Literatura académica sobre el tema "Hume, David, 1711-1776"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Hume, David, 1711-1776"
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Craig, Edward. "David Hume". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (marzo de 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004041.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
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Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (marzo de 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004069.
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David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
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Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (marzo de 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004065.
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David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
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Waldmann, Felix. "David Hume in Chicago: A Twentieth-Century Hoax". Journal of British Studies 59, n.º 4 (octubre de 2020): 793–820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2020.127.
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AbstractThis article alleges that two letters attributed to the philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) were forged in the twentieth century. The letters were first published in 1972 and 1973 by Michael Morrisroe, an assistant professor of English in the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, after which they became monuments of conventional scholarship on Hume's life and writings. Both letters are cited without qualification by scholars of Hume's thought in dozens of publications, including Ernest Campbell Mossner's celebrated Life of David Hume (1980), and John Robertson's entry for Hume in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). This article reconstructs the history and transmission of Hume's extant letters and attempts to account for why the forgeries published by Morrisroe were accepted as genuine. It makes a systematic case against the authenticity of the letters, and focuses in particular on the question of whether Hume met the Jansenist homme de lettres Noël-Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) and had access to his library, in Reims, in 1734. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the exposé for modern editorial scholarship and intellectual history.
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Trincado Aznar, Estrella. "La innovación en la economía británica en el siglo XVIII: Hume, Smith, Bentham". Cuadernos de Estudios del Siglo XVIII, n.º 33 (6 de julio de 2023): 45–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17811/cesxviii.33.2023.45-75.
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La innovación fue el problema económico clave del Siglo XVIII, una época privilegiada donde empiezan a resonar unos discursos exaltados, enaltecedores de la necesidad de innovación constante, pero en la que muchos señalaban también los riesgos de esta innovación. En este artículo se presentan las visiones de la innovación que surgieron en el siglo dieciocho de la mano de tres autores prototípicos, David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790) y Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Sus tres teorías arrojan luz sobre las consecuencias de la innovación, al estar basadas en sus distintas definiciones del agente económico, del tipo de interés, del empresario y del desarrollo económico.
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Reis, Nilo Henrique Neves dos. "Maquiavel na Inglaterra: O leitor David Hume". Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 10, n.º 21 (24 de enero de 2020): 79. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/.v10i21.8953.
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Os escritos de Nicolau Maquiavel foram lidos por várias pessoas de modo não confessional desde a sua divulgação. Indícios apontam que os ingleses tiveram acesso as suas obras já no reinado de Henrique VIII, ainda que de forma restrita à elite inglesa, que tinha familiaridade com o idioma italiano. Decerto que as obras do florentino ofereceram uma sólida contribuição ao pensamento político inglês, o que, por sua vez, estimulou uma reflexão crítica ao fenômeno político, bem como aos valores vigentes, pois, como se sabe, suas ideias serviram de inspiração para muitos escritores. A bem da verdade, cotejando as produções inglesas, principalmente após a guerra civil, sente-se a influência de Maquiavel. David Hume, que viveu entre 1711 a 1776, dois séculos depois da circulação dos escritos na Inglaterra, quando o florentino já era um referencial ali, não tinha como desconhecer as contribuições dos escritos políticos de Maquiavel, já que uma série de autores faziam referência diretas a ele, muitos dos quais, comentados pelo escocês. Em uma época em que era pernicioso fazer menções louváveis ao pensamento do florentino, há vestígios de que Hume usou estratégias para colocar suas posições próximas, e dado aos indícios encontrados neste escrito, defende-se a posição de que a familiaridade do escocês com os textos de Maquiavel era grande, visto que ele conhecia bem o “corpus machiavellicus”.
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Schabas, Margaret y Carl Wennerlind. "Retrospectives: Hume on Money, Commerce, and the Science of Economics". Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, n.º 3 (1 de agosto de 2011): 217–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.217.
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David Hume (1711–1776) is arguably the most esteemed philosopher to have written in the English language. During his lifetime, however, Hume was as well if not better known for his contributions to political economy, particularly for the essays published as the Political Discourses (1752). Hume left his mark on the economic thought of the physiocrats, the classical economists, and the American Federalists. Adam Smith, who met Hume circa 1750, was his closest friend and interlocutor for some 25 years. Among modern economists, Hume's essays on money and trade have informed theorists of both Keynesian and Monetarist persuasions. In this essay, we begin by discussing Hume's monetary economics, and then spell out his theory of economic development, noting his qualified enthusiasm for the modern commercial system. We end with an assessment of his views on the scientific standing of economics, specifically his counterintuitive argument that economics could be epistemologically superior to physics.
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JOSEPH T. EKONG, REV FR y O.P. "Hume's Critique of Locke’s Variant Of "Social Contract Theory”: A Ratiocinative Assessment". International Journal of Scientific and Management Research 05, n.º 07 (2022): 98–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.37502/ijsmr.2022.5709.
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David Hume (1711-1776) has long been considered a severe denunciator of 'social contract theory', and this interpretation has implicitly premised a perspective that lays heavy weight on the importance of social contract in the history of political thought. This work presents Hume's critique of the Lockean version of the social contract, and identifies the issues responsible for such criticism. In Book 3 of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature (henceforth T), Hume displays his systematic criticism of social contract theory. Hume did not consider social contract theory as an important trend in the history of political thought. One of his points was that 'social contract theory' was quite new, strange and 'heterodoxical' in politics. This work offers an appraisal of Hume’s stance on the Lockean variant of “Social Contract Theory” and proposes a more judicious textual reading of his contributions in this regard.
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Botero Camacho, Manuel. "To dream or not to dream: incursión en la lógica de la canción de S. T. Coleridge". Razón Crítica, n.º 1 (29 de agosto de 2016): 122–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21789/25007807.1139.
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<p align="justify">A lo largo de este artículo se expone una serie de posibilidades que puede ofrecer la lectura del poema de Samuel Taylor Coleridge titulado “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798). Los argumentos aquí expuestos carecen de intención distinta de aquella que consiste en señalar elementos que acaso no sean accidentales dentro del texto. David Hume (1711-1776) será quien proporcione las relaciones que deban examinarse. En este escrito se ofrecen tres posibilidades interpretativas y, al menos, dos de ellas pueden verse como contaminadas por las teorías de Hume. Aunque la tercera no está directamente tratada en la filosofía que aquí se maneja, es fácil hacer la inferencia del origen de tal relación. El objetivo es presentar el poema de Coleridge como una objeción a la teoría de la causalidad enunciada por Hume.</p>
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Alvarenga Junnior Neto, Francisco y Larissa Cristina Gomes Teixeira. "A FORMAÇÃO DAS CRENÇAS NA TEORIA DO CONHECIMENTO HUMIANA". Sapere Aude 13, n.º 26 (30 de diciembre de 2022): 542–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5752/p.2177-6342.2022v13n26p542-554.
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Neste texto temos a intenção de apresentar e discutir a forma como o importante filósofo escocês, David Hume (1711-1776), em sua teoria do conhecimento e filosofia, compreende o processo de formação das crenças, a qual foi fundamental para o empirismo britânico e para a filosofia dos séculos posteriores. Para tanto, de início, iremos apresentar a distinção fundamental que o filósofo realiza entre impressões e ideias, segundo a qual impressões são mais fortes e vivazes que as ideias e, por isso, são compreendidas como a origem de todo o conhecimento. Feito isso, discutiremos a importância e o papel da causalidade para a composição e o surgimento da crença em sua teoria do conhecimento e como este efeito se relaciona com outros elementos da filosofia humenana para tal. Por fim, iremos apresentar a compreensão de Hume segundo a qual seria através do hábito, em relação com a causalidade, que elaboraríamos nossas crenças.
Tesis sobre el tema "Hume, David, 1711-1776"
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Espinoza, Verdejo Alex. "David Hume : aspects ontologiques et épistémologiques de l'induction". Nantes, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005NANT3018.
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Contrairement à beaucoup de penseurs modernes, Hume ne trace pas une démarcation nette entre l'être et la connaissance de l'être. Pour argumenter en faveur de la thèse antidivisionniste de Hume, nous avons déterminé cinq sources du problème de l'induction : les sources physiques, psychologique, logique, métaphysique et sociologique. Dans chacune d'elles (mise à part une interprétation purement formaliste de la source logique) nous avons trouvé une idée commune : la connaissance est un processus qui mêle inextricablement l'objectif et le subjectif, l'être et le connaître. L'analyse détaillée des sources du problème de l'induction, et les nombreuses comparaisons des idées de Hume avec celles de penseurs anciens, modernes ou contemporains, nous ont conduit à la conclusion que la philosophie de Hume, en particulier en ce qui concerne les aspects ontologiques et épistémologiques de l'induction, serait une classe de "réalisme pragmatique".
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Ouellet, Dominique. "Science et scepticisme chez David Hume". Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/26324.
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L’oeuvre philosophique de David Hume repose sur un incontournable paradoxe. Dans le premier livre du Traité de la nature humaine, le projet d'une science expérimentale de la nature humaine se trouve curieusement juxtaposé à l'expression d'un scepticisme radical. Notre objectif consiste principalement à rendre compte, au-delà de cette contradiction apparente, de la cohérence de la position épistémologique de Hume. Nous tenterons de mettre en évidence la compatibilité des conceptions humiennes de science et de scepticisme. Nous chercherons également à souligner l'invraisemblance de l'interprétation traditionnelle qui dissout la tension entre science et scepticisme en réduisant la philosophie humienne à un scepticisme autodestructeur.
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Mullen, Shirley Annette. "David Hume and the partility-impartiality debate". Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683165.
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Jenkins, Joan (Joan Elizabeth). "The Enlightenment Legacy of David Hume". Thesis, University of North Texas, 1989. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc332061/.
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Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age.
The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume.
This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era.
In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.
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Rowan, Michael. "Hume, probability and induction". Title page, contents and abstract only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phr877.pdf.
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Espinosa, Sarmiento Ruth. "El Problema de Hume: Epistemología, escepticismo y metafísica". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2008. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/108472.
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[…] Por mucho tiempo se pensó que en Hume no había tal cosa como un interés propiamente epistemológico, es decir se pensó que no había interés alguno por describir condiciones normativas que justificaran nuestro conocimiento, sino más bien una descripción psicológica y por ende subjetiva del modo en que tienen lugar nuestros estado de “certeza” subjetiva. Por otra parte, hay una de las tres condiciones mencionadas que pocas veces es tratada en el marco del problema de la justificación, a saber, la verdad de la creencia. La verdad de la creencia, sin embargo, como se verá, no necesariamente ha de ser considerada como la verdad objetiva más allá del marco de las creencias del sujeto. Es decir, no es necesario, según creo, adquirir compromisos ontológicos en el marco de una teoría realista para sostenes una teoría de la justificación epistémica propiamente normativa. Para llegar a este punto en la filosofía de Hume, sin embargo, se analizará en el primer capítulo el origen y principales influencias del proyecto humeano de la ciencia del hombre. En la sección I, intentaré mostrar cómo la filosofía de Hume se comprende de manera más cabal en contraste con la filosofía a la que se opone, a saber, la metafísica racionalista. Leeremos, tal como Hume sugiere en su correspondencia, su Tratado de la Naturaleza Humana, en contraste con la filosofía cartesiana. En ella hallaremos una de las teorías de la justificación más conocidas y debatidas en la espistemología, a saber, el fundacionalismo clásico. En este mismo contexto haré notar la búsqueda de Hume de una renovada concepción de conocimiento capaz de subsanar los vicios de la vieja escuela. En las secciones II y III intentaré mostrar los principales recursos de Hume para levantar una nueva metafísica, que no es sino su así llamada ciencia de la naturaleza humana. En esta nueva ciencia la adopción del método experimental de razonar juega un rol central. Luego de ello, esbozaré en la misma sección la recepción y la interpretación de las doctrinas humeanas acerca del conocimiento humano en la epistemología contemporánea. Con ello se habrá delineado la visión estándar del autor del Treatise. Esta visión, sin embargo, no agota el pensamiento de nuestro autor, y debe ser considerada tan solo como la parte negativa de su filosofía. En el segundo capítulo, intentaré mostrar que la visión estándar de Hume, puede ser matizada por nuevas interpretaciones del proyecto de Hume, como una doctrina metafísica propositiva y no como un mero diagnosticador de los problemas del conocimiento. En ella, sostendré que es posible encontrar una teoría de la justificación fundada en una nueva comprensión de la naturaleza humana y fundamentalmente de la racionalidad.
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Cruz, Fernão de Oliveira Salles dos Santos. "As condições de possibilidade da ciência da natureza humana: crítica da metafísica e ciência do homem". Universidade de São Paulo, 2007. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-26112007-141351/.
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Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber.Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.
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Claisse, Thomas. "Hume et la mélancolie sceptique : une approche par la dynamique des discours". Thesis, Lille 3, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014LIL30050/document.
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Le discours mélancolique de Hume, placé au terme du premier livre de son oeuvre de jeunesse, met en danger la philosophie, en tirant les conclusions nécessaires d'une théorie empiriste de la connaissance : si le monde, et même l'existence toute entière, ne sont que des idées produites par l'imagination, la recherche philosophique, qui place la raison en exergue de toutes les facultés humaines, est alors vaine et dénuée de sens. Cependant, Hume, qui n'a que vingt-huit ans lorsqu'il publie les deux premiers livres du traité, vouera sa vie à la philosophie, et ira jusqu'à s'imaginer marchandant avec Charon un peu plus de temps à vivre pour terminer ses recherches et en voir l'accueil du public. Comment un tel dépassement est-il possible, d'une stupeur mélancolique désespérée à cette passion philosophique qui emplira toute une vie ? D'une mise en danger profonde et sérieuse de toute possibilité de science à un travail sans relâche dans les domaines de la métaphysique, de la morale, de la philosophie politique, de la religion, de l'histoire ? Et ce, qui plus est, sur les principes mêmes qui seront la cause de ce danger ? Nous proposons une lecture nouvelle et critique de cette 'fin de la philosophie' et de son dépassement, par le développement, en interaction avec l'objet d'étude lui-même, d'une conception originale de l'histoire de la philosophie. inspirée par l'articulation du discours de Hume et des problèmes qu'il soulève. Nous construirons, en la mettant directement à l'épreuve dans l'analyse des discours qui en sont l'impulsion première, une pratique efficace de l'histoire des idées. Nous tenterons grâce à celle-ci de répondre à cet enjeu final que Hume lance non seulement à la philosophie, mais aussi à toute entreprise humaine de science : à quoi bon penser et philosopher, si tout objet de connaissance n'est que chimère et simulacre d'un monde que nous ne pouvons que supposer, et qui n'existe peut-être même pas ?The melancholic speech of Hume, placed in the term of the first book of its early work, puts in danger the philosophy, by drawing the necessary conclusions of an empiricist theory of the knowledge
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Déragon, Sonia. "Identité personnelle chez David Hume : Imagonation et passions". Aix-Marseille 1, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001AIX10104.
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L'idée que nous défendons est celle suivant laquelle les discussions au sujet de l'identité personnelle développées dans les Livre I et II du Traité de la Nature Humaine sont consistantes l'une avec l'autre. Afin de démontrer cette thèse, nous discutons les propos tenus par Hume dans ces Livres et montrons que les discussions répondent à différentes questions et qu'elles se complètent bien théoriquement. Cette thèse se divise en trois parties. Nous expliquons, tout d'abord,"L'existence des substances matérielles". Nous montrons que nous trouvons chez Hume une première formulation de la thèse de la collection ainsi qu'une précision importante quant à la nature du lien entre les perceptions. Nous expliquons les croyances au sujet des corps extérieurs et soutenons que c'est grâce à la conception chez Hume de l'imagination que ces croyances "naturelles" peuvent être expliquées et justifiées. Nous distinguons, finalement, la croyance et la fiction et montrons l'importance de cette différenciation pour suivre correctement le propos humien. Dans la deuxième partie, nous discutons de "L'existence des substances spirituelles". Nous distinguons l'idée du moi et le moi des passions et montrons que l'idée "vraie" du moi ou de l'esprit est une idée complexe [. . . . ] Nous présentons ce que soutient Hume dans l'Appendice concernant l'identité et défendons les thèses suivant lesquelles 1) il n'y a pas de deuxième circularité théorique dans son traitement de l'identité et que 2) Hume est insatisfait de son explication de l'unité réelle de l'esprit humain. Dans la dernière partie, nous discutons de l'identité en tant qu'elle concerne les passions. Nous défendons l'idée suivant laquelle les passions contribuent grandement à la formation du moi et que, par conséquent, nous pouvons le différencier des fictions établies dans le Livre I. Nous expliquons le rôle essentiel que joue l'idée du moi dans les passions indirectes ainsi que dans les mécanismes de la sympathie et de la comparaison. Nous montrons, dans nos conclusions, la relation étroite entre le moi et l'autre ainsi que le rôle privilégié du corps humain dans la conception humienne de l'identité personnelle.
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Robel, Gilles. "Lumières et conservatisme dans la pensée politique de David Hume". Paris 3, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1998PA030013.
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Cette etude possede une triple ambition : souligner la coherence et l'unite de l'oeuvre de hume ; montrer en quoi sa comprehension appelle une critique de l'historiographie traditionnelle, qui presente lumieres et conservatisme comme des courants antagonistes ; enfin rehabiliter la pensee politique de hume, encore negligee en france. On examine d'abord la place du politique dans son oeuvre et sa carriere, ainsi que le mode d'articulation de son epistemologie a son ethique et a sa politique, et on montre qu'il est fecond de deplacer le centre de gravite des etudes humiennes vers le politique et les essays. On procede alors a une analyse de la relation de hume tant aux idees qu'aux acteurs des lumieres francaises et ecossaises. Hume se revele moins conservateur que la plupart des penseurs du scottish enlightenment, defini comme lumieres conservatrices, mais il n'epouse pas pour autant le radicalisme et le dogmatisme des philosophes. On examine le contenu de sa doctrine politique et l'on montre que loin de defendre le statu quo, il preconise une reforme profonde des institutions et des mentalites, et insiste sur le caractere dynamique de la societe. Un tel reformisme souleve la question du conservatisme : apres s'etre penche sur les evolutions de la perception du conservatisme humien, on procede a une anatomie de la pensee conservatrice en combinant approche substantialiste et approche historiciste. On examine notamment sa place sur l'echiquier politique, et son analyse de la revolution. Il ressort que si l'on peut definir une vision du monde conservatrice, elle trouve des traductions politiques variees, et le conservatisme humien a pour particularite d'etre un conservatisme sceptique. On determine alors quelle marque le scepticisme imprime au conservatisme de hume, la question etant celle des normes de l'action politique. On montre que la tension entre le possible et le reel chez hume se resout par la notion de "spectateur engage". En tant que spectateur engage, hume a recours a des criteres relatifs d'evaluation politique, tels que la pratique etablie ou l'utilite. Son contextualisme, et son utilitarisme ne le conduisent pas a reduire le devoir-etre a l'etre, mais lui permettent de determiner des orientations de changement adaptees aux pratiques. Sa politique peut alors etre comprise comme une veritable philosophie du progresThe present study aims at stressing the coherence of hume's work ; at showing why it cannot be fully understood without questionning the traditional historiography of the 18th century, which depicts enlightenment and conservatism as two antagonistic trends ; at rehabilitating hume's political thought, which is still overlooked in france. The study starts with an examination of the part played by politics in hume's work and career, and of the main connexions between his epistemology, his ethics and his politics. It explains why humean studies should focus less on his epistemology and more on his political thought and on his essays. It then moves on to an analysis of hume's relationship to the actors and ideas of the scottish and french enlightenments. Hume appears to be less conservative than most of the literati of the scottish enlightenment - defined as a conservative enlightenment - but is also critical of the radicalism and dogmatism of the philosophes. A detailed examination of his political programme shows that, far from defending the status quo, he advocates far-reaching reforms of institutions and ways of thinking. Hume's reformism raises the question of his conservatism : having showed that the perception of his conservatism evolved considerably, the study approaches conservatism in a substantialist and in an historicist perspective. Hume's position on the political scene and his approach to revolution(s) are examined. This twofold analysis reveals that while it is possible to identify one conservative world view, conservative responses to political events are varied. Hume's conservatism can best be described as a sceptical conservatism, which raises the question of the influence of hume's scepticism on his conservatism, and of hume's political standards. His thought seems to hesitate between "what is established" and "what is best", but the tension can be resolved by resorting to the notion of "committed spectator". As a committed spectator, hume assesses political practices by using relative stantards, such as the "established practice" or the notion of utility. Hume's contextualism, and his utilitarianism, do not lead him to reduce what ought to what is, but they help him determine directions of change which are adapted to practices. His political thought can thus be described as a true philosophy of improvement
Libros sobre el tema "Hume, David, 1711-1776"
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1942-, Tweyman Stanley, ed. David Hume: Critical assessments. London: Routledge, 1995.
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1942-, Tweyman Stanley, ed. David Hume: Critical assessments. London: Routledge, 1995.
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1942-, Tweyman Stanley, ed. David Hume: Critical assessments. London: Routledge, 1995.
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1942-, Tweyman Stanley, ed. David Hume: Critical assessments. London: Routledge, 1995.
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1942-, Tweyman Stanley, ed. David Hume: Critical assessments. London: Routledge, 1995.
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Kopf, Peter. David Hume: Philosoph und Wirtschaftstheoretiker, 1711-1776. Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Steiner, 1987.
Buscar texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "Hume, David, 1711-1776"
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Demeter, Tamás. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". En Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences, 1–7. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20791-9_440-1.
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Milgate, Murray y Shannon C. Stimson. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". En The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 908–15. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_173.
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Howard, Alex. "David Hume (1711–1776)". En Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 172–81. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04644-4_18.
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Rotwein, Eugene. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". En The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 6027–33. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_751.
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Rotwein, Eugene. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". En The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–7. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_751-1.
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Rotwein, Eugene. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". En The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–8. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_751-2.
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Clack, Beverley. "David Hume 1711–1776". En Misogyny in the Western Philosophical Tradition, 135–44. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230212800_11.
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Demeter, Tamás. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". En Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences, 850–56. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31069-5_440.
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Marshall, Gwendolyn y Susanne Sreedhar. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". En A New Modern Philosophy, 516–612. 2a ed. New York: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003406525-23.
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Morrissey, Lee. "David Hume (1711–1776) from “Of the Standard of Taste,” Essays (1757)". En Debating the Canon: A Reader from Addison to Nafisi, 17–20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04916-2_3.
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