Literatura académica sobre el tema "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831"
Crea una cita precisa en los estilos APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard y otros
Consulte las listas temáticas de artículos, libros, tesis, actas de conferencias y otras fuentes académicas sobre el tema "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831".
Junto a cada fuente en la lista de referencias hay un botón "Agregar a la bibliografía". Pulsa este botón, y generaremos automáticamente la referencia bibliográfica para la obra elegida en el estilo de cita que necesites: APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
También puede descargar el texto completo de la publicación académica en formato pdf y leer en línea su resumen siempre que esté disponible en los metadatos.
Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831"
1
Medeiros, Danilo Borges y Wagner Lafaiete de Oliveira Júnior. "A CONCEPÇÃO DE ESTADO DE GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL". Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia 12, n.º 33 (30 de diciembre de 2020): 17–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2020.v12n33.p17-35.
Texto completoResumen
O presente artigo investigará a concepção de Estado do filósofo alemão Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stuttgart, 27 de agosto de 1770 – Berlim, 14 de novembro de 1831) a partir da obra “Filosofia do Direito” (1821), em especial, a sua terceira seção, que será a base para a análise da temática, por ser nela que Hegel discute, a miúde, os elementos constitutivos do Estado. A análise feita a partir desta discussão definirá a ideia de Estado hegeliano respeitando três estruturas básicas adotadas pelo filósofo naquela seção, que comporta: 1º) a natureza do Estado; 2º) a fundamentação da organização interna do Estado e 3º) o poder do príncipe. O objetivo da investigação proposta neste artigo é apresentar os elementos centrais e constitutivos do Estado à estrutura do direito interno que fundamenta sua política.
2
Silva, Gabriel Rodrigues da. "Hegel e o progresso histórico". Primeiros Escritos, n.º 10 (22 de mayo de 2020): 57–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2594-5920.primeirosescritos.2020.155601.
Texto completoResumen
Este artigo visa apresentar e analisar a concepção de progresso histórico elaborada pelo filósofo alemão Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) em sua obra Lições sobre a Filosofia da História, publicada postumamente em 1837. Para isso, a exposição do artigo seguirá, principalmente, o terceiro capítulo da obra mencionada – denominado “O Curso da História Universal” –, acompanhando, detalhadamente, a argumentação do filósofo. A conclusão do artigo destaca o progresso histórico hegeliano compreendido enquanto um fim infinito, baseando-se, principalmente, na obra Does History Make Sense? (2017), de Terry Pinkard. Além disso, compara-se a compreensão hegeliana do progresso histórico com as compreensões linear e cíclica da história.
3
Bittencourt, Rodrigo do Prado. "As visões de Hegel e Marx acerca da História". Politeia - História e Sociedade 21, n.º 2 (19 de julio de 2023): 183–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.22481/politeia.v21i2.10409.
Texto completoResumen
Este artigo analisa o papel da História na vida humana segundo dois dos mais importantes filósofos alemães do século XIX: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) e Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883). A Filosofia Hegeliana dá muita importância à Razão: a História seria apenas mais uma forma de manifestação dela. A Dialética seria a estrutura da História e tudo estaria integrado para contribuir para a consumação do ser, tendendo ao Absoluto. Por outro lado, Marx deu outro sentido à dialética e até mesmo à História, enfatizando o papel do homem na construção de seu futuro e sua chance de mudar seu próprio destino. Segundo Marx, a luta de classes é responsável por fazer a estrutura social mudar ao longo do tempo. Os conflitos sociais equivalem, para a filosofia de Marx, ao papel que a Razão tem nas obras hegelianas.
4
Witte, Bernd. "‚ChristosDionysos‘: Hölderlin als Stifter einer neuen Religion". arcadia 51, n.º 2 (1 de noviembre de 2016): 344–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/arcadia-2016-0027.
Texto completoResumen
AbstractA close reading of Friedrich Hölderlin’s poems “Brod und Wein” and “Mnemosyne” demonstrates that Hölderlin intended to create a new religion as he and Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel had projected in their manifesto “Ältestes Systemprogramm.” This venture must be seen as part of the fight against monotheism and as an attempt to establish a counter-religion, characteristic for the threshold period between 1770 and 1800 in Western Europe. This attempt failed, as Hölderlin’s final desperation about the ambiguity of nature shows.
5
Zwart, Hub. "From the Nadir of Negativity towards the Cusp of Reconciliation". Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21, n.º 2 (2017): 175–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/techne20176565.
Texto completoResumen
This contribution addresses the anthropocenic challenge from a dialectical perspective, combining a diagnostics of the present with a prognostic of the emerging future. It builds on the oeuvres of two prominent dialectical thinkers, namely Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955). Hegel himself was a pre-anthropocenic thinker who did not yet thematise the anthropocenic challenge as such, but whose work allows us to emphasise the unprecedented newness of the current crisis. I will especially focus on his views on Earth as a planetary process, emphasising that (in the current situation) the “spirit” of technoscience is basically monitoring the impacts of its own activities on geochemistry and evolution. Subsequently, I will turn attention to Teilhard de Chardin, a palaeontologist and philosopher rightfully acknowledged as one of the first thinkers of the Anthropocene whose oeuvre provides a mediating middle term between Hegel’s conceptual groundwork and the anthropocenic present. Notably, I will discuss his views on self-directed evolution, on the on-going absorption of the biosphere by the noosphere, and on emerging options for “sublating” the current crisis into a synthetic convergence towards (what Teilhard refers to as) the Omega point. I will conclude that (a), after disclosing the biomolecular essence of life, biotechnology must now take a radical biomimetic turn (a shift from domesticating nature to the domestication of domestication, i.e., of technology); that (b) reflection itself must become distributed and collective; and (c), that the anthropocenic crisis must be sublated into the noocene.
6
Araújo, Edilene Rodrigues y Maira Nobre de Castro. "Uma análise crítica à concepção do empreendedorismo como alternativa para saída da crise social e econômica". Research, Society and Development 10, n.º 6 (27 de mayo de 2021): e17410615826. http://dx.doi.org/10.33448/rsd-v10i6.15826.
Texto completoResumen
Diversos estudos ligados à sociologia e às ciências políticas percebem o Estado como um importante mecanismo de coerção social. Analisando o desenvolvimento social da humanidade, depreende-se que o Estado tem se adaptado às diferentes demandas da elite burguesa, a qual detém o poder nos mais diversos contextos sociais e políticos. Com essa transformação capitalista da sociedade, ocorre, também, a subordinação da organização social às exigências do capital. Esse é o momento onde ocorre a construção de um Estado e das instituições políticas, ambos adequados ao domínio da burguesia. Diante desse contexto, o presente artigo tem como objetivo realizar uma discussão sobre a linha conceitual que considera o empreendedorismo como uma alternativa para a saída de uma crise social e econômica. Trata-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa e bibliográfica. Para a coleta dos dados foi realizado um levantamento teórico em estudos de Max Weber (1864-1920), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) e Thomas Hobbes (1588-1651) em relação à teoria geral do Estado; de Karl Marx (1818-1883) em relação à intervenção do Estado nos aspectos econômicos e sociais; e de Schumpeter (1997), por se tratar de uma importante referência no estudo do empreendedorismo. Os resultados contribuem para a discussão sobre os conceitos de empreendedorismo e as características dos empreendedores e empreendedoras, além de abordar sobre o processo de empreender em um Estado marcado pela sua subordinação histórica ao capital. Dessa forma, espera-se que o presente estudo colabore com a construção do referencial teórico sobre empreendedorismo e inovação, em uma vertente mais crítica e contextualizada.
7
Acosta, Jaime. "Reflexión filosófica sobre la actualidad de los PRIMEROS ESCRITOS de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831), en el período de Fráncfort (1797-1800), calificado como el período más importante de su vida". Colloquia, Academic Journal of Culture and Thought 3 (6 de julio de 2017): 144. http://dx.doi.org/10.31207/colloquia.v3i0.21.
Texto completoResumen
The debate herein exposed is aimed towards a confrontation between the autonomy of human will and its heteronomy, or between liberty and law. This crucial problem is also the most discussed within contemporary moral reflection. Is it possible to behave freely and morally by obeying law and to remain in full exercise of liberty? For his reflection, Hegel strongly criticizes Jewish religion and further concentrates on the passage of the New Testament that takes place at the home of Simon the Pharisee, analyzing the behavior of four characters: Mary Magdalene: love and need; Simon: the power to judge; the disciples: moral interest and Jesus: the voice of beauty and love. Hegel’s approach is summed up in seeking what man must do (morality) as a condition to access religion considered to be man’s happiness. How to open, therefore, the path of morality towards a religion that restores life and beauty, a religion as a living union between God and man? In conclusion, some arguments will be presented to demonstrate the insufficiency of Hegel’s criticism to religion in the Old Testament. Obedience appears as a human response to God’s nomination rather than as a response to law.
8
Tahir, Sobia y Sidra Maqsood. "Muhammad Iqbal and Grman Idealism: A Comparative Review". Review of Applied Management and Social Sciences 6, n.º 2 (12 de junio de 2023): 257–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.47067/ramss.v6i2.327.
Texto completoResumen
The phrase Idealism is not new for the students and readers of Philosophy, however, when the prefix German is added before it, it acquires a different meaning, mood, taste and inclination. German Idealism is distinguished from all other forms of European Idealisms. It concentrated on mind as an active and self-conscious entity. German Idealists suppressed the traditional ontologies based on substances and their accidents. The most prominent German Idealists include I - Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), II- Johann Gottelib Fichte (1762-1814), III-Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling (1775-1854) and IV- George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831).
Kant, though an empirical rationalist, could not deny the supremacy of mind over matter and of human beings over the external world. For him space, time and causality were the categories of mind, which it imposed on the outer world. However, he did believe in the dichotomy of mind and matter though he combined rationalism and empiricism in his Transcendental Idealism, which is an unconscious move towards unity despite the belief in noumena and phenomena. Later thinkers, however, gradually moved closer and closer to the Idealism and especially Monism.
Some salient features of German Idealism which give it a distinct identity separate from the rest of Western Philosophy include: i- Idea of the Absolute, ii- Beginning of the world in the Absolute, iii- Stages and phases of Self- consciousness, iv- Unity of the Subject and Object, v-First traces of Philosophical Anthropology (What man is in itself beyond all physical things and the universe?), vi- Intellectual intuition as a source of knowledge and a tendency towards esotericism, vii – Enthusiastic interest in Dialectics, viii- Freedom and Determinism, ix- Self as an entity free of external and causal determinants , x- Ideas of Ego and Spirit, xi- World Spirit and xii- Existence as a whole or a Unity.
These eternal, perennial, deep, highbrow, captivating, serious, scholarly, cherished, enthralling and fascinating ideas were presented and discussed at length by Muhammad Iqbal too in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Only one glance at the salient features of German Idealism brings into mind the familiar philosophical topics on which Muhammad Iqbal has written extensively. Besides his Urdu and Persian poetry, his political ideas bear profound stamps of these ideas. Therefore, this comparative study is academically justified, intellectually stimulating and scholastically enriching.
9
Kallio, Lauri. "Speculation and praxis." Studia z Historii Filozofii 15, n.º 1 (11 de abril de 2024): 17–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2024.002.
Texto completoResumen
The paper addresses the journal Jahrbücher für speculative Philosophie, published between 1846 and 1848 in Darmstadt. The paper focuses on the forewords of the journal written by the sole editor Ludwig Noack (1819–1885). In these forewords, Noack elaborates the current situation of philosophy. He outlines his vision for the future philosophy. It would be meaningful not only for professional philosophers but also for the general audience. Moreover, it would be closely associated with other sciences. Noack’s vision was inspired by August Cieszkowski’s (1814–1894) so-called “Philosophie der Tat” (the philosophy of action), which resonated with the entire generation of German Hegelians from the late 1830s. Noack realized his journal in co-operation with the “Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin”, founded by Cieszkowski and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s (1770–1831) former student Carl Ludwig Michelet (1801–1893) in 1843.
10
Simpson, Murray, Maura Daly y Mark Smith. "The Social Work Regulator and Professional Identity: A Narrative of Lord and Bondsman". British Journal of Social Work 50, n.º 6 (1 de mayo de 2020): 1909–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcaa034.
Texto completoResumen
Abstract Since the early 2000s, in a development since mirrored throughout much of the Anglophone world, social work across UK jurisdictions has been subject to external regulation. Whilst a key justification for regulation was to enhance professional identity, there is little evidence that it has done so. Indeed, a growing literature points out conflictual and unproductive relationships between the social work profession and its regulators, within which a marked power imbalance in favour of the regulator is apparent. In this article, we illustrate the nature of this imbalance theoretically by drawing upon the classic philosophical narrative, developed by Georg Willhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), of the ‘lord and bondsman’. We seek to demonstrate the utility of the Hegelian narrative using data from a study into the views of social workers on how they understand their professional identities, focusing specifically on those aspects of the study that address the place of regulation in this process. Whilst exposing some fundamental problems in the regulatory relationship, the lord and bondsman narrative may also offer some possibility of a way forward through identifying these dialectics as a step towards a more self-conscious professional maturity.
Tesis sobre el tema "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831"
1
Tavares, Pierre Franklin. "Hegel, critique de l'Afrique : introduction aux études critiques de Hegel sur l'Afrique". Paris 1, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990PA010555.
Texto completoResumen
On a longtemps tenu les textes hégéliens consacrés à l’Afrique pour secondaires, voire sans importance. Or, leur lecture attentive montre qu'il n'en est rien. Ils frappent par leur richesse étonnante et leur composition hétéroclite. Hegel, remarquons le, n'en est pas l'auteur. Au demeurant, il n'a jamais rien rédigé sur l’Afrique. Les textes en présence appartiennent à ses disciples qui, en la matière, ne lui ont pas été fidèles. Tissus de paradoxes, de contresens et de contradictions, ils ne laissent apparaitre ni les tensions auxquelles Hegel fut soumis durant ses recherches africanistes, ni ses hésitations (Egypte, Ethiopie) et ses refus (Saint-Domingue). Au reste, on y dénombre au moins trois conceptions de l’Afrique, ce qui jusqu'ici n'a jamais été mis en évidence. Nous avons tenté de reconstituer, période après période, l'itinéraire africain de Hegel qui participe intimement de son évolution, de Stuttgart à Berlin. Entre 1822 et 1826, ses études critiques le conduisent à réintégrer l’Afrique au sein de l'histoire. En 1831, à la veille de sa mort, Hegel s'apprêtait à remanier sa conception de l’Afrique. Son parcours de l'esprit africain mérite d'être entièrement repensé et refaitDuring along time, hegelian's texts about Africa have been considered subordinate, indeed without importance. Yet, their thorough reading shows they were not. They strike by their surprising richness and their heterogeneous composition. Hegel, we observe it, isn't the author. They belonged to his disciples who, on the subject, were unreliables. Tissues of paradox, misinterpretations and contradictions, these texts do not show the tensions which occupied Hegel during his africanists researches, neither his hesitations (Egypt, Ethiopia) nor his denials (Saint-Domingue). Besides, we count within three conceptions of Africa never been in evidence. Therefore, we have tried to reconstitute, period after period, the hegel's African itinary which takes intimately part in his evolution, from Stuttgart to Berlin. Between 1822 and 1826, his critical studies induce him to restore africa in the history. In 1831, just before his death, hegel got ready to adapt his conception of Africa. His run of african spirit is worth beeing completely thought over and done again
2
Richard, Stéphanie. "Le toucher des cadavres : la déduction de la diversité chez Hegel". Université Marc Bloch (Strasbourg) (1971-2008), 2007. https://publication-theses.unistra.fr/restreint/theses_doctorat/2007/RICHARD_Stephanie_2007.pdf.
Texto completoResumen
Suivre la poursuite de la ligne hégélienne, ne serait-ce pas, et de façon terrifiante, traverser un mouvement endurant de kénose, regard obscurci, toucher vacillant, et accueillir des haltes qui sont autant de renoncements à ces figures d’écriture, là précisément où nous séjournions traditionnellement ? Dès lors, tout est à relire, à écrire, et à l’aune de ce produire de la ligne, la singularité émerge en sa pauvreté : organique, membrane, tenue des corps en leur privation, la ligne hégélienne ne donne aucune stase, elle vacille en son émergence et nous abandonne à la plus radicale des pertes. Quelque chose dans cette encyclopédie du dénuement, qui s’arrache à toute encyclopédie des lumières, et qui mène la singularité jusqu’au naufrage de son regard, jusqu’à l’altération de sa peau, ce pourquoi peut-être il lui est donné de poursuivre et d’acérer les questions, de les brûler donc (Artaud)We may put forward that following the hegelian line is, in a terrifyng way, going through a rough movement of kenosis. With a blank glance, an incertain touch, we could have halts and they are renouncements to writing figures, and precisely where we traditionally used to stay. So we have to read and write everything again in this new perspective. Singularity raises in its own poverty. Organicity. Membrane. Raising of the bodies in there own privation. The hegelian line does not give any stasis. It is weavering while it is raising and it abandons us to to the loss. It is something like an Encyclopedy of poverty, far from the Encyclopedy of Enlightment and it leads the singularity till the weak of glance, tilll the alteration of the skin. It is why it may allow us to follow up, to improve the qestions, and so to burn them
3
Cohen, Joseph. "Altérité et révélation : le sacrifice de Hegel". Caen, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002CAEN1368.
Texto completoResumen
Comment l'altérité et la révélation ont-ils pénétré le discours philosophique de Hegel? Pourquoi l'altérité et la révélation ont-ils constitué un événement pour la philosophie hégélienne? Depuis quel lieu - et de quel droit et à quelle fin - l'altérité et la révélation ont-ils habité la métaphysique onto-théo-téléo-logique du spéculatif? Ces questions composent le socle de cette thèse. En retraçant le développement et l'extension du Concept spéculatif depuis les écrits de Tübingen jusqu'à la Phénoménologie de l'esprit, nous avons tenté d'approcher et de saisir l'élément intime de la pensée hégélienne depuis lequel se pense et peut se penser l'alliance entre altérité et révélation. Au coeur de cette alliance, c'est le sacrifice qui ne cesse d'oeuvrer comme la modalité propre de la compréhension et comme la mouvance absolue de la relève (aufhebung). Ainsi, dans et par le sacrifice s'ouvre le " portique " du Savoir absolu et se dévoile l'essence, le devenir et l'avenir, du penser spéculatif depuis lequel les vocables d'altérité et de révélation font, pour la philosophie hégélienne, sens. Quel avenir peut-il encore advenir dans cette réappropriation absolue de l'altérité et de la révélation? Quel avenir peut-il encore s'ouvrir dans et par cette absoluité effective du sacrifice? Celui-ci peut-être: l'insacrifiable pouvoir, c'est-à-dire, l'infinité en et pour soi-même de la nomination. Nommer l'altérité et la révélation " en et pour elles-mêmes ", c'est d'abord et avant tout, pour Hegel, sacrifier ce que représentent ces vocables en les élevant à la vérité infinie de la présence. Leur nomination comme présence est précisément l'explicitation du mouvement de l'infini oeuvrant dans le fini ou encore du fini déjà porté et transporté par l'infini; l'explicitation des conditions de possibilité et d'effectivité de l'altérité et de la révélation. Or, la question qui se pose au coeur de cette nomination spéculative, pourrait s'entendre ainsi: que reste-t-il quant à l'altérité et la révélation dans et par leur nomination absolue? C'est dire, reste-t-il ou peut-il encore rester un impensé inappropriable et innomable par le système absolu de la réappropriation et de la nomination? Un impensé autour duquel tournerait et ne cesserait de tourner - mais autrement et pas encore - le penser hégélien.
4
Menk, Tomás Farcic [UNESP]. "A formação científica do conceito de consciência em Hegel". Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/91771.
Texto completoResumen
Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0
Previous issue date: 2011-09-09Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:33:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1
menck_tf_me_mar.pdf: 428940 bytes, checksum: 020ae975f350b6f0f79fbac3d73fd769 (MD5)Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
O nosso objeto de pesquisa é a consciência, tal como ela foi elaborada por Hegel na Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas em Compêndio de 1830. A consciência passou a ser efetivamente um objeto da filosofia com Kant, ao utilizá-la como mediadora entre o eu penso (de influência racionalista) e a coisa em si (de influência empirista), porém acabou por criar um dualismo insuperável entre estas duas instâncias. Todos os autores românticos e os filósofos idealistas pós Kant tentaram, ao seu modo, superar este dualismo do entendimento postulado por Kant. É nesse ambiente que nasce a filosofia hegeliana, que tenta mediar ambos os lados da relação sujeito objeto sem que haja um dualismo insuperável. Assim, no primeiro livro da Enciclopédia, Hegel estuda o ser e o pensar e como estes dois elementos estão em unidade e fundamentam tanto o Eu (sujeito pensante) quanto o objeto. No segundo livro ele estuda a lógica no seu ser-outro, ou seja, a natureza, que é pura exterioridade. E no último livro Hegel analisa o espírito, e como se dá a relação entre o sujeito pensante e o ser-outro, que é propriamente a consciência. Assim, para este estudo mostra-se necessário analisar alguns aspectos do movimento de autodeterminação do Espírito Absoluto, que possui em sua interioridade o desenvolvimento da consciência. É imprescindível para uma investigação acerca do conceito de consciência na Enciclopédia refazer o percurso de seu desenvolvimento, pois antes de ser um conceito dado ou auto-evidente, ele é uma progressiva determinação de si mesmo. Concluímos que um trabalho que possui como objeto a consciência na Enciclopédia deve, na verdade, analisar a formação cientifica do seu conceito
This study aims to examine the question of consciousness in Hegelian philosophy, more specifically in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, 1830. Consciousness effectively became the object of philosophy with Kant, who used it as a mediator between the I think (influence of rationalist) and the thing-in-itself (empiricist influence), but ended up creating an insuperable dualism between these two instances. All romantic authors and idealist philosophers post-Kant tried, in their way, to overcome this dualism of the understanding postulated by Kant. It is in this environment where the Hegelian philosophy was born, which attempts to mediate both sides of the subject-object relationship without an insuperable dualism. Thus, in the first book in the Encyclopedia, Hegel studies the being and the thinking and how these two elements are in unit and support both the I (thinking subject) and the object. In the second book he studies the logic in its otherness (other-being), or nature, which is pure exteriority. And in the last book Hegel analyses the spirit, and how the relationship between the thinking subject and the otherness occur, which is properly the consciousness. So, for this study, it is necessary to analyze some aspects of the movement of self-determination of the Absolute Spirit, which has in its interiority the development of consciousness. Therefore, it is essential for an investigation of the concept of consciousness in the Encyclopedia, to remake the course of its development, because before being a given concept or self-evident, it is a progressive self-determination. We conclude that a study which has consciousness as its object the in the Encyclopedia must, in fact, analyze the scientific formation of its concept
5
Hémion, Jean-Marc. "La Philosophie du mariage chez Hegel : alliances et mobilisation". Nantes, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996NANT3013.
Texto completoResumen
Il s'agit de reperer chez hegel la place accordee, des les textes anterieurs a l'epoque d'iena (1800-1807), au mariage et a l'amour ; de suivre les deplacements de cette question, a l'importance toujours soulignee, jusqu'a berlin (1817-1831) : la question du lien ou de la liaison, de la fidelite inconditionnelle ou de l'unite ontologique, la question de la mobilite de la presence spirituelle, constituent le fil conducteur de cette recherche qui s'effectue en trois mouvements. - un passage, d'abord, du lieu politique et tragique a une reappropriation de l'epoux mystique par le rapport des "amants"; - une reconduction, ensuite, du sujet transcendantal a l'imagination et au couple; reconduction effectuee par une ecriture sacrificielle de la "vereinigung", par une philosophie du recueil total dans le concept ; - la confrontation, enfin , a l'interieur du mouvement hegelien d'accomplissement de l'esprit, entre le passage du familial a l'etat (par la societe civile) et l'inquietude que suscite l'espace et le temps liberes par les machines - tant civiles que militaires - a l'interieur de l'etat comme totalite articulee et exposee aux autres etats. Hegel, philosophe marie, n'est donc pas sollicite comme biographie exemplaire ou comme mort venerable mais comme le penseur resolument etatique, universitaire et pere de famille, par lequel s'installe. - un mouvement conjugal se deployant, par la societe civile, en etat reconnaissant la famille concrete comme moment ethique essentiel ; - une mobilisation technique dont l'espace et le temps menacent de reduction ou de dispersion le mouvement sacrificiel qui le suscite, c'est-a-dire la demeure conjugale comme moment d'accomplissement du christianisme concu. Si le mariage de hegel est bien, comme decision, indissociable des conditions de production de sa pensee, ce n'est pas comme institution exterieure au systeme (d'une exteriorite biographique ou sociologique), ni comme execution d'un programme logique, mais comme processus de resistance pensante (et non edifiante) au temps machinal libereWhat matters is to locate in hegel's works, as early as before the iena period (1800-1807) the importance attributed to marriage and love, and to follow up the successive shifts of a question the heaviness of which has always been emphasized until the berlin period (1817-1831) : thus, the question of the bond or the binding, of the inconditional faithfulness or the ontological oneness, the question of the mobility of spiritual presence, all twisted together form the vital lead of this research throughout three moves : - firstly, a passage from a political and tragic place onto a reappropriation of the mystical spouse by the lovers'relationship ; - then, a reconduction of the transcendental subject onto imagination and couple ; a reconduction performed through a sacrificial writing of "vereinigung", a philosophy of total gathering inside concept ; - finally, within the hegelian movement of the spirit becoming itself, the confrontation of the step from the familial to the statal(through civil society) with worry born from the release of space and time by machines - military as well as civilian - from within state as an articulated totality and as exposed to other states. Thus, hegel, a married philosopher, is not called upon as a biographical model or a worshipful dead but as the decided state thinker, faculty and family man, by whom are installed
6
Bowman, Brady. "Sinnliche Gewissheit : zur systematischen Vorgeschichte eines Problems des deutschen Idealismus /". Berlin : Akademie Verl, 2003. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39943890q.
Texto completo
7
Doz, André. "La Logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l'ontologie". Lille 3 : ANRT, 1986. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb375974403.
Texto completo
8
Lamontagne, Marc. "Vérité et conscience dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel". Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/46420.
Texto completoResumen
Notre mémoire dégage la nature du rapport de la conscience et de la vérité dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel selon deux aspects. D'un côté, la vérité est ce à quoi la conscience se rapporte comme une réalité en soi normative qu'elle distingue de son savoir. Mais, dès lors qu'elle veut s'assumer de la vérité de son savoir, elle fait l'expérience de la non-vérité de ce qu'elle tenait pour le Vrai. Cette expérience que fait la conscience et qui entraîne la perte d'elle-même, Hegel l'appelle la dialectique. De l'autre côté, l'absolu n'a pas seulement pour Hegel la teneur d'une substance, il est bien plutôt sujet, c'est-à-dire auto-mouvement mouvement d'advenir qui se manifeste phénoménalement en se déployant au cœur de l'opposition conscientielle du concept et de l'être, pour s'y montrer comme leur unité fondamentale. Le mémoire tente de cerner comment ces deux mouvements se concilient et quelles en sont les modalités d'accomplissement.
9
Abed, Habiba. "La morale et la religion selon Hegel". Paris 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA010567.
Texto completoResumen
La religion du jeune Hegel est liée à l'éducation rationnelle d'un peuple, tel que celui de la Grèce antique. Hegel distingue la religion objective des lumières, représentée par la religion chrétienne positive, et la religion subjective populaire grecque. Les idées de la raison kantienne s'imprègnent de la sensibilité naturelle des grecs, afin de purifier le christianisme des dogmes inséparés de l'oppression politique. Mais, pas plus le moralisme kantien que le sentiment de l'amour universel de jésus, ne font du christianisme une religion constitutive d'une société politique. À Iéna, Hegel murit son système de l'identité de l'identité et de la non-identité, conciliant la philosophie du sujet-objet objectif de Schelling et celle du sujet-objet subjectif de Fichte. Il critique ses contemporains et expose la moralité sociale ou la vie éthique d'un peuple dans sa culture juridico-économique et ses institutions politiques. Dans la phénoménologie de l'esprit, Hegel reconstruit la culture de l'humanité, tant du point de vue individuel que générique et historique. Chaque esprit d'un peuple détient une place dans l'histoire universelle. Hegel fait correspondre à chaque époque de l'histoire une figure déterminée de l'art et de la religion. Il y a une série progressive des représentations esthétiques de la religion. Son interprétation du dogme trinitaire exclut toute transcendance divine. L'infinité divine se finitise dans l'incarnation christique ; l'esprit humain de la communauté historique se réapproprie l'essence rationnelle, comme vérité d'un contenu divin. Echappant à l'esprit fini qui se représente. La dialectique de l'esprit consiste en la position de l'absolu et sa réflexion comme sujet et connaissance de soi-même. Grace à la reforme luthérienne, l'essence divine est rapprochée de l'homme, l'esprit ecclésiastique et le monde séculier et temporel se trouvent réconciliés.
10
Dunphy, Robert John. "Scepticism and presuppositionlessness : Hegel and the problem of beginning". Thesis, University of Sussex, 2018. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/80363/.
Texto completoResumen
This thesis is concerned with what I call “the problem of beginning.” This problem expresses the difficulty involved in getting the type of critical, rational thinking proper to philosophical work underway in a manner that is not problematically arbitrary. This amounts to a dilemma between beginning dogmatically by depending upon unexamined presuppositions, and beginning dogmatically with some fundamentally arbitrary assertion. After motivating the problem and explicating it in some detail in the introduction, I identify a number of possible, but unappealing ways to respond. In Chapter 1 I argue that, motivated by his relationship with Pyrrhonism, Hegel is engaging with this same problem at the start of his Science of Logic. I identify a distinctive form of a solution to the problem in Hegel's work which amounts to isolating a beginning which is both presuppositionless and non-arbitrary, or, in his terminology, both immediate and mediated. In Hegel's work I identify two different possible ways in which the form of this solution can be fleshed out. They differ in terms of what they designate as the element of mediation in the beginning. In the first case, this element is stated to be the project of phenomenology, as carried out in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second case, this element is characterised as a project of “consummate scepticism,” but left problematically underdeveloped. In Chapter 2 I present reasons for rejecting the suitability of the former, and in Chapter 3 I attempt to sketch a project of “consummate scepticism” which would be capable of functioning as the element of mediation in a manner capable of producing a working, “Hegelian” solution to the problem of beginning. I draw the thesis to a close by considering both the costs and opportunities which follow from this reconstructed solution, especially concerning the establishment of idealism.
Libros sobre el tema "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831"
2
1962-, Stern Robert, ed. G.W.F. Hegel: Critical assessments. London: Routledge, 1993.
Buscar texto completo
3
Harris, Errol E. The spirit of Hegel. Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Humanities Press, 1993.
Buscar texto completo
5
Rockmore, Tom. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Avant-après. Paris: Critérion, 1992.
Buscar texto completo
6
1930-, Stepelevich Lawrence S. y Hegel Society of America. Meeting., eds. Selected essays on G.W.F. Hegel. Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Humanities Press, 1993.
Buscar texto completo
7
Kainz, Howard P. G.W.F. Hegel: The philosophical system. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998.
Buscar texto completo
8
Althusser, Louis. The spectre of Hegel: Early writings. London: Verso, 1997.
Buscar texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831"
1
Kirkland, Frank M. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)". En Contributions to Phenomenology, 292–98. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5344-9_67.
Texto completo
2
Sandkaulen, Birgit. "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)". En Goethe Handbuch, 468–71. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-03655-1_151.
Texto completo
3
Lüthy, Herbert. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)". En Die Fairness-Formel, 47–52. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07956-7_6.
Texto completo
4
Phillips, Craig A. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)". En The Student's Companion to the Theologians, 276–86. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118427170.ch38.
Texto completo
5
Vormbaum, Thomas. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)". En Moderne deutsche Strafrechtsdenker, 137–47. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17200-7_10.
Texto completo
6
Howard, Alex. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)". En Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 214–24. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04644-4_22.
Texto completo
7
Hidalgo, Oliver. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)". En Tocqueville-Handbuch, 114–15. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05754-9_28.
Texto completo
8
Hidalgo, Oliver. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)". En Tocqueville-Handbuch, 157–59. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05979-6_28.
Texto completo
9
Wildenauer, Miriam. "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)". En International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 736–41. Elsevier, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.61047-4.
Texto completo
10
Voigt, Rüdiger. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)". En Staatsdenken, 86–92. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/9783845250939-86.
Texto completo