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Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Anscombe”

Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021

Data aktualizacji: 14 grudnia 2024

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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Anscombe"

O’Connell, Rory. "“I Do What Happens”: The Productive Character of Practical Knowledge". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, nr 5 (15.04.2020): 670–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.12.

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AbstractElizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “practical knowledge” into contemporary philosophy. Philosophers of action have criticized Anscombe’s negative characterization of such knowledge as “non-observational,” but have recently come to pay more attention to her positive characterization of practical knowledge as “the cause of what it understands.” I argue that two recent Anscombean accounts of practical knowledge, “Formalism” and “Normativism,” each fail to explain the productive character of practical knowledge in a way that secures its status as non-observational. I argue that to do this, we must appreciate the role of know-how or skill in practical knowledge.

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Lawrence, Gavin. "Reason, Intention, and Choice An essay in Practical Philosophy". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54 (marzec 2004): 265–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008547.

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It is the famous first thesis of Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ that we should lay aside moral philosophy—indeed ‘banish ethics totally from our minds’! (p. 38, paragraph 36)—‘until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology’. By a ‘philosophy of psychology’ I understand Anscombe to mean grammatical investigations into various psychological concepts that hold the key to ethics. Anscombe herself instances ‘action’, ‘intention’, ‘pleasure’, ‘wanting’ (‘more will probably turn up if we start with these’). Without such an understanding, she thinks we will simply go astray.

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Stockton, Jim, i Benjamin J. B. Lipscomb. "The Anscombe-Lewis Debate: New Archival Sources Considered". Journal of Inklings Studies 11, nr 1 (kwiecień 2021): 35–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/ink.2021.0094.

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Meeting from 26 January 1942 through 26 May 1972, the Oxford University Socratic Club was a fixture of Oxford intellectual life for three decades. Founded by Miss Stella Aldwinckle, chaplain to undergraduate women students for the Oxford Pastorate, the club was an immediate success and quickly became a favoured venue for students and faculty alike, with C.S. Lewis serving as club president and senior member (advisor) from its inception to December 1954. One of the club's most famous papers was delivered 2 February 1948, when twenty-eight-year-old Somerville philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe presented a critique of a key argument in Lewis's recently published Miracles (1947). Most of the critical literature on the event has come from Lewis biographers. Less has been written about Anscombe's perspective, one reason being a lack of primary evidence. Following a framing discussion of the Socratic Club's early years, Lewis's persona and role in the club, and Anscombe's early biography, this article presents three unpublished pieces of primary evidence – a letter by Anscombe, a remark about Lewis by Ludwig Wittgenstein, and a full transcription of the meeting minutes – before briefly considering the light they shed on the exchange between Anscombe and Lewis.

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Ometto, Dawa. "Causality and determination revisited". Synthese 199, nr 5-6 (1.11.2021): 14993–5013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03452-6.

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AbstractIt seems to be a platitude that there must be a close connection between causality and the laws of nature: the laws somehow cover in general what happens in each specific case of causation. But so-called singularists disagree, and it is often thought that the locus classicus for that kind of dissent is Anscombe's famous Causality & Determination. Moreover, it is often thought that Anscombe's rejection of determinism is premised on singularism. In this paper, I show that this is a mistake: Anscombe is not a singularist, but in fact only objects to a very specific, Humean understanding of the generality of laws of nature and their importance to causality. I argue that Anscombe provides us with the contours of a radically different understanding of the generality of the laws, which I suggest can be fruitfully developed in terms of recently popular dispositional accounts. And as I will show, it is this account of laws of nature (and not singularism) that allows for the possibility of indeterminism.

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Teichmann, Roger. "The Anscombe-Lewis Debate". Journal of Inklings Studies 1, nr 2 (październik 2011): 55–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/ink.2011.1.2.6.

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In Anscombe’s ‘Reply’ to chapter three of Lewis’ Miracles we may discern the influence of her teacher and friend, Wittgenstein, especially in two features of it: (i) Anscombe’s insistence on the variety and diversity of types of explanation, and of senses of ‘because’; (ii) her claim that a person’s reasons for thinking something, or for that matter motives in doing something, are not to be thought of as ‘inner’ processes or events. Lewis argued that an explanation why someone believes that P which alludes to the person’s reasons (grounds) for believing that P must be incompatible with any putative ‘naturalistic’ explanation of their believing that P; but in the light of (i) and (ii), Anscombe countered that he had demonstrated no such incompatibility. Nevertheless, as her much later comments on that early debate of her career show, she thought that Lewis’s chapter, both in its original, but even more in its revised, form, was struggling with a genuine and deep problem, one which (she writes) has still not been satisfactorily dealt with.

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Beards, Andrew. "Assessing Anscombe". International Philosophical Quarterly 47, nr 1 (2007): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200747157.

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Makin, Stephen. "Causality and derivativeness". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46 (marzec 2000): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100010377.

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This paper is a reflection on some of Elizabeth Anscombe's influential work on causation, in particular on some comments in her Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, published as ‘Causality and Determination’. One of Anscombe's major concerns in that paper is the relation between causation and necessitation, and she critically discusses the cast of mind which links causality with some kind of necessary connection or with exceptionless generalisation. In place of a semi-technical analysis of causation, Anscombe identifies the obvious and yet little considered core of the causal relation as follows:

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McCarthy, Christine. "Concrete passions: Anscombe's material politics". Architectural History Aotearoa 8 (1.01.2011): 20–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/aha.v8i.7097.

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Edmund Anscombe (1874-1948) was an advocate of concrete as a building material, especially in relation to housing. This paper examines Anscombe's promotion of concrete, with specific reference to his patented OK blocks in the 1920s, a time when he is better known for his work on the University of Otago campus, the 1925 New Zealand and South Seas Exhibition, and his move from Dunedin to Wellington in 1928.

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Hokari, Toru, i Masayuki Yao. "Eliciting Subjective Probabilities in Anscombe and Aumann's Model". International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 24, nr 03 (czerwiec 2016): 405–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218488516500203.

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In this note, we propose an alternative version of Anscombe and Aumann's Subjective Expected Utilities (SEU) representation theorem. In Anscombe and Aumann's model, a randomizing device with objective probabilities is available. As pointed out by Sarin and Wakker, when such a randomizing device is available, there is a natural and direct method to elicit subjective probabilities. Anscombe and Aumann did not use this method, but employed an indirect way to derive subjective probabilities. We investigate what happens if we use this direct method to elicit subjective probabilities in Anscombe and Aumann's model.

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Connell, Sophia. "Aristotle for the Modern Ethicist". Ancient Philosophy Today 1, nr 2 (październik 2019): 192–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/anph.2019.0015.

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Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley discussed Aristotle's ethics as an alternative to modern moral philosophy. This idea is best known from Anscombe's 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The mainstream response has been to design a normative theory of ‘virtue ethics’ to rival deontology and consequentialism. This essay argues that that response is inadequate; it misses Anscombe's point and obscures various aspects of Aristotle's ethics, in particular his emphasis on friendship and human interconnectedness. This element of Aristotelianism was favoured by Midgley. By returning to Midgley, with the support of Aristotle, it is possible to find an alternative modern Aristotelianism in ethics.

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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Anscombe"

Gallardo, Gómez Andrés. "Lenguaje, acción y virtud en G.E.M. Anscombe". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2018. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/170390.

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Tesis para optar al grado de Doctor en Filosofía
Esta tesis tiene por objeto contribuir a una interpretación de la obra de la filósofa inglesa G.E.M. Anscombe. Propondremos tres ideas-claves para sostener que hay una filosofía unitaria tras sus diversos y variados trabajos, a pesar de las dificultades señaladas por varios interpretes. La unidad de la filosofía de Anscombe está, en nuestra opinión, en una intención ética, una unidad metafísica, una unidad epistemológica y una concep-ción de la racionalidad que se sigue de ésta. Su intención ética es mostrar que la filoso-fía moderna no puede establecer que lo injusto es malo y esto hace que ella sea llevada a conclusiones desastrosas. Los problemas filosóficos son enfrentados desde una perspectiva próxima de la de Wittgenstein, en la que se pone atención al lenguaje, esta filosofía fundamental, aunque no fundacional, la llamaremos “metafísica”. Mostraremos como esta manera de tratar los problemas es una constante en toda la obra y que, además, tiene una conexión esencial con la manera de tratar los problemas filosóficos. Al aplicar este método al análisis de la acción aparecerá la especificidad del conoci-miento práctico como modo propio del ser humano en tanto que agente racional. Las excelencias de las capacidades psicológicas o antropológicas de este agente racional, es decir, sus “virtudes”, estarán en la base de la filosofía moral.

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Deng, Yunyan. "The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe : Virtue, Action, Language". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lille (2022-....), 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024ULILH024.

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Elizabeth Anscombe, une des grandes philosophes du vingtième siècle, a travaillé sur de nombreux sujets philosophiques. L'objectif de cette recherche est d'étudier sa philosophie morale, en particulier la manière dont elle est liée à ses travaux sur d'autres sujets. Cette recherche commence par les trois thèses présentées dans son article « Philosophie morale moderne », son article le plus connu en philosophie morale, en présentant d'abord que la discussion d'Anscombe sur la philosophie morale implique la théorie de l'action, la philosophie du langage, l'éthique de la vertu, etc. et en suggérant que sa philosophie morale devrait être étudiée dans le contexte historique dans lequel elle écrit. Après avoir présenté le cas de Truman, le conséquentialisme qui prévalait parmi ses contemporains, et ses amis pendant ses études et son travail à Oxford (chapitre 1), je discute de la manière dont les écrits d'Anscombe sur l'éthique de la vertu aristotélicienne (chapitre 2), la théorie de l'action (chapitre 3), et la philosophie du langage (chapitre 4) ont façonné différents points de vue de sa philosophie morale. Ensuite, j'examine le rôle de son article « philosophie morale moderne » en tant que renouveau contemporain de l'éthique de la vertu, afin de montrer que ni Anscombe ni ses disciples n'ont pris exclusivement Aristote comme ressource pour leur éthique, et que seuls les éthiciens qui se consacrent à expliquer comment les actions intentionnelles sont liées aux pensées sur le bien et le mal ont véritablement hérité des idées d'Anscombe. Enfin, je conclus que le travail d'Anscombe sur la philosophie morale ne forme pas un système, mais qu'il représente une perspective féminine de la philosophie (chapitre 5)
Elizabeth Anscombe, one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th Century, has worked on many topics in philosophy. The purpose of this work is to study her moral philosophy, especially how it relates to her work on other topics. This work starts with the three theses presented in her paper “Modern Moral Philosophy”, her most well-known paper in moral philosophy, first presenting that Anscombe's discussion of moral philosophy involves action theory, philosophy of language, virtue ethics, and so on, and suggesting that her moral philosophy should be studied in the historical context in which she writes. After introducing Truman's case, the consequentialism prevalent among her contemporaries, and her friends during her studies and work at Oxford (Chapter 1), I discuss how Anscombe's writings on Aristotelian virtue ethics (Chapter 2), action theory (Chapter 3), and philosophy of language (Chapter 4) shaped her moral philosophy from different perspectives. Then, I examine the role of “Modern Moral Philosophy” as a contemporary revival of virtue ethics, in order to show that neither Anscombe nor her followers have taken Aristotle exclusively as the resource for their ethics, and that only ethicists who devote themselves to explaining how intentional actions are linked to thoughts about good and bad have truly inherited Anscombe's ideas. At last, I conclude that Anscombe's work on moral philosophy does not form a system, but it represents a female perspective of doing philosophy (Chapter 5)

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Lagrut, Blandine. "Le réalisme moral d'Elizabeth Anscombe : une philosophie de l'intégrité". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lorraine, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024LORR0107.

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Pour Elizabeth Anscombe, tout effort de bonté est indissociablement une quête de vérité. La vigilance morale prend chez elle la forme d’un Daimôn rappelant à chacun la tâche d’examiner sa vie : « Peut-être que d’une manière que je ne vois pas, je me trompe désespérément sur une chose essentielle*. » Cette thèse défend l’idée qu’Anscombe élabore un type original de réalisme moral centré sur la notion d’intégrité et polarisé par une question : comment une personne parvient-elle à saisir, le plus rigoureusement possible, le sens et la gravité de ses actions ? Selon elle, trois conditions sont nécessaires afin d’évaluer correctement le poids de nos actes — elles donnent le plan de notre travail : on a besoin de savoir ce qu’on fait effectivement, on doit avoir une certaine idée des nécessités liées à sa nature d’humain et enfin, on doit reconnaître l’infinie valeur de cette nature.Pour savoir ce qu’elle fait, la personne doit pouvoir identifier les critères de « ce qui compte comme une description pertinente d’une action.» Or c’est précisément ce à quoi s’attèle Anscombe dans son étude de l’intention. Elle montre qu’il est possible d’isoler des types d’actions dont nous savons que, si nous la faisons intentionnellement, nous sommes dans le faux. La catégorie d’« acte intrinsèquement injuste » redevient disponible, offrant ainsi le point de départ d’une épistémologie morale réaliste.Pour être intègre, la personne a, par ailleurs, besoin de justifier ses évaluations en les fondant sur une compréhension approfondie de la forme de vie des humains. Là encore, Anscombe opère un déplacement majeur en donnant une nouvelle consistance au concept de nature humaine. Elle s’appuie sur l’idée que nous apprenons quelque chose sur la sorte d’être que sont les humains en dépliant la forme logique de leurs pratiques linguistiques. Sa méta-éthique gravite autour d’un axe souvent inaperçu, combinant le naturalisme d’Aristote et la grammaire logique de Wittgenstein.Enfin, une action ne sera vraie sur le plan moral qu’à la condition de manifester la valeur « mystique » de la nature humaine. La mise au jour de cet aspect constitue l’apport le plus novateur de cette thèse. L’étude approfondie des textes éthico-religieux permet de dégager le cœur de son anthropologie métaphysique : les humains sont non seulement des animaux rationnels, mais aussi des êtres spirituels, doués d’une dignité que nous pouvons connaître par « connaturalité » ou par « perception mystique ».L’exploration des différentes facettes du réalisme moral anscombéen permet, in fine, de préciser son rôle dans le débat éthique contemporain sur l’absolutisme. Certains actes sont-ils à refuser absolument, quoiqu’il en coûte du bien-être de la personne ou de la situation conséquente ? Pour Anscombe, la réponse est oui. Mais cela ne peut se faire ni au détriment du discernement personnel ni au prix d’une aliénation. Sa manière de concevoir l’humain permet de résoudre la tension en établissant que l’interdit n’a pas besoin d’être décrété par une autorité extérieure pour être absolu. Il peut s’imposer intérieurement à la personne, comme une évidence impérieuse, en raison de sa nature spirituelle.*G.E.M. Anscombe, « La philosophie morale moderne », traduit par G. Ginvert et P. Ducray, Klesis-Revue Philo-sophique. Actualité de la philosophie analytique, 2008, no 9, p. 25.Mots-clés : réalisme moral, intégrité, absolutisme, philosophie de l’action, épistémologie morale, méta-éthique, naturalisme, grammaire logique, perception mystique, connaturalité, anthropologie métaphysique, nature spirituelle
For Elizabeth Anscombe, every effort at goodness is also a quest for truth. Moral vigilance takes the form of a Daimôn reminding each person of the task of examining their life: ‘Perhaps in some way, I can’t see, I may be on a bad path, perhaps I am hopelessly wrong in some essential way*.’ This thesis argues that Anscombe is developing an original type of moral realism centred on the notion of integrity and polarised by one question: how does a person come to grasp, as rigorously as possible, the meaning and gravity of their actions? According to her, three conditions are necessary in order to correctly assess the weight of our actions – they provide the blueprint for our work: we need to know what we are actually doing, we need to have some idea of the necessities of our human nature and, finally, we need to recognise the infinite value of this nature.To know what they are doing, the person must be able to identify the criteria for ‘what counts as a relevant description of an action’. This is precisely what Anscombe sets out to do in her study of intention. She shows that it is possible to isolate types of action which we know that, if we do them intentionally, we are in the wrong. The category of "intrinsically unjust act" becomes available again, providing the starting point for a realist moral epistemology.The person also needs to justify their assessments by basing them on a thorough understanding of the human being. Here again, Anscombe makes a major shift by restoring consistency to the concept of human nature. She relies on the idea that we learn something about the kind of being that humans are by unfolding the logical form of their linguistic practices. Her meta-ethics revolves around an often-unnoticed axis, combining Aristotle’s naturalism and Wittgenstein’s logical grammar.Finally, an action will only be true on a moral level if it manifests the “mystical” value of human nature. Bringing this aspect to light is the most innovative contribution of this thesis. An in-depth study of the ethico-religious texts reveals the core of her metaphysical anthropology: humans are not only rational animals, but also spiritual beings, endowed with a dignity that we can know through “connaturality” or “mystical perception”.By exploring the various facets of Anscombean moral realism, we can ultimately clarify its role in the contemporary ethical debate on absolutism. Are certain acts to be rejected absolutely, whatever the cost to the well-being of the person or the consequent situation? For Anscombe, the answer is yes. But this cannot be done either at the expense of personal discernment or at the cost of alienation. Her way of conceiving the human makes it possible to resolve the tension by establishing that the prohibition does not need to be decreed by an external authority to be absolute. It can be imposed internally on the agent, as compelling evidence, due to their spiritual nature.*G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in Ethics, Religion and Politics, Collected Philosophical Pa-pers III, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, p. 37.Keywords: moral realism, integrity, absolutism, philosophy of action, moral epistemology, meta-ethics, naturalism, logical grammar, mystical perception, connaturality, metaphysical anthropology, spiritual nature

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Goldstein, Pierre. "La question de la moralité dans l'éthique néo-aristotélicienne depuis G.E.M. Anscombe". Thesis, Université Côte d'Azur (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017AZUR2038/document.

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L’éthique néo-aristotélicienne développée à la suite du programme proposé par G.E.M. Anscombe en 1958 exclut-elle la notion de moralité ? Anscombe contestait la pertinence de la notion de « devoir moral ». Cela implique-t-il que l’on doive, pour la suivre, renoncer à toute distinction entre le « moral » et le « non moral » ? La défense d’un absolutisme moral motivait les analyses d’Anscombe concernant « l’intention ». Les critiques du légalisme, du conséquentialisme ou du subjectivisme qui sont menées dans le sillage de « La philosophie morale moderne » par les principaux représentants de l’éthique néo-aristotélicienne – Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse ou Martha C. Nussbaum – répondent au même type de préoccupation. Les néo-aristotéliciens cherchent à opposer aux conceptions modernes de la rationalité morale l’idée d’une rationalité pratique homogène. Mais c’est pour montrer qu’elle est intrinsèquement liée à la vertu. Dans le même esprit, ils opposent à l’anti-naturalisme de la morale britannique du XXème siècle un naturalisme non réductionniste. Sous ces différents aspects, leur réflexion bénéficie des liens qu’elle renoue avec l’inspiration originelle de la méthode de la « psychologie » anscombienne. C’est ce qui permet à certains d’entre eux de poser les jalons d’une éthique fondée sur les notions de vertu et de bonheur, que celle-ci revendique ou non son appartenance à « l’éthique de la vertu ». A travers sa définition de « l’action humaine », cette éthique qui possède certains traits caractéristiques de l’éthique des Anciens, implique bien néanmoins une définition exigeante et originale de la moralité
Does neo-Aristotelian ethics, which was developed according to the programme by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, exclude the notion of morality? Anscombe challenged the relevance of the concept of ‘moral duty’. Does this imply that, to follow her programme, one must give up any distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’? The defence of moral absolutism motivated Anscombe's ‘intention’ analyses. Critics of legalism, consequentialism or the subjectivism that was conducted in the wake of ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ by the main representatives of neo-Aristotelian ethics—Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse and Martha C. Nussbaum—have responded to the same type of concern. The neo-Aristotelians, despite their disagreement on many points, seek to set the idea of a homogeneous practical rationality against modern conceptions of moral rationality; however, it is to show that rationality is intrinsically linked to virtue. In the same spirit, they set a non-reductionist naturalism against the anti-naturalist British ethics of the 20th century. Under these different aspects, their reflection benefits from a return to the original inspiration of Anscombe’s ‘psychology’ method. This return is also what allows some of them to lay the foundations for an ethical theory based on notions of virtue and happiness regardless of whether it claims to belong to ‘virtue ethics’ or not. Through its definition of ‘human action’, this ethical theory—which proposes to reconnect with certain characteristics of ancient ethics—implies, however, a demanding and original definition of morality

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Clot-Goudard, Rémi. "L'explication ordinaire des actions humaines. Recherches sur l'intention pratique et la grammaire des concepts psychologiques : recherches sur l'intention pratique et la grammaire des concepts psychologiques". Thesis, Grenoble, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENP001.

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Ce travail a pour objectif d'éclaircir, par la voie d'une enquête sur le langage de l'action intentionnelle et la grammaire des concepts psychologiques, la nature de notre capacité ordinaire à assigner un sens aux actions humaines et les conditions de son exercice. À l'heure actuelle, les débats sont dominés par une conception causaliste de l'action et de son explication qui innerve des problèmes tels que celui de la causalité mentale, de la réalité des états mentaux ou du statut de la « psychologie populaire ». Le causalisme pose que la différence entre une action et un simple mouvement corporel tient au fait que la première est causée par certains antécédents mentaux, distincts du mouvement, qui rendent compte de son caractère intentionnel. Expliquer une action consisterait dès lors à donner des raisons référant à ces états. Renouant avec l'approche logico-grammaticale issue de Wittgenstein et développée par Anscombe, nous entendons montrer que cette conception est erronée. Son principal défaut est de succomber à une image mentaliste selon laquelle les prédicats psychologiques utilisés dans les explications ordinaires ont toujours pour fonction de dénoter des états, des processus ou des événements internes à l'agent, distincts de l'action et pouvant entrer dans des chaînes causales. Contre cela, nous voulons établir que la différence entre action et mouvement corporel est une différence entre deux modes de description. Le mode intentionnel dans lequel se disent les actions se caractérise de façon essentielle par l'asymétrie de la première et de la troisième personnes. Expliquer une action consiste à en donner une description qui l'identifie dans sa dimension téléologique. Notre démarche est la suivante. Le premier mouvement de notre étude est consacré à la clarification des liens conceptuels entre intention et action. Après avoir rappelé les origines modernes de la conception causaliste, nous critiquons les arguments proposés par Davidson en sa faveur. Récusant leur mentalisme sous-jacent, nous montrons que le caractère intentionnel d'une action ne dépend pas de la présence d'un « ingrédient » mental. Puis nous rendons compte de la force explicative des descriptions intentionnelles en les mettant en rapport avec la spécificité du raisonnement pratique et de la connaissance d'agent. Dans un second mouvement, nous revenons sur la nature de la capacité à formuler des jugements psychologiques au sujet d'autrui. Nous examinons successivement la thèse selon laquelle les agents possèdent une théorie de l'esprit et celle selon laquelle ils recourent à un principe de charité interprétative. Contre ces approches intellectualistes, nous soutenons que l'usage sensé des termes psychologiques est un savoir-faire qui doit être mis en relation avec l'expressivité naturelle du corps humain, la dimension intrinsèquement sociale et institutionnelle de la vie humaine et l'existence de formes d'action et d'expression partagées faisant autorité. Reconnaître les conditions actionnelles de l'intelligibilité d'autrui exige de se défaire de l'illusion moderne d'un « sujet désengagé »
My objective is to elucidate, by means of a grammatical inquiry into the language of intentional action and the use of psychological concepts, the nature of our ordinary capacity to make sense of human actions, as well as the conditions of its exercise. In contemporary debates prevails a causalist view of action and its explanation, which underlies the discussions about mental causation, the reality of mental states or the epistemic status of so-called folk psychology. Causalism holds that an action differs from a mere bodily movement by its being caused by some mental antecedents, distinct from movement, which account for its intentional character. Explaining an action would thus consist in giving reasons ultimately referring to those states. In line with the wittgensteinian logico-grammatical approach developed by Anscombe, I intend to show that this view is misconceived. Its main defect lies in its mentalism, i.e. the tendency to see psychological predicates as always functioning to denote internal episodes or events, distinct from action and liable to figure in causal chains as links bringing about the agent's behaviour. Against this, I want to establish that the distinction between action and mere movement is to be seen as a difference between two modes of description. The intentional mode in which are couched action descriptions is essentially characterized by the first/third-person asymmetry. Explaining an action consists in identifying it by a description exhibiting its teleological features. My plan is the following. The first main move is to clarify the conceptual relations between intention and action. Having brought to light the modern roots of causalism, I consider the arguments Davidson put forward in its favour, so as to refute their underlying mentalism. I show that for an action, being intentional does not depend on any occurrence of a separate mental component. Then I proceed to account for the explanatory force of intentional descriptions by relating them to the specificity of practical reasoning and agent knowledge. The second main move tackles the question to know what the capacity of making sense of others consists in. I successively consider the idea that agents possess a theory of mind and the thesis as to which they must rely on a principle of interpretative charity. Against those intellectualist views, I claim that sensible use of psychological concepts is a practical skill which is to be related to the sensibility to the natural expressivity of human body, the intrinsically social and institutional features of human life and the existence of shared standards of expression and action. Acknowledging the action-based conditions of others' intelligibility requires to dispose of the modern illusion of a « disengaged subject »

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Aucouturier, Valérie. ""En termes de langage" : l'articulation entre intention , action et langage dans l'oeuvre de G.E.M. Anscombe". Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010669.

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Ce travail aborde la philosophie de I'action d'E. Anscombe depuis la perspective du langage. Une thèse centrale de celle-ci est qu'une action est toujours envisagée sous une description dont l'action intentionnelle serait une des formes majeures. L'action serait indissociable du langage en tant que produit d'une pratique linguistique particulière consistant notamment à fournir des raisons d'agir. L'ancrage linguistique de I'action suggère I'impossibilité d'expliquer I'action en dehors des catégories de langage qui lui sont propres. Nous défendons cette approche à I'encontre des conceptions de l'action visant à sa naturalisation. Notre propos s'appuie sur I'idée de la possibilité de défendre une conception dite « extemaliste» des intentions qui ne les réduit pas a une donnée introspective invérifiable. Nous articulons deux idées: Ie caractère essentiellement linguistique de l'action et sa dépendance à une réalité extralinguistique, à laquelle on ne peut cependant la réduire.

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Milliken, John Robert. "The Authority of Morality". Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1181165177.

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Aucouturier, Valerie. ""In terms of language" : the articulation between intention, action and language in the work og GEM Anscombe". Thesis, University of Kent, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.520867.

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Borges, Lucas Rodrigues. "Método de simulação da redução da dose de radiação na mamografia digital a partir da análise das características do ruído dos equipamentos mamográficos". Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18152/tde-24082015-074834/.

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Este trabalho tem como objetivo o desenvolvimento de um novo método para a simulação de redução da dose de radiação em imagens mamográficas clínicas. Assim, estudos sobre a influência da redução da dose de radiação no diagnóstico do câncer de mama podem ser realizados sem que o paciente se exponha a doses extras de radiação. Uma análise preliminar foi realizada para a caracterização do ruído produzido pelo equipamento mamográfico no processo de aquisição da imagem. Essa análise evidenciou a importância de um método local de simulação, uma vez que o ruído depende da posição ao longo do campo. O novo método proposto consiste em ajustar os níveis de cinza e adicionar uma máscara de ruído Poisson, dependente do sinal, nas imagens clínicas adquiridas com a dose de radiação padrão, simulando sua aquisição com doses de radiação reduzidas. A dependência entre ruído e sinal foi criada com o uso da transformada de Anscombe. O desempenho do método proposto foi avaliado utilizando-se imagens mamográficas de um phantom antropomórfico obtidas com diferentes doses de radiação. As imagens simuladas pelo método proposto foram comparadas com as imagens reais. A similaridade entre os espectros de ruído permitiu a comparação de métricas locais da imagem. O erro percentual entre os níveis de cinza das imagens reais e simuladas se manteve inferior a 1%. O ruído adicionado manteve um erro percentual inferior a 1%. Testes de t-Student mostraram que não existe diferença estatística significante (p < 0,05) entre as imagens reais e simuladas pelo método proposto.
This work aims to develop a new method for simulating reduction of the radiation dose in clinical digital mammography. Using such method, studies regarding the influence of dose reduction in cancer diagnosis can be performed without unnecessary exposure of patients to X-ray radiation. A preliminary study characterized the noise produced by the digital mammography equipment during the acquisition process. This analysis emphasized the importance of simulating noise locally, since noise is dependent on the spatial position of the pixel. Therefore, the proposed method consists of adjusting the gray levels and adding signal-dependent Poisson noise to images acquired at the standard radiation dose. Dependency between noise and signal was created using the Anscombe transformation. The performance of the proposed method was evaluated using mammographic images of an anthropomorphic phantom acquired at different radiation doses. Images simulated using the proposed method were compared to real images acquired using the clinical equipment. Similarity between noise power spectra and local metrics validated the similarity between images. The gray level of the simulated and real images were compared using local mean and reported averaged errors smaller than 1%. The added noise was also compared and the averaged error was smaller than 1%. Statistical Student\'s t-test tests showed no statistical difference (p < 0.05) between real images and the ones simulated using the proposed method.

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Tontiplaphol, Don. "Hunting for Happiness: Aristotle and the Good of Action". Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11307.

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The starting point of the dissertation is a special kind of intentional action -- Aristotelian praxis, or, in a more metaphysical register, energeia -- a kind whose agent's intention in acting must be expressible as the deliverance of one's prohairesis (``deliberate choice''), action that is the embodiment of one's conception of eupraxia (``acting well''), and, equivalently, of eudaimonia (``happiness''). It is special, since not all that we intentionally do can be intelligibly expressed as the deliverance of our conceptions of acting well. Recognition of the gaps between action in general and intentional action more specifically, and between intentional action and prohairetic action, sets the stage for a reinterpretation, not only of core aspects of Aristotle's Ethics, but also of central features of Aristotle's political recommendations. The interpretation defended here centers on the claim that, for Aristotle, defective political communities are often marked, not so much by an erroneous conception of human virtue, but by defective forms of action, forms in which agents fail to apply certain concepts to what they do. Importantly, such failures do not hang on the different failure to apply concepts correctly: the failure to act prohairetically need not come to the failure to grasp the correct conception of human virtue or of human happiness.
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Książki na temat "Anscombe"

Richter, Duncan. Ethics after Anscombe. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5.

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Richter, Duncan. Ethics after Anscombe: Post "Modern moral philosophy". Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2000.

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1967-, Mercado Juan Andrés, red. Elizabeth Anscombe e il rinnovamento della psicologia morale. Roma: Armando, 2010.

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Rayappan, Pathiaraj. Intention in action: The philosophy of G.E.M. Anscombe. Bern: Peter Lang, 2010.

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Torralba, José María. Acción intencional y razonamiento práctico según G.E.M. Anscombe. Pamplona: EUNSA, Editorial Universidad Navarra, S.A., 2005.

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Mary, Geach, i Gormally Luke, red. Human life, action and ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2005.

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Carli, Eddy. Mente e azione: Un'indagine nella filosofia analitica : Wittgenstein, Anscombe, von Wright, Davidson. Padova: Il poligrafo, 2003.

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1916-, Geach P. T., Anscombe G. E. M i Gormally Luke, red. Moral truth and moral tradition: Essays in honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe. Blackrock, Co. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994.

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Haddock, Adrian, i Rachael Wiseman. The Anscombean Mind. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429198601.

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Ford, Anton, Jennifer Hornsby i Frederick Stoutland, red. Essays on Anscombe's "Intention". Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674060913.

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Części książek na temat "Anscombe"

Teichmann, Roger. "Anscombe". W A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, 606–12. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444323528.ch74.

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Garrett, Brian, i Jeremiah Joven Joaquin. "Anscombe on ‘I’". W Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics, 163–67. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85517-8_22.

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Richter, Duncan. "The Incoherence of the Moral ‘Ought’". W Ethics after Anscombe, 1–18. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_1.

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Richter, Duncan. "Is Moral Philosophy Possible?" W Ethics after Anscombe, 19–34. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_2.

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Richter, Duncan. "How to do Moral Philosophy". W Ethics after Anscombe, 35–56. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_3.

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Richter, Duncan. "How to do Moral Philosophy". W Ethics after Anscombe, 57–75. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_4.

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Richter, Duncan. "The Ethics of Suicide". W Ethics after Anscombe, 76–96. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_5.

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Richter, Duncan. "Persons, Babies and Martians". W Ethics after Anscombe, 97–124. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_6.

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Richter, Duncan. "Does Meat Mean Murder?" W Ethics after Anscombe, 125–45. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_7.

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Richter, Duncan. "Conclusion". W Ethics after Anscombe, 146–62. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1478-5_8.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "Anscombe"

Wang, Yulan, Peng Wang, Xiwang Zhang, Jue Wang i Matthieu Muller. "Poissonian Hyperspectral Image Denoising without Using Anscombe Transform". W IGARSS 2023 - 2023 IEEE International Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium. IEEE, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/igarss52108.2023.10282110.

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Bohra, Pakshal, i Ajit Rajwade. "POISSON LOW-RANK MATRIX RECOVERY USING THE ANSCOMBE TRANSFORM". W 2018 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/globalsip.2018.8646370.

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Góes, Daniel A., i Nelson D. A. Mascarenhas. "Low-Dose Computed Tomography Filtering Using Geodesic Distances". W Conference on Graphics, Patterns and Images. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/sibgrapi.est.2020.12983.

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Due to the concerns related to patient exposure to X-ray, the dosage used in computed tomography must be reduced (Low-dose Computed Tomography - LDCT). One of the effects of LDCT is the degradation in the quality of the final reconstructed image. In this work, we propose a method of filtering LDCT sinograms that are subject to signal-dependent Poisson noise. To filter this type of noise, we use a Bayesian approach, changing the Non-local Means (NLM) algorithm to use geodesic stochastic distances for Gamma distribution, the conjugate prior to Poisson, as a similarity metric between each projection point. Among the geodesic distances evaluated, we found a closed solution for the Shannon entropy for Gamma distributions. We compare our method with the following methods based on NLM: PoissonNLM, Stochastic Poisson NLM, Stochastic Gamma NLM and the original NLM after Anscombe transform. We also compare with BM3D after Anscombe transform. Comparisons are made on the final images reconstructed by the Filtered-Back Projection (FBP) and Projection onto Convex Sets (POCS) methods using the metrics PSNR and SSIM.

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Tepper, Mariano, Andrea Giovannucci i Eftychios Pnevmatikakis. "Anscombe Meets Hough: Noise Variance Stablization Via Parametric Model Estimation". W ICASSP 2018 - 2018 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icassp.2018.8461938.

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Thanh, Le Thi, i Dang N. H. Thanh. "Medical Images Denoising Method Based on Total Variation Regularization and Anscombe Transform". W 2019 19th International Symposium on Communications and Information Technologies (ISCIT). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iscit.2019.8905207.

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Jenifa, R., T. Latha i C. Helen Sulochana. "Image restoration using modified Anscombe transform and non linear multiresolution median transform". W 2015 Global Conference on Communication Technologies (GCCT). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/gcct.2015.7342640.

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Makitalo, Markku, i Alessandro Foi. "On the inversion of the Anscombe transformation in low-count Poisson image denoising". W 2009 International Workshop on Local and Non-Local Approximation in Image Processing (LNLA 2009). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/lnla.2009.5278406.

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Tang, Joseph S., i James R. Fienup. "Integrating bias and gain invariance with the generalized Anscombe transform for wavefront sensing". W Space Telescopes and Instrumentation 2020: Optical, Infrared, and Millimeter Wave, redaktorzy Makenzie Lystrup, Natalie Batalha, Edward C. Tong, Nicholas Siegler i Marshall D. Perrin. SPIE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.2562416.

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Makitalo, Markku, i Alessandro Foi. "Poisson-gaussian denoising using the exact unbiased inverse of the generalized anscombe transformation". W ICASSP 2012 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icassp.2012.6288074.

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Tang, Joseph S., i James R. Fienup. "Improving accuracy of phase retrieval with mixed Poisson-Gaussian noise using the generalized Anscombe transform". W Computational Optical Sensing and Imaging. Washington, D.C.: OSA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/cosi.2020.cf2c.4.

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