marché dans l'économie. Ces théories sont les suivantes: l'utilitarisme; la théorie de la justice comme équité; le libertarianisme et la théorie des capabilités. Enfin (chapitre III), après avoir retenu comme modèle la théorie des capabilités de Sen et justifié ce choix, nous esquissons, sur cette base, les contours d'une fiscalité équitable en nous efforçant d'en montrer la désirabilité et la faisabilité. La conclusion de ce mémoire en rappelle les inévitables limites et indique sommairement les avenues de recherche qu'ouvre le présent travail. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Fiscalité, Théorie de la justice, Équité, Éthique, Amartya Sen, John Rawls, Milton Friedman, Robert Nozick, Québec, Canada.

Ce mémoire a pour but de miner le projet libertarien d'une défense de la structure de la propriété libérale basée sur le principe de propriété de soi. Loin de nier le concept de propriété de soi, nous adoptons le principe associé à la pensée libertarienne et démontrons que l'adoption d'un tel principe nous mène à la restructuration du concept de propriété vers un concept qui est cohérent avec les valeurs égalitaristes et démocratiques. Nous espérons, ceci faisant, pouvoir montrer l'incohérence du projet libertarien, et fournir les outils nécessaires afin que les égalitaristes puissent défendre leurs idées en terrain libertarien.
The purpose of this thesis is to try and undermine the libertarian project of defending the liberal structure of ownership through its use of the principle of self-ownership. Far from denying the concept of self-ownership, we adopt the principle associated with libertarian thought and show that the adoption of such a principle leads us to a restructuring of the concept of ownership towards one that is coherent with egalitarian and democratic values. We hope that, by doing so, we are able to show the incoherence within libertarianism and give the tools necessary for egalitarians to defend their ideas on libertarian grounds.

Lo, Ho Man.
Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 159-161).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
ABSTRACT --- p.2
AUTHOR´ةS DECLARATION --- p.4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.5
CONTENT --- p.7
INTRODUCTION --- p.9
Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- A CONCEPTION OF DESERT IN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE --- p.13
Chapter 1 --- The Structure and Features of Desert --- p.14
Chapter 2 --- Desert Basis --- p.26
Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DESERT --- p.34
Chapter 1 --- Emotional Response to Undeserved Treatment --- p.35
Chapter 2 --- Desert and Autonomy --- p.36
Chapter 3 --- "Desert, Congruence and the Meaning of the Good" --- p.40
Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- THE ENTITLEMENT THEORY AND OBJECTIONS TO DESERT --- p.43
Chapter 1 --- Outline of the Entitlement Theory --- p.43
Chapter 2 --- Desert as a Patterned Principle --- p.53
Chapter 3 --- Argument from Liberty --- p.55
Chapter 4 --- Argument from Right --- p.71
Chapter 5 --- Argument from Self-Ownership --- p.90
Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- TWO NOZICKEAN ARGUMENTS FOR DESERT --- p.101
Chapter 1 --- Individual Argument --- p.101
Chapter 2 --- Social Argument --- p.110
Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DESERT-INCLUSIVE ENTITLEMENT THEORY --- p.127
Chapter 1 --- Desert: Pattern or a Strand of Pattern? --- p.129
Chapter 2 --- Desert and Property Right --- p.140
Chapter 3 --- A Desert-inclusive Entitlement Theory --- p.152
CONCLUSION --- p.157
BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.159

Le néolibéralisme, un terme qui désigne couramment la raison d’état contemporaine, est largement associé à un désinvestissement de l’État pour la cause sociale ainsi qu’à un discours de légitimation des disparités socio-économiques. Il s’agit, pour plusieurs, d’une idéologie qui ne considère pas la justice comme un idéal collectif à poursuivre. Un retour sur certains penseurs à qui l’on attribue la formulation des idées néolibérales permet toutefois de constater que la justice fut, au sein de leurs travaux, l’un des thèmes majeurs. L’objectif général de ce mémoire est donc de présenter la conception de la justice chez deux penseurs du néolibéralisme : le journaliste américain Walter Lippmann et l’économiste autrichien Friedrich A. von Hayek. Cette perspective comparée me permettra d’identifier ce que je nomme la «conception néolibérale» de la justice, conception qui s’articule à partir d’une compréhension singulière du marché. Dans le premier chapitre, je présente le problème central de la conception néolibérale de la justice, en abordant la posture épistémologique privilégiée par Hayek et Lippmann. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je présente certaines modalités de cette conception et soulève ses principales apories. Je soutiens aussi qu’une rupture survient entre Hayek et Lippmann autour de la notion de «responsabilité». Finalement, je compare la conception néolibérale de la justice avec la conception libertarienne présentée par Nozick. C’est à partir des critères de justice respectifs de chaque théorie que j’avance la distinction, au troisième chapitre, entre les deux conceptions pourtant similaires. Contrairement à une analyse courante qui fait du néolibéralisme un projet amoral, je soutiens que la reconnaissance de la dimension morale du discours néolibéral ouvre une fenêtre à partir de laquelle il devient possible de critiquer le projet sur des bases éthiques. C’est en identifiant la notion de justice à l’oeuvre dans le discours néolibéral contemporain et en l’inscrivant dans la tradition morale présentée dans le cadre de ce mémoire que nous sommes mieux à même de comprendre l’idéologie du néolibéralisme.
Neoliberalism, a term commonly used to describe the current paradigm of the state, is largely related to a disengagement of the state from issues of social welfare and is associated with the legitimization of socio-economic inequalities. For many critics, it also represents an ideology that does not consider justice as a collective ideal that should be pursued. This stands in contradiction with the fact that justice was a central theme in the works of many thinkers to whom we attribute the formulation of neoliberal thought. Considering this paradox, the main purpose of this Master’s thesis is to expose the conception of justice as expressed by two key neoliberal thinkers: the American journalist Walter Lippmann and the Austrian economist Friedrich A. von Hayek. This comparative perspective will allow me to single out what I call the "neoliberal conception" of justice, a conception that builds on a particular understanding of the market. In the first chapter, I present the central challenge of the neoliberal conception of justice by broaching the epistemological stance common to Hayek and Lippmann. In the second chapter, I present specific properties of this conception and discuss its principal blind spots. I also show that Hayek and Lippmann disagree when it comes to the notion of "responsibility". Finally, I compare the neoliberal conception of justice with that of libertarians, as presented by Robert Nozick in his work Anarchy, State and Utopia. In this third section, I argue that Hayek and Nozick’s respective criteria of justice drive a wedge between two otherwise rather similar conceptions. In contrast to a standard analysis that treats neoliberalism as an amoral project, I contend that recognition of the moral dimension of neoliberal discourse opens up a perspective from which it becomes possible to challenge the project on ethical grounds. Understanding the idea of justice underpinning contemporary neoliberalism, as rooted in the moral tradition presented in this essay, is necessary if we are to criticize this ideology on moral grounds.

I argue in my dissertation that the Marxist ethical claim against capitalism could be bolstered through: 1) a recognition of the inaccurate human ontology that capitalist theories of entitlement presuppose, 2) a reconceptualization and replacement of that old paradigm of human ontology with a concept that I call “organicism” and 3) a normative argument for why this new paradigm of human ontology necessitates a new political economy and a new way of structuring society. I use the debate between Robert Nozick and G.A. Cohen as a launching point for my case.

In his book, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that Robert Nozick’s “entitlement theory” is unable to produce the robust sense of freedom that libertarians and capitalist proponents aggrandize. According to Cohen, the reason for this is due to the limitations and consistency errors produced by the libertarian adherence to the “self-ownership principle.” (the moral/natural right that a person is the sole proprietor of their own body and life). Namely, that the pale freedom that the proletariat enjoys within capitalism is inconsistent with the Libertarian’s own standard for freedom. So, Cohen argues for the elimination of the self-ownership principle. My project picks up where Cohen’s leaves off, claiming that the consistency errors don’t lie in entitlement theory’s use of the self-ownership principle (it is important that we don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater). Rather, the errors lie in the principle’s metaphysics - specifically in the ontology of the human being. The self-ownership principle is only faulty because it presupposes an impossible self. I show that entitlement theory heedlessly presupposes the self (or a human ontology) as a “rational, autonomous, individual.” I then deconstruct each of these three features (rationality, autonomy, and individuality) to show that this picture of the human being is not necessarily incorrect, but it is incomplete.

Although we are indeed rational, autonomous, individual creatures, these are only emergent characteristics that merely arise after the organic and socially interconnected aspects of our selves are nurtured. I encompass these latter features of our selves under the heading: “organicism”. So, my contribution is to provide a different ontological foundation of the human being – “organicism” – to replace the Enlightenment grown: “rational, autonomous, individual”. I draw heavily from Karl Marx’s philosophical anthropology, and G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of Geist/Spirit, with a little inspiration from Aristotle and ecological theory to construct “organicism” – a pancorporealist, naturalistic materialism. It is the theory that the human being is, in essence, an organic creature, inseparable from nature, but through the nurturing of these material, organic, symbiotic relationships (with other humans and with the ecosystem) that these “super”-natural capacities of rationality and autonomy arise along with and because of a full self-consciousness.

Finally, I infer the normative implications of this ontology of subjectivity. This organicist conception of the self has transformational effects on our notions of property and the way we structure society. So, I contend that organicist ontology then serves as the foundation for a normative theory of political economy that sees the flourishing or health (broadly speaking) of the organicist human as the primary ethical goal. I speculate on an alternative political economy that can provide the robust sense of freedom that Nozick’s entitlement theory (capitalism) was lacking because it actually produces the conditions necessary for rationality, autonomy and individual freedom.