Literatura académica sobre el tema "Central bank reserves"

The paper focuses on the importance of using reserve assets in order to increase the bank financial stability and the banking system as a whole. The essential requirements for reserving commercial banks have been presented. The methods of regulating the required reserves have been studied. The specific features of applying the required reserves in banking activities (reserve requirements and liquidity, monetary policy, reserve requirements as a monetary tool, reserve requirements as a fiscal tool) have been revealed. The schedule of averaging periods of required reserves for 2019 is being considered. The general principles which credit organizations are guided by when creating reserves are the following: obligatory availability of reserves for all credit organizations throughout their existence; forming reserves in relation to liabilities to legal entities and individuals; possibility of removing from the list obligations for which reserves have been created. It has been mentioned that the main objectives of the reserve requirement system are to provide banks with sufficient liquidity and to regulate the money supply. Particular attention is paid to the Central Bank as a reserve requirements regulator. In accordance with the changes of the Central Bank of July 1, 2019, the established standards on reserve requirements for deposits in national currency are set at 4%, in foreign currency at 14%. Manipulating the required reserve rate will provide the Central Bank with the opportunity to adjust the liquidity and solvency both of an individual bank and the entire banking system. The method of averaging required reserves includes the possibility for a commercial bank not to transfer reserves to the Central Bank based on a certain sum of money. The averaging coefficient is set at 0.25 to the standard volume of required reserves

We develop a model that shows how the currency denomination of a country's imports influences the funding structure of its banking system, and in turn, the currency composition of its central bank's reserve holdings. The link between the dollar's role in bank funding and its role as a central bank reserve currency is stronger when the country's fiscal capacity is limited, and when exchange rates are volatile. In the data, there is a pronounced cross-country relationship between the fraction of imports that are dollar invoiced, and the fraction of central-bank foreign-exchange reserves that are held in dollars.

We build a nonlinear dynamic model with currency, demand deposits and bank reserves. Monetary base is controlled by central bank, while money supply is determined by the interactions between central bank, commercial banks and public. In economic crises when banks cut loans, monetary policy following a Taylor rule is not efficient. Negative interest on reserves or forward guidance is effective, but deflation is still likely to be persistent. If central bank simultaneously targets both interest rate and money supply by a Taylor rule and a Friedman’s k-percent rule, inflation and output are stabilized. An interest rate rule policy is just a subset of a more general monetary policy framework in which central bank can move interest rate and money supply in every direction.

In a world with interest on reserves, the central bank has two distinct tools that it can use to raise the short-term policy rate: it can either increase the interest it pays on reserve balances, or it can reduce the quantity of reserves in the system. We argue that by using both of these tools together, and by broadening the scope of reserve requirements, the central bank can simultaneously pursue two objectives: it can manage the inflation-output tradeoff using a Taylor-type rule, and it can regulate the externalities created by socially excessive short-term debt issuance on the part of financial intermediaries. (JEL E43, E52, E58, G21)

AbstractIn March 2015, the Eurosystem launched its QE programme. The asset purchases induced a rapid and strong increase in excess reserves, implying a structural liquidity surplus in the euro area banking sector. Against this background, the first part of this paper analyses the Eurosystem’s liquidity management during normal times, crisis times and times of too low inflation. With a focus on the latter, the second part of this paper develops a relatively simple theoretical model in which banks operate under a structural liquidity surplus. The model shows that increasing excess reserves have no or even a contractionary impact on bank loan supply. As the newly created excess reserves are heterogeneously distributed across euro area countries, the impact of QE on bank loan supply may differ across countries. Moreover, we derive implications for monetary policy implementation. Increases in the central bank’s main refinancing rate as well as in the minimum reserve ratio and decreases in the central bank’s deposit rate develop expansionary effects on loan supply – contrary to the case in which banks face a structural liquidity deficit.

This paper provides an explanation for the supervisory role of the central bank in a monetary general equilibrium model of bank liquidity provision. Under incomplete information on the individual banks' liquidity needs, individual banks find it optimal to invest solely in bank loans holding no cash reserves, and rely on the interbank market for their withdrawal demands. Using the costly state verification approach under uncertainty in aggregate liquidity demands, the supervisory role of the central bank as a large intermediary arises as an incentive-compatible arrangement by which banks hold the correct level of cash reserves. First, it takes up a delegated monitoring role for the banking system. Second, it engages in discount-window lending at a penalty rate, where the discount margin covers exactly the monitoring cost incurred. Finally, under the central banking mechanism, currency premium no longer exists in the sense that currency is worth the same as deposits having an equal face value.

This paper models a representative bank, and uses this model to explore the assumptions and implications of a selection of money-creation theories. It is shown that the money-supply process tends toward the logic of exogeneity as banks' fears about liquidity stress increases. At present, banks do not fear liquidity stress because central banks are operating under a floor system with a superabundance of reserves following unsterilized quantitative easing. Secondly, a role for a ‘central-bank digital currency’ is suggested as a useful complement to reserves policy in an economy with large or collusive banks.

Insufficient level of liquid funds in banking activity is the main reason for its financial difficulties and, accordingly, the appearance of a shortage of payment funds. The article describes various methods of liquidity management. One of them is the optimal placement of your own and equivalent funds. The method requires maintaining a certain level of highly liquid assets. This method is used by banks in an undeveloped financial market. The second method of managing liquidity is to regulate the volume and structure of liabilities, which are secured by attracting external loans. This method is used by large banks. The article notes that each of these methods has liquidity management tools. In foreign countries, assets are classified into primary and secondary reserves. Secondary reserves are a complement to primary. The article shows that a large amount of money on deposit accounts of commercial banks can lead to rampant inflation. To regulate the money supply, the Central Bank conducts a policy of credit expansion or credit restriction. The authors note, a more effective tool is an increase or decrease in the base rate (discount), the use of which reduces or increases the excess reserves of banks and their ability to create new money. The participation of the Central Bank in the open market for the purchase and sale of securities, the establishment of minimum reserve requirements for commercial banks also allows you to reduce or increase the creation of new deposits. The authors show that the regulation of commercial banks' liquidity management methods maximizes revenue and minimizes banking services.

The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed an historically unprecedented rise in the quantity of assets held as foreign exchange reserves by central banks. The locus of this rise has been in east Asia. By analyzing the change in reserve accumulation behavior which followed the financial crises that swept the globe in the late 1990s, this paper puts forth an explanation of the rise in East Asian reserve holdings based on increased sensitivity to perceived crisis risk by the Asian "Tigers" (including Japan and China). Our findings indicate that not only are reserve holdings worldwide higher since the end of the 1990s in real terms, but that the increase in East Asian reserve holdings has outpaced the rest of the world by a factor of 6. Empirical results corroborate the hypothesis that the relevant channel of influence for this change is through the interaction of exchange rate policy-specifically, a "fixed" exchange rate regime-and the extent to which a country engages in international trade.

This thesis examines a number of issues related to central bank international reserves holdings and foreign exchange intervention. We study the long run determinants of reserves within the context of the post Bretton Woods dirty float period. It is argued that traditional approaches fail to take account of central bank attempts to influence the real exchange rate by foreign exchange intervention. Additionally, we update previous research by employing recent developments in the non-stationary timeseries and panel data literature. In particular, we utilise the Johansen VAR technology and recent innovations in panel cointegration, to assess the long-run determinants of reserves and short-run dynamics. By jointly modelling the UK reserve holdings and the monetary sector we consider the domestic economy impact of reserve changes, the stability of narrow money demand and whether monetary disequilibria effect reserves as suggested by the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments. The effects of daily US and German foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate volatility are also studied. We find evidence consistent with other research that US intervention reduces volatility and extend these results to bilateral rates not previously considered. Moreover, we find evidence in favour of the distinction between unilateral and concerted intervention and of the existence of policy externalities, underlining the importance of international policy coordination.

This diploma thesis is focused on analysis of foreign exchange reserves of central banks. The first part of the work explains the most important theoretical concepts, that are necessary for further understanding of the topic of the work. This section will also describe the main criteria which determines the optimal level of foreign exchange reserves. It will be also discussed about a new trend that is known as accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and about the sourcrces, the lead to accumulation. The following part explains in detail the concept of reserves currency and tells about the currency structure of reserves. The empirical part will be devoted to the analysis and management of the foreign exchange reserve in Israel.

La crise financière mondiale qui a débuté en 2008, et la crise des dettes souveraines en zone euro qui l'a suivie, ont successivement forcé les macroéconomistes à repenser leur cadre conceptuel. Cette thèse est une modeste contribution aux efforts colossaux déployés par les macroéconomistes à travers le monde pour faire face à ce défi: renforcer la compréhension de l'utilisation optimale des outils de politique économique non conventionnels. A cette fin, elle est construite en deux parties. Chaque partie vise à explorer au plan théorique un "contexte macroéconomique-type" au sein duquel des outils de politique économique non conventionnels ont été employés ces dernières années. La première partie, intitulée "Politique Non Conventionelle Optimale en Economie Ouverte", analyse l'utilisation optimale d'instruments de politique économique non conventionels par une banque centrale en économie ouverte. En présence de frictions financières qui modifient la manière dont la politique monétaire affecte l'économie, ou en présence de chocs exogènes qui mettent en défaut la "divine coïncidence", cette partie décrit comment un banquier central devrait combiner un instrument de politique monétaire non conventionnelle et la politique monétaire conventionnelle à des fins de stabilisation macroéconomique. La seconde partie, "Politique Budgétaire Optimale en Union Monétaire", adopte le point de vue du gouvernement d'un pays situé en union monétaire (typiquement la zone euro). Un tel pays ne disposant d'une politique monétaire autonome (au plan national), cette partie étudie la possibilité pour un tel pays d'utiliser la politique budgétaire comme un outil de stabilisation, et décrit l'utilisation optimale des dévaluations fiscales en réponse à des chocs exogènes idiosyncratiques
The 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent euro area sovereign debt crisis successively forced macroeconomists to reassess this conceptual framework. This thesis is a modest contribution to the huge efforts undertaken by macroeconomists following the crisis to meet this challenge, i.e. to develop some insights about the optimal use of unconventional policy tools. To do so, this thesis is twofold. Each part intends to explore from a theoretical perspective a fundamental macroeconomic situation that called for the use of unconventional policy instruments in the recent years. The first part, ”Optimal Unconventional Policy in An Open Economy” analyzes the optimal use of unconventional policy instruments by the central bank in an open economy framework. Assuming that the presence of financial frictions changes the way monetary policy affects the economy, or that the occurence of exogenous shocks breaks the ”divine coincidence”, this part describes how a central bank should combine an unconventional policy instrument and conventional monetary policy to favor macroeconomic stabilization. The second part, ”Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union”, takes the standpoint of the governement of a country located in a currency union (typically the euro area). Such a country being deprived of monetary policy autonomy, this part considers the opportunity of using fiscal policy as a stabilization tool, and describes the optimal use of fiscal devaluations following idiosyncratic exogenous shocks

This paper compares economical and political independence to a success rate of monetary policy of national banks, on a case of Fed and the Czech National Bank. Based on my definition of independence and accountability based on literature, I show that price stability defined as a main goal is the key factor. If the goal consists of more indicators, there is space for political pressure and the success rate decreases. Some rate of independence is necessary in order to achieve a healthy economy, however, total independence cannot be the target. Accountability then works towards independence as a system of achieving legitimacy, not as a substitute. Public inflation aversion is also considered as an important factor for achieving price stability.

The master´s thesis is about the conceptions of the Czech National Bank, the Federal Reserve System, the European Central Bank and People's Bank of China. It focuses on the comparison of these conceptions with the created universal model of the central bank and its parameters, and finds out that the selected central banks are lot away from this model. Important is also a perspective of the Czech National Bank after joining the euro area and the fact that at this moment her role will be replaced by the European Central Bank. The European Central Bank, compared with the Federal Reserve and the People's Bank deviates the least from its inflation target and therefore is pretty close to reach a price stability. However, ECB clearly financed some government debts, and that is inconsistent with the law. In conclusion can be noted that the central banks of the Czech Republic, the United States and the euro area reach the high level of freedom and are independent of the other components of state power and vice versa People's Bank of China remains strongly dependent on the executive power.

The thesis deals with relation between central bank independence and accountability. The relation is examined on example of quantitative easing implemented in the period 2005 - 2016 by the European central bank and the Federal Reserve System. From the theoretical and practical point of view the thesis proves that the relation between central bank independence and accountability are influenced by the specification of targets of monetary policy to a great extent. The thesis also proves that the specific definition of both central bank independence and accountability influenced the characteristics of quantitative resp. credit easing. Moreover, such monetary policy can potentially endanger the independence of both central banks in many ways. Thus, the implementation of quantitative easing itself and its potential consequences evidences that the contemporary conception of central bank independence and accountability is insufficient and needs to be reviewed.

This three part dissertation begins by "Examining the Origin of Federal Reserve Independence." This paper explores early Fed history with a particular emphasis on the period between 1947 and 1953 in order to provide a complete political account of Fed Independence.
Government

In this dissertation, I study the legitimacy of the Federal Reserve System. Administrative legitimacy, I argue, is an evaluative (or subjective) concept consisting of two beliefs: first, administrative institutions have a right to govern; second, they are an appropriate way to handle public tasks. After discussing scholarship on legitimacy, I examine the Federal Reserve System, asking two questions about it. First, how have its officials attempted to legitimate both their institution and their actions over time? Second, how have elected officials, scholars, and political activists attempted to (de)legitimate the Fed and its officialsâ actions? While answering my research questions, I tell a story about which strategies the institutionâ s supporters have used to legitimate the Fed and which strategies the institutionâ s opponents have used to delegitimate it. To do so, I examine two things: the public argument about the Fedâ s administrative legitimacy from 1970 to 1995; the Fedâ s interactions with its environment, those with direct implications for its legitimacy, during this time.
Ph. D.

After the global financial crisis, central banks have changed attitudes towards gold and have unconventional policy measures, in addition to conventional interest rate cuts. With these measures central banks aimed to support financial stability, and to reduce to potential adverse effects from international capital flows. From the perspective of investors and central banks gold positions and gold reserves are still significant and debatable issues. The purpose of this study is to investigate the composition of central bank reserves the period of 2008 and 2018. In this paper, generally we compared gold reserve holdings of major central banks with Turkey. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) has increased gold reserves especially since 2002. With implementing effective policies, CBRT has increased gold holdings in international reserves. CBRT is one of the countries with the highest share of gold reserves in the world.

In recent years, there has been considerable instability in the exchange rates of many countries. This can directly affect macroeconomic stability on one side and monetary policy or rather money supply on the other. Because central banks are making interventions to the foreign exchange market by buying and selling foreign exchange in order to provide stability of exchange rate. As a result, both the official reserves and the money supply are constantly changing. Since Kyrgyzstan is a country dependent on imports in most commodities, the Central Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic sees the exchange rates’ stability as an important instrument of price stabilizing. However, such a policy may deteriorate the stability of the total money supply and adversely affect the economy. Therefore, in this study, it is aimed to examine the relations between exchange rate, money supply and official reserves by using 2002-2016 monthly data and cointegration method. Empirical results have shown that a change in the exchange rate causes opposite changes in both the reserves and the money supply as a result of the central bank’s interventions. However, more concrete recommendations on the effectiveness of monetary policy in Kyrgyzstan are required to make more detailed analysis.

In this paper, we investigate the recent monetary policies and development of Turkish banking system during the post 2001 financial and banking crisis. We explore the effects of capital inflows and outflows to real exchange rates and the real stock market prices, before and after the financial crisis. We investigate the relationship between real exchange rate, real stock prices and capital flows. We decompose the foreign flows into real assets and liabilities, in order to investigate the possible long-term effect of inflows and outflows. Reversal of capital flow seems to create a possibility of exchange rate crisis. The Turkish Central Bank by taking lessons from this experience they formulate their recent policies accordingly. Recent Monetary Policy mix in Turkey aims to have financial stability by increasing the reserve ratio in each component of capital flows in Turkey. The ratio increases shorter the period of the asset. The Central Bank work claims to have an effect similar to inflation targeting.

In recent years there has been considerable interest in the development of electronic money schemes. Electronic money has the potential to take over from cash as the primary means of making small-value payments and could make such transactions easier and cheaper for both consumers and merchants. Electronic money is a record of the funds or "value" available to a consumer stored on an electronic device in his or her possession, either on a prepaid card or on a personal computer for use over a computer network such as the Internet. This paper argues that e-money, as a network good, could become an important form of currency in the future. Such a development would influence the effectiveness and implementation of monetary policy. If an increased use of e-money substantially limits demand for central bank reserves, it would require changes in the operational target of the central bank and a closer coordination of monetary and fiscal policies.

Quantitative easing (QE), as a measure of unconventional monetary policy (UMP), has been followed by many of the central banks of advanced economies to boost the economy by stimulating investment and consumption. The study identifies the most recent QE programs undertaken by central banks of four major advanced economies, namely, Federal Reserve (Fed), Bank of England (BOE), Bank of Japan (BOJ) and European Central Bank (ECB), and examines its impact on major macroeconomic indicators, namely output growth, inflation, exchange rate indices and stock market indices, employing vector autoregressive (VAR) models. Findings of the study suggest that QE was only favorable for real GDP growth of USA and the development of stock market of euro area. However, such an UMP failed to bring about changes in appropriate directions among the other economic indicators of these advanced economies. QE at an adequate scale to offset the recessionary forces could help achieve the expected results of the policy action. At the same time, policy makers should think over other supplementary measures that can support and expedite the impact of QE in favourable directions to achieve the desired goals of such UMP.

In this paper we study the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous expectations exchange rate model. The empirical evidence is conducted by applying a Markov switching approach to daily AUD/USD exchange rate, intervention data of the Reserve Bank of Australia from 2006 to 2012. Our results are supporting both chartists and fundamentalist regimes. It is shown that the two regimes are persistent. However, Reserve Bank of Australia efforts to exert a stabilizing effect of foreign exhange interventions, the result is inconclusive.

The Eurasian Economic Union, which was officially established five years ago, faced many financial and economic problems in this period. After 2014, when sanctions against Russia began, all members’ national currency suffered serious depreciation and central banks had to actively intervene in the foreign exchange market. In fact, Russia and Kazakhstan have changed regime and switched from the fixed to the flexible exchange rate system. Since the foreign exchange market has been more stable in recent years, central banks are trying to complete the reserves that had been lost that period. Therefore, with the change of foreign reserves, money supply is also changing. The aim of this study is to examine and compare the relationship between exchange rates, reserves and money supply in five EAEU countries. Quarterly data for the period 2010-2019 was used to achieve the goal. Toda-Yamamoto causality and ARDL cointegration approach were used as a method. It was concluded that more coordinated execution of monetary and exchange rate policies would be in favor of all members. However, the basic principle should be that all members benefit equally from the cooperation.

International funds flow freely across the countries both quantitatively and legally as a result of financial liberalization carried out by globalization process and huge amount of money flows into the countries in liberal system. Particularly for developing countries, these fund flows refer as hot money are mentioned frequently with respect of positive and negative signs. High export performance of the Netherlands as a result of discovering large natural gas reserve leads to increase rapidly its own currency. In 1959 when economic indicators getting worse, the reason of crisis appears as decreasing export in consequence of over-valued currency leads to decrease the industrial production. This paradoxical situation is named as “Dutch Disease” in economics literature. The purpose of this study is examining the effect of hot money inflow on the manufacturing sector of Turkey and testing Dutch disease for Turkish economy. In this paper, the monthly data 2006:01-2013:12 from Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey is used. Test results of causality tests that Toda-Yamamoto method (1995) and Hacker-Hatemi-J (2006) bootstrap method approve that there is no causality between portfolio investment and manufacturing industrial production index and also export. The results confirm that portfolio investments do not lead to Dutch disease for Turkey.

The Board of Directors of the Central Bank, as per the provisions of Article 5 of Law 31 of 1992, submits a report to the Congress of the Republic that describes the macroeconomic performance for the first half of 2019 and its prospects for the remainder of the year. The last two chapters report on the composition of the country’s international reserves and the projection of the financial situation of Banco de la República for 2019. The last chapter analyzes the payment systems in the cou

This paper studies from an empirical and theoretical perspective the systemic and bank-level effects of imposing reserve requirements (RR) in foreign currency in an economy with a heavily dollarized financial system. The paper empirically characterizes banks responses to the RR carried out by the Peruvian Central Bank since 2008 with the objective of stabilizing the financial market and meeting its policy targets. The results suggest that the RR is effective in reducing the overall level of credit in the economy and that banks response in terms of credit and deposits is very heterogeneous depending on their ex ante preference for foreign funding ratio, i.e., the ratio of deposits in dollars to total loans. Motivated by the empirical insights, the paper builds a DSGE small-open-economy model with financial frictions à la Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki, where bank heterogeneity and financial dollarization are introduced to evaluate the effectiveness of the differential RR in reducing financial dollarization and improving financial resilience.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.